Preferred Citation: Sepper, Dennis L. Descartes's Imagination: Proportion, Images, and the Activity of Thinking.

Berkeley: University of California Press, c1996 1996. http: ark.cdli!.or" ark: 1#$#$ ft$d%n99fd

Descartes's Imagination
Proportion, Images, and the Activity of Thinking Dennis L. Sepper
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

Berkeley Los Angeles Oxford

!""# T$e Regents o% t$e Uni&ersit' o% Ca(i%ornia

&o 'athleen

Preferred Citation: Sepper, Dennis L. Descartes's Imagination: Proportion, Images, and the Activity of Thinking. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1996 1996. http: ark.cdli!.or" ark: 1#$#$ ft$d%n99fd

&o 'athleen ( )i (

PREFACE AND AC)NO*LED+,ENTS

&he tr*th cannot force its +ay in +hen so,ethin" else is occ*pyin" its place. &o convince so,eone of the tr*th, it is not eno*"h to state it, !*t one ,*st find the path fro, error to tr*th. -LUD./0 ./&&012S&1/2 / have a 3*ite precise ,e,ory of +hen and +here this pro4ect !e"an. /n the sprin" of 195# / +as atte,ptin" to reconcile the Rules for the Direction of the ind +ith a rather conventional acco*nt of Descartes6s philosophy for a "ro*p of "rad*ate st*dents. Unfort*nately / +as faced !y passa"e after passa"e that did not fit the convention. &he first fe+ interpretive so*rces / t*rned to provided only a little help, hardly ,ore than a sharper foc*s. / reali7ed that +hen opport*nity arose, / +o*ld have to di" ,ore deeply into the ori"inal te)t and the secondary literat*re. B*t teachin" and other research kept ,e occ*pied *ntil the s*,,er of 1956, +hen ,y +ife and / had the chance to participate in 8ar4orie 0rene6s 2ational 1ndo+,ent for the 9*,anities :219; se,inar on Descartes at Cornell University, in

/thaca, 2e+ <ork. / still re,e,!er the first ti,e / tried to e)plain to 8ar4orie ,y inklin"s a!o*t Descartes6s i,a"ination= she e)clai,ed that that co*ldn6t !e fi"ht, !*t +e :she and / and another ,e,!er of the se,inar; +ent i,,ediately to the Latin te)t of >*le 1? and confir,ed that at least a fe+ of the inklin"s +ere +ell fo*nded. @ s*,,er of research convinced ,e that / had co,e *pon so,ethin" of "en*ine !*t ne"lected i,portance in Descartes. 8ore da*ntin", it also ,ade ,e reco"ni7e that e)plorin" and artic*latin" the !ack"ro*nd to Descartes6s *se of i,a"ination +o*ld de,and an investi"ation of ,edieval and >enaissance so*rces +ith +hich / +as little fa,iliar. &hat investi"ation, *ndertaken in the acade,ic year 1955A1959 +ith the s*pport of a fello+ship +ith the /nstit*te for >esearch in the 9*,anities of the University of .isconsin, 8adison, *ncovered for ,e the fiches of an old philosophical psycholo"y that had defined specific roles for i,a"ination-in ,editation, in the practice of ,e,ory, in poetic invention, in ,athe,atics, indeed in all co"nition. Unfort*nately / have !een a!le to incorporate only a fraction of those ( )ii ( riches into this !ook. So,e of ,y historical e)c*rsions are *ndo*!tedly oversi,plified, in part !eca*se of the de,ands of !revity, in part, / fear, !eca*se of ,y i"norance. &here are ,any places +here interested readers +ill +ish for f*rther detail that / do not "ive. &hose +ho are historically interested ,ay !e i,patient +ith so,e of the philosophical e)c*rsions= and the philosophically inclined ,ay find ,ore history than is to their likin". @ll the errors, of co*rse, are ,y o+n: / can only offer apolo"ies in advance for not ,akin" the !ook !etter than it is. 2evertheless, if / +ere to ,ake an apolo"ia for it, / +o*ld !e"in !y callin" attention to the +ords of .itt"enstein 3*oted a!ove. 2o philosopher of the ,odern era has !een, and contin*es to !e, ,ore ,ytholo"i7ed than Descartes. Bne reason is that Descartes hi,self !e"an the process +ith his Ca*to!io"raphyC in the Discourse on the ethod for !onducting "ne's Reason #ell and $inding Truth in the %ciences. Dirt*ally everyone since has follo+ed Descartes6s e)a,ple, if only !y readin" hi, teleolo"ically, that is, +ith the e)pectation that in everythin" he +rote he +as al+ays destined to !e the Descartes of the Discourse, the editations, and the Principia. &his is the CerrorC that holds the field and fro, +hich one ,*st co,,ence the 4o*rney= at the very least it is an o!stacle to *nderstandin" Descartes6s +ritin"s prior to 16#E. .hat / have therefore tried to do in this !ook is to trace a path fro, i,a"ination as it is fo*nd in the CcanonicalC Descartes to +hat / !elieve is the deeper tr*th, that his scientific and philosophical interests !e"an +ith the po+ers of the i,a"ination. &his ori"in not only reveals an ori"inatin" i,p*lse, it also lar"ely e)plains the co*rse of his researches and "ives cl*es to ho+ +e sho*ld read :and ho+ +e often ,isread; the +ritin"s of his ,at*rity. &he !ook is artic*lated as follo+s. /n the introd*ction / disc*ss i,pressions that so,eone fa,iliar +ith Descartes is likely to have a!o*t the role of i,a"ination in his tho*"ht, then offer si"ns of a 3*ite radically different assess,ent of i,a"ination fro, one of his earliest note!ooks. Part / sketches the !ack"ro*nd of ancient and ,edieval theories of i,a"ination as a sensitive po+er of the so*l +ith a deter,inate role in the process of kno+in"= it then t*rns to Descartes6s adaptation of this tradition in his early theory of an analo"ical and proportionali7in", cognitive i,a"ination. Part // proceeds to e)a,ine the Regulae ad directionem ingenii, in +hich a physiolo"ically !ased psycholo"y of kno+in" ela!orated and deepened the conception of co"nitive i,a"ination !*t also !e"an to create rifts !et+een the corporeal and intellect*al real,s. Part /// then attends to the ,ore li,ited !*t nevertheless still i,portant roles that i,a"ination played in the +ritin"s that follo+ed Descartes6s a!andon,ent of the Regulae, fro, &e onde :&he .orld, !e"*n aro*nd 16#$; to the Passions of the %oul :p*!lished in 16F9;. Gor altho*"h in these +orks Descartes sharply restricted its co"nitive !earin", i,a"ination nevertheless re,ained essential for physA

( )iii ( ics and ,athe,atics, it took on !asic f*nctions in "*idin" the h*,an passions, and it served analo"ically as a ,odel for thinkin" and ideas in his ,at*re philosophy. &he st*dy ends +ith a reflection on so,e i,plications of this atte,pt to reconceive Descartes and his philosophical i,portance. / do not pretend that this is the definitive interpretation of i,a"ination in Descartes, !*t / do hope that it helps reorient o*r conception of the pheno,ena in p*rs*it of +hich Descartes !eca,e a philosopher. 8y "*idin" intention, at any rate, has !een philosophical: to rea+aken o*r sense for a deep and +idely ran"in" ,ental e)perience that has !een lar"ely for"otten +itho*t ever !ein" invalidated or conf*ted. @ +ord a!o*t translation: &he availa!le translations of Descartes into 1n"lish all have their virt*es, !*t there is none that s*fficiently ,arks distinctions of psycholo"ical ter,s, especially those in Latin. &h*s / have "iven ,y o+n renderin"s of all the Descartes and of ,ost of the Latin ite,s / have 3*oted. / have tried to !e as literal and consistent as possi!le, pro!a!ly errin" over,*ch on the side of choosin" co"nates to render the ori"inal ter,s. /n translatin" the Latin, / have as ,*ch as possi!le kept to the ori"inal artic*lation of phrases, cla*ses, and sentences. &he res*lt is often stiff= !*t !etter a stiffness that ca*ses *s to p*ll *p in s*rprise fro, ti,e to ti,e than a fl*idity that s,ooths over i,portant distinctions. / o+e 8ar4orie 0rene a deep de!t of "ratit*de= her 219 se,inar +as the place +here this pro4ect +as "iven first shape and na,e, and even her criticis,s and do*!ts have !een a s*pport. 8any thanks to David Lind!er", Pa*l Boyer, and all the fac*lty and fello+s of the /nstit*te for >esearch in the 9*,anities of the University of .isconsin, 8adison, +ith a very special thankAyo* to Loretta Greilin", +ho keeps thin"s "oin". &he instit*te ena!led ,e to spend the acade,ic year 1955A1959 ha,,erin" o*t the first draft of this !ook= the instit*te6s doors +ere opened to ,e a"ain in the s*,,er of 199#, +hich sa+ the co,pletion of the pen*lti,ate draft that fo*nd its +ay a fe+ ,onths later to the University of California Press. @ heartfelt thanks to 1d+ard Di,end!er" of the Press for his pro,ptness, enco*ra"e,ent, and professionalis,= ,ay every a*thor find s*ch an editorH &hanks as +ell to Stephanie 1,erson, for helpin" ,e navi"ate the ,an*script thro*"h the voya"e of preprod*ction= to >e!ecca Gra7ier, for "*idin" it in prod*ction= and to Sheila Ber", for her care and sensitivity in editin". Barney >icca once a"ain saved ,e fro, havin" to learn to pro"ra, in Postscript= / thank hi, for the *se of his e)pertise and for his s+iftness in prod*cin" the fi"*res / +anted. &here are literally do7ens of li!rarians +hose help has !een inval*a!le to ,e, in partic*lar at Cornell University, the University of .isconsin :8adison and 8il+a*kee;, the University of Glorida :0alnesville;, the University ( )iv ( of &e)as :@*stin and Dallas;, the University of Bklaho,a :2or,an;, and the University of Dallas. 8y very special thanks "oes to 8rs. @lice P*ro, the /nterli!rary Loan Li!rarian of the University of Dallas, +ho al+ays has ti,e for a s,ile and a 3*ick check of BCLC, re"ardless of ho+ ,any re3*ests have flooded her desk. / +ish to e)press ,y "ratit*de to the editors of the 'ournal of the (istory of Philosophy for allo+in" the *se of passa"es fro, ,y article CDescartes and the 1clipse of /,a"ination, 1615A16#$,C +hich first

appeared in that 4o*rnal= and to B)ford University Press for the *se of portions of CIngenium, 8e,ory @rt, and the Unity of /,a"inative 'no+in" in the 1arly Descartes.C :1)cerpted fro, )ssays on the Philosophy and %cience of Ren* Descartes, edited !y Stephen Doss. Copyri"ht I 199# !y B)ford University Press, /nc. >eprinted !y per,ission.; &o the *nder"rad*ate ,a4ors and "rad*ate st*dents of the University of Dallas +ho have !een the a*dience, so,eti,es captive, often eno*"h +illin", for !oth prepared and spontaneo*s e)positions of Descartes, / +ant to say: yo*r interest and 3*estions helped s*stain this +ork= no+ yo* can see ho+ the +hole ar"*,ent "oes. &he end"a,e of this !ook, the finishin" of it, has as *s*al !ro*"ht a litAtie cra7iness into fa,ily life. / +ant to thank ,y children, 1li7a!eth and 8atthe+, for p*ttin" *p +ith ,y fitf*l fren7ies. 8y +ife, 'athleen, has seen this all !efore and kno+s that it is likely to happen a"ain. She, a real historian, ind*l"es ,y occasional pretensions to historical ac*,en. / can thank her for that= !*t for her love, / a, si,ply, deeply, lovin"ly "ratef*l. ( )v (

A--REVIATIONS AND CONVENTIONS

&he follo+in" a!!reviations are *sed for the ,ost often cited +orks. @J Regulae ad directionem ingenii , as printed in the 1E$1 Latin edition of var1io*s +orks !y Descartes: >. Des+!artes "puscula posthuma, physica , mathematica. @,sterda,: P. and K. Blae*, 1E$1. "euvres de Descartes .1dited !y Charles @da, and Pa*l &annery. 1? vols. Paris: Cerf, 159EA191#. >ev. ed. 11 vols. Paris: Drin, 196FA19EF. :&he ori"inal edition6s t+elfth vol*,e is a !io"raphy of Descartes !y Charles @da,.; &e)t references +ill take the for, C@& L #5EA#55,C ,eanin" pa"es #5EA#55 of vol*,e 1$. &he pa"ination of the t+o editions is the sa,e, e)cept for ,atter added at the end of the vol*,es in the second edition. Dol*,es D/// and /L are divided into s*!vol*,es that +ill !e indicated as D//L@, D///B, /L@, and /LB. The Philosophical #ritings of Descartes. # vols. &ranslated !y Kohn Cottin"ha,, >o!ert Stoothoff, D*"ald 8*rdoch, and @nthony 'enny. Ca,!rid"e: Ca,!rid"e University Press, 195FA1991. Regulae ad directionem ingenii, in the Latin 8S copy ordered !y Lei!ni7, discovered in the 15%$s in 9anover in the 'Mni"liche Nffentliche Bi!liothek !y Go*cher de Careil. Regulae ad directionem ingenii, in the D*tch translation of 165F: >. Descartes -rieven, Derde Deel, .effens een nette /erhandeling van het &icht. &ranslated into D*tch !y K. 9. 0la7e,aker. @,sterda,: Kan >ie*+erts7, 165F.

@& J

CS8 J

9J

2J

( )vi ( / have *sed the 1n"lish for, of rifles for the fo*r ,a4or +orks of Descartes that +ere p*!lished d*rin" his lifeti,e: th*s it is the Discourse on the ethod, the editations on $irst Philosophy, the Principles of Philosophy, and the Passions of the %oul. &he sa,e holds for the three scientific essays that acco,panied the Discourse, the Dioptrics, the eteorology, and the 0eometry. Gor other +orks / *se the Latin or the Grench, for e)a,ple the Regulae and &e onde. / have avoided *sin" CCartesianC as an ad4ective characteri7in" Descartes, his +orks, or his philosophy. .here it occ*rs, it si"nifies his follo+ers or the philosophy that is characteristic of the,. 1)cept +here noted, all the translations fro, Latin and Grench are ,y o+n. / have striven for literalis, rather than s,oothness. S3*are !rackets are *sed in translated passa"es in the follo+in" +ays: O+ord or phraseP indicates, +here the +ord or phrase is 1n"lish, that it can !e read in contin*ity +ith the s*rro*ndin" te)t. 8ost typically the +ord or phrase is the no*n antecedent that ,*st !e constr*ed +ith the ad4ective or prono,inal ad4ective precedin" it= or it is a relatively *nApro!le,atic interpolation that ,akes for a clearer artic*lation of ,eanin". .here the +ord or phrase is Latin or Grench, / a, identifyin" the ori"inal of +hat has 4*st !een translated. OJ +ord or phraseP indicates the antecedent or ,eanin" of the precedin" ter,, *s*ally a prono*n, +hen it cannot !e read in contin*ity +ith the s*rro*ndin" te)t. Oor +ord or phraseP indicates that the +ord or phrase is a possi!le alternative translation of +hat i,,ediately precedes. Oi.e., phrase or cla*seP indicates ,y interpolated e)planation of +hat i,,ediately precedes or its conte)t. (1(

Intro./ction Descartes an. t$e Imagination

/ consider that this po+er of i,a"inin" +hich is in ,e, inas,*ch as it differs fro, the force of *nderstandin", is not re3*ired for the essence of ,yself, that is, of ,y ,ind. Gor altho*"h it +ere a!sent fro, ,e, +itho*t do*!t / +o*ld none the less re,ain the sa,e thin" that / no+ a,= fro, +hich there see,s to follo+ that this Opo+erP depends on so,ethin" different fro, ,e. @nd / easily *nderstand that, if so,e !ody e)ists to +hich the ,ind is so 4oined that it OJthe ,indP ,i"ht apply itself to :as it +ere; inspectin" that O!odyP at +ill, then it co*ld happen that thro*"h this O!odyP itself / ,i"ht i,a"ine corporeal thin"s= so that this ,ode of thinkin" ,i"ht differ fro, p*re *nderstandin" only in this, that the ,ind, +hile it is *nderstandin"= t*rnsO1P in so,e +ay to+ard its very self and re"ards one of the ideas that are +ithin itself= +hile it is i,a"inin"= ho+ever, it t*rns itself to+ard a !ody, and looks into Oor int*itsP so,ethin" in this O!odyP in confor,ance +ith an idea *nderstood !y itself or perceived !y sense. -81D/&@&/B2 6, @& D// E#

A. T0E 1UESTION
>eaders of the editations on $irst Philosophy kno+ that the i,a"ination fails to !rin" *s to the tr*th, +hether a!o*t o*rselves as thinkin" thin"s or a!o*t the +orld as e)tended ,atter. /,a"ination !y its nat*re has as o!4ect +hat is not really Cthere,C and in drea,s and hall*cinations it takes appearances for reality. <et even as the ,editator sees it fall short of tr*th, i,a"ination nevertheless serves as a vehicle a!le to traverse part of the +ay to +hat is fir, and *nshaka!le. /n the Girst 8editation6s search for tr*th, that is, for an appearance that acc*rately corresponds to the *nderlyin" reality, i,a"ination co,po*nds the *ncertainties the ,editator discovers in sensation. @ltho*"h sensation can sometimes !e proved *nrelia!le, the i,a"ination, in the hall*cinations of ,ad,en and the drea,s of every,an, prod*ces appearances that are virt*ally "*aranteed not to have any correspondin" reality. /,a"ination6s po+er of fei"nin" reality t*rns o*t to !e ,ethodolo"ically fr*itf*l, ho+ever, O1P 6&*rn,6 here and a fe+ lines farther do+n, renders convertat, +hich, alon" +ith the no*n for, conversio, is the standard ter, in Scholastic Latin for the t*rnin" to+ard phantas,s that +as necessary for tho*"ht. See chapter t for the si"nificance of this. (?( as the ,editator p*rs*es the tho*"ht that she ,i"ht !e drea,in" and then considers the conse3*ences. @ltho*"h i,a"inin" prod*ces possi!ilities rather than certainties, it leads the ,editator to a !rilliant fictional device: the de,on +ho devotes all his force and c*nnin" to deceivin" the ,editator, al+ays and every+here. &he device !rin"s the ,editator to the threshold of the first certainty, the Cco"ito, s*,.C /t is not tr*e that i,a"ination perceives this tr*th, !*t it does prepare the +ay. /n the Si)th 8editation, i,a"ination once a"ain plays a preparatory role. @fter the Gifth 8editation pers*ades the ,editator of the tr*th of ,athe,atics, 0od6s e)istence, and the relia!ility of ,e,ory :+hen it recalls +hat has already !een kno+n clearly and distinctly;, the ,editator ret*rns to the 3*estion of the Girst 8editation, +hether there is an e)tended, ,aterial +orld correspondin" to ordinary sense e)perience. /,a"ination co,es close to esta!lishin" the e)istence of !odies, !*t only as a possi!ility, not as reality. &he proof of the e)istence of the corporeal real, re3*ires instead a rene+ed e)a,ination of the testi,ony of the senses, *nderstood no+ in the li"ht of the first tr*ths of ,etaphysics. &h*s !oth in the descent into do*!t and in the reascent to a kno+led"e of the e)tended +orld the i,a"ination plays an inter,ediate role !et+een the senses and the intellect. @ltho*"h co"nitively +eak, it is fr*itf*l in "eneratin" possi!ilities, and +hen ri"oro*sly p*t to ,ethodolo"ical p*rpose it points the ,editator in the ri"ht direction. Gro, the editations the i,a"ination appears to have the character of a ,iddlin" po+er. /t ,arks o*t an e)perience that rese,!les sensation !*t also e)hi!its a freedo, fro, the senses, yet this is not s*fficient to esta!lish that e)perience as sec*re eno*"h to satisfy intellect. &here is a ,akin" to i,a"ination, !*t it is not eno*"h to ,ake a reality= it can lead one closer to the tr*th, !*t it is incapa!le of kno+in" the tr*th. /t is si,*ltaneo*sly fr*stratin" in its incapacities and tantali7in" in the prospects and analo"ies it s*""ests. Gor e)a,ple, +hen Descartes !e"ins to +onder +hether his e)perience is drea,like, he reflects that drea,s ,i"ht !e like paintin"s. Perhaps the tr*e realities are the ele,ents o*t of +hich !oth drea,s and pict*res are co,posed-h*,an fi"*res, for e)a,ple, are co,posed of ar,s, le"s, and heads, or :concentratin" ,ore specifically on ho+ paintin"s are ,ade; perhaps of colors. C@nd for a not dissi,ilar reason, altho*"h these "eneral thin"s, eyes, head, hands, and the like,

co*ld !e i,a"inary, it is nevertheless necessary at least that certain other thin"s even si,pler and ,ore *niversal are to !e ackno+led"ed tr*e= o*t of s*ch tr*e colors :as it +ere; are fashioned all those i,a"es of thin"s, either tr*e or false, that are in o*r co"itationC :@& D// ?$;. 2evertheless, the i,pression of i,a"ination that a reader takes a+ay fro, the editations is ,ore likely to !e do,inated !y the ,e,ory of its fail*res than of its pro,ise. &he reflection on the reality of the ele,ents (#( or Ctr*e colorsC s*!verts o*r confidence in the tr*th val*e of all co,posites, and even the hope ,o,entarily p*t in the possi!le e)istence of tr*e ele,ents fails, at least for the ti,e !ein". Descartes6s adversion to color ,ay +ell ad*,!rate a so*rce of this fail*re, for, as +e kno+ fro, Cartesian physics, colors are not in thin"s !*t only in the ,ind. &he i,a"ination of the editations is si,*ltaneo*sly pro,isin" and perple)in". /n the conte)t of the search for tr*th it is !o*nd to co,e *p short, of co*rse, since !y the end of the Second 8editation the ,editator kno+s that i,a"ination does not and cannot kno+. @s the e)a,ination of the piece of +a) sho+s, the kno+led"e of thin"s !elon"s not to sensation or i,a"ination !*t to the inspection of the ,ind :inspectio mentis = @& D// #$A#?;. /,a"ination can prod*ce appearances, !*t this po+er is never definitive. @ltho*"h everyone can pict*re, that is, prod*ce in i,a"ination, a trian"le, a tho*sandAsided fi"*re is !eyond the h*,an !ein"6s i,a"inative po+ers= for the *nderstandin", ho+ever, the chilia"on is no less clearly and distinctly conceived than the trian"le :@& D// E?;. 8ost devastatin" of all to any pretensions for h*,an i,a"ination is the clai, ,ade in the epi"raph to this introd*ction: i,a"ination ,*st lie o*tside ,y essence as a thinkin" !ein", since +itho*t it / +o*ld still !e the sa,e thin" / a, no+ :@& D// E#;. @ltho*"h i,a"inin" is incl*ded as one of the ite,s fallin" *nder the "eneric na,e 6thinkin"6 :@& D// ?5;, it is a +eak instance of thinkin", inessential to that ,ost f*nda,ental of h*,an activities. /t see,s i,pla*si!le to take i,a"ination as in any sense typical or paradi",atic of +hat tho*"ht and *nderstandin" are. 8oreover, +e can even !e"in to +onder +hether i,a"ination6s ,ethodolo"ical *se in the editations can have ,ore than incidental si"nificance, especially +hen +e note the clai, in the letter of 1# 2ove,!er 16#9 to 8arin 8ersenne that i,a"ination har,s rather than helps in the search for the ,ost !asic tr*ths of all, those of ,etaphysics :@& // 6??;. /,a"ination !y its nat*re is, for co"nitive p*rposes, *nrelia!le and even deceptive. <et if +e are fa,iliar +ith all of Descartes6s +ritin"s, +e kno+ that i,a"ination does occasionally have positive co"nitive roles. Consider t+o re,arks dra+n fro, a note!ook that Descartes kept in the years 1619 to 16?1, that is, so,e t+enty years !efore the editations. @s i,a"ination *ses fi"*res to conceive !odies, so intellect *ses certain sensi!le !odies to fi"*re spirit*al thin"s, like +ind, OandP li"ht: +hence, philosophi7in", +e can !y co"nition raise the ,ind hi"her in the s*!li,e. /t can see, a,a7in", +hy pre"nant ,eanin"s OareP in the +ritin"s of poets ,ore than of philosophers. &he reason is that poets +rite thro*"h enth*sias, and the force of i,a"ination: there are particles Oor seedsP of science in *s, as in flintstone, that are ed*ced !y philosophers thro*"h reason, O!*tP that thro*"h i,a"ination are shaken loose !y poets and shine o*t ,ore. :CCo"itationes privatae,C @& L ?1E; (F(

&he co"nition of nat*ral thin"s !y h*,an !ein"s Oocc*rsP solely thro*"h the si,ilit*de of those thin"s that fall *nder sense: and indeed +e 4*d"e that person to have ,ore tr*ly philosophi7ed +ho +ill have ,ore s*ccessf*lly assi,ilated the thin" so*"ht to +hat is co"ni7ed !y sense. :CCo"itationes ptivatae,C @& L ?15A?19; &hese notes present a rather different, one ,i"ht say 3*ite *nCartesian, pict*re of i,a"ination and its role in kno+in". @s +e shall see in chapter ?, this is not an a!erration !*t typical of the hi"h estee, in +hich Descartes held co"nitive i,a"ination early in his philosophical career. &he Regulae ad directionem ingenii :@& L #%9AF69= pres*,a!ly a!andoned ca. 16?9 and not p*!lished in any for, *ntil thirtyAfo*r years after Descartes6s death; is the !estAkno+n +ork presentin" a positive *nderstandin" of i,a"ination= i,a"ination is disc*ssed thro*"ho*t, and the second part e)pressly develops a co"nitive ,ethod of e,ployin" i,a"ination to solve pro!le,s. 8oreover, even in +orks of his philosophical ,at*rity, Descartes fre3*ently *sed i,a"es for co"nitive p*rposes. /n the optics essay appended to the Discourse, for e)a,ple, tennis rackets, "rapes in +ine vats, and ri"id sticks are *sed as ,odels for conceivin" the ,echanics of li"ht= in the preface to the Grench edition of Principles of Philosophy, the tree of philosophy represents the relationships of the vario*s disciplines to one another. O?P @re s*ch CfactsC a!o*t i,a"ination in Descartes isolated, even a!errant, or do they reveal so,ethin" deeply in"rained in his tho*"htQ .hat is the *lti,ate stat*s of i,a"ination in DescartesQ &he ans+er depends not a little on +ho the 3*estioner thinks Descartes is. Gor philosophers, he is pro!a!ly a!ove all the a*thor of the editations, aro*nd +hich all the other +orks revolve. Gor an intellect*al or c*lt*ral historian, he ,i"ht !e instead the a*thor of the Discourse on ethod = for a historian of science, the a*thor of the essays on optics, ,eteorolo"y, and "eo,etry to +hich the Discourse +as 4*st a preface. @ccordin" to the Descartes intended, the ans+er +ill !e different, or at least differently inflected. @!o*t i,a"ination in Descartes, ho+ever, the editations' acco*nt of the inessentiality and co"nitive irrelevance of i,a"ination appears to !e the decisive fact that any scholar6s clai,s or CdiscoveriesC can never ,ini,i7e or deny. 2evertheless, Descartes scholarship and philosophical reflection a!o*t his +ork have not yet settled the 3*estion of the role and scope of i,a"ination in his tho*"ht. &he topic, see,in"ly of ,ar"inal interest, has prod*ced fe+ st*dies and no consens*s. /n the first part of this cent*ry there O?P Gor the tree of philosophy, see @& /LB 1FA1%. Gor evidence of the pervasiveness of s*""estive i,a"es in the later +ritin"s, see 0eneviRve >odisALe+is, CGro, 8etaphysics to Physics,C in )ssays on the Philosophy and %cience of Ren* Descartes, ed. Stephen Doss :2e+ <ork: B)ford University Press, 199#;, ?F?A?%5. (%( +as so,e attention to the place of i,a"ination in Descartes6s ,athe,atical +ritin"s,O#P 8ore recent st*dies have looked to so,e of his early +ritin"s, *np*!lished d*rin" his lifeti,e, to *nderscore the centrality of i,a"ination in finite h*,an e)istence.OFP @nother philosopher, s*rveyin" the entire corp*s of Descartes6s +ritin"s, recently s*""ested that shifts in the treat,ent of i,a"ination ,i"ht serve as indicators of deeper transfor,ations in his philosophy.O%P @ !ookAlen"th st*dy of i,a"ination in Descartes, +ritten in the early 19F$s !y a st*dent of KeanAPa*l Sartre, caref*lly s*rveys +hat Descartes had to say a!o*t i,a"ination in its psycholo"ical and physicoAphysiolo"ical ra,ifications. /t is li,ited, ho+ever, !y an ins*fficient attention to the so*rces and the develop,ent of Descartes6s theory, or rather theories, of i,a"ination.O6P /,a"ination can indeed serve as an inde) of Descartes6s deeper concerns and of the transfor,ations of

his tho*"ht-not !eca*se there are re,ote and o!sc*re connections !et+een the,, !*t rather !eca*se i,a"ination +as at the heart of his earliest philosophi7in", and !eca*se his prolon"ed effort to esta!lish the practical relevance and co"nitive i,portance of i,a"ination led hi, into a net+ork of pro!le,s that defeated his initial hopes. &he later philosophy, the canonical Descartes :as +e ,i"ht call it;, is a direct o*t"ro+th of a shift that +as intended to circ*,vent and displace the pro!le,atics of i,a"ination. 2evertheless, the later philosophy !ears the ,ark of its ori"ins, and it is not for any accidental reason that i,a"ination ,akes its appearance at cr*cial t*rns in the investi"ations of +hat h*,an !ein"s are and ho+ it is that they kno+. O#P Pierre Bo*tro*), &'Imagination et les math*mati1ues selon Descartes, Gac*ltS des lettres de /6UniversitS de Paris, no. 1$ :Paris: Geli) @lcan, 19$$;= LSon Br*nschvic", C8athS,ati3*e et ,Staphysi3*e che7 Descartes,C in )crits philosophi1ues, vol. 1: &'(urnanisme de l'"ccident: Descartes, %pino2a, 3ant :Paris: Presses Universitaires de Grance, 19%1;, 11A%F= and Kaco! 'lein, 0reek athematical Thought and the "rigin of Alge4ra, trans. 1va Brann :Ca,!rid"e: 8/& Press, 1965;, 1$EA?11 and notes. @ recent, profo*nd reevocation of this the,e is fo*nd in David >apport Lachter,an, The )thics of 0eometry: A 0enealogy of odernity :2e+ <ork: >o*tled"e, Chap,an T 9all, 195$;, esp. 6EA91. /n his st*dy of the Regulae, Leslie K. Beck notes the persistence of the ,ethodolo"ical i,portance of i,a"ination in the Discourse = see Beck, The ethod of Descartes: A %tudy of the 5Regulae5 :B)ford: Clarendon Press, 19%?;. OFP LUder 0V!e, Descartes' %el4stkritik: 6ntersungen 2ur Philosophie des 7ungen Descartes :9a,!*r": Geli) 8einer, 19E?;, and Kosef Si,on, #ahrheit als $reiheit: 8ur )nt9icklung der #ahrheits+frage in der neueren Philosophie :Berlin: de 0r*yter, 19E5;, esp. 1?1A1F9. O%P DSroni3*e GWti, C&he Cartesian /,a"ination,C Philosopky and Phenomenological Research F6 :1956;: 6#1A6F?. O6P Kean 9. >oy, &'Imagination selon Descartes :Paris: 0alli,ard, 19FF;. /n chapter E, / +ill ,ention in addition several o*tstandin" articles on i,a"ination in the editations. @lso of note is an *np*!lished dissertation that *ses >*les E, 1?, and 1FA16 of the >e"*lae, the passa"e e)plainin" i,a"ination6s role in ,*sical perception fro, the Co,pendi*, ,*sicae, and the 8editations6 assertion that the thinkin" h*,an !ein" is an i,a"e of 0od to ar"*e that i,a"ination is the tr*ly active, synthetic a"ent a,on" the po+ers of ,ind :a thesis to +hich / "ive only 3*alified assent;= see Stephen 9enry Gord, C/,a"ination and &ho*"ht in Descartes,6 Ph.D. dissertation, <ork University :Canada;, 19EE. / !elieve that Gord "ives too *nitary a readin" of i,a"ination in Descartes and overlooks essential differences !et+een the +ritin"s !efore and after 16#$= in partic*lar, he does not reco"ni7e the historical conte)t and develop,ent of Descartes6s psychophysiolo"y of i,a"ination, the central role of proportional ,athe,atics :or ,athetics; in its f*nctionin", and the !iplanarity of i,a"inative thinkin". 2evertheless, had it !een p*!lished, Gord6s st*dy +o*ld have helped esta!lish the *r"ent need for reconceivin" Descartes6s philosophical psycholo"y. (6( &his st*dy can !e vie+ed as ar"*in" for three ,a4or clai,s: :1; /n Descartes6s earliest +orks, fro, 1615 *ntil aro*nd 16#$, the co"nitive *se of i,a"ination +as al+ays of central concern and often the f*nda,ental one. :?; &e onde :!e"*n ca. 16#$; ,arked the !e"innin" of a sharper restriction of i,a"ination6s co"nitive capa!ilities to ,athe,atics and physics, !*t i,a"ination nevertheless re,ained at the center of his tho*"ht, !oth as an e)plicit the,e and as providin" an analo"ical key to *nderstandin" the +orkin"s even of p*re intellect. @nd :#; +hen the ,at*re Descartes *sed +ords like cogito :7e pense ;, esprit, idea :id*e ;, inspectio mentis, meditatio, and the like, he +as ,arkin"

positions in a psycholo"ical constellation infor,ed !y and ent+ined +ith a pre,odern conception of the h*,an so*l and its operations, a for,ation and ent+ine,ent that has !een eclipsed !y the passa"e of ti,e and !y a shift in the central pro!le,atics of .estern philosophy. Bnce +e have !eco,e a+are of this, ho+ever, even the editations' apparent re4ection of i,a"ination !e"ins to tell another story than the one to +hich +e are acc*sto,ed, and +e !e"in to reco"ni7e Descartes6s preocc*pation +ith i,a"ination as a key episode in his efforts to co,e to "rips +ith tho*"ht as an activity of ,ind. &he historical tendency of these three clai,s ,i"ht !e p*t in a kind of slo"an that, tho*"h oversi,plified, has the virt*es of !ein" co,pact and s*""estive: the philosophy of Descartes, fro, !e"innin" to end, is an e)tended reflection on the i,plications of a dict*, first prono*nced in 0reek anti3*ity !y @ristotle, C&here is no tho*"ht +itho*t phantas,sC-no tho*"ht +itho*t the presence of so,ethin" in i,a"ination in vie+ of +hich the po+er of *nderstandin" e)ercises its activity. &he third clai,, in partic*lar, that Descartes6s psycholo"y is ent+ined ,ore +ith pre,odern than ,odern psycholo"y, is as ,*ch a!o*t philosophy and the history of philosophy as it is a!o*t Descartes, and it concerns not ,erely his s*!se3*ent infl*ence on philosophy !*t *s as +ell. Consider first that 6episte,olo"y6 is a coina"e of the seventeenth cent*ry, not !y accident !*t !eca*se the attention to the po+ers, activities, and facts of conscio*sness transfor,ed the philosophical +ay of 3*estionin", a transfor,ation that received a decisive i,p*lse fro, Descartes6s +orks. <et, as +e shall see, this transfor,ation is only a partial translation of Descartes6s o+n pro!le,atic, +hich +as ,ore physical, physiolo"ical, psycholo"ical, (E( anthropolo"ical, and ,etaphysical than it +as episte,olo"ical. /f he is the father of ,odern philosophy, his offsprin" !ear an i,perfect rese,!lance to hi,. &h*s !y attendin" to so,e of the differences !et+een the preA and postACartesian pro!le,atics, +e can "ain a clearer sense of the distinctive character of ,odern tho*"ht. 8oreover, there is an i,portant sense in +hich the apparent ahistoricis, of Descartes6s o+n thinkin" is te,pered !y his a+areness that the startin" point of a thinkin" that rids one of pre4*dices is situated and ,*st traverse the "ro*nd of a herita"e in order to recover a clear and distinct sense of the activity of kno+in".OEP /f there is so,e f*nda,ental tr*th to the notion that there is no thinkin" +itho*t phantas,s-and / shall ar"*e that Descartes !elieved that this +as for ,ost p*rposes tr*e, even in his ,at*re philosophical +orks-and if the phantas, in the f*llest sense t*rns o*t to !e so,ethin" that is not 4*st an i,a"e of corporeal thin"s !*t also +ords and intellect*al ,e,ories that are !io"raphically and historically constit*ted, then !y follo+in" o*t the prod le,atics of i,a"ination in Descartes in an even ,ore radical +ay than he did +e can recover a relevant *nderstandin" of h*,an e)istence as historical and i,a"inative. &he phantas, th*s +o*ld t*rn o*t to !e not 4*st a notion of archival interest !*t a rich and evolvin" principle at the root of !oth thinkin" and doin".

-. LOO)IN+ A0EAD
&he reader +ith a speciali7ed interest in Descartes ,ay already find s*fficient reason to proceed. B*t, as the precedin" considerations have already s*""ested, there are lar"er reasons for pressin" ahead +ith the 3*estion of i,a"ination. &he first has to do +ith Descartes. &he Si)th 8editation6s dis,issal of the possi!ility that i,a"ination is essential to *s as thinkin" thin"s and its reco"nition of the co"nitive +eakness of i,a"ination do not esta!lish the irrelevance of i,a"ination and i,a"es to the later Descartes. &hro*"ho*t his career Descartes attri!*ted a key role to i,a"ination in ,athe,atical and physical thinkin". /n the last +ork

he p*!lished, the Passions of the %oul, he allo+ed it a nota!le f*nction in the ,astery of the passions. /n the editations he p*t i,a"ination to +ork in the very act of transcendin" it, and he took ordinary i,a"ination as an analo"ical ,odel for conceivin" OEP &he e)a,ination of !eliefs that one o*"ht to *ndertake once in one6s lifeti,e follo+s on one6s ac3*isition of those !eliefs not si,ply as a thinkin" thin" !*t also as a h*,an !ein" +ho has !een !ro*"ht *p in the +ays and traditions of a society +ith so,e decided conceptions a!o*t the nat*re and e)istence of kno+led"e :3*ite apart fro, the ,ores that "ive rise to the ,orality one adheres to;. Bne ,*st therefore think thro*"h the conflict of interpretations one has "ro+n *p +ith !y ,eans of the ,odels of ac3*ired and sec*red tr*th that have !een previo*sly reco"ni7ed and c*ltivated. (5( the activity and o!4ects of intellection. Bne need think only of the *se he ,ade of the C,ali"n "eni*sC at the end of the Girst 8editation to reco"ni7e that radical do*!t itself is an i,a"inative, or at least an i,a"inationAlike, f*nction. @s for i,a"ination6s role as analo"ical ,odel for the +orkin"s of the thinkin" thin", one ,i"ht read the C>esponsesC to the third set of o!4ections to the editations, +here Descartes tells &ho,as 9o!!es that he chose the ter, 6idea6 !eca*se it is *sed C!y philosophers for si"nifyin" the for,s of perceptions of the divine ,ind, altho*"h +e reco"ni7e no phantasia in 0od6 :@& D// 151;. /deas are like the for,s of 0od6s i,a"inin"s, if 0od had i,a"inin"s-+hich of co*rse he doesn6tH 1ven if over the years Descartes reconceived or do+n"raded the i,portance, especially the co"nitive i,portance, of i,a"ination, the response to 9o!!es s*""ests that for an ade3*ate *nderstandin" of so Cartesian a notion as 6idea6 +e ,*st consider it in the conte)t of i,a"ination6s f*nctions. @ f*rther ,otivation for p*shin" for+ard in this st*dy is provided !y re,arkin" that i,a"ination is 4*st one of +hat ,edieval and early ,odern thinkers called internal senses and that, as +e shall see, so,e of its f*nctions in Descartes are closely related or even identical to those that had traditionally !een assi"ned to the cogitativa, the internal sense in +hich co"itation proper !e"ins. /n the Regulae ad directionem ingenii, the ter, imaginatio in fact appears on one occasion as a direct synony, of cogitatio, +hich at the very least reinforces the s*spicion that Descartes6s preA16#$ *nderstandin" of psycholo"y provides a conte)t o*t of +hich the later philosophy ,i"ht !e ,ore acc*rately *nderstood. /t +o*ld, after all is said and done, !e hard to ar"*e that Descartes6s *nderstandin" of co"itatio is a ,atter of only ,in*te historical interest-not +hen the tr*th that resists the corrosiveness of hyper!olic do*!t and ,arks the !e"innin" of ,odern philosophy is for,*lated Cco"ito, er"o s*,.C B*t +e can press !eyond Descartes scholarship and history of philosophy conceived narro+ly to the 3*estion of his infl*ence and role in .estern intellect*al c*lt*re. &he constellation of the internal senses, fro, co,,on sense to co"itation, +as part not 4*st of philosophy !*t also of the ,edical and scientific *nderstandin" of the sensitive and co"nitive a!ilities of h*,an !ein"s, in partic*lar of the relationship !et+een !ody and ,ind or so*l. &he doctrine of internal senses constit*ted an intellect*al co,,onplace +ell into the seventeenth cent*ry, !*t in the +ake of CarAtesianis, it *nder+ent rapid disinte"ration and +as displaced !y radically si,plified sche,as. Unlike the Cartesians, that is, his follo+ers, Descartes !e"an his philosophic and scientific career solidly rooted in this earlier tradition. 9e developed a ne+ conception of the ,ind !ody relationship precisely !y thinkin" thro*"h the parado)es of the old tradition and discoverin" that it co*ld not !e !ro*"ht into confor,ity +ith the ,edicine and science of his day. /f there +as a Cartesian t*rn in .estern tho*"ht, (9(

Descartes hi,self +as the first to acco,plish it, and perhaps he +as the only person ever to acco,plish it in a thoro*"h"oin", philosophical +ay. Seein" ho+ this happened ,ay help *s reco"ni7e 3*estions a!o*t Descartes and ,odernity that have never !een ade3*ately e)plored. 2ot least of the advanta"es +e co*ld "ain ,i"ht !e a ,ore concrete and less de,oni7ed version of the classic Descartes, +ho, it is pop*lar to sti",ati7e as ori"inator of a host of ,odern evils. &he final reason / shall cite for pressin" for+ard has to do +ith i,a"ination itself and its place in the econo,y of h*,an !ein" and h*,an life. &oday no aspect of ,ind has co,para!le po+er to elicit !y the ,ere ,ention of its na,e a +ide and c*rio*s a*dience, !oth intellect*al and pop*lar. 6/,a"ination6 is a shi!!oleth of ,odern hopef*lness. /t na,es a po+er that ,any people think can save the,, if not the +orld= they !elieve that Cthe res*lts of an ever "reater tri*,ph of the i,a"ination can only !e "ood.CO5P 1va Brann, in a +ork that atte,pts to !rin" into foc*s the vast philosophical, psycholo"ical, and aesthetic literat*re on i,a"ination, re,arks that .estern tradition assi"ns i,a"ination Ca pivotal f*nction.C /t is placed centrally !et+een the fac*lties and inter,ediately !et+een so*l and +orld. &h*s it !oth holds the so*l to"ether +ithin and connects it to the o!4ects +itho*t. <et the treat,ent "iven this "reat po+er even !y ha!it*ally definitive a*thors like @ristotle and 'ant is tacitly *nfinished, c*rsory, and pro!le,atic. &he i,a"ination appears to pose a pro!le, too deep for proper ackno+led",ent. /t is, so to speak, the ,issin" ,ystery of philosophy.O9P Bne ,i"ht add: it is a ,issin" ,ystery of .estern c*lt*re as +ell. /t is risky to p*t "reat hopes in any one thin". &here is the dan"er of askin" fro, i,a"ination, !y nat*re a ,iddlin" po+er, ,ore than it can possi!ly deliver. /t cannot, for e)a,ple, s*pplant the e)tre,es that it ,ediates. /n order to *nderstand, +e ,*st have reco*rse to a!straction and concepts, !*t there ,*st also !e real o!4ects of *nderstandin" sit*ated in a +orld that is e)perienced !y sense !efore it is i,a"ined. .e cannot think in i,a"es alone, nor can +e live in the,. <et it so,eti,es see,s to even the ,ost to*"hA,inded thinkers that i,a"ination has a force a!le to deepen *nderstandin" and enliven ordinary e)perience. Ge+ have had s*ch hi"h hopes for i,a"ination as Descartes, and fe+ +ho have entertained s*ch hopes have ended !y so narro+in" its application. <et i,a"ination al+ays retained for hi, a paradi",atic aspect: he O5P >enS 0irard, Deceit, Desire, and the .ovel: %elf and "ther in &iterary %tructure, trans. <vonne Greccero :Balti,ore: Kohns 9opkins University Press, 196%;, 5%. 0irard ascri!es this senti,ent, +hich he does not share, to Cro,antics and neoro,antics6 alike. O9P 1va &. 9. Brann, The #orld of Imagination: %um and %u4stance :Sava"e, 8d.: >o+,an T Littlefield, 1991;, #= e,phasis in ori"inal. ( 1$ ( reco"ni7ed that it is in i,a"ination that ,ost h*,an !ein"s, incl*din" hi,self, first enco*nter :altho*"h not in p*rest for,; the active po+er of ,ind and the activity of tho*"ht. Perhaps it is not too fancif*l, here at the o*tset, to +onder +hether it is precisely o+in" to the closeness of i,a"ination to o*r thinkin", actin" !ein" that +e set s*ch "reat store !y it and at the sa,e ti,e are *na!le to "ive ,ore than a fra",entary or o!li3*e acco*nt of it. 8*ch of +hat Descartes has to say

a!o*t i,a"ination is fra",entary and o!li3*e. /s this !eca*se his *nderstandin" is inade3*ateQ Br is it !eca*se there is so,ethin" a!o*t i,a"ination that enco*ra"es, even de,ands, indirection and partialityQ @re h*,an !ein"s capa!le of a co,plete, disc*rsive *nderstandin" of i,a"inationQ @ltho*"h this !ook cannot aspire to ans+er each of these, it +ill, / hope, "ive insi"ht into the phenomenon of i,a"ination-the silent center of this investi"ation-and the 3*estions s*rro*ndin" it. @t the very least, !y tryin" to think i,a"ination alon" +ith Descartes, !y tracin" o*t the career of the i,a"inin" Descartes, +e can "ain not 4*st perspective on the evol*tion of a sin"le thinker !*t also insi"ht into the +orkin"s of this deeply rooted po+er, the so*rce of ,*ch pro,ise and ,any perple)ities. ( 11 (

PART I T$e Ear(' P$i(osop$' o% Imagination

( 1# (

ONE T$e Interna( Senses an. Descartes's Ps'c$op$'sio(og' o% Imagination

/n the introd*ction / ,entioned Descartes6s inde!tedness to a tradition of philosophical psycholo"y that placed soAcalled internal or in+ard senses !et+een the five e)ternal senses and the po+ers of intellect. &he p*rpose of this chapter is t+ofold: :1; to introd*ce the chief ele,ents of the doctrine of the internal senses and sit*ate the i,a"ination +ithin it and :?; to de,onstrate the connection of the psycholo"y and physiolo"y of *nderstandin" ela!orated in Descartes6s Regulae ad directionem ingenii to this tradition. @s +e shall presently see, altho*"h at first "lance the psychophysiAolo"y of the Regulae reads like an anticipation of the later theory of the pineal "land :as the seat of the so*l in the !ody;, it is in a ,ore ori"inal sense an o*t"ro+th of the doctrine of internal senses.

A. I,A+INATION AND T0E INTERNAL SENSES -EFORE DESCARTES

/,a"ination is a na,e traditionally "iven to one of the po+ers of the ,ind en*,erated in soAcalled fac*lty psycholo"ies,O1P +hich divide the h*,an so*l accordin" to f*nda,ental capacities. 8ost ,edieval disc*ssions follo+ @ristotle in takin" the ve"etative, sensitive, and intellect*al parts as O1P @s pointed o*t !y Kerry @. Godor, altho*"h fac*lty psycholo"y is prono*nced dead in every cent*ry, it invaria!ly recovers= see Godor, The odularity of ind: An )ssay on $aculty Psychology :Ca,!rid"e: 8/& Press, 195#;. &he central iss*e for a psycholo"y of fac*lties is not +hether ,ind or so*l is tho*"ht to have vario*s f*nctions !*t the de"ree of independence of these f*nctions fro, hi"her po+ers. Gor e)a,ple, if the senses are tho*"ht to operate in essential independence fro, intellect, then sensi!ility is an independent fac*lty= intellect, in its t*rn, ,i"ht f*nction independently of sense, for instance insofar as it does not re3*ire the i,,ediate action of the senses. @s soon as one allo+s even a s,all de"ree of independence to a f*nction, one has in fact taken the first step into a psycholo"y of

fac*lties. ( 1F ( !asic= &ho,as @3*inas a,plifies this to five !y addin" the appetitive :incl*din" +ill; and the loco,otive po+ers.O?P 1ach of these parts ,ay in t*rn !e s*!divided accordin" to its vario*s f*nctions and o!4ects. &he intellect*al po+er, for instance, can !e divided, accordin" to its mode of operation, into intellect, +hich is i,,ediately apprehensive, and disc*rsive reason, +hich proceeds !y sta"es= or, e,phasi7in" instead the o47ect to+ard +hich the fac*lty is directed, one can divide it into the three capacities of kno+in" :l; +hat is chan"in", :?; +hat is *nchan"in" !*t ,aterial, and :#; +hat is *nchan"in" and +holly i,,aterial. &he sensitive po+ers incl*de not 4*st the five e)ternal senses of si"ht, hearin", to*ch, s,ell, and taste !*t also the internal senses. @ltho*"h there +as no little disa"ree,ent a!o*t the precise n*,!er of the internal senses, their proper na,es, their or"anic locations, and the correct deli,itation of their f*nctions, there +as s*fficient consistency in ,edieval presentations for *s to a!stract a core theory. &he core theory *lti,ately derives fro, @ristotle !*t has ad,i)t*res fro, other philosophical traditions and incorporates scientific and ,edical doctrine as +ell. /n a first appro)i,ation +e sho*ld note that the sensitive po+ers, +hich h*,an !ein"s share +ith other ani,als, are inter,ediate !et+een the ve"etativeAn*tritiveAreprod*ctive po+ers possessed !y all livin" thin"s and the intellect*al po+ers possessed :at least a,on" physical !ein"s; only !y h*,ans. /n contrast to the ve"etative po+ers, the sensitive po+ers involve an a+areness of thin"s, or at least of aspects of thin"s. @+areness does not ,ake the, intellect*al, for the intellect*al po+ers proper operate at the level of a!stractions, *niversal concepts, and "enerali7ations, +hereas the sensitive po+ers deal +ith sensory aspects of sin"*lar thin"s. Still, there can !e ,ore than a s*perficial rese,!lance to *nderstandin" in ani,al sensi!ility. &his is evident not so ,*ch fro, individ*al sensations-seein" a color, hearin" a tone, s,ellin" an aro,a-as fro, the a!ility of ani,als to *se ,*ltiple sensations of the sa,e and different types, to co,pare and re,e,!er the,, in order to s*rvive and prosper. So, for e)a,ple, ,ost ,a,,als learn fro, a s,all n*,!er of incidents to avoid sit*ations that prod*ce *npleasant effects, and they can ,ake discri,inations in their environ,ent that per,it the, to sec*re food and shelter and to raise their yo*n". @ltho*"h so,e ,i"ht !e inclined to call these a!ilities for,s of intelli"ence and to treat the, as in essence intellect*al, the tradition / a, descri!in" sa+ these as closer to the e)ternal senses than to intellect. 2evertheless, they opened the +ay to the conception of a deeper kind of sensi!ility that is crystalli7ed in the internal sense tradition. @s / have already noted, the *lti,ate so*rce of the internal senses docA O?P %umma theologiae, 1, 3. E5, art. 1. ( 1% ( trine is @ristotle6s psycholo"ical +ritin"s, especially De anima :Bn the So*l;. &he second and third !ooks of De anima develop a theory :!eyond the ve"etative; of the sensitive and co"nitive po+ers of so*l: the five e)ternal senses, the co,,on sense :aisthesis koine ;, i,a"ination :phantasia ;, receptive intellect :nous pathetikos ;, and a"ent or prod*ctive intellect :nous poietikos ;. &his co"nitive psycholo"y +as predicated on the e)istence of for,s in s*!stances :for o*r p*rposes 6s*!stance6 can !e taken to ,ean physical o!4ects, tho*"h for @ristotle there are i,,aterial s*!stances, too;: an essential form, +hich constit*tes the nat*re of the thin" and ,akes it the kind or species of thin" it is :e."., the for, of h*,an !ein";, and sensi4le forms, +hich deter,ine the vario*s :,any nonessential; sensi!le

3*alities of the thin" :e."., the visi!le for, shape of a partic*lar h*,an !ody;.O#P Sensi!le for,s can !e co,,*nicated to the properly disposed sense or"ans of ani,als, and they are divided into t+o kinds: proper sensi!les, those thin"s that are perceived !y one and only one sense :color in vision, odor in s,ell, so*nd in hearin", etc.;, and co,,on sensi!les, like ,ove,ent, rest, fi"*re, ,a"nit*de, n*,!er, and *nity, +hich are co,,*nicated to ,ore than one sense :e."., !oth the eye and to*ch can detect fi"*re;. /t ,*st not !e tho*"ht that this co,,*nication of for,s necessarily occ*rs thro*"h local ,otion or that it takes ti,e, say !y ,eans of an C@ristotelian photonC flyin" thro*"h space fro, o!4ect to sense. @ristotle does not, for e)a,ple, conceive of vision as !ein" d*e to the trans,ission of little o!4ects or i,p*lses. >ather, a proper sensi!le in the o!4ect, for e)a,ple its color, acts on the or"an +hen the ,edi*, !et+een the,, in the case of color +hat @ristotle calls the diaphano*s or transparent, is ,ade act*ally transparent !y li"ht. /n darkness, transparent ,aterials are only potentially diaphano*s, and so colors cannot !e co,,*nicated to the eye= !*t li"ht activates the ,edi*,, th*s ena!lin" it to !e the ,eans thro*"h +hich the sensi!le for, co,,*nicates itself to the sense or"an.OFP &he res*lt is that the sense receives into itself the sensi!le for,s of thin"s +itho*t the ,atter. &o *se the classic for,*la, the sense in act is the sensi!le o!4ect in act= that is, the sense of si"ht as it is act*ally en"a"ed in seein" is the sa,e as the activity of the sensi!le for, of the o!4ect :+hich is co,,*nicated O#P @n ar"*,ent ,i"ht !e ,ade that this division into essential and sensi!le for,s is artificial, that it is fro, the essential for, that the act of an o!4ect is co,,*nicated to the sense or"ans, +hich receive and differentiate the for, accordin" to their nat*res. B*t the evidence of @ristotle6s te)t 4*stifies locatin" sensi!le for,s in the o!4ect. OFP Bnce a"ain, this is not like the case of li"ht rays !o*ncin" off an o!4ect and travelin" to the eye, !eca*se in s*ch a case the li"ht rays, not the diaphano*s, +o*ld !e the ,edi*,. @ f*rther step a+ay fro, the @ristotelian conception +o*ld !e to consider the rays not as a ,edi*, !*t as ,akers or sti,*lators of color :the early ,odern scientific notion of color as *nderstood !y 0alileo, Descartes, and 2e+ton;. ( 16 ( thro*"h the ,edi*, +itho*t the ,atter of the o!4ect and activates the sense or"an;. Br to *se the i,a"e that anticipated Descartes6s *se of it :in >*le 1?, @& L F1?; !y nearly t+o tho*sand years, Cevery sense is receptive of the for,s of sensi!le o!4ects +itho*t their ,atter, and in a sort of +ay in +hich +a) receives the i,pression of a si"netArin" +itho*t the iron or "old, for the +a) receives the i,pression of the "olden or !ron7e Orin"P not 3*a "old or 3*a !ron7eC :F?Fa1EA?l= !rackets in so*rce;.O%P Bet+een his disc*ssions of the five senses and intellect, @ristotle introd*ces t+o other po+ers that, +ith the addition of ,e,ory, initiated the internal senses tradition. &he first is co,,on sense, so na,ed !eca*se it is that part of sense in +hich the co,,on sensi!les like ,otion and shape are perceived. &he eye receives not 4*st color !*t also ,otion, rest, n*,!er, shape, and ,a"nit*de :F15a15A?$; !*t itself perceives only +hat is proper to it, color. @nother po+er is therefore needed in +hich the co,,on sensi!les can !e perceived alon"side the proper sensi!les and in +hich the sensi!les fro, all the different sense or"ans are !ro*"ht to"ether into a *nified field of perception.O6P &he eye 4*d"es of redness, !*t the *nified sense, not the eye, 4*d"es that a red thin" is ,ovin", that it is ro*nd, that it is lar"e, and so on. Dision !y itself reco"ni7es not o!4ects as s*ch !*t colors= hearin" reco"ni7es not thin"s !*t so*nds= and si,ilarly for the other e)ternal senses. B*t to reco"ni7e that this +hite, crystalline st*ff, called s*"ar, is s+eet, to reco"ni7e that an asse,!la"e of colors is a thin", and to

reco"ni7e that a partic*lar o!4ect has s*chAandAs*ch characteristics is perceived not !y any individ*al sense or"an !*t in the co,,on sense. &he 4*stification for this fac*lty is perhaps clearest fro, the need to coordinate and co,pare the infor,ationOEP of the different senses. .e can not only see +ith o*r eyes !*t also feel !y o*r to*ch that a thin" is ,ovin", ro*nd, or lar"e, and these t+o CchannelsC of infor,ation are perceived as referrin" to a sin"le thin". 2either the eye nor the ton"*e is a!le to 4*d"e that the +hite st*ff +e call s*"ar is s+eet :the eye perceives +hiteness !*t not s+eetness, the ton"*e s+eetness !*t not +hiteness;. &he co,,on sense is a!le to do these thin"s !eca*se it is +here the different sensi!les are *nified. &he co,,on sense, +e ,i"ht concl*de, is the repository of the *nified image of sensation. B*t +e also have i,a"es +hen +e are not directly sensin" thin"s, and this 4*stifies introd*cin" another sensitive po+er precedA O%P &ranslations fro, De anima are taken fro, Aristotle's 5"n the %oul5 :De anima;, trans. 9ippocrates 0. @postle :0rinnell, /o+a: Peripatetic Press, 1951;. O6P 6Unified field of perception6 is not @ristotle6s ter,, !*t it "ives so,e sense of the pro!le, !ein" addressed. OEP /t is not entirely ille"iti,ate to think of !oth the ,odern and the @ristotelian connotations of this +ord. ( 1E ( in" intellect, phantasia or i,a"ination. &here is de!ate a!o*t +hether i,a"ination is really a fac*lty for @ristotle,O5P !*t +e can !y and lar"e i"nore this, since for the vast ,a4ority of @ra!ic and Latin co,,entators there +as no do*!t that it +as a fac*lty-+hich is not to say that they tho*"ht there +ere no diffic*lties of interpretation. Diffic*lties arise not least !eca*se @ristotle6s disc*ssion of i,a"ination is dialectical and pro!le,atical. 8ost of the third chapter of !ook # of De anima :cited !elo+ as De anima /// #; is devoted to distin"*ishin" i,a"ination fro, e)ternal sense, co,,on sense, opinion, !elief, kno+led"e, and intellect, +ith d*e re"ard "iven to possi!le connections to these. P*t s*,,arily, @ristotle ar"*es that if i,a"ination, the po+er or ha!it !y virt*e of +hich i,a"es are for,ed in *s, is a po+er of discri,ination, it is nevertheless different fro, other discri,inatin" po+ers, like the e)ternal senses and co,,on sense, !eca*se it does not re3*ire the presence of an o!4ect, altho*"h it does depend on the previo*s activity of these :i.e., if one has never sensed anythin", one cannot have i,a"es;. Beca*se i,a"inin"s are not inherently tr*e, i,a"ination ,*st also !e differentiated fro, the co"nitive fac*lties that are al+ays tr*e, like kno+led"e and intellection. /t is not identical +ith or a variety of opinion, nor is it a ,i)t*re of opinion and sensation, !eca*se conviction and reason al+ays acco,pany opinion, +hereas neither is necessary for i,a"inin". 9e concl*des that i,a"ination has not so ,*ch to do +ith the proper activities of the senses-+hich are infalli!le +ith respect to the proper sensi!les :+hen the eye sees red it is really seein" red;-as +ith the attri!*tion of proper sensi!les to o!4ects and the discri,ination of co,,on sensi!les, +hich are so,eti,es false. C@ccordin"ly, if no thin" other than i,a"ination has the thin"s stated a!ove, then i,a"ination +o*ld !e a ,otion prod*ced !y the activity of senseC :F?5!#$AF?9a?;. C@nd !eca*se i,a"inations persist in *s and are si,ilar to the correspondin" sensations, ani,als do ,any thin"s accordin" to the,, so,e :i.e., nonArational ani,als; !eca*se they possess no intellect, and others :i.e., ,en; !eca*se their intellect is so,eti,es clo*ded !y passion or disease or sleepC :F?9aFA5;. Like the e)ternal senses and the co,,on sense, i,a"ination is of the sensi!le= !*t its o!4ects need not !e i,,ediately present, and it is responsi!le for or related to the persistence and the repeata!ility of i,a"es.

&his acco*nt of De anima /// # leaves ,any 3*estions *nresolved. /t is not entirely clear, for e)a,ple, +hat it ,eans for i,a"ination to !e a O5P See 8ichael D. .edin, ind and Imagination in Aristotle :2e+ 9aven: <ale University Press, 1955;= 8alcol, Schofield, C@ristotle on the /,a"ination,C in )ssays on Aristotle's 5De Anima,5 ed. 8artha C. 2*ss!a*, and @,Slie Bksen!er" >orty :B)ford: Clarendon Press, 199?;, ?F9A?EE= and Dorothea Grede, C&he Co"nitive >ole of Phantasia in @ristotle,C also in )ssays on Aristotle's 5De Anima,5 ?E9A?9%. ( 15 ( ,otion prod*ced !y the activity of sense. Since i,a"es persist in i,a"ination, it +o*ld see, to have so,e si"nificant relationship to ,e,ory, altho*"h that is not p*rs*ed in De anima,O9P and it appears to overlap the co,,on sense in that it deals in ,atters of the *nified sense :one +o*ld ass*,e +ith different f*nctions;. &he o!sc*rities and *nresolved 3*estions +o*ld !y the,selves have occasioned at least so,e ela!oration fro, co,,entators. B*t the deepest reason for the persistence of interest in @ristotle6s doctrine of phantasia +as a clai, ,ade in De anima /// E that p*ts i,a"ination at the heart of kno+in" itself. /,a"es are to the thinkin" so*l like sense i,pressions. B*t +hen Othe thinkin" so*lP affir,s or denies the, as "ood or !ad, it p*rs*es or avoids, respectively, and for this reason the so*l never thinks +itho*t i,a"es. . . . &he thinkin" part, then, thinks the for,s in the i,a"es= and 4*st as +hat is to !e p*rs*ed and +hat is to !e avoided O+hen the sensi!le o!4ects are presentP is deter,ined for it !y the correspondin" OsensationsP, so it is ,oved +hen i,a"es are !efore it and there is no sensation. Gor e)a,ple, sensin" a !eacon as !ein" fire, it kno+s !y the co,,on fac*lty of sensation that the ene,y is approachin" +hen it sees the !eacon in ,otion. @t other ti,es, it for,s 4*d",ents and deli!erates a!o*t f*t*re o!4ects relative to present o!4ects !y ,eans of i,a"es or tho*"hts as if it +ere seein" these o!4ects= and +henever it asserts that Ocertain o!4ects i,a"inedP are pleas*ra!le or painf*l, it p*rs*es or avoids Othose o!4ectsP as it does +hen it senses o!4ects= and it does so in actions in "eneral. :F#1a1FA1E, F#1!?A1$= !rackets in so*rce; &here is no thinkin" +itho*t i,a"es, +itho*t phantas,s. &he +ord for thinkin" here is dianoein, +hich in @ristotle i,plies 4*d",ent, the disc*rsive thinkin" that co,!ines or divides t+o thin"s= in De memoria et reminiscentia the sa,e state,ent is ,ade of noein, +hich e,!races !oth disc*rsive thinkin" and the int*itive "rasp of si,ple thin"s :ter,s or concepts, the ele,ents that disc*rsive thinkin" co,!ines in 4*d",ents;.O1$P @ristotle6s O9P B*t rather in De memoria et reminiscentia< see >ichard Sora!4i, Aristotle on Bro+n University Press, 19E?;. emory :Providence:

O1$P .oein, correspondin" to nous, +o*ld refer specifically to any si,ple act of receivin" a f*nda,ental concept or principle= ,ore "enerally, it co,prises !oth the int*ition of si,ple concepts and the co,!ination of the, in 4*d",ents. &he passa"e fro, De memoria et reminiscentia :F%$a1A6; reads:X9>Y @n acco*nt has already !een "iven of i,a"ination in the disc*ssion of the so*l, and it is not possi!le to think +itho*t a phantas,. Gor the sa,e affection occ*rs in thinkin" as in the dra+in" of a dia"ra,. /n the latter case, even tho*"h +e are not also *sin" the trian"le6s !ein" deter,inate in 3*antity, nonetheless +e dra+ it deter,inately as to 3*antity. /n 4*st the sa,e +ay, the person thinkin", even if he is not thinkin" of 3*antity, places OaP 3*antity !efore his eyes, !*t does not think of it 3*a 3*antity. 1ven if the nat*re Oof +hat he is thinkin"P is a,on" the 3*antities, !*t indeter,inate, he places !efore

hi, a deter,inate 3*antity, !*t thinks of it 3*a 3*antity only. :Z*oted after Lachter,an, &he 1thics of 0eo,etry, 5?; ( 19 ( for,*lations in ter,s of "ood !ad, pleas*ra!le painf*l, and f*t*re acts ,i"ht lead one to s*spect that the dict*, applies to practical activity and not to theoretical. B*t in the sa,e passa"e of De anima he notes that Co!4ects +hich are o*tside of the sphere of action, too, i.e., the tr*e and the false, co,e *nder the sa,e "en*s, na,ely, that of "ood and evil= they differ, ho+ever, O!y !ein" "ood or evilP either +itho*t 3*alification or in a 3*alified +ayC :F#1!1$A1?= !rackets in the so*rce;. .hat the ori"inal state,ent ,eans, then, is that all disc*rsive thinkin"-all thinkin" of any kind, if +e take into acco*nt the passa"e fro, De memoria et reminiscentia -re3*ires phantas,s, and i,a"es are i,portant not 4*st !eca*se they are f*nda,ental to the activity of co,parison that *nderlies 4*d",ent !*t also !eca*se it is fro, i,a"es that the for, or essence of a thin" is arrived at, is a!stracted. 8oreover, chapter E leaves open the 3*estion of +hether it is even possi!le for the intellect to think an o!4ect separate fro, ,atter.O11P &he i,a"e, +ith its re,nants of corporeal ,a"nit*de, is at the core of @ristotle6s ontolo"ically "ro*nded episte,olo"y. Chapter E of !ook # corrects an i,pression that one can easily "et: that the treat,ent of phantasia in chapter # +as incl*ded for the sake of co,pleteness rather than intrinsic i,portance, since chapters F and %, +hich treat the cr*cial topics of receptive and a"ent intellect, ,ake no reference to i,a"es. B*t those latter t+o chapters are dedicated chiefly to contin*in" the differentiation of so*l po+ers fro, one another that !e"an in !ook ?. @ccordin"ly, they identify the factors that differentiate intellect fro, other parts of the so*l and distin"*ish the intellect accordin" to its activity :a"ent intellect; and potentiality :receptive intellect;.O1?P /t is only in the follo+in" chapters, and there 3*ite !riefly, that @ristotle disc*sses the interrelations of the sensitive and co"nitive po+ers in h*,an kno+in" and doin". Understandin" the nat*re of the t+ofold intellect +as one of the chief and ,ost controverted parts of @ristotle6s De anima for the 8iddle @"es. &his +as not 4*st !eca*se of the i,portance of the 3*estion of kno+in" !*t also !eca*se it !ore on the i,,ortality of the so*l and its relation to O11P C/n "eneral, then, the intellect +hen in act*ality is the o!4ects +hich it thinks. B*t +hether the intellect, +hich is not separate fro, ,a"nit*de, can or cannot think any separate o!4ect is a ,atter to !e considered laterC :De anima, F#1!1EA19;. &he 3*estion is not treated s*!se3*ently in De anima< one ,i"ht consider the disc*ssion of tho*"ht thinkin" itself in the t+elfth !ook of etaphysics as decisive, !*t even there the 3*estion ,i"ht !e raised +hether human 4eings can tr*ly think +hat is separated fro, ,atter. O1?P /ntellection is not si,ply an a*to,atic process set off !y lo+er parts of the so*l. Gor @ristotle, everythin" that is not *nchan"in" needs to !e *nderstood in ter,s of potentiality and act*ality, and since h*,an intellect is so,eti,es *nderstandin" and so,eti,es not :or so,eti,es *nderstandin" one thin", so,eti,es another;, there ,*st !e a ca*se of this chan"e fro, one to the other state. Chapters F and % of !ook # sho+ that in intellection ca*se and effect are ontolo"ically correlative. ( ?$ ( 0od, inas,*ch as @ristotle had stated that altho*"h all the other fac*lties pass a+ay +ith the ani,al !ody, the a"ent intellect is apparently separate and *nchan"in". /n +hat follo+s / shall !y and lar"e leave *nto*ched the 3*estions of i,,ortality and of +hether the a"ent intellect is part of the h*,an

so*l or instead a divine e,anation :as in @vicenna; or even 0od hi,self. 8y foc*s +ill !e the interpretation of the process of co"nition. >ather than contin*e here +ith an analysis of @ristotle hi,self, +e can no+ t*rn to @vicenna6s interpretation of i,a"ination in the process of kno+in", since his theory of the for,er as one of the internal senses !eca,e canonical for the later Latin thinkers. @vicennaO1#P :95$Al$#E; +as a Persian philosopher and physician +hose ,edical +ritin"s +ere pro!a!ly the sin"le ,ost i,portant infl*ence on the ,edicine ta*"ht in 1*ropean *niversities thro*"h the >enaissance and +hose co,,entaries on and ela!orations of @ristotle :alon" +ith those of /!nA>*shd, or @verro[s, 11?6A1195; decisively shaped the reception of the Peripatetic philosophy in the thirteenthAcent*ry .est. /ndeed, it is likely that at the !e"innin" of that cent*ry @vicenna +as !etter kno+n and ,ore infl*ential in the Bccident than +as @ristotle.O1FP /n his o+n +ork a!o*t the so*l, also titled De anima, he tried not only to present @ristotle6s teachin"s !*t also to clarify and develop +hat the 0reek philosopher and his co,,entators had left o!sc*re or i,plicit. /n so doin", @vicenna contri!*ted ne+ doctrines and theories that +ere to shape the later ,edieval and >enaissance conceptions of the so*l and its co"nitive po+ers. /n his De anima, @vicenna identified five internal senses. &hey +ere translated into Latin *nder the na,es :1; fantasia or sensus communis, :?; imaginatio, :#; vis aestimationis, :F; vis memorialis or reminisci4ilis, and :%; vis imaginativa or cogitans.O1%P &he phantasy or co,,on sense is !asically the co,,on O1#P &his is the fa,iliar Latin for, of his na,e= the @ra!ic is /!n SinaO\P . O1FP See Kohn 8aren!on, &ater edieval Philosophy :==>?+=@>?;: An Introduction :London: >o*tled"e T 'e"an Pa*l, 195E;, %$A6%, esp. %FA%%. O1%P See 8aren!on, &ater edieval Philosophy, 1$%A1$6= see also 1. >*th 9arvey, The In9ard #its :London: .ar!*r" /nstit*te, 19E%;, F$AF1. @vicenna6s De anima +as translated into Latin in the t+elfth cent*ry !y 0*ndissalin*s. &he Latin tradition 3*ickly a!andoned the ter,inolo"ical identification of 6phantasia6 +ith 6sens*s co,,*nis6 fo*nd in the translation of @vicenna. 6Phantasia6 and 6i,a"inatio6 +ere rarely *sed !y any sin"le thinker as direct synony,s= it +as co,,on to find the, :or co"nates; *sed to distin"*ish internal sense po+ers, for e)a,ple the store of availa!le sense i,a"es vers*s the po+er to co,!ine, divide, and reco,!ine i,a"es. &he Latin ter,inolo"y, at any rate, varied "reatly fro, a*thor to a*thor. Gor disc*ssions of the tradition of the psycholo"y and anato,y of the internal senses, see .alther S*dhoff, CDie Lehre von den 9irnventrikeln in te)tlicher *nd "raphischer &radition des @ltert*,s *nd 8ittelalters,C Archiv fAr 0eschichte der edi2on E :191#;: 1F9A?$%= 1d+in Clark and 'enneth De+h*rst, An Illustrated (istory of -rain $unction :Berkeley, Los @n"eles, and London: University of California Press, 19E?;, esp. %A%%= 9arvey, The In9ard #its = 2icholas 9ans Steneck, C&he Pro!le, of the /nternal Senses in the Go*rteenth Cent*ry,C Ph.D. diss., University of .isconsin, 19E$= 9arry @*stryn .olfson, C&he /nternal Senses in Latin, @ra!ic, and 9e!re+ Philosophic &e)ts,C (arvard Theological Revie9 ?5 :19#%;: 69A1##= 8aren!on, &ater edieval Philosophy = 'atharine Park, C&he Br"anic So*l,C in The !am4ridge (istory of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Charles B. Sch,itt and Z*entin Skinner :Ca,!rid"e: Ca,!rid"e University Press, 1955;, F6FAF5F= and David S*,,ers, The 'udgment of %ense: Renaissance .aturalism and the Rise of Aesthetics :Ca,!rid"e: Ca,!rid"e University Press, 195E;. ( ?1 ( sense of @ristotle: it is the place +here all the sensi!le for,s are perceived. &hese for,s are stored for f*t*re *se in the i,a"ination, a kind of senseAi,a"e ,e,ory. Besides the for,s that can !e sensed,

there are also instinctive perceptions or 4*d",ents of "ood and !ad, advanta"eo*s and har,f*l :like a yo*n", ine)perienced la,!6s reco"nition of the dan"er posed !y a +olf;= these soAcalled intentiones, or intentions, are received in the vis aesti,ationis, or po+er of esti,ation. &he ,e,orial or re,inisci!le po+er stores these nonsensi!le intentions, 4*st as the i,a"ination stores the sensi!le for,s that have !een received !y the co,,on sense. &he re,ainin" po+er is called vis i,a"inativa in ani,als, vis co"itans in the h*,an !ein". &his po+er, as one scholar descri!es it, co,po*nds and divides :co,ponere et dividere; !oth sensi!le for,s taken fro, the i,a"inatio and intentiones taken fro, the vis ,e,orialis.Be"innin" +ith one of the,, it proceeds !y nat*re to another +hich is contrary or si,ilar or in so,e +ay to !e co,pared to the first. . . . @s the na,e @vicenna chooses for it in h*,ans indicates, the vis co"itans en"a"es in disc*rsive tho*"ht= !*t the ca*se of its ,ove,ent fro, one i,a"e or intention to another is al+ays a sin"*lar thin", not a *niversal.O16P &he co"itative po+er is th*s !ased on o*r a!ility :and, in so,e sense, also the a!ility of ani,als; to see one i,a"ined sensi!le for, in relation to another or in relation to the intentions, +hich in ani,als e,!ody an instinct for "ood and !ad. @vicenna6s theory of the internal senses e)plains the pro"ressive de,ateriali7ation or a!straction that takes place in the processes of sensation and intellection. @s the for,, i,a"e, or phantas, is passed on fro, sense or"an to co,,on sense to i,a"ination, and so on, it *nder"oes a pro"ressive eli,ination of the partic*larities of the ori"inal o!4ect. &he theory is also in lar"e part physiolo"ical= that is, the internal senses are dependent on and locali7a!le in the !ody. Physicians in anti3*ity had already s*""ested the locali7ation of the sensitive and rational po+ers, and @vicenna6s e)tension of this does not see, to !e inconsistent +ith @ristotle6s intentions. /n the !anon of edicine, translated into Latin in the t+elfth cent*ry !y 0erard of Cre,ona, @vicenna first divides the soAcalled ani,al virt*e into the co,prehensive and the active virt*es= the for,er incl*des !oth e)ternal and internal senses. &he !anon points o*t that the internal senses O16P 8aren!on, 1$%A1$6. ( ?? ( are considered !y doctors to !e three in n*,!er: phantasia in the anterior !rain ventricle, virtus cogitativa in the ,iddle, and virtus memorialis or conservativa in the posterior. Philosophers ,ake ,ore precise distinctions and identify five: the front ventricle has sens*s co,,*nis to receive sensations and phantasia to retain the,= the ,iddle ventricle6s virt*s co"itativa is referred to as 6i,a"inativa6 +hen it is *nder the co,,and of eBtimativa animalis and 6co"itativa6 +hen the rational po+er ,akes *se of it. &he virt*s e)ti,ativa does not properly have a ventricle, altho*"h its f*nctionin" depends on the other internal sense po+ers.O1EP Both h*,an !ein"s and ani,als have this instinctive attri!*tion of "ood and !ad, safe and dan"ero*s. &his po+er is not, ho+ever, to !e conf*sed +ith the hi"her po+ers proper. C&he co,prehendin" po+er, +hich is one of the co,prehendin" po+ers of the so*l, is the h*,an reason. @nd !eca*se doctors do not deal +ith the esti,ative po+er for the reason +e have "iven, they do not deal +ith this po+er for the sa,e reason: it +orks only thro*"h the other three po+ers Othat the doctors identifyP, and not in other thin"s.CO15P &he last po+er, virt*s ,e,orialis conservativa, is the sa,e for philosopher and doctor. /n addition to this psychophysiolo"y of the internal senses, @vicenna also held to the traditional Stoic ,edical doctrine of ani,al or !odily spirits, +hich +ere considered to !e Cthe !earer of the po+ers of the so*l in the li,!s of ani,als, +hich +ork !y OtheirP ,eans.CO19P @vicenna +as not *ni3*e in ,akin" the po+ers of the internal senses the focal point for a cooperation

of !ody and so*l that e)tended, on the one hand, into the ,ove,ents of the !ody and, on the other, into the real, of reason, nor +as he the first to do this, !*t he +as the ,ost infl*ential, especially in the .est. &he psychophysiolo"y of the internal senses !eca,e a co,,onplace, altho*"h the e)act na,es of the po+ers, the discri,ination of their f*nctions, and their de"ree of independence fro, intellect varied fro, a*thor to a*thor. @ partic*larly i,portant e)a,ple is @3*inas, +ho follo+ed @vicenna 3*ite closely :e)cept for the na,es; in the cases of sens*s co,,*nis, i,a"inatio :for fantasia;, and vis memorativa. 9e critici7ed @vicenna6s conception of i,a"inativa co"itativa :+hich @3*inas "ave the alternative na,e 6fantasia6;, ho+ever. &his is the po+er that co,!ines and divides i,a"inary for,s like the "olden ,o*ntain. @3*inas did not deny the e)istence of the po+er !*t rather ascri!ed it :follo+in" @verro[s; to the i,a"ination. 8oreover, @3*inas6s vis aestimativa is to !e distin"*ished fro, @vicenna6s virt*s e)ti,ativa. /n the !anon O1EP /n the De anima, he nevertheless positions the esti,ative po+er at the top of the ,iddle ventricle= see 9arvey, The In9ard #its, F%. O15P Z*oted !y 9arvey, The In9ard #its, ?F= the !racketed interpolation is ,ine. &he disc*ssion of this para"raph is lar"ely adapted fro, 9arvey. O19P Z*oted !y 9arvey, The In9ard #its, ?F= the !racketed interpolation is ,ine. ( ?# ( @vicenna had descri!ed it as dependin" on the other internal po+ers !*t as not properly located in any of the !rain ventricles= in the De anima, ho+ever, the vis e)ti,ativa +as considered to !e in the ,iddle ventricle and closely related in f*nction to i,a"inativa, co"itativa, and ,e,orialis :especially to the for,er t+o, since they also +ere seated in the ,iddle ventricle;. Gor @3*inas, the aesti,ativa, +hich in ani,als is the ,ost 4*d"A,entlike of the internal senses, is in h*,an !ein"s called cogitativa or ratio particularis. /t is the sensitive po+er that is ,ost deeply to*ched !y the rationality of h*,an nat*re. /t is the po+er !y +hich the h*,an !ein" kno+s individ*als as fallin" *nder a *niversal, altho*"h only intellect can kno+ the *niversal as s*ch. Bne ,odern analysis of the co"itativa in @3*inas e)plains it this +ay: Does therefore the co"itative, a sensi!le and or"anic fac*lty, kno+ the co,,on nat*re, that is, ,an or oak as *niversalQ St. &ho,as is caref*l to say no s*ch thin". 9e says that the co"itative kno+s the individ*al as e)istin", and as co,in" *nder the h*,an nat*re. Strictly speakin", therefore, it kno+s only the individ*al. <et, the h*,an !ein" +ho ,akes *se of his co"itative sense !eco,es conscio*s-a thin" that the !r*te !east co*ld never do-that this o!4ectAindivid*al +hich he apprehends !y his co"itative reali7es the *niversal nat*re of ,an or of oak, and he kno+s this *niversal nat*re of ,an or of oak !y his intellect.O?$P 0ranted that there is already a kind of tho*"ht that is at least i,plicit in the hi"hest internal senses: ho+ does intellect *se the phantas, prepared !y the, to think in the f*ll senseQ &he ans+ers to this 3*estion in the @ra!ic and Latin 8iddle @"es +ere ,anifold. @vicenna had a"ent intellect strip the i,a"e of its last vesti"es of ,atter and accidents, !*t this stripped i,a"e +as not itself i,pressed in receptive or passive intellect :+hat @ristotle had called 6no*s pathetikos6;= rather, the passive intellect +as there!y ,ade ready for the intelli"i!le for, that ca,e fro, a"ent intellect itself. &his a"ent intellect, the last of the e,anations of 0od, +as separate fro, all h*,an so*ls= as the co,,on so*rce of intelli"i!ility, it e)plained ho+ different people co*ld !e said to *nderstand the sa,e thin" in the sa,e +ay. &his pro!le, of the sa,eness of *nderstandin" in different actors and acts of *nderstandin" +as of even ,ore cr*cial i,portance to @verro[s, +ho did not accept @vicenna6s esti,ative po+er as a special fac*lty. 9e !elieved that the ancients had attri!*ted the f*nctions of esti,ation :receivin"

nonsensi!le intentions; to the i,a"inative po+er, and he n*,!ered the Ci,,aterial fac*ltiesC that @ristotle had posited as fo*r: co,,on sense, i,a"ination, co"itation, and ,e,ory. B*t in so,e O?$P K*lien Pe"haire, C@ Gor"otten Sense, the Co"itative accordin" to St &ho,as @3*inas,C %choolman ?$ :19F#;: 1?1A1F$, ?1$A??9= see p. 1F$. ( ?F ( conte)ts @verro[s red*ced the n*,!er to three, the i,a"inative, the co"itative, and the ,e,orative, one for each of the three ventricles of the !rain that he identified. Gor !oth @vicenna and @verro[s, the i,a"ination is very close to the hi"hest po+er that h*,an !ein"s possess per se. /n @vicenna no*s poietAikos, or a"ent intellect, does not properly !elon" to h*,an !ein"s, altho*"h passive intellect :no*s pathetikos; does= !*t there is at least a partial identification in @vicenna of passive intellect +ith i,a"ination :e."., in the 3ita4 al+.a7at, he calls i,a"ination a second passive intellect;.O?1P Gor @verro[s, i,a"ination, that is, the po+er of dividin" and co,posin" i,a"es :+hich he also so,eti,es referred to as co"itation;, +as 3*ite si,ply the hi"hest po+er of ,an= !oth the passive and the a"ent intellect +ere fro, 0od and co*ld !e participated in !y ,an only in the presence of a properly disposed phantas,. @ll five :or fo*r, or three; of the internal senses are involved in the preparation of phantas,s, and one of the,, the co"itative or its e3*ivalent *nder so,e other na,e, even CthinksC those phantas,s accordin" to a partic*lar for,. Gor the f*t*re history of the theory of the internal senses, in partic*lar for Descartes6s conception of the f*nction of i,a"ination, @vicenna6s teachin" is cr*cial, especially in that it +as trans,itted +ith essential inte"rity to the Latin 9i"h 8iddle @"es !y @l!ert the 0reat.O??P B*t @verro[s6s sche,e had its proponents as +ell, one of the, no less infl*ential than @3*inas. Despite the ,any variations that arose :especially in the *se of ter,inolo"y;, its !asics, its Ctopo"raphyC of or"anically located internal senses that effect the co,,on field of sensation, the retention of i,a"es and reactions to i,a"es, the recall of the,, and their co,position and division, re,ained canonical ri"ht *p to the !e"innin" of the early ,odern period in 1*rope. &he internal senses +ere *nderstood as ,*ltiple, as corporeal, and as to so,e de"ree already involvin", or at least i,itatin", tho*"ht, and the i,a"inative f*nctions +ere conceived as closely connected +ith, even identical to, the co"itation of partic*lars. /n the tradition of internal senses, e)ternal sensations are not i,,ediately taken *p !y the intellect*al po+ers !*t rather CprocessedC at an inter,ediate level. @ltho*"h any ani,ate !ein" is a!le to ,ake very si,ple discri,inations at the level of sensation-vision, not an internal sense or intellect, distin"*ishes !lack fro, +hite and red fro, !l*e-,ore sophisticated distinctions re3*ire a hi"her fac*lty :co,,on sense first of all, +hich distin"*ishes color fro, depth fro, aro,a;. &hese distinctions are O?1P See G. >ah,an, Avicenna's Psychology :London: 0eoffrey C*,!erle"e, for B)ford University Press, 19%?;, 65A69, 11%A116. @lready in anti3*ity co,,entators like Si,plici*s had identified i,a"ination +ith passive intellect. O??P See Steneck, CPro!le, of the /nternal Senses in the Go*rteenth Cent*ry,C esp. chaps. 1A#. ( ?% ( not yet intellect*al, ho+ever: 4*st as there is an a+areness at the level of vision, there is another a+areness at the level of each internal sense.O?#P &he internal senses as a "ro*p are capa!le not 4*st of odern

re"isterin" i,a"es delivered !y the e)ternal senses !*t also of co,parin", contrastin", deco,posin", and reco,posin" the, and :since it is of the essence of perfor,in" discri,ination and co,parison; of seein" one i,a"e in relation :identity and difference; to others. &his capacity of relatin" i,a"es to one another is +hat allo+s the internal senses at their peak to e)ercise the po+er of partic*lar 4*d",ent. G*rther,ore, since the internal senses are sensitive po+ers, they have or"ans or or"anic location 4*st as the e)ternal senses do. &he ,edieval thinkers, s*pported !y !oth ,edical and philosophical tradition, assi"ned the, to the interior spaces of the !rain, the ventricles enclosed !y the t+o he,ispheres. &hro*"ho*t the ,edieval and early ,odern periods one finds ill*strations and dia"ra,s of the positions of the internal senses in the head= it +as c*sto,ary, for e)a,ple, to place the co,,on sense in one of the front or anterior ventricles, the reco,!inative po+er of i,a"ination or co"itation in the ,iddle ventricle, and the ,e,ory in the posterior ventricle. &he ,edieval +riters +ere 3*ite a+are, therefore, that anato,ical and physiolo"ical differences !et+een individ*als co*ld affect the operations of the internal senses. 8oreover, since a phantas, is re3*ired for thinkin" proper and the phantas, is prepared !y the internal senses, lesions or diseases co*ld i,pair a person6s a!ility to think and *nderstand. /n short, the constit*tion of the internal senses co*ld partic*lari7e, even personali7e, the po+ers of e)periencin" and kno+in" that are co,,on to all h*,an !ein"s. @ltho*"h / have disc*ssed the internal senses as part of @ristotelian tradition, it is i,portant to reali7e that the !asics of the doctrine +ere accepted even !y those +ho +ere not properly @ristotelian or Scholastic. Z*ite apart fro, the fact that ,edical kno+led"e appeared to s*pport it, the doctrine had analo"*es in other philosophical traditions, especially the Platonic and the Stoic. @cceptin" so,e version of the internal senses +as th*s no ,ore controversial in late ,edieval and early ,odern 1*rope than it +o*ld !e today to hold that different parts of the !rain are responsi!le for different ,otor, speech, and co"nitive f*nctions :indeed, one can trace a line fro, the psychophysiolo"y of the internal senses do+n to ,odern theories of !rain f*nction;.O?FP &he ,edical tradition also helped contri!*te to a synthesis of @ristotelian the,es +ith the Stoic conception of O?#P &his parcelin" o*t of a+areness is not at all co*nterint*itive. @n asse,!ly line +orker ,i"ht !e a!le to sort parts !y color +hile daydrea,in", and a driver ,i"ht !e a!le to ne"otiate traffic all the +hile she is considerin" a ,athe,atical proof. O?FP @s is done in KeanAPierre 0han"e*), .euronal an: The -iology of ind, trans. Dr. La*rence 0arey :B)ford: B)ford University Press, 195%;, and in Clarke and De+h*rst, Illustrated (istory of -rain $unction. ( ?6 ( i,a"ination and psychophysiolo"ical f*nctions. &he Stoics !elieved that the nerves +ere hollo+ t*!es filled +ith pneuma, a very fine, active ,atter capa!le of ,ovin" and ani,atin" "rosser ,atter. &hese spirits, as they ca,e to !e called, +ere conceived as the ,eans !y +hich the i,pressions of the senses +ere conveyed to the co,,and center of the !rain, the hegemonikon , and it +as also !y ,eans of these spirits that thinkin" co*ld co,,and the !ody. &he Stoic pne*,a doctrine *lti,ately !eca,e e,!edded in the psychophysiolo"y of the internal senses. /n partic*lar, spirits +ere tho*"ht to fill the ventricles of the !rain= altho*"h !y today6s standards there +as ins*fficient attention to the details of the role they played in internal sensation, there +as little do*!t that they did. / have ,entioned the Stoics not si,ply !eca*se they contri!*ted a theory of ani,al spirits to the psychophysiolo"y of internal sensation or !eca*se, as +e shall see in +hat s*cceeds, hollo+ nerves filled +ith spirits are part of Descartes6s ne*rophysiolo"y. &he Stoics +ere also responsi!le, it appears, for the artic*lation of a concept*al str*ct*re and ter,inolo"y that dra,atically raised the stat*s of

i,a"ination, a str*ct*re that +as conveyed to the Latin .est !y +ay of ,edieval /sla,ic and Ke+ish thinkers. /n &ho,as @3*inas and other hi"h ,edieval Latin +riters, one finds 6i,a"iAnatio6 *sed in the sense of p*re concept*al int*ition, of a p*rely intellect*al i,a"ination. &his *sa"e can !e traced to a s,all n*,!er of concept*al pairin"s that ca,e do+n to @ra!s and Persians fro, Stoic +ritin"s !*t +ere *sed to artic*late the essentially @ristotelian distinction !et+een si,ple intellect*al apprehension :nous, intellectus ; and disc*rsive rational tho*"ht :dianoia, ratio ;.O?%P &his ,i"ht see, at first only to add to the conf*sion a!o*t the proper ,eanin" and stat*s of 6i,a"inatio6, +hich even in the narro+er confines of the Scholastic tradition +as rendered !y an *nsteady voca!*lary often *sed in 3*ite different senses !y thinkers close to one another in ti,e and place. B*t the variety and even the conf*sion ,ay testify instead to the nat*re and i,portance of the i,a"e. &he vario*s sensory and ,ental capacities for prod*cin", reprod*cin", and considerin" i,a"es are relevant to the entire ran"e of ,ental e)perience, fro, conceivin", storin", and recoverin" ordinary sense i,a"es, thro*"h reco,!inin" the, and !rin"in" the, into 4*d",entlike relations to one another, to *nderstandin" anythin" +hatsoever that appears to the ,ind. &his ran"e of po+ers and pro!le,s crystalli7ed into a net+ork arran"ed a!o*t the ter,s 6i,a"inatio6, 6phantasia6, 6i,a"inativa6, a net+ork that +as not in need of any sin"le philosophical, scientific, or ,edical tradition to !e e)ploited, adapted, c*ltivated, and, *lti,ately, handed do+n. &he pro!A O?%P See 9arry @*stryn .olfson, C&he &er,s tasa99urCDE and tasdi1CDE in @ra!ic Philosophy and &heir 0reek, Latin and 9e!re+ 13*ivalents,C oslem #orld :19F#; : 11FA1?5. ( ?E ( le,atic of the internal senses, in partic*lar of the i,a"ination, th*s took on a relatively a*tono,o*s c*lt*ral e)istence. @ltho*"h +e have very little specific infor,ation a!o*t ho+ Descartes !eca,e a+are of the pro!le,atic of i,a"ination and the internal senses, its pervasiveness ,akes esta!lishin" any specific connection ,oot. &hat Descartes +as e)posed to it at school is a nearAcertainty. .e sho*ld recall that the threeAyearAlon" philosophy c*rric*l*, of the Kes*it 9enry /D Colle"e at La GlRche, +hich Descartes attended fro, aro*nd 16$E to 161%, foc*sed on the +orks of @ristotle and &ho,as @3*inas. O?6P 8oreover, the Kes*its +ere the s*pre,e c*lt*ral "atherers of their day, collectin" artiAfacts, infor,ation, and kno+led"e in their a,!ition to evan"eli7e and to ,a"nify the "lory of 0od. .e kno+ that the precocio*s >enS Descartes +as per,itted to read ,ore +idely than his fello+ st*dents= do*!tless he enco*ntered i,a"ination and the internal senses in ,any !ooks and ,any different conte)ts. .e shall e)a,ine several of these conte)ts in the chapters that follo+, ran"in" fro, the ,athe,atical to the spirit*al. Gor no+ it +ill !e eno*"h to ,ention a sin"le +ork that likely +as availa!le at La GlRche and that reflects the Kes*its6 conception of the philosophical and co"nitive relevance of i,a"ination. / a, referrin" to the co,,entary on @ristotle6s De anima prepared !y Kes*it scholars at the University of Coi,!ra :in presentAday Port*"al;, one of the soAcalled Coi,!ran Co,,entaries. &he De anima co,,entary presents the 0reek te)t and a Latin translation on facin" pa"es= these te)ts are s*rro*nded !y footnoted co,,ent and disc*ssion ran"in" fro, the philolo"ical to the philosophical= and after each ,a4or section of te)t and co,,ent, the for,at is interr*pted !y 1uaestiones that disc*ss the f*nda,ental theses and conflictin" interpretations pro and contra :i.e., that reflect the !asic str*ct*re of the Scholastic 1uaestio ;. Bne of these, the ei"hth 3*estion foc*sin" on the first half of the third !ook of De anima, asks +hether phantas,s :and th*s the po+er of i,a"ination; are tr*ly re3*ired for all intellect*al activity. @fter a prolon"ed disc*ssion

O?6P Bn the years of Descartes6s attendance, see 0eneviRve >odisALe+is, 6Descartes6 Life and the Develop,ent of 9is Philosophy,C in The !am4ridge !ompanion to Descartes, ed. Kohn Cottin"ha, :Ca,!rid"e: Ca,!rid"e University Press, 199?;, ?1A%E, esp. p. ?#. Bn ed*cation at La GlRche, see Ca,ille de >oche,ontei), 6n !ollFge de '*suites auB G/II et G/III siFcles: &e !ollFge (enri I/ de &a $lFche, F vols. :Le 8ans: Le"*iche*), 1559;, esp. vol. F. &he Ratio studiorum, +hich "overned ed*cation at Kes*it schools, does not ,ention the teachin" of @ristotle6s De anima, !*t psycholo"ical topics are incl*ded in t+o !ooks +hich 9ere ta*"ht, the etaphysics and the .i9machean )thics, and the Catholic doctrine of separate s*!stances +o*ld !e scarcely intelli"i!le +itho*t distin"*ishin" the kno+in" processes of h*,an !ein"s, +ho re3*ire phantas,s for kno+in", fro, an"elic and divine kno+in". &he internal senses are ,entioned in a collection of theses s*!,itted !y a st*dent in 16?c= see >oche,ontei), 6n !ollFge de '*suites, F:#%?. ( ?5 ( the editors concl*de that phantas,s are necessary for ali Cordinary and co,,onC ,atters. &he e)ceptions are revealin": Christ co*ld *nderstand apart fro, phantas,s !eca*se he had a divine as +ell as a h*,an nat*re= in the afterlife, +hen h*,an so*ls +ill !e 4oined to "lorified !odies, it +ill !e possi!le to kno+ intellect*al thin"s directly :altho*"h in the "lorified state it +ill also !e possi!le to think !y +ay of phantas,s;= and, in the present life on earth, the very fe+ +ho are "iven a special "race fro, 0od that raises the, to a rapt*ro*s, ecstatic conte,plation of his essence think and kno+ +itho*t phantas,s. B*t CordinaryC h*,an ecstasy, like that e)perienced !y Socrates +hen he stood in rapt conte,plation of the /deas for a +hole day and ni"ht :told !y @lci!iades in the %ymposium ;, re3*ires phantas,s, as do all other activities of thinkin" and kno+in" that h*,an !ein"s perfor, in accordance +ith their nat*res.O?EP &he e)ceptions are therefore hardly e)ceptions= for all practical and theoretical p*rposes, apart fro, sit*ations in +hich the h*,an !ein" passes !eyond the nat*ral into the s*pernat*ral real,, there can !e no thinkin" and kno+in" +itho*t the internal senses and their phantas,s. @ll reasonin", conceivin", *nderstandin", all science and tr*th, ,*st co,e to *s !y +ay of and acco,panied !y phantas,s.

-. T0E PSYC0OP0YSIOLO+Y OF T0E RE+ULAE 2RULE !34

9avin" re,arked these thin"s, +e are ready to co,,ence o*r e)ploration of i,a"ination and the internal senses in Descartes. @nyone fa,iliar only +ith the Descartes of standard interpretations is likely to find a close readin" of the Regulae ad directionem ingenii s*rprisin", since there the po+er of i,a"ination is "iven a central role in kno+in" scientifically. &he f*ll e)tent of the i,portance of i,a"ination in the Regulae +ill !e the foc*s of Part // of this +ork. &o "ain a provisional sense of its role, it is *sef*l to look at a passa"e fro, the t+elfth r*le that presents Descartes6s early psychophysiolo"ical theory of h*,an co"nition. @ltho*"h there are controversies a!o*t the dates of co,position of the Regulae -so,e think Descartes +orked on it for a!o*t a decade, !e"innin" as early as 1615 :+hen he +as t+entyAt+o years old; and endin" aro*nd 16?5, hereas others think that the entire +ork +as prod*ced in a short period endin" at the latter date-it is !elieved that !y the ti,e he !e"an the investi"ations of &e onde :perhaps in late 16?9 or early 16#$; he had a!andoned the Regulae. Dirt*ally all st*dents of the 3*estion +o*ld a"ree O?EP / have *sed the third edition: !ommentarii !ollegii !onim4ricensis %ocietatis lesu, in tres li+4ros De anima, Aristotelis %tagiritae, #d ed. :Lyon: 9orace Cardon, 16$F;= see 3*estion 5, F%?AF%9. &he first edition appeared in 1%95.

( ?9 ( that >*le 1?, +hich disc*sses the psychophysiolo"y of kno+led"e, +as +ritten shortly !efore that a!andon,ent. &h*s, if +e place the !e"innin" of Descartes6s post"rad*ate intellect*al career in 1615 :th*s ,ore or less takin" the Discourse on the ethod at its +ord;, the Regulae's psychophysiolo"y falls ro*"hly ,id+ay !et+een this !e"innin" and Descartes6s first p*!lication, the Discourse and its acco,panyin" scientific essays :16#E;. 1arly in >*le 1?, +hich is !y far the lon"est of the t+entyAone e)tant r*les,O?5P Descartes presents a theory of sensation, i,a"ination, and *nderstandin" that has o!vio*s connections to the doctrine of internal senses, +hich it adapts in a novel +ay to a ne+ scientific sensi!ility. &he r*le e)plains that i,pressions received !y the sense or"ans are passed on to the sens*s co,,*nis, or co,,on sense, fro, +here they are f*rther trans,itted to the phantasia, or i,a"ination, +hich he calls Ca tr*e part of the !ody . . . of s*ch ,a"nit*de that its different parts can take on ,any distinct fi"*res one after another and *s*ally retain these for a lon" ti,eC :@& L F1F;= fro, this phantasia the kno+in" force :vis cognoscens ; can then receive an i,pression, or, reciprocally, the kno+in" force can i,press a ne+ fi"*re in it. &he e)ternal senses, Cinsofar as they are parts of the !ody, altho*"h +e apply the, to o!4ects thro*"h action, vi7., local ,otion, nevertheless properly sense thro*"h passion only, in the sa,e +ay in +hich +a) receives an i,pression fro, a sealC :@& L F1?;= that is, they are p*rely passive or receptive in sensation proper. 9e e,phasi7es that the co,parison to an i,pression in +a) is no ,ere fi"*re of speech :per analogiarn ;: +e ,*st think of the Ce)ternal fi"*re of the sentient !ody as !ein" really chan"ed !y the o!4ect, 4*st as that +hich is in the s*rface of the +a) is chan"ed !y the sealC :@& L F1?;. &his holds not 4*st for to*ch !*t also for the eye :Cthe first opa3*e ,e,!rane that is in the eye receives the fi"*re i,pressed !y an ill*,ination arrayed +ith vario*s colorsC; and all the other senses :the first ,e,!rane i,pervio*s to the o!4ect C!orro+s a ne+ fi"*re fro, the so*nd, the odor, and the flavorC;. Descartes notes f*rther that +e can conceive this ,ore clearly if +e ,ake the s*pposition that the variety of colors, so*nds, odors, and flavors corresponds to the "reat variety of possi!le t+oA di,ensional fi"*res. 2e)t, 4*st as the ,otion of one end of a pen "ets passed on ri"idly and instantaneo*sly to the rest of the instr*,ent as one +rites, so does the sti,*l*s of the sense or"an "et passed on Cto a certain other part of the !ody, +hich is called co,,on sense,C and this co,,on sense Cf*nctions like a seal for for,in" in phantasia or i,a"ination, as if O?5P &he individ*al r*les consist of a r*!ric or headin" and an e)position or co,,entary, +ith the e)ception of >*les 19 thro*"h ?1, +hich have only headin"s. Gro, Descartes6s re,arks at the end of >*le 1? and the !e"innin" of >*le 1# it is evident that he intended to present thirtyAsi) in all, divided into three "ro*ps of t+elve. ( #$ ( in +a), the sa,e fi"*res or ideasO?9P that co,e, p*re and +itho*t !ody, fro, the e)ternal sensesC :@& L F1F;. @fter !riefly e)plainin" ho+ phantasia can ca*se ,otions in the nerves to !rin" a!o*t the loco,otion of the !ody, he ascends to the *lti,ate po+er, the vis co"noscens, Cthat force thro*"h +hich +e properly kno+ thin"s,C +hich is p*rely spirit*al. /ndeed, it is the partic*lar f*nctionin" of this kno+in" force that prod*ces the differentiation of the other fac*lties. /n all these Ofac*ltiesP this force so,eti,es s*ffers, so,eti,es acts, and i,itates no+ the seal, no+ the +a)= +hich nevertheless is to !e taken here only thro*"h analo"y, for in corporeal thin"s nothin" at ail si,ilar to this is to !e fo*nd. @nd one and the sa,e is this force, +hich, if it applies itself alon" +ith i,a"ination to the co,,on sense, is said to see,

to*ch, etc.= if to i,a"ination alone +hen Oi,a"ination isP arrayed +ith diverse fi"*res, it is said to re,e,!er Ore,inisciP= if to the sa,e OJi,a"inationP in order to fashion ne+ ones, it is said to i,a"ine or conceive= if finally it acts alone, it is said to *nderstand: the +ay in +hich this last occ*rs / +ill e)po*nd at len"th in its place. @nd therefore the sa,e Okno+in" forceP accordin" to these diverse f*nctions is called either p*re intellect, or i,a"ination, or ,e,ory, or sense= it is properly called in"eni*,, ho+ever, +hen it at one ,o,ent for,s ne+ ideas in phantasia, at another applies itself Oinc*,!atP to those already ,ade. :@& L F1%AF16; Several thin"s are i,,ediately strikin" a!o*t this passa"e. &he first is ho+ closely i,a"ination is coordinated +ith a physiolo"ical theory. /n one sense, the i,a"ination is a physical or"an in the !rain, identified no ,ore specifically than !y the ter, 6phantasia6. /n another, i,a"ination is the res*lt of the kno+in" force applyin" itself to :or, ,ore literally, !earin" do+n *pon; this or"an. @ second strikin" note is ho+ central a role i,a"ination plays in the f*nctionin" h*,an !ein". &he kno+in" force can act on its o+n-in that case it is called p*re intellect-!*t in all other respects it acts *pon or thro*"h the or"an phantasia.O#$P Sensation is the kno+in" force O?9P /n the Regulae, and even in ,any occ*rrences in the Discourse on the synony,o*s +ith 6corporeal i,a"e6. ethod, 6idea6 is

O#$P @ recent translation of >*le 1? o!sc*res the relationship of the kno+in" force and phantasia to the co,,on sense. &he Latin cla*se Cvnica,3*e esse, 3*ae vel accipit fi"*ras ] sens* co,,*ni si,*l c*, phantasi^C :@& L F1% U. 16A15; is rendered as Cit Othe kno+in" forceP is one sin"le po+er, +hether it receives fi"*res fro, the 6co,,on6 sense at the sa,e ti,e as does the corporeal i,a"inationC= see CS8, 1:F?. &his translation i,plies that the phantasia and the kno+in" force are si,*ltaneo*sly !*t separately applyin" the,selves to the co,,on sense. B*t this is to read the phrase Csi,*l c*, phantasi^,C a prepositional a!lative, as tho*"h it introd*ced an elliptical s*!4*nctive cla*se, +ith 6phantasia6 in the no,inative :co,pare the last line of p. F1%, +hich has a parallel a!lative e)pression in Cvis, 3*ae, si applicet se c*, i,a"inatione ad sens*, co,,*ne,C;. 8oreover, 6si,*l6 pro!a!ly sho*ld not !e taken in the strictly te,poral sense !*t as 4oined +ith 6c*,6 to e)press a sharin" of action :i.e., 6to"ether +ith6;= s.v. 6si,*l6, "Bford &atin Dictionary, ed. P. 0. .. 0lare :B)ford: B)ford University Press, for the Clarendon Press, 195?; 9aldane and >oss rendered this +ith the ,ore defensi!le Cit is a sin"le a"ency, +hether it receives i,pressions fro, the co,,on sense si,*ltaneo*sly +ith the fancy,C +hich at least leaves the constr*al open= see The Philosophital #orks of Descartes, ? vols., ed. and trans. 1li7a!eth S. 9aldane and 0. >. &. >oss, corrected ed. :Ca,!rid"e: Ca,!rid"e University Press, 19#1;, 1:#5. 2ote also that 4*st a fe+ lines do+n fro, the cla*se in 3*estion, i,a"ination is "iven a role in all acts of the kno+in" force, e)cept +hen that force arts on its o+n :@& L F1%1. ?EAF161. 1?;. 8y preferred readin" is Cone and the sa,e is this force, +hich, if it applies itself alon" +ith i,a"ination to the co,,on sense. . . .C ( #1 ( applyin" itself in diverse +ays to the co,,on sense Calon" +ith i,a"inationC= re,iniscence is this force applyin" itself to i,a"ination alone insofar as there are fi"*res already i,pressed there= i,a"inin" :or conceivin", a not *ni,portant alternative that +e shall e)plore presently; is the kno+in" force applyin" itself in order to prod*ce ne+ fi"*res. 1ven the ,otion of the !ody depends on i,a"ination: C/t is to !e conceived that the ,otive force, or the nerves the,selves, takes its ori"in fro, the !rain, in +hich there is the phantasia, fro, +hich these OnervesP are ,oved in vario*s +ays, 4*st as the co,,on sense Ois ,ovedP !y e)ternal sense, or 4*st as the +hole pen Ois ,ovedP !y its lo+er partC :@& L F1FAF1%;. &his conception can even !e *sed, Descartes says, to acco*nt for Call ,ove,ents of

other ani,als, altho*"h in these a!sol*tely no co"nition of thin"s !e ad,itted, !*t only p*rely corporeal phantasia= like+ise as +ell in the +ay all those operations happen in o*rselves that +e acco,plish +itho*t any assistance fro, reasonC :@& L F1%;. &h*s i,a"inatioAphantasia-the for,er ter, i,plyin" chiefly the activity of ,akin" i,a"es, the latter the or"an +here the i,a"es are for,ed -is at +ork in virt*ally all activities of the h*,an !ein", +ith the apparent e)ception of p*re intellection.O#1P .hat sho*ld +e ,ake of this passa"eQ /t is te,ptin" to interpret it si,ply as an early version of the theory of the conarion or pineal "land, +hich is in fact located in the ventricles of the !rain.O#?P /n the early 16#$s, O#1P /n the Regulae, 6i,a"inafio6 so,eti,es refers to the or"an, !*t ,ore often it refers to the po+er of i,a"inin"= 6phantasia6, !y contrast, refers al,ost e)l*sively to the or"an and activities of i,a"ination insofar as they are *nderstood as the act of an or"an. &he de"ree to +hich p*re intellect constit*tes an e)ception fro, i,a"inative involve,ent +ill !e disc*ssed later. O#?P &he pineal !ody or "land is an o*t"ro+th of the roof of the diencephalon, one of the three parts of the fore!rain. /t is on the *pper,ost part of the !rain ste,, +hich is t*cked a+ay into the concave !ases of the !rain he,ispheres :kno+n as the ventricles;= the pineal "land is, specifically, in the third ventricle. /t is one of the fe+ !rain parts that do not develop !ilateral str*ct*res, and it is near the thala,*s, +here all the nerves fro, the senses :e)cept for s,ell; co,e to"ether. Descartes says that he chose the pineal "land as the central or"an of the sensory syste, !eca*se he tho*"ht it +as the only place for the t+o channels of infor,ation fro, the ri"ht and left side sense or"ans :e."., the ri"ht and left eye; to !e *nified into a sin"le i,pression :see &'(omme, @& L/ 1EFA1EE= Dioptrics, @& D/ 1?5A 1#$= and Passions, @& L/ #%?A#%#;. ( #? ( Descartes e)pressly identified this "land as the focal point of !odily activity: e)ternal i,pressions are conveyed to it fro, the sense or"ans !y ,eans of ,otions trans,itted alon" the nerves, and, in t*rn, it is the so*rce of flo+s of the soAcalled ani,al spirits that prod*ce the ani,al6s !ody ,otions. &he ,ind, +hich is a radically different kind of s*!stance fro, !ody, so,eho+ takes note of +hat is happenin" to the pineal "land and is a!le to prod*ce ,otions of that "land. Precisely ho+ s*ch thin"s happen !et+een radically distinct s*!stances, the ,ain pro!le, of ,indA!ody d*alis,, has e)ercised "enerations of Cartesians and critics, of co*rse. @t any rate, Descartes conceived thinkin" and !ody to !e inti,ately altho*"h ,ysterio*sly 4oined in h*,an !ein"s. 8ost people are *na!le to conceive the, as distinct !eca*se of this inti,ate 4oinin", a fact that sets the ,ain pro!le, for Descartes6s principal +orks, in partic*lar the editations, +hich appears to teach that +e can co,e to a p*re e)perience of o*rselves !y t*rnin" a+ay fro, reliance on the senses and i,a"ination.O##P /nterpretin" phantasia ,erely as the protopineal "land see,s 3*ite nat*ral. 2evertheless, a closer look can help clarify s,all !*t si"nificant differences !et+een the phantasia of the Regulae and the pineal "land of Descartes6s later +ork. &he pineal "land is the Cco,,and centerC of the a*tono,o*s ,echanical syste, that is the !ody. 6@*tono,o*s ,echanical syste,6 ,eans that the !ody6s f*nctionin" is e)plained !y the ,echanical la+s of the ,aterial *niverse. .ithin this syste, the pineal "land is affected !y ,otions of nerves and flo+s or c*rrents of the ani,al spirits, and it *ses these ,otions and flo+s to direct ne+ flo+s that prod*ce !ody ,otions and other physiolo"ical responses. &his syste,, +hich is at +ork in !oth ani,als and the h*,an !ein", re3*ires no conscio*sness to f*nction acc*rately and effectively. @ la,! flees fro, a +olf !eca*se the nerve ,otions and spirit flo+s elicit this as a ,echanical reaction= like+ise a h*,an !ein" +ithdra+s a hand fro, the searin" heat of a fla,e, or

,i"ht flee at the si"ht of a +olf, !eca*se of s*ch ,echanical operations. B*t in the case of a h*,an !ein" facin" a +olf, Cmight fleeC is the e)actly appropriate loc*tion, !eca*se there are the additional factors of ,ind and +ill. &he presence of the +olf can tri""er an a*to,atic response, !*t it ,i"ht also set the ,ind to +ork on the 3*estion of +hat to do. /f a sol*tion to the sit*ation appears, the ,ind, thro*"h its inti,ate f*sion +ith the pineal "land, can ind*ce "land ,otions that tri""er the appropriate !odily ,echanis,s i,ple,entin" +hat the ,ind has decided. &his ,indA!ody interaction is +hat is conventionally *nderstood as a key ele,ent of Cartesianis,. O##P Later, in chapter 6, / shall s*""est that altho*"h the editations does teach *s ho+ to t*rn a+ay fro, the corporeal po+ers, it does not teach that the essence of human 4eing is ,ind apart fro, !ody. ( ## ( /n >*le 1?, ho+ever, Descartes *ses a voca!*lary ,ore psycholo"ical than ,echanical to descri!e +hat happens on the +ay fro, sense or"an to phantasia. Sens*s co,,*nis, i,a"inatio, phantasia, and ,e,oria are of co*rse the in+ard or internal senses that played an i,portant role in Scholastic and >enaissance psycholo"y, in partic*lar in acco*nts of the pro"ress of a sensi4ie species fro, sense or"ans to the hi"her sensitive fac*lties. &he Regulae descri!es a trans,ission of i,pressions, !*t this +ay of conceivin" thin"s is not necessarily a ,odern trait: @ristotle hi,self *sed the i,a"e of the si"net rin" i,pressin" its shape into +a) to ill*strate the process of sensation. &he i,pression that Descartes descri!es is not in the first instance an i,pression of a ,echanical ,otion or force !*t rather the i,pression of an i,a"e. /f +e attend caref*lly to Descartes6s e)planation in >*le 1?, +e see that it is not intrinsically ,echanistic at all. &here are no ato,s, no collisions, no trans,ission of ,otion and nothin" !*t ,otion. Bf co*rse, Descartes descri!es a ,otion that takes place instantaneo*sly, like the si,*ltaneo*s ,otion of all the parts of a pen, !*t its p*rpose is not to red*ce sensation to ,otion !*t to ill*strate ho+ an i,pression or fi"*re ,ade on a sense or"an can !e trans,itted +itho*t lapse of ti,e. 8oreover, the trans,ission of the i,pression sketched in the Regulae takes place as a +hole, that is, as the trans,ission of an inte"ral i,a"e, +hereas in Descartes6s later physiolo"ical acco*nts the i,pression is !roken *p into ,any discrete ,otions !eca*se of the ,*ltiplicity of individ*al nerve fi!ers that are involved in the trans,ission of sensation.O#FP 2or is it clear fro, the Regulae passa"e +hat the ,edi*, of trans,ission is. /t is not clearly the nerves, since they are disc*ssed only as the ,edi*, for prod*cin" the locomotion of the !ody :like raisin" one6s ar, or +alkin";, and there is no ,ention of the involve,ent of ani,al spirits. Unlike the case of the p*rely ,echanical pineal syste,, the e,phasis in >*le 1? is on the internal senses and their relations to one another, that is, on traditional topics of ,edieval and >enaissance psycholo"y +ith their or"anic correlates. @ perhaps ,ore pre"nant difference !et+een phantasia and the pineal "land is s*""ested !y a si,ple synony,y noted in the passa"e. .hen the kno+in" force applies itself to the i,a"ination in order to for, ne+ fi"*res, it Cis said to i,a"ine or conceive.C &he con4*nction of imaginari and concipere s*""ests that i,a"ination is !ein" taken, not in the restricted sense of a po+er that ,erely for,s i,a"es, !*t in a ,ore e)pansive one that re"ards it as a tr*ly co"nitive po+er.O#%P &he i,portance of this synony,y is O#FP See Dioptrics, @& D/ 1F6. O#%P &he editations, of co*rse, *ses 6i,a"inari6 in a ,ore restricted sense. &he synony,y !et+een the t+o Latin ter,s is to !e fo*nd also in a very early +ork fro, late 1615, the !ompendiurn musicae = see chap. ?, Sec. @.

( #F ( reinforced +hen one considers that the for,al definition in >*le # of intuitus, +hich is the f*nda,ental +ay of kno+in" ta*"ht in the Regulae , calls it a concept :conceptum ; of ,ind :mens ;. !onceptum is, of co*rse, the past participle of concipere. /s it possi!le that Descartes had in ,ind so,ethin" like the ,edieval notion of an i,a"inatio that is not 4*st an internal sense !*t also an intellect*al po+er capa!le of e)ercisin" the si,plest and ,ost !asic act of ,ind, the act of int*itin" a conceptQ @nother 3*estion is inti,ated !y Descartes6s re,ark that the kno+in" force not only notices i,a"es present in phantasia !*t also applies itself to the co,,on sense +ith i,a"ination :cum imaginatione ; in the process of seein", to*chin", s,ellin", and so on. &hat is, not only is there an e)tra or"an involved in sensation, the sens*s co,,*nis, !*t the ,ind itself, *nder the na,e vis co"noscens, acts on it and see,s in this sense to !e ,ore deeply involved in the h*,an !ody than is the intellect that acts on the pineal syste,. /n the pineal syste, the "land is the *ni3*e location for direct !odyA,ind interaction= the ,ind can act directly there !*t no+here else. /f Descartes had already +orked o*t his t+oAs*!stance ,etaphysics and the correspondin" theory of the h*,an !ein" +hen he co,posed >*le 1?, +e +o*ld have to concl*de that this for,*lation is at !est slovenly. B*t it is not at all clear that he had +orked it o*t. /ndeed, it is likely that he did not +ork o*t the fo*ndations of his ,at*re ,etaphysics *ntil after he had "iven *p the Regulae.O#6P &hese fe+ CfactsC a!o*t differences !et+een the early and the later Descartes are ins*fficient in the,selves to !ear the +ei"ht of the thesis that the Regulae presents a conception of i,a"ination, h*,an co"nition, and the relation !et+een !ody and ,ind that is radically different fro, the one +e ordinarily attri!*te to Descartes. <et they are cl*es leadin" *s deeper into the pro!le, of *nderstandin" Descartes6s tho*"hts !efore 16#$ and th*s also into the 3*estions of +here, +hy, and ho+ he ,ay have chan"ed his ,ind a!o*t thin"s. 8oreover, the psychophysiolo"ical hypothesis of >*le 1? do*!tless reveals so,ethin" i,portant a!o*t the intentions of the pro4ect of the Regulae , for at least three reasons. Girst, at the o*tset of >*le 1? +e are told that the Cr*le concl*des everythin" that has !een O#6P @nother i,portant difference is that in the pineal syste, one really sho*ld not say that the ,ind prod*ces images in the pineal "land, or even that i,a"es are for,ed on its s*rface. &his clai, ,ay see, eccentric, "iven later te)ts that descri!e an i,a"e !ein" for,ed on the "land6s s*rface :e."., @& L/ 1E6 and #%%A#%6;. @s shall "rad*ally !eco,e clear, ho+ever, Descartes6s later, p*rely ,echanical conception of the processes involved in the ,otions and effects of nerve and ani,al spirit ,otions *nder,ines the le"iti,acy of reference to i,a"es in any literal sense, and therefore s*ch references ,i"ht !e interpreted as a thro+!ack to the prepineal acco*nts. See chap. E. @n acco*nt of the accepted *nderstandin" of Descartes6s physiolo"ical psycholo"y can !e fo*nd in 0ary 9atfield, CDescartes6 Physiolo"y and /ts >elation to 9is Psycholo"y,C in The !am4ridge !ompanion to Descartes, ed. Kohn Cottin"ha,, ##%A#E$ :Ca,!rid"e: Ca,!rid"e University Press, 199?;. ( #% ( said a!ove Oin the previo*s r*lesP, and it teaches in "eneral +hat +ill !eO#EP e)plicated in partic*larC :@& L F1$AF11;= th*s it see,s to serve as a linchpin to the ar"*,ent of the Regulae , !oth as a s*,,in" *p of the first part and an introd*ction to +hat follo+s. Second, altho*"h Descartes introd*ces the psychophysiolo"ical hypothesis as s*ppositions that +ill help the reader to conceive +hat he does not have space to e)po*nd at len"th :i,plyin" that he co*ld do so;, he says that they Cdi,inish nothin" of the tr*th of thin"s !*t only render everythin" clearer !y farC :@& L F1?;. Descartes ,*st !elieve that this i,a"inative hypothesis is really tr*e or at least "ets at a !asic tr*th. &hird, +e sho*ld re,ind o*rselves that the passa"e disc*ssin" the na,es correspondin" to the vario*s

activities of the kno+in" force concl*des +ith the definition of a fac*lty that +as not a,on" the standard Scholastic fac*lties !*t that nonetheless is cr*cial to the Regulae, ingenium. &he i,portance of this definition sho*ld !e o!vio*s, since after all it +as for the p*rpose of the direction of the in"eni*, that the Regulae +as co,posed.O#5P <et hardly anyone has taken notice of the si"nificance of this ter,. @s +e shall see in the co*rse of o*r disc*ssions, *nderstandin" precisely +hat in"eni*, is, is of capital i,portance for *nderstandin" +hat Descartes6s early philosophy is a!o*t. .e are not yet in a position to tackle the nat*re of in"eni*,, ho+ever. .e shall discover event*ally that the c*ltivation and direction of in"eni*, +as Descartes6s response to a pro!le, that he had !een thinkin" a!o*t for years, the role of the internal senses, specifically of i,a"ination, in kno+in". .e ,*st therefore first look into the pro!le,atics of i,a"ination and the internal senses in the earliest +ritin"s and doc*,entation availa!le. .e shall !e"in !y t*rnin" !ack to 1615, a year that ,arked a decisive t*rn-pro!a!ly the decisive t*rn-in Descartes6s life. O#EP @& has the past tense= @, 9, and 2, the f*t*re. O#5P &he title as Descartes intended it is so,e+hat con4ect*ral, since no ori"inal ,an*script is e)tant. /n partic*lar, the traditional Regulae ad directionem ingenii pro!a!ly sho*ld !e a,plified !y so,ethin" like Cde in3*irenda veritateC= see 8arion6s disc*ssion in RFgles utiles et claires pour la direction de l'esprit en la recherche de la v*rit*: Traduction selon le leBi1ue cart*sien et annotation conceptuelle, trans. KeanAL*c 8arion, +ith ,athe,atical notes !y Pierre Costa!el, @rchives /nternationales d69istoire des /dles, no. 55 :&he 9a"*e: 8artin*s 2i4hoff, 19EE;, 5%A5E. Gro, the fre3*ency of the occ*rrences of 6in"eni*,6 and 6in"enia6 in the r*le headin"s and co,,entaries, there can !e little do*!t of the ter,6s central the,atic i,portance: it appears in five of the first t+elve r*le headin"s, and a,on" no*ns ingenium is tied for total n*,!er of occ*rrences +ith figura :6$ each;, trailin" only cognitio :6?;, ratio :6F;, regula :69;, and the "eneric res :1%E;. ( #6 (

T*O T$e Onto(og'5 P$'sicomat$ematics5 an. Ps'c$o(og' o% Imaging in t$e Ear(' *ritings o% Descartes
Chroniclin" Descartes6s life and tho*"ht !efore 16#$ is not an easy task. 1arly !io"raphers like Pierre Borel and @drien BailletO1P not infre3*ently invented pla*si!le and pla*si!ly ti,ed acco*nts of events and travels-pla*si!le in the sense, for e)a,ple, that the c*rio*s, +ellAtoAdo scion of a fa,ily that had achieved so,e distinction in the provinces :>ennes; ,i"ht have fo*nd his +ay, or at least +anted to find his +ay, to certain places and events. &he dates and the fact*ality of ,any events are therefore *ncertain. 1ven the chronolo"y of his early co,positions is often *nconfir,a!le, and those that have co,e do+n to *s are for the ,ost part fra",entary and *ndated. Until his death in S+eden in Ge!r*ary 16%$, Descartes preserved several note!ooks fro, this early period :as attested !y the Stockhol, inventory ,ade at his death= see @& L %A1?;, !*t none of the ori"inals has s*rvived. 1ven if they +ere e)tant there +o*ld still !e *ncertainties a!o*t the datin" of individ*al entries, since so,e +ere started fro, !oth ends :t*rnin" the note!ook *pside do+n; and divided !y topic. &he notes that s*rvive +ere copied :,any !y Cottfried .ilhel, Lei!ni7 or at his !ehest; accordin" to principles of selection that +e can only "*ess at, so that it is often i,possi!le to kno+ +ith certainty fro, +hich note!ooks and cate"ories they derive.O?P 8oreover, fro, the entire period precedin" &e onde :+hich Descartes !e"an ca. 16#$; there are 4*st three s*rvivin" +orks

co,plete or e)tensive eno*"h to ,erit readin" as inte"ral: CDe solidor*, eleA,entis,C a short :1F pa"es in @&; treatise on the re"*lar "eo,etric solids= O1P Pierre Borel, /itae Renati !artesii, summi philosophi, !ompendium :Paris, 16%6;= and @drien Baillet, /ie de onsieur Descartes, ? vols. :Paris, 1691;. O?P B*t see the !rilliant reconstr*ction in 9enri 0o*hier, &es PremiFres pens*es de Descartes: !ontri4ution H l'histoire de l'anti+Renaissance :Paris: K. Drin, 19%5;, 11A15. ( #E ( Regulae ad directionem ingenii :111 pa"es;, +hich altho*"h *nfinished has lon" !een reco"ni7ed as of capital i,portance in reconstr*ctin" the develop,ent of Descartes6s tho*"ht= and !ompendium musicae :%# pa"es;, a treat,ent of the principles of ,*sical rhyth,, consonance, and dissonance. &he first +ork, despite its !revity, is a si"nificant doc*,ent in the history of ,athe,atics, !*t it has !een ascri!ed vario*sly to !oth the early and the late 16?$s and so is not a s*ita!le first e)hi!it for esta!lishin" Descartes6s earliest intellect*al concerns. &he Regulae , altho*"h it is of key i,portance in this st*dy, has also !een rendered chronolo"ically *ncertain !y disp*tes over datin".O#P &he !ompendium musicae, ho+ever, is !oth co,plete and precisely dated= Descartes presented it to /saac Beeck,anOFP as a "ift on 2e+ <ear6s Day, 1619.

A. CO,PENDIU, ,USICAE6 I,A+INATION AND ,USICAL PERCEPTION

&he !ompendium !e"ins +ith vario*s reflections. C&he end Oof ,*sicP is that it please, and that it ,ove in *s vario*s affections.C C&he ,eans to the end, or the affections of so*nd, are t+o principal ones: na,ely differences in the ratio of d*ration or ti,e, and in the ratio of the intensity +ith re"ard to ac*te OJ sharpP and "rave OJ flatP. Gor the 3*ality of so*nd itself, fro, +hat !ody and in +hat +ay it co,es o*t ,ore pleasin", is treated !y physicists.C C@nd so, !eca*se of all thin"s it OJ the h*,an voiceP is ,ost in confor,ity to o*r spirits, it appears to ,ake the h*,an voice ,ost pleasin" to *s. &h*s perhaps Othe voiceP of a closest friend is ,ore pleasin" O#P &he co,position of the Regulae +as *ntil recently tho*"ht to have taken place in or aro*nd 16?5. KeanAPa*l .e!er, &a !onstitution du teBte des 5Regulae5 :Paris: SociStS d6Sdition d6ensei"n,ent s*pSrie*r, 196F;, chan"ed the ter,s of de!ate !y ar"*in" for a co,ple) layerin" of the +ork that has to !e *nraveled !y *sin" contradictions and tensions to distin"*ish !et+een parts and to reconstr*ct their se3*ence of co,position= in addition, he clai,ed that the last t+o para"raphs of >*le F, the soAcalled >*le FAB, +ere +here Descartes started the pro4ect in Bcto!er or early 2ove,!er 1619. &he .e!er thesis has str*ck even so,e of its s*pporters as overs*!tle. Kohn @. Sch*ster has red*ced the n*,!er of strata to !asically three: first, a concern +ith *niversal mathematics that predated 2ove,!er 1619 :the topic of FAB, ,entioned no+here else in the Regulae, at least not *nder that na,e;= second, an ela!oration of method in the period 1619A16?1 :correspondin" to the rest of the first ei"ht r*les;= and, finally, a ret*rn to he*ristic 3*estions and a pro!le,Asolvin" mathematics in the later 16?$s :reflected fro, the ,iddle of >*le 5 to the end of the e)tant +ork;. See Sch*ster, CDescartes6 athesis 6niversalis: 1619A?5,C in Descartes: Philosophy, athematics and Physics, ed. Stephen 0a*kro"er :Bri"hton, S*sse): 9arvester Press &oto+a, 2.K.: Barnes and 2o!le Books, 195$;, esp. F1 and 51n.F. KeanAL*c 8arion, %ur &'"ntologie grise de Descartes: %cience cart*si+enne et savoir aristotelicien dans les Regulae :Paris: K. Drin, 19E%;, critici7es the .e!er thesis on the "ro*nds that +hat see, to .e!er to !e contradictions often are not, and he offers in response a "enerally coherentist readin" of the Regulae that dissolves ,any of the CcontradictionsC that +ere s*pposed to reveal different layers. Grederick Dan de Pitte, CDescartes6 a+thesis 6niversalis,5 Archiv fAr 0eschichte der Philosophie 61

:19E9;: 1%FA1EF, ,akes the case that .e!er ,is*nderstood the precise character of ,athesis *niversalis and so falsely distin"*ished ,athe,atics and ,ethod :a si,ilar point ,i"ht !e addressed, +ith 3*alification, to Sch*ster;. @ltho*"h ,y +ork addresses the .e!er thesis only occasionally and indirectly, / can say here that / find it hi"hly *nlikely that any part of the Regulae +as co,posed !efore the early 16?$s, and / think it is conceiva!le that Descartes a!andoned it as late as the early 16#$s. 8y readin" of the Regulae is, like 8arion6s, !asically coherentist, !*t !y placin" it in the conte)t of Descartes6s *nderstandin" of i,a"ination, / !elieve that +e can see ,ore clearly the kinds of tensions and perhaps even contradictions that do ,ark it. ( #5 ( than that of an ene,y, fro, the sy,pathy and antipathy of affections: for the sa,e reason fro, +hich people say that the skin of a sheep *sed for a dr*,head !eco,es silent if it happens that a +olf6s skin reso*nds in another dr*,C :@& L 59A9$;. /n the last re,ark one is i,,ediately str*ck !y the distinctly *nCarAtesian tone of sympathy and antipathy *sed as principles of e)planation. &he passa"e has led so,e critics to depreciate the i,portance of the !ompendium and others to interpret it as Descartes6s i,plicitly pole,ical dis,issal of a kind of ancient and ,edieval occ*ltis,, +hich is left, sli"htin"ly, to those +ho deal +ith ,atter and its 3*alities :the physicists; rather than to ,athe,aticians.O%P &his interpretation has the advanta"e of ,akin" the passa"e ,ore reco"ni7a!ly Cartesian !*t co,,its the fallacy of ass*,in" that the t+entyAt+oAyearAold Descartes +as in essential respects the philosopher of the editations. @s shall !eco,e evident shortly, other notes fro, aro*nd t6?$ s*""est that e)planations in ter,s of sy,pathies +o*ld not have see,ed pri,a facie inconceiva!le to the yo*n" Descartes. 1ven ,ore i,portant, ho+ever, is that those +ho +ish to read the !ompendium as a step in the Cartesian pro4ect of ,athe,ati7in" nat*re overlook :or dis,iss; his characteri7ation of the st*dy of ,athe,atical ratios as a means to *nderstandin" an end, the end of ,*sic, +hich is to aro*se affections in the so*l. &hat the +ork is chiefly an investi"ation into ratios or proportions is not in do*!t, !*t the fra,e+ork in +hich their investi"ation ,akes sense is not that of the a!stract ,athe,ati7ation of nat*re. &his is ,ade clearer !y the ei"ht post*lates, +hich i,,ediately follo+ the re,arks 4*st 3*oted. 1. ?. @ll senses are capa!le of a certain deli"ht. Gor this deli"ht there is re3*ired a certain proportion of the o!4ect +ith

OFP Beeck,an :1%55A16#E; and Descartes ,et in 9olland in Bcto!er 1615, apparently +hile !oth +ere inspectin" a poster anno*ncin" a pro!le, in ,athe,atics. Beeck,an, +ho had 4*st received his ,edical de"ree and had !e"*n teachin" school, +as interested in approachin" the physical sciences +ith techni3*es that +ere e)peri,ental, ,athe,atical, and a!ove all pict*ra!le. See 'laas van Berkel, Isaac -eeckman :=>II+=J@K; en de mechanisering van 4et 9ereld4eeld, 2ie*+e 2ederlandse Bi4dra"en tot de 0eschiedenis der 0eneesk*nde en der 2at**r+etenschappen, no. 9 :@,sterda,: >odopi, 195#;, chaps. F, E= see also pp. #1EA#19. O%P See >enS Descartes, A4r*gi de rausi1ue, suivi des 5)claircissements physi1ues sur la musi1ue de Descartes5 du R. P .icolas Poisson, trans, and ed. Pascal D*,ont :Paris: 8Sridiens 'linckAsieck. 199$;, 1E, 1FEn.F. ( #9 ( its sense. .hence it happens, for e)a,ple, that the din of ,*skets or th*nder does not see, s*ita!le to

,*sic: !eca*se, na,ely, it h*rts the ears, 4*st as the very "reat !rilliance of the s*n Oh*rtsP eyes directed to+ard it. #. &he o!4ect ,*st !e s*ch that it does not !efall sense too diffic*ltly and conf*sedly. .hence it happens that, for e)a,ple, a certain very co,plicated fi"*re, even if it !e re"*lar, as is the ,aterO6P in the astrola!e, does not please si"ht as ,*ch as another that is ,ade of ,ore e3*al lines, s*ch as the astrola!e6s fete *s*ally is. &he reason of this is that sense is ,ore satisfied in the latter than in the for,er, +here there are ,any thin"s that it does not perceive distinctly eno*"h. F. &hat o!4ect in +hich there is less difference of parts is ,ore easily perceived !y sense. %. .e call less different fro, one another the parts of a +hole o!4ect !et+een +hich there is "reater proportion. 6. &hat proportion ,*st !e arith,etic, not "eo,etric.OEP &he reason is that there are not so ,any thin"s in it to !e noticed, since the differences are every+here e3*al, and therefore sense is not so fati"*ed, so that it perceives everythin" in it distinctly. 1)a,ple: the proportion of OtheseP lines Ofi". lP is ,ore easily distin"*ished !y the eyes than of those Ofi". ?P, !eca*se, in the first, one only has to notice the *nit as the difference of each line= !*t, in the second, the parts a! and !c, +hich are inco,,ens*ra!le, and therefore, as / 4*d"e, they can in no +ay !e perfectly kno+n si,*ltaneo*sly !y sense, !*t only in an orderly relation to arith,etic proportion: in other +ords, sho*ld one notice, for e)a,ple, t+o parts in a!, three of +hich e)ist in !c /t is plain that here sense is constantly deceived.O5P O6P /n the planispheric astrola!e, +hich +as *sed !y astrono,ers and navi"ators for takin" the altit*des of celestial !odies, the mater +as a plate en"raved +ith crisscrossin" circles of altit*de, +hile the rete +as a rotata!le circ*lar rin" of the stars, Coften !ea*tif*lly desi"ned in fret+ork c*t fro, a sheet of ,etal, +ith na,ed pointers to sho+ the positions of the !ri"hter stars relative to one another and to a 7odiacal circle sho+in" the s*n6s position for every day of the year.C S.v. 6astrola!e6, )ncyclopaedia -ritannica :Chica"o: 1ncyclopaedia Britannica, 196E;, ?:6F$. OEP @ series of n*,!ers, or of lines havin" those n*,!ers as ,eas*re, constit*tes an arithmetic proportion if the series increases :or decreases; !y a fi)ed a,o*nt= th*s ?, %, 5, 11, 1F are in arith,etic proportion !eca*se the series increases each ti,e !y #. @ series constit*tes a geometric proportion if each s*ccessive ele,ent is derived !y ,*ltiplyin" the precedin" one !y a fi)ed n*,!er= th*s ?, 6, 15, %F, 16? are in "eo,etric proportion !eca*se each ele,ent is three ti,es the precedin" one. O5P @& notes that the concl*din" sentence of post*late 6 is present in t+o Latin ,an*script copies and in the Latin te)t p*!lished in 16%$, !*t not in the Grench translation of 1665 prepared !y 2icholas Poisson, +ho had at hand Descartes6s ori"inal 8S. /t is not necessary, at any rate, to interpret the sentence as a reason for do*!tin" the relia!ility of the senses in "eneral. >ather, it indicates a tendency of the senses to CreadC the proportions of thin"s as si,pler or ,ore co,,ens*rate than they act*ally are= this tendency prod*ces a need for the intervention of hi"her po+ers of ,ind to esta!lish the tr*e ratios, as +ill !eco,e clear fro, +hat follo+s. ( F$ (

Gi". 1. &he three line se",ents can !e easily co,pared !eca*se each contains a +hole n*,!er of *nits.

Gi". ?. &he ,iddle line se",ent is not co,,ens*ra!le +ith the other t+o, so that a vis*al co,parison of the parts is ,ore diffic*lt. E. @,on" o!4ects of sense the ,ost pleasin" to the so*l is not that +hich is ,ost easily perceived !y sense, nor that +hich is perceived +ith ,ost diffic*lty= !*t that +hich is not so easy, so that the nat*ral desire !y +hich the sense is dra+n to the o!4ects not !e co,pletely satisfied, nor so diffic*lt that it tire sense. 5. Ginally it is to !e noted that in all thin"s variety is ,ost pleasin". :@& L 91A9?; /t has !een said that if one is searchin" for the ori"inality of the !ompendium musicae, one +ill not find it in these post*lates, for the doctrine of sensation !ein" itself a kind of proportion :or !ased on proportion, logos ; "oes !ack at least to @ristotle.O9P Bne ,i"ht ,ention also @3*inas, for O9P See Descartes, A4r*g*e de musi1ue, 16. &he partic*lar passa"e in @ristotle noted as one that Ceveryone recopied for cent*riesC is De anima, !k. #, chap. ?,F?6a?EAF?6!E. ( F1 ( +ho, C!ea*ty consists in d*e proportion, for the senses deli"ht in thin"s d*ly proportioned, as in +hat is like the,-!eca*se the sense too is a sort of ratio, as is every co"nitive po+er.CO1$P &he doctrine is not intrinsically @ristotelianAScholastic, for Pytha"oreanis, and Platonis, like+ise *nderstood sensation, or at least its ,ost perfect for,s, as havin" a !asis in proportionality or even as !ein" proportion.O11P /ndeed, the conver"ence of different philosophical traditions on this !asic point is a reason for thinkin" that, re"ardless of +hat specific +orks Descartes read or did not read, the doctrine co*ld not have !een *nkno+n to hi,. :&his is especially tr*e since the doctrine is a staple of traditional ,*sical theory, +ith +hich Descartes sho+s a ,ore than passin" ac3*aintance.; Plato6s +ritin"s, especially the Repu4lic and the Timaeus, "ive an acco*nt of the cos,os as proportionally str*ct*red. &he divided line of Book 6 of the Repu4lic presents +hat co*ld !e called an ontolo"y of proAportionali7ed i,a"in" that "ro*nds an episte,olo"y of proportionali7ed i,a"in", in +hich the Gor,s are i,a"ed in the 8athe,aticals, the 8atheA,aticals in the o!4ects of the physical +orld, and the o!4ects of the physical +orld in shado+s and reflections-and !et+een each ,a4or cate"ory there o!tain strictly proportional relations. /n @ristotle the operations of the senses +ith respect to their o!4ects are fre3*ently said to !e proportional to the operation of the intellect +ith respect to its o!4ects. @ltho*"h Plato "ives so,e+hat ,ore e,phasis to ontolo"ical i,a"in" than to proportions, and @ristotle e,phasi7es the proportionalities +itho*t e)plicitly addressin" the possi!le rese,!lance of the sensi!le species to an intelli"i!le species, !oth thinkers provide ade3*ate space for reflectin" on the overall i,portance of rese,!lance and proportionalities in the process of ,ovin" fro, sensation to intellection. &his is a conte)t*al topo"raphy that opens *p the si"nificance of Descartes6s !ompendium rausicae ,ore reAvealin"ly than does the search for Descartes6s p*tative ori"inality in the history of ,*sical theory :a Cred*ction to ,athe,atical a!stractions,C for e)a,ple;. 8y initial thesis is this: /t +as precisely in p*rs*in" the 3*estion of the proportionalities of the senses and the other co"nitive po+ers that Descartes !eca,e a philosopher. 9e !e"an this p*rs*it not !eca*se he already had in ,ind a ,athe,atical ,ethod !*t rather !eca*se he s*spected that proportionality +as the f*nda,ental principle of kno+in" and that it reflected the +ay the cos,os +as str*ct*red. &he *nderlyin" theory of s*ch proportionality is +hat Descartes event*ally called mathesis universalis : a

theory e)pressi!le not 4*st in the a!stractions of intellect !*t also, and e3*ally +ell, or perhaps even !etter, in the fi"*ration of e)tension, +hether accordin" to sense or accordin" to i,a"ination. O1$P %umma, theologiae, /,3. %, art. F, ad 1 O11P Gor e)a,ple, in @*"*stine6s De musica. See S*,,ers, 'udgment of %ense, 6EA69. ( F? ( &he !ompendium musicae sho+s that !y late 1615 Descartes had already taken at least the first steps to+ard +orkin" o*t a theory of the co,,*nication of proportions fro, the e)ternal +orld to the senses. /t atte,pts to de,onstrate that the rhyth,s and tones of ,*sic are s*!4ect to a lo"ic inherent in the senses in "eneral and in the sense of hearin" in partic*lar, a lo"ic :fro, logos, one of +hose ,eanin"s in 0reek is 6ratio6 or 6proportion6; of arith,etic proportion. Both rhyth, and tone are "overned !y relations that can !e e)pressed in ter,s that are arith,etically increased or decreased thro*"h the addition or s*!traction of a *nit. &he doctrine of the !ompendium is therefore a partic*lar application of the principles en*nciated in the post*lates, 9hich are understood as applying to all sensation. &his does not in itself i,ply a radical red*ction to ,athe,atics any ,ore than it does for @ristotle or Plato. >ather, !eca*se so*nd, like all other sensi!les, reflects the order and ,eas*re of the +orld, it i,plicitly contains and reflects the principles that Descartes ed*ces and represents thro*"h ,athe,atics. &he specific 3*alities of so*nd are in no +ay eli,inated= they are rather *nderstood to necessarily carry +ith the, a proportional str*ct*re that can !e, and is, co,,*nicated fro, thin" to thin", and fro, thin" to ,ind. &he !asic ,athe,atics of consonance and dissonance has !een reco"ni7ed at least since Pytha"oras. Descartes6s specific contri!*tion +ith respect to this ,athe,atical tradition in the !ompendium is to sho+ that the consonant tonal relationships can !e discovered in, and represented !y, the arith,etic proportionalities of a sin"le strin" :line; divided into five parts !y first !isectin" the +hole strin", ne)t !isectin" the ri"ht,ost of the t+o se",ents, then the left,ost of these t+o and finally the left,ost of this last division :see fi". #;.O1?P @ccordin" to the principles en*nciated in the post*lates, these tones, !eca*se of the si,plicity of their relationships, are precisely those that are ,ost s*ited to the sense of hearin" and the ,ost easily perceived. &he sense of hearin" is so constit*ted that the tones !ased on an arith,etic division of the strin" are perceived as si,plest in their relationships to one another. &he theory of these si,plest relationships, +hich the !ompendium presents, is the f*nda,ental theory that Descartes !elieves sho*ld "*ide intelli"ent ,*sical co,position to+ard the end of ,*sic, the deli"ht of the senses. @ corollary of the standard thesis that Descartes a!stractly ,athe,ati7ed ,*sical theory is that he s*!4ectivi7ed ,*sical perception. B*t the O1?P See @& L 95A1$%. &his division and its novelty in the tradition of ,*sical theory are disc*ssed !y Kohannes Loh,ann, CDescartes6 6Co,pendi*, ,*sicae6 *nd die 1ntsteh*n" des ne*7eitlichen Be+*_tseins,C Archiv fAr usik9issenschaft #6, no. ? :19E9;: 51A1$F, and 9. G. Cohen, Luantifying usic: The %cience of usic at the $irst %tage of the %cientific Revolution, =>I?+=J>?, University of .estern Bntario Series in Philosophy of Science, no. ?# :Dordrecht: D. >eidel, 195F;. esp. 161A1E9. ( F# (

Gi". #. Descartes6s division of a line !y s*ccessive !isectionin" "ives rise to ratios of the principal consonances. Point C !isects @B= D !isects CB= 1!isects CD= and G !isects C1. @C prod*ces the octave a!ove @B= @C and @D yield a fifth= @D and @B prod*ce a fo*rth= @C and @1 yield a ,a4or third. &hese proportions are !ased on the n*,!ers ?, #, and % or their ,*ltiples= the process of !isection ,akes this vis*ally co,prehensi!le. @ll the relationships dependent on the last !isection at G lead to dissonances. @s a res*lt of this techni3*e of division, all the consonances are si,ply i,a"ed !y a sin"le line. corollary is as 3*estiona!le as the thesis. /t is indeed tr*e that, fro, 16#$ on, Descartes descri!ed the pleas*re taken in ,*sic as dependin" on the pec*liarities of individ*al history and taste, !*t s*ch testi,ony cannot decide +hat Descartes tho*"ht in 1615.O1#P &he ,ethod and doctrine of the !ompendium are predicated on the real e)istence of proportions in tone and rhyth,, the real correlation of s*ch proportions to the satisfactions of hearin" and the so*l, and the real a!ility of the h*,an psyche to detect, at first i,plicitly and event*ally +ith kno+led"e, the presence of these proportions, +hether in the so*nds of nat*re or in ,*sical co,positions. /f there is s*ch a Cpreesta!lished har,ony,C then it sho*ld not !e s*rprisin" that the h*,an ear ,i"ht have a nat*ral sy,pathy for the h*,an voice :pres*,a!ly h*,an !ein"s +o*ld try even in speakin" to prod*ce tones pleasin" to their o+n ears and th*s to the ears of those +ith so*ls and or"ans si,ilarly att*ned; and a nat*ral antipathy for so*nds not in accordance +ith the nat*ral proportions. &he reco"nition of s*ch proportions O1#P See, for e)a,ple, @& / 1?5 :letter to 8ersenne, F 8arch 16#$;. 1ven at this later date Descartes ,akes a distinction: altho*"h Ceveryone kno+s that the fifth is s+eeter than the fo*rth,C +hat pleases ,ore, or is fo*nd ,ore a"reea!le, ,ay !e so,ethin" different. &his apparently corresponds to the distinction the !ompendium's post*lates ,ake !et+een +hat is perceived ,ost easily and +hat is ,ost pleasin". /n any case, Descartes6s soAcalled s*!4ectivi7ation of aesthetics occ*rs after a decisive shift in his tho*"ht a+ay fro, the co"nitive val*e of sensi!le proportions. Bne sho*ld also note that the !ompendium's post*lates 6 thro*"h 5 i,ply that the satisfactions of ,*sic, +hich are proper to the so*l rather than to physical or"ans, are not to !e settled on the level of +hat is satisfyin" to the sense. Sense per se is pleased !y the si,plest arith,etic proportions= they are not al+ays to !e fo*nd in "ood ,*sic :end of post. 6;, ho+ever, !eca*se the p*rpose of ,*sic is not to satisfy i,,ediately and co,pletely the nat*ral desire of the sense or to fr*strate sense !y co,ple)ity, !*t to present the so*l +ith an inter,ediate diffic*lty in kno+in" :post. E;. .hen all is said and done, the so*l is satisfied not !y si,plicity !*t !y variety :post. 5;. &his "ives a "li,pse into Descartes6s earliest anthropolo"ical psycholo"y: the h*,an so*l is constit*ted so as to take deli"ht in diffic*lties, at least so lon" as the diffic*lties can !e overco,e. /t is therefore of the nat*re of the h*,an so*l to solve pro!le,s. ( FF ( constit*tes the fo*ndation of Descartes6s theory. &he theory is e)pressed in the ,athe,atics of proportions, !*t this ,athe,atics is precisely +hat is detected or perceived in the sensation of so*nd, in its aisthesis. /n this precise sense, the !ompendium musicae is the fo*ndation of the ,athe,atical aesthetics of so*nd. /n this st*dy, the partic*lar 3*estion to !e asked is ho+ i,a"ination enters into this ,athe,atical aesthetics. /n the co*rse of the !ompendium, Descartes talks fre3*ently a!o*t the senses and perception, !*t only occasionally a!o*t i,a"ination. &he i,a"ination +ords occ*r infre3*ently, ordinarily +itho*t any "reat intrinsic si"nificance. Gor e)a,ple, the ad4ective imaginarius is *sed as synony,o*s +ith 6fancif*l6 or 6,erely fictional6, and the ver! imaginor occ*rs in the sense of 6depict6 or 6conceive6.O1FP B*t the i,a"ination does fi"*re i,portantly in the section follo+in" the post*lates: CBn the n*,!er or ti,e in so*nd that is to !e o!served.C @fter notin" that ,*sical te,pi are divided into

do*!le and triple ti,es, Descartes e)plains ho+ +e perceive the,. &his division is ,arked !y perc*ssion or !eat, as they call it, +hich occ*rs in order to aid o*r i,a"ination= !y ,eans of +hich +e ,i"ht ,ore easily !e a!le to perceive all the parts of the son" and en4oy Othe,P !y ,eans of the proportion that ,*st !e in the,. S*ch proportion is ,ost often o!served in the parts of a son" so that it ,i"ht aid o*r apprehension th*s, that +hile +e are hearin" the last OpartP +e still re,e,!er the ti,e of the first one and of the rest of the son"= this happens, Ofor e)a,pleP if the +hole son" consists of 5 or 16 or #? or 6F, etc., parts, that is, +hen all the divisions proceed in do*!le proportion. Gor then, +hen +e hear the first t+o ,e,!ers, +e conceive the, as one= +hen O+e hearP the third ,e,!er, +e f*rther con4oin that +ith the first ones, so that there occ*rs triple proportion= thereafter, +hen +e hear the fo*rth, +e 4oin that +ith the third so that +e conceive Othe,P as one= there*pon +e a"ain con4oin the t+o first +ith the latter t+o so that +e conceive these fo*r si,*ltaneo*sly as one. @nd th*s o*r i,a"ination proceeds all the +ay to the end, +here at last it conceives the entire son" as one thin" f*sed o*t of ,any e3*al ,e,!ers. :@& L 9F; Perception, apprehension, ,e,ory, i,a"ination, and conception all enter into the ,ental process descri!ed in this para"raph, and +e ,i"ht s*spect that the yo*n" Descartes +as not necessarily *sin" these ter,s very precisely. 6/,a"ination6 and 6conception6, for e)a,ple, appear to !e synony,o*s. 9o+ever, +e have noted earlier that Descartes allo+s precisely this synony,y in >*le 1?, pro!a!ly ten years later, +hich ,akes it ,ore likely that it reflects a constant in Descartes6s *nderstandin" of the t+o ter,s !efore 16#$.O1%P O1FP @& L: 1$9 and 1$?, respectively. O1%P /n chap. l, a!ove. @ll theories datin" the Regulae a"ree that the co,position of >*le 1? +as relatively late. ( F% ( &he disc*ssion !e"ins and ends +ith i,a"inatio. >hyth, aids i,a"ination !y ,arkin" divisions so that they ,i"ht !e perceived= the proportionality a,on" the parts of the son" prod*ces Cdelectation,C en4oy,ent, and aids apprehension !y ena!lin" *s to re,e,!er +hat ca,e !efore as +e hear +hat co,es ne)t. 9o+ does this happenQ By contin*ally rec*rsive acts of conceivin", each synthesi7in" the ne+ part +ith all the precedin" and e)pressin" it in relation to the others !y ,eans of a *nit of ti,e. @ccordin"ly, rhyth,, 4*st like tone, is "overned !y arith,etic proportion. B*t, in contrast +ith tone, this proportion is e)pressed not all at once or in a short ,*sical phrase !*t thro*"ho*t the entire son", so that sense !y itself or even +ith the aid of shortAter, ,e,ory +ill not !e a!le to perceive the proportions. /t is i,a"ination that perfor,s the task of synthesi7in" the individ*al deliverances of the sense, of the individ*al *nits that ,ark the rhyth,. C@nd th*s o*r i,a"ination proceeds all the +ay to the end, +here at last it conceives the entire son" as one thin" f*sed o*t of ,any e3*al ,e,!ers.C &hat is, apprehension and delectation co,e a!o*t !y i,a"ination6s pro"ressively, proportionately synthesi7in" one thin" to another. /,a"ination is portrayed here as an e)traordinarily active po+er that is responsi!le for the a!ility to perceive the co,ple) *nity of so*nds as a +hole rather than as si,ply a con"eries of *nconnected tones. /n the passa"e it is also the pri,ary a"ent of co"nition, of the "raspin" !y ,ind :apprehension;. /t is an a"ent: that is, i,a"ination does the +ork of conceivin" synthesi7in"= an a"ent of co"nition: that is, the i,a"ination is not si,ply pro4ectin" vis*al :or a*ditory; i,a"es !*t reco"ni7in" so,ethin" not directly perceived !y the sense, the proportions in the son" taken as an entirety. 8oreover, the ,e,ory

re3*ired for this synthesis and co"nition appears to !e a !yAprod*ct of the process as it takes place fro, ,o,ent to ,o,ent, fro, ,*sical part to ,*sical part. By late 1615, Descartes conceived i,a"ination as a synthetic conceptive po+er operatin" on sensation, a po+er that "athers or collects the vario*s parts or ,o,ents that are s*ccessively presented and then conceives the, as *nified !y the deter,inate proportional relationships they !ear to one another. &he notion of proportionality +ill !e disc*ssed presently, *nder the aspect of the relation of i,a"ination to the ,athe,atics of proportion. 9ere +e ,i"ht re,ark that i,a"ination co,es *p first not in the vis*al real, !*t in the a*ditory, +hich s*""ests that Descartes +as already thinkin" of the po+er of i,a"ination as transcendin" the specific character of any sin"le sense. /t is precisely i,a"ination6s character of !ein" presentative, synthetic, and ,e,orative that see,s to interest hi,, rather than any ,erely representational *se. &his character rests on proportionality or, to *se the 0reek e3*ivalent, analo"y. &here is in the !ompendium no co,para!le e)planation of i,a"ination6s ( F6 ( f*nctions in the case of tone, the other !asic co,ponent of the aesthetics of ,*sic, !*t this sho*ld not !e s*rprisin". >hyth, ordinarily e)tends in an e3*a!le +ay thro*"ho*t an entire son" :or thro*"ho*t each of its ,a4or *nits;, so that the synthetic activity of conceivin" rhyth, creates a co,ple) *nity !y iteration and te,poral pro4ection retention, a co,ple) that nevertheless falls into one of t+o classes, either do*!le or triple ti,e. .ith tone there is less need for an e)tended synthesis :p*ttin" aside the loose re"*larity deter,ined !y the key or ,ode of a passa"e;, since the relationships of pri,ary i,portance e)ist !et+een tones so*nded in i,,ediate s*ccession or even si,*ltaneo*sly. &hese i,,ediate relationships are already proportioned to the sense of hearin" and its pleas*res, so the synthetic f*nctionin" of i,a"ination is less *r"ent for properly appreciatin" the,. 8oreover, there is a "reater variety of ,elodic effects than t+o, and to e)plain all of the, +o*ld re3*ire a "reater co,plication in the investi"ation !oth of the +ays in +hich the so*l is ,oved and of ho+ the proportions e)pressed in one har,ony or phrase are related !ack+ard and for+ard to the other parts of the son". @t the end of the !ompendium, Descartes in fact notes +ith respect to the variety of "rades and proportions of tone that fro, these and si,ilar Oite,sP vario*s thin"s ,i"ht !e ded*ced a!o*t their nat*re, !*t it +o*ld !e lon". @nd it +o*ld also follo+ that / sho*ld treat separately a!o*t the individ*al ,otions of the so*l that can !e e)cited !y ,*sic and sho*ld sho+ !y ,eans of +hat "rades, consonances, te,pi, and so forth, these o*"ht to !e e)cited= !*t / +o*ld e)ceed the p*rpose of the co,pendi*,.O16P :@& L 1F$; Descartes6s p*rpose +as not to e)ha*st the theory of ,*sic !*t to set do+n its principles. /n s*ch a conte)t the acco*nt of i,a"ination6s +ork presented in the section on rhyth, sho*ld not !e taken as a feat*re of accidental interest !*t as a process essential to co"nition thro*"h the senses.

-. T0E 7CO+ITATIONES PRIVATAE76 T0E T*O8I,A+INATIONS NOTE

&he relation !et+een i,a"ination and proportion is developed f*rther in the CCo"itationes privatae,C notes copied fro, one of Descartes6s early note!ooks :dated 1619A16?1; !y Lei!ni7 and first p*!lished in 15%9.O1EP /t ,ay !e only an artifact of Lei!ni76s selection, !*t it is s*rprisin" ho+ ,any of the, deal +ith i,a"ination and i,a"es either directly or indirectly. O16P 6Co,pendi*,6 in fact i,plies a !revity and econo,y that is nevertheless co,prehensive.

O1EP /n "euvres in*dits de Descartes, ed. Lo*is @le)andre co,te Go*cher de Careil, ? vols. :Paris: Ladran"e et D*rand, 15%9A156$;, 1:?A%E. ( FE ( &hese notes present an episte,olo"y !ased on the fi"*ration of rese,!lances, +ithin an ontolo"ical hierarchy of !ody and spirit. &hat is, the different po+ers of the ,ind or so*l p*t the h*,an !ein" into to*ch +ith hi"her thin"s !y +ay of their rese,!lance to lo+er ones. &he f*nda,ental instr*,ent of this ascent fro, lo+ to hi"h is i,a"inative analo"y and proportion. Consider a"ain a note already 3*oted in the introd*ction. @s i,a"ination *ses fi"*res to conceive !odies, so intellect *ses certain sensi!le !odies to fi"*re spirit*al thin"s, like +ind, OandP li"ht: +hence, philosophi7in", +e can !y co"nition raise the ,ind hi"her in the s*!li,e.O15P /t can see, a,a7in", +hy pre"nant ,eanin"s OareP in the +ritin"s of poets ,ore than of philosophers. &he reason is that poets +rite thro*"h enth*sias, and the force of i,a"ination: there are particles Oor seedsP of science in *s, as in flintstone, that are ed*ced !y philosophers thro*"h reason, O!*tP that thro*"h i,a"ination are shaken loose !y poets and shine o*t ,ore. :@& L ?1E; 2ot only does this note :+hich henceforth +ill !e called Cthe t+oAi,a"inations noteC; try to "ro*nd the principle of analo"y !y *se of an analo"y-an approach not likely to !e chosen !y a Descartes +ho is s*pposed to !elieve in the pri,acy of the direct intellect*al int*ition of ele,ental tr*ths and the ri"oro*s ded*ction of ne+ tr*ths fro, s*ch fo*ndations-even ,ore i,portant, it also presents i,a"ination in a t+ofold si"nificance central to Descartes6s early conception. &he first part of the note treats i,a"ination as the po+er of ,akin" corporeal thin"s conceiva!le thro*"h fi"*res and i,a"es= intellect in t*rn *ses the corporeal thin"s as fi"*res of even hi"her, spirit*al :or intelli"i!le;O19P thin"s. /n this conte)t, i,a"ination proper is a lo+er co"nitive po+er f*nctionin" !y ,eans of fi"*res and i,a"es that allo+ an *nderstandin" of !odies. <et the second part of the note s*""ests, de facto if not de dicto, that there is an intellect*al i,a"ination ,ore directly in to*ch +ith the hi"hest thin"s than is reason :ratio;: the i,a"ination of the poet, +hich ascends ,ore easily to spirit*al hei"hts than does the ploddin", disc*rsive reason of the philosopher. &he rest of this section and the several sections follo+in" foc*s on ra,ifications of the t+oA i,a"inations note and related ones. /n essence / ar"*e that ela!oratin" the !ack"ro*nd and scope of the note is key to *nderstandin" the !asic principles of the CCo"itationes privatae.C O15P /t is not clear +hether this entry sho*ld !e !roken into t+o para"raphs :at C8ir*, videri possitC;= for a disc*ssion, see 0o*hier, &es PremiFres pens*es, E9A5$. O19P &he choice !et+een 6spirit*al6 and 6intelli"i!le6 is not a ,atter of indifference. /n his earliest +ritin"s Descartes tended to refer to the hi"hest thin"s and po+ers as spirit*al. /n the Regulae the pair 6,aterial6 6spirit*al6 is *sed alon"side the ,ore Cartesian 6corporeal6 6intelli"i!le6. 6Spirit*al6 is ordinarily *sed in the early +ritin"s in a !road sense that e,!races 6intelli"i!le6. ( F5 ( &+o very stron", possi!ly cripplin" preli,inary o!4ections ,i"ht point o*t :l; that the note co*ld !e an idiosyncrasy, perhaps a ,ere 4ottin" +itho*t f*rther conse3*ence, and :?; that since the CCo"itationes privataeC are Lei!ni76s c*llin" of Descartes6s notes, any *nity to !e fo*nd is ,ore likely to !e d*e to the ,ind of the for,er than of the latter. @s for the first o!4ection, the i,,ediately follo+in" notes p*rs*e

f*rther the 3*estion of *sin" i,a"es and sy,!ols for the sake of kno+in" !oth physical and e)traA physical thin"s. @ partic*larly *nCartesian note is the other private co"itation already 3*oted in f*ll in the introd*ction: C&he co"nition of nat*ral thin"s !y h*,an !ein"s Oocc*rsP solely thro*"h the si,ilit*de of those thin"s that fall *nder sense: and indeed +e 4*d"e that person to have ,ore tr*ly philosophi7ed +ho +ill have ,ore s*ccessf*lly assi,ilated the thin" so*"ht to +hat is co"ni7ed !y senseC :@& L ?15A?19;. @nother see,s to e)plicate the intent of the t+oAi,a"inations note !y "ivin" e)a,ples of ho+ Csensi!le thin"s OareP apt for conceivin" Bly,pian thin"sC: +ind si"nifies spirit, ,otion in ti,e si"nifies life, and so on. 2otes like this ,i"ht +ell provide cl*es for interpretin" so,e of the ,ore el*sive ,o,ents of Descartes6s early intellect*al career, for e)a,ple, the three drea,s of 1$A11 2ove,!er 1619O?$P B*t even ,ore si"nificant is that these notes help e)plain the principle Descartes +as follo+in" in the physical and ,athe,atical notes that apparently for,ed the ,a4or part of the CCo"itationes privatae.C 8oreover, the t+oAi,a"inations note not only helps clarify the relevance of co"itations that other+ise see, to stand in isolation :like a reflection on the art of ,e,ory and adversions to that aspect of the h*,an so*l called in"eni*,; !*t also points ahead to pro!le,s faced in the Regulae ad directionem ingenii. &herefore, in response to the second o!4ection, even if Lei!ni76s selection is responsi!le for the appearance of a "reater *nity than e)isted in the ori"inal, that ori"inal *nity, ho+ever ,*ch looser, +o*ld nevertheless !e Descartes6s doin". &o ret*rn to the interpretation, then: &he t+oAi,a"inations note sketches o*t a po+er of ,ind or so*l, i,a"ination in the *s*al, corporeal sense, that *ses fi"*res to conceive !odies, and another, analo"o*s po+er of intellect, +hat / have ter,ed 6intellect*al i,a"ination6, that takes !odies and *ses the, to conceive or fi"*re spirit*al thin"s. Both are co"nitive, the one directed to+ard !odies, the other to+ard spiritualia, spirit*al ,atters. Both are active and synthetic, insofar as the fi"*ration of a !ody re3*ires that the !ody !e seen as represented !y an :perhaps co,ple); i,a"e, +hereas the fi"*ration of hi"her thin"s re3*ires a !ody to !e seen as the analo"ical i,a"e of so,ethin" spirit*al. &he ,ost !asic si,ilarity of O?$P See 0o*hier, &es PremiFres pens*es, 5FA5%. @ccordin" to Baillet, the narrative of the drea, +as contained in the section of the CCo"itationes privataeC note!ook rifled CBly,Apica.C See Baillet, /ie, 1:51A56, +hich is reprod*ced in @& L 151A155. ( F9 ( the t+o is precisely ,arked o*t !y the f*nda,ental analo"y: as fi"*res are to !odies, so are !odies to spirit*alia. Brdinary i,a"ination relates fi"*res to !odies, intellect in its i,a"inative ,ode relates !odies to spirit, and so it see,s reasona!le to concl*de that i,a"ination stands to intellect accordin" to the sa,e proportion. &his i,plies that there is not an infinite "ap !et+een any of the pairs fi"*res and !odies, !odies and spirit*al realities, i,a"ination and intellect= all have the a!ility to ,irror a set of co,,on relationships.

C. I,A+ININ+ AND T0E PROPORTIONAL ,AT0E,ATICS OF RESE,-LANCE

.hat is involved in conceivin" !odiesQ &he first cla*se of the t+oAi,a"inaAtions note says i,a"ination *ses fi"*res to conceive !odies. 9o+ does the o!4ect :the !ody; stand in relation to the fi"*reQ &here is nothin" in the passa"e to s*""est that the o!4ect is ori"inally constructed !y i,a"ination or sense= that is, there is no hint here of a 'antian position, or of a "enerali7ation of the hearin" processes descri!ed in the !ompendium rausicae so that they apply to vision. /f +hat is ori"inally "iven to the ear in the !ompendium is tone and !eat, o*t of +hich ,elody and rhyth, are constr*cted, there o*"ht to !e

so,ethin" else that is "iven to the eye, !*t +hat that ,i"ht !e is not identified. 9o+ever, since hearin" is a te,poral process, +hereas vision is see,in"ly instantaneo*s, there is no o!4ection in principle to sayin" that the visi!le !ody is +hat is ori"inally "iven. /n any case, the process of i,a"ination descri!ed in the t+oAi,a"inations note !e"ins only once the o!4ect is already in the possession of sense. &he cla*se therefore s*""ests that seein" or other+ise sensin" an o!4ect or !ody is not *nderstandin", !*t only the startin" point for *nderstandin", !eca*se *nderstandin" re3*ires the act of i,a"ination conception. /f the e)perience of the thin" as ori"inally "iven is to !eco,e *nderstandin", i,a"ination ,*st co,e into play. /,a"ination has the po+er of *sin" fi"*res. 9o+ are these fi"*res for,ed and *sedQ &he ans+er is i,plicitly "iven in lar"e part !y other notes of the CCo"itationes privatae,C especially the ,athe,atical and physico,athe,atical ones :see Sec. D, !elo+;, !*t in principle the proced*re is not ,*ch different fro, the !ompendium musicae's *se of line se",ents to represent ,*sical consonances. &he repeatedly !isected strin" of the !ompendium can !e presented in i,a"ination or on paper, or it can !e instantiated in a real ,*sical strin". &o !rin" so,e re"*larity into *sa"e and si,*ltaneo*sly to shed li"ht on the relationships, +e can say that for i,a"ination proper to +ork there ,*st !e :1; an o!4ect to !e *nderstood, :?; a fi"*re, and :#; an act of the ,ind seein" the o!4ect in the perspective of the fi"*re. /n a si,ple ,*sical case the o!4ect ,i"ht !e a strin" of a "iven len"th at a fi)ed ( %$ ( tension= the fi"*re co*ld !e the i,a"inative conception of a line se",ent repeatedly !isected= the act of the ,ind +o*ld !e to conceive the o!4ect as vario*sly stopped in accordance +ith the divisions of the i,a"ined se",ent. B*t then the i,a"ined se",ent stands not 4*st for the real strin" !*t for the +hole set of har,onic relationships that the ,*sical theorist kno+s a!o*t. &he i,a"ined fi"*re is a dyna,ic presentation, a presentation for the sake of ,anifold *se= and in this sense one co*ld add that the act of conception is pra",atically oriented. B!vio*sly this analysis calls for so,e f*rther clarification. Girst, "iven this type of position Descartes cannot very +ell accept his later d*alistic ,etaphysics, +here there is no necessary rese,!lance !et+een the ideas of the thinkin" so*l and the e)tended +orld. 8oreover, Descartes does not at this sta"e of his career *se the voca!*lary of the later position, so that it is at least so,e+hat ,isleadin" to call the fi"*res that help conceive the !odies and the !odies that fi"*re spirit*al thin"s ideas. Gor no+, let *s note that the ideas of the later philosophy have a representative f*nction. /t is their very nat*re to point to so,ethin" !eyond the,selves= this aspect is d*!!ed the o!4ective reality of the ideas in the &hird 8editation. &here the 3*estion i,,ediately arises +hether, and ho+ closely, ideas rese,!le their proper o!4ects= indeed, the hyper!olic do*!t of the editations thrives on the +orry that the rese,!lance is far less than perfect. 9ere in the CCo"itationes privataeC there is no pres*,ption that the fi"*res or !odies need to represent anythin" perfectly, and therefore it is do*!tf*l that one sho*ld even think of the relation pri,arily in ter,s of representation. /t is ,ore appropriate to think of it as sy,!olic, provided that the sy,!ol not !e taken as a ,ere si"n. .hat is a sy,!olQ 1yt,olo"ically it is so,ethin" thro+n to"ether :a parallel Latinate ter, +o*ld therefore !e con7ect ;. /t is said that the 0reek +ord ori"inally denoted the parts of a coin, seal, or tile that had !een !roken to provide holders of the parts +ith an *nreplica!le ,ark of a sole,n transaction= the sy,!ols needed to !e reasse,!led to co,plete the transaction. &he sy,!ol +as therefore a sign of the 9hole, a ,ark of it, and it +as also a part of the 9hole and shared in its character. 1ach part e)isted !eca*se of the +hole and in relation to it. 8oreover, the part +as a sy,!ol not !eca*se it e)ternally represented so,ethin" else !*t rather !eca*se it participated in a nat*re co,,on to the other part and

the +hole. >epresentation as co,,only conceived is "overned chiefly !y the 3*estion of e)ternal si"nin" or pointin", +hereas the sy,!ol is part of the sa,e reality and has so,e resem4lance to the other parts relevant to a transaction. &he sy,!olic resides in +hat ,ay !e called the partial presence of the a!sent or distant +hole. Let *s look ,ore closely at +hat the t+oAi,a"inations passa"e has to say and s*""est a!o*t the presence of the a!sent. .hat the first cla*se apA ( %1 ( pears to say is this: +e see or e)perience an o!4ect, a !ody= !*t havin" an o!4ect in sensation is not in any +ay to *nderstand it. 9o+ do +e co,e to *nderstand or conceive itQ By i,a"ination, +hich *ses fi"*res :pres*,a!ly ,odeled accordin" to so,e aspect or aspects of the !ody; as the +ay to conception and kno+led"e. /,a"ination is therefore not constr*ed here as the act of ori"inally representin" the o!4ect as o!4ect to perception, !*t rather as a +ay of :re;constr*in" or :re;"raspin" that o!4ect in the presence of the o!4ect, +hich is either direct presence :sensed; or re,e,!ered presence. /,a"ination is a +ay of :re;"raspin" the o!4ect, either in direct :sensed; or re,e,!ered presence. .e *se a fi"*re to conceive a rock +hen +e consider the o*tline of its shape or even +hen +e si,plify the o*tline to the nearest re"*lar "eo,etrical fi"*re it rese,!les. &o appro)i,ate the space taken *p !y the rock, +e can i,a"ine a parallelepiped, or a sphere, or a spheroid that renders the vol*,e in a ro*"hA andAready +ay= to ,eas*re it ,ore precisely, +e can i,a"ine it as, say, divided into tens or h*ndreds or tho*sands of identical c*!es :a tho*sand c*!ic centi,eters, for e)a,ple;. Si,ilarly +e can conceive of a certain direction as an a)is and ,entally place the rock alon" it, there!y "ettin" a line :and, i,plicitly, a ,eas*re; that can represent it for so,e li,ited p*rpose. &he fi"*re or line derived in this +ay rese,!les at least so,e part or aspect of the thin", ho+ever ,ini,ally, and it is i,a"ined as standin" for this part. /t is a sy,!ol, and potentially a representa,en, thro*"h +hich the ,ind :re;"rasps the o!4ect sy,!oli7ed. Bne need not restrict this process of fi"*ration to the "eo,etry of the o!4ect, ho+ever. &he hardness and the color of the rock, for e)a,ple, can !e fi"*red in !oth a literal and an e)tended sense. /n the si,plest kind of case +e co*ld conceive a hard, "ray rock insofar as it is a!le to scratch !asalt or insofar as its h*e is a partic*lar shade. S*ch si,ple cases s*""est that +e are i,a"in" "raspin" the thin" in i,plicit, !*t potentially syste,atic, co,parison +ith si,ilar thin"s. .e can classify the hardness of ,inerals !y scratch tests *sin" a lar"e n*,!er of standard sa,ples, or arran"e colors alon" different scales :+ithin a 2e+tonian spectr*,, or in the C/1 color trian"le, or accordin" to the 8*nsell colorAchip catalo", +ith respect to the colors6 !ri"htnesses, h*es, or other salient characteristics;. &his kind of fi"*ration pres*pposes that +e have previo*s e)perience, reflection, even e)peri,entation, so,e of +hich :the scratch test, for e)a,ple; +ill involve a ,ore invasive activity than si,ply ,eas*rin" or sketchin" an o*tline :+hether this is done in the ,ind or on paper;. /n principle, ho+ever, all fi"*ration re3*ires activity-the ,ini,*, of +hich is like conceivin" fi"*res ,entally or si7in" *p an o!4ect in a "lance. &his interpretation has already "one considera!ly !eyond the direct evidence of the note, tho*"h, as +e shall see, not !eyond the evidence of the ( %? ( CCo"itationes privatae,C the !ompendium musicae, and, *lti,ately, the Regulae . &his e)c*rs*s has

!ro*"ht *s to the point +here +e can ,ore precisely characteri7e differences fro, Descartes6s later +orks. /n Disco*rse F of Dioptrics :p*!lished in 16#E as one of the three essays prefaced +ith the Discourse on the ethod ; as +ell as in the first chapter of &e onde :+ritten ca. 16#$A16##;, Descartes ar"*ed that there +as no necessary rese,!lance !et+een i,a"es or ideas in the ,ind and the o!4ects fro, +hich the i,a"es co,e :@& D/ 1$9A11F, L/ #A6;. /n the editations the 3*estions of rese,!lance +ere s*,,ari7ed in the pro!le,atic of the o!4ective reality of ideas-that is, their representative f*nction-+hich o*r nat*res incline *s to accept as sho+in" thin"s the +ay they tr*ly are. B*t this is not the pro!le, sit*ation of the CCo"itationes privatae.C /ndeed, the 3*estion of the relationship !et+een ho+ thin"s appear to *s :in s*!4ectivity, to *se postACartesian parlance; and ho+ they are in the,selves :o!4ectively; is a!sent. &he fi"*res, the !odies, and even the spirit*alia are *nderstood as thin"s in and of the +orld. @ circle, a star, and a spirit can certainly all !e conceived in the ,ind, !*t even ,ore i,portant is that they are e)traA,ental e)istences that can !e *sed to e)e,plify or fi"*re one another. Descartes is not concerned in his earliest +ritin"s +ith +hether the shape that conscio*sness re"isters in lookin" at a star is the star6s shape in reality, !*t rather +ith ho+ the ,ind can take a fi"*re and *se it to help conceive the star. &he operative ass*,ption is not that the Cidea in the ,indC inti,ately rese,!les the thin" in the +orld !*t that the t+o thin"s are different +ith relevant sa,enesses= !oth difference and sa,eness are deter,ined analo"ically and proportionally. 6Conception6 here is the "raspin" of the thin" in 3*estion. &he co"nitive a!ility of the so*l is *nderstood not accordin" to the a*thority or veridical character of its passive or receptive po+ers :incl*din" sensation; !*t accordin" to the activity perfor,ed +ith +hat it already possesses. /t is not appropriate, therefore, to for,*late the activity descri!ed in the t+oAi,a"inations note as representation. &he lo"ic of representation has the representin" thin", the representa,en, stand for and in place of the represented. @ltho*"h *sin" a circle or a prolate spheroid to fi"*re a rock has a representative aspect, it is not ,erely or even essentially a representation. &his is clear !y recallin" a f*nda,ental pro!le, for episteA,olo"ical representationalis,: the s*!4ect has access to not the o!4ects of the +orld !*t the representations of the, in conscio*sness. Conscio*sness is the plane on +hich the o!4ects are pro4ected, +itho*t any clear +arrant that the thin"s pro4ected there have !een rendered acc*rately accordin" to a relia!le process. &he sit*ation of the kno+er is th*s *niAplanar, restricted to the plane of conscio*sness. &he sit*ation of the t+oAi,a"inations note, ho+ever, is !iplanar. &o conceive corporeal thin"s, +e *se fi"*res= that is, there is first the plane of corporeal o!4ects, to +hich ( %# ( +e already have access, and then there is the plane of i,a"es and fi"*res, to +hich +e also have access and +hich +e can freely vary, either on paper or in o*r i,a"inations. &he first plane is vie+ed in co,parison to, or rather thro*"h, the second. @ f*rther difference is that in the *niplanar sit*ation the ho,*nc*l*s pro!le, can !e avoided only !y p*ttin" conscio*sness in the plane of the appearances, +hereas !y its very nat*re the !iplanar sit*ation c*ltivates a ,ova!le conscio*sness that can attend to one plane, or another, or even to +hatever ,ay !e !et+een for e)a,ple, in fi"*rin" o*t the relationship and solvin" pro!le,s !et+een planes. &his !iplanar sit*ation ,akes very little sense in standard Cartesian ter,s, !*t it is perfectly intelli"i!le in a ScholasticA@ristotelian fra,e+ork. @s +as e)plained in chapter 1, the doctrine of the internal senses holds that there are internal po+ers of sensi!ility, the internal or in+ard senses, that prepare and ,anip*late the phantas, that is considered essential for all thinkin". /n partic*lar, the co,,on sense is presented +ith an i,a"e co,posed of the proper and the co,,on sensi!les, that is, +ith an i,a"e prod*ced fro, all the senses-in ,ore ,odern ter,s, +e co*ld call it the co,posite sensation or even the co,posite percept-and, in t*rn, fro, this and or fro, re,e,!ered i,a"es as +ell, the

cooperatin" internal senses, incl*din" i,a"ination and co"itation, prod*ce the phantas, that is necessary for the intellective po+ers to operate. /n si,plified ter,s, the corporeal o!4ect perceived is in co,,on sense, +hereas the fi"*re thro*"h +hich +e conceive it is in phantasia. .e are th*s in possession of !oth the o!4ect and the fi"*re: each is present in its o+n field or plane, and there is an a+areness or conscio*sness that pertains to each plane !*t also transcends each. &his !rin"s *s to a clearer distinction !et+een the *niplanar sit*ation of representation and the !iplanar sit*ation of i,a"ination. >epresentations, it is pres*,ed, are *lti,ately ca*sed !y states of affairs in the +orld, !*t +e have no access to those states of affairs e)cept thro*"h the representations-and that only !y +ay of inferences a!o*t +hat kinds of connections !et+een +orld and ,ind co*ld prod*ce those representations. /n the !iplanar sit*ation of !ody and i,a"e, in contrast, +e have direct access to !oth, and +e can vie+ the !ody directly thro*"h the ,edi*, of the i,a"e. /t is not even essential in this !iplanar fra,e+ork that +e !e c*rrently sensin" the !ody, for thro*"h another of the internal senses, ,e,ory, +e are a!le to preserve and recall direct i,a"es of the !ody that, held in one plane, can !e fi"*red in another.O?1P O?1P .e need not do the !iplanar vie+in" directly, since +e can te,porarily allo+ the perceived or re,e,!ered !ody to drop fro, o*r attention +hile +e fi"*re o*t relations in the i,a"e. Gor e)a,ple, +e ,i"ht pict*re a past*re as a s3*are and, after ,eas*rin" the sides, sit do+n +ith paper and pencil to calc*late the area of the i,a"ined s3*are to o!tain the past*re6s area. &he e,ploy,ent of ,e,ory do*!tless raises the 3*estion of +hether or not ,e,ory i,a"es appear in the sa,e plane as the fi"*rin" i,a"es. /t is at least conceiva!le that the planes are different, !*t even if they are the sa,e, it is possi!le to retain a nontrivial sense of !iplanarity in that one ,oves !ack and forth !et+een the fra,e of the fi"*rin" and the fra,e of the re,e,!erin"-as it +ere, like ,ovin" !et+een different +indo+s of a ,*ltitaskin" co,p*ter pro"ra,. ( %F ( &he !ompendium musicae's portrayal of the perception of rhyth, i,plicitly ill*strates ho+ this !iplanarity +orks: s*ccessive notes are heard and please the sense ,ore or less accordin" to the proportions !et+een the,= then the i,a"ination !e"ins its +ork of fi"*rin" o*t the rhyth, or the har,ony of the +hole son". /t does this !y s*ccessive acts of inte"ration of the notes into a pro4ected +hole. @fter the first t+o notes one pro!a!ly cannot yet kno+ +hether the rhyth, is in do*!le or triple ,eter, !*t already at that point the i,a"ination con4ect*res a +hole. Beca*se ,*sic is spread o*t in ti,e and !eca*se in co,parison to vision so ,*ch ,ore constr*ctive activity see,s to !e re3*ired to "et even fairly si,ple a*ral o!4ects, the !ompendium's e)a,ple needs so,e ad4*st,ent to !e applica!le to vision. @s everyone havin" even a little ac3*aintance +ith Descartes6s later +ritin"s kno+s, the paradi",atic ,etaphor for the so*l6s activity is seein". Dision appears 3*ite early on to have displaced hearin" in his conception of i,a"inative kno+in". 1ven +ith the shift to the paradi", of vision, ho+ever, Descartes retained his *nderstandin" of i,a"ination as an activity. &he fi"*ration presented in the t+oAi,a"inations note is +ork, an acco,plish,ent, +hether it is done !y corporeal i,a"ination or i,a"inative intellection. 9ere a"ain the !ompendium provides a cl*e a!o*t ho+ and +hy this +ork takes place. Sensation has a nat*ral affinity for certain rhyth,s and ,*sical intervals, +hereas the so*l as a +hole takes ,a)i,*, pleas*re not in +hat is si,plest or ,ost co,plicated !*t rather in +hat presents a solva!le challen"e to its po+ers of i,a"inative discri,ination and 4*d",ent. Descartes al+ays reco"ni7ed his penchant for solvin" p*77les and fi"*rin" o*t pro!le,s he p*t to hi,self.O??P /f there is in h*,an !ein"s a nat*ral desire to kno+ and a correspondin" pleas*re in kno+in", and if nearly all kno+in" presents itself first in the for, of a 3*estion or pro!le, that has to !e sorted o*t and solved-a notion that one already

finds in @ristotleO?#P -then it +o*ld see, likely that the so*l sho*ld in "eneral take pleas*re in solvin" pro!le,s. /n each case it +o*ld !e"in +ith a po+er, an e)ternal or internal O??P See @& L ?1F. K*st t+o entries earlier, in +hat is the second note of the +hole CCo"irationes privatae,C Descartes re,arks, Cas a yo*th, +henever in"enio*s discoveries +ere presented, / asked ,yself +hether / co*ld discover Othe,P for ,yself, even +itho*t havin" read the a*thor: fro, +hich / "rad*ally noticed that / +as *sin" fi)ed r*les Ocertis regulis PC :@& L ?1F;. See also the Regulae, @& L F$#. O?#P See etaphysics, 95?!1?A95#a?1. ( %% ( sense, that receives +hat it is "iven in accordance +ith its nat*ral affinities for so,e thin"s rather than others and then +o*ld reconfi"*re this "iven accordin" to the corporeal i,a"ination :or, in the case of spirit*al thin"s, the intellect*al i,a"ination; in order to "et hold of a sol*tion, that is, in order to kno+. &he ori"inal reception and retention takes place in one plane, the reconfi"*ration in another. &he notion of these t+o planes helps clarify so,e i,portant feat*res. /n analo"y to ,icroscopes and telescopes, +hich have an o!4ect lens on the side of the o!4ect !ein" vie+ed and an oc*lar lens for the vie+er6s eye, +e can call the plane of reception retention the o47ect plane, +here the so*l is "iven the ori"inal o!4ect and its relevant conte)t, and the plane of reconfi"*ration the ocular plane, +here the +ork of the i,a"ination proper takes place. /t is precisely these planes as conte)ts that no+ take on the,atic i,portance. &he o!4ect e)ists or appears as part of a conte)t, for e)a,ple a stone lyin" loose on a sandy !each. /f / no+ i,a"e this as a lar"e sphere on a oneAinchAthick !ed of tiny spheres 4*,!led to"ether, / have ,i,icked the i,,ediate e)periential conte)t and can *se it as a kind of te,plate that confi"*res the rock and its sit*ation. &he i,portant thin" to notice is that +ithin each plane there can take place certain events and transfor,ations independent of any that ,i"ht take place in the other, yet ,any of +hich can !e ,i,icked reciprocally. Gor instance, another stone ,i"ht !e +ashed *p on the !each :/ can fi"*re this as a second lar"e sphere !ein" p*shed onto the !ed of tiny spheres;= or the sphere ,i"ht !e rolled in a +ay that traces an SAc*rve a,on" the tiny spheres :o!vio*sly correspondin" to a si,ilar path traced !y the real stone;. 1ach plane has a de"ree of a*tono,y and certain principles accordin" to +hich it operates= in fact, it is these principles that ,ake for the a*tono,y. 1ach of the planes also has a de"ree of openness to innovations, altho*"h these are not *nli,ited. Gor e)a,ple, / co*ld i,a"ine the sand as occ*pied !y a "ro*p of s*n!athers in addition to the near!y stone: / +o*ld th*s !e !rin"in" the s*n and h*,an !ein"s and their co,port,ents into the !each sit*ation. / co*ld perhaps ,i,ick these +ith cartoon or stick fi"*res in ,y oc*lar plane refi"*ration, !*t !eyond a certain li,it there is no point in carryin" this f*rther. / ,i"ht instead !eco,e interested in the 3*estion of ho+ the tiny spheres +o*ld ,ove if a sinkhole developed, and in +hat +ay they ,i"ht carry the lar"e sphere alon" +ith the,. .ith a co,p*ter vis*ali7ation and so,e si,ple dyna,ical r*les / ,i"ht +ell !e a!le to develop a tolera!le ,odel of real sinkhole !ehavior :and !*ildin" the co,p*ter ,odel a,o*nts to openin" a third plane;. / co*ld try to set *p an analo"o*s sit*ation on a real !each +ith a ,ore or less spherical rock and perfor, e)peri,ents, !*t only if / sa+ so,e reason to do this. /n every case there +o*ld !e a certain li,it !eyond +hich it ( %6 ( +o*ld !eco,e diffic*lt or even pointless to contin*e developin" the conte)t and sit*ation of one plane

so that it corresponds to the other. .hat ,akes a plane a plane, then, is that there is a sit*ation of relevancy that is or can !e transfor,ed accordin" to certain principles. /n a very !asic sense +e co*ld say that the sit*ation of the rock on the !each is all the processes and activities that take place in a short span of ti,e. &his looks like the CrealA +orldC sit*ation. B*t the realA+orld sit*ation is itself la!ile, for a "eolo"ist ,i"ht see the appropriate sit*ation as involvin" ,illennia or even ,illions of years. &h*s there is al+ays a te,poral and sparial sit*ation of a realA+orld o!4ect. &he apparently relevant ti,e and space ,ay !e e)panded or contracted, and the relations of the o!4ect +ith other thin"s ,ay chan"e dependin" on the foc*s of attention. /n the case of the plane in +hich / fi"*re the !each +ith spheres, the ti,e is the va"*ely defina!le one of present concern, and the place ,i"ht !e called a s*!set of i,a"ined threeAdi,ensional 1*clidean "eo,etry. B*t the principles accordin" to +hich processes and co,port,ents take place in this ti,e and place +o*ld depend on the r*les of transfor,ation and the intrinsic po+ers of the i,a"ination to conceive and reconfi"*re the ti,e and place. &he advanta"e that the plane of i,a"inative "eo,etry has over the realA+orld plane is that its possi!ilities are less *npredicta!le= they are in fact a*tarchic, defined !y the i,a"iner in principle. /f certain r*les are follo+ed, or if the sit*ation confor,s to !asic po+ers of the i,a"ination, it is ,ore controlla!le than the realA+orld sit*ation. S*ch a sit*ation +o*ld !e ,a)i,ally achieved, for e)a,ple, if / i,a"ined a *niverse in +hich all particles +ere of the sa,e si7e and shape :spheres; that o!eyed +ellAdefined r*les of ,ove,ent :linear; and collision :perfectly elastic, conservin" ,o,ent*,;. /n s*ch a case, one +o*ld not need to ,ake constant ad hoc interventions or decisions to ,aintain an on"oin" process: the initial r*les and sit*ation +o*ld take care of all that follo+ed. &he reader +ill reco"ni7e that / have in effect developed the notion of a ,odel. &hat +as not the pri,ary intention, !*t in fact the notion of a ,odel is derivative fro, the possi!ility of !iplanar vie+in", seein" one thin" and its sit*ation in ter,s of another. @ ,odel is a for,ali7ed and ,*ltiA di,ensional analo"y, +hereas !iplanar vie+in" is si,ply a +ay of "ettin" a Cvis*alC fi) on so,ethin". O?FP Bne needs to "et a fi) !efore one can ,odel. Bne thin" that sho*ld !e clear !y no+ is that there is no intrinsic reason +hy one of the planes sho*ld or ,*st al+ays !e the real +orld. Gor e)a,ple, the ,athe,atical real, of an e3*ation can !e pict*red as :vie+ed in ter,s of; a "eo,etrical c*rve, and vice versa. /t sho*ld !e evident as +ell that if one can "et a fi) on so,ethin" in one plane :the o!4ect plane; in O?FP &his difference corresponds ro*"hly to that !et+een analo"y and ,etaphor and tends to s*pport the co"nitive pri,acy of ,etaphor. ( %E ( ter,s of another plane :an oc*lar plane that happens to !e si,pler;, then the relative si,plicity of that oc*lar plane ,ay ease the diffic*lties of findin" ans+ers to 3*estions that co,e *p in the o!4ect plane. @ll that is re3*ired is that certain thin"s and relationships in one !e fi"*red in the other. Brdinarily this +o*ld ,ean that certain proportions !e ,aintained, even if not in an i,,ediately reco"ni7a!le for,. G*rther,ore, it is also evident that if - is an oc*lar plane fi"*rin" o!4ect plane A, then in t*rn plane can !eco,e an o!4ect plane +ith respect to ne+ oc*lar plane !, and that if so,e proportionality is ,aintained in each transition, then ! can serve as an oc*lar plane, directly or indirectly, for plane A. &he reader ,ay think that +e have "enerated a ,o*ntaino*s apparat*s to e)plain a si,ple point that Descartes +as "ettin" at. 8ore si"nificant, he or she ,ay already "*ess that the *lti,ate o*tco,e and s*pport of this !iplanar fi"*rin" is a strict analo"y !et+een the ,aterial *niverse :"eo,etric space; and the space of the i,a"ination to !e fo*nd in the later Descartes. B*t it is necessary to ,ake the "eneral

case a!o*t the concept of !iplanarity !eca*se the i,a"inative fi"*rin" of the early Descartes, even +hen it fi"*res in a strictly "eo,etric sense concernin" physical 3*estions, proceeds +ith a ,*ch "reater fle)i!ility than it did later on, and it displays a ,arked preference for ad hoc sol*tions that respect the particular conteBt of the pro!le, and therefore the essential relativity of the planes that / have e,phasi7ed. G*rther,ore, the f*nda,ental notion of e)tension in the later Descartes +ill take on a different si"nificance +hen it is conceived in ter,s of a !iplanarity esta!lished, in the ,anner of &e onde, !et+een the real, of physical e)tension and the real, of the i,a"ination :the fa!le that !e"ins in chapter 6 of that +ork;. &his in t*rn +ill have an effect on the +ay in +hich +e conceive the positions achieved in the +ritin"s p*!lished in Descartes6s lifeti,e. @ltho*"h so,e of the iss*es related to the intellect*al i,a"ination ,*st !e postponed *ntil the final section of this chapter, +e have already seen eno*"h to reco"ni7e that nothin" in principle prevents the ,ethod of !iplanar fi"*rin" fro, !ein" e)tended to spirit*al and intellect*al ,atters. Gor the techni3*e is !ased, not on the ,ateriality or e)tensionality of i,a"ination, !*t on the a!ility of relations in one plane to !e analo"ically and proportionally fi"*red in another plane. &hat is, as lon" as there are C,irrora!leC relations in a plane, no ,atter +hat the nat*re of the entities in that plane or the r*les of ,irrorin", those entities and relations can to that de"ree !e i,a"ed !y fi"*res and !odies. &he ,ethod is therefore ontolo"ically !ased: not in ter,s of s*!stances and essences, !*t rather in ter,s of relations, relations that can in ,ost cases !e presented in the very clear and ri"oro*sly deli,ita!le ter,s of ,athe,atics. &h*s the ontolo"ical !asis is that of si,ilarity !et+een vario*s thin"s, possi!ly even !et+een all thin"s= the ontolo"ical !asis is psycholo"ically and episte,olo"ically ( %5 ( i,a"ed in corporeal and intellect*al i,a"ination= and the +ay in +hich these relations are presented "ives rise to deter,inate and often ,athe,atically solva!le pro!le,s. /f +e li,it o*rselves si,ply to the real, of the corporeal, +e can derive fro, these considerations a co,prehensive techni3*e or ,ethod of solvin" pro!le,s of this real,. &his see,s to have !een the point of the note 3*oted earlier in +hich Descartes said that the "oal of nat*ral e)planation is to acco,,odate e)planations to +hat is kno+n !y sense :@& L ?15A?19;. S*ch a !ald assertion co*ld never have !een *ttered !y the older Descartes. &he note links all nat*ral thin"s to sense !y +ay of si,ilarity, a si,ilarity that pervades all nat*re and sense and that allo+s the Cassi,ilationC of one kind of nat*ral kno+led"e to another.O?%P /t is pro!a!ly not coincidental that in Lei!ni76s selection there is 4*st a sin"le note :a!o*t the perfection of the acts of ani,als s*""estin" their lack of free +ill; !et+een this and the !e"innin" of the series of notes a!o*t nat*ral scientific and ,athe,atical topics, a series that contin*es ri"ht *p to the end of Lei!ni76s selection. 1ven if they +ere not conti"*o*s in the ori"inal note!ook, the physico,athe,atical notes apply in fact +hat the precedin" Cfi"*rin"C notes develop in principle. /t is in li"ht of the techni3*e of fi"*rin", then, that +e can appreciate one of the earliest sta"es of Descartes6s thinkin" a!o*t ,ethod.

D. T0E P0YSICO,AT0E,ATICAL NOTES OF T0E 7CO+ITATIONES PRIVATAE7

Shortly after their first ,eetin", /saac Beeck,an recorded in his 4o*rnal that Descartes considered hi, the only person he had ,et +ho acc*rately 4oined physics +ith ,athe,atics, a co,pli,ent that Beeck,an reciprocated :@& L %?;. Beeck,an +as in the ha!it of "ivin" ,ar"inal titles to his O?%P Consider the cogitatio privata that reads CUna est in re!*s activa vis, a,or, charitas, har,oniaC :@& L ?15;, CBne Oand the sa,eP is in thin"s active po+er, love, charity, har,ony.C &he *s*al

renderin"s into 1n"lish and Grench constr*e this alon" the lines of C&here is only one active force in thin"s: love, charity, har,ony,C !*t the Latin +ord order s*pports constr*in" vis as part of the concl*din" series. Despite amor's !ein" a ,asc*line no*n ordinarily re3*irin" unus, the +ei"ht of the three fe,inines ,akes a distri!*tive constr*al of una to all fo*r per,issi!le= and on the *s*al readin", the three concl*din" no*ns dan"le. &he aphoris, +o*ld therefore !e not pri,arily a!o*t the active force in thin"s h*t a!o*t the f*nda,ental ontolo"ical identity in thin"s of active po+er, love, charity, and har,ony, altho*"h accordin" to distinctions of reason they appear to !e different. .hen taken in this ,anner the se3*ence is a stron"ly ascendin" order: fro, the ordinary po+er in :physical; thin"s to the yearnin", erotic love of the ani,ate to selfless, spirit*al love and, finally, to the dyna,ic e3*ili!ri*, of all thin"s in the cos,os. &he +hole *niverse is th*s *nited in a contin*o*s +e! of relational po+ers stretchin" across the entirety of creation, fro, ordinary thin"s to thin"s of the spirit. ( %9 ( 4o*rnal entries= this one he la!eled CPhysico,athe,atici pa*cissi,i,C the very fe+ physico,athe,aticians. Since then the r*!ric has !een not *nco,,only *sed to desi"nate the ,ethod and kind of nat*ral science that Descartes practiced early in his career. /n !rief, physico,athe,atics is the application of a "eo,etric analysis to pro!le,s conceived accordin" to a ,echanical and ,ore or less corp*sc*lar *nderstandin" of nat*ral thin"s and events, like the ,otion of a !ody s*!4ect to *nifor, acceleration or the path follo+ed and the press*re e)erted in a +aterAfilled container !y a particle of +ater at the *pper s*rface. 9ere / shall not offer an interpretation of this physico,athe,atics as an episode in the history of ,odern physics or in the develop,ent of its concept*al apparat*s, or even in co,parison +ith the later physics of Descartes.O?6P /nstead, / !e"in !y notin" that these t+o pro!le,s +ere recorded !oth in Descartes6s note!ook and in Beeck,an6s 'ournal, that they are 4*st t+o of a lar"e n*,!er of si,ilar pro!le,s raised in the note!ook, and that +hat they have in co,,on is a ,ethod of *sin" in"enio*s "eo,etrical fi"*ration to arrive at sol*tions, or sol*tions in principle, of physical pro!le,s. / re,ark f*rther that these notes are in essential contin*ity +ith the techni3*e of representin" ,*sical consonances !y a line divided into proportional parts, yet +ith an increasin"ly sophisticated develop,ent of the fi"*res, the proportions, and the operations *sed for derivin" pro!le, sol*tions. So, for e)a,ple, the first physico,athe,atical pro!le, in the CCo"itationes privatae,C ,*ch disc*ssed in the literat*re since early in this cent*ry, is that of a fallin" stone, s*!4ect to *nifor, acceleration in a vac**,.O?EP /t happened to ,e a fe+ days a"o to ,ake the ac3*aintance of a ,ost in"enio*s ,an, +ho proposed to ,e this 3*estion: C@ stone,C he said, Cdescends fro, @ to B in one ho*r= it is, ho+ever, attracted !y the earth !y a force constantly the sa,e, and it does not lose fro, its speed +hat has !een i,pressed on it !y prior attraction. Gor +hat is ,oved in a vac**, is al+ays ,oved,C he considered. .hat is so*"ht: .in +hat ti,e a "iven space is traversed.C O?6P S*ch analyses can !e fo*nd in 0aston 8ilha*d, Descartes savant :Paris: @lcan, 19?1;= 1. K. Di4ksterh*is, The echani2ation of the #orld Picture: Pythagoras to .e9ton, trans. C. Dikshoorn :B)ford: Clarendon Press, 1961= reprinted Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956;= Kohn @. Sch*ster, CDescartes and the Scientific >evol*tion, 1615A16#F: @n /nterpretationC :Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 19EE;, esp. %$A1%9= Sch*ster, CDescartes6 athesis 6niversalis C= .illia, >. Shea, The agic of .um4ers and otion: The %dentific !areer of Ren* Descartes :Canton, 8ass.: Science 9istory P*!lications, 1991;, 1%A??= and Daniel 0ar!er, Descartes' etaphysical Physics

:Chica"o: University of Chica"o Press, 199?;, 9A1?. O?EP See, for e)a,ple, 8ilha*d, Descartes savant, ?6A#1= @le)andre 'oyrS, 0alileo %tudies, trans. Kohn 8epha, :@tlantic 9i"hlands, 2.K.: 9*,anities Press, 19E5= Grench ori"inal 19#9;, E9A9F= and Shea, agic of .um4ers and otion, 1%A?E. ( 6$ (

Gi". F. &he fi"*re that Descartes *sed to CsolveC the fallin" !ody pro!le,. / solved the 3*estion. /n a ri"ht isosceles trian"le Ofi". FP, the space @BC represents Xthe ,otionJ=O?5P the ine3*ality of the space fro, point @ to !ase BC,the ine3*ality of the ,otion. &herefore @D is traversed in a ti,e that @D1 represents= DB in the ti,e that D1BC represents: +here it is to !e noted that less space represents a slo+er ,otion. B*t @1D is a third part of D1BC: er"o it traverses @D three ti,es slo+er than DB. :@& L ?19; /t has lon" !een reco"ni7ed that Descartes6s Csol*tionC is +ron" and that it s*ffers fro, concept*al a,!i"*ities. /t does not caref*lly distin"*ish !et+een distance, speed, and ti,e: first the areas are said to represent ,otion, that is, speed= ne)t they are taken to represent ti,es= then they are taken to correspond to de"rees of slo+ness rather than speed. Descartes concl*des that the rock traverses AD three ti,es slo+er than D-, +hich is the sa,e as to say that if AD is traversed in one *nit of ti,e then the s*ccessive e3*al distance of fall D- +ill take l # :$.###; *nit. &he correct, 0alilean ans+er, +hich +e derive al"e!raically fro, the relation d J 1 ? at? :+here d is distance, a acceleration, and t ti,e;, is that if AD is traA O?5P &he caret !rackets are in @&. ( 61 ( versed in one *nit of ti,e, then traversin" D- takes another

A 1, or a!o*t $.F1F, *nits. Beeck,an preserved in his 'ournal a ,ore f*lly e)plicated and so,e+hat less pro!le,atic version of this sol*tion and also his o+n ans+er, +hich !y ,odern standards is correct.O?9P Beeck,an6s note on Descartes6s sol*tion also ,entioned other pro!le,s that co*ld !e solved !y fi"*rate reasonin". &he one that i,,ediately follo+s the fallin" !ody pro!le, is a variant of it in +hich the attractive force :and so also the acceleration; is constantly increasin"= accordin" to Descartes6s techni3*es, says Beeck,an, the sol*tion re3*ires a threeAdi,ensional fi"*re :a pyra,id; appropriately s*!divided into sections. &his entry in the 'ournal also !riefly considers the pro!le, of co,po*nd interest. Bne i,a"ines it to increase in individ*al ,o,ents, and asks +hat is o+ed at this or that ti,e: for this pro!le, is solved *sin" proportions divided !y a trian"le= !*t the line a! ,*st not !e divided into arith,etic parts, that is, e3*al parts, !*t in "eo,etrical, or proportional. @ll of +hich / co*ld prove ,ost evidently fro, ,y OJ Descartes6sP "eo,etric al"e!ra, !*t it +o*ld !e too lon". :@& L E5; &his co,po*nd interest pro!le, appears, in its t*rn, in the CCo"itaAtiones privatae,C as does also the

variant of the fallin" !ody pro!le, that post*lates an increasin" force of attraction= the note a!o*t the latter ackno+led"es that its sol*tion +o*ld re3*ire a pyra,id. /t is i,,ediately follo+ed !y t+o entries that ,ake a ,ethodolo"ical "enerali7ation. <et as / lay do+n the fo*ndations of this science, ,otion every+here e3*al OJ constant, *naccelerated ,otionP +ill !e represented !y a line, or !y a rectan"*lar s*rface, or a parallelo"ra,, or a parallelepiped= +hat is increased !y one ca*se, !y ,eans of a trian"le= !y t+o, a pyra,id, as a!ove= !y three, !y ,eans of other fi"*res. Gro, these thin"s an infinite n*,!er of 3*estions are solved. :@& L ??$; /n the contin*ation of this last note and the notes that follo+, Descartes states pro!le,s and descri!es the kinds of c*rves that +o*ld !e *sed in solvin" the,: for e)a,ple, at +hat point the speed of a rock fallin" in air stops increasin", the co,po*nd interest pro!le,, +hether the c*rvat*re of a chain han"in" slack !et+een t+o s*pports descri!es a conic section, +hy an o!4ect h*rled fro, an ar, ,ovin" circ*larly aro*nd a pivot point !e"ins to ,ove strai"ht ahead +hen it is released, and ,any others. @ltho*"h Descartes does not atte,pt act*al sol*tions or sketch fi"*res in O?9P Beeck,an solved the pro!le, !y lettin" the area of the fi"*re stand for ti,e= see @& L %5A61. Co,pare @& L E%AE5 for the f*ller acco*nt of Descartes6s sol*tion that BeeckA,an recorded in his 'ournal. ( 6? ( ,ost of these notes, it is clear that he had already considered ,any in detail and that he had reco"ni7ed so,e specific diffic*lties they raised. Concernin" the co,po*nd interest pro!le,, he appears to have "one !eyond the sol*tion o*tlined in Beeck,an6s 'ournal for he reco"ni7es that constr*ctin" Cthe line of proportionsC in the "eo,etrical fi"*re re3*ires *sin" a c*rve kno+n as the 3*adratri), +hich Carises fro, t+o ,otions not s*!ordinated to one another, OoneP circ*lar and Othe otherP strai"htC :@& L ??#;.

E. T0E UNIVERSAL SCIENCE OF PROPORTION

&he 3*estion of the 3*adrati) and the kind of Cline of proportionsC its constr*ction re3*ires in fact p*ts *s fi"ht in the ,iddle of the central pro!le,atic of Descartes6s ,athe,atics: proportionality. Bne of the ,ain pro!le,s-one sho*ld pro!a!ly call it the ,ain pro!le,-Descartes p*rs*ed thro*"ho*t his career as a ,athe,atician +as the techni3*e of constr*ctin" "eo,etric proportionals. &he constr*ction of these proportionals had lon" !een reco"ni7ed as an iss*e in ,*sical theory and +as taken *p in detail !y the one a*thor to +ho, Descartes ackno+led"es a de!t in the !ompendium, 0ioseffo `arlino. O#$P &he classic constr*ction techni3*es of the ancient 0reek ,athe,aticians, e,ployin" r*ler and co,pass, are in "eneral not s*fficient for prod*cin" an ar!itrarily chosen n*,!er of "eo,etric proportionals.O#1P &he ,athe,atician 1ratosthenes, ho+ever, took an i,portant step in the develop,ent of ,ore co,plicated, nonclassical devices for constr*ctions !y inventin" the ,esola!e, a set of interconnected trian"les +ith pivotin" ar,s that are a!le to slide in a rectan"*lar fra,e+ork. &he ,esola!e can !e *sed to find t9o ,ean proportionals !et+een t+o "iven line se",ents, +hich ena!led 1ratosthenes to d*plicate the c*!e :i.e., to constr*ct a c*!e do*!le the si7e of a "iven c*!e;. /t also O#$P /n `arlino6s Istitu2ioni harmoniche :Denice, 1%%5;, 11#A11F, and Dimostra2ioni harmoniche :Denice, 1%E1;, 16#A165= cited !y Shea, agic of .um4ers and otion, #5AF$. O#1P Usin" 4*st r*ler and co,pass one can al+ays find a point that deter,ines a singte "eo,etric ,ean proportional c !et+een t+o len"ths a and 4. Bne can therefore also take this ne+ line and find the ,ean proportionals !et+een it and the other t+o :!et+een a and c find d, !et+een c and 4 find e ;, th*s

ac3*irin" three ,ean proportionals, d, c, and e, !et+een the ori"inal lines= dividin" each s*ccessive pair of these five lines yields fo*r ,ore ,ean proportionals, for a total of seven !et+een the ori"inal t+o lines= dividin" a"ain prod*ces a total of fifteen, etc. :i.e., one can *se this techni3*e to find l, #, E, 1%, #1, 6#, and in "eneral ? A 1 ,ean proportionals !et+een the t+o ori"inal len"ths;. B*t one cannot in "eneral constr*ct an ar!itrary n*,!er of "eo,etric proportionals !et+een t+o len"ths. By contrast, for any co*ntin" n*,!er n one can divide the interval !et+een t+o lines into n e3*al se",ents= that is, any ar!itrary n*,!er of arithmetic ,ean proportionals can !e fo*nd *sin" ordinary techni3*es of constr*ction. ( 6# (

Gi". %. Descartes6s proportional co,pass. <L and <` are 4oined !y a pivot at <= r*ler BC :+hich can !e ,ade as lon" as necessary on side C; is ri"idly attached to <L at a ri"ht an"le= r*ler CD has a slidin" attach,ent that keeps it perpendic*lar to <`= as do also 1G and 09= si,ilarly, D1 and G0 have slidin" attach,ents to keep the, perpendic*lar to <L. @s the co,pass is pivoted open, the point of intersection !et+een BC and <`, that is, C, ,oves to the ri"ht, and the r*ler BC p*shes CD alon" <`, CD p*shes D1 alon" <L, and so forth= +hen the co,pass is closed, all the r*lers are p*lled !ack to+ard <. can !e *sed for dividin" an octave into t+elve e3*al se,itones, for +hich p*rpose `arlino ,entions it. O#?P @pparently sti,*lated !y the *sef*lness of the ,esola!e, in early 1619 Descartes !e"an to devise other ,echanical instr*,ents for solvin" co,ple) "eo,etrical pro!le,s. /n partic*lar, he ,ade a "eo,etrical co,pass that co*ld in principle !e *sed to find any n*,!er of "eo,etric proportionals !et+een t+o "iven len"ths. &he only li,it +as a practical one: ho+ ,any rotatin" and slidin" r*lers co*ld !e ,ana"ea!ly co,!ined in a net+ork of pivots and "rooves. &he constr*ction of the instr*,ent, pict*red in fi"*re %, !e"ins +ith t+o principal r*lers, MG and M8, pivoted at M. &hese r*lers are ,achined +ith "rooves that allo+ the transverse r*lers like -! O#?P @fter dividin" the interval !et+een a strin" and its ,idpoint into three "eo,etrically proportional se",ents *sin" the ,esola!e, one then divides these three proportionally *sin" 4*st r*ler and co,passes :this prod*ces si) intervals !et+een the ori"inal t+o lines;, then divides each of these si) a"ain !y a sin"le proportional :yieldin" t+elve intervals, the se,itones of a ,*sical octave;. ( 6F ( and !D to slide as the co,pass is opened :that is, as an"le GM8 is enlar"ed; or closed :GM8 "ets s,aller;. &hese transverse r*lers are attached in the follo+in" +ay. Girst, -! is ri"idly affi)ed to the *pper r*ler MG at - = these t+o r*lers al+ays re,ain perpendic*lar to one another at this point. .hen GM8 is opened, point ! +ill ,ove pro"ressively to the ri"ht alon" M8 . /f +e ,ake r*lers MG, M8 , and -! as lon" as +e need and please, then as GM8 is opened very +ide :so that MG and M8 are nearly perpendic*lar to one another; the point ! +ill ,ove to+ard the ri"ht to infinity, *ntil finally -! !eco,es parallel to M8 +hen MG t*rns perpendic*lar to M8. So ,*ch for the first of the transverse r*lers. &he second transverse r*ler, !D , represented in the fi"*re as LAshaped, is fitted to the other r*lers so that it +ill !e p*shed to the ri"ht !y -! as the co,pass is

opened and p*lled !ack to the left as the co,pass is closed= as this happens, !D al+ays re,ains perpendic*lar to M8. Unlike the first transverse r*ler, +hich is per,anently attached at point -, !D and all the rest of the transverse r*lers slide alon" either MG or M8<!, D, ), $, 0, and ( are all ,ovin" points that ,ove ri"ht or left accordin" to +hether the instr*,ent is opened or closed, +hile the short le" of each transverse r*ler keeps it perpendic*lar to either MG or M8. &h*s the t+o principal r*lers and the transverse r*lers, as ,any as one likes :tho*"h here there are 4*st si) transverse r*lers;, are ,echanically interlinked so that increasin" or decreasin" the principal an"le GM8 ca*ses the points !, D, ), and so on, to !e"in slidin"= the transverse r*lers p*sh and p*ll one another into ne+ positions as a net+ork. Gor it all to f*nction in a real instr*,ent there +o*ld need to !e appropriately tooled linka"es: for e)a,ple, a slot alon" the !otto, of -! in +hich a !*tton pivot attached to !D at ! +o*ld slide as -! p*shed or p*lled on !D . /n a si,ilar fashion, D) +ill !e attached to !D at D so that the r*ler !D p*shes or p*lls D) to ,ake the short le" of D) :at D ; slide alon" MG and the point ) ,ove to the ri"ht or the left alon" M8. )$, $0, and 0( +ill !e attached and +ork in a si,ilar +ay. .ith a ro*tin" tool and !*tton pivots one co*ld fairly easily constr*ct a +orkin" version of s*ch a co,pass. &here is no li,it in theory to the n*,!er of transverse r*lers that can !e *sed, !*t practically the instr*,ent +o*ld soon "ro+ !*lky and stiff in its operation if one *sed too ,any. &he theoretical key to this co,pass6s *sef*lness is that the interlockin" r*lers for, trian"les that are "eo,etrically si,ilar to one another. /f one takes any t+o trian"les for,ed !y the vario*s parts of the co,pass, one +ill find e3*al correspondin" an"les, and this ass*res that the len"ths of the correspondin" sides +ill ,aintain a strict proportion to one another. So, for e)a,ple, in the trian"les M-! and M$0 , the an"les at M are e3*al, the ri"ht an"les at - and $ are e3*al, and the an"les at ! and 0 are e3*al= ( 6% ( therefore M-NM$ O M!NM0 O -!N$0. &rian"le M-! is also si,ilar to !-D, +hich is si,ilar to D!), +hich is si,ilar to )D$ , +hich is si,ilar to $)0 , +hich is si,ilar to 0$( = M-! is si,ilar to M!D, M)$ , and M0( as +ell. Beca*se of these si,ilarities +e can set *p a lon" series of proportions that hold !et+een the r*ler len"ths. /t is a si,ple e)ercise to see that (0N0$ O 0$N$) O $)N)D O )DND! O D!N!- O !MNM- = and even si,pler that M-NM! O M!NMD O MDNM) O M)NM$ O M$NM0 O M0NM(. &he co,pass is in effect a ,achine for "eneratin" series of line se",ents in constant, contin*in" proportion. So, for e)a,ple, +e can see that M! is the "eo,etric ,ean proportional !et+een M- and MD :since, fro, the !e"innin" of the second e3*ation strin" 4*st "iven, M-NM! O M!NMD = the "eo,etric ,ean proportional !et+een t+o n*,!ers or len"ths a and 4 is the n*,!er or len"th B s*ch that aNB O BN4 or, e3*ivalently, s*ch that B? J a4 ;. MD is the "eo,etric ,ean !et+een M! and M) = M) is the ,ean !et+een MD and M$ = and so forth. 2o+ if +e stip*late that M- is "oin" to !e o*r *nit len"th, so that M- J l, +e "et 1 M! O M!NMD, +hich is e3*ivalent to MD O M!? . /n the second e3*ation strin" of the second sentence in the precedin" para"raph, +e have the e3*ality M!NMD O MDNM) = since +e 4*st sho+ed that MD O M! ? , +e can s*!stit*te M! ? for MD : M!NM! ? J <CO?P <1. 8*ltiplyin" !oth sides of this e3*ation !y M! and !y M) , then red*cin" it to si,plest for,, +e "et M) O M!O#P . Si,ilarly, since MD N M) O M) N M$ , +e can s*!stit*te and +ork the e3*ation to sho+ that M$ O M!OFP = fro, M)NM$ O M$NM0, +e can reason that M0 O M!O%P , and finally M$NM0 O M0NM( lets *s concl*de that M( O M! 6 . /f in theory or reality +e

!*ild a co,pass +ith n transverse r*lers, +e can in a si,ilar +ay find a line len"th that is e3*al to M!n for any positive inte"er n. Bne of the thin"s this co,pass does, then, is to raise the 3*antity c represented !y the len"th M! to any po+er +e like-or, ,ore acc*rately, it raises it to all po+ers si,*ltaneo*sly, since M!, MD, M), M$, M0, M(, and so on, represent the first, second, third, fo*rth, fifth, si)th, and so on, po+ers at the sa,e ti,e. 2otice that to "et all these po+ers one only needs to ,ake M- the *nit ,eas*re and open the co,pass *ntil M! is of the desired len"th c = one can then read the po+ers off of the principal r*lers, +ith the len"ths correspondin" to oddAn*,!ered po+ers lyin" alon" M8 and evenAn*,!ered po+ers alon" MG /nversely, one can take any n*,!er k , open the co,pass so that MD O k and have the s3*are root represented !y M! = or open the co,pass so that M) O k and have M! !e the c*!e root of k = or open it *ntil M$ O k and have M! !e the fo*rth :3*artic; root of k = and so forth. So the co,pass also e)tracts roots of any de"ree. &he last *se of the co,pass to point o*t here-one that is a strict conse3*ence of the precedin"-is that it +ill display si,*ltaneo*sly any ar!itrary n*,!er of "eo,etric ,ean proportionals !et+een t+o n*,!ers len"ths :pres*,in", of co*rse, that +e can add on transverse r*lers at +ill;. ( 66 ( Bet+een M- and M0 the co,pass displays the fo*r ,ean proportionals M!, MD, M) , and M$ = !et+een M- and M( it displays five :+ith M0 added to the previo*s list;. So "iven any t+o n*,!ers a and 4 , set the scale on all the r*lers so that M- O a :a scale, of co*rse, 4*st sets a !asic proportion that +ill hold thro*"ho*t all the ter,s of a pro!le, or representation, as in a scale dra+in";,O##P e)pand the co,pass so that, say, M( O 4 , and one +ill have the five "eo,etric ,ean proportionals. Later, as is evidenced !y the 0eometry of 16#E, Descartes contin*ed his st*dies of this and related co,passes, st*dies that +ere cr*cial for developin" his version of +hat +e call analytic "eo,etry. &he f*nda,ental point is that if one takes M8 as fi)ed in place, it in effect !eco,es the e3*ivalent of the B Aa)is of Cartesian coordinates in t+o di,ensions, and the points of intersection !et+een the transverse r*lers and the *pper principal r*ler, that is, points -, D, $ , and ( , all trace o*t c*rves as the MG ar, is rotated co*nterclock+ise. &hese are the dotted lines of fi"*re %. @ny s*ch c*rve traced !y the ,ovin" points of intersection of this co,pass is descri!a!le as an al"e!raic polyno,ial.O#FP /n effect, these polyno,ial c*rves can !e *sed "eo,etrically to constr*ct sol*tions to pro!le,s of proportion, even +itho*t the direct *se of the co,pass. Contrari+ise, the co,pass, +ith pencils attached to the ,ovin" points, can !e *sed to trace polyno,ial c*rves. @ll the ,otions are ri"idly interconnected and interdependent: the ,otion of any part of the device prod*ces a deter,inate ,otion in every other part. &his device and others like it, pl*s Descartes6s researches into 3*estions of ho+ the proced*res of slidin" and rotatin" co*ld !e "enerali7ed ,athe,atically to "enerate c*rves and fi"*res for solvin" pro!le,s, are to !e fo*nd in the last pa"es of the CCo"itationes privatae.C Gor e)a,ple, he conceives of a device for prod*cin" conic section c*rves !y i,a"inin" a line capa!le of slidin" thro*"h a fi)ed point +hile it si,*ltaneo*sly rotates aro*nd an a)is= if the line is i,a"ined to !e a pen tracin" o*t a c*rve on a fi)ed paper plane, the "eo,etrical device !eco,es a practical one, an instr*,ent for dra+in" conic sections. S*ch i,a"inin" provides the principle accordin" to +hich a technician ,i"ht devise correspondin" practical ,achines. &his techni3*e of i,a"inin" the deter,inate confi"*ration and ,otions of ideal ,achines occ*rs also in Descartes6s +ork of the later 16?$s, in partic*lar in his search for devices to "rind optical lenses. @ltho*"h +e shall not follo+ these develop,ents of Descartes6s ,atheA

O##P @s +e shall note presently, fi)in" the scale e)actly, +hich is 3*ivalent to deter,inin" he *nit ,eas*re, is not al+ays a solva!le pro!le,. O#FP @n al"e!raic polyno,ial has the for, a nB a anA1B a . . . a a?B a a1B a a$ , +here n is a positive inte"er "reater than or e3*al to o and all the ter,s a/ are rational n*,!ers :e3*ivalently, one can restrict all the ter,s ai to inte"er val*es;. ( 6E ( ,atics f*rther, the cr*cial point is that Descartes6s Canalytic "eo,etryC +as derived fro, his e)a,ination of proportionality= it +as driven !y his discovery of an e3*ivalence !et+een :on the one hand; n*,erical al"e!raic approaches and :on the other; "eo,etric constr*ction !y the contin*o*s, ri"idly interlocked ,otions of ,echanical instr*,ents. @ny al"e!raic pro!le,, it see,ed, co*ld !e e,!odied in a ,achine or co,pass, and any ,achine or co,pass co*ld !e *sed to "enerate +hat +e +o*ld reco"ni7e as an al"e!raic polyno,ial in one *nkno+n. &hese ,achines are perfectly descri!a!le !y a ,athe,atics *sin" only rational n*,!ers and therefore 3*ite concretely and deter,inately i,a"ina!le. @t the end of the previo*s section and the !e"innin" of this one, / ,entioned a c*rve called the 3*adratri). &he 3*adratri), Descartes reali7ed, +as the c*rve necessary for solvin" pro!le,s of co,po*nd interest. /ts si"nificance in the present conte)t is that it cannot !e "enerated !y the kind of interlockin" ,achines and co,passes / have !een descri!in". /n fi"*re 6, let "D and "! !e o*r ,*t*ally perpendic*lar reference :coordinate; a)es, fi)ed ri"idly in place. &ake a line se",ent "A and attach it !y a pivot at " :this se",ent +ill rotate aro*nd " once +e set the ,achine into operation;. &ake another line se",ent -! and attach it to "D so that it can slide *p and do+n "D +hile re,ainin" perpendic*lar to a)is "D and parallel to a)is "! . &he ,achine +ill start +orkin" at ti,e t$ +ith "A lyin" alon" "D and -! intersectin" "D at A . .e !e"in the ,otions !y p*ttin" "A into clock+ise rotation aro*nd " at a *nifor, speed and lettin" -! slide at a *nifor, speed do+n+ard alon" "D. .e +ant to coordinate the rotation of "A and the do+n+ard slide of -! so that at the ,o,ent +hen -! reaches " :and therefore lies alon" "! ; the entire rotatin" se",ent "A +ill coincide +ith -! and "! . &his device constr*cts the 3*adratri) as the line traced o*t !y the ,ovin" point of intersection of "A and -0 /n fi"*re %, it is the c*rve ,arked !y the points -, ), $, 0, ( . By attachin" a pencil at this ,ovin" point of intersection +e co*ld act*ally dra+ the c*rve +ith an acc*racy li,ited only !y technical in"en*ity. .hat differentiates this C,achineC fro, the proportional co,pass and other ri"idly interlinked instr*,ents is that it is not a sin"le ,achine at all !*t t+o independent ,achines in need of coordination. &he catch is that the coordination cannot take place !y ,eans of an interlinked syste, of pivots, slidin" r*lers, "ears, or the like, connected in a +ay to ass*re that the t+o lines ,ove *nifor,ly and also coincide at e)actly the ri"ht ,o,ent S*ch coordination can !e achieved only appro)i,ately, and altho*"h there +ill al+ays !e +ays to i,prove the appro)i,ation, it is i,possi!le to "ive a sol*tion that is "eneral and e)act. .ith p*rely pra",atic "oals s*pported !y a s*fficiently po+erf*l technolo"y, the lack of an ideal sol*tion is a ,inor pro!le,. Bne can still "ain CcontrolC over theoretical and practical pro!le,s apart fro, 1$$ percent ( 65 (

Gi". 6. Se",ent B@ is pivoted at B and set rotatin" clock+ise at a *nifor, rate= its positions at ti,es t$ , t1 , t? , t# , and tF are pict*red. Si,*ltaneo*sly se",ent BC slides do+n a)is BD at a *nifor, rate= its positions at ti,es to thro*"h tF are pict*red. &he t+o ,otions are coordinated so that B@ falls alon" a)is BC precisely at the ,o,ent :tF ; +hen BC reaches it= at that ,o,ent B@, BC, and BC coincide. &he 3*adratri) is the c*rve traced o*t !y the ,ovin" point of intersection of B@ and BC, indicated !y the c*rve B1G09. acc*racy and "enerality. &he techni3*es of !iplanar fi"*rin" +o*ld contin*e to !e *sef*l. B*t Descartes does not see, to have !een interested in p*rely practical control +itho*t a theoretical certainty to !ack it *p. &he reasons are pro!a!ly relatively si,ple. Girst, +itho*t kno+led"e of the e)act sol*tion, one cannot kno+ ho+ acc*rate a ,erely practical sol*tion is. &his is not to deny that in partic*lar cases one can deter,ine +hat the acc*rate sol*tion +o*ld !e: for e)a,ple, there are si,ple techni3*es for constr*ctin" a li,itless n*,!er of individ*al points of the 3*adratri). <et one loses there!y the econo,y that the "eneral sol*tion provides, and, even ,ore i,portant, one loses a caref*l and co,prehensi!le *nderstandA ( 69 ( in" of the relationships involved :i.e., one loses si"ht of the tr*th of the ,atter and its tr*e ca*se or ca*ses;. /n the sol*tion of a sin"le pro!le, the res*ltin" i,precision ,i"ht ,atter little, !*t if the pro!le, is part of a series of interconnected pro!le,s the *ncertainties co*ld 3*ickly pile *p in an indeter,inate +ay, th*s addin" f*rther *ncertainties to any overall sol*tion. Second, if a ,echanical constr*ction is i,possi!le, the 3*estion arises +hether this kind of ,otion is possi!le at all, that is, +hether it co*ld really occ*r in nat*re. 0od, of co*rse, co*ld !rin" it a!o*t, !*t not !y ordinary, nat*ral ,eans. 1vent*ally, in the period leadin" *p to the co,position of the 0eometry , the last of the essays acco,panyin" the Discourse on the ethod , Descartes !eca,e interested in the pro!le, of syste,atically descri!in" in al"e!raic ter,s the c*rves prod*ced !y the kinds of ,achines he had i,a"ined in his yo*th. /n the earlier period +e can see traces of this interest, !*t it is not +ell developed. @ltho*"h at the very end of the CCo"itationes privataeC he presents ar"*,ents a!o*t ho+ al"e!raic e3*ations of the fo*rth de"ree can !e red*ced to thirdAde"ree pro!le,s, he does not, s*rprisin"ly, call attention to any connections !et+een his "eo,etrical and his al"e!raic investi"ations. &heir interrelationships are e)plicit in the 0eometry , ho+ever= indeed, these interrelationships are its essential teachin". Precisely +hen Descartes ,oved on to e)a,ine the essential str*ct*res of the interrelationship of al"e!ra and "eo,etric c*rves is a ,atter of de!ate. Lookin" at thin"s fro, the lon"er perspective provided !y the 0eometry, one can nevertheless "enerali7e: &he kinds of ,achines Descartes conceived in the CCo"itationes privataeC can !e *sed to trace o*t c*rves that are descri!a!le as analytic polyno,ials :i.e., c*rves that correspond to al"e!raic polyno,ials havin" +hole n*,!er coefficients;. /n principle s*ch c*rves are the res*lt of raisin" a varia!le n*,!er :len"th; to a po+er :i.e., ,*ltiplyin" the varia!le len"th !y itself the n*,!er of ti,es indicated !y the po+er, res*ltin" in a Cpo+er len"thC;, ,*ltiplyin" the res*lt !y a +hole n*,!er :i.e., addin" the po+er len"th to itself a +hole n*,!er of ti,es;, and finally addin" to or s*!tractin" fro, one another all the res*ltin" ter,s :len"ths;.O#%P @s a res*lt, there is a translata!ility fro, a varia!le "eo,etry into analytic polyno,ials and !ack, a translata!ility that provides po+erf*l techni3*es for ,athe,atical pro!le, solvin". @ si,ple e)a,ple:

to solve an e3*ation like )O%P J F one can in effect find fo*r "eo,etrical ,ean proportionals !et+een a line of len"th 1 and another of len"th F= contrari+ise, to find sol*tions to "eo,etrical pro!le,s, in partic*lar those that re3*ire the constr*ction of ne+ line se",ents, one can translate the relationships into al"e!raic ter,s, perfor, s*ccessive O#%P @s +e shall see in chapter #, this is the kind of ,athe,atics presented in the *nco,pleted second part of the Regulae ad directionem ingenii. ( E$ ( operations on the e3*ations to isolate the sol*tion for an *nkno+n, and then reprod*ce the "eo,etrical analo"s of these operations *sin" "eo,etrical fi"*res and appropriate constr*ction ,achines. &hin"s !eco,e ,ore co,plicated +hen one allo+s irrational coefficients in the e3*ations, that is, +hen the "ivens of the "eo,etrical pro!le, do not have a co,,on ,eas*re, and ,ore co,plicated still +hen the e3*ations one is dealin" +ith are no lon"er representa!le !y a finite al"e!raic polyno,ial. &he 3*adratri) is an e)a,ple of the last, as are also the tri"ono,etric f*nctions :sines, cosines, tan"ents, etc.;. Bne sho*ld reali7e, ho+ever, that the iss*e is not si,ply one of constr*cti!ility, since, for e)a,ple, one can easily constr*ct se",ents representin" the tri"ono,etric val*es for a "iven an"le *sin" 4*st a r*ler and a co,pass= like+ise one can find as ,any points of the 3*adratri) as one likes *sin" 4*st these si,ple tools. &he iss*e is rather +hether the +hole c*rve can !e s,oothly, contin*o*sly constr*cted !y a constant ,otion that e,!races every possi!ility, not 4*st for a finite n*,!er of val*es or even for a potentially infinite n*,!er selected one !y one. /n the letter to Beeck,an of ?6 8arch 1619, Descartes e)plained the "oal he +as p*rs*in" +ith these and related researches. @nd ass*redly, as / shall lay !are to yo* +hat / a, la!orin" at, / do not desire to propo*nd a Ll*llian @rs !revis !*t a co,pletely ne+ science, !y +hich ,i"ht !e solved "enerally all 3*estions that can !e p*t for+ard in any "en*s of 3*antity, contin*o*s as +ell as discrete. B*t each accordin" to its nat*re: for, as in @rith,etic, so,e 3*estions are solved !y rational n*,!ers, so,e only !y s*rd OJ irrationalP n*,!ers, others finally can indeed !e i,a"ined !*t not solved: so / hope that / shall de,onstrate that, in contin*o*s 3*antity, so,e pro!le,s can !e solved +ith strai"ht or circ*lar lines alone= others cannot !e solved e)cept +ith c*rved lines, !*t +hich arise fro, one sin"le ,otion, and therefore can !e dra+n !y the ne+ co,passes, +hich / consider no less certain and 0eo,etrical than the co,,on ones +ith +hich circles are dra+n= others, finally, cannot !e solved e)cept !y ,eans of c*rved lines "enerated !y different ,otions that are not s*!ordinated to one another, +hich are certainly only i,a"inary: s*ch a Oc*rvedP line is the 3*adratri), O+hich isP +ell kno+n eno*"h. @nd / think that nothin" can !e i,a"ined that cannot !e solved at least !y these lines= !*t / hope that / shall de,onstrate +hich 3*estions can !e solved in this +ay or that and not another: so that al,ost nothin" +ill re,ain to !e discovered in 0eo,etry. &he +ork is virt*ally infinite, and not for one person alone. O/t isP incredi!ly a,!itio*s= !*t / have "li,psed thro*"h the o!sc*re chaos of this science so,e sort of li"ht, !y the help of +hich / think every darkness, ho+ever dense, can !e dispelled. :@& L 1%6A1%5= ,y e,phasis; Descartes6s hope, as he spells it o*t here, is !orn of havin" conceived a science of 3*antity ,ore "eneral than either "eo,etry or arith,etic. &he for,er deals in magnitudes like len"th, +idth, and vol*,e, +hich can take

( E1 ( on any val*e +hatever, the latter in num4er, +hich is in essence !ased on the discrete ele,ents of order. @s any @ristotelian ,i"ht have o!served, these are !oth species of 3*antity, of the Cho+ ,*ch.C &h*s his o!4ect is to develop a kind of ,athe,atics that deals not +ith one or the other !*t +ith 3*antity per se. /n arith,etic, pro!le,s can !e divided accordin" to the kinds of n*,!ers that arise: the si,plest pro!le,s are solved !y co*ntin" n*,!ers and the res*lts of the fo*r !asic arith,etic operations :division, in partic*lar, "ives rise to the rational n*,!ers;= the ne)t level of co,ple)ity is in pro!le,s that re3*ire s*rds, that is, irrational n*,!ers that res*lt fro, the fo*r !asic operations pl*s the takin" of roots of any de"ree= the last is i,a"inary only, !y +hich Descartes ,eans not i,a"inary n*,!ers in the ,odern senseO#6P !*t rather sol*tions that re3*ire n*,!ers that cannot !e directly e)pressed !y either arith,etic or rootAtakin" operations :and so cannot !e derived fro, the ,otions of ri"idly interconnected ,achines; !*t are nevertheless deter,inate. Gor e)a,ple, calc*latin" the circ*,ference of a circle re3*ires the *se of a n*,!er, pi , +hich is neither rational nor s*rd, yet it is 3*ite deter,inately i,a"ined as the ratio of the circ*,ference of a circle to its dia,eter. &he pro!le, of proportions +as at the center of the ,athe,atics of Descartes in lar"e part !eca*se it appeared to hi, the key to arrivin" at a "eneral ,ethod of solvin" pro!le,s. &he constr*ction of proportions falls into a "eneral sche,e that divides pro!le,s into those that can !e solved !y arith,etic proportions :rational n*,!ers;, those that can !e solved !y "eo,etrical proportions :analytic, +hich ,eans the sol*tions can !e represented !y a polyno,ial havin" rational coefficients;, and those that can only !e i,a"ined :havin" transcendental sol*tions; h*t not "enerally or ,echanically solved. &he criterion here is that classes one and t+o are !oth constr*cti!le and i,a"ina!le, +hereas class three is only i,a"ina!le. /t is s*fficiently clear, then, that e)plorin" the po+er and scope of i,a"ination +as at the root of Descartes6s early ,athe,atics and science. &he f*nda,ental cate"ories of the science of 3*antity +ere deter,ined in accordance +ith i,a"ina!ility, !oth the kind that is ,echanically constr*cti!le O#6P &hat is, !y takin" the s3*are root of a ne"ative n*,!er. @ltho*"h Descartes is so,eti,es credited +ith havin" in this passa"e initiated the ,odern *sa"e of 6i,a"inary n*,!er6 :see 0ino Loria, CL61ni",a del n*,eri i,,a"inari attraverso i secoli,C %cientia ?1 :191E;: 1$%;, it is clear that he is not referrin" to s3*are roots of ne"ative n*,!ers !*t indicatin" i,a"ina!le !*t ,echanically *nconstr*cti!le sol*tions. @& a"rees that Descartes is not referrin" to ,odern i,a"inary n*,!ers !*t then s*""ests that he is thinkin" of sol*tions to e3*ations hi"her than de"ree fo*r :@& L 1%E;. &his see,s do*!tf*l to ,e, since e3*ations of de"ree five and hi"her do not prod*ce sol*tions different in kind fro, e3*ations of lo+er de"ree, tho*"h perhaps the practical diffic*lties of solvin" hi"herAde"ree e3*ations led Descartes to s*""est this third kind of 3*antity :"eneral techni3*es for solvin" e3*ations of the first fo*r de"rees had !een invented !y the ,iddle of the si)teenth cent*ry, and it +as discovered later that there can !e no "eneral techni3*es for de"ree five and hi"her;. ( E? ( and the looser kind that is pict*ra!le !*t not constr*cti!le. &here is a corollary: &he real, of the corporeal is only a special case of the i,a"ina!le= the i,a"ination in its ,ost "eneral for, is ,ore capacio*s and ,ore po+erf*l than the +orld that is ,erely "iven. Bne can i,a"inatively conceive +hat cannot !e corporeally i,ple,ented.

F. DREA,S5 AND I,A+ES OF T0E SPIRIT

&he t+oAi,a"inations note !e"ins +ith the po+er of corporeal i,a"ination to fi"*re physical thin"s= it

ascends to the *se of physical thin"s to fi"*re +hat is hi"her. /ntellect *ses !odies, that is, the ordinary thin"s of this +orld, to fi"*re spirit*al thin"s. /t is clear that there is license for takin" 6fi"*ration6 in an e)tended sense even at the level of the corporeal i,a"ination :i.e., i,a"ination is not confined to p*re "eo,etry; and that the process of fi"*ration is repeated at the spirit*al level-pres*,a!ly in a +ay analo"o*s to the lo+erAlevel process. .hat this fi"*ration !y ,eans of !odies is like is ill*,inated !y another of the private co"itations. Sensi!le thin"s OareP apt for conceivin" Bly,pian thin"s: +ind si"nifies spirit= ,otion in ti,e, life= li"ht, co"nition= heat, love= instantaneo*s activity, creation. @ll corporeal for,s act thro*"h har,ony. 8ore thin"s OareP cold than dry, and h*,id rather than hot, !eca*se other+ise the active +o*ld have 3*ickly carried off tri*,ph, and the +orld +o*ld not have lon" end*red. :@& L ?15; &his note see,s to present a 3*ite precise sy,!olo"y for the hi"her thin"s= one co*ld i,a"ine e)tendin" the list to yield a CkeyC for spirit*al interpretation. B*t this is pro!a!ly "oin" too far, and it overlooks that the key to interpretin" the sy,!ols ,*st !e the analo"y of participation. Creation is a kind of act, so insofar as a corporeal activity is also an act it can sy,!oli7e creation= !*t a,on" corporeal actions the ,ost appropriate sy,!ol +o*ld !e one that acts in an instant :since creation, in Christian theolo"y, happens o*tside of ti,e and is the !e"innin" of ti,e;. Si,ilarly for the others= either the analo"ical rese,!lance appears to !e !ased in a nat*ral and o!vio*sly shared characteristic, as in fi"*rin" kno+led"e !y li"ht, or there is so,e event or set of events that esta!lishes the ri"htness of the sy,!ol :+ind for spirit derives fro, the tradition of spirit as pne*,a and the co,in" of the 9oly Spirit at Pentecost-an event that +o*ld also 4*stify fire as a sy,!ol;.O#EP O#EP Bf co*rse, so,e sy,!ols are o!vio*s only !eca*se of esta!lished convention, and historically !ased sy,!ols +ill !e ,eanin"f*l only to those +ho share the history. B*t this is not really an o!4ection to sy,!olo"y per se. /f the +orld is pervaded !y analo"y and rese,!lance, there are ,any +ays to "et fro, one thin" to another, since rese,!lances and analo"ies are ,anifold, and every thin" and every act participate in nat*res or for,s that they share +ith other thin"s and acts. ( E# ( &he Bly,pian thin"s here are spirit, life, co"nition, love, creation= takin" a c*e fro, the first ,e,!er of the list, +e can call the, spirit*alia. .hat the note i,plies is that sensi!le thin"s stand in certain definite correspondences +ith spirit*alia and therefore can !e *sed :!y the poet or the in"enio*s philosopher; to ill*,inate the latter. 9enri 0o*hier has !ro*"ht this and related notes into connection +ith the section CBlyr, picaC of the vanished note!ook C, +hich section incl*ded, accordin" to Baillet, the narration of three drea,s that Descartes e)perienced on the ni"ht of 1$A11 2ove,!er 1619.O#5P /n the first drea, Descartes +as +alkin" to so,e *nspecified place +hen he !e"an to ,eet +ith a series of hindrances: +eakness on his ri"ht side, t*r!*lent and opposin" +inds, and enco*nters +ith ac3*aintances +ho +anted to speak +ith hi,. .hen he a+oke fro, this drea, he prayed for deliverance fro, the evil thin"s it fore!oded and then considered the "ood and evil of the +orld for nearly t+o ho*rs !efore fallin" asleep a second ti,e. &he second Cdrea,C +as a noise like th*nder that fri"htened hi, o*t of sleep, +here*pon he sa+ scintillatin" li"hts that !y closin" and openin" his eyes he interpreted favora!ly accordin" to Creasons taken fro, his philosophy.C 9e fell asleep once ,ore in a feelin" of cal, and had a third drea,, centered on the appearance and disappearance of t+o !ooks, a dictionary and a collection of poetry. Descartes said that he !e"an interpretin" +hile he +as still drea,in" and contin*ed after a+akenin". &he dictionary, he tho*"ht, represented the sciences taken all to"ether, and the collection of the poets C,arked in partic*lar, and in a ,ore distinct ,anner, philosophy and +isdo, 4oined to"etherC :@& L 15F;. Baillet contin*es:

9e did not !elieve that one o*"ht to !e so very astonished to see that the Poets, even those +ho only a,*se, are f*ll of sentences of ,ore "ravity, ,ore sensed, and !etter e)pressed than those fo*nd in the +ritin"s of the Philosophers. 9e attri!*ted this ,arvel to the divinity of 1nth*sias, and to the force of /,a"ination, +hich ,akes the seeds of +isdo, :+hich are fo*nd in the spirit of all ,en, like the sparks of fire in stone; e,er"e +ith ,*ch ,ore facility and even ,*ch ,ore !rilliance than >eason can do in the Philosophers. @lready the editors of the @da, and &annery edition re,arked that this passa"e contains a nearly ver!ati, translation of the t+oAi,a"inations note fro, the CCo"itationes privatae,C and 0o*hier interpreted it as a co,,entary on the drea,s. Bne can easily a"ree +ith 0o*hier6s contention that it is not a key to the interpretation of drea,s that Descartes +as searchin" for :since he of co*rse kne+ there are drea,s that fantasy alone prod*ces, +itho*t relation to tr*th; !*t rather a ,a"nificent "enerali7ation O#5P &he narration !e"ins: CL. 2ove,!er 1619, +hen / +as f*ll of enth*sias, and +as *ncoverin" the fo*ndations of a +onderf*l science etc.C See @& L 1E9A155. ( EF ( in ans+er to the 3*estion, C/s there not a necessity that spirit*al thin"s !e translated !y sensi!le i,a"esQ 2ot only in drea,s, !*t in the Bi!le, in nat*re itself insofar as it e)presses the perfection of the Creator.C Bne can also a"ree +ith 0o*hier that this is Descartes as ,an of the >enaissance rather than as father of ,odern philosophy.O#9P <et it is not at all clear that +e can dis,iss this line of tho*"ht as a yo*thf*l, enth*siastic indiscretion of +hich he later repented, for it is an inti,ate part of his early philosophy and closely connected to the,es that persisted into ,at*rer years. @t the very least +e ,i"ht +onder +hat t*rned Descartes fro, philosopher of the >enaissance to philosopher of ,odernity. &here is in fact a the,e in the CCo"itationes privataeC that can help *s identify a co,,on !asis for the t+o i,a"inations: discovery in accordance +ith the seeds or sparks of tr*th in the h*,an so*l. /t !eco,es evident fro, a revie+ of co"itations a!o*t the so*l, its po+ers, and its inclinations. Descartes re,arks that +hen he +as yo*n" he +o*ld often try to see +hether 4*st !y hearin" a!o*t a ne+ discovery he co*ld replicate it for hi,self and that little !y little he noticed that he +as *sin" certain r*les :@& L ?1F;. 8ost !ooks, he notes, reveal their entire ,essa"e in a fe+ lines and a fe+ fi"*res, the rest ,erely fills *p paper :@& L ?1F;. CGor all in"enia deter,inate li,its are prescri!ed that they cannot transcend. /f so,e cannot *se principles for discovery !eca*se of a defect of in"eni*,, they can nevertheless kno+ the tr*e re+ard of the sciences, +hich s*ffices the, for carryin" o*t tr*e 4*d",ents in the esti,ation of thin"sC :@& L ?1%;. 9e calls vices Cdiseases of the so*lC and notes that they are harder to dia"nose than diseases of the !ody, !eca*se altho*"h +e have often e)perienced the proper health of the !ody, +e have never e)perienced the health of the ,ind :@& L ?1%;. 9e notes his inclination to sleep and eat +hen he is sad or +hen dan"er is i,,inent, +hereas 4oy inclines hi, to neither :@& L ?1%;. &he t+oAi,a"inations note is follo+ed !y a reflection that Cthe sayin"s of the +ise can !e red*ced to a certain very fe+ "eneral r*lesC :@& L ?1E;, and it is preceded !y this: &here are certain parts in all in"enia that, +hen even li"htly to*ched, e)cite stron" affects: th*s a !oy +ith a stron" spirit, havin" !een scolded, +ill not cry !*t "et an"ry= another +ill cry. /f it is said that ,any and "reat cala,ities have happened, +e +ill !e saddened= if it is added that so,e evil person +as the ca*se, +e +ill "et an"ry. &he passa"e fro, passion to passion Oocc*rsP thro*"h nei"h!orin" ones= often, ho+ever, the passa"e fro, contraries is ,ore ro!*st, as +hen at a 4oyf*l party there is s*ddenly anno*nced a sad event. :@& L ?1E; O#9P 0o*hier, &es Premieres pens*es, 5FA56. Gor a different vie+ of the drea,s, as a hyperArationalist

fiction, see >ichard 'ennin"ton, CDescartes6 6Bly,pica,6C %ocial Research PI, no. :S*,,er 1961;: 1E1A?$F. ( E% ( /n each h*,an !ein" there are not 4*st seeds of tr*th !*t also seeds of nat*ral tendencies to affective responses, tho*"h the latter are ,ore varia!le fro, person to person than the seeds and o*t"ro+ths of tr*th. &his reflection p*ts *s !ack in the concept*al *niverse of the !ompendium musicae , +hich +as !ased on the post*late of typical affective responses to tones ,ore or less in accord +ith the or"ans of hearin". Descartes6s concern here is the native endo+,ent of the h*,an !ein", each person6s in"eni*,. &he co"nitively relevant seeds of tr*th are in each h*,an !ein", !*t they !la7e o*t in the hi"her i,a"ination of poets, +hich is only ploddin"ly approached !y philosophers. @ccordin" to the Bly,pian thin"s note, all corporeal for,s +ork !y har,ony. &his picks *p a the,e of the i,,ediately precedin" note: /n thin"s, active force, love, charity, har,ony are one.OF$P &he action of !odies takes place har,onio*sly !y virt*e of their for,s. &here is a !alance in the cos,os so that the hot, correspondin" to love, does not i,,ediately over+hel, the cold. &his is as far fro, conventional ,aterialis, as one can i,a"ine, and alien to any ,echanis, that +orks chiefly !y collisions, p*shes, and p*lls. &his kind of action or ca*sality is !ased on har,ony, and, since har,ony is har,onio*s !eca*se of the o!servance of proportions, then it can *lti,ately !e fi"*red ,athe,atically, even if e)actit*de is not feasi!le. &hat this tho*"ht is cos,olo"ical in at least the physical sense is clear fro, the sentence that follo+s, +hich, *sin" ter,s dra+n fro, @ristotle6s physics, i,plies that the ele,ents and their 3*alities had to !e in a certain proportion so that the +orld co*ld end*re: too ,*ch heat and dryness +o*ld lead to e)cessive activity that, pres*,a!ly, +o*ld t*rn the +orld into a ,ere incoherency of overe)cited, too rapidly ,ovin" ele,ents. Bne ,*st !e caref*l, ho+ever, not to read too ,*ch of the ,athe,atical into s*ch passa"es. &he tendency of ,ost Descartes interpreters is to follo+ the s*""estion of the Discourse and to pres*,e that the yo*n" Descartes, seein" that arith,etic and "eo,etry +ere the ,ost certain of sciences, proceeded to e)tend a ,ethod derived fro, these to the rest of kno+led"e. &hat is to ,iss so,ethin" cr*cially distinctive. Gor the yo*n" Descartes, the po+er of ,athe,atics is essentially its a!ility to sy,!oli7e relations and to e)press proportionalities, and this a!ility is "ro*nded in the analo"ical str*ct*re of the cos,os. &h*s the science of nat*re is not so ,*ch intrinsically ,athe,atical as har,onio*sly proportionate, a har,ony and proportion that is !y its nat*re e)pressi!le in !oth "eo,etric and arith,etic lan"*a"e. /n a sense, each thin" reflects other thin"s, each relationship is e)pressi!le in ,anifold +ays. .hat nat*ral science sho*ld do is pithily e)pressed in a private co"itation OF$P See footnote ?% for a disc*ssion of the translation of C*na est in re!*s activa vis, a,or, charitas, har,onia.C ( E6 ( / have already cited t+ice: C&he co"nition of nat*ral thin"s !y h*,an !ein"s Oocc*rsP solely thro*"h the si,ilit*de of those thin"s that fall *nder sense: and indeed +e 4*d"e that person to have ,ore tr*ly philosophi7ed +ho +ill have ,ore s*ccessf*lly assi,ilated the thin" so*"ht to +hat is co"ni7ed !y senseC :@& L ?15A?19;. Certainly ,athe,atics can !e of *se in this process of assi,ilation, !*t its po+er is not *ni3*e. 8athe,atics is deeply en,eshed in the ontolo"ical and psycholo"ical po+ers of fi"*ration= its advanta"e as a ,ode of fi"*ration is that it is perfectly e)pressi!le in the real, of the

,aterial and sensi!le.

+. I,A+ES5 ,E,ORYART5 AND T0E SECRETS OF ,ET0OD

&he relation !et+een ,athe,atics, physics, and i,a"ination in the earliest sta"e of Descartes6s +ork, then, depends on the analo"ical proportional character of the +orld that allo+s i,a"ination to fi"*re one kind of thin" !y *sin" another and to discover tr*ths co,prehensive of a class of thin"s !y ,anip*latin" and transfor,in" an i,a"inative representation of the,. P*t "enerally, i,a"ination serves as the a"ent of intelli"ent perception, the fo*ndation of physics and ,athe,atics, and the chief fac*lty for risin" to spirit*al tr*ths. /t sho*ld not !e s*rprisin", then, that i,a"ination and proportion also served as the core of an early reflection on the ,ethod and *nity of the sciences in another of the CCo"itationes privatae,C +hich proposes t+o approaches to a Ctr*e art of ,e,ory.C Bn readin" thro*"h Schenckel6s profita!le trifles :in the !ook De arte ,e,oria;OF1P / readily tho*"ht that everythin" / have discovered had !een e,!raced !y i,a"ination. /t occ*rs !y the leadin" !ack Ored*ctioP of thin"s to ca*ses: +hen all those thin"s are finally led !ack to a sin"le one, there +ill !e no need of ,e,ory for any science. Gor +hoever *nderstands ca*ses, +ill easily for, ane+ in the !rain the alto"ether vanished phantas,s !y the i,pression of the ca*se. &his is the tr*e art of ,e,ory and it is plain contrary to the art of that sorry fello+ OSchenckelP. 2ot !eca*se his OartP lacks effect, !*t !eca*se it re3*ires the +hole spaceOF?P that o*"ht to !e occ*pied !y !etter OF1P @& identifies this Cprofita!le trifleC as La,!ert &ho,as Schenckel6s De memoria :1%9%;= see @& L ?%1. @ccordin" to Paolo >ossi, this +ork +as reprinted in Schenckel6s 161$ o,ni!*s collection of vario*s ,e,ory treatises, titled 0a2ophylacium = see >ossi, !lavis 6niversalis: Arti della memoria e logica com4inatoria da &ullo a &ei4ni2, ?d ed. :Bolo"na: /1 8*lino, 195#;, 1F9. / have cons*lted OKohannP La,!ert*s Schenckeli*s D*silvi*s, 0a2ophylacium artis memoriae, p*!lished in /ariorum de arte memoriae, tractatus seB, ? vols. in one :Grankf*rt: K. 9. 1llin"er, 16E5;, 1:1A15?. OF?P 6Space6 is Grances @. <ates6s s*""estion= see <ates, The Art of emory :Chica"o: University of Chica"o Press, 1966;, #E#. &he +ord is act*ally chartam, paper, sheet, or ta!let. Schenckel6s art e,ploys the CspaceC of the i,a"ination, not e)ternal, ,aterial aids. ( EE ( thin"s and consists in an order that is not ri"ht= the Ori"htP order is that the i,a"es !e for,ed fro, one another as interdependent. 9e o,its this :+hether advisedly / do not kno+;, +hich is the key to the +hole ,ystery. / have e)co"itated another ,ode: /f fro, the i,a"es of not *nconnected thin"s there are learned additionally Oaddiscant*rP ne+ i,a"es co,,on to all, or at least if o*t of all of the, at the sa,e ti,e there co,es to !e one i,a"e, not only +o*ld there !e a relation to the closest, !*t also to the others: so that sho*ld the fifth relate to the first !y ,eans of a spear thro+n on the "ro*nd, the ,iddle one O+o*ld !e relatedP !y stairs fro, +hich they descend, the second one !y an arro+ pro4ected at it, and the third !y so,e si,ilar rationale, in accordance +ith the reason of si"nification either real or fictitio*s.OF#P :@& L ?#$; Both Paolo >ossi and Grances <ates 3*ote this passa"e in their !ooks on the art of ,e,ory=OFFP >ossi, in partic*lar, *ses it to sho+ that the ,e,ory art +as instr*,ental in shapin" Descartes6s conception of ,ethod. /t +o*ld !e "oin" too far afield to "ive an acco*nt of +hat +as involved in this art and its lon"

tradition "oin" !ack to ancient 0reece and >o,e. /t ,*st s*ffice to re,ark that it +as !ased on creatin" i,a"eAsy,!ols for +hat +as to !e re,e,!ered and then p*ttin" these in deter,inate ,e,ory places.OF%P Gor e)a,ple, one chose a fa,iliar space, say, a >o,an !asilica or a theater, and then located +ithin it, in an easily reprod*ci!le order, vivid and si"nificant i,a"es that co*ld !e recollected in se3*ence +henever one needed to re,e,!er. &he i,a"es co*ld !e direct or ,erely ,ne,onic, either conventional or personal.OF6P Bne co*ld, alternatively, detach the art fro, any partic*lar space and instead create e,!le,atic i,a"es :K*stice !lindfolded, holdin" a s+ord and scales, is a conventionali7ed re,nant of s*ch e,!le,s;. Br, *sin" even "reater a!straction, one co*ld practice the art !y co,!inin" ro*tini7ed sy,!ols, a techni3*e that Schenckel prefers. @t any rate, Schenckel6s +ork is a fairly a,ple acco*nt of the art of ,e,ory !ased on the physiolo"y of the !rain and on the OF#P &he last cla*se reads, 2et tertia si,ili ali3*^ ratione in ratione, si"nificationis vel verae vel fictitiae.C OFFP >ossi, !lavis 6niversalis, 1E%= and <ates, Art of emory, #E#A#EF. OF%P &he *se of act*al or fictional places for the i,a"es led to the alternative na,e for this techni3*e, local memory. &his spatial locali7ation of i,a"es +as not *niversally advocated, ho+ever= Schenckel6s ,ethod, for instance, does not cr*cially depend on it. See <ates, Art of emory = 8ary K. Carr*thers, The -ook of emory: A %tudy of emory in edieval !ulture, Ca,!rid"e St*dies in 8edieval Literat*re, no. 1$ :Ca,!rid"e: Ca,!rid"e University Press, 199$;= and Kanet Cole,an, Ancient and edieval emories: %tudies in the Reconstruction of the Past :Ca,!rid"e: Ca,!rid"e University Press, 199?;. OF6P <ates repeatedly ,akes the point that, in ,ost versions of the art, vividness re3*ired creatin" the i,a"es for oneself, altho*"h ,edieval and >enaissance proponents often provided conventionali7ed sy,!ols and e,!le,s. By direct i,a"e, / ,ean, e."., the i,a"e of Socrates talkin" *sed to re,e,!er +hat he said to 0la*con= !y ,ne,onic, e."., the i,a"e of Socrates *sed to stand for +isdo,. ( E5 ( psycholo"y of the internal senses as these +ere *nderstood in the 8iddle @"es and the >enaissance. &he techni3*es he teaches are s*pposed to !e applica!le to anythin" that needs re,e,!erin", incl*din" all sciences. <ates re,arks that the first, ca*sal approach that Descartes offers as an alternative to Schenckel is innovative, +hereas the ,ne,onic devices e,ployed in the second are 3*ite traditional. &he first in essence eli,inates the need for ,e,ory: one i,presses the ca*se in i,a"ination, and this prod*ces the entire se3*ence of all the related i,a"es or phantas,s. &he ,ind in possession of ca*ses is therefore in virt*al possession of all the phantas,s that derive fro, the,. &he second alternative depends on findin" an i,a"e that is co,,on to all others, so that one need not even "o o*tside the real, of i,a"es :to ca*ses;. /n this second ,ode the i,a"es all stand in a deter,inate, interdependent relationship that can !e recalled to ,ind !y sy,!ols like the h*rled spear :for the ,ost distant relation of first to fifth; and the stairs :+hich !rin" *s fro, the first to the ,iddle level;. &his conception of orderin" phantas,s co*ld easily !e translated into ter,s of se3*ences ordered !y proportion. /t is not hard to see ho+ Descartes ,i"ht have !elieved that he had fo*nd a +ay to *nite !oth these ,ethods, the ca*sal and the proportionate. &he kinds of devices he i,a"ined consistin" of interconnected, ,ovin" lines effect an o*tco,e in principle that can !e ca*sally translated to real ,achines in the physical +orld= all these ,otions and effects are interconnected !y proportional relationships. @ll co,ple) proportions, in t*rn, are constr*cti!le fro, si,ple proportions that are s*!4ect to "eo,etrical co,plication= the acts of "eo,etrical co,plication are, in their t*rn, i,ita!le !y

the arith,etic operations of addition, s*!traction, ,*ltiplication, division, raisin" to po+ers, and takin" roots. &he art that takes advanta"e of these i,a"ina!le, proportionate operations is the tr*e one, !eca*se it depends not at all on the ar!itrariness and ,e,ori7ation of the classic art of ,e,ory, !*t instead only on the easily i,a"ina!le, easily replica!le principles of ,athe,atical proportion. @t the very least, Descartes ,*st have tho*"ht, the h*,an ,ind6s po+ers are s*fficiently co,,ens*ra!le +ith the nat*re of the cos,os that it can e,!race the overarchin" principles of har,ony that pervade it in constellations of proportionally interrelated i,a"es :the second ,ethod of the Schenckel note;= !*t even !etter +o*ld !e a +ay that allo+ed the ,ind to pass fro, i,a"e to i,a"e accordin" to the active ca*ses that "overn the cos,os. /n this li"ht, it is easy to "ive an e)planation of Descartes6s pro"ress in the sciences in the co*rse of the decade fro, 1615, +hen he co,posed the !ompendium musicae, to the late 16?$s, +hen he "ave *p +ork on the Regulae ad directionem ingenii. D*rin" this period the chief disciplines of Descartes6s theoretical attention +ere har,ony, ,echanics, optics, and ,athe,atics. >ather than interpret this +ork ,erely as a pro"ressive ,athe,atiA ( E9 ( 7ation of the sciences of nat*re, +e note instead that ,*sical har,ony is a special !*t o!vio*s case of the f*nda,ental cos,ic har,ony that *nites all the thin"s of the +orld, a har,ony that ,akes the, all e)pressive and kno+a!le in accordance +ith the h*,an fac*lties that are att*ned to the,. 9is investi"ation of ,*sic is si,*ltaneo*sly an e)ploration of har,ony, that is, of proportionalities, and of their co,,*nication and intrinsic co,,*nica!ility. /n this li"ht Descartes6s st*dy of ,athe,atics is really not +hat ,odern historio"raphy has ,ade of it, an early version of analytic "eo,etry, !*t rather a co,prehensive ela!oration of the principles of proportion that s*pport the relatedness of all thin"s. &he st*dy of ,echanics is not si,ply the first sta"e in the ,echani7ation of the +orld !*t even ,ore the st*dy of the dyna,ics of physical o!4ects as they stand to one another in a net+ork "overned !y proportional relations and proportional ,otions. &he st*dy of li"ht, as +e shall see shortly, also fits +ithin the sche,a of har,ony and proportion, for optics is a st*dy of the f*nda,ental po+er of the co,,*nication of the proportional states of thin"s to one another and to the h*,an !ein" endo+ed +ith sensitive and co"nitive po+ers. @t the center of all these investi"ations is the po+er of proportionali7in" i,a"ination. /t is no accident that this po+er is the notAsoAhidden center of the +ork that is a c*l,ination of this pro4ect, as +ell as a transition to the later philosophy: the Regulae ad directionem ingenii. ( 51 (

PART II Imagination an. t$e Reg/(ae a. .irectionem ingenii

( 5# (

T0REE Ingeni/m an. Fig/ration T$e ,at$ematics o% t$e Reg/(ae

9avin" discovered the i,portance of i,a"ination in +orks fro, the years 1615A16?1, +e can no+ !e"in to ascertain +hat they contri!*te to an interpretation of the Regulae ad directionem ingenii. &he Regulae is *nfinished. @ccordin" to >*le 1?, it +as to have consisted of three parts +ith t+elve r*les each. &he first, +hich is co,plete in the sense that there are t+elve r*les :r*le headin"s; +ith disc*ssion :r*le co,,entary;, lays do+n the !asic principles of the ,ethod of properly orderin" kno+led"e. &he second, for +hich there are only si) r*les +ith co,,entary :1#A15; and another three +ith 4*st r*le headin"s :19A?1;, +as to have disc*ssed pro!le,s that co*ld !e *nderstood perfectly, even if the sol*tion +as not yet kno+n :@& L F?9;. &he third, sketchily planned !*t not e)ec*ted, +as to have treated pro!le,s not perfectly *nderstood. /nterpretations of the Regulae *s*ally e,phasi7e several thin"s: ,ethod, int*ition and ded*ction, the *nity of kno+led"e, si,ple nat*res, and the ,athe,ati7ation of tho*"ht. Dery fe+ e,phasi7e the 3*estion of psycholo"y,O1P that is, the 3*estion of the po+ers of the so*l that ,ake intuitus and deductio possi!le and that allo+ the develop,ent of a ,ethod. Gro, o*r earlier e)a,ination of >*le 1?6s acco*nt of the internal senses and its definition of in"eni*, as the po+er of treatin" i,a"es +hether ne+ly ,ade or re,e,!ered, +e reco"ni7e that the traditional rifle, +hich speaks of r*les for the direction of the in"eni*,, is inti,ately tied to psycholo"ical ,atters.O?P 6/n"eni*,6 has, in 1n"lish, typically !een translated as 6,ind6, !*t O1P Kean Laporte, &e Rationalisme de Descartes :Paris: Presses Universitaires de Grance, 19F%;, esp. F#AE6, is an i,portant e)ception, as is also Gerdinand @l3*iS, &a D*couverte m*taphysi1ue de l'homme che2 Descartes, ?d ed. :Paris: Presses Universitaires de Grance, 1966;. O?P Bf co*rse, +e cannot !e certain +hat title, if any, the treatise !ore in ,an*script. /n the Grench inventory of the posth*,o*s papers of Descartes, the Regulae is "iven *nder ite, G: C2e*f cahiers, relie7 ense,!le, contenant partie d6*n &raitS des >e"les *tiles T claires po*r la direction de l6esprit en la recherche de la veritS.C @fter e)a,inin" the e)tant testi,onies a!o*t the title, 8arion ar"*es that the first Latin edition of 1E$1, version @ :Regulae ad directionem ingenii ;, o*"ht not to !e co,pletely a*thoritative. K*st as cr*cial as the the,es of r*les and the direction of the spirit is the the,e of the search for tr*th. 9e contends that the title of the Grench inventory is !est= in the Latin of Pierre Borel, a*thor of the /itae Renati !artesii :16%6;, it +o*ld read Regulae utiles et clarae ad ingenii directionem in veritatis in1uisitione. ( 5F ( this is far too "eneric a concept to render even +hat Descartes e)pressly says a!o*t it. .e ,i"ht then +ell !e"in !y askin", .hat is in"eni*,Q

A. T0E NATURE OF IN+ENIU, AND T0E CONTE9T OF P0ILOSOP0ICAL PSYC0OLO+Y

/n 1n"lish, the ter, is *s*ally rendered as 6,ind6= a revised version of a recent translation *ses 6native intelli"ence6.O#P &he standard, hardly controversial, !*t also not very ill*,inatin" Grench renderin" is esprit.OFP /n the fe+ e)tant Grench letters !efore 16#$, Descartes *sed 6esprit6 in Grench +herever 6in"eni*,6 ,i"ht !e e)pected in Latin. B*t >*le 1? ,akes it s*fficiently clear that Descartes had in ,ind so,ethin" rather ,ore deter,inate than any of these ter,s conveys, /n"eni*,, as +e have seen,

is defined there as the action of the kno+in" po+er C+hen it at one ,o,ent for,s ne+ ideas in phantasia, at another applies itself to Oor !ears do+n on, concentrates onP those already ,adeC :@& L F16;. &he for,ation of ne+ ideas in phantasia, ho+ever, +as defined a fe+ lines earlier as i,a"inatio proper, and concentration on those already for,ed a,o*nts to +hat +as defined as re,e,!erin" :reminisci ;.O%P /n"eni*, is therefore the "eneral fac*lty of for,in" and actin" *pon i,a"es, +hich, !eca*se of the synA O#P 9aldane and >oss typically *se 6,ind6, and for the pl*ral, 6,ental po+ers6. CS8 *ses 6,ind6= in %elected Philosophical #ritings :1955;, a oneAvol*,e selection of CS8, 6,ind6 has !een chan"ed to 6native intelli"ence6, +hich, as +e shall see, ,ore acc*rately conveys an essential aspect of in"eni*,. /n the present +ork, ingenium and ingenia +ill !e left *ntranslated. OFP &he 16FF Latin translation of the Discourse on the ethod a*thori7ed !y Descartes renders esprit as ingenium, and the 16FE Grenchin" of the editations renders the fe+ occ*rrences of ingenium as esprit. O%P &he Latin reads: Cproprie a*te, in"eni*, appellat*r, c*, ,odo ideas in phantasia novas for,at, ,odo 4a, factis inc*,!it.C &he definitions of re,iniscence and i,a"ination conception read: Csi ad i,a"inatione, sola, *t diversis fi"*ris ind*ta,, dicit*r re,inisci= si ad ea,de, *t novas fin"at, dicit*r i,a"inari vel concipere.C &he activity of i,a"inin" per se, that is, the application of the kno+in" po+er to the i,a"inative or"an in order to shape or contrive ne+ ideas, +o*ld see, to !e e)actly +hat the first modo cla*se of the ingenium definition descri!es. Si,ilarly, the second modo cla*se appears to descri!e the application of the kno+in" po+er to i,a"ination, insofar as it is already arrayed +ith vario*s fi"*res :+ith a stron" sense of !earin" do+n on the fi"*res or ideas s*""ested !y incum4it ;. ( 5% ( ony,y !et+een 6i,a"inari6 and 6concipere6, +o*ld also ,ean the fac*lty of for,in" and actin" *pon +hat is conceived. /t can !e considered a*tono,o*s in that it does not directly depend for its contents on the e)ternal +orld !*t on the operations of the co"nitive or kno+in" po+er in the or"an phantasia. &he very ne)t para"raph of >*le 1? f*rther e,phasi7es the *nity of the po+er in 3*estion !y ar"*in" that ,e,ory, at least insofar as it is of corporeal thin"s, is a po+er of i,a"ination :C!*t the ,e,ory, at least that +hich is corporeal and si,ilar to the recordation of !easts, is not at all distinct fro, i,a"inationC;= ,oreover, the sa,e passa"e assi"ns to i,a"ination the po+ers of ,ovin" :in addition to !ein" ,oved !y; intellect and of actin" *pon :in addition to !ein" acted *pon !y; the senses. &he po+er of i,a"ination in"eni*, *nder"oes a rapid e)pansion of its psychophysiolo"ical co,petencies in these passa"es fro, >*le 1?. /n li"ht of this and the definition of in"eni*, proper as i,a"ination pl*s re,iniscence, the Regulae ad directionem ingenii appears to !e r*les for the direction of the fac*lty of conceivin" i,a"es, *nderstood as a sin"le, *nified po+er.O6P Pressin" too hard on synony,y and the e)act +ordin" of a te)t can lead to distortions in interpretation, of co*rse. Bne co*ld point o*t, for instance, that the lan"*a"e of the Regulae, even that of >*le 1? taken !y itself, is not al+ays consistent= at the very least there see,s to !e fre3*ent ter,inolo"ical vacillation. Gor e)a,ple, 6ded*ctio6, 6ind*ctio6, and 6en*,eratio6 are all *sed for +hat is ar"*a!ly the sa,e ,ental process.OEP /n >*le 1?, 6intellect*s6 is so,eti,es *sed as an e3*ivalent for 6vis co"noscens6, the kno+in" po+er ho+soever it ,anifests itself, !*t at other ti,es in a strict sense of the kno+in" po+er actin" on its o+n, apart fro, i,a"ination. @"ain in >*le 1?, the opposition of 6!ody6 and 6spirit6 is so,eti,es for,*lated alternatively as that of 6,atter6 and 6intellect6. &hese ter,inolo"ical tensions, as +e ,i"ht call the,, have not "one *nnoticed individ*ally, !*t their

syste,aticity has !een lar"ely hidden fro, vie+ !y an al,ost total *na+areness of the relevance of traditional philosophical psycholo"y and the de"ree to +hich Descartes initially +orked +ithin its pres*ppositions. /n the later +orks there are only hints and traces of this earlier concern. /t is not so ,*ch that Descartes deli!erately hid this fro, vie+, for instance !y Csaniti7in"C the a*to!io"raphical acco*nt of his intellect*al career in the Discourse. Descartes +as *nder no o!li"ation to descri!e every t+ist and t*rn of his philosophical ed*cation, especially not O6P .olfson re,arks a tendency in early ,odern Scholasticis, to red*ce the n*,!er of internal senses, even to a sin"le one. &he e)a,ple he "ives is 1*stace of St. Pa*l, an early seventeenthAcent*ry +riter kno+n to Descartes. .olfson, 6/nternal Senses in Latin, @ra!ic, and 9e!re+ Philosophic &e)ts,6 1?6= see also 1tienne 0ilson, IndeB scolastico+cartQsien :Paris: @lcan, 191#;. S.D. 6i,a"ination6, pp. 1#EA 1#9. OEP B*t see chap. F, Secs. D and 1, !elo+, for possi!le distinctions. ( 56 ( those paths that he had decided +ere i,passa!le. :8oreover, the part of his philosophical apprenticeship that / a, reconstr*ctin" here t*rns o*t to !e at least consistent +ith ,ost of +hat he says in the Discourse and else+here.; 2or is it the case that he *lti,ately re4ected i,a"ination as co"nitively *ni,portant. >ather, after the Regulae he fo*nd it necessary to deli,it its do,ain ,ore caref*lly= yet +hat re,ained to it incl*ded nothin" less than the +hole of "eo,etry and therefore also the s*!stance of the physical +orld. B*t in co,parison +ith the i,a"ination of his earliest philosophical spec*lation, this +as a very considera!le restriction, for thro*"h principles of analo"y its scope had for,erly e)tended into the hi"hest real,s of spirit*al tr*th. /t is a ,eas*re of the de"ree to +hich Descartes6s +ritin"s shifted the philosophical hori7on that +e are scarcely a+are of this develop,ent of his tho*"ht. &hat is, Descartes chan"ed the ter,s and fra,e+ork +ithin +hich physiolo"ical, philosophical psycholo"y +as conceived and set an a"enda radically different fro, the precedin" tradition, +hich had dra+n not 4*st on @ristotle !*t on Plato and the Stoics as +ell. @s a res*lt it is easy to !e insensi!le to the rich voca!*lary and caref*l distinctions to !e fo*nd in that tradition, a voca!*lary and distinctions that are al,ost inevita!ly o!sc*red in ,odern translations and interpretations.O5P Bne need only co,pare 1n"lishAlan"*a"e translations of Descartes6s psycholo"ical ter,inolo"y in the Regulae to the ori"inal Latin to reco"ni7e a concept*al flattenin". 6/n"eni*,6 is the o*tstandin" e)a,ple of this flattenin". &o render it as 6,ind6 or 6spirit6 is to ,iss its specific character. 1ven the Grench 6esprit6, +hich +o*ld see, to have Descartes6s i,plicit a*thority, is far too appro)i,ate to co,e to ter,s +ith it.O9P &he evidence of >*le 1? presented so far sho*ld ,ake it co,p*lsory that +e look ,ore deeply into the possi!ility that the *niverse of the Regulae is different fro, +hat +e have tho*"ht. /n !e"innin" this investi"ation it is i,portant to reali7e that altho*"h i,a"ination and in"eni*, are points of foc*s, they lead into a different +orld of philosophical disco*rse. 8oreover, +hat is at iss*e is not si,ply the Regulae or the early Descartes, so that those +hose ,a4or concern is the C,at*reC philosophy ,i"ht safely i"nore these ,atters. 1arlier +e noted that Descartes 4*stifies his *se of O5P @s Descartes fo*nd it the voca!*lary +as al,ost e)cl*sively Latin. By 16$$, the traditional psycholo"y had already !een si,plified and even v*l"ari7ed, and it did not s*rvive lon" eno*"h to !e carried over f*lly into philosophy +ritten in the vernac*lar lan"*a"es. /ndications of the re,nants of this psycholo"y in the seventeenth and the first half of the ei"hteenth cent*ry can !e "leaned fro, Kohn .. <olton, Perceptual Ac1uaintance from Descartes to Reid :8inneapolis: University of 8innesota Press B)ford: Basil Black+ell, 195F;.

O9P &he si"nificance of ingenium has escaped even the philosophical s*!tlety and historical learnin" of 8arion, +ho in his Grench translation and co,,entary *ses esprit +itho*t cavil= nor is ingenium incl*ded in the inde) or in the list of LatinAGrench correspondences. ( 5E ( 6idea6, a ter, central to his later tho*"ht, !y notin" that philosophers *se it Cfor si"nifyin" the for,s of perceptions of the divine ,ind, altho*"h +e reco"ni7e no phantasia in 0odC :@& D// 151= the Grench has Cfor si"nifyin" the for,s of the conceptions of the divine *nderstandin", altho*"h +e do not reco"ni7e in 0od any fantasy or corporeal i,a"inationC O@& /L 1F1P;. /f this is not eno*"h to convince *s of the relevance of these investi"ations of i,a"ination for *nderstandin" Descartes as a +hole, +e need only re,ind o*rselves once ,ore that Descartes ,ade the cogito , rendered into Grench as 7e pense and into 1n"lish as 6/ think6, a vital part of the s*!se3*ent history of philosophy. By follo+in" the co*rse of the editations, a thinker can pres*,a!ly reco"ni7e her essence as res cogitans, the thin" that en"a"es in co"itatio-+hich in the Regulae is assi,ilated to i,a"inatio.O1$P .e already reco"ni7e that in Scholastic psycholo"y co"itatio is the activity of the vis co"itativa, +hich, alon" +ith i,a"inatio, is one of the internal senses, and that there +as already in @vicenna and @verrobs a tendency to assi,ilate the active f*nctions of i,a"ination to co"itativa. /s it not possi!le that if +e do not take this into acco*nt, if +e do not search o*t the +ays in +hich a tradition ,ay have shaped or at least affected Descartes6s *nderstandin" of these ,atters, +e r*n the risk of ,issin" di,ensions that are essential to the entire philosophy of DescartesQ

-. T0E ,EANIN+ OF 'IN+ENIU,'

/n his co,,entary on the Discourse on the ethod, 1tienne 0ilson distin"*ishes three senses of 6esprit6 :havin" noted that the Latin e3*ivalent is 6in"eni*,6;: first, thought as s*!stantial and personal-and, taken in its ,ost "eneral acceptation, as opposed to e)tension= second, memory and imagination, as distinct fro, reason in its proper sense :here 0ilson refers to >*le 1?;= third, spirit as distinct fro, 6so*l6 :the latter ter, tends to incl*de ve"etative and ,otive po+ers and therefore ,i"ht enco*ra"e the conf*sion of !ody and so*l;,O11P B*t, as the definition of >*le 1? already s*""ests and as / hope +ill !eco,e clear fro, the re,ainder of this chapter, ingenium as *sed !y Descartes in the period !efore 16#$, tho*"h ,ost closely rese,!lin" the second of the senses identified !y 0ilson, not only enco,passes aspects of the others !*t also "oes !eyond the,. Descartes6s notion of 6in"eni*,6 clearly takes on the personal and s*!stantial aspect O1$P Cf. @& L #5E 1. 1? +ith #55 1. #. 0iovanni Crap*lli !elieves on the !asis of the 165F D*tch version 2 :+hich has C!e+ee"in" van denkin"C thro*"ho*t; that C,otion of imaginatio C sho*ld !e e,ended to C,otion of cogitatio. C See >enS Descartes, Regulae ad directionem ingenii, ed. 0iovanni Crap*lli, /nternational @rchives of the 9istory of /deas, no. 1? :&he 9a"*e: 8artin*s 2i4hoff, 1966;, ??. @, 9, and @& all have imaginatio, ho+ever. O11P >enS Descartes, Discours de la m*thode, %th ed., ed. 1tienne 0ilson :Paris: K. Drin, 19E6;, 56. ( 55 ( indicated in 0ilson6s first sense of 6esprit6, and if it does not really incl*de the ve"etative, it certainly incl*des the ,otive po+ers !y virt*e of phantasia6s central control of the nerve and ,otor syste,s. &his personal s*!stantiality is *nderstood as corporeal :and th*s e)tended; as +ell as intellect*al and spirit*al: in"eni*, e,phasi7es the h*,an person6s endo+,ent as a partic*lar, corporealAspirit*al

!ein", +ho !eca*se of those partic*larities has a so,e+hat "reater or lesser aptit*de for reali7in" the potentialities, especially co"nitive ones, that are co,,on to all h*,an !ein"s 3*a h*,an. &he notion therefore does not pres*,e the radical dichoto,y of tho*"ht and corporeality to !e fo*nd in the later Descartes. 8oreover, Descartes6s in"eni*, is a co"nitive po+er that is a!le to reco"ni7e the for,s and relations of i,a"es and to ,anip*late the, accordin"ly, so that it e)ercises f*nctions of the @vicennan vis co"itativa and the &ho,ist partic*lar reason. /n classical Latin, 6in"eni*,6, a co,,only *sed +ord derived fro, in Aand gignere :to !ear, prod*ce, !e"et; and th*s s*""estin" so,ethin" in!orn or innate, indicated in its ,ost !asic sense the s*, of in!orn fac*lties or po+ers. Bf h*,an !ein"s it indicated the ori"inal po+er of in!orn disposition, +ith also the ,ore specific sense of a stron" and fir, so*l. .ith re"ard to the intellect, it co*ld !e *sed "enerally of the po+ers of the ,ind and e)tended ,etony,ically to the +hole h*,an !ein"= *sed partic*larly, it co*ld !e synony,o*s +ith pr*dence, in"en*ity, and the like, indicate sin"le fac*lties of ,ind, or refer specifically to the fac*lties of invention or phantasia. /t co*ld !e *sed of deficient or !ad parts or characteristics of ,ind or so*l= and, finally, it co*ld occasionally !e *sed of !easts and other nat*ral thin"s in the sense of their nat*re or fac*lties.O1?P 6/n"eni*,6 is not *nco,,on in ,edieval Scholastics. Gor the ,ost part it is not sin"led o*t for technical or speciali7ed *se :*nlike 6ratio6 or 6phantasia6; !*t contin*es to convey the chief ,eanin"s of classical Latin *sa"e. /n &ho,as @3*inas, for e)a,ple, it can indicate in"en*ity or cleverness, !*t also the s*, of h*,an po+ers or h*,an intellect*al po+ers= and in so,e for,*lations it s*""ests the properly h*,an po+ers of kno+in" that therefore fall short of reachin" the thin"s of revelation.O1#P &he ter, does have a ,ore syste,atic *se in the +orks of 9*"h of St. Dictor :d. 11F1;, incl*din" the Didascalicon and his +ritin"s on ,editation. /n these +orks in"eni*, is paired +ith ,e,oria as the t+o nat*ral po+ers :naturae = they are contrasted !y 9*"h to practice and discipline; that are necessary to prolon"ed st*dy or ,editation. 8e,oria ena!les h*,an !ein"s to retain +hat they have e)perienced and read, +hereas in"eA O1?P S.v. 6in"eni*,6, Thesaurus linguae latinae, ?% vols. :Leip7i": B. 0. &e*!ner, 19$$A;, vol. E, pt. l, 1%??A1%#%. O1#P See Petr*s De Ber"o,o, ed., In opera %ancti Thomae A1uinatis IndeB seu Ta4ula Aurea :Paris: 155$= phototype ed. @l!aA>o,e: 1ditiones Pa*linae, n.d.;, %$%. ( 59 ( ni*, is the nat*ral aptit*de for "raspin" or conceivin" those thin"s properly in the first place.O1FP &he +ord had a pro"ra,,atic i,portance for /talian >enaissance h*,anists, as the h*,an po+er of *nderstandin" and invention that in its fle)i!ility and adapta!ility *nderlies the effective *se of +ords and that contrasts +ith a reason :ratio; that deals +ith the eternal and th*s transcends ail thin"s specifically h*,an.O1%P /n the late si)teenthAcent*ry co,,entary on @ristotle6s dialectics !y the Kes*it cardinal Grancisco de &oledo, a +ork that +as certainly availa!le to Descartes at the CollR"e 9enri /D at La GlRche, 6in"eni*,6 is *sed to indicate the hi"hest rational po+ers of reco"nition :the f*nda,ental ,odes of the syllo"is,, he says, depend on principles revealed !y nat*ral li"ht fro, +hich the h*,an in"eni*, is *na!le to dissent;. &he +ord is also not infre3*ent in the co,,entaries on @ristotle prod*ced at the Kes*it University of Coi,!ra to+ard the end of the si)teenth cent*ry, and it even takes on a 3*asiAtechnical ,eanin" in the one devoted to "n 0eneration and !orruption. &here 6in"eni*,6 is e3*ivalent to the e,!odied h*,an spirit, the individ*al h*,an !ein" as a partic*lari7ed corporeal ,anifestation of the species. &h*s the ter, is !road eno*"h to cover the pec*liarities ind*ced !y individ*ali7ation as +ell as the "eneral nat*re and po+ers d*e to the species.O16P

Ingeniurn takes *p sli"htly ,ore than a f*ll t+oAcol*,n pa"e in >*dolph*s 0ocleni*s6s early seventeenthAcent*ry &eBicon philosophicum, +hich concisely s*,,ari7es the variety of learned acceptations of Latin and 0reek philosophical ter,s.O1EP 0ocleni*s starts +ith the key "eneral and specific O1FP See !ook # of 9*"h of St. Dictor, The Didascalicon of (ugh of %t. /ictor: A edieval 0uide to the Arts, trans. Kero,e &aylor :2e+ <ork: Col*,!ia University Press, 1961;, esp. chaps. E and 5. &he Didascalicon is perhaps the pre,ier ,edieval treatise on the nat*re of science and ,ethod. Ingenium is pro,inent also in 9*"h6s CDe ,odo dicendi et ,editandi,C in K.AP. 8i"ne, ed., Patrologiae !ursus !ompletus, ?d ser. :Paris, 15%F= kno+n as Patrologiae &atinae ;, 1E6: 5E%A55$, esp. 5EE. &he relationship of 9*"h6s +ork to Descartes and possi!le infl*ences of this constellation of topics on Descartes6s thinkin" deserve f*rther investi"ation. O1%P See 1rnesto 0rassi, (eidegger and the Luestion of Renaissance (umanism: $our %tudies, 8edieval and >enaissance &e)ts and St*dies, vol. ?F :Bin"ha,ton, 2.<: Center for 8edieval and 1arly >enaissance St*dies, 195#;, ?$, E#AE6= and 9annaABar!ara 0erl, )infAhrung in die Philosophic der Renaissance :Dar,stadt: .issenschaftliche B*ch"esellschaft, 1959;, 1%F-16#. /n"eni*, +as f*nda,ental to the invention of concetti or conceits in !aro3*e aesthetics= see Koseph @. 8a77eo, Renaissance and %eventeenth+!entury %tudies :2e+ <ork: Col*,!ia University Press London: >o*tled"e T 'e"an Pa*l, 196F;, ?9AF#, and 8. G*,aroli, ed., !riti1ue et cr*a tion litt*raires en $rance au Bvii' siFcle, Collo3*e /nternational d* Centre 2ational de la >echerche Scientifi3*e, no. %%E, Paris, FA6K*ne 19EF :Paris: 1ditions d* Centre 2ational de la >echerche Scientifi3*e, 19EE;. O16P See Grancisc*s &olet*s, Introductio in dialecticam Aristotelis :Denice, 1%55;, 16#= Coi,!ran Colle"e of the Society of Kes*s, In duos li4ros de 0eneratione et !orruptione Aristotelis, ?d ed. :Lyon, 16$6;, F5%AF59. O1EP S.v. 6in"eni*,6 in >*dolph*s 0ocleni*s, &eBicon philosophicum 1uo tan1uarn clave philosophiae fores aperiuntur :Grankf*rt: 8. Becker, 161#= photo"raphic reprint 9ildeshei,: 0eor" Bl,s, 196F;, ?F1A?F?. ( 9$ ( *ses: the ,ost general is for the Cin!orn po+er and nat*re of any thin" +hateverC= the specific proper ,eanin" indicates Cthe po+er of s*ccessf*lly and easily discoverin" and contrivin" in h*,an !ein"s, and the po+er of ,e,oryC= and the specific improper refers in analo"ical *se to ani,als and in ,etony,ic *se to arts discovered thro*"h in"eni*,. 9is disc*ssion ,akes several points i,portant for o*r p*rposes. 9e re,arks that in"eni*, spoken ,ost properly is the constit*tion of the rational fac*lty of the rational so*l for *nderstandin" so,ethin" or discoverin" or teachin". Br in"eni*, is the nat*ral aptit*de or fac*lty !y +hich +e teach, and thro*"h O+hichP +e o*rselves think, or discover so,ethin". &he "en*s of in"eni*, is e*ph*ia,O15P ,ore !roadly indeed the latter is open to the for,er, since :"enerally it is the native "oodness of so*l or !ody; specifically it is the "ood constit*tion !y nat*re of the rational so*l no+ +ith respect to the tr*e, no+ +ith respect to the "ood, nor is e*ph*ia only of in"eni*, !*t also of nat*ral 4*d",ent. Schecki*s, &opic. at #9, a"rees: C&his in fact is e*ph*ia, to !e a!le to ri"htly elect the tr*e and flee the false.C B*t for @ristotle the part of in"eni*, is the nat*ral facility for 4*d"in" so,ethin". 0ocleni*s re,arks f*rther that a f*nction of in"eni*, is eumatheia, Cthe ri"ht constit*tion for learnin" disciplinesC and the ha!it of s+iftly discoverin" ,iddle ter,s, and he distin"*ishes it fro, sunesis,

+hich is nevertheless affine to ingenium. @fter notin" political, pne*,atic :spirit*al;, and theolo"ical senses of an in"eni*, apart fro, 4*d",ent, he points o*t that Scali"er differs fro, those +ho s*!ordinate 4*d",ent to in"eni*, and 3*otes the Kes*it Peter 8olina, +ho said that Cphilosophy is the file of 4*d",ent, and the +hetstone of in"eni*,,C to sho+ that ,e,ory is not necessary for "ood 4*d",ent. 9e concl*des, &he variety of in"eni*, depends so,eti,es on the te,pera,ent of the !ody, so,eti,es on the vario*s disposition of the ,ind, and the constit*tion of the or"ans, and of the a*)iliary fac*lties, as of the phantasia :i,a"inatricis;. &he distinctions of in"eni*, are vario*s. Gor the in"eni*, is s*!tle, or thick, ac*te or o!t*se. Perspicacio*s or less perspicacio*s, 3*ick or slo+, sharp or less sharp :!eca*se of +hich also sharpness Oacri,oniaP is attri!*ted to 4*d",ent;. &h*s in"eni*, has chiefly to do +ith the nat*ral po+ers of thin"s and, in h*,an !ein"s, +ith the nat*ral po+ers associated +ith the rationality that differentiates the, fro, ani,als, !*t that also incl*des the corporeal !asis attendant on their !ein" rational animals. /t is associated +ith 3*ickness of 4*d",ent and learnin" and the ri"ht constit*tion for learnin" in a O15P &his ter, and also the eumatheia and sunesis that 0ocleni*s s*!se3*ently ,entions appear in @ristotle6s .icomachean )thics. )uphuia is 6nat*ral "ift6, 6"ood nat*ral parts6, or 6cleverness6 :e."., at 111F!#A1$;= eumatheia is 6readiness in learnin"6= sunesis 6intelli"ence in practical 4*d"in"6. ( 91 ( disciplined or scientific +ay= it is closely dependent on the disposition of the physical or"ans that aid the ,ind, especially the i,a"ination. &he advanta"e of referrin" to 0ocleni*s is that he reflects learned *sa"e conte,porary +ith Descartes6s yo*th. 6/n"eni*,6 +as not 4*st a +ord for philosophers6 and theolo"ians6 treatises, ho+ever. .e ,*st recall that Latin +as the lan"*a"e of instr*ction and co,,*nication at La GlRche, !oth inside and o*tside the classroo,, and so Descartes +o*ld s*rely have picked *p any collo3*ial ,eanin"s that the +ord had. /t is interestin" to note, then, that in assessin" the perfor,ance of their p*pils, the Kes*its *sed 6in"eni*,6 as one of their cate"ories, ,ore or less synony,o*s +ith +hat +e +o*ld today call Cnat*ral a!ility,C Ctalent,C or Captit*de.C &h*s >enS the school!oy +o*ld have heard hi,self and his ,ates eval*ated +ith respect to their in"enia in the follo+in" ter,s: ,ediocre, s*fficiently ac*te, opti,*,, d*ll, very sharp, deficient in in"eni*,, does not lack in"eni*,, of ,oderate in"eni*,, so,e+hat ac*te, ,ost perspicacio*s, litAde apt for lo"ic, of at ,ost ,ediocre in"eni*,, ,ini,ally sharp, o!t*se, not +ell constit*ted !y in"eni*,, in"enio*s !oy, has a "ood ,e,ory, less pro,pt in"eni*,, of sharpest in"eni*, and o*tstandin" in ,e,ory, vario*s and ,*ta!le in"eni*,, ac*te and s*!tle, st*pid.O19P &he in"eni*, the instr*ctors +ere assessin" +as an individ*ated capacity for learnin", partic*lar to each st*dent.O?$P in +hich the pre,i*, +as placed on 3*ickness, penetration, and "ood ,e,ory.

C. DESCARTES AND IN+ENIU,

/t is reasona!le to think that the yo*n" Descartes +o*ld have !een affected !y, or at least a+are of, the standard technical acceptations of philosophical ter,s co,,on in his day, as +ell as the ,eanin"s of everyday lan"*a"e, even +hen he *lti,ately chose :as in the case of intuitus = see @& L #69; to adapt ter,s to his o+n p*rposes. / +ish to s*""est, then, that 6in"eni*,6 as *sed !y Descartes, at least !efore 16#$, lies on the se,antic a)is laid o*t !y *sa"e co,,on in the late si)teenth and early seventeenth cent*ry, a *sa"e that is in fact not far re,oved fro, that of classical ti,es !*t that *nder+ent

develop,ents in accord +ith the prevalent psychoAphysiolo"y. &his a)is +o*ld of co*rse not necessitate that every occ*rrence of the ter, in Descartes !ear the sa,e ,eanin". B*t each occ*rrence O19P @ll of these are taken fro, Creport cardsC kept at La GlRche= see >oche,ontei), 6n !ollFge de'*suites auB G/II et G/III siF, F=?$%A?$6, #F5A#%$. O?$P 0iven that the "rade list >oche,ontei) p*!lished eval*ates ?E !oys and considerin" that ,arks for in"eni*, +ere *s*ally "iven in 4*st one or t+o +ords, there is relatively little d*plication fro, st*dent to st*dent. &his +o*ld indicate that the instr*ctor took so,e care to differentiate each case and th*s confir,s the essentially personal and individ*al character of in"eni*,. ( 9? ( sho*ld typically refer to in!orn po+ers that are proper to h*,an !ein"s as s*ch. 8ore likely than not, the ter, +ill indicate intellect*al or co"nitive po+ers, often +ith at least so,e s*""estion of the individ*ali7ation or personali7ation of the, d*e to the corporeali7ation of spirit. 6/n"eni*,6 therefore +o*ld !e !est *nderstood in the first instance as partic*lar corporeali7ed spirit, that is, spirit that incl*des so,e of the pec*liarities arisin" fro, this corporeal partic*larity.O?1P P*ttin" aside for the ,ost part the soAcalled ve"etative po+ers :n*trition, reprod*ction, and the like;, in"eni*, +o*ld !e the native h*,an endo+,ent that "ives rise to a h*,an essence e)hi!itin" personality and character. .ith e,phasis placed on the co"nitive side, it +o*ld !e the e,!odied ,ind that has access to the f*nda,ental principles of kno+in" :the nat*ral li"ht;, and therefore the correspondin" co"nitive activity or kno+in" po+er +o*ld reflect !oth corporeality and spirit*ality. By virt*e of in"eni*,, each h*,an !ein" +o*ld have all the pec*liarities of his or her personal e)istence, !*t that personal e)istence +o*ld also incl*de the po+ers and f*nctions that are co,,on to all h*,an !ein"s per se. &he reader +ho considers these reflections to !e s*fficient ,i"ht proceed i,,ediately to the ne)t section. /t is nevertheless ill*,inatin" to find the, s*pported !y Descartes6s Latin +ritin"s fro, !efore 16#$. /n his correspondence +ith Beeck,an the +ord occ*rs fre3*ently. Bn ?F Kan*ary 1619, Descartes in3*ires after his friend6s health in a +ay that e,phasi7es the co"nitive side: C<o* ,*st !elieve that ,y concern is not 4*st science alone !*t yo* yo*rself, not 4*st in"eni*,, altho*"h it is the "reatest part, !*t the +hole ,an.C /n the ne)t para"raph he says that he has !een +orkin" not on an i,portant :and other+ise *nidentified; treatise that Beeck,an had *r"ed hi, to +rite !*t rather on dra+in", ,ilitary architect*re, and Gle,ish, Cthin"s +hich +itho*t do*!t yo*r in"eni*,, occ*pied +ith hi"her thin"s, +ill conte,n.C 9ere the sense a"ain s*""ests the hi"her, intellect*al fac*lties, altho*"h it is also possi!le that !oth occ*rrences incl*de the +ider spirit*al aspects of h*,an !ein" as +ell, incl*din" character. Bn ?# @pril 1619, Descartes +rites, CGor yo* tr*ly are one +ho ro*sed the slothf*l one, recalled an er*dition that had al,ost lapsed fro, ,e,ory, and led the in"eni*, +anderin" fro, serio*s occ*pation !ack to !etter thin"s.C /n the ne)t para"raph he recalls the discoveries *sin" the ne+ ,athe,atical co,pass that he had reported in a previo*s letter and says he is plannin" a treatise on the s*!4ect: C!*t no+ / have not +orked for a O?1P Gor e)a,ple, those +hose !rain ,atter +as too soft co*ld easily for, perceptions !*t retain the, only +ith diffic*lty, +hereas those +ho had a very hard !rain ,atter +o*ld typically !e insensi!le to perceptions !*t co*ld retain +ith ease those that ,ana"ed to i,press the,selves. ( 9# ( ,onth, !eca*se to !e s*re O,yP in"eni*, +as so e)ha*sted !y these discoveries that it no lon"er +as

s*fficient for discoverin" those other thin"s +hich / had hitherto resolved to seek. /t +ill s*ffice, ho+ever, for preservin" the ,e,ory of yo* perpet*ally.C &he Cslothf*l oneC that Beeck,an had ro*sed ,i"ht in fact !e :speakin" "ra,,atically; 6in"eni*,6= since the second passa"e allo+s for the e)ha*stion of 6in"eni*,6, there is no reason +hy it co*ld not !e la7y as +ell. &his certainly +o*ld not conflict +ith the second passa"e fro, the ?F Kan*ary letter, in +hich Descartes had ad,itted to occ*pyin" his in"eni*, +ith relatively insi"nificant thin"s. Bn ?9 @pril, Descartes +rites askin" Beeck,an to cons*lt >ay,ond Ll*ll6s Ars 4revis for hi, and co,,ents, C/ have s*ch confidence in yo*r in"eni*, that / a, certain yo* +ill easily see those thin"s :if there are any; +hich are necessary to the intelli"ence of other thin"s !*t other+ise o,itted, +hich he OJ a follo+er of Ll*ll6s +ith +ho, Descartes had conversedP calls 6keys6.C 9ere the *sa"e see,s to e,phasi7e that aspect of the co"nitive a!ilities that +e call in"en*ity or shre+dness, the po+er of reco"ni7in" +hat is not readily apparent. /n these early letters in"eni*, is associated +ith intellect !*t i,plies a "ood deal ,ore. /t *ndertakes pro4ects, it ai,s at discovery or invention, it re,e,!ers, its e)ercise re3*ires effort, and it can !e affected +ith pec*liarities of character like sloth and physical or physiolo"ical states like e)ha*stion. O??P &he only other Latin letter +ith an occ*rrence of 6in"eni*,6 fro, !efore 16#$ is con4ect*rally ascri!ed to 16?5= it is Descartes6s eval*ation of the !ook &ettres du %ieur de -al2ac.O?#P 6/n"eni*,6 appears five ti,es: attentive in"enia are said to !e fr*strated !y the ins*!stantiality of ,any +riters= in pri,itive ti,es, +hen +ords +ere the sincere e)pression of one6s ,ind, Cthere +as in s*perior in"enia a certain divine po+er of elo3*ence, +hich flo+in" fro, 7eal for tr*th and a!*ndance of sense led pri,itive ,en o*t of the forests, i,posed la+s, fo*nded cities, and the sa,e had the po+er of pers*adin" and si,*ltaneo*sly r*lin"C= Bal7ac ,akes ar"*,ents clear and si,ple eno*"h to a+aken tr*st in co,,on people, yet Cthey are nonetheless so solid and tr*e that the "reater anyone6s in"eni*, is, the ,ore certainly he is convincedC= Cif he decides to speak of hi,self, he does not fear conte,pt for layin" open illnesses of !ody and the fee!leness of nat*re nor envy for not disse,!lin" the deservin" ,erits of his in"eni*,C= O??P &here are in fact only t+o other Latin letters e)tant fro, this period: a len"thy one concernin" ,athe,atical and physical ,atters :?6 8arch 1619; and a oneApara"raph ,essa"e :?$ @pril 1619;, !oth addressed to Beeck,an and neither of +hich *ses ingenium. O?#P Bal7ac +as a friend of Descartes6s. /t is con4ect*red that the letter +as addressed to a friend of !oth, perhaps Kean Silhon. See Descartes: !orrespondance, ed. Charles @da, and 0RrAard 8ilha*d, 5 vols. :Paris: GSli) @lcan Ovols. lA?P Presses Universitaires de Grance Ovols. #-5P, 19#6A196#;, 1:#$ n. 1. ( 9F ( and posterity +ill 4*d"e favora!ly Cthis candor and the ancient Oi.e., like that of the ancientsP character of an in"eni*, set a!ove the v*l"ar.C 1ven ,ore clearly than in the letters of nearly a decade earlier, in"eni*, is as ,*ch a ,atter of "eneral character, a!ilities, and 4*d",ent as of intelli"ence, and the intelli"ence descri!ed is as ,*ch practical as theoretical. Gro, these letters +e see that in"eni*, is the "reatest part of the h*,an !ein"= it en"a"es in science, ,ore "enerally in intellect*al pro4ects, and is the po+er !y +hich +e ,ake discoveries= it can !e 3*alified as !ein" hi"her or lo+er, "reater or lesser, slothf*l or ind*strio*s, +hich s*""ests that it constit*tes at least part of +hat is called virt*e, vice, and character. .e ,i"ht call it native intelli"ence, +ith the *nderstandin" that it is intelli"ence in all +alks of life, incl*din" the intelli"ence of sensi!ility

as +ell as of intellect= !*t even this pro!a!ly restricts in"eni*, too ,*ch to the co"nitive real,, and therefore it +o*ld pro!a!ly !e !etter to speak of the native :i.e., in!orn; h*,an endo+,ent.O?FP

D. IN+ENIU, AND T0E PRINCIPLES OF INNOVATION AND DISCOVERY

Descartes6s Latin letters are not the only relevant so*rce for his *se of 6in"eni*,6: there are also the notes of the CCo"itationes privatae.C /ndeed, in"eni*,, i,a"ination, and ,athe,atics are disc*ssed in these private co"itations in a +ay that inti,ates the connection !et+een the,. Bne note anno*nces a fictive !ook, the Thesaurus mathematicus of Poly!i*s the Cos,opolite, +hich +ill treat the ,eans of solvin" all ,athe,atical diffic*lties and in +hich Cis de,onstrated that nothin" ,ore can !e done +ith re"ard to these !y h*,an in"eni*,C= it pro,ises as +ell to relieve the tor,entin" la!ors of those +ho spend day and ni"ht !eco,in" trapped in ,athe,atical 0ordian knots Cand *selessly cons*,e therein the oil of in"eni*,C. :@& L ?1F;. &his in"eni*, that can !eco,e e)ha*sted in ,athe,atical la!ors is clearly in line +ith +hat +e have previo*sly seen. @nother entry helps deepen the conception of in"eni*,, +hich +e already kno+ to !e 3*alifia!le in vario*s +ays. Gor all in"enia deter,inate li,its are prescri!ed that they cannot transcend. /f so,e cannot *se principles for discovery !eca*se of a defect of in"eni*,, they can nevertheless kno+ the tr*e re+ard of the sciences, +hich s*ffices the, for carryin" o*t tr*e 4*d",ents in the esti,ationO?%P of thin"s. :@& L ?1%; O?FP 2or,an 'e,p S,ith s*""ested translatin" 6in"eni*,6 as 6total ,indA!ody e3*ip,ent6, +hich capt*res the essence of the ,atter. See 'e,p S,ith, .e9 %tudies in the Philosophy of Descartes: Descartes as Pioneer :London: 8ac,illan, 19%?;, 1% l, 16$. O?%P &he ter, 6aesti,atione6 ,ay i,plicitly refer to the internal sense vis aesti,ativa. ( 9% ( &he first sentence asserts that in"eni*, is inevita!ly finite and li,ited. &he second ,akes clear that it is not only li,its d*e to the nat*re of in"eAni*, that Descartes has in ,ind !*t also those that have to do +ith the partic*lar constit*tion of the individ*al6s in"eni*,. &he point, ho+ever, is that altho*"h defects of in"eni*, ,i"ht ,ake it i,possi!le for so,eone to ,ake discoveries directly fro, first principles, it does not affect the a!ility to ,ake tr*e 4*d",ents= apparently in"eni*, is the na,e for that po+er h*,an !ein"s have to assess and deal tr*ly +ith +hatever they ,eet in the co*rse of their lives, re"ardless of their a!ility to reason fro, first principles. &he ne)t note concernin" in"eni*,, 3*oted already in chapter ?, is s*rprisin"ly clear a!o*t ho+ far !eyond the co"nitive it "oes. &here are certain parts in all in"enia that, +hen even li"htly to*ched, e)cite stron" affects: th*s a !oy +ith a stron" spirit Oforti ani,oP, havin" !een scolded, +ill not cry !*t "et an"ry= another +ill cry. /f it is said that ,any and "reat cala,ities have happened, +e +ill !e saddened= if it is added that so,e evil person +as the ca*se, +e +ill "et an"ry. &he passa"e fro, passion to passion Oocc*rsP thro*"h nei"h!orin" ones= often, ho+ever, the passa"e fro, contraries is ,ore ro!*st, as +hen at a 4oyf*l party there is s*ddenly anno*nced a sad event. :@& L ?1E; 9ere in"eni*, has to do +ith the sensitive part of the so*l in the a,plest sense of the ter,: any part of the h*,an !ein" that is involved in a sensitive response is incl*ded. &he f*ll ran"e of h*,an affectivity, +hether it is e,otional, e)ternally sensory, internally sensory, or rational, is e,!raced !y

in"eni*,. /t ,i"ht therefore !e ri"htly conceived accordin" to this note as the so*l insofar as it is ,ore than ve"etative, that is, involved in ,ore than the physical processes of constr*ctin", ,aintainin", and reprod*cin" the !ody. .hat Descartes is disc*ssin" in this note +as of co*rse treated ,any years later as passions of the so*l. &he affective, the sensitive, and the co"nitive po+ers of in"eni*, are th*s in!orn and part of the nat*re of the individ*al. .hat is at iss*e here is the individ*al native h*,an endo+,ent that ,akes the h*,an !ein" this person rather than that, yet still ,akes hi, or her a f*lly h*,an !ein". Bne can have a li,ited or defective in"eni*,= one can !e in"enio*s or ind*strio*s or slothf*l= one can !e capa!le of !oth discovery and 4*d",ent, or 4*st of 4*d",ent. /t is precisely !eca*se the f*nda,ental po+ers of in"eni*, are co,,on to all that it is capa!le of re"*lation. &his aspect !eco,es clear !y 4*)taposin" t+o other notes fro, the private co"itations: @s a yo*th, +henever in"enio*s discoveries +ere presented, / asked ,yself +hether / co*ld discover Othe,P for ,yself, even +itho*t havin" read the a*thor: fro, +hich / "rad*ally noticed that / +as *sin" fi)ed r*les Ocertis re"*lisP. :@& L ?1F; ( 96 ( and &he sayin"s of the +ise can !e !ro*"ht !ack Ored*ciP to a certain very fe+ "eneral r*les. :@& L ?1E; /nventions that +ere in"enio*s :ingeniosis inventis ;, that sho+ed the *se of an ener"etic in"eni*, and +ere reinvented !y the yo*n" Descartes si,ply fro, hearin" of the, +itho*t any e)planatory "loss, led hi, little !y little to reco"ni7e that this *se of the in"eni*, proceeds accordin" to certain r*les= and he even "ained the insi"ht that the sayin"s of the +ise, of those +ho kno+ ho+ to 4oin science and virt*e,O?6P can !e led !ack to r*les. .hat +e have here, then, is an ad*,!ration aro*nd 16?$ of the field to+ard +hich the Regulae +as directed: the proper *se of the in"eni*, accordin" to certain si,ple r*les that are the,selves inherent in in"eni*,. &hat is, the native h*,an endo+,ent !y its very nat*re is capa!le of directin" itself +ell if it reco"ni7es the essential characteristics of its nat*re. &h*s in"eni*, is also closely related to another the,e fo*nd in !oth the CCo"itationes privataeC and the Regulae, that even +itho*t a conscio*s kno+led"e there e)ists +ithin the so*l a s,all n*,!er of principles, r*les, sparks, seeds-as they are vario*sly called-that are s*fficient for discovery and 4*d",ent a!o*t all thin"s. /t is al,ost 4*st a corollary, then, that any theory of ,ethod, +hether a ,ethod of invention for those !lessed +ith a s*per! in"eni*, or si,ply a ,ethod of 4*d"in" ari"ht for those +ho have no ,ore than the po+ers of in"eni*, co,,on to all, +o*ld find its leadin" principle in the in"eni*, itself= and that s*ch a theory +o*ld have not 4*st a co"nitive p*rpose, and certainly not 4*st the "oal of p*re intellection, !*t also a practical p*rpose: the "*idance of 4*d",ent in all thin"s that are s*scepti!le of 4*d",ent, incl*din" those thin"s that the sensitive, responsive h*,an spirit enco*nters in everyday livin".

E. T0E ,AT0ETICS OF IN+ENIU, IN T0E RE+ULAE

/n"eni*,, in a !etter than first appro)i,ation to Descartes6s ,eanin", is the native endo+,ent of the h*,an !ein" +ho is co,posed of !ody and so*l :th*s it +o*ld not !e relevant to the so*l that has !een li!erated fro, the !ody after death;. @ll have this native endo+,ent, !*t !eca*se of the partic*larities of their individ*al !ein", people +o*ld have a less or ,ore retentive ,e,ory, a lesser or "reater

capa!ility of i,a"inin" "eoA O?6P @t the !e"innin" of the acco*nt of the %tudium 4onae mentis in his !io"raphy of Descartes, Baillet descri!es the %tudium as Cconsiderations on the desire +e have to kno+, on the sciences, on the dispositions of the spirit for learnin", on the order one ,*st keep for ac3*irin" +isdo, Ola sagesse P, that is, science +ith virt*e, in 4oinin" the f*nctions of the +ill +ith those of the *nderstandin"C :Baillet, /ie, ?:F$6= cited at @& L 191;. ( 9E ( ,etrical fi"*res, the need to e)ercise less or ,ore attention to sense properly, and so on. 9o+ever, the very fact that this native endo+,ent is the res*lt of the coe)istence of a kno+in" po+er and a !ody, a coe)istence +ith typifyin" characteristics, ,eans that the native endo+,ent of every h*,an !ein" can !e e,ployed si,ilarly. Si,ilarity does not "*arantee e3*al s*ccess fro, person to person, !*t it does ens*re that certain "eneral principles or r*les can !e ed*ced for the proper *se of the native endo+,ent. &his native endo+,ent, in partic*lar its co"nitively relevant aspects, +o*ld !e ,ost properly called in"eni*,. .hat does this i,plyQ /n li"ht of the later Descartes +e are te,pted to concl*de that he is si,ply "ivin" *s the kind of division of the h*,an spirit, the anato,y of the res co"itans, that is characteristic of the editations, +here +e find thinkin" anato,i7ed into sensation, i,a"ination, and p*re thinkin". B*t +e sho*ld recall that in the editations the division of the so*l co,es a!o*t as a res*lt of the division of ideas into different kinds: those that appear to co,e to *s fro, an e)ternal +orld :adventitio*s ideas;, those that +e ,ake :factitio*s ideas;, and those that are innate. &he ideas that occ*py in"eni*, certainly ,ay !e of the first t+o kinds, as the definition of >*le 1? ass*res= and, as shall appear in the co*rse of this analysis, in"eni*, can also +ork +ith ideas that ,i"ht properly !e called innate. <et approachin" the division of the so*l !y +ay of ideas is forei"n to the Regulae . Descartes *ses 6idea6 in the Regulae t+entyAt+o ti,es= e)cept for one, all occ*rrences co,e in >*le 1? and after. 6/dea6 is *sed in the Regulae not in the sense of the editations, ho+ever, !*t in a ,ore restricted one. /f +e p*t aside the e)ception of >*le F, it is al+ays *sed to indicate partic*lar contents of phantasia. &h*s, in the parlance of the editations, 6idea6 refers either to an adventitio*s or to a factitio*s idea !*t not to an innate idea proper to p*re thinkin" :like the concept of trian"le or the idea of 0od;. 6/dea6 in the Regulae can therefore !e taken as synony,o*s +ith 6corporeal i,a"e6 or 6corporeal fi"*re6 or, to *se a ter, that Descartes e,ployed in the early 16?$s and that +as the standard Scholastic ter, for the contents of the internal senses, 6phantas,6. @t any rate, to overe,phasi7e 6idea6 in the Regulae +o*ld !e a ,istake, for it is ,erely a synony, for i,a"es +ithin internal sense psycholo"y.O?EP O?EP >o"er @rie+ and 8ar4orie 0rene point o*t that in seventeenthAcent*ry literary *sa"e 6idea6 referred to i,a"es, *s*ally those of sense= there +as Ca ,ore o!sc*re and a,!i"*o*s co,ple) of philosophical definitions,C the central one !ein" the e)e,plars in the divine ,ind. See @rie+ and 0rene, C/deas, in and !efore Descartes,C'ournal of the (istory of Ideas %6, no. 1 :Kan*ary 199%;: 5EA1$6= and also Stephen 0a*kro"er, CDescartes6s 1arly Doctrine of Clear and Distinct /deas,C 'ournal of the (istory of Ideas %#, no. F :Bcto!erADece,!er 199?;: %5%A6$?. Gor the occ*rrences of 6idea6 in the Regulae, see K.A >. @r,o"athe and K.AL 8arion, IndeB des Regulae ad directionem ingenii de Ren* Descartes, Lessico /ntellett*ale 1*ropeo, no. 1$, Corp*s Cartesian*,, no. 1 :>o,e: 1di7ioni dell6@teneo, 19E6;, s.v. 6idea6. &he one *sa"e in the Regulae that does not confor, occ*rs in >*le F, at @& L #E6 1. 19. /n the strati"raphic theory of co,position, this is considered part of >*le FAB, +ith +hich Descartes is s*pposed to have !e"*n the Regulae in Bcto!er or 2ove,!er 1619, that is, in the period leadin" *p to

his drea,s of the ni"ht of 1$A11 2ove,!er 1619. &his occ*rrence in >*le FAB is odd, !eca*se it is the only one in the Regulae that does not have the sense 6corporeal i,a"e6 !*t instead approaches the sense it has in the editations :in the Discourse !oth senses appear;. /s this not a reason to do*!t the very early datin" that the strati"raphic theory attri!*tes to FABQ ( 95 ( 6/n"eni*,6 as Descartes specifically defines it in >*le 1? is not intrinsically concerned +ith the provenance of the i,a"e !*t rather +ith the a!ility of the kno+in" po+er to occ*py itself +ith it, +hether it has co,e fro, sense, ,e,ory, or the activity of the kno+in" po+er itself. &he co"nitive po+er6s act of occ*pyin" itself +ith i,a"es as s*ch is in"eni*,. /n this respect it co*ld !e said to rese,!le +hat +e call the free play of the i,a"ination. 9o+ever, it is i,portant to keep in ,ind that this play of the i,a"ination is the kno+in" po+er6s play and th*s that it al+ays retains a co"nitive p*rpose. &he freedo, of this play is the po+er of variation for the sake of findin" so,ethin" interestin"ly the sa,e or different, that is, for the sake of discovery. Gor e)a,ple, the activity of constr*ctin" a "eo,etrical proof +o*ld !e lar"ely in the do,ain of in"eni*,. /n tryin" to prove that the three an"le !isectors of a trian"le intersect at a sin"le point, +e +o*ld ordinarily either 4*st i,a"ine a trian"le +ith three an"le !isectors, or, if o*r i,a"inative capacity +ere li,ited, +e co*ld dra+ a pict*re of a trian"le +ith its an"les all !isected. &hen +e +o*ld try to conceive ho+ to "o a!o*t the proof= in o*r i,a"ination or on paper +e +o*ld spec*latively add ne+ lines or follo+ any other strate"y of ,odifyin" the fi"*re that ,i"ht s*""est itself. 2o+ clearly the dra+in" of a trian"le involves o*r nerves, ,*scles, and li,!s, as +ell as the apparat*s of the e)ternal +orld, and as s*ch it cannot !e conceived as an act of in"eni*, alone, at least not in the strict sense of Descartes6s definition. B*t the act of dra+in" is a direct conse3*ence of the in"enial activity, so that especially "iven >*le 1?6s conception of phantasia as the ori"inator of ,*scle ,otions, it is not fancif*l to call it an act of in"eni*,. 8oreover, insofar as the co"nitive po+er is lookin" at a fi"*re on paper +ith the intent of co,in" to a proof of the proposed theore,, the sensation involved is part of the co"nitive po+er6s occ*pyin" itself +ith the idea, and so it, in t*rn, ,ay also !e said to !e an in"enial act. @s +e have 4*st characteri7ed in"eni*,, it looks ,athe,atical, or rather "eo,etrical. @s s*ch, the psychophysiolo"y of >*le 1? co*ld !e seen as an introd*ction to the fi"*rative ,athe,atical representation of pro!le,s that Descartes takes *p in earnest in the second part of the Regulae, espeA ( 99 (

Gi". E. Discrete ele,ents are *sed to pict*re so,ethin" en*,era!le !y a co*ntin" n*,!er. cially >*les 1F thro*"h ?1. &he art of ,athe,atical representation ta*"ht there is +itho*t do*!t in"enial activity. &o recall the +ords of one of the CCo"itationes privatae,C the i,a"ination can *se fi"*res to conceive corporeal thin"s. B*t is in"enial activity confined to the representation !y C!are fi"*resC advised in >*le 1F, or is it +ider stillQ Bne thin" that is clear is that the representations ,andated !y that r*le are not of physical !odies !*t rather of the terms of pro!le,s and that +e learn not 4*st ho+ to introd*ce 3*antitative measure into the ter,s of pro!le,s !*t also ho+ to *se fi"*res to present sche,atically the relationships i,plied in a pro!le, and !et+een its ter,s. @s >*le 1F points o*t, +e are not to *se 4*st any fi"*res !*t

o*t of the inn*,era!le different species of these, +e are to *se only those !y +hich all the differences of ha!it*des Oor relationsP or proportions are ,ost easily e)pressed. &here are, ho+ever, strictly speakin" t+o "enera of thin"s that are !ro*"ht to"ether for co,parison +ith one another, ,*ltit*des and ,a"nit*des= and so +e have t+o "enera of fi"*res for proposin" these thin"s to o*r conception. Gor e)a,ple, points Osee fi". EP, !y +hich is desi"nated a trian"*lar n*,!er, or the Ofa,ilyP tree +hich e)plicates so,eone6s linea"e ( 1$$ (

Gi". 5. >elationships !et+een fa,ily ,e,!ers are pict*red !y a tree dia"ra,. Osee fi". 5P, etc., are fi"*res for e)hi!itin" a ,*ltit*de Odiscrete 3*antityP= those, ho+ever, +hich are contin*o*s and *ndivided, like the trian"le, s3*are, etc. Osee fi". 9P, e)plicate ,a"nit*des OJ contin*o*s 3*antityP. :@& L F%$-F%1; /t has !een a co,,onplace in Descartes st*dies to assert that this is part and parcel of Descartes6s ,ethod of applyin" ,athe,atical or al"e!raic analysis to all pro!le,s. B*t this is a halfAtr*th, and it descri!es the s*rface rather than the depths of Descartes6s ai,. Bne applies a thin" L to a thin" < either in the spirit of play or !eca*se one has the e)pectation that this application +ill !e fr*itf*l. @ t+entiethAcent*ry Grench philosopher ,i"ht !e +illin" to do the for,er, !*t it hardly see,s credi!le as the !asis for Descartes6s early +ork. .hy did Descartes !elieve that applyin" fi"*res to pro!le,s of all kinds +o*ld !e fr*itf*lQ .e have already seen ele,ents of the ans+er in the precedin" chapters. Girst, it +as not 4*st any ,athe,atics that Descartes +ished to apply, !*t the ,athe,atics of proportional relations= and that relational ,athe,atics +as "ro*nded in an ontolo"ical episte,olo"y of analo"y that i,plied si,ilarity !et+een different levels of !ein", a si,ilarity that is in fact the ontolo"ical and episte,olo"ical "ro*nd of the applica!ility of ,athe,atics and that "ives ontolo"ical and episte,olo"ical priority to a ,athe,atics of proportion. &he very analo"ical str*ct*re of reality allo+ed for a ( 1$1 (

Gi". 9. &+oAdi,ensional fi"*res are *sed to pict*re different relationships. certain fle)i!ility in the application of ,athe,atics, ho+ever= it is not the case that Descartes !elieved that there +as a privile"ed ,athe,atical representation of a pro!le, or relation, !*t that there +ere alternative +ays of presentin" or approachin" pro!le,s. &he analo"ical str*ct*re of reality is +arrant that there are ,any kinds and de"rees of si,ilarity, so that no one thin" can !e said to !e a perfect representation-e)cept the thin" itself, +hich is not a representation at all, altho*"h a thin" ,i"ht stand for its o+n essence. @s Descartes conceived these ,atters in the 16?$s, ho+ever, the h*,an ,ind does not *nderstand thin"s in the,selves or in their essences !*t +ithin the activity of fi"*ration that he had !e"*n e)plorin" in the analo"y notes of 1619A16? 1.O?5P &his acco*nt i,,ediately helps interpret the p*rpose of the second part of the Regulae . /n the intended tripartite str*ct*re of the +ork, the first t+elve r*les +ere to :1; present the ai, of a *nified +ay to

kno+led"e, :?; "ro*nd that kno+led"e in the t+o ,ental operations of int*ition and ded*ction, :#; propose the division of 3*estions in the se3*ential search for si,ple nat*res to !e follo+ed !y a res*rvey in order fro, the si,plest thin"s to the thin" so*"ht, and :F; sketch a psycholo"ical and even physiolo"ical !asis for the ri"ht *se of the native endo+,ent. @fter the state,ent of the fo*ndin" theory in the first t+elve co,es the e)plication in the t+entyAfo*r that follo+. &he second t+elve r*les +ere to deal +ith perfect pro!le,s, the third +ith i,perfect pro!le,s. &he second t+elve r*les, +hich teach ho+ to present the sche,e of relationships *sin" lines and t+oAdi,ensional fi"*res, serve t+o p*rposes: to train the reader :or Descartes the re,e,!erer; not to i"nore si,pler thin"s for the sake of the co,ple) :perfect pro!le,s are easier to deal +ith than i,perfect ones; O?5P / a"ree +ith 0c!e that !efore 16#$ Descartes did not !elieve that h*,an !ein"s can kno+ the essential nat*res of thin"s per se= rather, one has a freedo, of ,ind that allo+s one to approach thin"s fro, ,any different perspectives. See 0c!e, Descartes' %el4stkritik, 5FA9?. ( 1$? ( and to sho+ in the ,ost !asic +ay ho+ the in"eni*, can *se ,arks and lines to aid in the sol*tion of pro!le,s of proportion. Bne does not have to +orry i,,ediately a!o*t +hether thin"s really e)ist in the +ay they are represented= the 3*estion of e)istence is one for the physicist to solve :@& L FF5;, not the teacher of the ne+ or"anon of the Regulae.

F. IN+ENIAL ,AT0E,ATICS5 OR T0E ART OF ,E,ORY SUPPLANTED

Bne of the chief lessons to !e dra+n fro, the second part of the >e"*lae is al+ays to si,plify. Gor e)a,ple, in >*le 1F +e are told: Ginally it sho*ld !e kno+n that of the di,ensions of contin*o*s ,a"nit*de nothin" is ,ore distinctly conceived than len"th and +idth, and one sho*ld not attend to ,any Odi,ensionsP si,*ltaneo*sly in the sa,e fi"*re +hen +e are co,parin" t+o different ones +ith one another: !eca*se it is of the art that if +e have ,ore than t+o to co,pare +ith one another +e r*n thro*"h these s*ccessively and attend to only t+o at any one ti,e. &hese thin"s havin" !een noted, it is easily "athered that: here propositions are no less to !e a!stracted fro, the fi"*res of +hich 0eo,etry treats, if the 3*estion is a!o*t these, than fro, any other ,atter= and for this *se nothin" is to !e retained !eyond rectilinear and rectan"*lar s*rfaces, or strai"ht lines, +hich +e also call fi"*res, !eca*se !y ,eans of these +e co*ld i,a"ine a really e)tended s*!4ect no less than !y ,eans of s*rfaces, as has !een said a!ove= and finally !y ,eans of these sa,e fi"*res are to !e e)hi!ited so,eti,es contin*o*s ,a"nit*des, also so,eti,es a ,*ltit*de or n*,!er= and nothin" si,pler for e)pressin" all differences of ha!it*de can !e invented !y h*,an ind*stry. :@& L F%?; @t the o*tset of >*le 1%, +hich follo+s i,,ediately *pon this para"raph, +e are told that it is helpf*l to act*ally p*t i,a"es :species ; !efore o*r eyes. &he *nit, for e)a,ple, can !e represented as havin" len"th and !readth :a s3*are;, as havin" only len"th :a line;, or si,ply as an ele,ent of a ,*ltit*de :a point;= C!*t ho+ever it !e depicted and conceived, +e al+ays *nderstand it to !e a s*!4ect in every +ay e)tended and capa!le of infinite di,ensionsC :F%#;. /f +e need to attend to t+o ter,s of a proposition si,*ltaneo*sly, C+e e)hi!it the, to the eye !y ,eans of a rectan"le, +hose t+o sides are the t+o proposed ,a"nit*desC= if the t+o ,a"nit*des are inco,,ens*ra!le, +e *se a si,ple rectan"le, and if co,,ens*ra!le, +e *se a set of points or a rectan"le co,posed of s,aller *nit rectan"les so that their co,,ens*ra!ility is evident. /f +e need to attend to 4*st one ,a"nit*de, +e present it either as a si,ple line or, if +e +ill need to co,pare the line +ith a s*rface, as a rectan"le, one side !ein" the si,ple line

and the other the *nit len"th= or, if it is co,,ens*ra!le +ith the thin" to +hich it is co,pared, !y a set of points. ( 1$# ( 1verythin" propo*nded in the second part of the Regulae is for the sake of sho+in" as si,ply as possi!le ho+ pro!le,s +ith infor,ation s*fficient for their sol*tion can !e attacked. 2one of the s*""estions of >*les 1F and 1% a!o*t fi"*ration and refi"*ration has to do +ith e)pressin" the Cnat*re6 of the thin" in 3*estion= they are only presentations or e)hi!itions of so,e aspect relevant to the pro!le, :+hat Descartes calls 6di,ension6;. &herefore Descartes is not effectin" an ontolo"ical red*ction of the thin"s in 3*estion to ,athe,atics= that is, he is not ar"*in" i,plicitly or e)plicitly that thin"s are essentially, or essentially e)pressed, !y fi"*res, n*,!ers, or e)tension. Z*ite the contrary: relations and aspects of thin"s are e)pressi!le in this +ay.O?9P 8oreover, +hatever is not presently and i,,ediately of concern in the pro!le, does not need to !e f*lly e)pressed !*t is to !e kept in reserve !y ,eans of re,inders, !y ,arks rather than fi"*res. &his is a conse3*ence of Descartes6s !ehest that +e never treat ,ore than t+o thin"s si,*ltaneo*sly. Besides, !eca*se +e said that not ,ore than t+o different di,ensions o*t of the inn*,era!le ones +hich can !e depicted in o*r phantasia are to !e conte,plated +ith one and the sa,e int*it*s, either of the eyes or of ,ind: it is of "reat val*e to retain all the others so that they can easily occ*r +henever need re3*ires= for +hich end ,e,ory see,s to have !een instit*ted !y nat*re. :@& L F%F; Since ,e,ory can !e *nrelia!le, and since +e need to avoid divertin" o*r attention, +e ,ake *se of the invention of +ritin". .e shall co,,it nothin" at all to ,e,ory, !*t t*rnin" a free and entire phantasia over to the present ideas +e shall depict +hatever +as to !e retained on paper= and this Ois to !e doneP !y ,eans of the !riefest notes Oi.e., ,arks or sy,!olsP, so that after +e have inspected the sin"le thin"s distinctly accordin" to >*le 9 +e can accordin" to >*le 11 r*n thro*"h the, all +ith a very rapid ,otion of co"itation and int*it si,*ltaneo*sly as ,any as possi!le. :@& L F%%; Presently +e shall have to deal +ith iss*es s*ch as the ,eanin" of 6di,ension6, the pro!le,s that can and cannot !e dealt +ith accordin" to this proced*re, the psycholo"ical act of r*nnin" thro*"h thin"s +ith a rapid ,otion of i,a"inative co"itation, and the si"nificance of an int*ition that can take place +ith respect !oth to the eyes and to the ,ind. Gor no+ +e ,*st note that Descartes is offerin" a techni3*e of *sin" the native fac*lties O?9P Bne thin" to reali7e a!o*t these passa"es is that they are not concerned +ith the representation of thin"s thro*"h fi"*res !*t the e)hi!ition of thin"s and relations of thin"s !y ,eans of other thin"snote that at @& L F%# 11. l#A1% the fi"*res are descri!ed as a s*!4ect, not as an idea of tho*"ht-and that the +ays or di,ensions in +hich they can !e e)hi!ited are infinite. ( 1$F ( of the h*,an !ein" as si,ply and efficiently as possi!le in the +orkin" o*t of pro!le,s. &he central fac*lty of this techni3*e is i,a"ination, that is, in"eni*, as the fac*lty of ,akin" and dealin" +ith i,a"es or species in the phantasia and as the ,edi*, for translatin" those i,a"es in the ,ind into i,a"es and ,arks that appear on paper. &he techni3*es are all acco,,odated to the stren"ths and +eaknesses of in"eni*,. &oo ,any aspects considered at once +ill overta) it, so it is necessary to keep

the aspects to no ,ore than t+o at any one ti,e. .e do not have to rely solely on the a!ility of o*r phantasia to retain the i,a"es it is +orkin" +ith, since +e can dra+ appropriate, si,ple fi"*res on paper to represent the relationships they !ear to others. :2ote that this is literally a reApresentation of a sy,!oli7ed presentation of the relations of the ter,s of a pro!le,H; &his si,plification of the +ork of the ,ind need not lead to ne"lect of the totality of +hat is at iss*e, for +e have ,e,ory and, even ,ore i,portant, the aid to ,e,ory called +ritin". @ll +e need do at any "iven ,o,ent, then, is to devote o*r i,,ediate attention to the one or t+o relationships *nder present consideration and to re,e,!er that this is !*t a part of the pro!le,= +e do not have to actively re,e,!er the rest, since the ,arks that +e ,ake +ill ena!le *s to find o*r place easily. /t is pertinent to recall Descartes6s CCo"itationes privataeC entry a!o*t Schenckel6s treatise on the art of ,e,ory. &he ,edieval and early ,odern art of ,e,ory +as constr*cted on a psychophysiolo"ical *nderstandin" of the ,ind and its f*nctions. Dependin" on the physical constit*tion of the !rain, on the relative dryness or ,oist*re, heat or cold of its vario*s parts, it +as conceived as a!le to retain ,ore or less easily the i,a"es conveyed to it !y the senses and to i,press ,ore or less stron"ly those i,a"es in the corporeal ,e,ory so that they ,i"ht !e preserved. Divid thin"s are ,ore easily re,e,!ered than ordinary ones, so the art co*nsels confectin" strikin" i,a"es +henever possi!le :and as ta*"ht !y Schenckel, it also provides ,ne,onically sti,*latin" conventional i,a"es, like a !o+ for the letter ! ; and keepin" the, +ell ordered !y locatin" the i,a"es se3*entially in a fa,iliar and th*s easily re,e,!ered place. /n his co,,ent on Schenckel, Descartes noted that he had tho*"ht of alternatives that eli,inated the need for ,e,ory: "eneratin" phantas,s fro, other phantas,s, and *sin" i,a"es and fi"*res to stand for the relationships !et+een the ele,ents of a pro!le,. &he Regulae i,ple,ents accordin"ly a pro"ra, in +hich the *se of and need for often *nrelia!le ,e,ory is ,ini,i7ed, !y keepin" only one or t+o thin"s active in i,a"ination and rele"atin" the rest to paper, +ith the se3*ence of steps to !e taken deter,ined !y the principles of the first t+elve r*les. Bf co*rse Descartes is not teachin" an art desi"ned pri,arily to help *s ,e,ori7e thin"s, !*t one that facilitates the solvin" of pro!le,s !y an analysis into ele,ents and the reasse,!ly of these ele,ents into the desired +hole, a pro!le, solvin" that can !e reA ( 1$% ( evoked and d*plicated at any ti,e and, *nlike +ith thin"s ,erely ,e,ori7ed, al+ays +ith the f*ll evidence of proof. @ccordin" to the psychophysiolo"ical hypothesis of >*le 1?, Descartes, like Schenckel, is !asin" this Cart,C as he not infre3*ently calls it, on an *nderstandin" of the f*nctions and physiolo"y of the ,ind and !rain. >ather than advise *s to *se vivid i,a"es of o*r o+n invention, ho+ever, he provides *s +ith a stock of relia!ly and e)actly reprod*ci!le i,a"es: not !o+s for C and scales for 4*stice, !*t rectan"les, lines, and points. &his +o*ld see, to offer rather strikin" evidence that Descartes is in principle carryin" o*t in the Regulae the advice that in 1619A16?1 he had already "iven hi,self in the conte)t of a sol*tion he had devised to a pro!le, of ,otion posed !y Beeck,an: @s / p*t do+n the fo*ndations of this science, ,otion +hich is every+here e3*al Oi.e., *nifor, ,otionP +ill !e represented !y a line, or a rectan"*lar s*rface, or a parallelo"ra,, or a parallelepiped= that it increases fro, one ca*se, !y a trian"le= fro, t+o, !y a pyra,id, as a!ove= fro, three, !y other fi"*res. :@& L ??$; @nd, as the note i,,ediately follo+in" this re,arks, Cfro, these an infinity of 3*estions can !e solved.6 /ndeed, in co,parison +ith the CCo"itationes privatae,C the Regulae effects a si,plification. 2o lon"er

+ill the pro!le, solver need pyra,ids and other co,plicated threeAdi,ensional fi"*res, !*t only si,ple rectan"les, lines, and arrays of points. &he ,athe,atical representation of thin"s and pro!le,s has !een red*ced to a !are ,ini,*,. B*t on the !asis of +hat, and fro, +hatQ .e ,*st re,e,!er that the ,athe,atical techni3*e introd*ced in the second part of the Regulae has a peda"o"ical p*rpose and so is ,a)i,ally si,ple and that it rests on the identification of relevant aspects or di,ensions of the pro!le, at hand. .e shall need to disc*ss +here these di,ensions co,e fro, and +hat they are !efore +e can dra+ any definitive concl*sions a!o*t the ,athe,atical presentation of the,= and, after all is said and done, the ai, of pro!le, solvin" ,*st !e to arrive at a rapid synthesis of all the ele,ents into a +hole that can, as it +ere, !e int*ited !y a sin"le act of ,ind. 8oreover, it is not perfectly evident ho+ this ,athe,atical presentation can !e translated into the sol*tion of the soAcalled i,perfect pro!le,s, +here not everythin" is clearly distin"*isha!le. B*t there is a piece of i,portant evidence a!o*t the drift of Descartes6s thinkin" aro*nd 16?5, evidence that !rin"s Descartes6s techni3*es rather closer to a ,athe,ati7ed version of the classical art of ,e,ory, that allo+s a si"nificant role to +hat +e call secondary 3*alities, and, finally, that s*""ests that the r*les of the second part of the Regulae +ere not +ritten !efore late 16?5. &he piece of evidence is an entry in the 4o*rnal of /saac Beeck,an. /n ( 1$6 ( Bcto!er 16?5, Descartes visited his friend +ho, he had not seen in nine years :and to +ho, it see,s he had not even +ritten since 1619H;. /n the co*rse of the visit he revealed so,e of the ,athe,atical and physical reAs*its he had achieved in the intervenin" years. Beeck,an recorded these in his 'ournal :see @& L ## 1A#F5;. Under the headin" C@ Certain Speci,en of Descartes6s @l"e!raC he ,ade an entry of partic*lar interest. 9e says also he invented a "eneral @l"e!ra, and for it he *ses not the fi"*res of !odies !*t only planes, !eca*se these are ,ore easily insin*ated into the ,ind= and so other thin"s !eyond 0eo,etry are opti,ally e)pressed !y these. 9e conceives *nity !y a s,all rectan"le= th*s also he conceives a point. 1ven a line or a radi) OJ an *nkno+nP he conceives !y a parallelo"ra,, conflated o*t of one side of this O*nitP rectan"le and Oo*tP of the d*e len"th.O#$P @ rectan"le he conceives ,ade o*t of so ,any radi)es= a c*!e, ,ade o*t of so ,any rectan"les as the n*,!ers indicate, red*ced to o!lon" for,= a !i3*adrate, in the sa,e +ay, etc. 2o+ he also e)plains all these thin"s !y lines, so that a represents a point, ! a line, c a 3*adran"le, d a c*!e. /n this +ay also f represented a c*!e ,ade o*t of the ,*ltiplication of the 3*adran"le e !y the n*,!er of the radi) Osee fi". 1$P. .ith no less tro*!le he solves the sa,e thin"s !y si,ple lines. . . . /n partic*lar he of co*rse conceives a c*!e !y three di,ensions, as others also do= !*t the !i3*adratic O+hich +o*ld !e a fo*rAdi,ensional fi"*reP he conceives as if o*t of a si,ple c*!e, +hich is considered as +ooden, there co,es to !e a stone c*!e= and so for the +hole thin" a di,ension is added= and if another di,ension is to !e added, he considers the c*!e iron= then "olden, etc., +hich happens not only in "ravity, !*t also in colors and all other 3*alities. &h*s c*ttin" o*t of the +ooden c*!e three rectan"les, he also conceives finally that he is c*ttin" a c*!e conflated of +oodenness, ironAness, etc., alone, so that the iron c*!e is dra+n thro*"h Operd*cat*rP into a +ooden one in the sa,e +ay that the si,ple c*!e Ois dra+n thro*"hP into rectan"les o!erved in every "en*s.O#1P :@& L ###A##F;

Beeck,an "oes on to descri!e ho+ one can solve e3*ations *sin" these techni3*es. Settin" aside inevita!le o!sc*rities, +e can see that in the fall of 16?5 Descartes +as descri!in" to Beeck,an so,ethin" akin to the techni3*es proposed in the second part of the Regulae , that is, the e)pression of all kinds of o!4ects and relations, not 4*st "eo,etrical, !y lines :in the third para"raph; and rectan"*lar plane fi"*res :in the first and second;. B*t the fo*rth para"raph of Beeck,an6s entry descri!es so,ethin" not to !e O#$P &hat is, a line is represented !y a rectan"le that has as one side the line and the other the *nit len"th. O#1P &he concl*din" part of this last cla*se is "ar!led= the translation follo+s a s*""estion of @&. ( 1$E (

Gi". 1$. &he dia"ra, that acco,panies Beeck,an6s ?5 Bcto!er 16?5 'ournal entry. @ll the ele,ents of a pro!le, are fi"*red in t+o di,ensions. &he *nit s3*are is a= three of the, p*t to"ether for, != three of those p*t to"ether end to end ,ake c, +hereas stackin" three for,s e= three of fi"*re c ,ake *p d, +hile three of e,ake f. fo*nd in the Regulae a techni3*e that e,ploys strikin" i,a"es not *nre,iniscent of those fo*nd in the second techni3*e Descartes devised in response to the ,e,ory art of Schenckel, +here he appealed to ascent on ladders, the h*rlin" of spears, and the like, to help e)plicate the relations to one another of the ele,ents of a series. @ threeAdi,ensional pro!le, he conceives *sin" a +ooden c*!e, a fo*rA di,ensional one *sin" stone, a fiveAdi,ensional *sin" iron, and so on. B*t he *ses not only "ravity :perhaps the increasin" specific +ei"hts of these ,aterials is the si"nificant co,parative factor; !*t also colors and all other :secondary; 3*alities to differentiate pro!le,s. /s this the direction in +hich Descartes intended to develop the third part of the Regulae Q So,eone ,i"ht o!4ect that the fo*rth para"raph of Beeck,an6s acco*nt presents a ,ethod so at odds +ith the others, not to ,ention +ith the Regulae , that this is i,pla*si!le. .as Descartes, then, ,erely e)plainin" to his friend a path he had for,erly considered !*t had already re4ected :and so perhaps Beeck,an ,is*nderstood this as part of Descartes6s c*rrent al"e!ra;Q B*t this s*""estion is hi"hly i,pla*si!le. Descartes +as not in the ha!it of revealin" even to friends anythin" he tho*"ht +as i,perfect, and *nlike, say, a 'epler, he +as not one to chronicle his ,issteps. 8oreover, his introd*ction of c*!es of different ,aterials is not inconsistent +ith the ,ethod of representation in the Regulae if it is *nderstood pri,arily as a ploy for keepin" in ,ind, indeed em4odying, all the di,ensions of a pro!le,. Gro, Beeck,an6s description it see,s that Descartes *sed these c*!es to preserve ,*ltiple relations that co*ld !e ( 1$5 ( carved off as needed in the for, of different cross sections, that is, rectan"les, to +hich the kind of ,anip*lations of lines and plane fi"*res ta*"ht !y the Regulae ,i"ht !e applied. &he 3*alified c*!es +o*ld th*s !e ,e,ory devices. .hat see,s to have happened !et+een the in"enio*s ideas of Bcto!er 16?5 and the last r*les of the Regulae is that Descartes decided no lon"er to preserve all the di,ensions in an act*al "eo,etrical fi"*re, carvin" off those rectan"*lar co,!inations of t+o di,ensions as they +ere needed, !*t instead to *se e)cl*sively si,ple ,arks or notations on paper to help re,e,!er the

di,ensions not c*rrently in *se +hile actively concentratin" on no ,ore than t+o. @s Descartes conceived of his "eo,etrici7ed al"e!ra !efore late 16?5, then, it +as an art of i,a"ination :and th*s of in"eni*,; even closer to the classical art of *sin" strikin" i,a"es for re,e,!erin" than is the techni3*e of the Regulae. @ll e)periencea!le 3*alities, not 4*st the easily 3*antifia!le ones that +e call pri,ary, +ere eli"i!le for *se in this earlier ,ethod, altho*"h +hen it ca,e do+n to act*al calc*lations the solids +ith secondary 3*alities +ere to yield *p the infor,ation they stored !y a ,ethod of sectionin" that res*lts in lines and rectan"les. /n addition, *nlike the Regulae, +hich "ives pride of place to ,anip*latin" lines, the Bcto!er 16?5 ,ethod appears to privile"e plane fi"*res. Does the *se of secondary 3*alities for ,e,ory i,a"es i,ply anythin" a!o*t Descartes6s *nderstandin" of s*ch 3*alities aro*nd 16?5Q .hat secondary 3*alities have in their favor is that they ena!le one to constr*ct si"nificant images !eyond three di,ensions= !*t perhaps 4*st as one needs a threeAdi,ensional o!4ect !efore one can have a colored or a +ei"hty one, one +o*ld start the constr*ction of the o!4ect *sin" the three "eo,etrical di,ensions and only then add other 3*alities. <et +e ,*st also note that as early as the note on Schenckel, Descartes did not !elieve that the *se of partic*lar kinds of i,a"es i,plied an ontolo"ical co,,it,ent, for there he re,arked that the si"nification :!y i,a"es s*ch as h*rled spears; ,i"ht !e either tr*e or fictitio*s. &his contin*es to !e the case in the Regulae, +here, in >*le 1F, he says that the co*ntless di,ensions that are conceiva!le add nothin" to the o!4ect, !*t Care *nderstood in the sa,e +ay +hether they have a real fo*ndation in the s*!4ects the,selves or have !een e)co"itated o*t of the +illed 4*d",ent OeB ar4itrio P of o*r ,indC :@& L FF5;. 6Di,ension6 is th*s not to !e identified si,ply +ith 6"eo,etric di,ension6. &he CSpeci,en of Descartes6s @l"e!raC preserved in Beeck,an6s 'ournal vi"oro*sly asserts that this techni3*e applies as ,*ch to representin" di,ensions "eo,etrically as to representin" the, !y ,eans of color, specific "ravity, hardness, or any other 3*ality. 2one of these are ,eant to !e tr*e pict*res of ,aterial or spatial reality as it is in itself, !*t as ,eans to the e)pression of relations for the sake of solvin" pro!le,s. /f colors or the different specific "ravities of ,aterials can ,irror the proA ( 1$9 ( portions or even 4*st the order of real or possi!le relationships, then there is nothin" to stand in the +ay of *sin" the,. Si,plicity of e)pression and efficiency in contri!*tin" to sol*tions are the pri,e desiderata. @n e)a,ple fro, >*le 1? helps confir, that this pra",atis, a!o*t representative devices holds even in the Regulae. &here Descartes proposes conceivin" colors accordin" to different patterns of lines and rectan"les. So,eone thinkin" of the later philosophy ,i"ht see here a pro"ra,,atic red*ction of secondary to pri,ary 3*alities. @ltho*"h / +o*ld not deny that it can !e constr*ed as a step tendin" to+ard that end, his ,otives see, to !e tactical rather than strate"ic. Girst of all, the Regulae reflects an a+akenin" interest in anato,y and physiolo"y, !*t Descartes6s *se of standard late si)teenthA and early seventeenthAcent*ry voca!*lary and the lack of detail "iven in his psychophysiolo"ical hypothesis stron"ly s*""est that he had done little ,ore than read a!o*t these s*!4ects and that he +as tryin" to adapt +hat he had "leaned to his ,ethod of i,a"inative representation.O#?P /n e)plainin" the process of sense perception, he ar"*es that the senses take on i,pressions in the sa,e +ay as +a) receives the i,pression fro, a seal= the senses then ,ake an i,pression in the sens*s co,,*nis, +hich in t*rn carries the i,pression into the phantasia= and finally-altho*"h here the e)a,ple of the +a) and seal !eco,es analo"ical rather than literal-the phantasia ,akes its i,pression on the kno+in" po+er. @ll of this he *nderstands as takin" place instantaneo*sly and ri"idly= the ,odel he "ives is the si,*ltaneo*s ,otion of all the parts of a pen +hen the ni! end is ,oved.

/n this conte)t he ar"*es that the sensation of all 3*alities takes place !y si,ilar processes of i,pression= Cth*s the first opa3*e Os*rfaceP +hich is in the eye receives a fi"*re i,pressed !y the ill*,ination end*ed +ith vario*s colors= and the first ,e,!rane of the ears, nostrils, and ton"*e that is i,pervio*s to the o!4ect also th*s !orro+s a ne+ fi"*re fro, so*nd, odor, and flavorC :@& L F1?AF1#;. @cc*sto,ed as +e are to Descartes6s only sli"htly later conception :as e)pressed at the o*tset of &e onde, perhaps as early as 16#$ and no later than 16##; of an instantaneo*s ,otion trans,itted thro*"h space and alon" the nerves to the pineal "land, +e feel the stron" *r"e to read this as a first, cl*,sy +ay of p*ttin" that conception, !*t the interestin" thin" is that he does not state or apparently O#?P @ firsthand kno+led"e of s*ch thin"s ca,e later. /n early 16#1$, Descartes tells 8ersenne that he is st*dyin" che,istry and anato,y and learnin" thin"s that are not in any !ook :1% @pril 16#$, @& / 1#E;. /n late 16#?, +e find hi, +ritin" to 8ersenne that he is doin" anato,ical dissections :2ove,!er Dece,!er 16#?, @& / ?6#;. 9is pro"ress ,*st have !een prodi"io*s, for he +as invited to ass*,e the chair in theory of ,edicine at the University of Bolo"na in 16##. See Dincen7o B*sacchi, CLa chia,ata di Caresio alla cattedra e,inente di teorica della ,edicina hello st*dio di Bolo"na nel 16##,C Pagine di storia della medicina 11, no. ? :196E;: 9A1#. ( 11$ ( even intend this. &he analo"y to the ,otion of the +hole pen does not i,ply that he is thinkin" of ,otion alon" the nerves. &he nerves enter in only later, +here they are identified as the ,edi*, of the active ,otive po+er of the !ody :@& L F1F; rather than of the passive reception of i,pressions. &he pen6s ,otion appears si,ply to confir, that the i,pression on the sense or"an can !e trans,itted +hole and entire in an instant, not that the different parts of the i,pression are carried alon" different nerve paths :the Regulae "ives no s*""estion of this later conception;. Descartes si,ply does not offer ,*ch infor,ation a!o*t the nerves and their ,odalities= this pro!a!ly o*"ht to lead one to concl*de that he had not yet tho*"ht these thin"s o*t in detail. B*t it is clear that he still thinks of colored li"ht, so*nds, odors, and flavors-not ,otions-as the a"ents effectively i,pressin" the,selves on the senses, a fact that is scarcely co,pati!le +ith his havin" already arrived at a si"nificant pri,aryA secondary distinction. /n this conte)t he "oes on to s*""est a +ay of e)pressin" color !y fi"*res. @nd this Oi.e., the notion that the first ,e,!rane receives an i,pression fro, li"ht, so*nd, etc.P "reatly helps in conceivin" all thin"s, since nothin" falls *nder the senses ,ore easily than fi"*re: for it is to*ched and seen. 9o+ever, nothin" false follo+s fro, this s*pposition any ,ore than fro, so,e other, as is de,onstrated fro, this, that the concept of fi"*re is so co,,on and si,ple as to !e involved in every sensi!le thin". Gor e)a,ple, s*ppose color is so,e force, yo* +ill nevertheless not deny that it is e)tended, and conse3*ently fi"*red. &herefore +hat inco,,odio*s thin" follo+s if, takin" care not to *selessly ad,it and rashly contrive any ne+ entity, +e do not even deny anythin" a!o*t color that pleases others !*t only a!stract fro, everythin" else +hat has the nat*re of fi"*re, and conceive the diversity that there is !et+een +hite, !l*e, red, etc., as that !et+een these or si,ilar fi"*res, etc. Osee fi". 11PQ &he sa,e can !e said a!o*t all thin"s, since it is certain that the infinite ,*ltit*de of fi"*res s*ffices to e)press all differences of sensi!le thin"s. :@& L F1#; .hat appears to !e happenin" is this: Bn the !asis of the physical and physiolo"ical aspects of his hypothesis, it is pla*si!le that all sensations ,ake chan"es in the shape of the receptive ,e,!ranes of the sense or"ans. &his shape is i,,ediately trans,itted, apparently +itho*t defor,ation, alon" so,e *nspecified ro*te to the sens*s co,,*nis, +hich can i,press it on the phantasia, +hich in t*rn can

:analo"ically; i,press it on the kno+in" po+er. .hatever one thinks of the nat*re of sensation, it is *ndo*!ted :Descartes asserts; that the thin" sensed has e)tension= this nat*re, eBtension, is si,ple and co,,on to all sensi4ilia. @nd if +e consider "eo,etry, +e see that the variety of fi"*res is so rich that all differences !et+een thin"s can !e e)pressed !y the,. ( 111 (

Gi". 11. Descartes6s spec*lative e)a,ple of ho+ vario*s colors ,i"ht !e represented !y different "eo,etric fi"*res. &here are several levels in this ar"*,ent. Descartes allo+s, as a proponent of analo"ical ,ethod ,*st, that there are other s*ppositions possi!le for presentin" the differences in colors :he re,arks that other people ,i"ht hold certain !eliefs a!o*t color that his s*pposition does not deny, !*t also that nothin" false follo+s fro, his any ,ore than fro, so,e others= @& L F1#;. B*t physical thin"s are e)tended, and so +e are not to !e s*rprised that e)tension and fi"*re co*ld !e trans,itted to and +ithin o*r physiolo"ical apparat*s. /n any case, the fi"*res of thin"s trans,itted in the physical and physiolo"ical processes +ill contri!*te so,ethin" to the sensation i,pression. 8oreover, even if there is so,ethin" fictional a!o*t the partic*lar fi"*rative representation +e choose :say; for colors, nevertheless the differences in the fi"*res can easily stand in for the differences !et+een thin"s. Perhaps so,e day +e +ill even !e fort*nate eno*"h to co,e *pon the precise differences that distin"*ish the,, or at least *pon a syste, of fi"*res that perfectly ,irrors the syste, of relations !et+een colors. Bne ,i"ht recall a"ain a relevant note fro, the CCo"itationes privataeC: C&he co"nition of nat*ral thin"s !y h*,an !ein"s Oocc*rsP solely thro*"h the si,ilit*de of those thin"s that fall *nder sense: and indeed +e 4*d"e that person to have ,ore tr*ly philosophi7ed +ho +ill have ,ore s*ccessf*lly assi,ilated the thin" so*"ht to +hat is co"ni7ed !y senseC :@& L ?15A?19;. /n li"ht of the psychophysiolo"y of >*le 1?, +hat falls *nder the senses in all cases is i,pressed fi"*re, if nothin" else :tho*"h +e are not told +e can concl*de that this is all that can !e i,pressed, and in fact the opposite is s*""ested;. &herefore the one +ho reasons a!o*t nat*ral thin"s +ill *se s*ch fi"*res and perhaps other sensi!le :and i,a"ina!le; thin"s as +ell to philosophi7e ,ore tr*ly than one +ho does not. /t is c*rio*s that in so,e sense Descartes is tryin" in >*le 1? to take ( 11? ( advanta"e of !oth of his alternatives to the ,e,ory art of Schenckel. Bne +as Cnat*ral,C !ased on real ca*ses: if the ca*se +as identified, its correspondin" i,a"e:s; or se3*ence of i,a"es in the ,ind co*ld !e reprod*ced at +ill. &he other +as a co,pro,ise !et+een the artificial and the nat*ral: a net+ork of relationships ,i"ht !e analo"ically e)pressed thro*"h other+ise *nrelated i,a"es :spears, ladders, stairs, and the like;. Bn the one hand, Descartes in >*le 1? +ants *s to a"ree that the trans,ission of i,a"es fro, a thin" to o*r senses to o*r kno+in" po+er is as he descri!es it and that the e)tendedness of the o!4ects of sense is a real ca*se of the e)tension of the fi"*ration in the or"an6s ,e,!rane= on the other hand, he is +illin" to !e satisfied +ith analo"y, that thin"s are something like this, and +ith the tho*"ht that it is the differences of thin"s and not their essence that are !ein" e)pressed. Gi"*res are si,ply ,arks that can !rin" these thin"s and their interrelations to ,ind. 9e is still f*nda,entally appealin" to the notion that thin"s are related to one another !y :not necessarily "eo,etric or al"e!raic;

analo"y and proportion. /n the ne)t chapters +e +ill consider ho+ the first part of the Regulae is also ca*"ht !et+een the ca*sal and the representative, !et+een the literal and the analo"ical. B*t first it ,i"ht !e helpf*l to concl*de +ith a spec*lative sketch of Descartes6s pro"ress in the *se of i,a"ination. /n late 1615, the i,a"ination +as for Descartes the synthetic co"nitive po+er a!le to reco"ni7e and constr*e proportions that are presented or revealed disc*rsively, !it !y !it :as in the pro"ress of a son" or the fits and starts of pro!le, solvin";. 9is inclination to "ive co"nitive pri,acy to i,a"ination +as *ndo*!tedly enco*ra"ed !y Beeck,an, +ho !elieved that everythin" in the *nderstandin" of nat*re o*"ht to !e pict*ra!leO##P -and th*s !e"an a shift to the paradi", :and analo"y; of the visi!le and the ,anip*la!le. /n the period 1619A16?l, in part *nder the sti,*l*s of his innovations in addressin" the "eneral theory of ,athe,atical proportions, !e ela!orated an ontolo"ical episte,olo"y of rese,!lance, accordin" to +hich corporeal i,a"ination co*ld fi"*re !odies, and !odies in t*rn co*ld fi"*re spirit*al thin"s. 9e !elieved that the chief instr*,ent of discovery and of conceivin" proportions +as i,a"ination and searched for +ays to syste,ati7e and ,ethodi7e it, especially its a!ility to ,ove fro, i,a"e to i,a"e. &+o possi!ilities he e)plored +ere that of "eneratin" a +hole series of i,a"es !y !e"innin" +ith ca*ses and that of e)pressin" the relations of se3*entiali7ed o!4ects !y ,e,ory i,a"es that so,eho+ ,irror act*al relations. .hen +e !eco,e privy to his tho*"hts a"ain after a sevenAyear hiat*s, +e see that he has *niversali7ed the "eo,etrical fi"*ration of relations as the fo*ndation of a pro!le,Asolvin" ,ethod :his "eo,etric al"e!ra; !*t that he has not alto"ether a!andoned non"eo,etrical i,a"es. &hen, in the O##P See van Berkel, Isaac -eeckman, chap. E, and #1EA#19 :1n"lish s*,,ary;. ( 11# ( final sta"e of the co,position of the Regulae, after Bcto!er 16?5, he decides to a!andon the *se of secondary 3*alities as a part of his pro!le,Asolvin" ar,a,entari*, in favor of the ,arks and sy,!ols of +ritin" and to definitively set aside the *se of fi"*res of di,ensions a!ove t+o. 2one of this had anythin" to do +ith the principal tenets of his later philosophy= for e)a,ple, he +as not ,otivated !y any ontolo"ical i,perative to red*ce ordinary o!4ects to p*re e)tension. >ather, he +as driven !y the need to invent efficient devices for e)pressin" and solvin" pro!le,s accordin" to proportionality, +hether or not those devices had anythin" directly to do +ith the +ay thin"s e)ist in reality. 2evertheless, the +orkin" o*t of the details of the i,a"inative ,ethod, especially his nascent concern +ith the physical and physiolo"ical trans,ission of i,a"es, !e"an to prod*ce tensions that *lti,ately led to a !reakdo+n in the theory. &he place +here those tensions !eco,e evident is in the first part of the Regulae, >*les 1 thro*"h 1?, to +hich +e no+ t*rn. ( 11F (

FOUR Int/it/s5 De./ctio5 an. ,et$o. T$e Ps'c$o(ogica( Fo/n.ations o% Uni&ersa( ,at$esis
Let *s spec*late for a ,o,ent a!o*t +hat happens if the position of the earliest +ritin"s is driven to+ard lo"ical li,its. /ts !asic contention is that so,e thin"s can !e *sed to fi"*re, conceive, and *nderstand other thin"s, *lti,ately !eca*se they are interrelated +ithin a cos,ic har,ony. &+o

3*estions co,e i,,ediately to ,ind: @re there thin"s +ithin this har,ony that are privile"ed= that is, are there so,e thin"s ,ore f*nda,ental or ,ore +orth kno+in" than othersQ @nd +hat is the nat*re of the relationship !et+een fi"*res and the !odies they i,a"e, and !et+een !odies and the hi"her tr*ths those !odies i,a"eQ

A. SY,-OLS5 ANALO+Y5 AND T0E ONTOLO+Y: PSYC0OLO+Y OF RESE,-LANCE

&he ans+er to the second 3*estion looks fairly si,ple: the fi"*re, +hether +e take this ter, literally or ,etaphorically, in so,e +ay represents or sy,!oli7es the o!4ect conceived thro*"h it. &he !asic relationship +o*ld !e one of representation or sy,!oli7ation. &his ans+er is ,ini,ally ill*,inatin", ho+ever, !eca*se it is ,erely "eneric. @s Descartes +ill point o*t at the !e"innin" of &e onde, +ords too represent tho*"hts or thin"s, yet +itho*t any need of rese,!lance. &hey no ,ore need to !e like the thin" than ,arks that +e ,ake on paper to keep track of the parts of a pro!le, not c*rrently *nder consideration need to !e like the thin" they stand for :@& L/ F;. /n askin" a!o*t the relationship !et+een fi"*res and !odies +e are not, ho+ever, askin" ho+ the letter a relates to a n*,!er, a line, or anythin" else, !*t rather ho+, for e)a,ple, an oval stands in relation to an e"", a shade of !l*e to the sky, +ind to spirit, and the like. .ith the e""6s shape and the sky6s color the kind of relationship see,s o!vio*s: +e idenA ( 11% ( tify a feat*re of the o!4ect and portray it accordin" to so,e sche,a, not, ho+ever, to isolate the feat*re and its sche,atic representation, +hich rather +e take for "ranted, !*t instead to *se these to "et a !etter fi) on the o!4ect in 3*estion and the relations +ithin +hich it stands. Bne takes +hat a,o*nts to a part, or a sche,ati7ed part, of the o!4ect to "et at the o!4ect6s place in a net+ork of relations. /n an analo"ical *niverse, everythin" is e)pressive of other thin"s, so the partic*lar nat*re of any individ*al thin" is not as i,portant as its relationship to others. >e,indin" o*rselves of the earlier disc*ssion of the sy,!ol can help !rin" this into foc*s. @,on" the 0reeks a sym4olon +as a part of a coin that had !een split as the ,ark and seal of an a"ree,ent. Since coins in a ,oney econo,y are the ,edi*, of e)chan"e, they the,selves participate in the nat*re of e)chan"e or transaction and so are not ,ere physical o!4ects. @ transaction re3*ires the perfor,ance !y several parties= the partitionin" of the coin ,irrors this character. &he co,pletion of the transaction is i,a"ed in the re4oinin" of the coin6s parts into a +hole. &he net+ork of relations created aro*nd the sy,!olon th*s sche,atically displays feat*res that are si,ilar to that +hich it sy,!oli7es, and the sy,!ol and the sy,!oli7ed share, each in its o+n plane, at least these feat*res, and each of the t+o can !e vie+ed in the perspective of the other. /n the case of a contract, one can vie+ the sy,!olon fro, the perspective of the plane of econo,ic transactions, or the transaction fro, the plane of the divided sy,!olon. /n corporeal i,a"inin", each aspect of the !ody in 3*estion is part of a +hole. Die+in" the !ody *nder the aspect of +ei"ht +ill evoke a different net+ork of relationships and different res*lts than +ill vie+in" it *nder the aspect of si7e or color or shape. /f o*r interest is in the totality of !ein" of that partic*lar thin", +e ,i"ht i,a"ine o*r co"nitive "oal to !e !rin"in" to"ether all the parts or aspects for a f*ll and clear conception of the thin", and +e ,i"ht +ant to call this representation proper of the thin". B*t this is a ,isleadin" +ay of approachin" the 3*estions of analo"y in Descartes6s early philosophy. /n an analo"ical +orld, each thin" is capa!le of representin" ,any other thin"s= ,oreover, conceivin" a thin" is achieved thro*"h the representation of aspects of the thin", rather than !y a sin"le

i,a"e that is taken to !e its paradi",atic, total representation. &hat is, there is no necessary i,plication that the end res*lt +ill !e a sin"le :tr*e; i,a"e that can !e called the representation :or, *sin" a later loc*tion, the idea; of the thin". @ representation is al+ays a representation, one a,on" the ,any possi!le needed to !rin" the thin" in 3*estion into clear foc*s in one respect or another. /,a"inative co"nition as conceived !y the early Descartes is a partiali7in", disc*rsive process. &he !ody perceived is i,a"inatively !ro*"ht into relationship +ith other thin"s in certain respects :*nder an aspect, alon" ( 116 ( a certain a)is;. Bne ,i"ht even try to !rin" these respects or aspects into relationship +ith one another :e."., +ei"ht or shape co*ld !e related to density, or color to te)t*re;, !*t then one +o*ld have to decide +hether these co*ld !e !ro*"ht into a direct relationship or only an indirect one. /nsofar as the ori"in of one6s 3*estionin" is to conceive a !ody in its relationships, one ,i"ht s*spect that the relationship of aspect to aspect has to !e conceived !y +ay of a partic*lar instance or instances. @t any rate, +hat is essential to i,a"inative seein" +ithin an analo"ical *niverse is that a characteristic of one thin" can ad*,!rate an analo"o*s characteristic in other kinds of thin"s, and the relationships !et+een thin"s can !e ,irrored !y other thin"s. /n this kind of *niverse s*ch relationships and characteristics have a ,eanin" relatively independent of any instance. @ partic*lar e"" ,ay !e !l*e and oval, !*t the !l*eness and the ovalness s*""est interconnections !ased on the nat*re of !l*eness and ovalness rather than on the nat*re of the e"", and their con4*nction ,ay !e ,eanin"f*l apart fro, any partic*lar thin" in +hich they appear to"ether. So ,*ch for corporeal i,a"ination. Does intellect*al i,a"ination, +hich *ses !odily thin"s to fi"*re hi"her, spirit*al thin"s, f*nction si,ilarlyQ 9o+, for e)a,ple, does +ind fi"*re spiritQ &he strate"y of identifyin" feat*res is not so clearly applica!le, or one sho*ld say it is applica!le only !y stretchin" analo"y even f*rther. @ !ody can !e i,a"ed in three di,ensions !y a "eo,etrical solid :or !y a t+oA di,ensional fi"*re pro4ected onto a plane fro, a "iven vanta"e point;, it has a color that can !e seen, an odor that can !e s,elled, a hardness and te)t*re that can !e felt, and so on. .e can conceive of each of these aspects "*idin" and foc*sin" o*r i,a"inative attention. 9o+ does this translate into e,ployin" !odies to fi"*re spirit*al thin"sQ .e cannot appeal to ,athe,atics, !eca*se ,athe,atics itself co*ld !e conceived as still +ithin the li,its of the corporeal insofar as it pres*pposes spatial e)tension. /t is not clear that Descartes "ives *s a concrete sa,ple of intellect*al fi"*rin", *nless +e take his three drea,s of 1$A11 2ove,!er 1619 as a revelation of Bly,pian or spirit*al tr*ths. .hatever the diffic*lties presented !y the drea,s, the acco*nt "iven !y Baillet evidences a !elief that lo+er or corporeal thin"s can si"nify spirit*al tr*ths. /n the narrative Descartes takes partic*lar thin"s as standin" for hi"her ones :the !orpus poetarum, a collection of poetry, he interprets as science and +isdo, 4oined to"ether, the dictionary that appears he considers to !e the sciences "athered into a +hole, the ,elon that he is s*pposed to deliver to an ac3*aintance is taken for solit*de, the +ind that opposes hi, for a "ood or evil spirit;. <et it is also i,portant that this Cstandin" forC takes place +ithin and depends on a narrative conte)t. &he drea,s the,selves, +hose ,eanin" Descartes !e"ins interpretin" +hile still drea,in" the third drea,, do not i,,ediately reveal their si"nificance any ,ore than a !ody presented ( 11E ( to o*r senses is instantaneo*sly *nderstood in a clear conception. K*st as +e CinterpretC the !ody !y

fi"*rin" it thro*"h aspects confi"*red to+ard lar"er conte)ts linkin" individ*als that share in the aspect in so,e +ay, so +e interpret the drea, !y parts that are reciprocally confi"*red to constit*te, or at least to point to+ard, a lar"er, inte"rated conte)t. &hat is, i,a"ination, !oth corporeal and spirit*al intellect*al, constr*es or constr*cts ,eanin" as part of a narrative. Both sho+ the po+er of interpretation at +ork. &his approach can help !rin" the i,a"ination of the !ompendium musicae, +hich is a*dial, into clearer confor,ity +ith the vis*al i,a"ination of the CCo"itationes privatae.C 1ach !e"ins +ith thin"s that are so,eho+ presented or "iven :to hearin", to sensation in "eneral, to protoco"nition;= so,ethin" is s*!se3*ently, yet al,ost i,,ediately, detached fro, the "iven :proportions in so*nd, vario*s 3*alities and 3*antities pertainin" to !odies, aspects of possi!le si"nification in spirit*al thin"s;, and thro*"h this detach,ent +e try to conceive the entirety !etter. &he process is disc*rsive, and it involves a reco"nition of so,ethin" that is already present !*t not-at least not initially-e)pressly or clearly noticed. Still, a difference re,ains that is not *ni,portant for the later develop,ent of Descartes6s conception of the *ses of i,a"ination. /f yo* look at a !ody, yo* are in so,e sense instantaneo*sly in possession of the +hole that needs to !e constr*ed= like+ise if yo* have an inti,ation of a hi"her tr*th. B*t a son" is intrinsically e)tended thro*"h ti,e, and one never has the +hole i,,ediately in one6s possessiontho*"h it does ,ake sense to say that there is s*ch a thin" as a +hole son", appreciatin" +hich depends on a disc*rsive acco*nt and therefore on ,e,ory. 8e,ory is ,ore o!vio*sly involved in the constr*al of ,*sic than in the constr*al of !odies and spirit*al tr*ths. 8ore o!vio*sly, !*t perhaps not ,ore essentially, since in vision the thin" in 3*estion does not reveal the f*ll e)tent of its relationships, +hich ,*st !e constr*ed !y an activity of ,ind. /nterpretation in either case is arrived at thro*"h a disc*rsive process, and, *nless the chain of interpretation is at the last step a!ro"ated !y an i,,ediate int*ition of the +hole tr*th, *nderstandin" re3*ires recall of the +hole chain. .hether that is done in the direct presence of a !ody or only thro*"h the ,e,ory of the o!4ect that +e +ish to *nderstand :+hether it is ,*sic, a !ody, or a spirit*al thin"; +o*ld see, to !e of s*!ordinate i,portance. @s / have already noted and as shall !e f*rther confir,ed presently, the Regulae atte,pts to "ive aids to replace ,e,ory, so that in the last analysis ,e,ory +ill !e virt*ally overco,e. @ disc*rsive process of kno+in", +hether it is rational or i,a"inative, can co,e to a proper end only if there are selfAevidencin" tr*ths, pheno,ena that reveal their ,eanin" si,ply in ter,s of the,selves= other+ise the disc*rsion +o*ld !e openAended. /f it +ere openAended, there ( 115 ( ,i"ht still !e a possi!ility of kno+led"e if the entire cos,os +ere traversed and *lti,ately conceived :e."., in a kind of circ*larity that avoided !ein" vicio*s !y enco,passin" everythin";. B*t fro, the !e"innin" of his spec*lations a!o*t i,a"inative kno+in" Descartes ass*,ed that kno+led"e is locally deter,inate. &hat is, kno+led"e is directed to+ard a "iven o!4ect :e."., a fallin" cannon!all; or class of o!4ects :all fallin" thin"s;, and the process of disc*rsion operates in a local lo"ical space deter,ined !y the relationships !et+een the i,a"ed feat*res and the o!4ect. :9ere 6i,a"ed feat*res6 is a first appro)i,ation to the si,ple nat*res of the Regulae, +hich +ill !e e)a,ined in chapter %.; Bne conceives the o!4ect not in re,ote relationship, for instance to an essence, !*t only in local relationship to the i,a"ea!le feat*re that has str*ck one as relevant. 9avin" conceived the "iven o!4ect and si,ilar ones accordin" to the de"ree to +hich they e)hi!it the isolated feat*re, one can *se the, and their relationships to conceive different, even hi"her, tr*ths. &o "ive an ill*stration :not fo*nd in Descartes;, a lead !all ,i"ht fi"*re the "ravity of ,atter and contrast +ith the li"htness of a fla,e, +hich fi"*res spirit. &his process of co,in" to kno+ is analo"ical !*t still ,ore or less deter,inate= it +orks +ithin

the lo"ical or i,a"istic space esta!lished !y a disc*rsivity that analy7es the relations present in or e)hi!ited !y the o!4ect, and th*s it is, in a so,e+hat ,ore e)tended sense of the ter,, still locally deter,inate. &he philosopher or savant th*s learns to discipline the i,a"inative leaps that the poet ,akes= "*ided !y the spark of tr*th poetic i,a"ination reveals, the philosopher fills in, ite, !y ite,, thro*"h stepA!yAstep i,a"inative disc*rsion, the lo"ical space that the poet typically overleaps. &his !rin"s *s !ack to o*r first 3*estion, +hether in an analo"ical *niverse there are privile"ed tr*ths. /t ,i"ht !e ar"*ed, on the !asis of the t+oAi,a"inations note, that t+o thin"s are privile"ed: the !odies that are conceived !y fi"*res and the spirit*al thin"s that are fi"*red !y !odies. Beca*se !odies are in one case the end and in the other the ,eans, +e have a kind of hierarchy: lo+est of all are the fi"*res, then co,e !odies, then spirit*al thin"s. /t does not take too ,*ch i,a"ination to see that there are traces of Plato6s divided line here :Repu4lic, !k. 6, %$9DA%11D;. &he line-+hich represents !oth po+ers of ,ind and the o!4ects e)perienced !y those po+ers, fro, the hi"hest intelli"ence :no*s; to phantasia, fro, Plato6s /deas to the i,a"es of thin"s-is arrived at !y dividin" a line se",ent into t+o parts accordin" to a "iven proportion and then dividin" each of those parts a"ain !y the sa,e proportion. /n this line +hat holds to"ether the divisions is the proportionality that o!tains !et+een the parts and the correspondin" a!ility of each part of the line to serve as a ,ore or less distant i,a"e of the other parts. &he 3*estion can easily arise, .hat is the *lti,ate o!4ect of kno+in"Q /s it the Ideas at the intelli"i!le end of the line, or the proportionalities that ,ake the line into a +holeQ Do +e look to ( 119 ( the *lti,ate essences of thin"s, or do +e look to the proportionalities that *nderlie the i,a"in" relationship !et+een the parts of the ontolo"ical and psycholo"ical hierarchies represented on the line, an i,a"in" relationship that acts accordin" to proportions and "ives rise to the rese,!lances !et+een the different parts of the lineQ @ si,ilar 3*estion can !e p*t to Descartes: /s it *lti,ately the hi"hest thin"s that +e seek, the Bly,pian thin"s, or is it an *nderstandin" of the analo"ical +orkin" of the entire cos,osQ Bn the one hand, +e are inclined to ans+er that the spirit*al thin"s are privile"ed, are ,ost +orth kno+in". @"ain citin" Plato, in the intelli"i!le part of the line, divided into the ,athe,aticals :+hich are the fo*ndations of disc*rsive sciences; and the /deas, it is the /deas that are ,ost +orth kno+in". B*t, on the other hand, +hat is ,ost co,prehensively tr*e is the syste,atic relationships of all the parts of the line to one another, relationships that prod*ce rese,!lances. >ese,!lance accordin" to proportionality itself there!y "ains an ontolo"ical stat*s. Perhaps that is +hat is ,ost +orth kno+in". @t this 4*nct*re there arises a diffic*lty. /f there is a proportionality that "overns the +hole divided line, and proportionality is ,athe,atical, !*t the ,athe,aticals are not the very hi"hest part of the line, ho+ can proportionali7ed rese,!lances !e ,ost i,portant of allQ /n addition, if +e *se a +ooden trian"le to envision the ,athe,atics of a trian"le, +e are *sin" so,ethin" on the third level :physical thin"s; as an i,a"e of so,ethin" on the second :,athe,aticals;= !*t if +e i,a"ine the o*tline of that +ooden trian"le, as +e +o*ld in i,a"inative co"nition, are +e not descendin" to the fo*rth level, that of shado+s or i,a"es of physical o!4ects, rather than ascendin" to the second :even tho*"h an ar"*,ent ,i"ht !e ,ade that +e are descendin" to the fo*rth for the sake of ,ore easily conceivin" p*re, secondAlevel ,athe,aticals;Q Since ,y p*rpose is not to present an ar"*,ent a!o*t Plato6s line !*t rather to clarify the net+ork of pro!le,s that Descartes +as facin" e)plicitly or i,plicitly, let *s ret*rn the 3*estionin" to hi,. .e co,e to *nderstand thin"s, not directly, !*t !y +ay of inter,ediaries, !y fi"*res in the !roadest sense of that ter,. &his i,plies that +e never :or at least rarely; conceive or *nderstand thin"s directly= +e

,*st, as it +ere, esta!lish a distance fro, the thin"-the corporeal o!4ect as sensed or the spirit*al tr*th as inti,ated-!y tryin" to Cfi"*re it o*t.C .e need so,e po+er or fac*lty that per,its this. &he one that Descartes identified in the t+oAi,a"inations note is i,a"ination: not 4*st corporeal, not 4*st intellect*al, !*t the co,!ination of !oth, +hich to"ether can fi"*re o*t +hat presents itself to sense and +hat is present to intellect. Let *s t*rn a"ain to intellect. /f +hat +e said earlier a!o*t needin" an inter,ediary in order to *nderstand is tr*e, then intellect ,*st perfor, its act of *nderstandin" !y +ay of this inter,ediary, !y +ay of a fi"*ration ( 1?$ ( +orked o*t !y i,a"ination. / !elieve that this is precisely the position held in the Regulae and that the tensions arisin" in that +ork are lar"ely a res*lt of Descartes6s tryin" to erect on this !asis a coherent and +ideAran"in" theory of the kno+in" po+ers and +hat is kno+n. 0iven the spec*lations +e have 4*st *ndertaken, +e ,i"ht e)pect that certain pro!le,s +ill arise: for e)a,ple, +hether there are e)ceptions to inter,ediation :e."., if at least so,e thin"s are not i,a"es !*t f*nda,ental realities, or if intellection can take place +itho*t *sin" an i,a"e;= ho+ i,a"ination in the lo+er, corporeal sense cooperates +ith intellect= +hether there is a distinction !et+een the hi"her, intellect*al i,a"ination and intellect p*re and si,ple= +hether the ,athe,atics of proportionality has an a!sol*tely privile"ed stat*s or is si,ply a tool= and, a!ove all, +hether the activity of i,a"inin", of fi"*rin" one thin" in li"ht of another, is separa!le fro, its o!4ects. .e in fact find all of these thin"s at the heart of the Regulae -a confir,ation that it is an atte,pt to +ork o*t the conse3*ences of i,a"inative kno+in" in a co,prehensive +ay.

-. T0E PSYC0OP0YSIOLO+Y OF UNIVERSAL ,AT0ESIS

&he psycholo"y of Scholasticis, *nderpins an *nderstandin" of scientific kno+in" that !e"ins +ith the senses and ends in the a!straction fro, phantas,s of an intelli"i!le species, in accordance +ith +hich one can *nderstand o!4ects sensed or re,e,!ered and fro, +hich one ,i"ht *lti,ately ascend to a kno+led"e of noncorporeal thin"s: not 4*st of the h*,an spirit and 0od !*t also, ,ore "enerally, of the for,s or essences that are the nat*res of corporeal thin"s and that +hen co,po*nded +ith ,atter constit*te s*!stances. &his psycholo"ical process s*pports a notion of science that "ives privile"e of place to +hat si"nifies the a4stracta, the ter,s. &er,s are co,!ined in 4*d",ents and then detached fro, and reattached to one another in disc*rsive reasonin", in partic*lar !y dint of syllo"istic ar"*,ent. &he doctrine of internal senses and the s*pportin" physiolo"y of e)ternal and internal sensation +as at the center of this process of co,in" to kno+, and its pec*liarities created !oth opport*nities and pro!le,s. /f all kno+in" !e"ins in sensation and re3*ires the inter,ediation of a phantas,, then a deeper kno+led"e of the corporeal +orkin"s of the e)ternal and internal sense or"ans and po+ers ,i"ht +ell lead to i,prove,ents in kno+in" !y capitali7in" on their a!ilities and co,pensatin" for their li,itations, and it ,i"ht facilitate the ease and s+iftness of discoverin" ne+ tr*ths. @t the very least one ,i"ht learn ho+ to re,ove o!stacles that an *ndisciplined or careless *se of these fac*lties p*t in the +ay of kno+in". Pres*,a!ly s*ch i,prove,ents co*ld co,e a!o*t !y vario*s actions taken ( 1?1 ( in the everyday, corporeal +orld, for e)a,ple !y prescri!in" e)ercises or *sin" ,edical or ,echanical

,eans. .hether one co*ld directly intervene to i,prove the +orkin" of the ill*,ination of the phantas, !y a"ent intellect :or the li"ht of nat*re; +o*ld see, less likely. Li"ht ill*,inates +hat it +ill= +hether +e see depends on the state of o*r !odies-this +e ,i"ht act to i,prove-and on +hether +e pay attention. Payin" attention +o*ld see, to !e in part a noncorporeal f*nction that +e ,i"ht i,prove thro*"h practice and discipline. <et this +o*ld train the +ill ,ore than the intellect, for in the last analysis +hether +e see +hat +e are lookin" to+ard, especially +hen it is not corporeal and seein" takes place in a ,etaphorical sense, is not finally *p to *s. /f the li"ht does not reveal so,ethin", then +e cannot see it. @ f*rther pro!le, is ho+ the physics of the +orld and the physiolo"y of o*r !odies s*pport scientific kno+in". /f, in partic*lar, so,ethin" in ,aterial thin"s needs to !e conveyed to the sense or"ans to provide *s +ith a sti,*l*s to kno+in", then any li,itations on the acc*racy of the physical and physiolo"ical processes +ill adversely affect kno+in". /f, for e)a,ple, no transparent ,edi*, can perfectly convey the sensi!le for, of color to o*r eyes, or if the nerve processes can convey it to the cere!ral centers of the internal senses only in di,inished perfection, then there +ill !e a li,it in principle to ho+ +ell the kno+a!le that is in the sensi!le thin"s :the for, or essence; can !e *nderstood. &his holds tr*e even if it +ere in so,e sense proportionality that +as conveyed in these processes. /n fact, it ,i"ht hold ,ore critically, for a har,onio*s proportion can !e destroyed !y very s,all deviations in the co,ponent 3*antities. /f the process that !rin"s the sensi!le for,s to the !rain is defective, perhaps there is nevertheless a possi!ility of at least sche,atically i,provin" +hat can !e derived fro, the,. &he !iplanarity that allo+s h*,an !ein"s to see one thin" in ter,s of another ,i"ht !e *sed to correct one i,a"e in the li"ht of others. &he *se of ,athe,atics, +hich has an e)actit*de e)ceedin" that of the everyday +orld, ,i"ht el*cidate co,,onalities and co*nter!alance distortions. &he po+er of reco"ni7in" proportion and analo"y ,i"ht !y its very nat*re allo+ the h*,an in"eni*, to correct sli"ht, or even s*!stantial, i,perfections. B*t this de,ands a kind of seein" that transcends the ,erely corporeal, that !rin"s to the seein" ,ore than is in the seen= it also raises pro!le,s a!o*t ho+ the evidence that is i,plicit in corporeal thin"s co,es to li"ht, ho+ it is taken hold of in conscio*sness. Do +e take hold of so,ethin" that is in the o!4ects or is i,,ediately derived fro, the,Q 9o+ do +e *nderstand +hat is co,ple)Q 9o+ do +e *nderstand +hat is si,ple and kno+ that it is si,pleQ 9o+ do +e forestall the pro!le,s that can arise !eca*se of defects in ,e,ory, even over the very short ter,Q Can +e ( 1?? ( !e s*re that disc*rsive reasonin", +hich ,oves fro, thin" to thin", does not o!sc*re the clarity of each individ*al step in the reasonin"Q

C. INTUITUS5 DEDUCTIO5 AND T0E ACTIVITY OF CO+ITATION

&he first t+o r*les of Part / of the Regulae set o*t the !asic pre,ises. >*le 1 states that the ai, of st*dy is the direction of in"eni*, so that it can for, tr*e and solid 4*d",ents a!o*t everythin" that co,es !efore it. >e4ectin" the @ristotelianAScholastic division of the sciences accordin" to s*!4ect ,atter, Descartes clai,s that Csince all the sciences are nothin" other than h*,an +isdo, Ohumana sapientia P, +hich al+ays re,ains one and the sa,e, ho+ever ,*ch it is applied to different s*!4ects, and since it receives no "reater distinction fro, these thin"s than does the li"ht of the S*n fro, the variety of the thin"s it shines on, there is no need to confine in"enia to any li,itsC :@& L #6$;. @ltho*"h he looks

for+ard to p*rs*in" sciences *sef*l for the co,,odity of life and the pleas*re of conte,platin" the tr*th, +hich are le"iti,ate fr*its of science, he points o*t that +e often overlook s,all thin"s that see, neither *sef*l nor interestin" !*t that are nevertheless essential to kno+in" other thin"s and that Cit is to !e !elieved that all OsciencesP are so interconnected that it is !y far easier to learn the, si,*ltaneo*sly 4oined than to separate a sin"le one fro, the others.C &h*s one sho*ld Cthink only of increasin" the nat*ral li"ht of reason, not in order to resolve this or that diffic*lty of the school !*t so that in the individ*al events of life the intellect ,i"ht sho+ forth to the +ill +hat o*"ht to !e chosen.C /n this +ay one +ill ,ake ,ore rapid pro"ress than !y p*rs*in" partic*lar st*dies :@& L #61;. >*le ?, developin" the the,e that o*r ordinary +ays of p*rs*in" kno+led"e are defective, ar"*es that +e often in effect di,inish o*r kno+led"e !y for,in" opinions a!o*t thin"s that are too diffic*lt. .e sho*ld t*rn o*r attention only to those o!4ects for +hich o*r in"enia appear s*fficient to deliver certain and ind*!ita!le co"nition= and so C+e re4ect all those ,erely pro!a!le co"nitions, and +e hold that thin"s are to !e !elieved only if they are perfectly co"ni7ed and it is not possi!le to do*!t the,C :@& L #6?;. &here are, Descartes insists, ,any ,ore s*ch co"nitions than people think. &he learned have !y and lar"e ne"lected the,, despite the fact that they +o*ld Cs*ffice for the certain de,onstration of co*ntless propositions +hich hitherto they have not !een a!le to treat e)cept pro!a!ly.C /n +hat at first ,ay see, to !e a partial recantation of the position 4*st esta!lished, Descartes notes that there is hardly any 3*estion in the e)istin" sciences that is not a ,atter of controversy. C&herefore a!o*t all thin"s of +hich there are pro!a!le opinions in this +ay +e see, *na!le to ac3*ire a perfect science, !eca*se it is not per,itted +itho*t te,erity to ( 1?# ( hope for ,ore fro, o*rselves than others have e)hi!ited= so that if +e do o*r reckonin" +ell, only @rith,etic and 0eo,etry re,ain, of the sciences already discovered, to +hich the o!servance of this r*le leads *sC :@& L #6#;. &he acc*sation a"ainst the learned +o*ld th*s !eco,e that they have ne"lected ,athe,atics= !*t, as events +ill sho+, the recantation is ,ore rhetorical than real, since a proper consideration of the !asis of ,athe,atical certainty opens *p a ne+ vista of kno+in". 9e "oes on to say that it is after all still !etter to e)ercise the in"enia of yo*th +ith *ncertain opinions and ,ove the, to a spirit of e,*latin" their ,asters than to leave the, to their o+n devices. &hose +ho are no lon"er *nder the t*tela"e of a ,aster, ho+ever, and +ho +ish to ascend to the hei"hts of h*,an co"nition ,*st follo+ the r*le of not a!*sin" leis*re !y p*rs*in" diffic*lt thin"s and th*s *lti,ately only addin" to do*!ts. 1asier thin"s ,*st not !e ne"lected. @rith,etic and "eo,etry are Cfree fro, every vice of falsity and *ncertaintyC precisely !eca*se they are so easy. C&o consider ,ore dili"ently the reason +hy this is so it is to !e noted first that +e arrive at the co"nition of thin"s in t+o +ays, na,ely, thro*"h e)perience or ded*ction.C 1)periences of thin"s, ho+ever, are often fallacio*s, +hile ded*ction or Cp*re illation of one thin" fro, anotherC never "oes +ron" for even the ,ini,ally rational ,ind-tho*"h the ded*ction can !e ,issed if the ,ind overlooks it. 1very deception of h*,an !ein"s is th*s d*e solely to the fact Cthat certain littleA *nderstood e)periences are s*pposed or 4*d",ents are set do+n rashly and +itho*t fo*ndation.C &he "reater certainty of ,athe,atical disciplines arises !eca*se Cthese alone are en"a"ed +ith o!4ects so p*re and si,ple that they s*ppose nothin" at all that e)perience ,i"ht render *ncertain, !*t the +hole consists in conse3*ences to !e ded*ced rationally. &h*s they are the easiest and ,ost perspic*o*s of all and have an o!4ect s*ch as +e re3*ire, since in those thin"s it see,s that, apart fro, inadvertence, the h*,an !ein" scarcely ever fails.C &he concl*sion to !e dra+n is Cnot, ho+ever, that only @rith,etic and 0eo,etry are to !e st*died, !*t only that those in3*irin" into the ri"ht road of tr*th o*"ht to !e occ*pied +ith no o!4ect a!o*t +hich they cannot have certainty e3*al to arith,etical and "eo,etrical

de,onstrationsC :@& L #66;. &o s*,,ari7e and ela!orate: !y the end of >*le ?, +e have !een told that there is a f*nda,ental *nity to kno+led"e, +hether theoretical or practical= that this *nity can !e c*ltivated !y increasin" the nat*ral li"ht of reason= that there are t+o +ays to kno+led"e, e)perience and ded*ction= that, as the p*re ded*ctionO1P of one thin" fro, another sho+s, the h*,an ,ind is incapa!le of ,akin" a ,istake +here the o!4ect of kno+led"e is si,ple, altho*"h it is possi!le that +e ,i"ht overlook s*ch si,ple thin"s= O1P &hat is rather different fro, its ordinary ,eanin" / shall sho+ presently. ( 1?F ( and therefore that instead of p*rs*in" co,ple) and diffic*lt pro!le,s, +e sho*ld try first to notice and kno+ the si,ple thin"s, since only +ith the, can +e evade the *ncertainties prod*ced !y fallacio*s e)perience. .hen the ,ind is presented +ith si,ple thin"s, it ,akes no ,istakes in ded*ction. &he advanta"e of ,athe,atics is that it deals +ith si,ple o!4ects not falsifia!le !y ne+ e)periences-they si,ply appear as they are and can al+ays !e e)perienced in an *nfalsifia!le si,plicity. /t is i,portant to notice here that Descartes is not ,akin" ded*ction and ,athe,atics the paradi", of science !*t rather *sin" the, as paradi",atic e)a,ples of ho+ +e can errorlessly arrive at tr*th 9hen the simplicity of the o47ect in 1uestion allo9s. Bnce +e have si,ple thin"s as o*r o!4ect, ded*ction- ety,olo"ically a leadin" of tr*th do+n or a+ay fro, so,ethin" "iven-+ill take care of itself !eca*se of the nat*re of the rational ,ind. &here is no need for a ne+ theory of lo"ic or dialectic !*t rather for an ac3*aintance +ith si,ple thin"s as si,ple. @ltho*"h e)perience, one of the t+o +ays of kno+in" thin"s, is often fallacio*s, there ,*st !e a kind that is not, or else ded*ction itself +o*ld !e impossi4le, !eca*se ded*ction is !ased on an e)perience of one thin"6s tr*ly follo+in" fro, another, and pointless, !eca*se ded*ction cannot yield tr*th +itho*t !ein" "iven so,ethin" tr*e to !e"in +ith. &he follo+in" r*les th*s 3*ite lo"ically concentrate on ho+ +e can arrive at the kind of tr*th that is ,ost kno+a!le !eca*se si,plest, on the !asis of +hich infalli!le ded*ction or illation !eco,es possi!le. &he si,ple e)perience of si,ple thin"s is not afflicted +ith *ncertainty and so is the very !asis of the certainty of ded*ction. &his kind of e)perience is called int*it*s. >*le # introd*ces *s to the Regulae's theory of int*it*s and ded*ctio. &he first 3*estion to ask is ho+ +e sho*ld translate these +ords. 6/nt*ition6 has :and had already at the !e"innin" of the seventeenth cent*ry; collected a "reat deal of philosophical !a""a"e not i,plied in Descartes, +ho e)plicitly states that he is not *sin" the ter, in its philosophically accepted sense !*t rather in a +ay faithf*l to its si,ple Latin ,eanin". Intuitus is the past participle of the infinitive intueri, 6to look at, *pon, or to+ard6, in a ,ore e)tended sense 6to re"ard, o!serve, conte,plate, consider, attend to6= intuitus can !e *sed as a no*n ,eanin" 6a look, vie+6. /n translatin" >*le #, / have *sed 6int*itAsee6 for intueri and 6int*it*sAseein"6 for intuitus.O?P O?P Later / shall on ,any occasions *se dint*ite for the ver!, especially +hen there is no dan"er of s*""estin" a s*!4ective, ,ysterio*s po+er of insi"ht= another occasional alternative +ill !e dclearly seee. / shall also loosen the renderin" of intuitus fro, ti,e to ti,e, +itho*t, ho+ever, resortin" to dint*itione. 2either 8ariones Grench :regarder and regard for the ver! and no*n, respectively; nor ,y 1n"lish renderin"s !rin" o*t the connotations of the prefi) in A, +hich intensifies the root sense of tuere and e,phasi7es the directedness to+ard or into an o!4ect. 6/nsi"ht6 +o*ld see, to !e the nat*ral 1n"lish e3*ivalent, !*t it is *sed for other p*rposes and like 6int*ition6 s*ffers fro, a s*!4ectivist connotation that +eakens the sense of an intensive lookin" caref*lly ai,ed at its o!4ect. Gor a

disc*ssion of pro!le,s of translation, see 8arion, RFgles utiles et claims pour la direction de l'esprit en la recherche de la v*rit*, ?9%A#$?. ( 1?% ( Deductio appears to !e far less pro!le,atically rendered !y 6ded*ction6. <et there is a dan"er here as +ell. @s +e shall see, ded*ctio ,*st !e *nderstood first of all fro, the perspective of int*it*s rather than fro, standard notions of syllo"istic or other for,s of lo"ical ded*ction. Descartes has little ,ore than scorn for the standard lo"ic of his day :he sa+ it as *sef*l for rhetorical p*rposes rather than for kno+in"= see @& L F$6;. / have therefore *s*ally retained the Latin deductio rather than e,ploy the tooAfa,iliar 6ded*ction6.O#P &he r*le headin" i,,ediately sets aside as o!4ects of scientific in3*iry all opinions, +hether o*r o+n or others6= if science is to !e ac3*ired, +e ,*st investi"ate C+hat +e can clearly and evidently int*itA see or certainly ded*ceC :1uid clare , evidenter possimus intueri, vel certo deducere = @& L #66;. >eadin" ancient !ooks is advisa!le C!eca*se it is an enor,o*s !enefit that +e can e)ploit the la!ors of so ,any people,C in part to learn a!o*t +hat has already !een discovered, in part to learn a!o*t +hat re,ains to !e tho*"ht in every discipline. B*t +e r*n the risk of c*ltivatin" ,ere history rather than scientific kno+in" and of fallin" into the errors of o*r predecessors if +e seek to kno+ only +hat they said instead of the tr*th a!o*t thin"s. /n "eneral their +orks are +rapped in controversy, and +hen they do relate so,ethin" certain and evident they Cnever e)hi!it it +itho*t involvin" it in vario*s o!sc*rities, since they do*!tless fear that the di"nity of the discovery +ill !e di,inished !y the si,plicity of the reason, or !eca*se they !e"r*d"e *s the open tr*thC :@& L #6E;. /t is not eno*"h even to co,,it to ,e,ory those thin"s that are clearly tr*e, like ,athe,atical de,onstrations, for the point is to kno+, not 4*st to !e a!le to recapit*late.OFP .e ,*st refrain fro, ever ,i)in" the *ncertain or pro!a!le +ith the certain. &o this end +e ,*st ac3*aint o*rselves +ith the only t+o Cactions of o*r intellect thro*"h +hich +e can arrive at the co"nition of thin"s +itho*t any fear of deceptionC: intuitus scilicet , deductio, int*it*sAseein" and ded*ctio.O%P O#P Usin" deductio rather than 6ded*ction6 helps keep 1n"lish speakers fro, ass*,in" too cas*ally that +hat Descartes intends is f*nda,entally an acco,plish,ent of lo"ic. &he ver! for, +ill so,eti,es !e translated as 6lead do+n :fro,;6 rather than 6ded*ce6. OFP &his can !e taken as a ne"ative adversion to the "oals of the ,e,ory art, ,e,ori7ation rather than *nderstandin". O%P Dersion @ of the Regulae has inductio rather than decluctio. Crap*lli prefers deductio !eca*se it is attested !oth !y version 9 and the D*tch translation of 165F :version 2;. Since in the re,ainder of the r*le Descartes disc*sses intuitus and deductio, this see,s hardly controversial. ( 1?6 ( By int*it*s / *nderstand not the fl*ct*atin" faith of the senses or the fallacio*s 4*d",ent of a !adly co,posin" i,a"ination= !*t the concept of a p*re and attentive ,ind so easy and distinct that no do*!t at all is left !ehind a!o*t +hat +e *nderstand= or, +hich is the sa,e thin", the not do*!tf*l concept of a p*re and attentive ,ind, +hich arises fro, the li"ht of reason alone, and is ,ore certain than ded*ctio itself, !eca*se it is si,pler, altho*"h ded*ctio cannot !e !adly done !y h*,an !ein"s as +e noted a!ove. &h*s everyone can int*itAsee +ith respect to so*l that it e)ists, that it thinks, that a trian"le is !o*nded !y only

three lines and a "lo!e !y a sin"le s*rface, and si,ilar thin"s that are far ,ore n*,ero*s than ,ost people consider, !eca*se they disdain t*rnin" their ,ind to thin"s so si,ple. :@& L #65; &his int*it*s is re3*ired not only for the kinds of propositions en*nciated in the passa"e C!*t also for all disc*rsive reasonin"s +hateverC :sed etiam ad 1uosli4et discursus< @& L #69;. 2ot only does it ena!le *s to reco"ni7e that ? a ? J F and that # a 1 J F !*t also that !oth s*,s are e3*al to one another. &he other C,ode of kno+in"C is ded*ctio, !y +hich, Descartes says, +e *nderstand all that +hich is necessarily concl*ded fro, so,e other thin"s kno+n certainly. B*t it had to !e done th*s !eca*se ,any thin"s are kno+n certainly altho*"h they are not the,selves evident, only they are O1P so,eti,es ded*ced fro, tr*e and kno+n principles thro*"h a contin*o*s and in no +ay interr*pted ,otion of co"itation perspic*o*sly int*itin"Aseein" sin"le thin"s: O+hich happens inP no other +ay than that +e kno+ the e)tre,e link of a lon" chain to !e connected +ith the first, even if +e do not conte,plate +ith one and the sa,e int*itin"Aseein" of the eyes everythin" inter,ediate on +hich this connection depends, O?P so,eti,es +e shall have s*rveyed the, s*ccessively, and still recall that the sin"le ones adhere to their nei"h!ors fro, the first to the last. 9ere therefore +e distin"*ish the int*itin"Aseein" of the ,ind fro, certain ded*ctio fro, this, that in the latter a ,otion or a certain s*ccession is conceived, !*t not in the for,er= and f*rther,ore !eca*se for the latter present evidence is not necessary, +hich is for int*itin"A seein", !*t rather it !orro+s in so,e +ay its certainty fro, ,e,ory. :@& L #69A#E$= the n*,!erin" is ,ine; &he chief advanta"es of renderin" intuere and intuitus +ith ter,s that e,phasi7e the act of seein" are t+o. Girst, the Latin +ords s*""est a +ellAdirected and caref*l attention of the kind specified in the alternative definitions Descartes "ives. 1ach calls it the concept :easy and distinct in one case, not do*!tf*l in the other; of a p*re and attentive ,ind. :Later +e shall pro!e the i,plications of this act of seein"6s !ein" called conceptum, insofar as the latter ter, s*""ests a kind of "raspin".; Second, they can !e *sed of !oth intellect*al and vis*al attention. Descartes several ti,es speaks of int*it*s +ith respect to the eyes, and he constantly e)ploits the analo"y !et+een vision and kno+led"e :,ost e)tensively in >*le 9;. ( 1?E ( 1ven those +ho are favora!ly inclined to historical st*dies in philosophy ,ay !e s*spicio*s of ar"*,ents fro, ety,olo"y. B*t Descartes points o*t that he is *sin" 6int*it*s6 in a +ay different fro, the *s*al and ,akes a "eneral ad,onition a!o*t his voca!*lary: C/ si,ply a, not thinkin" a!o*t ho+ each +ord has !een e,ployed Oor *s*rpedP in these recent ti,es in the schools, !eca*se it +o*ld !e ,ost diffic*lt to *se these sa,e +ords and take a co,pletely different sense= !*t / only note +hat the individ*al +ords si"nify in Latin, so that, as often as proper ones are lackin", / transfer those +hich see, to ,e ,ost apt to ,y o+n senseC :@& L #69;. .hat Descartes is identifyin" !y the ter, 6int*it*s6 is not a ,ysterio*s po+er !*t the principal effect in h*,an in"eni*, of the li"ht of reason, the nat*ral li"ht that accordin" to >*le 1 is the *nchan"in" so*rce of all kno+led"e. /t is not confined to those +ho have a special "ift, !*t is in!orn in, is part of the native endo+,ent of, every h*,an !ein" +ho is ,ini,ally rational. /t is that po+er that, +hen p*rely and attentively directed to at least relatively si,ple o!4ects, reveals the tr*th. Bne 3*ite si,ply sees or "rasps the tr*th in s*ch sit*ations, and that si,ple seein" evokes the ori"inal Latin ,eanin" of the ter,: one looks and sees. /f +e took Descartes6s "eneral ad,onition at face val*e, +e +o*ld pro!a!ly +ant to refrain fro,

callin" to ,ind the +ay in +hich this and other ter,s +ere *sed !y hi"h and late Scholasticis,. <et for *s +ho are *nfa,iliar +ith those *sa"es it is helpf*l to consider the, at least !riefly. Intuitio :a +ord that Descartes does not *se in the Regulae ;O6P and intueri al,ost invaria!ly s*""ested an a+areness of the i,,ediate presence of an o!4ect that is !ein" sensed or kno+n. &here is an int*ition, therefore, involved in feelin" the co,p*ter key!oard at one6s fin"ertips, in noticin" the li,!s of the tree across the alley +avin" in the !ree7e, and in savorin" the aro,a of the ,ornin"6s first coffee= !*t it +ill also :and especially; !e present in the int*itive co"nition of the i,,ediate presence of 0od in the afterlife. Bne +o*ld not typically have an int*ition of concepts, ho+ever. &he concept +as for the Scholastics the first act of the ,ind-the other t+o !ein" 4*d",ent and disc*rsive reasonin"-!*t !y that very fact, it +as an inter,ediation !et+een the kno+er and the thin" kno+n. /nt*ition is therefore a receptivity or apprehension of the ,ind that corresponds to the &ho,ist dict*, that the first thin" apprehended is !ein" :even !efore concept*ality ,akes an appearance; and to the no,inalist privile"in" as real the i,,ediate i,pression of the o!4ect :in contrast to the artifact*al character of the concept;. Intuitus, in contrast, had a technical ,eanin" that +as especially pro,inent in theories of conte,plation, that is, of the ascent fro, co"itation to O6P &herefore one ,*st !e+are of cas*ally takin" this as a synony, of intuitus. ( 1?5 ( ,editation to conte,plation. &he canonical ,edieval theory of this ascent is fo*nd in 9*"h of St. Dictor :d. 11F1; and >ichard of St. Dictor :d. 11E#;, +hose for,*lations created a fra,e+ork that +as a*thoritative +ell into the seventeenth cent*ry.OEP /n their +ritin"s intuitus and contuitus appear as na,es for the po+er of seein" *nities thro*"h a ,anifold of evidence. 8editation is *nderstood to !e a disc*rsive process that s*rveys the o!4ects a!o*t +hich the ,ind is ,akin" in3*iry and that caref*lly e)a,ines the variety of thin"s that have !een provided to co"itation !y !oth sense and ,e,ory. /nt*it*s is the penetratin" "a7e !y +hich the ,ind reco"ni7es the tr*th of thin"s in the li"ht of reason. .itho*t int*it*s it +o*ld not !e possi!le to achieve contemplatio, +hich is the "a7e that steadily vie+s that to +hich int*it*s has penetrated. Intuitus is also fo*nd in a so,e+hat different sense in late Scholastic ,an*als, like the %umma philosophiae 1uadripartita of 1*stace of St. Pa*l :a +ork that Descartes kne+;, especially in the phrase simpleB intuitus. 1*stace defines the first act of the ,ind, +hich he initially calls concept*,, as Cthat !y +hich the proposed thin"s are apprehended in a si,ple int*it*sC=O5P thereafter he *ses the ter, 6si,ple) int*it*s6 for the ,ind6s first act. Descartes did not opt in the first instance for any of these *ses of intuitus or intueri, altho*"h in a sense his *nderstandin" of int*it*s adapts aspects of each. 9is notion of the i,,ediacy of int*it*s6s evidence is analo"o*s to the "eneral Scholastic sense of i,,ediate presence of the apprehended o!4ect thro*"h int*itio. &he Dictorines6 Platonic fra,e+ork of ill*,ination parallels Descartes6s conviction that int*it*s is a clarified conception proceedin" fro, the li"ht of reason. @nd, like 1*stace, he places int*it*s at the root of co"nition. Bne of co*rse need not ar"*e for the direct infl*ence on hi, of any partic*lar te)ts or theories-despite the fact that they +o*ld have !een availa!le at the Kes*it colle"e at La GlRche- since these notions +ere staples of philosophical traditions that he +o*ld certainly have heard and read a!o*t. .e need only clai, that, +hatever the provenance, Descartes ca,e to think that there +as a si,ple kind of apprehension of tr*th +ith precisely these characteristics: i,,ediacy of present evidence= visi!ility or appearance in a f*nda,ental, ind*!ita!le +ay to ,ind or eye :perhaps to other senses as +ell;= and pri,ordial or ori"inal si,plicity a,on" all the acts of the ,ind.

OEP S.v. C8editation.C (istorisches #Rrter4uch der Philosophie, ed. Koachi, >itter and 'arlfried 0rUnder, vol. %: LA8n :Dar,stadt: .issenschaftliche B*ch"esellschaft, 195$;, 96#= and Dictionnaire de spiritualit*, asc*ti1ue et mysti1ue: Doctrine et histoire, ed. 8arcel Diller :Paris: Bea*chesne, 19#EA;, 1:51#. O5P 1*stachi*s a Sancto Pa*lo, %umma philosophiae 1uadripartita :Paris, 16$9;, 11%. Grederick Dan de Pitte e)plores Descartes6s possi!le kno+led"e of 1*stace in Dan de Pitte, CSo,e of Descartes6 De!ts to 1*stachi*s a Sancto Pa*lo,C The onist E1, no. F :Bcto!er 1955;: F5EAF9E. ( 1?9 ( @s +e look ,ore deeply into the Regulae, these characteristics +ill !eco,e ,ore sharply defined. @t this point, ho+ever, it is i,portant to re,ark the de"ree to +hich the Regulae e,phasi7es the activity of ,ind. /n his history of lo"ic, .ilhel, >isse points o*t that the late si)teenthAand early seventeenthA cent*ry theorists stron"ly psycholo"i7ed lo"ic= that is, they e,phasi7ed the !asis of lo"ic in the activities of the ,ind. &he Kes*its, +ho proposed r*les and precepts that +o*ld "ive direction to the ,ind, +ere leaders in this trend, and Descartes6s Regulae ad directionem ingenii +as a contin*ation and develop,ent of it.O9P &h*s late Scholastic lo"icians took the esta!lished distinction !et+een for,al and ,aterial lo"ic, the one c*l,inatin" in syllo"istic, the other in the analysis of the acts of the ,ind, and attri!*ted pri,acy to the latter. Gor,al lo"ic +as no ,ore than an a!straction fro, ,aterial lo"ic. Besides intuitus, Descartes6s *nderstandin"s of deductio, conceptum, and propositio all e)hi!it the pri,acy of ,ind6s concrete actions. 6Concept*,6 is not e3*ivalent to 6a!stract notion6 !*t +hat is fir,ly "rasped !y ,eans of a +ellAprepared and +ellAdirected ,o,ent of seein" p*rely and attentively.O1$P &hat is, the o!4ect ,*st first have everythin" e)traneo*s or distractin" cleared a+ay, and the ,ind ,*st take hold of it !y ,eans of a steady vie+ +ithin the conte)t of in3*iry.O11P /ndeed, the concept*, is clearly seen only so lon" as it is held clear of distractions, a"ainst a favora!le !ack"ro*nd. Bnce the concept*, is ac3*ired in this +ay, it !eco,es part of the stock of thin"s clearly "rasped that the in"eni*, +ill have at its co,,and for f*t*re occasions. &he Descartes of the Regulae is constantly on the alert for +ays in +hich people, especially the learned, ,islead the,selves :and others; +ith conf*sed talk. .hen in the Second Part he teaches that one sho*ld +henever possi!le represent o!4ects and relations !y i,a"es, he is chiefly tryin" to forestall the intellect6s *nfort*nate ha!it of thinkin" a!stractly, apart fro, specific o!4ects of tho*"ht. &he concrete "rasp of an o!4ect !y a ,ind that is p*re and attentive is the *lti,ate co"nitive "oal of the ,ethod :or art; of the Regulae. &he ,odel for this is presented in >*le 9, +hich advises the O9P See .ilhel, >isse, Die &ogik der .eu2eit, P vols. :St*tt"artABad Cannstatt Griedrich Gro,,ann Derla" O0Unther 9ol7!oo"P, 19E$;, ?:1FAFE, esp. #$A#1= and >isse, C`*r Dor"eschichte der cartesischen 8ethodenlehre,C Archiv fAr 0eschichte der Philosophie F% :196#;: ?69A?91, esp. ?5FA?59= also 2or,an K. .ells, CDescartes6 Idea and /ts So*rces,C American !atholic Philosophical Luarterly 6E, no. F :@*t*,n 199#;: %1#A%#%. O1$P @!straction for Descartes involves isolatin" a ter, *sed analo"ically o*tside the conte)t of any specific nat*re= see the disc*ssion of 6li,it6 at @& L F15AF19, +hich is treated in chap. %, Sec. 0. O11P &he conte)t of in3*iry is not e,phasi7ed here in >*le #, !*t as the presentation of the ,ethod pro"resses thro*"h the r*les it !eco,es evident that the concept*, of int*it*s re3*ires takin" hold of the o!4ect in a perspective relevant to the pro!le,. /nt*it*s is al+ays oriented at the very least !y the nat*re :aspect; *nder +hich an o!4ect is vie+ed.

( 1#$ ( reader to practice int*it*s !y i,itatin" the crafts,an, +ho is acc*sto,ed to ,akin" perfect distinctions !et+een thin"s and is capa!le of foc*sin" on the s,allest detail :@& L F$1;. 6Propositio6, too, +hich +e are inclined to take to ,ean a 3*asiAver!al entity, is another ter, that ,*st !e *nderstood as an aspect of ,ental activity. Propositio is derived fro, proponere, to p*t o*t in front -here, !efore the ,ind. /n Scholasticis,, a proposition, +hich can of co*rse !e cast in ver!al ter,s, +as in the first instance an act of the ,ind, 4*d",ent, +hich sets !efore the ,ind a tho*"ht co,plete +ith respect to tr*th or falsity. .e shall see that at cr*cial 4*nct*res Descartes *ses the ter, not for a passive o!4ect of attention !*t for the prod*ct of the ,ind6s +ork. 6Ded*ctio6, *nderstood si,ply as lo"ical ded*ction, fails to capt*re Descartes6s *nderstandin" of this disc*rsive act. Descartes6s initial for,*lation-Call that +hich is concl*ded necessarily fro, certain other thin"s kno+n +ith certaintyC :@& L #69;-is in fact ,isleadin". &he reader, inclined to think alon" the lines of syllo"istic reasonin" or 1*clidean "eo,etry, tends to overlook the very ele,entary sense in +hich a ded*ctio leads or takes tr*th fro, one thin" do+n to another in a ,otion of tho*"ht. &he active sense is affir,ed in Descartes6s e)planation of the distinction !et+een ded*ctio and int*it*s: ded*ctio is a motion of tho*"ht. &he ,ost !asic 4*stification for the distinction is not s*rprisin": C,any thin"s are certainly kno+n altho*"h they are not evident.C &he fact that +e e)perience so,e tr*ths as i,,ediately evident +hile others appear only "rad*ally ,akes it clear that there does e)ist a kind of kno+led"e ,ediated thro*"h pro"ressive evidence. Ded*ctio is this ,ovin" +ork of ,akin" and seein" the connections of one thin" to others. /n standard Scholastic acco*nts, ded*ctio is a for, of disc*rsive reasonin"-th*s proper to the third act of the ,ind-and depends on havin" ,*ltiple :at least t+o; propositiones for,ed !y dint of the second act of the ,ind, 4*d",ent. Gro, the Scholastic vie+point, Descartes6s acco*nt of int*it*s and ded*ctio appears conf*sed, ho+ever, !eca*se it portrays int*it*s as acco,plishin" 4*d",ents and even ded*ctions, +hereas ded*ctio is at ti,es red*ced to int*it*s. /,,ediately after definin" int*it*s Descartes "ives fo*r e)a,ples of tr*ths it can kno+: Cthat it Othe so*lP e)ists, that it thinks, that a trian"le is ter,inated !y 4*st three lines, a sphere !y a sin"le s*rface, and si,ilar thin"s,C ite,s far ,ore n*,ero*s than people think !eca*se they disdain t*rnin" their ,inds to si,ple ,atters. &+o para"raphs later he says that indeed, this evidence and certit*de !y ,eans of int*it*s is re3*ired not 4*st for sin"le en*nciations !*t also for any kind of disco*rse. Gor e)a,ple, this conse3*ence is dra+n: ? and ? ,ake the sa,e as # and l= not only ,*st it !e int*itedAseen that ? and ? ,ake F, and # and 1 also ,ake F, !*t, !eyond ( 1#1 ( this, o*t of these t+o propositions the third is concl*ded necessarily. :@& L #69; &hese e)a,ples sho+ that int*it*s co,pares and contrasts ter,s, so,ethin" that in traditional lo"ic sho*ld !e an e)ercise of the second act of the ,ind, 4*d",ent, and it even cond*cts disc*rsive reasonin" :concl*din" that ? a ? J # a l;, the third act. /t looks as if Descartes has indeed introd*ced a conf*sion. &here appears to !e an *ndenia!le ded*ction involved in seein" that :a; ? a ? J F, :!; # a 1 J F, and then :c; ? a ? J # a l, yet Descartes calls these the res*lt of int*it*s. .hat the e)a,ple sho+s, ho+ever, is that ,*ch int*itin"Aseein" involves a co,parison !et+een ele,ents that can !e, and in the process of discovery initially is , carried o*t se3*entially, !*t that once the ele,ents have !een "rasped is done in a sin"le look. Bnce +e kno+ ? a

? and # a 1-that is, once +e can instantly reco"ni7e each e)pression in its res*lt-+e can instantly reco"ni7e their e3*ality.O1?P @ll seein" that is not the seein" of a si,ple thin" :si,ple nat*re;O1#P is therefore an atte,pted seein"Aas: is @ the sa,e as B, or differentQ &he act pres*pposes an ac3*aintance +ith @ and B and o*r a!ility to reco"ni7e +itho*t disc*rsion +hether the t+o thin"s are the sa,e or different. &his int*it*s is si,*ltaneo*sly an activity of seein" and an activity of discri,inatin", neither of +hich can !e perfected +itho*t the other. &here is of co*rse an ontolo"ical and episte,olo"ical pro!le, not far !eneath the s*rface: is the F that is reco"ni7ed +hen +e think 6# a 16 really co,posed o*t of s*,s or is it prior to any s*, that yields it= and can +e "et !eyond the act of co,position, of s*,,in", to reco"ni7e i,,ediately the F that is arrived at !y additionQ .hat is really and *lti,ately si,ple, +hat is really co,ple), and ho+ do +e kno+ the differenceQ @s KeanAL*c 8arion in partic*lar has ,ade clear, the Regulae does not have a definitive sol*tion for this pro!le,.O1FP /n >*le # it is only to*ched *pon. &he chief ai, there is to esta!lish the need for t9o acts of ,ind, int*it*s and ded*ctio. &he reason ded*ctio is needed is precisely !eca*se +e cannot or at least do not in every case red*ce a te,poral series of reco"nitions to a O1?P &his is also the role of int*it*s in the Dictorines. O1#P Descartes does not ,ention the si,ples or si,ple nat*res at this point, ho+ever. Gor a disc*ssion of the conte,porary state of scholarship on the si,ple nat*res, see KeanAL*c 8arion, CCartesian 8etaphysics and the >ole of the Si,ple 2at*res,C in The !am4ridge !ompanion to Descartes, ed. Kohn Cottin"ha,, 11%A1#9 :Ca,!rid"e: Ca,!rid"e University Press, 199?;. O1FP B*t, he ar"*es f*rther, the theory of kno+in" it presents has an i,plicit, in 8arion6s +ords a "ray, ontolo"y, an ontolo"y of the si,ple nat*res. /t is one of the ,a4or *nresolved tensions of the Regulae, and it +as at least in part Descartes6s effort to deter,ine +hat ,i"ht !e si,ple in an a!sol*te sense :especially in >*le 1?; that led hi, to p*t aside the Regulae. ( 1#? ( sin"le seein". Perhaps the "reatest ,athe,atician can i,,ediately see the tr*th of the Pytha"orean theore,, !*t even for her there +ill !e inn*,era!le other, ,ore co,ple) theore,s the tr*th of +hich she can derive only !y a ton", ard*o*s process of disc*rsive reasonin". 2ear the end of >*le #, Descartes ackno+led"es that the kno+a!le cannot !e neatly divided into +hat is properly approached only !y int*it*s and +hat is approached !y ded*ctio. Bf co*rse the very si,plest kno+in"s co,e thro*"h int*it*s, the re,otest concl*sions thro*"h ded*ctio, !*t Cthose propositions that are concl*ded i,,ediately fro, first principles can !e said to !e kno+n, *nder diverse consideration, in part thro*"h int*it*s, in part thro*"h ded*ctioC :@& L #E$;. @ltho*"h this see,s to ,*ddy the distinction, lookin" !ack to the precedin" characteri7ation of ded*ctio restores clarity a!o*t the *nderlyin" principle. Ded*ctio is descri!ed there :@& L #69A#E$; as kno+led"e not evident in itself that occ*rs in one of t+o +ays. &he first is Ca contin*o*s and in no +ay interr*pted ,otion of co"itation int*itin"Aseein" sin"le thin"s perspic*o*sly.C /n this ,anner +e can kno+ that the link at one e)tre,e of a lon" chain is connected to the link at the other e)tre,e +itho*t a sin"le, allAenco,passin" re"ard of the +hole or a step+ise vie+in" of each discrete connection. &hat is, +e ,ake an *ninterr*pted s+eep of the chain6s contin*ity, a s+eep of tho*"ht that sees all the parts yet never co,es to rest !efore reachin" the end. &his contin*ity is conceived as different fro, !oth si,ple seein" and stepA!yAstep, ter,A!yAter, disc*rsivity. .e note the contin*ity s*rveyed !y the *ninterr*pted ,otion of vision= +e find no !reak in the ,otion of the ,ind. &he second +ay of acco,plishin" ded*ctio occ*rs +hen +e note each

connection individ*ally, step !y discrete step, and repeatedly resort to ,e,ory to recall that each s*ccessive link +e check is connected one !y one all the +ay !ack to the first. &he i,portance of this distinction !et+een t+o ,odes of ded*ctio, !oth of the, dyna,ic, the one !ein" contin*o*s, the other divided into discrete steps, +ill !e disc*ssed later.O1%P .hat !oth share is the *nderstandin" of ded*ctio as a ,otion of co"itation-or even, as >*le E p*ts it :@& L #55 1. #;, a ,otion of i,a"ination. &he ,otion of co"itation either links discrete ele,ents, O1%P /n Sec. D of this chapter. &he distinction is not *nrelated to the difference !et+een the t+o ,ethods of i,a"inative kno+led"e presented in the Schenckel ,e,ory art note of the CCo"itationes privatae,C one an evol*tion of phantas,s accordin" to ca*se, the other a preservation of proportional relationships in discrete i,a"es p*t to"ether into a lar"er i,a"inative str*ct*re. &o ,y kno+led"e, the fact that Descartes ,akes a distinction of principle in this passa"e of >*le # has not !een appreciated in the e)tant secondary literat*re. &ranslations fro, Latin typically ,isrender the modo . . . modo . . . constr*ction that introd*ces the distinction :@& L #69 1. ?#, #E$ 1.?; as tho*"h the second modo +ere si,ply a repetition or e)plication of the first. ( 1## ( each re"arded individ*ally !y int*it*s, or in so,e +ay creates a contin*o*sly pro"ressin" vision that falls short of the i,,ediate "raspin" of int*it*s yet does not rest at any sin"le point. :/nt*it*s ,*st of co*rse have a f*ll and present evidence +itho*t any te,poral pro"ression fro, one thin" to another.; 1ach of these ,otions Cin so,e +ay !orro+s its certainty fro, ,e,ory,C tho*"h the e)act character of that !orro+in" depends on +hether the ,otion is s+ift and contin*o*s or slo+ and stepA!yAstep. Ded*ctio therefore al+ays involves a ,otion of tho*"ht, +hether it is prolon"ed or +hether it is Ci,,ediateC in the sense of havin" no inter,ediate sta"es !et+een the ori"inal thin" conceived and the conse3*ent. /f one si,ply sees that # a 1 is identical to F, one has e)perienced this !y int*it*s= if one takes #, adds l, reco"ni7es F and the e3*ality, one is en"a"ed in ded*ctio. /n either case the ,ind is not passively receptive !*t actively involved in "raspin" the tr*th. Ded*ctio6s activity is ,ore o!vio*s in that it is a ,otion, !*t int*it*s is no less an activity. Gor *nless one is dealin" +ith an o!4ect of a!sol*te si,plicity-+hat that ,i"ht ,ean has !y no ,eans !een ,ade evident yet-the ,ind ,*st clear a+ay o!str*ctions fro, the o!4ect so that it can !e fir,ly "rasped in the appropriate conte)t. &his clarity can have parts +itho*t !ein" disc*rsive, and so an o!4ect that can !e s*rveyed !y a disc*rsive ,otion of tho*"ht ,i"ht instead !e held to"ether !y a sin"le perspic*o*s act of the ,ind. >*le # ends +ith a reiteration that these are the only t+o really certain +ays to science, that Cno ,ore on the part of in"eni*, are to !e ad,itted,C and that all +ays s*spected of allo+in" error are to !e re4ected. &his does not stand in the +ay of !elievin" that divinely revealed thin"s are C,ore certain than all co"nition . . . since faith, all +hich is a!o*t o!sc*re thin"s, is not an action of in"eni*, !*t of +ill.C <et that +hich has so,e fo*ndation in intellect can and sho*ld !e discovered !y one of the t+o +ays, Cas +e perhaps +ill sho+ in ,ore detail so,e dayC :@& L #E$;.

D. INTUITUS AND DEDUCTIO AS CO+ITATIO

/n its dyna,is, the ded*ctio of >*le # !ears a rese,!lance to the i,a"inative process that Descartes had sketched for the perception of ,elodic and rhyth,ic *nity in the !ompendium rnusicae. &hey are not identical, of co*rse, especially insofar as the i,a"inative conception in the !ompendium f*nctions !y a pro4ective, spec*lative synthesis :to the co,pletion of the son";, +hereas ded*ctio can never !e hypothetical at any sta"e of its ,ove,ent. B*t it is si"nificant that in the Regulae Descartes ret*rns to

the iss*e of tho*"ht6s ,ove,ent and atte,pts to resolve do*!ts that it ,i"ht cast on the certainty and tr*th of kno+led"e. ( 1#F ( .hat is tho*"ht, that it is s*!4ect to ,otionQ 6&hink6 is cogitare in Latin, 6tho*"ht6 is cogitatio, t+o ter,s of cr*cial i,portance to Cartesian philosophy. .hat, then, is co"itatioQ /n the eleventh chapter of the tenth !ook of the !onfessions, @*"*stine of 9ippo "ives his ety,olo"y of cogitare. @nd ho+ ,any thin"s of this kind does ,y ,e,ory !ear, +hich have already !een discovered, and, as / said, are as it +ere placed ready to hand, +hich thin"s +e are said to have learned and to kno+: +hich if for a short interval of ti,e / cease to recall, they sink !ack a"ain and disperse as it +ere to re,oter cha,!ers, so that a"ain they have to !e tho*"ht o*t ane+ fro, there-for there is no other re"ion for the,-and "athered !ack to"ether, that they ,i"ht !e kno+n, that is, as collected fro, a certain dispersion, +hence it is called co"itate. Gor co"o OJ / "ather to"etherP and co"ito are Oto one anotherP as a"o OJ / doP and a"ito OJ / e)erciseP, facio OJ / ,akeP and factito OJ / keep ,akin", / practiceP. B*t yet the rational so*l lays proper clai, to this +ord for itself, so +hat is collected, that is, "athered to"ether, not 4*st any+here !*t in the rational so*l, is no+ properly said to !e co"itated.O16P &he Latin philolo"ist and "ra,,arian 8arc*s &erenti*s Darro :116A?E B.C.; "ave a so,e+hat different tho*"h not *nrelated ety,olo"y. 9e *nderstood the +ord cogito as co+agito, an intensive a"itation or t*rnin" over of thin"s !y the ,ind.O1EP @ccordin" to !oth of these traditional interpretations, co"itation is a repeated, intensive activity of the ,ind, an activity re3*irin" ,ental effort and e)ertion. &he Regulae does not define 6co"itatio6, !*t the overall i,pression of the +ord6s occ*rrences is that it stands for any and all activities of the h*,an ,ind, 4*st as it did for @*"*stine. &his of co*rse incl*des int*it*s and ded*ctio !*t e)tends to any co"nitively pro!le,atic activity :say, nonAint*itin" e)perience or nonded*ctive spec*lation; or to certain nonco"nitive activities as +ell :like fantasi7in";. &he Regulae as a +hole atte,pts to arrive at principles for re"*latin" the activity of cogitation, principles !ased on these t+o f*nda,ental cognitive actions, so that co,ple) ,atters ,i"ht !e e,!raced co,pletely and tr*thf*lly !y the action and the ,otion or disc*rsivity of tho*"ht. Clearly the 3*estion of the contin*ity of co"itation6s ,otion ca*sed Descartes so,e diffic*lty. /t is not si,ply that in the co*rse of the Regulae he "ives three na,es to +hat is ar"*a!ly a sin"le operation of disc*rsive tho*"ht-deductio, enumeratio, and inductio -!*t that any tho*"ht re3*irin" the passa"e of ti,e calls on ,e,ory and th*s introd*ces a co"nitive "ap thro*"h +hich *ncertainty ,i"ht creep. >*le E, echoin" the characteri7ation of ded*ctio "iven in >*le #, pro,ises the f*lfill,ent of scienA O16P @*"*stine, !onfessions, trans. >. S. PineACoffin :9ar,onds+orth: Pen"*in Books, 1961;, ?15A ?19. O1EP S.v. cogito, Chariton &. Le+is and Charles Short, A &atin Dictionary :B)ford: @t the Clarendon Press, 15E9;. Agito is the fre3*entative of ago . ( 1#% ( tific kno+in" thro*"h Cthe contin*o*s and in no +ay interr*pted ,ove,ent of co"itationC or Ci,a"inationC that leaves nothin" o*t of acco*nt, a s*rvey in ,otion that +ill !e an aid Cto the infir,ity of ,e,ory.C /f / have co,e to kno+, !y separate operations of ,ind, the proportions !et+een A and -,

!et+een - and !, !et+een ! and D, and !et+een D and ), / do not see +hat it Othe relationP is !et+een @ T 1, nor can / precisely *nderstand OitP fro, +hat is already kno+n *nless / re,e,!er all of the,. Gor this reason / shall r*n thro*"h the, contin*o*sly +ith a certain ,otion of i,a"ination si,*ltaneo*sly int*itin"Aseein" individ*al thin"s and transitin" to so,e others, *ntil / shall have learned to transit fro, the first to the last so 3*ickly that, leavin" al,ost no part to ,e,ory, / see, to int*itAsee the +hole thin" at once= in this +ay, +hile ,e,ory is reinforced, the slo+ness also of in"eni*, is i,proved and its capacity e)tended !y so,e reason OratioP. :@& L #55; /n >*le 16, Descartes thro+s ca*tion to the +ind !y clai,in" not ,erely that in this ,otion one seems to re"ard the +hole thin" at once !*t that !y *sin" the senses, the i,a"ination, and the !riefest ,ne,onic ,arks as efficiently as possi!le, Cso that after +e shall have inspected the sin"le thin"s distinctly in accordance +ith >*le 9, +e ,i"ht in accordance +ith >*le 11 r*n thro*"h the, all !y a ,otion of co"itation as fast as possi!le and int*itAsee simultaneously as ,any as possi!leC :@& L F%%= ,y e,phasis;. &here is no contradiction !et+een the t+o passa"es, ho+ever. &he "oal of the Regulae is to i,prove the po+ers of in"eni*,= ,oreover, the in"eni*, of so,e people is a!le to do !y int*it*s +hat others have to do !y la!orio*s ded*ctio. By +orkin" to i,prove the in"eni*,, the slo+er person can "rad*ally approach the a!ilities of so,eone +ith ,ore po+erf*l in!orn talents. So,e thin"s for,erly kno+n only !y ded*ctio can !e reco"ni7ed in a sin"le int*it*s= slo+er ded*ctio +ill !eco,e faster= and thin"s not previo*sly kno+n at all +ill !e reached !y the e)pandin" operations of ded*ctio. &his e)pansion of in"eni*,6s po+er thro*"h e)ercise helps e)plain Descartes6s introd*ction of a ded*ctioAlike po+er *nder the na,e 6en*,eratio6 or 6ind*ctio6 in >*le E. /t is re3*ired C!eca*se the other precepts help in resolvin" ,any 3*estions, !*t only +ith the aid of en*,eration can it happen that, to anythin" +hatever to +hich +e apply o*r so*l, +e +ill al+ays render a tr*e and certain 4*d",ent a!o*t it, and therefore nothin" +ill entirely escape *s, !*t +e +ill appear to kno+ so,ethin" a!o*t all thin"sC :@& L #55;. &he p*rpose is e)plained as follo+s: &here is therefore this en*,eration, or ind*ction, of all those thin"s +hich are aspects of so,e proposed 3*estion, so dili"ent and acc*rate an e)a,ination Oper3*isitioP that fro, it +e concl*de certainly and evidently that nothin" has !een falsely overlooked !y *s: so that as often as +e ,ake *se of it, if the so*"ht thin" is lackin" to *s, at least +e +ill !e +iser in this, that +e ( 1#6 ( +o*ld perceive certainly that it co*ld have !een fo*nd in no +ay kno+n !y *s= and, +hat is ,ore, if as often happens +e +ere a!le to s*rvey all +ays +hich "ive h*,ans access to it, it +o*ld !e per,issi!le to assert !oldly that co"nition of it had !een p*t a!ove every capacity of h*,an in"eni*,. /t is to !e noted f*rther that !y 6s*fficient en*,eration6 or 6ind*ction6 +e *nderstand only that o*t of +hich tr*th is concl*ded ,ore certainly than thro*"h all other finds of provin" Opro!andi "en*sP, other than si,ple int*it*s= as lon" as so,e co"nition cannot !e red*ced to this Oint*it*sP, since all the chains of syllo"is,s have !een re4ected there re,ains to *s only this +ay, to +hich +e ,*st !rin" total faith. Gor +hatever sin"le thin" +e ded*ced i,,ediately fro, others, if the illation +as evident this thin" has already !een red*ced to tr*e int*it*s. /f ho+ever o*t of ,any and dis4*nct thin"s +e infer so,e one thin", often the capacity of o*r intellect is not s*ch as to !e a!le to "rasp all this +ith a sin"le int*it*s= in

+hich case the certit*de of this operation ,*st s*ffice. Gor +hich reason +e cannot distin"*ish all the links of so,e lon"er chain +ith one int*it*s of the eyes= !*t nevertheless, if +e shall have seen the connection of the sin"le ones +ith OtheirP nei"h!ors, this s*ffices so that +e ,i"ht say +e have also seen in +hat +ay the last is connected +ith the first. :@& L #55A#59; &he effect of this passa"e is to !e"in a certain displace,ent of ded*ctio proper. >*le # had already pointed o*t that the si,ple ded*ctio of one thin" fro, another is red*ci!le to int*it*s= the i,,ediate illation of one thin" fro, another, the i,,ediate ,ove,ent of tho*"ht, has in fact overco,e ,ove,ent +ith an instantaneo*s "rasp. @s the passa"es fro, >*le E and >*le 16 cited a!ove s*""est and as >*le # already allo+ed, an even lon"er chain can !e red*ced to instantaneity or to the se,!lance of it in a very rapid ,ove,ent of tho*"ht. @t the end of the previo*s section / called attention to t+o senses in +hich ded*ctio can !e acco,plished: either contin*o*sly or step+ise. /n the lon" passa"e 3*oted a!ove, the contin*o*s kind so closely appro)i,ates int*it*s that it shades off into it, is red*ced to it, +hereas the stepA+ise kind is evoked in the very chain i,a"e that had appeared in the second Cso,eti,es6 cla*se of the ne)t to last para"raph of >*le # :@& L #E$ 11. ?AF;.O15P /f the contin*o*s and *ninterr*pted ,otion of co"itation leads effortlessly and certainly fro, one ite, to another, +itho*t the least hesitation and +ith the str*ct*re of the +hole se3*ence clear at every step, then it can !e called ded*ctio in the f*ll sense. /t is an illation or inference that has proceeded +itho*t the least hesitation or do*!t, and !eca*se of the *nity of the process and the red*ction of the need for ,e,ory, it !e"ins to rese,!le or even to !eco,e int*it*s. Gor the finite h*,an !ein", +ho is *s*ally en"a"ed in the search for, rather than the possession O15P &hat is, the second modo cla*se= the relevant passa"e is 3*oted in f*ll in Sec. C, a!ove. See also footnote 1%, a!ove. ( 1#E ( of, tr*th, +ho starts in relative i"norance and st*,!les ,any ti,es alon" the +ay, this is kno+led"e in the f*ll sense, +hich can !e achieved only at the end of the search.

E. T0E ART OF SOLVIN+ PRO-LE,S

.e sho*ld pa*se !riefly to note ho+ this theory of int*it*sAded*ctioen*,eratio ,i"ht have "ro+n o*t of Descartes6s physico,athe,atics. @nyone can "rasp i,,ediately :int*itAsee; a line se",ent as a line se",ent. @ yo*n" child ,i"ht have to co*nt the sides of a trian"le the first ti,e he enco*nters onethis is a stepA!yAstep ded*ctio-!*t soon he +ill "rasp it all at once. /f +e ask the child +hether a partic*lar fi"*re is contin*o*s and closed, he can trace it +ith his fin"er-a contin*o*s ded*ctio-to see that there is no !reak. .hen +e teach the no+Aolder child "eo,etry, +e +ill sho+ hi, ho+ to constr*ct a sin"le ,ean proportional !et+een t+o line len"ths !y addin" the t+o to for, a lon" se",ent, tracin" a circle +ith that lon" se",ent as dia,eter, and then erectin" a perpendic*lar se",ent fro, the point +here they +ere 4oined to the circle6s peri,eter= this is a"ain a stepA!yAstep ded*ctio. Perhaps he +ill ,at*re ,athe,atically to the point of !ein" a!le to see these thin"s i,,ediately :int*it*s; or at least in a contin*o*s s+eep of i,a"inative co"itation :contin*o*s ded*ctio;. B*t if not, +e can take a step to+ard i,,ediacy !y "ivin" hi, Descartes6s proportional co,pass and sho+in" ho+ it "enerates the ,ean proportion-indeed, ,*ltiple ,ean proportionals-in a contin*o*s, *ninterr*pted ,otion that can !e +itnessed in fact and reAcreated in i,a"ination. @ny solva!le pro!le, of physico,athe,atics, perhaps any pro!le, +hatsoever, o*"ht to !e solva!le in one of these +ays. flo*r in"eni*, is over,atched !y a pro!le,, +e +ill need to proceed step+ise and rely on ,e,ory

and ,e,ory aids= if o*r in"eni*, is *p to the task, +e +ill see ,any aspects of the ans+er, perhaps the entire ans+er, in a "lance. /n !et+een these e)tre,es is contin*o*sly ,ovin" ded*ctio: if +e can find a +ay in +hich an ans+er can !e "enerated !y an *ninterr*pted, interlinked ,otion like those of the co,pass, a rotatin" line se",ent, a para!ola slidin" alon" a circle, or the like, +e +ill have overco,e so,e of the shortco,in"s of ,e,ory and achieved a kind of ,ovin" int*it*s. &his is not solely a theory of ho+ to do ,athe,atics or physics, ho+ever. &he Regulae atte,pts to sketch o*t a theory of ho+ the dyna,is, of the ,ind can !e adapted to the nat*re of 3*estions or pro!le,s of all types. 8athe,atics affords *s pro!le,s +ith relatively si,ple o!4ects, so that the ho+ and +hy of the e,ploy,ent of the in"eni*, is ,*ch ,ore perspic*o*s than +ith ,ore co,ple) 3*estions in re,oter s*!4ect ,atters. 2evertheless, Descartes intends the lessons to !e *niversally applica!le. 9e is sketchin" o*t the lo"ic of ,athe,atical pro!le,s !*t also ( 1#5 ( e)plorin" the lo"icalAi,a"inative space +ithin +hich all pro!le,s of all kinds play the,selves o*tone "overned !y the e)istence of int*ita!le ele,ents that have deter,inate relationships to one another that can !e traced o*t and even "enerated !y the ,ind that o!serves the proportionali7in" ,ethod of ,athesis *niversalis. &he first desiderat*, in solvin" a pro!le, is often not so ,*ch to proceed i,,ediately to inferences as to "ain a "eneral notion of +hat the pro!le,6s relevant considerations are and ho+ they fit to"ether. /n solvin" anythin" +e first need to kno+ the lay of the land. &his "eneral *nderstandin" of the pro!le, is provisional= +e either a,plify it or ,odify it or re4ect it, dependin" on +hat event*ates. /f +e are dealin" +ith so,ethin" co,ple), then it +ill take a lon" ti,e to pro"ress fro, the provisional notion to the detailed and perspic*o*s acco*nt. 9avin" a "eneral notion, a strate"y for attackin" the pro!le,, is like havin" a ,ap. /f the ,ap is "ood, it +ill help *s see in principle ho+ to reach o*r "oal= !*t even a "ood ,ap +ill not allo+ *s to foresee every step of the +ay, and so,eti,es it +ill leave o*t relevant ite,s. @nd, of co*rse, so,eti,es ,aps contain errors. @ccordin"ly, >*le E distin"*ishes different senses of 6en*,eration6: the co,plete en*,eration :+hen not even the s,allest thin" in the chain is o,itted, altho*"h reason proceeds step+ise rather than in an *ninterr*pted s+eep;, the distinct :+hen +e have distin"*ished all the sin"le parts fro, one another;, and the s*fficient. .hat is especially c*rio*s a!o*t the last, in li"ht of Descartes6s ,at*re position, is that the acco*nt in >*le E see,s to allo+ inco,pleteness and indistinctness in the en*,eration +itho*t invalidatin" it. @"ain, at ti,es this en*,eration ,*st !e co,plete, at ti,es distinct, so,eti,es neither is needed= and so it has !een said only that it ,*st !e s*fficient. Gor if / +ant to prove thro*"h en*,eration ho+ ,any kinds of entities are corporeal or in so,e +ay fall *nder sense, / +ill not assert that they are this ,any and no ,ore, *nless first / have kno+n certainly that / have e,!raced everythin" !y en*,eration, and have distin"*ished the sin"le thin"s fro, one another Oi.e., the en*,eration is co,plete and distinctP. /f indeed / +ant to sho+ in the sa,e +ay that the rational so*l is not corporeal, it +ill not !e necessary that the en*,eration !e co,plete, !*t it s*ffices if all !odies are si,*ltaneo*sly e,!raced in several collections so that / ,i"ht sho+ that the rational so*l can !e referred to none of these. /f finally / +ant to e)hi!it thro*"h en*,eration that the area of a circle is "reater than the area of every other fi"*re +hose periphery is the sa,e, it is not necessary to s*rvey all fi"*res, !*t it s*ffices to de,onstrate this a!o*t certain ones in partic*lar, so that thro*"h ind*ction the sa,e thin" ,i"ht also !e concl*ded a!o*t all the others Oi.e., all fi"*res +ill have !een treated in principle, !*t only a fe+ +ill have !een e)a,ined individ*allyP. :@& L

#9$; &he e)a,ples of the rational so*l and the circle sho+ that to solve a pro!le, yo* do not al+ays need to en*,erate distinctly or co,pletely. Gor ( 1#9 ( certain p*rposes it ,ay !e eno*"h to "ro*p 3*ite different thin"s in +ays appropriate to the pro!le,. / ,i"ht !e a!le to "ro*p to"ether all corporeal thin"s into certain sets-for e)a,ple, nonh*,an ani,al, ve"eta!le, and ,ineral-+hether or not the sets tr*ly correspond to nat*ral kinds, and sho+ on their !asis that the rational so*l cannot !e a ,e,!er of any= the practice is co,,onplace in ,athe,atics and lo"ic, +here, for e)a,ple, it ,i"ht !e easier to prove a theore, !y !reakin" it do+n into sets of cases that e,!race all possi!ilities. &hese "ro*pin"s can even display a certain ar!itrariness :e."., one ,i"ht prove a theore, in arith,etic first for odd n*,!ers and then for even;. Bf co*rse one can !e confident in the ,athe,atical e)a,ples that the s*rvey covers all relevant individ*als, +hereas in other cases there ,i"ht !e resid*al do*!t a!o*t this :e."., is the real, of corporeal thin"s tr*ly e)ha*sted !y the classes ani,al, ve"eta!le, and ,ineralQ;. &he e)a,ple of the circle as containin" the lar"est area for a peri,eter of a "iven len"th co*ld perhaps !e seen as appealin" to ,athe,atical ind*ction, +hich allo+s a de,onstration in a specific case to !e e)tended in principle to all other cases. Gor e)a,ple, to prove that the for,*la :n A?; f 15$g "ives the s*, of the internal an"les of an n Asided plane fi"*re yo* co*ld sho+ :1; that if the for,*la holds for an n Asided fi"*re it +ill also hold for a fi"*re +ith n a 1 sides and :?; that it holds for the case n J #, that is, for trian"les= fro, :l; and :?; yo* can clai, that it holds for all cases of n +here n is "reater than or e3*al to #, +itho*t specifically e)a,inin" any other case. B*t it +o*ld !e anachronistic si,ply to ass*,e that this is +hat Descartes had in ,ind. >ather, the e)a,ple s*""ests that he is thinkin" of cases for +hich a fe+ typical instances ,i"ht !e s*fficient for reco"ni7in" the tr*th of a theore,. Bne ,i"ht prove that a, say, re"*lar octa"on of a "iven peri,eter has a lesser area than the circle of the sa,e peri,eter and note that do*!lin" the n*,!er of sides increases the area in a +ay that does not e)ceed the area of the circle. /f one can see as +ell a principle or a fact ens*rin" that f*rther do*!lin"s +ill not increase the area at a s*fficient rate to s*rpass the area of the circle, one need not distin"*ish and consider the inter,ediate cases or even ,ake an e)plicit ,athe,atical ind*ction. &he secret to an ind*ction of the kind Descartes proposes is that the cases !e +ell ordered= altho*"h yo* do not inspect each and every one, yo* discover a principle in the act*ally e)a,ined cases that "*arantees the validity of the concl*sion. >*le E points o*t that +ell orderin", either !y n*,erical se3*ence or accordin" to partition classes, is cr*cial, !eca*se it often allo+s *s to treat collectively thin"s that co*ld not !e s*rveyed sin"ly in the finite ti,e "iven to h*,an !ein"s. 8oreover, the order of en*,eration does not have to !e of a specific kind, Cand it depends on the 4*d",ent of each personC :@& L #91;. Descartes notes that if +e +ished to solve an ana"ra,, +e +o*ld not even need to follo+ the earlier r*les= Cit ( 1F$ ( +ill s*ffice to propose to yo*rself an order for e)a,inin" the transposition of letters so that the sa,e ones are never r*n thro*"h t+ice, and so that the ,*ltit*de of the, is, for e)a,ple, distri!*ted into certain classes so that it i,,ediately appears in +hich there is "reater hope of findin" +hat is so*"ht= for in this +ay it often +ill not take lon" !*t !e only child6s playC :@& L #91;. &his passa"e, rather than ,arkin" a descent into triviality, not only reinforces the idea that there is no

tr*th so ele,entary that it can !e safely overlooked-in >*le 1$, Descartes act*ally reco,,ends e)ercisin" in"eni*, in "a,es, p*77les, and crafts-!*t also sho+s that a reco"nition of tr*th does not re3*ire an a!sol*te and total red*ction of thin"s to si,plest parts. @s +e shall see in >*le 6, division into s,all parts is i,portant, and even at ti,es a!sol*tely necessary, !*t only if the search for tr*th has !een other+ise fr*strated.

F. PRACTICIN+ INTUITUS
8ost of the re,ainder of the Regulae is dedicated to *nderstandin" and i,provin" disc*rsive reasonin". >*le 9, ho+ever, provides instr*ction a!o*t ho+ one can i,prove the e)ercise of int*it*s. >*le 9: /t is necessary to t*rn the +hole sharpness of in"eni*, to the s,allest thin"s and the ,a)i,ally easy thin"s, and to re,ain in those thin"s as lon" as needed, *ntil +e !eco,e acc*sto,ed to int*itin"Aseein" the tr*th distinctly and perspic*o*sly. 9avin" set o*t the t+o operations of o*r intellect, int*it*s and ded*ctio, +hich alone, +e said, are to !e *sed in learnin" the sciences, +e "o on in this and the follo+in" proposition to e)plicate !y +hat effort +e can render Othe,P apter to e)ercisin" these thin"s and si,*ltaneo*sly c*ltivatin" t+o principal fac*lties of in"eni*,, na,ely, perspicacity !y distinctly int*itin" sin"le thin"s and sa"acity !y skillf*lly ded*cin" so,e thin"s fro, others. @nd, indeed, in +hat +ay one is to *se int*it*s of the ,ind +e kno+ !y co,parison +ith the sa,e Oint*it*sP of the eyes. Gor +hoever +ants to look *pon ,any o!4ects si,*ltaneo*sly in the sa,e int*it*s +ill see nothin" of the, distinctly= and e3*ally +hoever is *sed to attendin" to ,any thin"s si,*ltaneo*sly +ith a sin"le act of co"itation is of conf*sed in"eni*,. B*t those artisans +ho are practiced in the ,ost ,in*te la!ors and are acc*sto,ed to direct the sharpness of their eyes attentively to sin"le points, ac3*ire thro*"h *se the capacity of perfectly distin"*ishin" as ,any s,all and s*!tle thin"s as one co*ld +ish= so also those +ho never distract co"itation +ith vario*s o!4ects si,*ltaneo*sly !*t +ho al+ays occ*py the +hole Oco"itationP +ith considerin" every si,plest and easiest thin" !eco,e perspicacio*s. :@& L F$$AF$1; /t is to !e noted that those +ho tr*ly kno+ distin"*ish the tr*th +ith e3*al facility +hether they have ed*ced it fro, a si,ple s*!4ect or fro, an ( 1F1 ( o!sc*re one: for they co,prehend each and every one OJ tr*thP !y a si,ilar, sin"le, and distinct act, once they have arrived at it= !*t the +hole difference is in the +ay, +hich certainly o*"ht to !e lon"er if it leads fro, the first and ,a)i,ally a!sol*te principles to a ,ore re,ote tr*th. /t is therefore proper that all !eco,e acc*sto,ed to e,!race !y co"itation si,*ltaneo*sly so fe+ and so si,ple thin"s that they never think they kno+ so,ethin" that is not int*ited e3*ally distinctly as that +hich they kno+ ,ost distinctly of all thin"s. :@& L F$1AF$?; Descartes re,arks that so,e people are !orn +ith a "reater perspicacity than others !*t that practice can i,prove any in"eni*,. &his is not done !y t*rnin" to "reat and o!sc*re thin"s or to s*!li,e philosophical ar"*,ents, !eca*se even the ,ost Ca!str*se sciences are to !e led do+n Odeducendas P only fro, easy thin"s and ,ore accessi!le onesC :@& L F$?;. 9e "ives t+o e)a,ples: :l; /f +e +ish to kno+ +hether a nat*ral po+er can travel thro*"h space in an instant, it is a ,istake to t*rn to diffic*lt ,atters like ,a"netic force, the infl*ence of the stars, or even the speed of li"ht. >ather, one sho*ld

t*rn to the 3*estion of the local ,otion of !odies, C!eca*se nothin" in this +hole s*!4ect ,atter Ogenus P can !e ,ore sensi!le Oi.e., ,ore accessi!le to the sensesP.C @ltho*"h the ,otion of an ordinary !ody proceeds fro, place to place and therefore is not instantaneo*s, an ordinary !ody can e)hi!it a type of instantaneo*s ,otion +hen it is ,oved as a +hole: Cfor e)a,ple, if / ,ove one e)tre,ity of a stick, !e it as lon" as one likes, / easily conceive that the po+er !y +hich this end of the stick is ,oved necessarily also ,oves all the other parts of it in one and the sa,e instantC :@& L F$?;. :?; /n +hat +ay ,i"ht one and the sa,e si,ple ca*se prod*ce si,*ltaneo*s contrary effectsQ &o ans+er this / sho*ld not think of ,edicines that drive o*t so,e !odily h*,ors +hile retainin" others or of the po+er of the ,oon to +ar, !y its li"ht as it cools !y an occ*lt 3*ality, C!*t !etter that / shall int*itAsee a !alance scale, in +hich the sa,e +ei"ht raises one pan in one and the sa,e instant as it depresses the other, and si,ilar thin"sC :@& L F$#;. &he +orkin"s of the int*ition of ,ind and eye are e)plained here *sin" physical pro!le,s as e)a,ples, !*t that ,*st not ind*ce *s into thinkin" that Descartes +as ill*stratin" only ho+ to address corporeal pro!le,s. &he entire conte)t of >*le 9 takes as "iven the strict analo"y !et+een int*it*s of the ,ind and int*it*s of the senses, so that the latter can serve as a ,odel for the for,er. &his is entirely in the spirit of the principle of analo"ical rese,!lance of his earliest philosophy. 8oreover, the r*les of the second part of the Regulae sho+ ho+ i,a"inative aids can !e *sed in sol*tions to any kind of pro!le,= they sho+ +ays in +hich thin"s can !e Cfi"*redC concretely and f*rther ill*strate the !iplanarity of int*it*s. /n the CCo"itationes privatae,C especially in the notes CSensi!le thin"s OareP apt for conceivin" Bly,pian thin"sC and C&he co"nition of nat*ral ( 1F? ( thin"s !y h*,an !ein"s Oocc*rsP solely thro*"h the si,ilit*de of those thin"s that fall *nder sense,C corporeal thin"s i,a"e thin"s hi"her than the corporeal. /n the present e)a,ples natural po9er and the possi!ility of its !ein" instantaneo*sly conveyed are ill*strated !y the h*,!le :!*t perhaps not a!sol*tely si,ple; e)a,ple of a stick. &he sin"le e)a,ple does not prove that any other nat*ral po+er is instantaneo*sly conveyed, !*t :p*ttin" t+entiethAcent*ry physics to one side; it does sho+ that s*ch a po+er e)ists nat*rally. Si,ilarly, the contrary ,otions of the t+o pans of a !alance scale sho+ that a sin"le ca*se can have opposite effects. /t is 3*ite evident that Descartes is not proceedin" !y !eforeA theAfact reasonin" !*t rather sho+in" that if +e learn to "rasp relatively si,ple, concrete thin"s in the ri"ht +ays +e can i,,ediately see tr*ths of interest and relevance. S*ppose a Scholastic philosopher +anted to deter,ine +hether li"ht traverses space over ti,e or instead occ*pies the +hole of the intervenin" space in an instant. 9e +o*ld proceed !y searchin" for one or ,ore ,iddle ter,s that +o*ld connect the ,inor ter,, li"ht, +ith the ,a4or ter,, instantaneity, and these ,iddle ter,s +o*ld have to !e a!stract essences or 3*alities, 4*st like the ,a4or and ,inor ter,s. S*ch a search +o*ld !e close to hopeless. :l; /f one conceives li"ht !y +ay of "en*s, say Cnat*ral po+er,C one can sho+ that li"ht is instantaneo*s only if all nat*ral po+ers are trans,itted in an instant. @ set of collapsin" do,inoes sho+s the contrary. :?; @n alternative is to settle +ith e)actit*de the essence of li"ht, in the hope that the essence +ill i,ply instantaneity. B*t essences cannot !e discovered thro*"h ,iddle ter,s :!eca*se they identify +hat the thin"s in 3*estion si,ply are;, so either :a; instantaneity ,*st t*rn o*t to !e the differentiatin" factor that ,akes li"ht +hat it is :the instantaneous nat*ral po+er; or :!; it +ill have to !e an essential attri!*te that is deriva!le fro, the differentiatin" factor pl*s "en*s :s*ppose that there +ere a characteristic, informity, s*ch that li"ht +as an infor,itive nat*ral po+er, and everythin" infor,itive +as instantaneo*s in effect; or :c; it is ,erely an accidental property of li"ht. /n cases :a; and :c; +e +o*ld si,ply have to reco"ni7e li"ht as

instantaneo*s-in one case essentially, in the other accidentally-that is, no ,iddle ter,s +o*ld !e involved. /n case :!; +e +o*ld find o*rselves !ack at the !e"innin": if +e did not already kno+ that all infor,itive thin"s are instantaneo*s, +e +o*ld have to search for ,iddle ter,s to prove it, a task that +o*ld pro!a!ly !e ,ore diffic*lt than the ori"inal one. /n order for the search to +ork at all, one si,ply ,*st have an int*it*slike po+er of reco"ni7in" thin"s, even relatively co,ple) thin"s like pan !alances, for +hat they are, +hat they do, and +hat they sho+. Descartes a!andons the search for essences in favor of the search for rese,!lances :at the o*tset of >*le 6= see chap. %, Sec. B;, and he there!y devises a ,ethod +ith ,any ,ore e)pedients for addressin" pro!le,s !y p*ttin" int*it*s at its heart. /f Descartes had asked hi,self +hether li"ht ( 1F# ( +as instantaneo*sly trans,itted-and of co*rse he did ask hi,self this 3*estion-he ,i"ht in his search have proceeded like this: C9o+ can / deter,ine +hether li"ht is instantaneo*sQ .ell, / *s*ally think of it as a nat*ral po+er, !*t not the only one. Let ,e co"itate. . . . Perhaps / can en*,erate different e)a,ples of nat*ral po+er: li"ht, "ravity, i,p*lsion. . . . &his 6,ethod6 / a, follo+in" here hardly see,s co,prehensive, it6s 4*st rando,. . . . B*t +aitH / can approach this 3*estion fro, another, ,ore concrete direction. / can i,a"ine an instantaneo*s po+er in an ele,entary e)a,ple, the ,otion of a ri"id stick= +hen one end is p*shed, the other ,oves at the sa,e ,o,ent. So / kno+ that at least one s*ch nat*ral po+er e)ists, !eca*se it occ*rs in a really e)istin" nat*ral thin". &his +ill allo+ ,e to st*dy li"ht in a ,ore foc*sed +ay: / can analo"i7e li"ht to the stick, / can try to think of +ays in +hich the action of the stick can !e taken as a ,odel for the action of li"ht. Let6s see. . . . S*ppose that space +ere not void !*t a plen*,, filled +ith ,atter, and that for any part of it to ,ove the i,,ediately ad4acent part had to ,ove, 4*st as +ith the stick, and s*ppose that li"ht is an action trans,itted thro*"h this ,atter as ,edi*,, then. . . .C &his is, of co*rse, not a sol*tion, !*t 4*st one or t+o steps on the +ay to a sol*tion. 2evertheless, it pro,ises to !e a ,ethod ,*ch ,ore fle)i!le and rich in alternatives than is the a!stract search for ,iddle ter,s. &o !eco,e kno+led"e these hypotheses and notions +o*ld have to !e incl*ded in, first, a stepA!yAstep ded*ctio :a s*fficient en*,eration; and then perhaps into a contin*o*s ded*ctio approachin" the stat*s of int*it*s, if ,y in"eni*, is po+erf*l eno*"h. &he techni3*e of analo"ical e)trapolation fro, individ*al cases can lead to kno+led"e only if there is so,e !asis for kno+in" not 4*st :say; that the !ehaviors of sticks and li"ht !oth e)hi!it nat*ral po+ers !*t also that they have in the,, or participate in, the characteristic Cnat*ral po+erC in the sa,e relevant +ay. >*le 6 in fact presents a doctrine of nat*res conceived not as essences !*t as se,!lances that thin"s participate in or contain in varyin" de"rees. B*t !efore +e t*rn to this participation theory, +e need to hi"hli"ht >*le 96s special contri!*tions to *nderstandin" the !iplanarity of int*it*s. Bne does not int*it thin"s in the a!sence of conte)t. &he co,,and C/nt*itHC or C/nt*it that !alance scaleHC +o*ld elicit the response C9o+QC Cin +hat +ayQC /nt*itin"Aseein" that the scale e)ists is different fro, int*itin"Aseein" that it is corporeal, +hich in t*rn differs fro, int*itin"Aseein" that the t+o pans ,ove in opposite directions !eca*se of a sin"le +ei"ht. &he easy and distinct, the not do*!tf*l concept of a p*re and attentive ,ind :to *se the idio, of >*le #;, re3*ires that the o!4ect !e cleared of e)traneo*s considerations :e."., in the case of >*le 9 the ,etal o*t of +hich the scale is ,ade +o*ld !e set aside; and that the ,ind !e sharply foc*sed and attentive. &he clearin" a+ay of +hat is e)traneo*s takes place in the ( 1FF (

co*rse of the search for tr*th, and the direction of foc*s is provided !y the conte)t of the pro!le,. &herefore, 4*st as in the earliest philosophy, there is an o!4ect plane and an oc*lar or confi"*rin" :or fi"*rin"Ao*t; plane. /nt*it*s is the hold that the ,ind "ets on the o!4ect in li"ht of +hat the conte)t of the pro!le, ill*,inates. &he !alance scale can !e "rasped in ,any +ays: to na,e 4*st a fe+, as si,ple ,achine, as ,aterial o!4ect, as e)istin" !ein", as +ei"hin" device, as e)hi!itor of contrary effects !y a sin"le ca*se. /nt*it*s is therefore not "raspin" CtheC idea of the scale= rather, the concept*, of int*it*s is the partic*lar, foc*sed, active "rasp of +hat has !een presented to and prepared !y the ,ind.

+. ,AT0ESIS AND T0E NECESSITY OF ,ET0OD

@s the CCo"itationes privataeC noted, every in"eni*, has li,its that it cannot transcend, yet those +ho Ccannot *se principles for discovery !eca*se of a defect of in"eni*, can nevertheless kno+ the tr*e re+ard of the sciences, +hich s*ffices the, for carryin" o*t tr*e 4*d",ents in the esti,ation of thin"sC :@& L ?1%;. @nother private co"itation, +hich falls a,id the notes a!o*t the po+ers of i,a"ination and the capacity of sensi!le thin"s to ,irror Bly,pian thin"s, re,arks that Cthe sayin"s of the +ise can !e !ro*"ht !ack Oreduci P to a certain very fe+ "eneral r*les.C @ finite in"eni*,, +hether considered *nder the aspect of its partic*lar defects or fro, the perspective of the li,its that are i,posed on all h*,an !ein"s, is nevertheless capa!le of tr*ly 4*d"in" in the appraisal of thin"s, and the very principles that are characteristic of all h*,an in"enia are s*ch that they can !e ,ade s*!4ect to a re"*lated *se, that is, to ,ethod. >*le # has identified t+o +ays native to in"eni*,, int*it*s and ded*ctio, and it is on the !asis of these that the s*!se3*ent r*les present a re"*lated *se. >*le F 3*ite conse3*ently !e"ins !y anno*ncin" that C,ethod is necessary to investi"atin" the tr*th of thin"s.C &he predo,inatin" ,etaphors of >*le F6s first para"raph are !lindness and ai,less +anderin": C8ortals are so ,*ch held !y !lind c*riosity that often they lead do+n Odeducant PO19P their in"enia alon" *nkno+n +ays +itho*t any reason of hope,C as if so,eone overco,e !y "reed for findin" treas*re sho*ld Cperpet*ally +ander the streetsC lookin" for so,ethin" ,islaid !y another traveler. @l,ost all che,ists, ,any "eo,eters, and no fe+ philosophers proceed in this +ay. B*t it +o*ld !e prefera!le never to think of searchin" for the tr*th of a thin" than to proceed +itho*t ,ethod= Cfor it is ,ost certain that thro*"h inordinate st*dy of this kind and o!sc*re ,editations the nat*ral li"ht is conf*sed and the in"enia are O19P 6Ded*ction6 +o*ld of co*rse !e co,pletely *naccepta!le here. ( 1F% ( !linded,C 4*st as eyes acc*sto,ed to darkness +eaken so that they cannot !ear the li"ht of day. .hat is ,ethodQ CBy ,ethod / *nderstand s*re and easy r*les +hich anyone ,i"ht o!serve e)actly so that he never p*ts anythin" false for the tr*e and, no endeavor of ,ind !ein" *selessly s3*andered !*t rather al+ays "rad*ally increasin" science, he arrives at the tr*e co"nition of all thin"s of +hich he +ill !e capa!leC :@& L #E1A#E?;. @ccordin" to the second para"raph of the r*le, ,ethod +ill ri"htly teach ho+ the proper *se of ,ind6s int*it*sAseein" can prevent *s fro, fallin" into error and ho+ ded*ctions are to !e fo*nd so that +e can co,e to the co"nition of all thin"s. /t +ill also teach that nothin" ,ore is needed for the co,pleteness of ,ethod than int*it*s and ded*ctio= that is, these t+o are !oth necessary and s*fficient for ,ethod. >*le F is therefore a nat*ral o*t"ro+th of >*le #. B*t the r*le i,,ediately ,oves to forestall a possi!le ,isconception a!o*t the direction the doctrine of ,ethod o*"ht to take. &he ,ethod of the Regulae +ill not teach ho+ to perfor, int*it*sAseein" or ded*ctio, C!eca*se they are the si,plest and

the first of all, so that *nless o*r intellect is already a!le to *se the, it +o*ld co,prehend no precept at all of this ,ethod, ho+ever easy it ,i"ht !eC :@& L #E?;. 8oreover, the operations of the ,ind that ordinary lo"ic and dialectic teach are *seless !eca*se they tend to i,pede and o!sc*re the li"ht of reason rather than add to it. &he ne)t para"raph appears to !e"in +ith a 4*stification for re4ectin" the classic lo"icalAdialectical ,ethod in favor of the ,ethod of int*it*sAded*ctio. Descartes says that since to "ive oneself over to st*dies +itho*t this tr*e ,ethod is ,ore har,f*l than helpf*l, he can easily pers*ade hi,self that the "reat ,inds of the past :called the ma7orii ingenii ; had already reco"ni7ed it in so,e +ay, C!y "*idance of nat*re alone.C Usin" a conceit that appeared in the CCo"itationes privataeC and that occ*rs three ti,es here in >*le F,O?$P Descartes anno*nces that Cthe h*,an ,ind has so,ethin" divine, / kno+ not +hat, in +hich are fo*nded the first seeds of *sef*l co"itations in a +ay that often prod*ces spontaneo*s fr*it, ho+ever ne"lected and s*ffocated it ,ay have !een !y st*dies Othat areP at crossA p*rposesC :@& L #E#;. @s an e)a,ple of the po+er of these first seeds, the r*le add*ces arith,etic and "eo,etry, the latter in the for, of the ancient "eo,etric analysis, the for,er *nder the aspect of the stillAdevelopin" O?$P &+ice in FA@ :@& L #E# 11. 5A9, Cpri,a co"itation*, *tili*, se,inaC= #EF ll. EA5, Cpri,a rationis h*,anae r*di,entaC; and once in FAB :@& L #E6 ll. 1?A1#, Cpri,a 3*aeda, veritat*, se,ina h*,anis in"eni4s a nat*ra insitaC;. &he co*nt is raised to fo*r if one incl*des a si,ilar phrase in FA@ :@& L #E# ll. 19A?$, Cspontaneae fr*"es e) in"enitis h*4*s ,ethodi principi4s na,eC;. Since .e!er6s strati"raphic theory of co,position considers the repetition of ideas to !e a ,ark of red*ndancy, then the s*pposedly later FA@ contains one of the very red*ndancies said to differentiate FAB fro, the rest of the r*le. ( 1F6 ( ,ode, al"e!ra. C&hese t+o are nothin" other than the spontaneo*s fr*it !orn fro, the con"enital principles Oingenitis principi7s P of this ,ethod.C &hey have flo*rished !eca*se of their very si,ple o!4ects. &ho*"h all other sciences have had their advance !locked !y "reater i,pedi,ents, Cprovided they are c*ltivated +ith the "reatest care they +ill +itho*t do*!t arrive at perfect ,at*rity.C &he ne)t para"raph reflects on +hat this ,eans for the pro4ect of the Regulae. C/ndeed / have *ndertaken principally in this tractate to ,ake this happen Oi.e., the arrival at ,at*rity of all sciencesP.C /f he ai,ed at nothin" ,ore than solvin" inane pro!le,s like other lo"icians and "eo,eters, his +ork +o*ld !e as pointless as theirs. &he disc*ssion then t*rns to the p*rpose of the fre3*ent references to fi"*res and n*,!ers that occ*r in the rest of the !ook. Gro, no other disciplines can !e dra+n e)a,ples so evident and so certain, !*t +hoever +ill attentively have re"ard to ,y sense +ill easily perceive that / a, thinkin" here of nothin" less than the *s*al ,athe,atics, !*t rather that / a, settin" o*t a certain other discipline, of +hich others are the inte"*,ent Oor coverin"P rather than the parts. Gor this OdisciplineP ,*st contain the first r*di,ents of h*,an reason and e)tend to elicitin" the tr*th fro, any s*!4ect +hatever= and, to speak freely, / pers*ade ,yself that this is "reater than all other co"nition that is h*,anly handed over to *s, inas,*ch as it is the fo*nt of all the others. @nd / said 6inte"*,ent6 not !eca*se / +ant to cover over this doctrine and ,ake it involved so as to keep a+ay the v*l"ar OpeopleP, !*t rather to dress and orna,ent it so that it can !e !etter acco,,odated to h*,an in"eni*,. :@& L #EF; So,e thirty years a"o KeanAPa*l .e!er, the leadin" proponent of the thesis that the Regulae is a patch+ork of inconsistent initiatives :the contradictions !et+een +hich reveal the order of co,position;, clai,ed that these +ords ,ark the end of >*le FA@, +hich he !elieves is the second draft

of the r*le. &he last half, that is, the last t+o para"raphs, kno+n as FAB, he !elieves +as the historical startin" point for the entire Regulae and that it +as co,posed in the +eeks precedin" Descartes6s drea,s of 1$A11 2ove,!er 1619. Before passin" 4*d",ent on the possi!le coherence or inconsistency of FAB +ith FA@, then, it +ill !e *sef*l to reflect on +here thin"s stand at the end of FA@ and to co,pare ho+ the t+o parts are for,*lated. People ordinarily p*rs*e kno+led"e rando,ly, and this rando, p*rs*it tends to !lind the nat*ral endo+,ent of the seeds of tr*th. &he leadin", @ristotelian theory of scientific kno+led"e, e,!odied in dialectic and syllo"istic lo"ic, either confo*nds +hat is innate !y tryin" to teach it or i,pedes the proper *se of the in!orn seeds of tho*"ht !y presentin" *seless co,plications. @ltho*"h the kind of s*ccess that c*ltivatin" the seeds can !rin" is ,ost evident in ,athe,atics, the o!4ect of the Regulae is neither to teach ,athe,atics nor to drive off *nt*tored readers +ith a s,okeA ( 1FE ( screen of fi"*res and for,*las. &he "oal is to !rin" a!o*t the perfection of all sciences +hatsoever. Brdinary ,athe,atics is introd*ced not for its o+n sake !*t as the only c*rrent e)a,ple of ho+ si,ple thin"s can !e certainly and evidently kno+n !y ,eans of int*it*s and ded*ctio. Brdinary ,athe,atics is !*t the o*ter vest,ent of the discipline that tr*ly contains the first r*di,ents of h*,an reason, and ,athe,atics is an especially "ood so*rce of e)a,ples !eca*se it is +ell acco,,odated to the in"eni*, of h*,an !ein"s. 8any the,es of the co"itations of 1619A16?1 are so*nded here: that there are seeds of kno+led"e= that *ntil no+ the sciences have !een hidden= that only a s,all n*,!er of r*les, not a co,ple) science of lo"ic and dialectic, are needed to "*ide the native co"nitive endo+,ent= that there are li,its to h*,an in"eni*,, !*t that each h*,an !ein" possesses +hat is needed to 4*d"e for hi,Aor herself= and that the fi"*res of ,athe,atics can !e *sed to sho+ forth so,ethin" else, so,ethin" hi"her and ,ore perfect than the,selves. Descartes e)presses thro*"h 3*alifications that he is dealin" here in h*,an thin"s, in h*,an kno+led"e, and that his standard is not divine kno+in" or !ein": the ne+ discipline he is seekin" is !etter than all other co"nition humanly handed do+n to *s, it contains the first r*di,ents of human reason, and the ,athe,atical inte"*,ent acco,,odates it to human in"eni*,.O?1P B*t +hat does it ,ean to !e acco,,odated to the in"eni*, of h*,an !ein"sQ &here is a fairly clear ans+er fro, o*r previo*s e)a,ination of i,a"ination and in"eni*,. &he in"eni*, as defined in >*le 1? is the "enerali7ed po+er of for,in" and ,anip*latin" i,a"es and of re"ardin" i,a"es as i,a"es, that is, as fi"*rin" so,ethin" else. &he easiest thin" for i,a"inative in"eni*, to do, the thin" ,ost acco,,odated to its nat*re in h*,an !ein"s, is to for, si,ple "eo,etrical fi"*res to represent the proportions of relevant aspects of +hat is in 3*estion. 8athe,atics is not so ,*ch a discipline *nto itself as the o!4ect ,ost nat*rally s*ited to the h*,an in"eni*,, +hich is a!le to fi"*re thin"s o*t ,*ch ,ore readily !y lookin" at a pro!le, in partic*lar respects than !y tryin" to "rasp essences and nat*res. &he ai, of the +hole Regulae sho*ld accordin"ly !e to sho+ not ho+ everythin" can !e red*ced to ,athe,atics !*t rather ho+ ,athe,atics in its e)3*isitely si,ple +ork of ,akin" and e)a,inin" i,a"es can !e applied, and "ive cr*cial "*idance, to the ,ore co,prehensive *se of the in"eni*,. /n"eni*, is a!le to e,!race all sciences !y ,akin" fi"*res that ena!le it to conceive the o!4ects of those sciences. &he O?1P 0V!e e,phasi7es the h*,an li,itation of Descartes6s co"nitive clai,s in the Regulae, as does also Kosef Si,on= see 0V!e, Descartes' %el4stkritik, and Si,on, #ahrheit als $reiheit, pt. ?, chaps. ? and #. /t is interestin" here that, altho*"h the 3*alification of in"eni*, !y h*,an*, is not rare in the Regulae, in"eni*, occ*rs in the vast ,a4ority of cases +itho*t it. Gor a 3*ick overvie+, cons*lt the

IndeB des 5 Regulae ad directionem ingenii. C ( 1F5 ( practice of ,athe,atics, taken !y analo"y, +ill provide the h*,!le ,odel for *sin" fi"*ration and conceivin" the no!ler sciences. &h*s fi"*ration and conception is the discipline that contains and ela!orates the seeds of all kno+led"e. Part B of >*le F !e"ins a*to!io"raphically. .hen / first applied ,y rational spirit Oani,*,P to 8athe,atical disciplines, / read thro*"h +itho*t pa*se ,ost of those +hich are *s*ally treated !y their a*thors, and / c*ltivated chiefly @rith,etic and 0eo,etry, !eca*se they +ere said to !e the si,plest, and as it +ere roads to the others. B*t in neither case did any +riters !y chance then fall into ,y hands +ho co,pletely satisfied ,e: for / read ,any thin"s in the, a!o*t n*,!ers, +hich +hen / perfor,ed the reasonin"s / e)perienced to !e tr*e= and a!o*t fi"*res, they e)hi!ited ,any thin"s in a certain +ay to the eyes the,selves, and they dre+ concl*sions fro, certain conse3*ences= !*t +hy these thin"s +ere so, and in +hat +ay they +ere discovered, they did not appear to sho+ s*fficiently to the ,ind itself= and so / +as not s*rprised if even ,ost of those in"enio*s and er*dite ,en either soon ne"lected these onceAtasted arts as p*erile and vain or on the contrary +hile learnin" Oso,e thin"sP fro, these +ere fri"htened a+ay at the very !order !y see,in"ly very diffic*lt and intricate thin"s. Gor tr*ly nothin" is ,ore inane than to treat of !are n*,!ers and i,a"inary fi"*res in s*ch a +ay that +e see, to +ant to find rest in the co"nition of s*ch trifles and to take pains +ith those s*perficial de,onstrations, +hich ,ost often are discovered ,ore !y accident than !y art and pertain ,ore to the eyes and the i,a"ination than to intellect, so that +e !eco,e *nacc*sto,ed in so,e +ay to *sin" reason itself= and at the sa,e ti,e nothin" is ,ore intricate than !y a ,ode of s*ch testin" to disentan"le ne+ diffic*lties involved +ith conf*sed n*,!ers. :@& L #EFA#E%; &his passa"e :appro)i,ately oneAfo*rth of the first para"raph of FAB; is cr*cial not only !eca*se of its i,portance for deter,inin" +hether the Regulae is a coherent +ork !*t also !eca*se of the cl*es it yields a!o*t Descartes6s conception of the *nity of his st*dies. .hat does it acco,plishQ Despite its initial appearance of !ein" an a*to!io"raphically narrative interloper in an other+ise disc*rsive conte)t, it is in fact stron"ly linked to +hat precedes. >*le F !e"an as a reflection on the !lind and errant +ays on +hich h*,an investi"ators set o*t and the relative "ood fort*ne of those +ho have not had their po+ers, their nat*ral li"ht, o!sc*red !y ,is"*ided e)perience. /t spoke fro, the perspective of one +ho had already discovered the ori"in of all ,ethodical in3*iry, int*it*s and ded*ctio. /t did not clai,, ho+ever, that the ori"in and ,ethod +ere previo*sly *nkno+n= the e)istence in all h*,an !ein"s of in!orn seeds of thinkin" and kno+in" led the a*thor to pers*ade hi,self that, even +hen ne"lected or crossed, nat*re spontaneo*sly leads so,e people to prod*ce fr*its of +isdo,. Precisely at this point he first ,entioned the ( 1F9 ( arith,etic and "eo,etry of ancients and ,oderns as evidence of this thesis and as s*rety that, once ,ore co,plicated o!4ects have !een approached +ith a deli!erate application of ,ethod, the sciences of the, +ill reach Cperfect ,at*rity.C &he acco*nt of FA@ therefore had three foci of develop,ent: the h*,an search for tr*th, the seeds of ,ethod that can "*ide it, and the o!4ects and disciplines that +ill

!e *nderstood as a res*lt. @fter >*le # had ,arked o*t t+o +ays and t+o +ays only of co,in" to the tr*th, >*le FA@ proceeded 3*ite lo"ically-for the yo*n" Descartes, +ho prefers thinkin" that is concrete-to the 3*estion of +here and +hen they have !een follo+ed. &he !e"innin" narrative in >*le F +as th*s essentially the fr*it of historical reflection on the hitherto lar"ely a!ortive 3*ests for tr*th and the reasons for their fail*res and any s*ccesses. Pres*,a!ly the a*thor of s*ch a narrative +as +ritin" fro, the perspective of s*ccess in the 3*est for tr*th, and so it is *nderstanda!le that he +o*ld incl*de historical reflection on hi,self, that is, a*to!io"raphy. &h*s there is nothin" very ,*ch s*rprisin" +hen the narrative t*rns to a*to!io"raphical considerations in FAB. &his is a "eneral 4*stification of the !e"innin" of FAB, in ter,s of the rhetorical sit*ation. .hat 4*stifies its partic*larsQ Consider: the last para"raph of FA@ ,ade clear that it is not ,athe,atics that the Regulae is intent on teachin", despite the fact that the +ork fre3*ently adverts to e)a,ples of n*,!ers and fi"*res :as it had already done in >*le #;, !*t rather a discipline fro, +hich even the scientific s*!4ects that are called ,athe,atical *lti,ately derive their kno+a!ility and certainty, a discipline that is the *lti,ate discipline !eca*se it Ccontains the first r*di,ents of h*,an reason and e)tends to elicitin" the tr*th fro, any s*!4ect +hatever.C .hen Descartes +rote in the very last lines of FA@ that he calls ,athe,atics the inte"*,ent of this discipline not to hide it !*t to vest and orna,ent it Cso that it can !e !etter acco,,odated to h*,an in"eni*,,C he +as not concl*din" his e)position !*t only settin" the sta"e for an ela!oration of :1; +hat in ordinary ,athe,atics can !e *sed to conceive this hi"her discipline, :?; +hat differentiates the hi"her discipline fro, ordinary ,athe,atics, and :#; in +hat sense ordinary ,athe,atics acco,,odates h*,an in"eni*, to the hi"her discipline. .ithin the conte)t of >*le F, 3*estions 1 and ? receive provisional ans+ers, +hile # a+aits the f*rther ela!oration of ho+ the re"*lation of the in"eni*, is to !e *ndertaken in the s*cceedin" r*les. .e already have seen, ho+ever, in +hat +ay >*les 1? thro*"h ?1 can !e said to present a doctrine that *ses a si,ple ,athe,atics of n*,!er and line in order to acco,,odate the p*rs*it of kno+led"e to the character of the h*,an in"eni*,. /n FA@, Descartes +rote that his first readin" of ,athe,atical a*thors concentrated on arith,etic and "eo,etry C!eca*se they +ere said to !e si,plest and as it +ere +ays to the other disciplines,C B*t he did not find ( 1%$ ( the, to !e as he e)pected. @ltho*"h !y verifyin" the res*lts he fo*nd that ,*ch of +hat they said +as tr*e, this did not satisfy hi, !eca*se they did not e)plain C+hy these thin"s +ere soC or Cin +hat +ay they +ere discovered.C &he reasons s*pportin" the kno+led"e and the process of reachin" it +ere left o!sc*re. /t +as clear fro, the poor *se these +riters ,ade of their discoveries that they did not really possess any clear ,ethod that had !ro*"ht the, to their res*lts= it +as as ,*ch chance as ac*,en. /n addition, they acted as tho*"h the "oal +ere to !e satisfied +ith s*perficial de,onstrations concernin" !are n*,!ers and i,a"inary fi"*res, and their de,onstrations appealed ,ore to the eye and i,a"ination than to the intellect. B!vio*sly there is so,ethin" ,ore that Descartes e)pects of a process of kno+in" adapted to h*,an in"eni*,. /t is clear that he does not desire si,ply the application of ,athe,atics for its o+n sake, !*t rather the science that *ncovers and ela!orates the *nity of all kno+in" and that si,*ltaneo*sly is the "ro*nd of all application of kno+led"e. /n FAB, Descartes points o*t that he reflected on a de,and ,ade !y ancient thinkers: that one learn ,athesis, the +ay of co"nitive discipline, as a prere3*isite to the st*dy of +isdo,, !eca*se it is the si,plest and ,ost necessary of all for preparin" the in"eni*,.O??P &his reflection aro*sed a s*spicion: that the ancients possessed the key to learnin", a ,athesis that +as radically different fro, the ,athe,atics and even the al"e!ra of the c*rrent day. 9ere in FAB, 4*st as t+o para"raphs earlier in FA@

precisely at the point of disc*ssin" the +orks of predecessors, he adverts to the first seeds of kno+led"e, Ccertain first seeds of tr*th seated in h*,an in"eni*, !y nat*re.C B*t here the reasonin" has a different ai,. /n the earlier passa"e reflection on the divine seeds of kno+in" led to arith,etic and "eo,etry as e)a,ples of ho+ even ne"lect and ,ised*cation cannot co,pletely fr*strate their effect, +hereas here the ancients6 treat,ent of ,athe,atics as a prea,!le to +isdo, sp*rs hi, to ,ention these seeds as leadin" not 4*st to ,athe,atics !*t also to f*nda,ental kno+led"e of all kinds. &he one +ho seeks +isdo, can discover ,oral tr*ths, 4*st as the ancients discovered that virt*e is to !e preferred to pleas*re and honesty to *tility, and the other tr*e ideas of philosophy and ,athesis as +ell, all C+ith one and the sa,e li"ht of the ,ind.C &hese are not ,athe,atical ideas he is talkin" a!o*t !*t philosophical and mathetical ones. 9enceforth / shall *se the ter, 6,athetical6 to distin"*ish this f*nda,ental philosophical character of ,athesis fro, ,athe,atics. Before e)plainin" f*rther its si"nificance, +e ,*st note that Descartes does not say O??P 8arion traces the antecedents of this ad,onition. &he ancients spoke of "eo,etry rather than ,athesis. @ late si)teenthAcent*ry +ork that Descartes had certainly read, Clavi*s6s !ook on the )lements of 1*clid :1%59= ?d ed. 16$#;, speaks of the need to kno+ Cthe 8athe,atical sciences.C Descartes6s ,athesis in fact radicali7es the ad,onition: learn not ,athe,atics !*t the fo*ndation of everythin" that is learna!le. ( 1%1 ( he fo*nd the vesti"es of this tr*e ,athesis in all past ,athe,aticians-for e)a,ple, he ,entions Papp*s and Diophant*s !*t not 1*clid-and he points o*t that in the recent past there have !een Ccertain ,ost in"enio*s ,enC +ho have tried to res*scitate it, altho*"h it needs to !e relieved of Cthe ,*ltiplicity of n*,!ers and the ine)plica!le fi"*res *nder +hich it is !*ried.C &he analysis of Papp*s and Diophant*s +as a techni3*e for solvin" "eo,etrical and "eo,etrically representa!le pro!le,s !y takin" !oth the kno+n and the *nkno+n as deter,inate and then, !y ,eans of relationships that are "iven or ded*ci!le, +orkin" o*t the *nkno+ns.O?#P &his is the discipline that Descartes calls a ,athesis very different fro, the v*l"ar one of his a"e. /t is not eno*"h si,ply to foster pro!le, solvin" !y *sin" the al"e!ra of the ,athe,aticians, ho+ever= for +hen this insi"ht Crecalled Ohi,P fro, the partic*lar st*dies of @rith,etic and 0eo,etry to a certain "eneral investi"ation of 8athesis,C Descartes !e"an to Cin3*ire first of all precisely +hat everyone *nderstands !y this na,eC and +hy other sciences like astrono,y, ,*sic, optics, ,echanics, and ,any others are called parts of ,athesis. 9e +arns, ho+ever, that it is not eno*"h si,ply to ask after the ori"in of the +ord. &his calls to ,ind the caveat of >*le #: look not to the ,eanin"s of the ter,s as *s*rped !y the schools !*t to their si,ple Latin ,eanin"s, and then *se the one ,ost apt. Descartes notes that 6,athesis6 a,o*nts to the sa,e thin" as 6disciplina6, discipline, and !y the criterion of si,ple ,eanin" all ,ethodically or"ani7ed kno+in" has as ,*ch ri"ht to !e called a discipline as does "eo,etry. 9e then invokes the *niversal testi,ony of people, even those +ho possess a ,ini,al rationality: all those +ho have reached school a"e easily distin"*ish the "eneral ,atters that pertain to the f*nda,ental discipline, ,athesis, fro, +hat specifically !elon"s to other, partic*lar disciplines. 9e arrives at the concl*sion that everythin" in +hich order and ,eas*re are e)a,ined refers to ,athesis and that the science that treats everythin" pertainin" to order and ,eas*re in any ,anner and any ,atter +hatsoever is to !e called 6,athesis *niversalis6, C!eca*se in this is contained all that on acco*nt of +hich the other ,athe,atical sciences are called parts Oof ,athe,aticsP.C Bf co*rse, there are other, partic*lar thin"s for +hich this *niversal ,athesis cannot acco*nt, !*t anythin" that in any +ay reflects

order and ,eas*re is s*!4ect to it. @s Descartes "oes on to say in the second, concl*din" para"raph of FAB, B*t conscio*s of ,y +eakness / decree that / +ill pertinacio*sly o!serve s*ch order in the in3*irin" co"nition of thin"s that / +ill al+ays proceed fro, the si,plest and easiest thin"s and never pro"ress to others *ntil it see,s to ,e O?#P Kaco! 'lein, 0reek athematical Thought and the "rigin of Alge4ra, 1?6 A1F9= and Pa*l &annery, &a 0*om*trie grec1ue :Paris, 155E;. ( 1%? ( that nothin" ,ore to !e +ished for re,ains in these= +herefore / have c*ltivated till no+ this *niversal 8athesis insofar as +as in ,y po+er so that 1 consider ,yself a!le to treat fro, the !e"innin" so,e+hat profo*nder sciences +ith a not pre,at*re dili"ence. B*t !efore / t*rn to this, / +ant to collect into one and dispose in order everythin" / have perceived +orthy of note +ith re"ard to these s*perior st*dies, partly so that one day / ,i"ht easily recall s*ch thin"s fro, this !ook if the occasion de,ands, +hen ,e,ory is di,inished !y increasin" a"e, partly so that no+, ,e,ory !ein" li!erated fro, these sa,e thin"s, / can ,ore freely shift ,y rational spirit Oani,*,P to the others. :@& L #E5A#E9; 9ere is f*rther evidence that the Regulae is parado)ically patterned on the art of ,e,ory, *sin" vario*s devices to ,ini,i7e the need for that fickle po+er. 8oreover, the chief a*to!io"raphical conceit of the para"raph, that the Regulae is a +ork of transition and an instr*,ent for a ,e,ory that is al+ays over!*rdened and in dan"er of failin", certainly adds to the i,pression that FAB is in essential contin*ity +ith !oth the precedin" three and a half r*les and +ith >*les 1? thro*"h ?1.O?FP B*t the e,phasis in the passa"e on the need for order in all st*dies and the orderliness of the Regulae itself-+hich is an orderly reflection on the f*nda,ental principles of order-indicates that the Regulae participates in the very s*!4ect ,atter it is a!o*t: it is a!o*t order, and it is itself orderly. /n this sense, the Regulae itself is ,ore than a token for ,e,ory: in the sense identified earlier, it is itself a sy,!ol of order, indicatin" the +hole +hile also participatin" in it.

0. ,AT0E,ATICS5 I,A+INATION5 AND ,AT0ESIS

Chapter 1 introd*ced the ,edieval doctrine of the internal senses and ar"*ed that its d*ra!ility +as d*e not si,ply to the @ristotelianis, of .estAe, Scholasticis, !*t also to s*pport fro, other traditions, especially ,edical theory. &he *nderstandin" of the i,a"ination as a po+er of sensi!ility dependent on locali7ed !rain f*nctions and playin" a si"nificant role in co"nition +as therefore not specifically !o*nd to the fate of @ristotelian O?FP /t see,s *nlikely that this +o*ld acc*rately descri!e his sit*ation in late 1619, tho*"h it see,s ,ore than apt for his intention to e)plore first philosophy at the *r"in" of Cardinal BSr*lle :perhaps in late 16?E; and his act*al e)ec*tion of that intention d*rin" his first nine ,onths in 9olland :i.e., in 16?9;. Bne sho*ld note that >*le F6s a*to!io"raphical approach to the history of ,athesis is not echoed in any of the notes fro, the period 1619A16?l, apart fro, the narration of the drea,s of 1$A11 2ove,!er 1619, +hich is an episode to !e interpreted rather than a life to !e narrated. &he %tudium 4onae mentis, the only other early a*to!io"raphical piece, cannot antedate ?6?#, since accordin" to Baillet6s acco*nt it disc*sses events of that year, and it is possi!le that this no lon"er e)tant +ork +as +ritten years later. Bnce a"ain the evidence points to a later rather than an earlier date for the co,position of >*le F.

( 1%# ( or Scholastic tenets. &he centrality of i,a"ination +as !olstered !y the conc*rrence of other traditions that contri!*ted theories of its i,portance. Gor e)a,ple, the Stoics ta*"ht that the do,inant po+er of reason, the he"e,onikon, +as located in the !rain and there received the phantasiai fro, the e)ternal +orld. /n the 2eoplatonic @*"*stine, in contrast, ,e,ory +as, alon" +ith intellect and +ill, a ,e,!er of the hi"hest triad of psycholo"ical po+ers, +hile corporeal i,a"ination +as part of the i,,ediately s*!ordinate triad of sensitive po+ers. /ndeed any 2eoplatonist is as likely as not to ascri!e an i,portant role to i,a"ination. @ltho*"h 2eoplatonis, is, Cin "eneral, ini,ica!le to a constr*ctive theory of fantasy,C it is capa!le at any ti,e of takin" a co*rse +hich leads to the enno!le,ent of a ,ental capacity +hich its !asic philosophy affected to despise. &his parado)ical nat*re of 2eoplatonic tho*"ht concernin" phantasia and related po+ers can hardly !e overe,phasi7ed: its idealis, ta*"ht it to despise phantasies, its d*alis, fo*nd a place for the,, its psycholo"y, lar"ely @ristotelian, ta*"ht it to st*dy the,, and its passion for the &i,ae*s led it to reco"ni7e the, as 0odA"iven.O?%P @ccordin" to a rec*rrent 2eoplatonic the,e, the different levels of reality i,a"e or ,irror one another, so that i,a"ination can ac3*ire a certain ontolo"ical and episte,olo"ical credi!ility and partially !rid"e the "ap !et+een the corporeal and spirit*al real,s. .ith respect to ,athe,atics, Descartes +as not the first to ascri!e a special role to i,a"ination= indeed, already in late anti3*ity 2eoplatonists interpreted the phantasia as providin" the ,edi*, and ,atter for ,athe,atical o!4ects. /n his ,ono"raph on the !ack"ro*nd to Descartes6s *se of the ter, 6,athesis *niversalis6, 0iovanni Crap*lli traces the notion !ack to the 0reek ,athe,atician 1*clid and the 2eoplatonic philosopher Procl*s :F1?AF5%;. /n the si)teenth cent*ry the content of a *niversal ,athe,atics +as disc*ssed *nder vario*s na,es, s*ch as scientia communis, mathesis generalis or universalis, mathesis universa, and mathematica generalis. &hese na,es +ere intended to indicate the discipline co,,on to all the ,athe,atical sciences= the core of it +as the 1*clidean theory of proportion presented in the fifth !ook of the )lements of 0eometry. 8oreover, +ithin these si)teenthA cent*ry disc*ssions of ,athesis *niversalis there +as an infl*ential strand of tho*"ht "oin" !ack to ancient co,,entaries on 1*clid that *nderstood the ,edi*, or ,aterial of ,athe,atics and ,athe,atical o!4ects to !e the intelli"i!le ,atter of phantasia. So, for e)a,ple, in his co,,entary on 1*clid6s "eo,etry, Procl*s presented the notion of O?%P 8*rray .ri"ht B*ndy, The Theory of Imagination in !lassical and ediaeval Thought, University of /llinois St*dies in Lan"*a"e and Literat*re, vol. 1?, nos. ?A# :Ur!ana: University of /llinois Press, 19?E;, 1F6. ( 1%F ( kinesis phantastike :i,a"inative ,otion; as *nderlyin" the ,ental activity of the "eo,eter= else+here he descri!ed the phantasia as a Cfor,A"ivin" intellection of the intelli"i!les.CO?6P &his doctrine of the i,a"inative !asis of ,athe,atics "ained rene+ed topicality in the si)teenth cent*ry, especially thro*"h @lessandro PiccoloA,ini6s !ommentarium de certitudine mathematicarum disciplinarum. /n his disc*ssion of the co,,on science :scientia co,,*nis; he ar"*ed that the ,athe,atical sciences +ere considered !y the ancients as inter,ediate sciences !oth !eca*se they +ere neither entirely intellect*al nor entirely i,,ersed in ,atter, and also !eca*se of their efficient ca*se,

the phantasia: Ca certain po+er of so*l that holds an inter,ediate place !et+een sense and intellect,C +hich Piccolo,ini, follo+in" Procl*s and others, identified +ith @ristotelian intellectus passivus :no*s pathetikos;, passive or potential intellect. &he thin"s of ,athe,atics Care not at all sensi!les in the s*!4ect OJ s*!stanceP nor thin"s in+ardly li!erated fro, it: those ,athe,atical fi"*res are fo*nd rather in phantasia itself, "ar!ed nevertheless on the occasion !y 3*antities fo*nd in sensi!le ,atter.C &he phantasi7ed 3*antity :1uantum phantasiatum ; did not constit*te the ,atter of any partic*lar kind of ,athe,atics= rather, Cone thin" of "reat +ei"ht is to !e noted, that +hen +e have sho+n the phantasi7ed 3*antity to !e the ,atter or s*!4ect of ,athe,aticians, this is said to !e the s*!4ect not of "eo,etry or arith,etic, +hich t+o are the first "enera of ,athe,atics, !*t of a certain fac*lty co,,on to "eo,etry and arith,etic.C Piccolo,ini *nderstood this 3*ant*, phantasiat*, and its *nderlyin" fac*lty of ,ind as clarifyin" +hat other a*thors had Ci,properlyC called intelli"i!le ,aterial= accordin" to hi,, it +as not so ,*ch intelli"i!le as i,a"inative.O?EP /n the )thics of 0eometry, a reflection on the different si"nificance of constr*ction in ancient and ,odern ,athe,atics :+ith 1*clid and Descartes the prota"onists;, David Lachter,an s*""ests that Procl*s6s elevation of i,a"ination ,akes hi, the first ,odern ,athe,atician. 9is infl*ence, in co,!ination +ith an affinity for i,a"ination a,on" early ,odern al"e!raists that +as enco*ra"ed !y their adaptation of techni3*es fro, the arts of ,e,ory ta*"ht !y Ll*ll, Petr*s >a,*s, and 0iordano Br*no, decisively shaped ,odern ,athe,atics. Lachter,an considers, in partic*lar, the *se of dia"ra,s in ancient and early ,odern ,athe,atics +ithin the conte)t of an ontolo"ical dile,,a posed !y i,a"ea!ility. 9e O?6P Disc*ssed !y Lachter,an, )thics of 0eometry, 59A9$. &he 3*ote, "iven !y Lachter,an, is fro, the !ommentary on the Repu4lic, 1.?#%.15. O?EP See the acco*nt of Piccolo,ini in 0iovanni Crap*lli, athesis 6niversalis: 0enesi di un'idea nel G/I secolo, Lessico /ntellectt*ale 1*ropeo, no. ? :>o,e: 1di7ioni dell6@teneo, 1969;, #6A#5. @ccordin" to Crap*lli :p. F1;, Piccolo,ini +as re"arded !y ,ost of his conte,poraries and i,,ediate s*ccessors as a ,athe,atician of e,inence. ( 1%% ( interprets @ristotle, in co,parison to 2eoplatonists, as ,ore sharply separatin" the kno+led"e of ,athe,atics fro, i,a"ination, in that the process of a!straction ,akes the i,a"e transparent to intellection so that the latter can kno+ *nchan"ea!le, *niversal essences.O?5P /n follo+in" Procl*s rather than @ristotle, ,odern thinkin" !etrays a practical rather than a theoretical orientation to+ard ,athe,atics. CSi,ply stated, radically ,odern thinkin" a!o*t i,a"ination takes its !earin" fro, the pheno,enon of prod*ctive arts, incl*din" especially those arts adept at fashionin" internal ,ental i,a"es and then e,!odyin" these else+here, !y desi"nC= Descartes, in partic*lar, is one of these radically ,odern thinkers, and his ,athe,atics is a paradi", of the ,odern approach.O?9P &o settle these iss*es +o*ld re3*ire not only !roachin" the controversies !et+een ancients and ,oderns !*t also-and ,ore to the point-setAflin" the nat*re and so*rce of ,athe,atics and ,athe,atical thinkin". Both tasks are !eyond the scope of this !ook. &he point in raisin" the, here is different: first, to sho+, ho+ever sketchily, that i,a"ination +as traditionally and perhaps ine)trica!ly !o*nd *p +ith the early ,odern *nderstandin" of ,athe,atics and ,athesis *niversalis= second, to ,ake clear that *niversal ,athe,atics, far fro, !ein" ,erely a ,athe,atician6s concern, inevita!ly raises 3*estions a!o*t the ,eans !y +hich thin"s are kno+a!le and a!o*t +hat ontolo"ical stat*s the thin"s kno+n have. 1ven if Descartes had intended to confine his interests strictly to ,athe,atics, the conte)t of the s*!4ect ,atter +o*ld have forced hi, to ,ove into ,etaphysical territory.

<et it is pro!a!ly incorrect to ded*ce that Descartes ,erely st*,!led onto this territory. Gor fro, the si)th r*le on+ard Descartes rec*rs ,ore and ,ore insistently not ,erely to the fac*lties !y +hich +e kno+ and to the processes and ,ethod of kno+in" !*t also to the stat*s of the thin"s that are kno+n and to the 3*estion of +hether they can !e kno+n apart fro, concrete i,a"inin"s. /t is not 4*st the psycholo"y of i,a"ination that O?5P &he disc*ssion is in Lachter,an, )thics of 0eometry, E6A9$. Lachter,an6s inclination is to disco*nt the i,portance in ,athe,atics of the phantas, per se, !eca*se this transparency ,akes it invisi!le= the ,ind transcends the phantas, and proceeds to *nchan"ea!le. *niversal essences. 9e considers the noetic stat*s of phantas,s to !e the key difference !et+een ancient and ,ode, ,athe,atics. @ncients "ave priority to the p*rely theoretical, +hereas the ,ode, orientation is ,ore practical. / a, not entirely pers*aded !y Lachter,an6s effort to distin"*ish @ristotle fro, Descartes on the iss*e of phantas,s, ho+ever, not only !eca*se / interpret Descartes as atte,ptin" to think thro*"h so,e of the aporiai a!o*t phantas,s left !y @ristotle and @ristotelians !*t also !eca*se / !elieve that Lachter,an *nderstates the essentiality and indefeasi!ility of phantas,s in @ristotle6s theory of kno+led"e. 2evertheless. +e can only re"ret that he is not alive to enli"hten *s f*rther on this and ,any other thin"s. O?9P Lachter,an, )thics of 0eometry, 5?, 56. ( 1%6 ( is i,portant, then, !*t also the ontolo"ical *nderpinnin"s of this psycholo"y and its associated episte,olo"y-or, to *se a na,e tr*er to the teachin"s of the Regulae, the ontolo"ical *nderpinnin"s of its +ay of ,athesis. .here this ontolo"ical concern first e,er"es +ith cons*,,ate clarity is in the doctrine of nat*res. .here Descartes !e"ins the e)ploration of this doctrine is in >*le 6, a r*le that he calls the secret of the +hole art. ( 1%E (

FIVE Or.er5 Nat/res5 an. Series T$e Topo(og' o% Imagination

>*le F left *s in the follo+in" sit*ation. &o act*ali7e the f*nda,ental *nity of all science +e need not 4*st the t+o +ays of kno+in", int*it*s and ded*ctio, !*t also a ,ethodical +ay of approachin" and ac3*irin" kno+led"e. Descartes va*nts hi,self as the first not so ,*ch to reali7e that there is s*ch a ,ethod :for he finds traces of it in predecessors; as to e)plicate and p*!lici7e it. >*le F told ho+ he ca,e to this discovery and e)plained :l; that this ,ethod of ,athesis is a discipline for +hich the hitherto ,ost certain of sciences, the ,athe,atical, are like vest,ents, :?; that it is the so*rce of +hat is perspic*o*s and easy in ordinary ,athe,atics, :#; that the ,athe,aticians of his day +ho c*ltivate al"e!ra are atte,ptin" to res*scitate the ,athetical art of analysis that the ancients kne+, and :F; that this ,athesis is the science of everythin" havin" to do +ith order and ,eas*re. &he art of analysis of the ancients took !oth +hat +as kno+n and +hat +as so*"ht in a pro!le, as "iven and *sed the codeter,ination of the parts to arrive at an e)act deter,ination of the *nkno+n.O1P /n "eneral, the val*es that are possi!le for any one of a set of factors are at least partially deter,ined and deli,ited !y the str*ct*re of relationships that hold !et+een the, all.

/f +e recall that the Regulae +as pro4ected to consist of three parts, the latter t+o !ein" devoted to perfect and i,perfect pro!le,s, respectively, +e !e"in to see ,ore clearly ho+ in principle the acco*nt of the ,ethod +as to !e laid o*t. @fter Part / set do+n the !asics of the doctrine, Part // +o*ld sho+ ho+ the codeter,ination of factors co*ld !e *sed to discover *ni3*e sol*tions for *nkno+ns, and Part /// +o*ld deal +ith sit*ations O1P See chap. F, Sec. 0, a!ove. ( 1%5 ( +here the "ivens are ins*fficient to deter,ine a sol*tion.O?P .e see that the lines and rectan"les that Descartes introd*ced in >*les 1% thro*"h ?1 are ,eant to create a kind of calc*l*s, an al"e!ra *sin" fi"*res rather than n*,!ers, to instantiate the di,ensions of a pro!le,. &he theory of proportions that Descartes had !een +orkin" on at least since 1619 received its *lti,ate ,ethodolo"ical e)pression in this "eo,etric calc*l*s. .hat har, is there, then, in sayin" that this science, this *niversal ,athesis, is ,athe,atics, that the Regulae creates a ne+, ,ore "eneral type of ,athe,atics to deal +ith pro!le,s of all kinds at a hi"h level of a!straction, and th*s that the Regulae c*l,inates in the doctrine of the *niversal applica!ility of ,athe,aticsQ @fter all, the Regulae in essence teaches ho+ ,athe,atical pro!le,s can !e presented thro*"h a syste, of e3*ations that can !e t*rned into "eo,etry= these e3*ations, +hether in one or several *nkno+ns, and +hatever their de"ree, are solva!le precisely insofar as the vario*s ter,s are codeter,ined !y their relationships to one another. Bne diffic*lty +ith this conception is that it ,i"ht si,ply !e an anachronis, derivin" fro, the lon" tradition of historio"raphy of science that credits Descartes +ith inventin" ,odern analytic "eo,etry. .hat that tradition tends to ,ini,i7e is that Descartes6s approach +as ,otivated !y "eo,etrical considerations ,ore than !y +hat +e consider al"e!ra.O#P B*t this orientation to "eo,etry, on ,y interpretation, is d*e not so ,*ch to an essentially !ack+ardAlookin" :and, fro, a t+entiethAcent*ry vie+point, atavistic; notion of "eo,etry6s pree,inence over arith,etic :and th*s also over al"e!ra; as it is to the ,ethod of i,a"inative co"nition that Descartes had !een c*ltivatin" at least since 1615, a ,ethod that "ives pri,acy to the for,ation and *se of i,a"es. .hat the Regulae is atte,ptin" to proA O?P >*le 5 presents the distinction !et+een the parts so,e+hat differently, ho+ever: it pro,ises that the second part +ill deal +ith co,posite nat*res that are ded*ced fro, the si,plest nat*res, and the third +ith co,posite nat*res Cthat pres*ppose other thin"s also, +hich +e e)perience to !e co,posite on the part of the thin"C :@& L #99;. O#P /t is *nclear at +hat sta"e in his career Descartes !e"an *sin"-and apparently invented-a ,ode, po+er notation for representin" polyno,ials. 8ilha*d dates Descartes6s first *se of a ,odern notation to aro*nd 16?$= see 8ilha*d, Descartes savant, 56. P.K. Gededco places Descartes6s invention of ,odern notation close to 16#$= see Gederico, Descartes on Polyhedra: A %tudy of the 5De %olidorum )lementis,5 So*rces in the 9istory of 8athe,atics and Physical Sciences, vol. F :2e+ <ork: Sprin"er Derla", 195?;, #$A#?. Gro, Beeck,an6s 4o*rnal entries of late 16?5, it is clear that Descartes +as still *sin" the older cossic notation :it is, of co*rse, conceiva!le that Descartes *sed cossic for,*las to ,ake thin"s easier for Beeck,an; and +as solvin" +hat +e consider to !e al"e!raic pro!le,s !y "eo,etrical ,ethods close in spirit to those of the Regulae. Gor ,ore "eneral considerations on the relation !et+een al"e!ra and "eo,etry in Descartes, see &i,othy Lenoir, CDescartes and the 0eo,etri7ation of &ho*"ht: &he 8ethodolo"ical Back"ro*nd of Descartes6 60So,Strie,6C (istoria athematica 6 :19E9;: #%%A#E9= and Pierre Costa!el, CLa ,athS,ati3*e de Descartes antSrie*re ] la 60So,Strie,6C in D*marches originales de Descartes savant :Paris: K. Drin, 195?;, ?EA#E.

( 1%9 ( vide, / clai,, is a s*pportin" theory of the nat*re of h*,an co"nition that e)plains +hy and ho+ i,a"ination can play the central role in h*,an kno+in".

A. T0E AI, OF ,AT0ETICAL )NO*IN+

Let *s re,ind o*rselves of the a,!ition for i,a"ination in the period 1619-16?1: corporeal i,a"ination +o*ld *se fi"*res to i,a"e !odies, +hile intellect*al i,a"ination +o*ld *se !odies to i,a"e spirit*al tr*ths, the t+o standin" in an analo"ical relationship to one another. .hat happens in the Regulae, indeed in the very heart of >*le F, is that the direction of in"eni*, takes *lti,ate ai, at h*,an +isdo,, the ori"ins of +hich are the first seeds of tr*th that FAB says led the ancients to prefer honesty to *tility and virt*e to pleas*re and, ,ore "enerally, to ackno+led"e tr*e ideas of ,athesis :disciplina; and philosophy. /t is the native endo+,ent of h*,an !ein"s that ,akes ail this possi!le, and +hat Descartes see,s to !e offerin" in this +ork, +hich intends to s*, *p +hat he has learned !efore he "oes on to profo*nder st*dies :@& L #E9;, is a distillation of the si,ple tr*ths "overnin" all co"nition into a s,all n*,!er of r*les that henceforth can !e *sed !y anyone to 4*d"e of the tr*th in any ,atter +hatsoever. &his doctrine "overnin" kno+in" is !ased on the pre,ise of the int*it*s of si,ple thin"s and the ded*ctio fro, these of tr*ths that cannot !e kno+n i,,ediately: everythin" that can !e kno+n leads !ack *lti,ately to the distinct and easy concept of a p*re and attentive ,ind, and +hat cannot !e so led !ack cannot properly !e kno+n. &his +ay of kno+in" is tr*ly *niversal in scope, since even 4*st the r*di,ents of it led the ancients to tr*e ideas of ,athesis and philosophy :Philosophiae etiam , atheseos veras ideas agnoverint = @& L #E6 11. 15-19;.OFP .hat this ,eans is that the first seeds of kno+led"e ena!le *s, if +e look +ith a p*re and attentive ,ind, to reco"ni7e certain o!4ects, like +hat is virt*o*s and +hat is honest, and to see ho+ they stand +ith respect to other o!4ects, like pleas*re and *tility.O%P B*t i,,ediately after notin" these f*nda,ental OFP &his is the only occ*rrence of 6idea6 !efore >*le 1?, and the only one in the Regulae +here the +ord see,s to ,ean so,ethin" other than Ccorporeal i,a"e.C &his is a s,all piece of evidence that, contrary to the .e!er thesis, Descartes ,ay have +orked on FAB ,*ch later than 1619. O%P &his i,plies that the reco"nition of ter,s is prior to the reco"nition of propositional tr*ths. Despite the fact that the Regulae fre3*ently relates its teachin"s to the co"nition of propositiones, the !asis of the proposition is the ,ental "rasp of a relatively si,ple o!4ect. .hat +ords "o +ith any partic*lar "rasp is indifferent, !*t as soon as one co,pares one thin" +ith another, one arrives at a 4*d",ent, +hich is the !asis for all ver!al propositions. Bne ,*st recall a"ain Descartes6s penchant for lookin" to the ori"inal ,eanin" of ter,s: 6propositio6 *lti,ately derives fro, +hat is proposed to :propositus ;, p*t !efore, the ,ind= as any Scholastic thinker +o*ld have noted, the lin"*istic proposition *lti,ately derives fro, the receptivity and acts of the ,ind. ( 16$ ( principles *nderstood ,athetically !y the ancients, Descartes t*rns the disc*ssion to+ard a ,athesis conceived alon" ,athe,atical lines. .hatever else they ,i"ht have !een, Papp*s and Diophant*s +ere reco"ni7ed, not chiefly as +ise ,en, first philosophers, or teachers of ethics, !*t as ,athe,aticians. @nd even tho*"h order and ,eas*re are so !road as to enco,pass ,ore than strictly ,athe,atical thin"s, the conte)t of the last part of FAB is do,inated !y the presence of the traditionally ,athe,atical

disciplines. /t is 3*ite *nderstanda!le that ,ost people have interpreted the Regulae as applyin" a kind of conventionally conceived hi"her ,athe,atics to all pro!le,s. /t is i,portant to reco"ni7e, ho+ever, that in the f*nda,ental intention of the +ork and in the very notion of ,athesis so,ethin" even hi"her is i,plied that the +ork itself at cr*cial points falls short of-especially as the *niversal !asis laid do+n in the first part is "rad*ally steered to+ard !eco,in" a pro!le,Asolvin" techni3*e. <et even at its ,ost technical, the Regulae stays in close contact +ith co"nitive i,a"ination= in fact, it is precisely +here the doctrine !eco,es ,ost ,athe,atical, in the last of the e)tant r*les, that Descartes insists on *sin" i,a"es for,ed !oth in phantasia and Con paperC :in the e)ternal +orld; to assist the intellect, +hich other+ise is in dan"er of error thro*"h overlookin" relevant considerations. .e sho*ld recall once ,ore the t+o i,a"inations of the CCo"itationes privataeC: the corporeal one *ses fi"*res to conceive !odies, and the intellect*al one *ses !odies to fi"*re spirit*al tr*ths. &he Regulae "ives pri,acy to the corporeal i,a"ination and conceives the intellect as for the ,ost part dependent on ,athetical i,a"es, yet essentially different fro, the corporeal i,a"ination !eca*se it, the intellect, is spirit*al.O6P &he independence of fac*lties as conceived !y the Scholastics is displaced !y a ,ore *nitary notion of ,ind. Properly speakin", accordin" to >*le 1?, it is no+ the vis co"noscens or, in a !road sense, intellect that *ses fi"*res to conceive thin"s even at the lo+er level= the operation of the vis co"noscens in phantasia is +hat i,a"ination in the precise sense is. @nd, as +ill !e re,arked in >*le 5 and reiterated thereafter, !ody or the corporeal co,es into consideration not as e)istin" in the +orld O6P Bne of the CCo"itationes privataeC sheds li"ht on +hat differentiates this fro, the earliest position. CGor 0od to separate li"ht fro, darkness, in 0enesis is to separate the "ood an"els fro, the !ad, !eca*se a privation cannot !e separated fro, OitsP ha!it: for +hich reason it cannot !e *nderstood literally. P*re intelli"ence is 0odC :@& L ?15= the order of the concl*din" sentence, C/ntelli"entia p*ra est De*s,C decidedly identifies p*re intelli"ence +ith 0od;. &he i,plication is t+ofold: the i,a"e *sed in 0enesis conveys so,ethin" of the tr*th, !*t it re3*ires analo"ical *nderstandin"= ,oreover, since only 0od is p*re intelli"ence, h*,an !ein"s are not, and so the hi"hest tr*ths ,*st in so,e +ay !e acco,,odated to their lesser capacities. &he intellect of the Regulae see,s in ,any passa"es to !e a p*re for, of spirit, !*t its contin*in" dependence on i,a"es and its involve,ent +ith the !ody s*""est there is at least a re,nant of the i,p*re analo"ical intelli"ence descri!ed in the 0enesis note. ( 161 ( !*t only insofar as it is conceived, or to*ched, !y the ,ind. &his is the real, of p*re phantas,s. .hat +e are likely +itnessin" in the Regulae is a transfor,ation fro, the earliest conception of i,a"ination, its aspects, its po+ers, and its o!4ects, a transfor,ation that is pro!a!ly i,plicit in the lo"ic of any co"nitive ,ethod that pro,inently feat*res i,a"ination. &he notes of 1619A16?1 reflected a native realis, a!o*t !odies: there +as no si"n that they +ere !ein" tho*"ht of +ith the proviso C!odies only insofar as they are conceived !y the ,ind,C and in fact Descartes pres*,ed to kno+ that there +as one active po+er in thin"s, and that in !odies this +as corporeal form. &he for,s of thin"s in the +orld +ere so,eho+ "rasped !y *s, and those for,s in t*rn co*ld !e *sed to "rasp hi"her thin"s. /,a"ination +as the po+er that ena!led *s to "et a ti"hter "rasp than ,ere "a+kin" +o*ld= it allo+ed *s to dra+ !ack fro, the i,,ediacy of the "iven so that +e ,i"ht *se fi"*ration to !etter conceive thin"s. <et this distance loosened the connection !et+een sensation and kno+in", it opened *p a space +here the i,a"ination co*ld f*nction !*t si,*ltaneo*sly introd*ced the possi!ility of "oin" astray !eca*se of chance, ar!itrariness, and the ineffective *se of this po+er. &he i,a"ination is in need of direction, and +hat proArides that direction are the seeds of kno+led"e "iven to every in"eni*, and the s,all n*,!er of r*les it is possi!le to prescri!e therefro,. @s the private co"itation on Schenckel6s art

of ,e,ory s*""ested, t+o +ays of approachin" the tr*th open *p: proceedin" fro, phantas,s to ca*se and !ack and for,in" a phantas, co,,on to each of a "ro*p of phantas,s, that is, findin" the idea or eidos of the "ro*p :@& L ?#$;. 1ither of these +ays, or !oth taken to"ether, +o*ld provide "*idance for the other+ise *nsta!le, la!ile i,a"ination. &he first ,ethod is a +ay that leads to the real and the ca*ses of thin"s= the second is a +ay that can proceed alon" either real or fictive lines so lon" as order is ,aintained. B*t this 3*ite nat*rally opens *p a ne+ pro!le,, for ho+ can +e kno+ that a ,ethod allo+in" fictions +ill *lti,ately lead to the real and tr*eQ 8oreover, +hat is the nat*re of the real, of the cause, that prod*ces phantas,sQ /s it itself so,ethin" that shares in the nat*re of the phantas,, or is it e)ternal to that real,Q Does the activity of the ,ind parallel the activity of the +orld, or are ,ind6s activity and ,ind itself so,ethin" other than the +orldQ &he Regulae can !e *nderstood, / think, as an atte,pt to +ork o*t these pro!le,s and 3*estions, an atte,pt that still ,aintains a !asic confidence in the po+ers of i,a"ination. B*t certain 3*alifications and li,itations have inevita!ly +orked their +ay in. /ntellect, +hich in the early notes e)ercised the hi"her kind of i,a"ination that is proper to the poets, na,ely, *sin" corporeal thin"s to fi"*re spirit*al thin"s, is no+ the a"ent proper in all co"nitively relevant acts, fro, sensation to p*re intellection. Bodies are no lon"er considered per se !*t as they are to*ched !y the ,ind. ( 16? ( @ltho*"h Descartes credits the ancients +ith reco"ni7in" philosophical and ethical tr*ths thro*"h the r*di,ents of ,athesis, there is other+ise no ,ention of ho+ the intellect *ses !odies, or ideas of !odies, to fi"*re spirit*al-!oth ,oral and intellect*al-tr*ths. /f the pri,ary ,otif of the early notes +as co"nitive and spirit*al ascent !y +ay of !oth corporeal and intellect*al i,a"ination, the do,inant ,otif of the Regulae is the intellect +orkin" on pro!le,s that are C!eneath6 it. /t is of co*rse tr*e that even in the early note!ooks Descartes +as a ,athe,atical and physical pro!le, solver, !*t then he stood in the first "lo+ of enth*sias, for a techni3*e that pro,ised to carry its practitioner to the hi"hest hei"hts, to +hich other+ise only the poets easily ascended= +hereas no+ that the techni3*e is !ein" +orked o*t in detail, the hei"hts ,ay !e appearin" in the "*ise of the si,ple, that is, si,ple o!4ects si,ply "rasped !y a p*re and attentive ,ind. &he hi"h i,a"inative leaps of the poet are !ein" i,plicitly conde,ned as *n,ethodical and replaced +ith the stepA!yAstep ascent of the orderAlovin" philosopher.

-. SERIATION AND T0E NATURALNESS OF SI,PLICITY

>*le F anno*nced that every e)a,ination of order and ,ethod properly refers to *niversal ,athesis= >*le % anno*nces that the +hole ,ethod consists in proper orderin" and that the t+o r*les that follo+ +ill clarify ho+ this order is to !e discovered and ho+ it is possi!le to avoid error. &he e,phasis on order is not at all s*rprisin", since it is an ela!oration of +hat is i,plicit in the doctrines of int*it*s and ded*ctio. /f +e are to *se these properly :that is to say, if +e are to proceed ,ethodically; +e ,*st kno+ +hen they are in order. .e cannot inspect or int*it 4*st anythin": the pro!le, is that ,ost people are tryin" to *nderstand a !loo,in", !*77in" conf*sion, the everyday +orld, +hereas inspection is possi!le only +here +e have separated o*t the conf*sions and have arrived at so,ethin" easy= and only once +e have reco"ni7ed these easy thin"s can +e reverse direction and !e"in ded*ctio, proceedin" fro, the si,plest to the ,ost co,ple). &his orderly proced*re is +hat >*les 6 and E teach. B*t, as one +o*ld e)pect fro, +hat has preceded, this orderly proced*re sho*ld involve learnin" !oth ho+ to p*t the ,ind into a p*re and attentive state and +hat the ,ind is reco"ni7in" +hen it is in that state: that is, there are t+o s*!4ects *nder consideration, the activities and po+ers of ,ind and the proper o!4ects of those activities. >*le 6 in fact e,phasi7es the proper o!4ect of co"nition, *nder the r*!ric of si,plicity,

+hich ,akes that o!4ect +ell adapted to the li,its of in"eni*,. &he headin" of >*le 6 reads: C/n order to distin"*ish the si,plest fro, involved thin"s and to follo+ thro*"h in order, it is re3*ired to o!serve, in ( 16# ( every series of thin"s in +hich +e directly ded*ce Oor lead do+nP certain tr*ths one fro, another, +hat is ,a)i,ally si,ple and in +hat +ay all the others are ,ore, or less, or e3*ally, re,oved fro, it.C &he co,,entary !e"ins !y sayin" that this r*le Ccontains the chief secret of the art, nor is any other ,ore *sef*l in this +hole treatise.C &he reason is e)pressed in the ne)t cla*se. Gor it advises that all thin"s can !e disposed Oi.e., set o*tP accordin" to certain series, not indeed insofar as they are referred to a certain "en*s of entity, as philosophers divide these thin"s into their cate"ories, !*t insofar as so,e can !e kno+n fro, others, s*ch that as often as so,e diffic*lty occ*rs +e can i,,ediately notice +hether certain ones are prior to others, and +hich ones, and in +hat order to s*rvey Othe,P. :@& L #51; &he secret to the art is th*s the disposal of thin"s into series accordin" to a cognitive order of dependency. .hat is re4ected is @ristotelianAScholastic practice: identifyin" thin"s accordin" to "en*s and differentiatin" character :+hich t+o ,ake *p the identification of the species; and classifyin" all the +ays in +hich thin"s e)ist accordin" to the cate"ories of s*!stance, 3*ality, 3*antity, place, relation, and so on, that is, accordin" to the order of !ein" rather than of kno+in". /n addition, as +ill !eco,e clear fro, the se3*el, Descartes is also re4ectin" the resort to a!stract *niversals, the Cter,sC of the dialecticians and lo"icians, in favor of a special kind of partic*larity. /t appears, then, that the secret of ,athesis is the proper orderin" of certain kinds of thin"s= *niversal ,athesis is the science of the proper order of +hat is kno+n. B*t ho+ can co"nition and the co"itation that arrives at co"nition e)hi!it proper orderQ &he ans+er is i,plicit in +hat has preceded. Si,ple o!4ects are the thin"s ,ost easily kno+a!le of all, and as s*ch they are the ori"in of kno+in": they are first in the order of kno+in". Bne can call the, the ori"in of kno+in" in t+o senses. Girst, there is nothin" ,ore kno+a!le than si,ples= they are perfectly tailored to the nat*re and capacity of the h*,an ,ind. Second, fro, si,ples +e can arrive at other, ,ore co,ple) tr*ths= the place of co,ple) thin"s in the order of kno+in" depends on ho+ re,ote they are fro, the si,ple firsts. 9o+ do +e kno+ that +e have hit *pon a si,pleQ By the fact that it is so easy and distinct that it leaves no do*!t in a p*re and attentive ,ind. &hat is all +ell and "ood, !*t it does not "ive any "*idance a!o*t ho+ to p*t o*r ,inds in s*ch a state or any criterion for distin"*ishin" a co,ple) fro, a si,ple thin". 9o+ do +e ,ana"e to avoid the ai,less +anderin"s that ,ost of o*r predecessors have fallen into a,on" the +elter of a co,plicated +orldQ /n the very ne)t para"raph Descartes !e"ins to address this 3*estion. C/n order ho+ever that this ,i"ht co,e a!o*t ri"htly, all thin"s, in the sense accordin" to +hich they can !e *sef*l to o*r proposal, +here +e do ( 16F ( not look at the solitary nat*res of the,, !*t rather co,pare the, to one another so that so,e ,i"ht !e kno+n fro, others, can !e called either a!sol*te or respective.C 9e proceeds to define +hat he ,eans !y 6a!sol*te6: C/ call a!sol*te +hatever contains in itself the p*re and si,ple nat*re +hich is in 3*estion, like everythin" that is considered as independent, ca*se, si,ple, *niversal, one, e3*al, si,ilar, direct Oor strai"htP, or other thin"s of this kind= and / call this first thin" the ,ost si,ple and ,ost easy

inas,*ch as +e *se it in resolvin" 3*estions.C &he 6respective6, in t*rn, is +hat participates OinP the very sa,e nat*re, or at least so,ethin" fro, it OJ fro, the nat*re in 3*estionP, accordin" to +hich it OJ the respective thin"P can !e referred to the a!sol*te, and ded*ced fro, it OJ the a!sol*teP thro*"h a certain series= !*t !eyond this it involves certain other thin"s in its conception, +hich / call respects: s*ch thin"s are +hatever is called dependent, effect, co,posite, partic*lar, ,any, *ne3*al, dissi,ilar, o!li3*e, etc. .hich respective thin"s are the ,ore re,oved fro, a!sol*te thin"s !y this, that they contain ,ore respects of this kind s*!ordinated one to another= all +hich thin"s, +e +ill !e advised !y this r*le, are to !e distin"*ished, and the nat*ral ne)*s of these a,on" the,selves and the nat*ral order are so to !e o!served that fro, the last +e ,i"ht !y transitin" all the others reach to that +hich is ,a)i,ally a!sol*te. :@& L #5?; &he cr*cial notions here are a nat*re, one or ,ore thin"s that contain or participate :in; this nat*re, and an act of co,parison. Co,parison is of co*rse i,plicit in a +ay of co"itation accordin" to rese,!lance, +hether in co,parin" i,a"es to !odies, !odies to hi"her thin"s, or any ordera!le or ,eas*ra!le thin"s to others of the sa,e kind. Co,parison operates accordin" to !iplanarity. 1ither one co,pares t+o thin"s alon"side one another :in the first plane; +ith respect to so,e characteristic :+hich defines the second plane; or one thin" is seen +ith respect to the characteristic. /t is pro!a!ly not possi!le to "ive a sea,less, totally consistent acco*nt of the a!sol*te, the respective, the si,ple, and nat*res, and it is likely that one of the chief ca*ses of Descartes6s leavin" the Regulae *nfinished +as the intrinsic diffic*lty of e)plainin" the,. <et a caref*l e)a,ination of >*le 6 in co,parison +ith other parts of the Regulae allo+s *s to ill*,inate the key ele,ents. Descartes6s acco*nt of the a!sol*te and the respective is not in the first instance a!o*t nat*res :and certainly not a!o*t essences; !*t a!o*t +hat contains or participates the,. Bne has a thin" in ,ind, and one vie+s it in ter,s of a nat*re, Cthe p*re and si,ple nat*re that is in 3*estion.C Gor e)a,ple, a kin" ,i"ht !e vie+ed in ter,s of independence. /t +o*ld see, ri"ht to affir, that a kin", if anyone, is independent. B*t the ,ethod of >*le 6 re3*ires co,parison. So no+ one takes into vie+ not 4*st a kin" !*t ( 16% ( also an earl, a kni"ht, a yeo,an, and a serf. &he res*ltin" relationships to independence have !eco,e ,ore co,ple) and artic*lated. &he serf participates least in independence, !eca*se he see,s close to a slave= one ,*st !e+are of si,ply assertin" that he participates to de"ree 7ero, ho+ever, precisely !eca*se +e have no+ conceived of another individ*al +ho participates in less than he. :G*rther,ore, one ,i"ht "o on to co,pare a do,estic slave, a slave +ho +orks in the sta!les, another +ho +orks in the fields, and a fo*rth +ho la!ors in a ,ine;. &he yeo,an clearly has ,ore independence than the serf, the kni"ht ,ore than the yeo,an, the earl ,ore than the kni"ht, *p to the kin", +ho, if his po+er is not 3*alified !y anythin" or anyone hi"her, not ,erely participates in the nat*re !*t +holly contains it. /n this series the kin" is a!sol*te-and that is tr*e even if he is not f*lly independent in an Ca!sol*teC sense. @!sol*teness as Descartes defines it is a property of standin" at the head of a series +ith respect to a nat*re !y virt*e of +holly containin" it or perhaps 4*st participarin" it ,ore than any other ,e,!er of the series. @ fine line etched in a flat ,ar!le sla!, a railroad track crossin" a plain, the path of a !ea, of li"ht, a !ricklayer6s pl*,! line: all participate to varyin" de"rees in strai"htness, e)tension, and len"th. Perhaps none +holly contains the nat*re strai"htness :each pro!a!ly deviates fro, perfect strai"htness to so,e de"ree;= each see,s to contain +holly e)tension in len"th, and for that ,atter e)tension in the other

t+o di,ensions as +ell :the etched line ,ay !e 4*st $.$1 ,, in +idth and $.$$% ,, in depth, !*t that is still e)istence in three di,ensions;. @s +e sa+ in chapter #, Sec. G :+ith reference to @& L F%#;, Descartes conceives act*al i,a"es as havin" the three spatial di,ensions of len"th, +idth, and depth. &hat is, even a line dra+n on paper or a line i,a"ined in phantasia has threeAdi,ensionality :see >*le 1F, esp. @& L FF6;. B*t the po+er vis co"noscens is s*ch that +e can relia!ly foc*s on 4*st one aspect, one nat*re, at a ti,e. /t is not properly the nat*res that are a!sol*te or respective !*t the Cthin"sC :res; that contain or participate a nat*re, or, as Descartes 3*alifies f*rther in the definition of 6respective6, participate Cat least so,ethin" fro, the nat*reC accordin" to +hich it can !e referred and co,pared to the a!sol*te thin" that stands at the head of the series and perhaps even +holly contains the nat*re. &h*s it is contained and participatin" nat*res that are the fo*ndation of co,parison: the a!sol*te thin"s that +holly contain the nat*res serve as standards fro, +hich the respective thin"s are 4*d"ed to !e ,ore or less re,oved or distant. &he respective thin"s, in their t*rn, can !e co,pared to one another as ,ore, or less, or e3*ally participatin" a nat*re. 1ach "ro*p of thin"s can conse3*ently !e p*t into a seriesseriali7ed or seriated-accordin" to this co,parison in li"ht of their differential participation of a specified nat*re. 8oreover, the a!sol*te ( 166 ( in each s*ch series is the si,plest and easiest insofar as it facilitates the sol*tion of pro!le,s.OEP 6@!sol*te6 and 6respective6 are therefore pra",atic rather than ontolo"ical ter,s, that is, relative to the practice of co,parison for the sake of pro!le, solvin". @t least for the ti,e !ein", Descartes is not addressin" the 3*estion of +hether all thin"s can !e ontolo"ically red*ced to a fe+ si,ple nat*res :like thinkin" and e)tension;. /t is not even clear that he is allottin" ontolo"ical or even episte,olo"ical pri,acy to 6independence6, 6ca*se6, 6si,plicity6, 6*niversality6, 6oneness6, 6e3*ality6, 6si,ilarity6, 6strai"htness6, and the anony,o*s 6others of this sort6. &he passa"e that privile"es these cate"ories in deter,inin" the a!sol*te can !e read as sayin" not that these are a!sol*tes !*t that they are ,arks or criteria that a thin" e)hi!itin" a relation to a nat*re :other than these; act*ally contains the nat*re and th*s can !e called 6a!sol*te6. Gor e)a,ple, the ri"id stick and the pair of scales add*ced at the end of >*le 9 si,ply contain, respectively, Ci,,ediately cond*cted nat*ral po+erC and Cnat*ral po+er si,*ltaneo*sly prod*cin" contrary effectsC= the for,er contains *nity and ca*se in a si,ple ,anner, the latter ca*se and e3*ality :of opposites;. &his interpretation is consistent +ith Descartes6s initial e,phasis on the thin"s rather than on the nat*res the thin"s e)hi!it. &h*s !eca*se a kin" is the ca*se of the a*thority of his vassals, he ,ay !e called the C,ost si,ple and easiestC thin" in the series +ith respect to a*thority. /n co,parison to the kin"6s pri,e ,inister, the kin"6s a*thority is *ndivided :*nitary or one;= a"ain this is a ,ark that the kin" stands in the a!sol*te position. &hese reflections lead to a 3*estion: is it the nat*res that are si,ple and p*re, or the thin"s e)hi!itin" the,Q >ecall that in the definition of int*it*s it +as the grasp or concept that +as characteri7ed as easy and the mind as p*re. Both the thin" and the nat*re need to !e "rasped= perhaps the nat*re is nothin" ,ore than a deter,inate +ay of "raspin" :or a deter,inate foc*s of attention to; a thin". /t is possi!le that !oth nat*res and the thin"s that participate the, can !e si,ple and p*re, altho*"h in the develop,ent of the theory of nat*res that takes place later in >*le 6, and even ,ore in >*les 5 and 1?, p*rity and si,plicity co,e to !e seen as OEP &his last characteri7ation in ter,s of a thin"6s pro!le,Asolvin" efficacy p*shes the seriali7er to find so,ethin" a!sol*te not 4*st for a partic*lar series !*t for all series of the sa,e kind. &h*s a +ooden r*ler ,i"ht serve as the Ca!sol*teC ,eter for one type of ,eas*re,ent :say, the layo*t of a practice

track;, +hereas a standard ,eter ,ade of precio*s ,etal preserved in a vac**, at constant te,perat*re +o*ld s*persede the +ooden r*ler in an a,plified series and !e even ,ore effective for settin" the standard of scientific ,eas*re,ent :tho*"h o!vio*sly one *ses it to ,eas*re only occasionally, for e)a,ple to esta!lish standard ,eter len"ths for the !*rea*s of standards of different co*ntries;. 8ost effective of all ,i"ht !e a ne+ a!sol*te defined in ter,s of a certain n*,!er of +avelen"ths of a certain kind of ato, :+hich is ho+ the standard ,eter is c*rrently defined;. ( 16E ( ,ost properly ascri!ed to nat*res. &he latter t+o r*les ,*ch ,ore directly address ontolo"ical 3*estions a!o*t nat*res and ,anifest ,*ltiple tensions and strains. @s / shall sho+, the nat*res led Descartes a+ay fro, the rese,!lance doctrine of his early years= initially conceived as a s*pport for that doctrine, the nat*res "rad*ally *nder,ined the notion of co"nition !y rese,!lance and analo"y +hen the nat*res +ere conceived in a radically fo*ndationalist +ay. /n >*le 6 the place +here the develop,ent of the acco*nt of nat*res !e"ins is not so ,*ch in the definition of 6a!sol*te6 as in that of 6respective6. @ thin" is respective not 4*st +hen it participates a nat*re in less than the a!sol*te +ay !*t also !y involving respects that are connected to one another in a hierarchical +ay. Besides the participatin" thin", there is C+hatever is called dependent, effect, co,posite, partic*lar, ,any, *ne3*al, dissi,ilar, o!li3*e, etc.C &his list is in perfect parallel +ith the previo*s para"raph6s listin" of the characteristics that ,ake a thin" a!sol*te= each ter, is the privative or ne"ative correlate of the correspondin" ,e,!er of the first list. &he lo"ic appears to !e this: @ thin" +e call dependent, or effect, or co,posite, and so on, is to !e *nderstood *lti,ately as !ein" in relation to the positive for, of the characteristic, that is, the independent, the ca*se, the si,ple. @ thin" that in its !ein" "rasped :in suo conceptu ;O5P involves dependence, say, a kin"6s vassal, is at a certain re,ove fro, the kin". /f +e call to ,ind that the vassal in t*rn has his o+n vassals, +e vie+ hi, not si,ply in direct re"ard of independence !*t, for instance, also as the ca*se of the po+ers of his vassals, and this ,i"ht re,ind *s that his !ein" a vassal to+ard the kin" ,eans he is an effect as +ell. Descartes e,phasi7es that 6a!sol*te6 and 6relative6 are not the,selves a!sol*te ter,s. @nd so the secret of the +hole art consists in this, that in everythin" +e dili"ently direct o*rselves to that +hich is ,a)i,ally a!sol*te. Gor so,e thin"s are, *nder one consideration, ,ore a!sol*te than others, !*t looked at other+ise they are ,ore respective: as the *niversal is ,ore a!sol*te than the partic*lar, !eca*se it has a si,pler nat*re, !*t all the sa,e it can !e called ,ore respective, !eca*se that it e)ists depends on individ*als, etc. :@& L #5?; 8oreover, he "oes on, thin"s are ,ore or less a!sol*te dependin" on +here they stand: th*s if +e are lookin" to :respiciamus ; individ*als the species is a!sol*te, !*t if +e are lookin" to the "en*s it is respective= like+ise a,on" ,eas*ra!le thin"s e)tension is so,ethin" a!sol*te, !*t a,on" e)tensions it is len"th, etc. @nd finally, so that it ,i"ht !e !etter *nderstood O5P &his is the fo*rthAdeclension no*n conceptus, not the secondAdeclension conceptum = the for,er is the act of conceivin", collectin", or "atherin" :here, in the ,ind;. ( 165 ( that +e are lookin" here at the series of thin"s to !e kno+n, and not the nat*re of each one,

+e have deli!erately co*nted ca*se and e3*al a,on" the a!sol*te, altho*"h their nat*re is really respective: for even a,on" Philosophers ca*se and effect are correlative= here, ho+ever, if +e in3*ire +hich is the effect, it is necessary to kno+ the ca*se first, and not the contrary. 13*als also correspond one to another, !*t thin"s that are *ne3*al +e do not reco"ni7e e)cept !y co,parison to e3*als, and not the contrary, etc. :@& L #5?A#5#; &hese 3*alifications are !afflin" *nless +e keep constantly !efore o*r ,inds-precisely as Descartes ad,onishes *s-that the end is not to *nderstand nat*res per se, ,*ch less thin"s as havin" *ni3*e and essential nat*res, !*t to kno+ thin"s accordin" to series, as they e)hi!it a certain nature or look fro, the perspective of the in3*iry. 62at*re6 is in effect *sed in a threefold sense in >*le 6. Girst, it is synony,o*s +ith @ristotelianA Scholastic 6essence6= !*t >*le 6 at the o*tset disco*nts the val*e of p*rs*in" nat*res in this sense, altho*"h it does not "o so far as to deny that s*ch nat*res e)ist. Descartes6s assertion that the nat*res 6ca*se6 and 6e3*al6 are really respective s*""ests that he attri!*tes a certain reality to at least so,e nat*res. Second, it ,eans an aspect or characteristic in vie+ of +hich a thin" can !e deter,inately vie+ed and "rasped, the sense that is ,ost !asic to the ,ethod e)plained !y >*le 6. &hird, it ,eans a restricted class of nat*res in the second sense, the fe+ nat*res that are kno+a!le in independence fro, all other nat*res, as the second annotation to the r*le e)plains. /t is to !e noted second that, strictly speakin", fe+ are the p*re and si,ple nat*res, the ones it is "ranted to int*it first and per se, not dependent on any others !*t either in the e)periences the,selves or !y a certain li"ht sit*ated in *s= and these thin"s, +e say, are to !e dili"ently attended to: for they are the sa,e ones that in every sin"le series +e call ,a)i,ally si,ple. @ll the others, ho+ever, can !e perceived in no other +ay than if they are led do+n Oded*cant*rP o*t of these, and this either i,,ediately and pro)i,ately, or not *nless thro*"h t+o or three or ,ore different concl*sions= the n*,!er of +hich also is to !e noted, so that +e ,i"ht reco"ni7e +hether these are re,oved fro, the first and ,a)i,ally si,ple proposition !y ,any or !y fe+er de"rees. /ndeed of s*ch a nat*re is the conte)t*re of conse3*ences every+here, o*t of +hich are !orn those series of thin"s to !e in3*ired a!o*t, to +hich OseriesP every 3*estion is to !e !ro*"ht !ack Ored*cendaP, so that it ,i"ht !e e)a,ined !y a s*re ,ethod. Beca*se, ho+ever, it is not easy to s*rvey all to"ether, and f*rther,ore !eca*se they are not so ,*ch to !e retained !y ,e,ory as distin"*ished !y a certain ac*,en of in"eni*,, so,e O,eansP is to !e in3*ired after of for,in" the in"enia so that they OJ in"eniaP i,,ediately heed the,, as often as there +ill !e need= / have e)perienced that for this there is really nothin" apter than if +e !eco,e acc*sA ( 169 ( to,ed to reflect +ith a certain sa"acity on each ,ini,*, thin" o*t of those that +e have already perceived previo*sly. :@& L #5#A#5F; /t +o*ld !e pre,at*re to ass*,e that Descartes had in ,ind +ith this third sense of 6nat*re6 the red*ction of all thin"s to either e)tension or thinkin", altho*"h that is a direction in +hich it ,i"ht !e taken. 9o+ fe+ are the nat*res of this kindQ Descartes does not say, !*t only o*r kno+led"e of the later Descartes +ill ,ake *s ass*,e they are 4*st t+o= the tenor of the passa"e s*""ests a relatively !*t not ,ini,ally s,all n*,!er. 8oreover, as +e shall see shortly, >*les 5 and 1? allo+ at least three types of nat*res, those that are corporeal, those that are intellect*al or spirit*al, and those that can !e either :i.e., e)hi!ited !y either corporeal or intellect*al thin"s;. .hat Descartes see,s to !e ai,in" at here is !*ildin" in the ,ethodical investi"ator a !road and deep

e)perience of nat*res as points of reference, so that +hen a pro!le, appears she +ill !e provided +ith every possi!le +ay of approachin" it *nder diverse considerations :they are therefore like topics in the classical, rhetorical sense;. .e are "iven ass*rance that there are si,ple and p*re nat*res in an *lti,ate sense, !*t +e do not necessarily have to resort to the, in addressin" partic*lar pro!le,s :tho*"h they have the advanta"e that they are to !e fo*nd as ,a)i,ally si,ple in every-pres*,a!ly co,pleteseries +e ,i"ht enco*nter;.O9P @ fa,iliarity +ith s*ch !asic nat*res and their interconnection +ith others +ill keep a pro!le, solver fro, !ein" st*,ped if she cannot solve a pro!le, e)pressed in its ori"inal ter,s. Gor e)a,ple, in an e)a,ple provided !y >*le 9,O1$P if one is tryin" to deter,ine at +hat speed li"ht travels one ,i"ht recall that it is a nat*ral po+er, and this in t*rn ,i"ht ind*ce one to think of si,ple, concrete e)a,ples of the propa"ation of nat*ral forces, so,e te,poral, others instantaneo*s. 9ere the p*re and si,ple nat*re, or at least the s*rro"ate for it, is 6nat*ral po+er6, +hich certainly does constit*te a perspective *nder +hich ,any series can !e perceived. B*t has not Descartes chan"ed the +ay in +hich pro!le,s are to !e solved !y shiftin" fro, seein" thin"s in the perspective of nat*res to seein" nat*res in the perspective of other nat*resQ Does this not displace thinkin" in ter,s of concrete thin"s +ith thinkin" in ter,s of the ter,sQ &he ans+er is that a shift ,ay !e *nder +ay !*t it is not acco,plished. >ather, the Regulae appears to !e at the threshold of s*ch a shift. &he O9P Clearly Descartes ,eans not that any one or t+o of these nat*res appear in every series, !*t that, "iven any ar!itrary series, the +ay to at least one nat*re +ill "li,,er in the distance :in the last analysis, so to speak;. O1$P /n the disc*ssion of perspicacity, +hich is the ha!it of an in"eni*, practiced in the division of thin"s into parts and their seriation. ( 1E$ ( interconnection of nat*res and the e)istence of so,e that are either e)perienced !y the,selves or kno+n !y the,selves thro*"h a certain li"ht of nat*re is not the center of "ravity of the ,ethod of the Regulae . &hat center is instead the co,parison of thin"s accordin" to their de"rees of rese,!lance to one another, +ith the principle of rese,!lance takin" the na,e 6nat*re6. &he ,ethod of notin" rese,!lances does not depend on an ontolo"ical red*ction to f*nda,ental nat*res. So, for e)a,ple, one is not li,ited to *sin" the ,ethod of fi"*ration only for solvin" corporeal pro!le,s, !eca*se it is the proportional interconnection of thin"s and nat*res that is at iss*e, and the concrete, proportionali7in" fi"*rations that the Regulae e,ploys are perfectly s*ited to representin" s*ch interconnections, that is, the proportional involve,ent and intrication of nat*res, +hatever those nat*res ,i"ht !e. &o conceive the Regulae as co*nselin" the direct, p*rely intellect*al thinkin" of nat*res +o*ld !e to fall !ack into the Scholastic ,ethods that Descartes has re4ected. Later, +hen in the first half of >*le 1? Descartes s*""ests representin" colors !y "eo,etrical fi"*res, he is not effectin" the ontolo"ical red*ction of color to e)tension :or to ,otion and e)tension; !*t i,plyin" that colors are invaria!ly involved +ith the nat*re e)tension. Color itself is a nat*re in the sense of the Regulae -for e)a,ple, nat*ral o!4ects participate in colors, and one can seriali7e o!4ects accordin" to their h*es. @ltho*"h the conveyance of the i,pression of color to the senses and the ,ind involves e)tension, color is not si,ply replacea!le !y e)tension or !y a ,ode of it, since, as Descartes notes, so,eone !lind fro, !irth cannot kno+ color. .hat he does hope to esta!lish in >*le 1?, ho+ever, is that the variety of "eo,etrical fi"*res is a,ple eno*"h so that the patterns of the interrelationships that hold a,on" colors can !e acc*rately represented !y the pattern of differences !et+een the representin" fi"*res.

.hat Descartes6s ,ethod in the Regulae proposes is not to co,e at concepts a!stractly, as is the co,,on Scholastic practice in the 3*aestio, +herein +e +o*ld define and distin"*ish so that +e ,i"ht ded*ce, !*t rather to think of the individ*als, the instantiations that participate +holly or in part in these nat*res, and to arrive at an int*it*s of the nat*re !y relatin" :distin"*ishin" and assi,ilatin"; individ*als to one another in a series. Descartes6s ,ethod is th*s directed to+ard the classification of individ*als, or, to p*t it ,ore acc*rately and less ,isleadin"ly, to+ard the vie+in" of individ*als *nder partic*lar aspects. 6/ndivid*als6 here can !e taken in a !road sense, li,ited only to +hatever directly appears to the ,ind as an o!4ect. Under this definition it +o*ld not !e the case that the si,ple nat*res the,selves are individ*als, since they are perceived only as participated in !y individ*als. Descartes6s *nderstandin" of the act of the ,ind, "ro*nded in co,parison, or rather seein" a thin" alon" an a)is *lti,ately pointin" to+ard ,a)i,ally si,ple nat*res, involves not irred*ci!le ( 1E1 ( ele,ents !*t the "rasp :concept; of a thin" in li"ht of an aspect it participates or contains. &he si,plest proposition is th*s derived !y "raspin" a thin" +ith a p*re and attentive ,ind in li"ht of a p*rified aspect or nat*re= this kind of "rasp is int*it*s of the ,ost ele,entary :tho*"h not to say ele,ental; kind.O11P /nt*it*s takes place at ,ore developed levels as +ell, of co*rse, since every ded*ctio is *lti,ately !ased in int*it*s= si,ple int*it*s is seein" so,ethin" in its ,ost *nela!orated for,, si,ply as it ,ost f*nda,entally sho+s itself easily and distinctly +ithin the net+ork of appearances. &he o!4ect need not !e ontolo"ically si,ple, only pheno,Aenolo"ically: it ,*st stand o*t sharply, !y virt*e of caref*l preparation :*sin" series;, fro, its aspect*al !ack"ro*nd. &herefore so,e people ,i"ht +ell !e a!le to "rasp the Pytha"orean theore, in a sin"le int*it*s rather than in a co,ple) series of aspects red*ced to other aspects. @s has already !een re,arked several ti,es, +e ,*st take Descartes6s ad,onition a!o*t his *se of Latin +ords serio*sly. /t sho*ld ca*se *s to hesitate +henever +e are inclined to take ter,s in a conventional +ay. So, for e)a,ple, the +ord conceptum, +hich appears in !oth definitions of int*it*s, sho*ld not +itho*t f*rther ado !e assi,ilated to 6concept6. !oncipere, of +hich conceptum is the past participle, ,eans ,ost !asically 6to take hold of6= as / have already pointed o*t, it is *sed in !oth the !ompendium musicae and the Regulae :>*le 1?; as a synony, of imaginari. Since int*it*s is presented as an act of the ,ind, the pri,ary sense of the definition sho*ld !e so,ethin" like Cthe hold that the p*re and attentive ,ind has taken on its o!4ect.C Si,ilarly, to stand in a series is to !e proposed :propositum ; to the ,ind6s vie+ in a certain +ay, and th*s every ele,ent in the series, incl*din" the si,plest, is a propositio, and *nderlyin" every proposition as state,ent is a propositio as act of the ,ind. .hat Descartes presents here as a ,ethod of in3*iry is th*s "ro*nded in the very str*ct*re and nat*re of the ,ind6s acts. .hen the ,ind presents itself, or is presented +ith, an individ*al o!4ect, it already has it in its "rasp alon" an a)is. Bnly if +e are faced literally +ith !loo,in", !*77in" conf*sion do +e fall short of this state. B*t *s*ally +e are already presented +ith ,ore: the identification of this individ*al as shaped th*s and so, of a certain color, of a certain kind. &hat is, +e are presented +ith vario*s aspects or a)es alon" +hich to see the thin", so,e 3*ite definite, others rather va"*e. /f it is definite, then +e have already :i,plicitly; placed O11P G*rther li"ht is shed on +hat is involved in the si,ple int*it*s of nat*res !y >*le 1?6s acco*nt of *niversals. .e are told there that 6li,it6 is not properly a nat*re, even tho*"h it see,s to !e ,ore "eneral than ter,s like 6shape6, !eca*se it is conflated o*t of different real,s, for e)a,ple, li,it +ith respect to space and li,it +ith respect to ti,e :@& L F15AF19;. &his ,eans that the *lti,ate criterion of +hether one is dealin" +ith a real :,*ch less si,ple; nat*re is +hether it is *ne3*ivocally instantiated

in thin"s and also that not every *niversal is a nat*re. See also footnote #6, !elo+. ( 1E? ( the individ*al in a specific location alon" the relevant a)is= if va"*e, then +e can, !y applyin" ind*stry, seek a precise location alon" the a)is. &he a)is and the indefiniteness, or even the a)is and *ne)plicitated definiteness, present *s +ith the task of precise location: that is, +e are faced +ith so,ethin" to in3*ire after, a 3*aestio, +hich can !e resolved if +e identify s*fficient deter,inin" factors and also represent to o*rselves, if need !e !y the ,ethod of "eo,etrical instantiation, the order and the definite proportions that hold !et+een those factors, the nat*res or aspects.

C. SERIATION AND +EO,ETRIC INSTANTIATION

&he evocation of the least thin"s in o*r past e)perience at the end of the second annotation to >*le 6 leads 3*ite nat*rally to the third annotation, +hich so*nds a rec*rrent the,e of the Regulae !y invitin" *s to practice o*r po+ers first not +ith co,ple) !*t +ith fairly si,ple ,atters. &hird and finally, it is to !e noted that the !e"innin" of st*dies is not to !e ,ade +ith the investi"ation of ,ore diffic*lt thin"s= !*t, !efore +e "ird o*rselves for certain deter,inate 3*estions it is needf*l previo*sly to collect spontaneo*sly, +itho*t any choosin", o!vio*s tr*ths, and tentatively thereafter to see +hether certain others can !e ded*ced fro, the,, and in t*rn others fro, these, and so forth. &his havin" !een done, one ,*st attentively reflect on the discovered tr*ths, and ,*st dili"ently think +hy +e +ere a!le to find so,e earlier and ,ore easily than others, and +hich ones these are= so that fro, this +e +ill 4*d"e, +hen +e set *pon so,e deter,inate 3*estion, +hich other thin"s to !e discovered it +ill help to attend to first. :@& L #5F; &he first annotation !ro*"ht o*r attention to nat*res and the de"ree to +hich thin"s participate in the,= the second points o*t that these differences in participation "ive rise to series leadin" *p fro, the "iven o!4ects to the ,a)i,ally si,ple nat*res and !ack= this third annotation finally "ives *s an easy, C!ootstrappin"C ,ethod for fa,iliari7in" o*rselves +ith de"rees of participation in series !y advisin" *s to t*rn first to the easiest kinds of pro!le,s. &his is accessi!le to anyone and everyone +ho possesses reason in the least de"ree, re"ardless of previo*s e)perience. <o* do not even need to e)ercise pr*dent choice= 4*st take the first o!vio*s tr*th that co,es !y and see +here it leads, then look !ack over the +hole se3*ence of one thin"6s !ein" related to another to "ain insi"ht into ho+ pro!le,s are solved. &his provides not only kno+led"e of the for, of ar"*,ent !*t, even ,ore i,portant, the ,aterial o*t of +hich pro!le,s are ,ade. @fter all, in fa,iliari7in" o*rselves +ith the dependency !et+een certain tr*ths and others +e are ac3*aintin" o*rselves +ith series that lead !ack or point to nat*res. @ny partic*lar practice e)ercise ,ay not necessarily lead *s all the +ay !ack to ,a)i,ally si,ple nat*res, !*t it is these ( 1E# ( to +hich the +hole ,ethod refers and on +hich its efficacy depends. /n the last analysis these practice e)ercises teach *s ho+ to ,ane*ver +ithin the co"nitive real, laid o*t on their !asis. &he e)a,ple >*le 6 "ives of choosin" a si,ple tr*th and seein" +here it leads is the relations !et+een the ,e,!ers of the series of n*,!ers #, 6, 1?, ?F, F5, and so on. .e notice, for e)a,ple, that 6 is do*!le # and in3*ire +hat the do*!le of 6 is, na,ely, 1?, and so on= fro, this +e ded*ce that the proportion !et+een each s*ccessive pairin" :!et+een # and 6, !et+een 6 and 1?, !et+een 1? and ?F; is

the sa,e and th*s that the +hole series constit*tes a contin*in" proportion. Descartes "rants that this see,s a !it childish, !*t that is si,ply !eca*se these thin"s are cons*,,ately perspic*o*s. CBy reflectin" attentively on this / *nderstand +ith +hat reason Oor ratio, ratione P all 3*estions that can !e proposed a!o*t the proportions or ha!it*des of thin"s are involved, and in +hat order they o*"ht to !e in3*ired after: +hich one thin" e,!races the s*, of the +hole science of p*re 8athe,atics Ototius scientiae purae athematicae summam PC :@& L #5FA#5%;. &his is a re,arka!le clai,, that all of p*re ,athe,atics derives fro, these si,ple reflections= it evinces the po+er and a,!ition of the proportionali7in" ,ethod he is proposin". &he rest of the r*le e)plores f*rther +hat is involved in this si,ple n*,erical series and sho+s ho+ the ease or diffic*lty of discoverin" the different ,e,!ers and their relations to one another depends on the partic*lar +ay in +hich a pro!le, is posed. Gor e)a,ple, "iven # and 6 it is easy to find 1?, !*t if yo* +ere "iven # and 1? and asked to find the ,ean proportional :the n*,!er !et+een # and 1? s*ch that # B O B 1?; the pro!le, +o*ld !e ,ore diffic*lt= and even ,ore diffic*lt +o*ld !e to find t+o ,ean proportionals !et+een # and ?F :n*,!ers B and y s*ch that # B O BNy O y ?F;. Bf co*rse, since +e already have the series in hand, these are artificial rather than real pro!le,s, !*t if +e chan"e the "iven n*,!ers to, say, l$ and 1%$, +e reco"ni7e that it is not at all o!vio*s +hat the ,ean proportionals are and that it +o*ld take so,e at least ,ini,al intellect*al a"ility to find the,. :&he for,*las / have "iven in parentheses in the previo*s t+o sentences "reatly facilitate the e)act sol*tion of the pro!le,= s*ch for,*las are not "iven in the Regulae, and one ,i"ht reflect that o*r a!ility to red*ce the pro!le,s to s*ch si,ple e3*ations is precisely the sort of thin" that Descartes +as tryin" to c*ltivate.; B*t if +e concl*de that 4*st addin" to the n*,!er of proportionals to !e fo*nd ,akes the pro!le, increasin"ly diffic*lt, +e +ill !e +ron"= for if +e are asked to find three ,ean proportionals, +e ,i"ht notice that this pro!le, can !e red*ced to si,pler ones: na,ely, first find the ,ean proportional !et+een the t+o e)tre,es, say # and F5 :this is 1?, since # 1?J1? F5;, then find the ,ean proportionals !et+een this n*,!er and each of the e)tre,es :6 is the ,ean proportional !et+een # and 1?, ?F is the ,ean !et+een 1? and F5;. ( 1EF ( &hese discoveries a!o*t this partic*lar series of n*,!ers depend on the fact that each ,e,!er of the series is derived fro, # !y s*ccessive do*!lin"= the series is #, ? f #, ? f :? f #;, ? f :? f ? f #;, and so on, or, *sin" al"e!raic notation and a "enerali7ed for,*la, the nth ,e,!er of this series is "iven !y the for,*la ?nA1 f # :a"ain, Descartes does not "ive s*ch a for,*la here;. P*ttin" this into the fra,e+ork of the entire >*le 6, +e can say the follo+in": in this series, the a!sol*te ,e,!er is the first, in that it contains +holly and p*rely the f*nda,ental nat*re, #, that "ives rise to the +hole series, and all the other ,e,!ers are respective, relative to this.O1?P Bf co*rse, the series is deter,ined not 4*st !y the n*,!er # !*t also !y the +ay in +hich all the other ,e,!ers participate in #, that is, accordin" to the for,*la ?nA1 f # :accordin" to the co,,on nat*re 6do*!le6= the co,,on nat*res +ill !e e)plained in Sec. D, !elo+;. &h*s the secret of the +hole art, >*le 6, teaches that the key to solvin" pro!le,s is t+ofold: :1; findin" the *lti,ate perspective, the nat*re, involved in a thin"= and :?; analy7in" the deter,inate relationship of this thin" to si,ilar thin"s. @ll pro!le,s al+ays involve at least one "iven aspect or nat*re and the relation of at least one thin" to that nat*re. &h*s Descartes in >*le 6 "ives not 4*st a ,ethod of pro!le, solvin" !*t a philosophical theory of +hat a pro!le, is. &he r*le is key to *nderstandin" +hy Descartes insisted that his art or ,ethod +as different fro, the Scholastic ,ethod predicated on ter,s and concepts: rather than seek the essence and the attri!*tes of a thin", it fosters notin" +hat is "iven, re,arkin" si,ilarities, differences, and rese,!lances, and identifyin" a)es or aspects *nder +hich the "iven can !e vie+ed. 9avin" ,astered

the si,ple !*t po+erf*l ,athe,atics of proportion +e can thereafter address any pro!le, and either solve it or co,e to the reali7ation that +ith o*r c*rrent reso*rces it is *nsolva!le. /ndeed, one ,i"ht consider the entire Regulae as a treatise on +hat constit*tes a pro!le,. &he ,edieval notion of 3*aestio is redefined: no lon"er is it a 3*estion that has arisen !eca*se of controversy, !eca*se of a conflict of interpretations, +hich is resolved !y attendin" to the necessary concept*al distinctions for the ,atter at hand or the thin" in vie+. /n Descartes6s eyes these are disp*tes over +ords. 9e *r"es instead attendin" to the o!4ect presented to the ,ind and the possi!le aspects *nder +hich it can !e "rasped, esti,atin" the relation of the o!4ect to other o!4ects havin" the sa,e aspect so that its relative or proportional distance fro, the p*re and +hole participation in that aspect can !e ,ore or less precisely deterA O1?P 2ote that the si,plest ele,ent ,i"ht not al+ays appear a,on" the "iven ,e,!ers of the series, for e)a,ple, if the series had a ,ore co,plicated for,*la :tho*"h it +o*ld not need to !e very ,*ch ,ore co,plicated= e."., the one deter,ined !y the for,*la O? f #PA1;. ( 1E% ( ,ined, and then deter,inin" the interrelations of these o!4ects +ith respect to different aspects= if a s*fficiently +ellAdeveloped net+ork of relationships is esta!lished, all the relevant de"rees of interparticipation can !e reckoned= if not, either ,ore +ork re,ains to !e done or the pro!le, is *nsolva!le.

D. I,A+INA-ILITY OF SERIATION5 I,A+INA-ILITY OF INTELLECT

&hin"s participate in certain nat*res to varyin" de"rees, and the h*,an in"eni*, can easily ascertain +hether t+o thin"s participate e3*ally, or one ,ore and the other less. &his a!ility to co,pare participation is the psycholo"ical fo*ndation of order and, +hen a unit of co,parison can !e ascertained, ,eas*re. @ll relationships of order and ,eas*re can !e si,ply represented !y fi"*res. .here order is in 3*estion the fi"*res can !e either discrete or contin*o*s :e."., a collection of three points to represent the third position vers*s a line se",ent three *nits in len"th;= +here ,eas*re is in 3*estion it is often necessary to *se a contin*o*s representation, *nless all the ,eas*res involved are co,,ens*ra!le :i.e., e)pressi!le either in +hole n*,!ers or in rational fractions;. /n >*les 1? thro*"h 1F, Descartes !rin"s to a foc*s the *se of i,a"ination in co"nition. &his *se o!serves the po+ers and li,its of h*,an in"eni*, raised in the first part, and it develops i,a"ination into a *niversal instr*,ent of kno+in". >*le 1? lays do+n !oth a sche,a of the fac*lty psychophysiolo"y of co"nition and a theory of nat*res. /n accordance +ith the preli,inary disc*ssion in >*le 5, the nat*res are divided into those that are ,a)i,ally si,ple and those that are co,ple) or co,posite :@& L #99;. &he si,ple nat*res cannot !e false= only in nat*res co,posed !y the intellect can there !e falsity. /n >*le 5 the ,a)i,ally si,ple nat*res are divided into the spirit*al, the corporeal, and those pertainin" to either of these= >*le 1? calls the, intellect*al, or ,aterial, or co,,on to !oth :@& L F19;.O1#P B*t Descartes 3*ickly sets aside the 3*estion of ho+ thin"s act*ally e)ist in favor of ho+ they appear to the ,ind. Gor if, for e)a,ple, +e consider so,e e)tended and fi"*red !ody, +e even say that, fro, the perspective of the thin", it is so,ethin" one and si,ple= O1#P &hese divisions appear to !e, in the lan"*a"e of >*le E, en*,erations that are s*fficient rather than co,plete or distinct. @n ontolo"ically c*rio*s philosopher +o*ld event*ally +onder +hether the ter,s 6corporeal6, 6intellect*al6, 6co,,on6, and so forth, refer to "en*inely si,ple nat*res or si,ply to a!stract

"enerali7ations, like the ter, 6li,it6 :as e)plained at @& L F15AF19;. See footnote 11, a!ove. ( 1E6 ( and indeed, in this sense, it cannot !e said to !e co,posed o*t of corporeal nat*re, e)tension, and fi"*re,O1FP !eca*se these parts never e)isted each distinct fro, the others= !*t fro, the perspective of o*r intellect, +e call the co,posite so,ethin" Oco,posedP o*t of these three nat*res, !eca*se +e *nderstood the sin"le thin"s separately !efore +e co*ld 4*d"e these three in one and discover the, si,*ltaneo*sly in the sa,e s*!4ect. Gor this reason, since here +e are not treatin" of thin"s e)cept insofar as they are perceived !y the intellect, +e call only those si,ple the co"nition of +hich is so perspic*o*s and distinct that they cannot !e divided into several thin"s ,ore distinctly kno+n !y the ,ind: s*ch are fi"*re, e)tension, ,otion, etc.= all the rest, ho+ever, +e conceive as in so,e +ay co,posed of these. :@& L F15; Bnce a"ain a pra",atic episte,olo"ical ai, rather than an ontolo"ical one "overns the disc*ssion. /t is not so ,*ch that the nat*res are !ein" treated as fictional as that their ,ode of e)istence in the thin" is allo+ed to !e different fro, their ,ode in the ,ind. &hat they certainly are conArained or participated !y thin"s is not in 3*estion. &he principle of the division of nat*res into intellect*al, ,aterial, and co,,on classes sho+s this. &hose thin"s, +hich +ith respect to o*r intellect are called si,ple, are either p*rely intellect*al, or p*rely ,aterial, or co,,on. P*rely intellect*al are those that are kno+n !y the intellect thro*"h a certain in!orn li"ht, and +itho*t the aid of any corporeal i,a"e: for it is certain that there are so,e s*ch thin"s, nor can any corporeal idea !e fei"ned that +o*ld represent to *s +hat co"nition is, +hat do*!t, +hat i"norance, like+ise +hat is the action of +ill that it is "ranted to call volition, and si,ilar thin"s= all +hich +e nevertheless tr*ly kno+, and so easily that for this it s*ffices that +e !e participators in reason. P*rely ,aterial are those +hich are not kno+n *nless they are in !odies: as are fi"*re, e)tension, ,otion, etc. Ginally, those are to !e called 6co,,on6 that so,eti,es are attri!*ted to corporeal thin"s, so,eti,es to spirits +itho*t distinction, like e)istence, *nity, d*ration, and si,ilar thin"s. &o this also are to !e referred those co,,on notions +hich are like a certain chain con4oinin" other si,ple nat*res to one another, and !y the evidence of +hich is s*pported +hatever +e concl*de !y disc*rsive reasonin". Di7., these: those thin"s that are the sa,e as a third are the sa,e as one another= like+ise, +hat Ot+o thin"sP cannot !e related in the sa,e +ay to a third thin" also have so,e difference !et+een the,, etc. @nd even these co,,on ones can !e kno+n either !y p*re intellect, or !y the sa,e OintellectP int*itin" the i,a"es of ,aterial thin"s. :@& L F19AF?$; Descartes also incl*des a,on" the si,ple nat*res ne"ation and privations of the positive nat*res. @!stractions like 6li,it6, +hich +e derive !y a!stractA O1FP 2ote ho+ Descartes distin"*ishes these as tho*"h they +ere three ,a)i,ally si,ple nat*res. /n the later philosophy, e)tension +o*ld !e the fo*ndation of the other t+o. ( 1EE ( in" fro, different si,ple nat*res :in cases of shape, d*ration, ,otion, and the like;, are not n*,!ered a,on" those nat*res. &he crisis in Descartes6s thinkin" posed !y his develop,ent of the nat*res doctrine +ill !e taken *p in

the ne)t t+o chapters. Gor no+ +e shall consider only that the nat*res of >*le 1? are s*fficient to "ro*nd the *niversality of i,a"ination as a pro!le,Asolvin" instr*,ent. &his is tr*e despite the fact that the intellect reco"ni7es the p*rely intellect*al nat*res !y an innate li"ht +itho*t representin" the, in i,a"es. Bf co*rse Descartes leaves no do*!t that there can !e p*re intellect*al kno+led"e, !*t the e)a,ples he "ives have so,e c*rio*s feat*res. @ll of the, are actions or passions of the ,ind or so*l: kno+led"e, do*!t, i"norance :a passion;, volition. 2one of the nat*res involved is a direct o!4ect of co"nition, ho+ever: +illin" +o*ld !e reco"ni7ed as s*ch in the act of +illin" so,ethin" else, and si,ilarly for the others. @ll of these acts can have as their o!4ect an i,a"e or a !ody. 8oreover, the fact that a certain nat*re can !e reco"ni7ed !y intellect alone does not i,ply that i,a"ination cannot !e of assistance in addressin" 3*estions a!o*t intellect*al thin"s, especially since Descartes6s pro!le, solvin" in the Regulae is not a ,atter of deter,inin" essences. Gor e)a,ple, a kind of order sho*ld !e possi!le even +ith respect to kno+in" and +illin": after all, the Regulae itself is an atte,pt to discover and enco*ra"e order in kno9ing. Bne ,i"ht order volitions accordin" to o!4ects. Bne ,i"ht ascertain that a certain order or proportion e)ists !et+een +illin" and kno+in" in even p*rely intellect*al acts, and this order and proportion co*ld !e represented sche,atically !y discrete or contin*o*s fi"*res. >epresentin" one act of +ill as participatin" in *nderstandin" ,ore than another, or ad4*d"in" that one act of +ill is ,ore intense than another, does not re3*ire ontolo"ically red*cin" so,ethin" p*rely intellect*al to corporeal for,. &hat a volition in itself is noncorporeal and as s*ch has no si,ilarity to the i,a"es of the corporeal real, is one thin"= that ,y participatin" in +illin" is soAandAso intense and relates to another act of +ill in a certain proportion is 3*ite another, havin" to do +ith the interrelations of thin"s and nat*res. >ecall that the co,,on nat*res incl*de the Cco,,on notionsC that are like a Cchain con4oinin" other si,ple nat*res to one another, and !y the evidence of +hich is s*pported +hatever +e concl*de !y disc*rsive reasonin".C @ll disc*rsive reasonin", even that a!o*t intellect*al nat*res, th*s has reco*rse to co,,on nat*res, +hich can !e instantiated !y either intellect*al or corporeal thin"s. &hat there are nat*res co,,on to !oth spirit and corporeal thin"s ,eans that there are +ays of at least indirectly representin" spirit thro*"h corporeal sy,!ols. &he Ce)istence, *nity, d*ration, and the likeC of a spirit*al thin" can !e represented !y a parallel and proportionate corporeal instantiation of Ce)istence, *nity, d*ration, and the like.C ( 1E5 (

E. SOLVIN+ PRO-LE,S -Y PROPORTION

C@ll h*,an science consists in this one thin", that +e distinctly see in +hat +ay these si,ple nat*res si,*ltaneo*sly conc*r for the co,position of other thin"sC :@& L F?E;. &he co,,on error in enco*nterin" any pro!le, is to s*ppose that there is involved so,e kind of previo*sly *nkno+n entity= the partic*lar te,ptation to +hich the ed*cated s*cc*,! is to s*!stit*te their learned conceptions and learned voca!*laries, +hich are really *nintelli"i!le !oth to the,selves and to others, for +hat they have e)perienced. B*t +hoever co"itates that nothin" in Ofor e)a,pleP a ,a"net can !e kno+n that does not consist of certain si,ple nat*res, kno+n thro*"h the,selves, is not *ncertain a!o*t +hat to do: first to collect dili"ently all e)perience that it is possi!le to have a!o*t this stone, o*t of +hich then he tries to lead do+n Oor ded*ceP +hat ,i)t*re of si,ple nat*res is necessary for prod*cin" those effects that he has e)perienced in the ,a"net= once these are discovered, he can !oldly assert that he has e)perienced the tr*e nat*re of the ,a"net insofar as it co*ld !e discovered !y a h*,an !ein" and fro, the "iven e)periences. :@& L

F?E; &he key is to ascertain +hat nat*res ,i"ht !e involved and ho+ they can !e co,!ined, the chief device for +hich is the deter,ination of orderly relations !et+een thin"s and nat*res noted !y the in"eni*,6s po+ers of co,parison, seriali7ation, and proportionali7ation. >*le 1? ends +ith a re,ark that prepares the +ay for the r*les of the second part. /t says that everythin" +ill !e divided either into si,ple propositions or 3*estions :pro!le,s;. @s for si,ple propositions, +e treat no other precepts than those +hich prepare the po+er of kno+in" Ovi, co"noscendiPO1%P for int*itin" any o!4ect +hatever ,ore distinctly and scr*tini7in" it ,ore sa"acio*sly, !eca*se these ,*st occ*r spontaneo*sly, nor can they !e in3*ired after= +hich +e have e,!raced in the t+elve precedin" precepts, and in +hich +e !elieve +e have e)hi!ited all thin"s that +e 4*d"e can render the *se of reason so,e+hat easier. :@& L F?5AF?9; .hat involves a si,ple nat*re si,ply cannot !e investi"ated, it is si,ply seen. B*t +hen there is any interconnection or relation not clearly seen there is a 3*estion or pro!le, of proportion to !e resolved. Like the Scholastics, Descartes proposes to address 3*aestiones. &he lo"ic of addressin" the,, ho+ever, is not dialectical and ver!al, that is, dependent on past te)ts O1%P 2ote the si,ilarity to, !*t also difference fro,, >*le 1?6s 6vis co"noscens6 :for +hich the for, here +o*ld !e 6vi, co"noscente,6;. &he variations in ter,inolo"y add f*rther +ei"ht to the contention that Descartes6s thinkin" +as in fl*). ( 1E9 ( and a*thorities, !*t the seriali7in" and proportionali7in" lo"ic of the interconnection of nat*res,athesis *niversalis. Descartes divides 3*estions or pro!le,s into t+o kinds, those that are perfectly *nderstood, to !e treated in >*les 1# thro*"h ?F, and those that are not, to +hich the pro4ected >*les ?% thro*"h #6 +ere to !e dedicated. &he reason for this division is peda"o"ical: the last t+elve r*les +o*ld have pres*pposed ac3*aintance +ith the precedin" do7en, and C+e teach those earlier +ith +hich also +e think +e sho*ld first !e occ*pied in order to c*ltivate the in"eniaC :@& L F?9;. &he perfectly *nderstood pro!le,s of >*les 1# thro*"h ?F re3*ire that +e perceive three thin"s: C!y +hat si"ns that +hich is !ein" so*"ht can !e kno+n, +hen it presents itself= +hat it is, precisely, fro, +hich +e ,*st ded*ce it= and in +hat +ay it is to !e proved that these thin"s so depend on each other that one can !y no reason Oratio P !e chan"ed, leavin" the other *nchan"edC :@& L F?9;. &his is a case of learnin" ho+ to discover a concl*sion not !y ded*cin" one thin" fro, a sin"le si,ple thin", C!*t one thin" dependin" on ,any i,plicate thin"s si,*ltaneo*sly, evolved so artf*lly that it re3*ires no "reater capacity of in"eni*, than for ,akin" the si,plest illation6 :F?9;. &his is sho+n ,ost easily !y *sin" e)a,ples fro, arith,etic and "eo,etry, +hich are *sef*l for the practice needed to ac3*ire the techni3*e. >*les 1# and 1F lay the "ro*nd+ork for the treat,ent of 3*estions or pro!le,s, and as s*ch they are !oth an e)tension of +hat precedes and an anticipation of +hat is to co,e. Descartes !e"ins !y distin"*ishin" +hat he is doin" fro, the practice of Scholastic lo"icians. .e are not to search for the ,iddle ter, connectin" t+o e)tre,es !*t rather :in echo of the last para"raph of >*le 1?; to reco"ni7e that in every pro!le, there is so,ethin" *nkno+n, that this *nkno+n ,*st !e desi"nated in a deter,inate +ay, and that this desi"nation ,*st !e ,ade in ter,s of +hat is already kno+n. &his is precisely +hat +e teach children in al"e!raic pro!le, solvin" today. C@ tr*ck sets o*t fro, city

@ for city B at 1 P.8. /t arrives in city B at #:#$ P.8. &he tr*ck avera"es F% ,iles per ho*r. 9o+ far apart are cities @ and BQC &here is so,ethin" *nkno+n, the distance !et+een @ and B= +e desi"nate this !y B . &his desi"nation has to !e p*t in relation to thin"s that are kno+n, the ti,e oft. ravel :?.% ho*rs; and the avera"e velocity :F% ,iles ho*r;, !y ,eans of an e3*ation: B J ?.% ho*rs f F% ,iles ho*r J 11?.% ,iles. &his kind of pro!le, reflects the pro"ressive co,plication that ,arks the division of the Regulae into three ,a4or parts. /n co,parison +ith the si,plest thin"s-for e)a,ple, noticin" that the tr*ck is ,ovin", that it is ,ovin" faster than a car, that cities @ and B are different !*t still !oth cities-this pro!le, is co,plicated. B*t in confor,ity +ith >*le 1?6s criterion :@& L F?9;, the ans+er is perfectly kno+a!le in ter,s ( 15$ ( of the "iven !eca*se all the proportions are interrelated in a +ay that allo+s a *ni3*e sol*tion :in contrast to pro!le,s in +hich the infor,ation is inade3*ate-for instance, +hat the speed of the tr*ck +as at precisely ?:$$ P.8.-or the interrelations deter,ine no sol*tion or ,*ltiple sol*tions;. /n confor,ity +ith >*le 56s distinction !et+een the second part, treatin" of nat*res ded*ced fro, si,ple and evident nat*res, and the third, treatin" of nat*res that pres*ppose nat*res co,posite in reality :@& L #99;, these types of pro!le,s involve nat*res so perspic*o*sly interrelated :space, ti,e, ,otion; that a f*rther kno+led"e of nat*res, one that can !e ac3*ired only thro*"h the e)perience of co,positions acco,plished in reality, is not necessary.O16P .hat see,s 3*ite si,ple to *s +as not yet a per,anent ac3*isition of ,athe,atics aro*nd 16#$= Descartes of co*rse +as one of the first to insist on the need to na,e *nkno+ns and to ,anip*late the, ,athe,atically as tho*"h they +ere ordinary n*,!ers. 1ven this is to p*t a ,odern spin on thin"s, for the e)tant part of the r*les does not e)plicitly deal in e3*ations, and, "iven the kind of "eo,etric rather than arith,etical representation and ,anip*lation it presents, +e cannot si,ply assert that it is teachin" the ele,entary alge4ra of pro!le, solvin". >ather, it is the ele,entary art of pro!le, solvin", +hich is the lar"est part of +hat >*le F calls ,athesis *niversalis. &he re,ainder of >*le 1# "ives instr*ction in +hat +e sho*ld do as +e !e"in to approach a pro!le,, in the initiatin" he*ristic of pro!le, solvin". .e are told that if the pro!le, is, for instance, a!o*t the nat*re of the ,a"net, +e already possess the ,eanin"s of the ter,s 6nat*re6 and 6,a"net6 and th*s have a preli,inary deter,ination of ho+ to proceed. /n another case +e ,i"ht !e asked +hat is infera!le of the nat*re of the ,a"net fro, the e)peri,ents p*!lished in .illia, 0il!ert6s De magnete :16$$;, +hether they !e tr*e or false= in yet another +e ,i"ht !e "iven specific data a!o*t the si7e and +ei"htin" of strin"s and asked to deter,ine +hatever +e can a!o*t the nat*re of so*nd. Descartes "rants that these specific pro!le,s are i,perfect, in that +e cannot !e s*re at the o*tset that +e have everythin" needed to solve the,, !*t nevertheless they can "ive an idea of ho+ +e !e"in a Cred*ctionC to a perfect pro!le, !y tryin" to en*,erate the si,plest parts or nat*res. Descartes pro,ises f*rther that in his e)planations Cit +ill appear also in +hat +ay this r*le can !e o!served, so that the +ellA *nderstood diffic*lty !e a!stracted fro, every O16P S*ch pro!le,s of real co,ple)ity-pres*,a!ly Descartes is thinkin" of nat*res no less co,ple) than color, +hich >*le 1? "rants can !e kno+n only thro*"h realAlife enco*nters-re3*ire a !ack"ro*nd e)perience that "oes far !eyond +hat is accessi!le !y a certain in!orn li"ht of reason :the distinction is ,ade in this +ay in >*le 6, @& L #5#;. Bnly nat*res kno+n to *s in the latter +ay a)e s*ita!le for the ,ost perspic*o*s kinds of pro!le,s and th*s treated in the second part of the Regulae. ( 151 (

s*perfl*o*s concept, and so far red*ced so that +e +ill not think OJ co"itateP of !*syin" o*rselves ,ore +idely +ith this or that s*!4ect !*t only in "eneral concernin" certain ,a"nit*des to !e co,pared co,posedO1EP +ith one anotherC :@& L F#1;. >*le 1# re,inds *s that >*les % and 6 had advised takin" diffic*lties !ack to si,ple thin"s, and >*le E dividin" the,, Cso that after+ards ail ,ay !e co,prehended si,*ltaneo*sly !y a s*fficient en*,eration6 :@& L F#?;. /f there are ,any e)peri,ents concernin" the ,a"net, / ,*st r*n thro*"h the, separately, one after another= if the 3*estion is a!o*t so*nd, / +ill co,pare first strin"s A and -, then A and !, and so forth, +ith the ai, of co,prehendin" the en*,erated +hole. Descartes re,arks that one needs to resort to >*les % thro*"h E only, *sin" p*re intellect +ith respect to the ter,s of each proposition, !efore "oin" on to >*les 1F thro*"h ?F, and he pro,ises to e)plain ho+ this sho*ld !e done in the neverA+ritten third part of the Regulae . &he pure intellect ,*st do its +ork !efore the r*les e)plicitly applyin" spatial fi"*ration can !e *sed effectively. .hyQ Beca*se only intellect has the po+er of ,akin" the distinctions necessary for the Ca!straction Oof a 3*estionP fro, ail s*perfl*o*s concepts,6 and distinctions are an e)ercise of the po+er of ne"ation.O15P /n the initial for,*lation of a pro!le, the "iven data and ter,s are treated as a!stract *nits of co,parison= their specific content is not appropriated *ntil the act*al sol*tion process !e"ins in accordance +ith >*les 1F thro*"h ?F. &h*s, altho*"h this distinction ,akin" is a +ork of the intellect alone, it is not the +ork of an intellect dealin" +ith only noncorporeai o!4ects= 3*ite the contrary. &he po+er to co"ni7e and reco"ni7e differences is f*nda,entally that of intellect, in +hatever ideational or i,a"inal for, the differences appear. &h*s it is the intellect that initiates a 3*estion !y settin" *p its f*nda,ental ter,s. Bnce the 3*estion has !een set in this ,anner Cit is to !e seen precisely in +hat its diffic*lty consists, so that this thin", a!stracted fro, everythin" else, ,i"ht ,ore easily !e solvedC :@& L F#E;. C9ere, therefore, +e say only this to !e +orth+hile, to revie+ in order ail those thin"s that are "iven in the proposition,O19P re4ectin" those that +e see ,anifestly do not contri!*te to the thin" Oad rem non facere aperte P, retainin" the necessary ones, and sendin" the do*!tf*l !ack for a ,ore dili"ent e)a,inationC :@& L F#5;. O1EP @ has componendas, 9 comparandas = the difference is not of "reat i,portance, as co,parison is the +ay in"eni*, has of analy7in" the co,posed thin"s it e)periences, and it is in accordance +ith its co,parative *nderstandin" of series leadin" to nat*res that it learns ho+ thin"s are co,posed. O15P See the ne)t section, !elo+, for this point as it is raised in >*le 1F6s disc*ssion of the different +ays in +hich the ter, 6e)tension6 is to !e taken. O19P Z*ite clearly, 6proposition6 :propositio ; ,*st !e *nderstood here as C+hat is proposed or set forth to the ,ind.C ( 15? ( &hese are the concl*din" +ords of >*le 1#. @t this point, if the pro!le, has not resolved itself, the +ork of i,a"ination ,*st !e"in. @s the >*le 1F headin" p*ts it, Cthis sa,e O3*estionP is to !e transferred to the real e)tension of !odies, and the +hole proposed to the i,a"ination thro*"h !are fi"*res: for th*s it +ill !e perceived far ,ore distinctly !y the intellectC :@& L F#5;. /t +o*ld !e ,istaken to ,ini,i7e this as co*nsel that applies only to pro!le,s concernin" corporeal thin"s, for it is presented not as a special case of pro!le, solvin" !*t as the appropriate +ay of takin" f*rther any pro!le, that has not !een solved already !y the si,plifyin" and distin"*ishin" +ork of >*le 1#. .hat ,akes this ,ethod of ,athesis *niversal is precisely :1; the proportionality of thin"s6

participatin" in nat*res and :?; the en*,era!le interconnections of one nat*re +ith others, !oth of +hich can !e perspic*o*sly represented in !are fi"*res. &his is e)actly the point ,ade !y the first para"raph of the co,,entary to >*le 1F. So that, ho+ever, +e ,i"ht also *se i,a"ination as an aid, it is to !e noted that +henever one *nkno+n thin" is ded*ced fro, so,e other already kno+n, not for all that is so,e ne+ "en*s of entity discovered !*t rather this +hole co"nition is only e)tended th*s, that +e perceive the thin" in3*ired after to participate th*s or so OinP the nat*re of those +hich +ere "iven in the proposition. Gor e)a,ple, if so,eone is !lind fro, !irth, it is not to !e hoped that +e can ever !y any ar"*,ent !rin" a!o*t that he perceive the tr*e ideas of colors s*ch as +e have +ith so*nd senses= !*t if so,eone has at so,e ti,e seen the pri,ary colors, altho*"h never the inter,ediate and ,i)ed ones, it can happen that he ,i"ht for, i,a"es also of those that he has not seen fro, the si,ilit*de of others thro*"h a certain leadin"A do+n Oded*ctionP. /n the sa,e +ay, if in the ,a"net is so,e "en*s of entity to +hich o*r intellect has hitherto perceived nothin" si,ilar, it is not to !e hoped that +e +ill ever kno+ that thro*"h disc*rsive reasonin"= !*t it +ill !e necessary to !e instr*cted either !y so,e ne+ sense or !y the divine ,ind= !*t +hatever in this ,atter can !e dischar"ed !y h*,an in"eni*,, +e shall !elieve o*rselves to have "ained, if +e perceive ,ost distinctly that ,i)t*re of already noted entities or nat*res that prod*ces the sa,e effect that appears in the ,a"net. :@& L F#5AF#9; &he follo+in" para"raphs e)plain as concisely as possi!le that +hen +e kno+ so,ethin" it happens !y ,eans of the proportionali7in" co,parison of one thin" to another, accordin" to their differential participation in a nat*re or co,,on idea appearance :e)cept in the case of the int*it*s of a sin"le thin";. &hat co,parison, to !eco,e perspic*o*s, re3*ires an e3*ali7ation :settin" e3*al; !y proportions -today +e *nderstand this as settin" *p an e3*ation-and all co,parison, insofar as it involves differences of de"ree +ith respect to a nat*re, can !e !ro*"ht !ack to differences in ,a"nit*des that are easily depicta!le in the i,a"ination. ( 15# ( @nd indeed all these entities already noted, s*ch as are e)tension, fi"*re, ,otion, and the like, en*,eratin" +hich is not in place here, are kno+n thro*"h the sa,e idea in diverse s*!4ects, and +e do not i,a"ine the fi"*re of a cro+n differently if it is silver than if it is "old= and this co,,on idea is transferred fro, one s*!4ect to another in no other +ay than thro*"h si,ple co,parison, thro*"h +hich +e affir, that +hat is so*"ht is, accordin" to this or that, si,ilar, or the sa,e, or e3*al to so,e "iven: so that in all ratiocination +e kno+ the tr*th precisely only thro*"h co,parison. Gor e)a,ple, in this: all @ is B, all B is C = therefore all @ is C = the so*"htAfor and the "iven are co,pared to one another, na,ely, @ and C, accordin" to the fact that each is B, etc. B*t !eca*se, as +e have already often +arned, the for,s of syllo"is,s help not at all in perceivin" the tr*th of thin"s, it +ill profit the reader if, these thin"s !ein" o*tri"ht re4ected, he conceive all co"nition +hatever that is not had thro*"h the si,ple and p*re int*it*s of one solitary thin" to !e had thro*"h the co,parison of t+o or several to one another. @nd indeed al,ost the +hole ind*stry of h*,an reason consists in this operation6s !ein" prepared= for +hen it is open and si,ple there is not need of the assistance of art for int*itin" the tr*th +hich is had there!y !*t only of the li"ht of nat*re. @nd it is to !e noted that co,parisons are said to !e si,ple and open only +hen the so*"htA for and the "iven participate OinP so,e nat*re e3*ally= all the rest, ho+ever, re3*ire

preparation for no other reason than that the co,,on nat*re is not e3*ally in each, !*t accordin" to certain other ha!it*des Oor relationsP or proportions in +hich it is involved= and the pree,inent part of h*,an ind*stry is to !e located in nothin" other than red*cin" these proportions so that e3*ality !et+een the so*"htAfor and so,ethin" that is kno+n is seen clearly. /t is to !e noted conse3*ently that nothin" can !e red*ced to s*ch e3*ality *nless it receive ,ore or less, and that all this is co,prehended thro*"h the +ord 6,a"nit*de6: so that after the ter,s of the diffic*lty are a!stracted fro, every s*!4ect accordin" to the precedin" r*le, +e *nderstand o*rselves to attend s*ccessively only to ,a"nit*des in "eneral. :@& L F#9A FF$; Bne can hardly e)a""erate the i,portance of this passa"e, for it not only ill*,inates +hat follo+s !*t artic*lates the fo*ndation of the ,ethod in the first t+elve r*les as +ell. /t is co,parison that is essential to kno+in", and kno+led"e !y ,eans of co,parison is a 4*d",ent of either si,ilarity, or sa,eness :i.e., identity;, or e3*ality= and this 4*d",ent is ,ade in li"ht of a "iven that is vie+ed in a partic*lar +ay :secundum hoc vel illud, accordin" to this or that;. &he kind of ordered and proportionali7ed seriation envisioned in >*le 6 is possi!le and tr*thf*l only on s*ch a !asis. &+o thin"s that participate in one nat*re participate in it in a si,ilar, an identical, or an e3*al de"ree. /f identical, then the t+o thin"s are either one and the sa,e or at ,ost different instances of the sa,e thin", and they +ill occ*py the sa,e r*n" in the series= if ,erely e3*al, they are different thin"s that nevertheless are on the sa,e r*n" +ith respect to the partic*lar nat*re in ( 15F ( 3*estion :+ith respect to other aspects, ho+ever, they +ill differ;= if si,ilar, then they participate in the sa,e nat*re in different +ays or de"rees. Bften +e can easily see that one is ,ore or less participant than another, !*t this !eco,es perfected kno+led"e only once +e have ascertained this relation precisely, that is, only once +e have discovered the proportion of participation. .hether the participation is e3*al or proportional, ho+ever, this relation participates in 3*antity, and !eca*se of this it can !e e)pressed in ,a"nit*des. This holds true 9hether 9e are dealing 9ith a corporeal nature, a miBed or common nature, or a purely intellectual nature. .ith respect to the relation of participation in nat*res, there is no essential difference a,on" these types, and even the relations of p*rely intellect*al thin"s can !e e)pressed thro*"h corporeal ,a"nit*de. &his kno+led"e !y proportionali7ation is tr*ly a ,athesis *niversalis. Descartes says that all kno+led"e that re3*ires t+o or ,ore thin"s is co,parative= th*s ded*ctio and en*,eratio are e,!raced !y this cate"ory. &he only e)ception is the si,ple and p*re int*it*s of a solitary thin". <et +ithin the fra,e+ork of the Regulae it is not clear +hether +e can ever have s*ch int*it*s. &he only candidate for it is a nat*re, or rather a si,ple nat*re thin". Do +e ever have int*it*s of p*re e)tensionQ @s +e shall see shortly, Descartes says in >*le 1F that there cannot !e e)tension +itho*t an e)tended thin". So the 3*estion !eco,es, Can +e have int*it*s of a partic*lar e)tended thin"Q B*t then +e +o*ld appear to have at least t+o thin"s: the partic*lar instantiation and also the si,ple nat*re in li"ht of +hich +e are vie+in" the thin" :+hich, pres*,a!ly, +e co*ld also vie+ in li"ht of fi"*re, ,otion, or other nat*res;.O?$P &his ,ay in fact i,part so,e clarity, retrospectively, to the point of callin" the hi"hest thin" in a series constit*ted accordin" to >*le 6 6a!sol*te6. /t is a!sol*te !y virt*e of +holly containin" the nat*re in 3*estion, rather than ,erely participatin" in it to so,e de"ree :see @& L #51 11. ??A?# and #5? 11. #A6;. @ny e)tended thin" +holly contains the nat*re e)tension :there still can !e a differentiation !ased on the 3*antity of the e)tension;. 1ven a finely dra+n line is e)tended in three di,ensions and th*s contains e)tension +holly. /t also participates

differentially in linearity or in c*rvat*re= the strai"htest one +e are a!le to dra+ +o*ld serve as the a!sol*te ,e,!er of the series 6linearity6. /n an i,portant sense, the f*ll character of the :si,ple; nat*re itself !eco,es p*rely and si,ply apparent only if it is seen in its pree,inent instance or instances, and those instances are seen as pree,inent only in co,parison to instances that participate in the nat*re to a lesser de"ree. O?$P Bnce a"ain, o*r i,pressions of the later Descartes ,islead *s. .e have !eco,e acc*sto,ed to thinkin" that a p*re inspection !y the ,ind of a si,ple idea in and !y itself is not only possi!le !*t the very st*ff of Descartes6s tho*"ht, to the point that +e tend to overlook evidence to the contrary. ( 15% ( &herefore even the si,ple nat*re cannot !e seen as si,ple e)cept in contrast to other thin"s= and +itho*t a f*llA!lo+n innatis,, the likes of +hich the Descartes of the Regulae does not see, +illin" to co*ntenance,O?1P one +o*ld have to rely on so,ethin" like ha!it, th*s on ,e,ory, for a seriesAless evocation of the si,ple nat*res. &he only +ay that one ,i"ht !e a!le to escape this parado) +itho*t a!andonin" the fra,e+ork of the Regulae +o*ld !e to ar"*e that p*re and si,ple int*it*s is properly interpreted as the caref*l and penetratin" vie+in" of a sin"le thin" act*ally present to conscio*sness in its ,ost cr*cial or essential aspect.O??P &hat perhaps does not f*lly eli,inate the possi!le taint of pl*rality, altho*"h it +o*ld appear to take an i,portant step to+ard the kind of inspectio ,entis that divides the +orld into t+o ,*t*ally e)cl*sive si,ple s*!stances, res co"itans and res e)tensa, and identifies every partic*lar thin" as an instance or a ,odali7ation of one or the other. Bnly one additional point is needed to ,ake the doctrine of the r*les that follo+ al,ost a ,ere conse3*ence of the fore"oin" disc*ssion: the role of i,a"ination, to +hich >*le 1F i,,ediately t*rns. So that indeed +e no+ also i,a"ine so,ethin" and do not ,ake *se of p*re intellect !*t of the help of species depicted in phantasia: it is to !e noted finally, that nothin" is said a!o*t ,a"nit*des in "eneral that cannot !e referred also to any in partic*lar.O?#P Gro, +hich it is easily concl*ded that it +ill !e not a little helpf*l if +e transfer those thin"s that +e *nderstand a!o*t ,a"nit*des in "eneral to that species of ,a"nit*de that, a,on" all, is dra+n ,ost easily and distinctly in o*r i,a"ination: indeed that this is the real e)tension of a !ody a!stracted fro, every thin" other than that it is fi"*red follo+s fro, +hat +as said at >*le 1?, +here +e conceived phantasia itself +ith e)istent ideas in it to !e nothin" other than a tr*e !ody, real, e)tended, and fi"*red. .hich thin" is also evident per se, since in no other s*!4ect are all differences of proportion ,ore distinctly e)hi!ited= for altho*"h one thin" can !e said to !e ,ore or less +hite than another, like+ise one so*nd ,ore or less sharp, and si,ila)ly for other thin"s, +e nevertheless cannot e)actly define +hether s*ch e)cess consists in a d*ple or triple, etc., proportion *nless thro*"h a certain O?1P /n s*pposition si) of >*le 1? +e are advised that falsity can !e avoided !y resortin" solely to +hat +e have act*ally e)perienced :@& L F??AF?#;. &he in!orn seeds of kno+led"e that the Regulae co*nts on are not s*fficient to "enerate a priori all kno+a!le thin"s. O??P /n the Principles :/ %?A%#, @& D///@ ?%; +e kno+ a s*!stance thro*"h an attri!*te only, never in itself. &h*s the ,at*re philosophy retains the !iplanarity characteristic of the early period. O?#P @ltho*"h the parallelis, of Cde ,a"nit*dini!*s in "enereC +ith Cad 3*a,li!et in specieC s*""ests this translation, there is also a parallel to Cspecie!*s in phantasiaC in the first part of the sentence, so that this co*ld !e rendered: Cnothin" is said a!o*t ,a"nit*des in "eneral that cannot also !e referred to any in an i,a"e.C B*t this does not affect the interpretation.

( 156 ( analo"y to the e)tension of fi"*red !ody. &herefore let it stay settled and fi)ed that perfectly deter,ined 3*estions contain scarcely any diffic*lty !eyond that +hich consists in evolvin" proportions into e3*alities= and all that in +hich precisely s*ch a diffic*lty is discovered can easily, and ,*st, !e separated fro, every other s*!4ect, and then transferred to e)tension and fi"*res, a!o*t +hich thin"s alone +e no+ +ill treat *p to >*le ?%, every other co"itation !ein" o,itted. :@& L FF$AFF1; &his passa"e ,akes the tr*ly re,arka!le state,ent that it is in phantasia that the differences of proportion are ,ore distinctly evident than any+here else= as +e shall see fro, the ne)t section of >*le 1F, this i,plies as +ell that intellect is incapa!le of reco"ni7in" proportions in any distinct +ay +itho*t the aid of i,a"ination. 2or, to e,phasi7e it once ,ore, is this proced*re !ein" restricted to the treat,ent of 3*estions a!o*t corporeal and corporeal intellect*al nat*res. /t is a perfectly "eneral proced*re, for any pro!le, +hatsoever. 1ven the transfer of de"ree of participation in nat*res to line len"ths is presented as an eBample of +hat this proced*re allo+s, not as its essence, since ,any other kinds of fi"*ration are possi!le and per,issi!le, dependin" on the pro!le,. &he doctrine of nat*res or co,,on ideas, +hatever their provenance, is the fo*ndation of the co"nitively effective application of phantasia. De"ree of participation or contain,ent can, indeed ,*st, al+ays !e co,pared *sin" ,a"nit*des. Since proportions can !e ,aintained at any ar!itrary scale, one can take any ,a"nit*de one pleases and call it the +hole or, in cases of ,eas*re, the *nit= all the relations of other thin"s to this ,a"nit*de can !e e)pressed proportionally *sin" lar"er or s,aller ,a"nit*des. 8oreover, once one has led the participation do+n to ,a"nit*des one does not have to keep in ,ind the nat*res the,selves. Bne can solve :e3*ali7e; de"rees of participation +hile co,pletely prescindin" fro, the special character of the nat*re not e)pressed in ,a"nit*des. Bnly at the end of the e3*ali7ation process, +hen one has deter,ined the ,a"nit*de that corresponds to the *nkno+n thin" !y treatin" it as tho*"h it +ere kno+n-+hat +e +o*ld call Csolvin" e3*ations in *nkno+nsC-does one need to re,ind oneself +hat the nat*re is, 4*st as in physics one can solve e3*ations *sin" techni3*es of p*re ,athe,atics +hile i"norin" the *nits in 3*estion *ntil the end, +hen one has to re,ind oneself that they are centi,eters, or 4o*les, or kilo"ra,A,eters per second s3*ared. &hese fo*ndational principles of the i,a"inative pro!le,Asolvin" techni3*e are ela!orated at the end of >*le 1F :after an intervenin" disc*ssion of different +ays in +hich e)tension is i,a"ined and *nderstood= see Sec. 0, !elo+;. 9ere therefore +e t*rn to the e)tended o!4ect, considerin" nothin" else in it !*t the e)tension itself and a!stainin" !y ind*stry Oor on p*rposeP fro, the +ord 63*antity6, for there are certain philosophers so s*!tle that they ( 15E ( have distin"*ished that also fro, e)tension= !*t +e s*ppose all 3*estions so ded*ced that nothin" else is so*"ht for than a certain e)tension that is to !e kno+n, !y its !ein" co,pared +ith a certain other kno+n e)tension. :@& L FFE; &his +ill !e acco,plished !y red*cin" involved proportions, all e)pressed e)tensionally, to a sin"le one that is e3*al to the *nkno+n= this can !e done no ,atter ho+ ,any differences of proportion there are. &he cr*) of the ,atter is fi"*rin" o*t +ays of presentin" these differences and Cred*cin"C their relationships so they are visi!le to the eye and the i,a"ination. C@nd therefore it +ill !e s*fficient to o*r instit*tion if in this e)tension +e consider all those thin"s that can assist the e)position of the differences of proportion, of +hich there occ*r only three, na,ely, di,ension, *nit, and fi"*reC :@& L

FFE;. Di,ension and *nit have to do chiefly +ith +hat is ,eas*ra!le= fi"*re, +ith !oth the ,eas*ra!le and the ordera!le. >*le % had asserted that the ,ethod +as a ,atter of orderin" and arran"in" thin"s, >*le 6 that the participation of thin"s in nat*res co*ld !e *sed to prod*ce orderly and even ,eas*ra!le series. &his part of >*le 1F sho+s ho+ this order can !e i,a"ed and develops an *nderstandin" of ,eas*re as derivative fro, a certain type of order. 8eas*rin" re3*ires a *nit of ,eas*re= a *nit of ,eas*re ,*st ,eas*re so,ethin", a di,ension= a di,ension is a partic*lar +ay of "raspin" the thin"s in 3*estion. /t is either a nat*re or nat*relike-even if it t*rns o*t that it does not act*ally e)istH By 6di,ension6 +e *nderstand nothin" other than the ,ode and reason accordin" to +hich so,e s*!4ect is considered to !e ,eas*ra!le: so that not only len"th, +idth, and depth are di,ensions of !ody, !*t also "ravity is a di,ension accordin" to +hich s*!4ects are +ei"hed, speed is a di,ension of ,otion, and infinite others of the sa,e kind. Gor division itself into several e3*al parts, +hether it is real or only intellect*al, is properly a di,ension accordin" to +hich +e n*,!er a thin"= and that ,ode that ,akes the n*,!er, is properly said to !e a species of di,ension, altho*"h there is so,e diversity in the si"nification of the na,e. Gor if +e consider the parts in an order to+ard the +hole, then +e are said to n*,!er= if contrari+ise +e vie+ the +hole as distri!*ted into parts, +e are ,eas*rin" it: e."., +e ,eas*re cent*ries !y years, days, ho*rs, and ,o,ents= if ho+ever +e n*,!er the ,o,ents, ho*rs, days, and years, +e +ill finally fill *p cent*ries. Gro, these thin"s it appears that there can !e infinitely ,any different di,ensions in the sa,e s*!4ect, and that these add on nothin" at all to the thin"s ,eas*red o*t Ore!*s di,ensisP, !*t are *nderstood in the sa,e +ay +hether they have a real fo*ndation in the s*!4ects the,selves or have !een e)co"itated fro, a +illed 4*d",ent Oe) ar!itrioP of o*r ,ind. Gor the "ravity of !ody, or the speed of ,otion, or the division of a cent*ry into years and days is so,ethin" real= not, ho+ever, the division of days into ho*rs and ,o,ents, etc. @ll these thin"s nevertheless relate to one another in the sa,e ( 155 ( +ay if they are considered only *nder the reason of di,ension, as is to !e done here and in the ,athe,atical disciplines= for it pertains ,ore to the physicists to e)a,ine +hether the fo*ndation of these is real. :@& L FFEAFF5; Descartes points o*t that altho*"h len"th, +idth, and depth have a real !asis in corporeal thin"s, the three are ar!itrarily distin"*ished. 9ere +e do not consider these any ,ore than infinite others that are either fei"ned !y intellect or have a fo*ndation in thin"s: as in the trian"le, if +e +ant to ,eas*re it perfectly, three ite,s on the part of the thin" are to !e kno+n, na,ely, either three sides, or t+o sides and one an"le, or t+o an"les and the area, etc.= si,ilarly in the trape7i*, five, si) in the tetrahedron, etc.= all of +hich can !e called di,ensions. So, ho+ever, that +e choose here those !y +hich o*r i,a"ination +ill !e ,a)i,ally helped, +e +ill never attend to ,ore than one or t+o si,*ltaneo*sly depicted in o*r phantasia, even if +e *nderstand that in the proposed thin" a!o*t +hich +e are !*syin" o*rselves there e)ist as ,any others as +e co*ld +ish= for Othe essenceP of the art is to distin"*ish these into as ,any as possi!le so that +e t*rn si,*ltaneo*sly only to as fe+ as possi!le !*t nevertheless to all in s*ccession. :@& L FF9; &he notion of di,ension esta!lished here, Descartes ar"*es, is not the "eo,eter6s ar!itrary one of the

three spatial di,ensions len"th, +idth, and depth. &hese correspond to so,ethin" real in thin"s, he a"rees, !*t they are not si,ply "iven !y nat*re= rather, they involve an identification !y intellect of a ,ode or aspect of a thin" that is ,eas*ra!le accordin" to so,e conceiva!le division. &o take the ,eas*re of a trian"le +e need to kno+ at least three ele,ents Con the part of the thin"C-three sides, or t+o sides and one an"le, or t+o an"les and the area, and so on. /n a trape7i*, +e need five ele,ents :even tho*"h it has fo*r sides;, in a tetrahedron :a solid +ith fo*r faces; +e need si): C+hich all can !e called di,ensionsC :@& L FF9;. @ltho*"h !oth the trape7i*, and the trian"le are plane fi"*res e)istin" in t+o spatial di,ensions, the perfect deter,ination re3*ires five and three 3*estionAdi,ensions, respectively= the threeAdi,ensional tetrahedron re3*ires si) di,ensions.O?FP @s is typical of the Regulae, it is not a 3*estion of deter,inin" or definin" the essences of these thin"s. /ndeed, their essences in the Scholastic sense are taken for "ranted, and one6s inA O?FP @ trape7i*, is a 3*adrilateral +ith no parallel sides= one co*ld deter,ine it precisely !y :to "ive one e)a,ple; specifyin" the len"th of a first side :this is the first factor or di,ension;, the an"les at +hich the t+o sides co,e off the ends of that first :t+o ,ore di,ensions;, and the len"ths of those t+o sides :another t+o, ,akin" five in all;. @ tetrahedron is a solid +ith fo*r trian"*lar faces= one co*ld deter,ine it !y specifyin" first one of the trian"les as a !ase :this re3*ires three di,ensions; and then the ape) at +hich the other three faces ,eet :!y takin" one of the sides of the !ase trian"le as an a)is and "ivin" three coordinates that +o*ld take yo* fro, one of its end points to the position of the ape) point= this "ives three ,ore di,ensions;. ( 159 ( terest instead is ho+ to constr*ct the, *na,!i"*o*sly-,ore "enerally, ho+ to "et di,ensions that codeter,ine one another and th*s allo+ the sol*tion of the 3*estion at hand. .hat one needs to solve a 3*estion depends on +hat the 3*estion asks for. 8oreover, Descartes as al+ays *r"es *s to adapt o*rselves to the capa!ilities of o*r in"enia. &o repeat the ad,onition of >*le 1F: So, ho+ever, that +e choose here those Odi,ensionsP !y +hich o*r i,a"ination +ill !e ,a)i,ally helped, +e +ill never attend to ,ore than one or t+o si,*ltaneo*sly depicted in o*r phantasia, even if +e *nderstand that in the proposed thin" a!o*t +hich +e are !*syin" o*rselves there e)ist as ,any others as +e co*ld +ish= for Othe essenceP of the art is to distin"*ish these into as ,any as possi!le so that +e t*rn si,*ltaneo*sly only to as fe+ as possi!le !*t nevertheless to all in s*ccession. :@& L FF9; &o s*,,ari7e the process of >*les 1# and 1F: /n settin" *p the pro!le, one *ses intellect to en*,erate and distin"*ish all the relevant aspects, ter,s, and divisions of the thin" in 3*estion. &hen one e)presses in easily i,a"ina!le, fi"*rate for, the proportional relations that are deter,inately "iven, and one treats +hat is *nkno+n as tho*"h it +ere kno+n-kno+n, that is, in relation to the proportional participation in nat*res of other thin"s or their aspects.O?%P &he fi"*res-chiefly line se",ents, !*t also discrete ,a"nit*des and t+oAdi,ensional fi"*res +here appropriate-+ill then !eco,e the o!4ects of ,anip*lation as one tries to e3*ali7e the vario*s proportions, +ith the ai, of e)pressin" the desi"nated *nkno+ns in ter,s of +hat is kno+n. &o keep this all ,ana"ea!le for an in"eni*, that has diffic*lty attendin" to ,ore than t+o thin"s at a ti,e, one +ill *se ,arks and sy,!ols to keep track of the pro!le,-a techni3*e that +ill "enerate sy,!olic e3*ations. B*t at this point Descartes is envisionin" ,ore than the develop,ent of ,odern al"e!raic pro!le, solvin". .hat co*nts ,ost for hi, is the *niversal relevance of proportional participation in nat*res, a participation that is e)pressi!le in its ,ost perspic*o*s for, not !y al"e!ra, +hich is sy,!ols +itho*t

content, !*t !y fi"*res, +hich visi!ly e,!ody act*al proportions. Gor every al"e!raic ,anip*lation one can perfor, on an e3*ation there is, ,ore i,portant, a 3*ite precise, i,a"ina!ly e)ec*ta!le "eo,etric constr*ction correspondin" to it. :/n fact, it is only in the later ,athe,atics of the 0eometry that there e,er"es an independence, or rather O?%P Gor e)a,ple, in a physics pro!le, concernin" the +ei"ht, density, hardness, and si7e of ,inerals, there +ill !e proportional relations !et+een the different aspects :e."., +ei"ht ,i"ht !e e3*al to len"th ti,es +idth ti,es hei"ht ti,es density, and hardness ,i"ht !e a f*nction of density;. &hese proportions Cred*ceC each nat*re to others, not in the sense of ontolo"ically eli,inatin" it !*t in the sense of e)pressin" interconnections. &he science of the Regulae is not the red*ctive science of the Discourse. ( 19$ ( 3*asiAindependence, of al"e!raic ,anip*lation fro, "eo,etric representation= nevertheless, the 0eometry is in principle still a!o*t ho+ to discover and e)ec*te e)act "eo,etric constr*ctions !y follo+in" the pattern of ,anip*lations indicated in al"e!raic e3*ations.; &he ,arks and sy,!ols are especially helpf*l in the sortin" o*t of the ele,ents of a pro!le,, for representin" in a contentless !*t ,ne,onically *sef*l +ay the line se",ents and other fi"*res that e,!ody the proportions. &he sortin"A o*t process is +hat the ancient "eo,eters called analysis: takin" the *nkno+ns as kno+n and sche,atically +orkin" o*t +hat +o*ld !e tr*e if they +ere kno+n= and then, provided one reaches the point of havin" red*ced the pro!le, to ter,s that are kno+n or constr*cti!le, the reverse process of synthesis, of the act*al constr*ction :or ded*ction, a leading do9n ; of the sol*tion, can !e carried o*t. /n co,parison to the ancients, Descartes si,plifies the analytic phase !y ,akin" it ,ore accessi!le to h*,an in"eni*,. &he ancient "eo,eters had +orked +ith co,plicated fi"*res re3*irin" a sophisticated "eo,etrical insi"ht, and each sta"e of analysis re3*ired findin" an e)ec*ta!le ne)t step that +as *s*ally dependent on ,*ltiple considerations :e."., one ,i"ht need to add several ne+ lines to an already co,plicated fi"*re;. Descartes *ses the identification of relevant di,ensions, the si,ple fi"*rate representation of proportions one at a ti,e, and the sy,!ols and ,arks of Cal"e!raic e3*ationsC to red*ce the analysis to a pro"ressive linear se3*ence re3*irin" attention to no ,ore than t+o thin"s at once. .hat is ,ore, the al"e!raic e3*ations, !y containin" direct sy,!olic references to the ori"inal "ivens and *nkno+ns of the pro!le, :B F J a? a ?4c A c# directly involves the B, the a, the 4, and the c ;, allo+ one, if the analysis is s*ccessf*l, to constr*ct the *nkno+n proportion stepA!yAstep :,*ltiply the line a !y itself, add to this res*lt the line that is t+ice the prod*ct of 4 and c = s*!tract line c ,*ltiplied !y itself and !y itself a"ain= then take the fo*rth root of this res*lt, and yo* "et the desired, previo*sly *nkno+n B ;. &his entire process, then, is si,ply an iterated and reiterated application of int*it*s and ded*ctio to the i,a"e for,s of the pro!le,, arrayed in a se3*ence and ,anner that ,akes everythin" as clear and as i,a"ina!le as possi!le. &he decisive advanta"e of this kind of ded*ctio over the ded*ction fro, a)io,s and post*lates of ordinary lo"ic and dialectic is its perfect reversi!ility and reciprocity: if y is the prod*ct of f and g, it is also tr*e that f can !e o!tained fro, y and g !y division :i.e., !y a proportion, yNg ;, and like+ise " can !e o!tained as yNf &he ter,s of dialectic, ho+ever, are not in "eneral reversi!le. C@ll h*,an !ein"s are ani,alsC does not 4*stify the concl*sion that all ani,als are h*,an !ein"s !*t only the +eak and relatively indeter,inate CSo,e ani,als are h*,an !ein"s.C Gro, this latter assertion no f*rther concl*sion is possi!le +itho*t the addition of a ne+ ( 191 (

*niversal pre,ise tellin" *s so,ethin" a!o*t either ani,als or h*,an !ein"s. Descartes6s pro!le, solvin", !y contrast, *ses *niversal ,athesis to reason a!o*t nothin" other than partic*larly represented relations, so that the presence of nothin" !*t partic*lars does not prevent a sol*tion. Bn the contrary, it is +hat ,akes a sin"le deter,inate sol*tion possi!le. /n the concl*din" re,arks to >*le 1F, Descartes notes that in choosin" a,on" fi"*res for e)pressin" the relations in pro!le,s Cit is necessary to kno+ that all relations that there can !e !et+een entities of the sa,e "en*s are to !e referred to t+o headin"s: na,ely, to order or to ,eas*reC :@& L F%1;. @s to order, the +hole Regulae has !een directed to+ard sho+in" the nat*re and conse3*ences of order and the search for it. Bri"inally findin" o*t an order can take a "reat deal of +ork :tho*"h so,e orderliness is intrinsically si,ple;, !*t once an order is discovered there is no diffic*lty in kno+in" it !y follo+in" >*le E6s advice of r*nnin" thro*"h a se3*ence of the parts that have !een distinctly separated fro, one another, !eca*se, to +it, in this "en*s of relations one part is referred to others o*t of the,selves alone, !*t not !y ,eans of a third, as happens in ,eas*rin"s, a!o*t the evolvin" of +hich +e are alone here treatin". Gor / reco"ni7e +hat is the order !et+een @ and B +itho*t considerin" anythin" !eyond each e)tre,e= / do not, ho+ever, kno+ +hat the proportion of ,a"nit*de is !et+een t+o and three *nless it is considered !y so,e third thin", na,ely, !y the *nity +hich is the co,,on ,eas*re of each. :@& L F%1; Contin*o*s ,a"nit*de can al+ays !e red*ced, at least in part, to a ,*ltit*de :a line of len"th E.### . . . can !e appro)i,ately represented !y E points or, if one takes. 1 as the *nit, E#, etc.;, +hich ,eans that pro!le,s of ,eas*re can, !y ,eans of the *nit of ,eas*re, !e translated into pro!le,s of order.O?6P &o represent di,ensions !y contin*o*s ,a"nit*de +e sho*ld not *se anythin" ,ore than len"th and +idth= that is, +e sho*ld not attend to ,ore than t+o di,ensions si,*ltaneo*sly. /n concl*sion, he points o*t a conse3*ence: that even pro!le,s concernin" ,athe,atical entities :like "eo,etrical fi"*res; are to !e treated accordin" to this ,ethod. 9ere propositions are to !e no less a!stracted fro, those fi"*res that "eo,eters treat, if the 3*estion is a!o*t the,, than fro, any other ,atter +hatever= and for this p*rpose none are to !e retained !eyond rectilinear and rectan"*lar s*rfaces, or ri"ht lines, +hich also +e are callin" fi"*res, O?6P / do not see that one in fact "ains ,*ch fundamentally fro, this proced*re, since it does not eli,inate the *nit :+hich is a third thin" interposin" itself !et+een the t+o thin"s to !e co,pared; !*t rather leaves it i,plicit. 2evertheless, it perhaps "ives a ,ore i,a"ina!le precision: t+o lines, one of len"th E1 #, the other of len"th pi, leave considera!le +ork to the i,a"ination in fi)in" the e)act proportion, +hereas p*ttin" E# tenthA*nits ne)t to #1 ,akes the proportion so,e+hat ,ore deter,inately, tho*"h appro)i,ately, evident. ( 19? ( since !y ,eans of these +e i,a"ine a tr*ly e)tended s*!4ect no less than !y ,eans of s*rface, as +as said a!ove= and finally !y ,eans of the sa,e fi"*res !oth contin*o*s ,a"nit*des and also ,*ltit*de or n*,!er are to !e e)hi!ited= and nothin" si,pler for the e)position of all differences of relation can !e invented !y h*,an endeavor. :@& L F%?; &h*s, far fro, applyin" ordinary ,athe,atics to all thin"s, Descartes is advisin" the application of ,athesis *niversalis, the science of concretely i,a"ed proportional relations, even to arith,etic and "eo,etry. @ ,athe,atician +ill therefore identify relevant aspects or nat*res in any strictly ,athe,atical pro!le,, proportionali7e the "ivens, then perfor, an i,a"inative process of contin*ed

proportionali7ation to solve for an *nkno+n. /f this process is different fro, the ordinary ,ethods of ,athe,atical proof, so !e it. &he r*les follo+in"-1% thro*"h 15 have !oth headin"s and e)plications, 19 thro*"h ?1 only headin"s -are virt*ally contained in >*le 1F. >*le 1% sho+s ho+ to *se a point or line or s3*are to stand for the *nit and then ho+ to e)tend these to represent ,eas*res that are co,,ens*ra!le +ith the *nit or to constr*ct a rectan"le to e)hi!it to the eyes t+o ,eas*res in relation to one another. >*le 16 advises the *se of concise ,arks to keep track of the pro!le, as a +hole= >*le 1E advises s*rveyin" all the parts of the pro!le, on the sa,e !asis of instantiated proportions, +hether they !e kno+n or *nkno+n. >*le 15 sho+s ho+ to add and s*!tract line se",ents fro, one another and e)plains the principle *nderlyin" ,*ltiplication and division *sin" lines and rectan"les. Cr*cial to the effectiveness of the proced*re is the a!ility to translate a ,eas*re fro, a line se",ent into a rectan"le and fro, a rectan"le into a se",ent, so that it is never necessary to e)ceed t+o spatial di,ensions :in ancient ,athe,atics, the ,*ltiplication of t+o n*,!ers +as conceived !y constr*ctin" a rectan"le +ith sides of those len"ths= ,*ltiplication !y a third n*,!er re3*ired the constr*ction of a solid= ,*ltiplication !y a fo*rth n*,!er th*s presented nearly ins*pera!le pro!le,s of conception, since it +o*ld have re3*ired enterin" a fo*rth spatial di,ension;.O?EP >*le 19 :headin" only; says that in solvin" a pro!le, +e need to find as ,any ,a"nit*des :line len"ths, rectan"les, n*,!ers; as there are *nkno+n ter,s !y *sin" operations on the *nkno+ns as if they +ere kno+n :in ,odern alge4raic ter,s, +e look for e3*ations settin" B, y, 2, and any other *nkno+ns e3*al to so,e for,*la that contains only kno+n val*es;. >*le ?$ :headin" only; pro,ises to tell ho+ to carry o*t the operations of ,*ltiplication and division O?EP Descartes6s techni3*e of red*cin" a plane fi"*re to a line represents an advance over the ,athe,atical adaptation of the ,e,ory art he had e)plained to Beeck,an in Bcto!er 16?5= see chap. #, Sec. 1 a!ove. ( 19# ( :+hich had !een p*t off *ntil this point !eca*se of their "reater technical diffic*lty;. @nd >*le ?1, the last e)tant headin", *r"es that ,any e3*ations !e red*ced to a sin"le one. @t this point the Regulae !reaks off.

F. T0E SCIENCE OF ORDER AND ,EASURE AND T0E PARADO9ES OF SI,PLE NATURES
.as the Regulae a!andoned, or did Descartes si,ply leave it inco,pleteQ @re there tensions and conflicts !et+een it and the later philosophy, or is the later philosophy si,ply a contin*ation of +hat +as laid do+n in its r*lesQ .ith each 3*estion cases can !e ,ade for either alternative. Consider the possi!le si"nificance of the fact that the !reak in the Regulae occ*rs at >*le ?1 and that none of >*les 19 thro*"h ?1 consists of ,ore than a headin". @ll three have to do +ith for,in" e3*ations on the !asis of fi"*rate and sy,!olic representations and the operations of addition, s*!traction, ,*ltiplication, and division disc*ssed in the precedin" r*les. &he last s*!stantive re,ark ,ade in the co,,entary *nder >*le 15 says that in order to red*ce any rectan"le to a line se",ent one ,*st !e a!le to constr*ct on a "iven line a rectan"le e3*al :in area; to a "iven rectan"le. &he rationale is this: &he prod*ct of a len"th a ,*ltiplied !y a len"th 4 can !e represented !y the area of a rectan"le +ith sides of len"th a and 4 . /f one +ants to ,*ltiply this prod*ct !y another n*,!er, one needs to convert a4 into a line len"th and then constr*ct a ne+ rectan"le +ith sides of len"th a4 and c , the area of +hich +ill !e a4c . Bne co*ld constr*ct a c*!e +ith di,ensions a, 4, and c, !*t then in order to perfor, a ne+ ,*ltiplication one +o*ld have to red*ce the

c*!e6s vol*,e to an area or a line= !*t a c*!e in any case re3*ires attention to three ,eas*res at once :len"th, +idth, and hei"ht;, contrary to the advice of the Regulae to keep co,parisons to t+o ite,s at a ti,e. &h*s any "eo,etric techni3*e of ,*ltiplyin" is "oin" to re3*ire the red*ction of a hi"herA di,ension fi"*re to a fi"*re of the ne)t lo+er di,ension. /f a and 4 are inte"ers or rational n*,!ers, the constr*ction of a line se",ent e3*al in len"th to their prod*ct is relatively si,ple-one can 4*st reckon *p the total n*,!er of *nits or fractional parts and then !*ild *p the prod*ct line piece !y piece-!*t if one of the n*,!ers is irrational, this +ill not !e possi!le. 2or +ill any arith,etic or al"e!raic techni3*es :al"orith,s; "ive the res*lt e)actly, for they +ork !y appro)i,ation. &he desired line len"th co*ld !e o!tained !y identifyin" a "eneral techni3*e of "eo,etric constr*ction, ho+ever. 0iven a rectan"le of area a4, if one can constr*ct a second rectan"le of e3*al area on a line se",ent havin" *nit len"th, the t+o sides ad4acent to this *nit se",ent o!vio*sly +ill !oth ( 19F ( have len"th a4. So the a!ility to constr*ct on a "iven *nit line a rectan"le e3*al in area to another "iven rectan"le a,o*nts to !ein" a!le to constr*ct a line +hose len"th represents the prod*ct of t+o n*,!ers. &he "eneral techni3*e is concept*ally si,ple= act*ally constr*ctin" s*ch a line or rectan"le is 3*ite another ,atter.O?5P B*t does this Regulae ,ethod really serve Descartes6s lar"er and *lti,ate "oalsQ &he 0eometry of 16#E, one of the three essays that follo+ed the Discourse on the ethod, "ives so,e insi"ht into this 3*estion. Bn the one hand, the 0eometry can !e conceived as Descartes6s f*rther ela!oration of the correspondence !et+een line len"ths and sy,!olic al"e!ra, +ith the al"e!ra s*!ordinate insofar as it is an easily ,anip*la!le sy,!olic for, for e)pressin" proportions that are *lti,ately to !e translated into "eo,etric constr*ctions. Bn the other hand, it can !e seen as a re4ection of the ,ethod of applyin" strai"ht lines and rectan"les in favor of a "eneral techni3*e of solvin" for proportions !y the "eneration of co,ple) c*rves. &he 0eometry +orks as resol*tely in t+o di,ensions as does the Regulae, !*t its favored tools are strai"ht lines and c*rves derived fro, the motions of strai"ht lines and lo+erAdi,ensioned c*rves !y contin*o*s and ri"oro*sly ,echanical processes. &he antecedent of this aspect of the 0eometry is Descartes6s st*dy aro*nd 16?$ of the properties of ne+ kinds of tools for "eo,etric constr*ction, like the proportional co,pass, the operation of +hich co*ld !e *sed to trace o*t c*rves !y virt*e of the ,echanical linka"e of its se",ents. &he later "eo,etry of Descartes p*ts a "reater pre,i*, on the "enerative process and its contin*ity, and it syste,atically e)plores the possi!ilities of "eneratin" co,ple) c*rves that correspond to al"e!raic e3*ations. &his is a dyna,ic "eo,etry, in contrast to the ,ore static and episodic character of the ,athe,atics in the e)tant Regulae, +here one al+ays stops to co,pare 4*st one line to another, then perfor,s one or ,ore si,ple ,anip*lations, then co,pares the res*lt to one of the ori"inal lines or yet another, and so on. &he 0eometry 6s "eo,etry proceeds contin*o*sly and dyna,ically, not stepA!yAstep. &he conte)t of the ,athe,atics of the 0eometry is the scientific *nderstandin" of e)tension and ,atter that Descartes developed for &e onde, a +ork !e"*n a!o*t 16#$, after the a!andon,ent or pres*,ed a!andon,ent of the Regulae. 9o+ that +ork is predicated on a ,ore contin*o*s and dyna,ic, !*t also ,ore restricted, po+er of i,a"ination +ill !e revealed in the ne)t chapter. Before +e can proceed to that, +e ,*st conA O?5P /f yo* kno+ e)actly ho+ lon" the *nit len"th sho*ld !e, relative to the len"ths a and 4, it is easy to constr*ct the line of len"th a4. Gor, a first fi"ht trian"le +ith le"s of len"th 1 and a, then dra+ a line of len"th 4 parallel to the side of len"th i and constr*ct a second trian"le on len"th 4 si,ilar to the first trian"le !y dra+in" parallels to the other t+o sides. &he other le" of the second trian"le :parallel to the

side a of the first trian"le; +ill have len"th a4. .hen a and 4 are rational n*,!ers it is al+ays possi!le to constr*ct a line of *nit len"th, !*t +hen they are !oth irrational the +hole trick is to constr*ct s*ch a *nit len"th e)actly. ( 19% ( cl*de the disc*ssion of the Regulae !y raisin" so,e of the ,a4or *nresolved pro!le,s to +hich it led. &hey +ill !e presented *nder t+o headin"s: the parado) of the nat*res doctrine in the conte)t of science, especially in ,atters of physiolo"y and physics, and the interaction of intellect and i,a"ination. /,a"ination, it t*rns o*t, fi"*res centrally in !oth. >*le 6 introd*ced the nat*res in the phrase Cp*re and si,ple nat*res,C !*t +hat they a,o*nt to in the first instance are aspects co,,on to ,any thin"s :] la >*le 1F; that are participated to varyin" de"rees. &his differential participation "ives rise to an order fro, the least to the ,ost= the thin"s that ,ost participate in-or, !etter, +holly contain-the nat*re in 3*estion are called 6a!sol*te6. B*t even in the co*rse of >*le 6 there !e"ins to appear the thornier 3*estion of the participation of nat*res in one another. >*le 5 and, even ,ore, >*le 1? "o on to address not 4*st the po+ers of ,ind !*t also the o!4ects of those po+ers, the nat*res. &he nat*res are divided in >*le 5 into the spirit*al, the corporeal, and the spirit*al corporeal= in >*le 1?, into the intellect*al, the ,aterial, and the co,,on. Both r*les distin"*ish si,ple nat*res fro, co,ple) ones= the latter are either ori"inally e)perienced as s*ch, that is, as co,ple), or are co,posed !y the intellect. Galsity e)ists only in the co,posite nat*res p*t to"ether !y intellect. &he second part of >*le 1? in fact offers a pres*ppositional acco*nt of nat*res, in ,*ch the sa,e +ay that the first part presents an acco*nt of the psychophysiolo"y of the internal senses that, like the hypotheses of the astrono,ers, is intended to ,ake thin"s clearer +itho*t a final ass*rance of tr*th. &he pres*ppositional acco*nt "oes as follo+s. Girst, the +ay that nat*res e)ist in reality is said to pro!a!ly differ fro, ho+ they appear in kno+led"e, since, for e)a,ple, real !odies, +hich are sin"le and si,ple as thin"s, are *nderstood as so,eho+ p*t to"ether o*t of diverse nat*res. Second, there are three classes of nat*re, intellect*al, ,aterial, and co,,on, the last incl*din" the co,,on notions of ,athe,atics and reason :e."., if t+o thin"s are e3*al to a third thin", they are e3*al to one another;. &hird, any si,ple nat*re is evident, kno+n in itself, so that havin" the sli"htest "rasp of it is to have it co,plete. Go*rth, the si,ple nat*res are con4oined either necessarily or contin"ently= in the first case separatin" the, ,akes it i,possi!le to conceive the co,ponents distinctly. Gifth, the only thin"s +e can *nderstand are these si,ple nat*res and a certain ,i)t*re or co,position of the,. Si)th, the co,posite nat*res are either kno+n as s*ch thro*"h e)perience or are ,ade *p !y intellect. Seventh, the co,posites +e ,ake co,e a!o*t thro*"h i,p*lse, thro*"h con4ect*re, or thro*"h ded*ction :@& L F15AF?%;. 8arion has ar"*ed at len"th that the si,ple nat*res of Descartes are inscri!ed a"ainst a !ack"ro*nd of @ristotelian ontolo"y and episte,olo"y and that in the doctrine of the, is contained +hat he calls the C"ray ( 196 ( ontolo"yC of the Regulae, that is, an ine)plicit ontolo"ical fra,e+ork that s*!se3*ently evolved into the philosophy of Descartes6s ,at*rity.O?9P 8arion is certainly ri"ht to p*t s*ch +ei"ht on the nat*res for Descartes6s f*t*re tho*"ht. Descartes so*"ht fro, the, ontolo"ical s*pport for the ,ethod of the Regulae, and the partially developed theory of nat*res offered there raises the,es and s*""ests

positions of the later philosophy +itho*t setAflin" the,. /n the Regulae, Descartes appears to !e 3*ite content +ith the possi!le discrepancy !et+een nat*res in e)istent thin"s and nat*res in o*r kno+led"e that the first of the seven pres*ppositions allo+s. 1ven on the episAte,olo"ical level he displays a re,arka!le cas*alness a!o*t the nat*res. @ltho*"h they are to provide the fo*ndations for all kno+in", Descartes does not insist on a perfect red*ctio to the,. 9e is perfectly happy to "et on +ith the task of pro!le, solvin" !y ,eans of pra",atic and he*ristic e)pedients, the ,ost !asic of +hich is the discovery of series +ith a!sol*tes that are less than a!sol*tely a!sol*te. /n fact this cas*alness is not *ni3*e to the Regulae !*t is a rec*rrent trait in all Descartes6s +ritin"s, a cas*alness "ro*nded in a conviction, first, that h*,an nat*re-h*,an in"eni*,-is constit*ted so that it can kno+ and learn and, second, that the fo*ndations of kno+in" are not infinitely or even "reatly re,ote fro, o*r capa!ilities !*t only a short distance !eneath the s*rface :often !*ried *nder the de!ris of philosophical ,aled*cation;. &o *se an i,a"e of the Discourse, ,ost people !*ild on sand, and this is especially *nfort*nate !eca*se one need not di" deep to hit clay or rock. Br to chan"e to a vis*al ,etaphor: one can reach the tr*th relatively easily !y lookin" caref*lly and clearin" a+ay +hat is e)traneo*s= once one has done this it is easy to see thin"s, and once one sees the, one has the,. Bne ,i"ht recall in addition the rec*rrent ,otif of Descartes6s +ritin"s that says one ,*st once in one6s life *ndertake an e)a,ination of one6s ,ind and opinions to find the tr*th and co,!ine this +ith the fact that he ackno+led"es havin" reco"ni7ed this need early in his o+n life yet postponed the e)a,ination for nearly a decade :@& D/ 1$ 16A1E, ??= D// 1E;. &hat it needs to !e done !*t once in one6s life indicates that, *nlike ancient theoria and ,edieval conte,platio, the *lti,ate tr*ths do not open *p a +ay of life that is a contin*o*s "a7in" on tr*th, !*t that once tr*ths are seen they can !e *sed to "*ide all the concerns and solve all the pro!le,s that life presents. >eal tr*th is sec*re and ,ay !e relied on= "iven 0od6s veracity, it does not even have to !e recalled in its f*ll and present evidence !*t only re,e,!ered as havin" in the past !een kno+n. <et the atheist can reco"ni7e the tr*th 4*st as +ell as the !eliever in the ,o,ent of evidence= this confir,s that tr*th6s fo*ndations are in essential harA O?9P See 8arion, %ur &'"ntologie grise de Descartes, esp. 1#1A1F5, 15%A19$. ( 19E ( ,oney +ith the caref*l !*t nonfo*ndational *se of one6s kno+in" po+ers. &herefore one can kno+, live, and act in the li"ht of the tr*th even +hen one has not looked to the so*rce of the ill*,ination, and one does not need in every case of kno+in" to look deep !eneath the s*rface of thin"s. &he Regulae appears to !e +ritten in this do*!le confidence, that the fo*ndations are shallo+ !*t still sec*re and that the "ood *se of in"eni*, does not in ,ost cases re3*ire "oin" do+n to the fo*ndations. &he hypothetical ,ode of all of >*le 1?, co,!ined +ith the relative si,plicity of the physical and physiolo"ical lan"*a"e and the,es posited there :and else+here, for e)a,ple >*le 5, +hich disc*sses the anaclastic line of optics in physical ter,s that are ,ore Scholastic than Cartesian;,O#$P tends to confir, that the Regulae precedes the deeper investi"ations of physics, ,etaphysics, and fo*ndational episte,olo"y that +e re"ard as "en*inely Cartesian. B*t this +o*ld !e perfectly consistent +ith an essential contin*ity of this +ork +ith the ontolo"ical episte,olo"y of rese,!lance, +hich is ,ore coherentist than fo*ndationalist and e)presses a confidence that hi"her tr*ths are ad*,!rated even in the least thin"s. @ Descartes +orkin" at the Regulae +ith this confidence +o*ld see the f*nda,ental co"nitive task as one of pro"ressive clarification. <et it is do*!tless ri"ht that the 3*estion of +hat in the last analysis +e see +hen +e see and +hat +e kno+ +hen +e kno+ ind*ced Descartes to p*t a ter, or end point to seein" and to call the, nat*res.

9is first i,p*lse, one e)pressed in the ,ain pro4ect of the Regulae, +as to treat the, as the aspects of thin"s= his second i,p*lse, +hich appears in the o!vio*sly inco,plete sections of >*les 5 and 1?, +as to conceive the, as a kind of o!4ect :or res, thin"; capa!le of participatin" in other nat*res 4*st as ordinary thin"s do. @t the li,it of this participative process stood the *lti,ate si,ple nat*res, +hich need no f*rther pheno,enolo"ical or ca*sal s*pport. Descartes6s treat,ent of the, is hesitant, ho+ever= he does not p*sh the si,ple nat*res to their lo"ical and ontolo"ical e)tre,es, !*t instead takes the, in several directions not entirely consistent +ith one another. &he ,athetical approach of >*les 1# thro*"h ?1 is oriented to practical pro!le, solvin" and an i,a"inative ,athe,atics of participation in O#$P See @& L #9F. &he anaclastic line is the c*rve of a lens that +o*ld foc*s all parallel rays of li"ht to a sin"le point. @ltho*"h the Regulae 6s disc*ssion of optical ,atters s*""ests that Descartes had already achieved no little ,athe,atical sophistication in optical theory, his physical theory of li"ht is still ,arkedly traditional. @ si"n of this is his *se of diaphanum. CS8 is certainly +ron" in renderin" totum diaphanum as 6the entire transparent !ody6 and e)plainin" it in a note as 6the very fl*id 6s*!tle ,atter6 +hich Descartes took to !e the ,edi*, of the trans,ission of li"ht6 :CS8 1:?9;, for diaphanum is si,ply the Latin ter, for the transparent ,edi*, that, accordin" to @ristotle, ,*st !e act*ali7ed !y li"ht for the proper sensi!le, color, to !e conveyed to the eye. ( 195 ( nat*res that "ives rise to ,eas*rin" the de"ree of participation. /t has a pra",atic conception of nat*res, *nderstood as di,ensions, +hich can !e either fictional or real. &he idea of red*ctio presented is not ontolo"ical !*t proportional, +hich ,eans si,ply that proportions allo+ *s to e)press one thin" in deter,inate, reversi!le relations to others !y +ay of vario*s di,ensions. So, for e)a,ple, the reflection of a li"ht ray can !e analy7ed as a relation !et+een lines standin" for the ray and a line standin" for the reflectin" s*rface= the proportions !et+een the lines can !e e)pressed !y an"les= and the nat*ral forces involved can !e p*t in ter,s of the an"les and lines. &he so*rce of error in this process is the intellect, +hen it overlooks +hat the concrete presentation of the pro!le, contains. 2evertheless, intellect still has the f*nda,ental pro!le,Asolvin" task of sortin" o*t the different nat*reA di,ensions in the "ivens of the pro!le, and deter,inin" +hat is relevant-+hich also ,eans leavin" aside the irrelevant, altho*"h no criterion for this distinction is "iven. >*le 6 presents an o!4ectAcentered approach oriented !y a participation in nat*res that "ives rise to an orderin", seriali7in" activity. /t esta!lishes a +o!!ly fo*ndation for the later ,athetical r*les, +hich pres*ppose the inA"enial activity of co,parin" one thin" to another in li"ht of nat*res that are the startin" point of >*le 6. &he seriali7in" is chiefly of the thin"s that participate in nat*res rather than of the nat*res the,selves. &he thin"s rather than the nat*res are in the first instance treated as a!sol*te or respective. &he second annotation of the r*le !e"ins to !roach the 3*estion of the participation of nat*res in one another +itho*t clarifyin" +hether this participation is of a different kind. >*le 1? :and >*le 5; atte,pts to pro!e +hat >*le 6 pres*pposes: the character of the physical processes and of the psychoAor"anic apparat*s that convey the appearances of thin"s to ,ind, and also the very nat*res that are increasin"ly conceived as the *lti,ate o!4ects of the psycholo"ical activities. B*t >*le 1? proceeds !y pres*pposition. /n the psychophysical part it pres*,es that the i,pressions of thin"s are conveyed !y physical processes that are +holly relia!le and preserve the se,!lances of thin"s intact :one ,i"ht s*r,ise that he e)pects the physicist to confir, this in short order;, and it adapts a lon"Aesta!lished internal senses doctrine to a ,odified !*t still traditional physiolo"y in a ,anner that sho+s no partic*lar ac3*aintance +ith concrete anato,ical st*diesO#1P 9e identifies the

real so*rce of i,a"ination as the vis co"noscens actin" in the or"an phanA O#1P Descartes pro!a!ly did not !e"in st*dyin" anato,y at first hand *ntil so,eti,e in 16?9= see Dennis L. Sepper, CDescartes and the 1clipse of /,a"ination, 1615A16#$,C 'ournal of the (istory of Philosophy ?E, no. # :K*ly 1959;: #E9AFo#= and Sepper, C/n"eni*,, 8e,ory @rt, and the Unity of /,a"inative 'no+in" in the 1arly Descartes,C in )ssays on the Philosophy and %cience of Rtn* Descartes, ed. Stephen Doss, 1F?A161 :2e+ <ork: B)ford University Press, 199#;. See also chap. #, footnote #?, a!ove. ( 199 ( tasia-as ,*ch +illAlike as intellectlike, since it is an intentional application of the kno+in" forceand places thinkin"6s center of "ravity there= yet he allo+s a certain de"ree of a*tono,y to a p*re intellect that he scarcely even !e"ins to artic*late. /n the nat*res part of >*le 1? he co*ntenances a possi!le discrepancy !et+een ho+ thin"s in the +orld and thin"s in the ,ind participate in nat*res, yet he post*lates a fo*ndationalist ontolo"y of episte,olo"ical nat*res that has to !e *lti,ately consistent +ith the !ein" of real thin"s if it is to !e co"nitively effective. 9e says that nat*res ,*st !e co,posa!le and distin"*ishes !et+een necessary and contin"ent co,position, !*t he does not clarify necessity in any deeper sense than the ,ind6s ina!ility to distinctly separate the necessarily co,posed nat*res. /n this sche,atics of nat*res as necessary or contin"ent, fallin" into the three classes of the p*rely ,aterial, the p*rely intellect*al, and the either ,aterial or intellect*al, he !e"ins to evolve a hi"herAorder voca!*lary for talkin" a!o*t nat*res that s*""ests there are hi"herAlevel or transcendental si,ple nat*res, the character of +hich is left o!sc*re. Ginally, the theory of the co,position of nat*res that o*r intellect perfor,s, accordin" to either i,p*lse, con4ect*re, or ded*ction, !e"ins to address +hat ,i"ht provide a fo*ndation for the co"nitive activity of i,a"ination, altho*"h Descartes6s presentation is a ,i)ed !a" of pro!le,atic assertions :@& L F?F;. :1; 9e tells *s that impulse can lead to either tr*th or error: it is never a so*rce of error +hen it co,es fro, on hi"h :altho*"h this stands o*tside the scope of ,ethod;, rarely +hen fro, o*r free +ill, al,ost al+ays +hen it is d*e to an indisposition of phantasia :like 4a*ndice;. :?; By con7ecture +e co,pose +hat is ,erely pro!a!le= this does not deceive *s so lon" as +e do not assert it to !e tr*e. :#; Deductio re,ains as the sole +ay of co,posin" thin"s so that +e can !e certain of their tr*th, precisely !y *sin" int*it*s in a pro"ression that reveals the necessity of the con4*nctions of nat*res. Descartes appears to have fo*nd the the,es of his ,at*rity and the "er, of his approach to the, in this 3*ick sketch, !*t the co,pression and pro!le,atic coherence s*""est that he had not yet tho*"ht the, thro*"h.

+. CO,PARATIVE INTELLECT AND CONCRETE I,A+INATION

/nt*it*s, of co*rse, is the easy and distinct concept*, of a p*re and attentive ,ind. <et the thin"A oriented int*it*s of the early r*les as +ell as the ,athetical int*it*s of the final r*les !e"in to inti,ate that nat*res ,i"ht !e the easy and distinct thin"s "rasped !y the p*re and attentive ,ind. Consonant +ith the !iplanar conscio*sness of Descartes6s philosophy, inAt*it*s is the +ellAprepared seein" of a thin" +ith respect to a nat*re. 2at*res are th*s in the first instance a ,odality of the "raspin"Aseein" of a ( ?$$ ( thin", an indirect o!4ect, so to speak. Can nat*res in t*rn !eco,e the direct o!4ects of int*it*sQ /f they

can, they +o*ld rese,!le the ideas of the later Cartesian philosophy. &here are reasons provided in >*le 1F to think that Descartes did not intend s*ch an o*tco,e, that he in fact intended so,ethin" 3*ite different. &he relevant passa"e is the lon" disc*ssion of the ,*t*al assistance of intellect and i,a"ination in conceivin" the vario*s senses of eBtensio, 6e)tension6. 9e introd*ces the passa"e !y sayin" that the ,athetical r*les are indeed *sef*l in the ,athe,atical sciences, !*t that the *tility is so "reat for attainin" to hi"her +isdo, that / a, not afraid to say that this part of o*r ,ethod +as discovered not on acco*nt of ,athe,atical pro!le,s !*t ,ore that these thin"s are to !e learned al,ost solely for the sake of c*ltivatin" it. @nd / s*ppose nothin" fro, these disciplines e)cept perhaps certain thin"s that are kno+n thro*"h the,selves and o!vio*s to everyone= h*t the kno+led"e of the, as it is *s*ally presented !y others, even if it is corr*pted !y no ,anifest errors, is nevertheless o!sc*red !y o!li3*e and !adly conceived principles that +e +ill try to e,end here and there in the thin"s that follo+. By 6e)tension6 +e *nderstand all that has len"th, +idth, and depth, not askin" +hether it is a tr*e !ody or only space= nor does it appear to re3*ire "reater e)plication, for nothin" at all is ,ore easily perceived !y o*r i,a"ination. 2evertheless, !eca*se often the learned *se s*ch ac*te distinctions that they dissipate the nat*ral li"ht and discover shado+s even in those thin"s that are never *nkno+n OevenP to peasants: they are to !e advised that here !y 6e)tension6 is desi"nated not a distinct so,ethin", separated fro, its o+n s*!4ect, nor do +e ackno+led"e in the *niverse philosophical entities of this kind, +hich do not tr*ly fall *nder i,a"ination. Gor even if so,eone co*ld pers*ade hi,self, e."., that it +o*ld not !e contradictory, if +hatever is e)tended in the nat*re of thin"s +ere red*ced to nothin", that e)tension itself e)isted per se alone, he nevertheless +ill not !e *sin" a corporeal idea for this conception !*t only !adly 4*d"in" intellect. .hich he +ill confess hi,Aserf, if he reflects attentively to that i,a"e itself of e)tension that he +ill try to fei"n there in his phantasia: for he +ill notice that he does not perceive it destit*te of every s*!4ect, !*t i,a"ines it co,pletely other+ise than he 4*d"es= so that those a!stract entities :+hatever intellect sho*ld !elieve a!o*t the tr*th of the thin"; nonetheless never are for,ed in phantasia separate fro, s*!4ects. :@& L FF?AFF#; /t is the intellect, not the i,a"ination, that is responsi!le for error. &he passa"e disc*sses eBtension in partic*lar, !*t its concl*sion applies to all thinkin" directed to+ard an i,a"e, all thinkin" that re3*ires or involves phantas,s. &he intellect, not the i,a"ination, tends to ,islead *s !eca*se it often looks a+ay fro, the phantas, +hen the concl*sion it tries to dra+ concerns the phantas,. /n its desire to ,ake s*!tle distinctions the ( ?$1 ( intellect d*pes itself= it overlooks the fact that it is tryin" to separate the insepara!leO#?P &hese reflections a!o*t +hat a +ord is taken to ,ean vers*s +hat even the ,ost *nlearned peasant kno+s a!o*t the thin" the +ord desi"nates lead to a disc*ssion of the vario*s senses in +hich i,a"ination and intellect take thin"s in different conte)ts of ,eanin". Since henceforth +e shall !e doin" nothin" +itho*t the assistance of i,a"ination, it is +orth the effort to distin"*ish caref*lly thro*"h +hich ideas the individ*al si"nifications of +ords are to !e proposed to o*r intellect. Gor +hich p*rpose +e propose to consider these three for,s of speakin": Ce)tension occ*pies place,C C!ody has e)tension,C and Ce)tension is not !ody.C

@,on" +hich thin"s the first sho+s in +hat +ay 6e)tension6 is taken for that +hich is e)tended= for / plainly conceive the sa,e thin" !y sayin": Ce)tension occ*pies place,C as !y sayin": Cthe e)tended occ*pies place.C 2evertheless, it is not on that acco*nt the case that to avoid a,!i"*ity it is !etter to *se the +ord 6OtheP e)tended6: for it +o*ld not si"nify so distinctly that +hich +e conceive, na,ely, that so,e s*!4ect occ*pies a place !eca*se it is e)tended= and so,eone co*ld interpret OitP as Cthe e)tended is a s*!4ect occ*pyin" place,C no differently than if / sho*ld say: Cthe ani,ated occ*pies place.C .hich reasonin" e)plicates +hy here +e shall say that +e are dealin" +ith e)tension rather than +ith the e)tended, even if +e think it sho*ld !e conceived no differently than the e)tended. 2o+ +e co,e to these +ords: C!ody has e)tension,C +here 6e)tension6 +e *nderstand to si"nify so,ethin" other than 6!ody6= +e nevertheless do not for, t+o distinct ideas in o*r phantasia, one of !ody, the other of e)tension, !*t only a sin"le one of e)tended !ody= and it is no different on the part of the thin" than if / sho*ld say: C!ody is OtheP e)tendedC= or rather: Cthe e)tended is e)tended.C .hich thin" is pec*liar to those entities that are OJ e)istP only in another, and cannot ever !e conceived +itho*t a s*!4ect= and it happens other+ise in those thin"s that are really distin"*ished !y ,eans of s*!4ectsO##P for if / sho*ld say, e.".: CPeter has riches,C the idea of Peter is plainly different fro, that of riches= like+ise, if / sho*ld say: CPa*l is riches,C / i,a"ine so,ethin" co,pletely different than if / sho*ld say, Criches are riches.C 8any, not distin"*ishin" this difference, falsely opine that e)tension contains so,ethin" distinct fro, +hat is e)tended, 4*st as the riches of Pa*l are other than Pa*l. Ginally, if it is said: Ce)tension is not !ody,C then the +ord 6e)tension6 is O#?P @!stractions and distinctions of reason therefore can easily t*rn o*t to !e false +hen they concern concrete o!4ects or i,a"es. &he i,plications of this co*ld !e considera!le, especially in the search for tr*ly f*nda,ental si,ple nat*res. O##P CS8 translates Cillis, 3*ae a s*!4ectis realiter distin"**nt*rC as Centities +hich are really distin"*isha!le fro, their s*!4ectsC :CS8 1:6$;, h*t the e)a,ples are not of thin"s that are distin"*isha!le fro, their s*!4ects :Peter, Pa*l, and riches; !*t of t+o s*!4ects that are distin"*isha!le. ( ?$? ( taken far differently than a!ove= and in this si"nification no pec*liar OJ partic*larP idea in phantasia corresponds to it, !*t this entire state,ent is acco,plished !y p*re intellect, +hich alone has the fac*lty of separatin" this kind of a!stract entity. .hich thin" is the occasion of error to ,any, +ho, not noticin" that e)tension taken in this +ay cannot !e co,prehended !y i,a"ination, represent it to the,selves thro*"h a tr*e idea Overa, idea,P= since s*ch an idea necessarily involves the conception of !ody, if they sho*ld say e)tension so conceived is not !ody, they are i,pr*dently i,plicated in this, that Cthe sa,e thin" is si,*ltaneo*sly !ody and not !ody.C @nd it is of "reat ,o,ent to distin"*ish state,ents in +hich na,es of this kind: e)tension, fi"*re, n*,!er, s*rface, line, point, *nity, etc., have so strict a si"nification that they e)cl*de so,ethin" fro, +hich they are tr*ly not distinct, as +hen it is said: Ce)tension, or fi"*re, is not !odyC= Cn*,!er is not n*,!ered thin"C= Cs*rface is the li,it of !ody, line of s*rface, point of lineC= C*nity is not 3*antity,C etc. @ll +hich si,ilar propositions are to !e co,pletely re,oved fro, the i,a"ination in order to !e tr*e= for +hich reason +e shall not !e dealin" +ith the, in the follo+in". @nd it is to !e dili"ently noted that in all other propositions in +hich these +ords, altho*"h

they retain the sa,e si"nification and are said in the sa,e ,ode a!stracted fro, s*!4ects, nevertheless e)cl*de or ne"ate nothin" fro, +hich they are not really distin"*ished, +e can and ,*st *se the help of i,a"ination: !eca*se then, even if the intellect precisely attends to only that +hich is desi"nated !y the +ord, i,a"ination nevertheless ,*st fei"n a tr*e idea of the thin" so that, +henever *se de,ands, the sa,e intellect can t*rn to its other conditions not e)pressed !y the +ord and not ever i,pr*dently 4*d"e that they have !een e)cl*ded. So if the 3*estion is a!o*t n*,!er, +e shall i,a"ine so,e s*!4ect ,eas*ra!le !y ,eans of ,any *nits, to the sole ,*ltit*de of +hich the intellect can indeed t*rn in the present ,o,ent, yet +e shall take care that fro, this s*!se3*ently it not concl*de so,ethin", in +hich the n*,!ered thin" is s*pposed to have !een e)cl*ded fro, o*r po+er of conception: as those do +ho attri!*te to n*,!ers +onderf*l ,ysteries and *nad*lterated nonsense, to +hich they certainly +o*ld not lend so ,*ch faith if they did not conceive n*,!er to !e distinct fro, the n*,!ered thin"s. Like+ise, if +e are dealin" +ith fi"*re, +e +ill think +e are dealin" +ith an e)tended s*!4ect accordin" to +hat is conceived !y this reason only Os*! hac tant*, ratione conceptoP, that it is fi"*red= if +ith !ody, +e +ill think +e are dealin" +ith the sa,e thin", as so lon", so +ide, and so deep= if +ith s*rface, +e conceive the sa,e as lon" and +ide, depth !ein" disre"arded, not ne"ated= if +ith line, as lon" only= if +ith a point, the sa,e +ith everythin" else o,itted e)cept that it is an entity. :@& L FF#AFF6; &his e)tended passa"e is ,otivated in the first place !y the need to e)plain ho+ ter,s in lin"*istic propositions are to !e conceived !y the ,ind, in partic*lar in +hat +ays the i,a"ination can conceive the,. @s corollary, it also indicates a role of p*re intellect, the f*nctionin" of +hich Descartes had in >*le 1? pro,ised to descri!e. &he partic*lar conte)t in +hich the passa"e appears is the precedin" state,ent that all the proportions that ( ?$# ( can !e detected o*"ht to !e e)pressed in e)tension and fi"*ration, so that it appears to !e the appropriate place for an e)planation of 6e)tension6= yet the points ,ade are not restricted to this notion alone !*t are applica!le !y analo"y to distinctions of other ter,s as +ell. &he passa"e, in !rief, says the follo+in": 1very +ord or for, of si"nification has a Ctr*e :i,a"inative; ideaC associated +ith it, and in al,ost all cases it is appropriate and necessary to portray this idea in phantasia. @ state,ent that has t+o ter,s :e."., C!ody is e)tendedC; does not necessarily re3*ire that t+o thin"s !e i,a"ined, ho+ever, !eca*se certain nat*res are s*ch that they are al+ays and every+here i,plicated +ith others. /n s*ch cases +e sho*ld for, one i,a"e or idea, and !y a difference in foc*s, !y a different concentration or "rasp-that is, !y a different concept -the intellect can no+ direct itself to this or that aspect of the one i,a"e. /n other cases, +hen there is not this i,plication of nat*res in the t+o ter,s :e."., CPeter has richesC;, it is necessary to for, t+o ideas. B*t there is a class of cases +here ,eanin" or si"nification is intended in so restricted a sense that it is inappropriate to for, an i,a"e !eca*se the state,ent +o*ld !e contradictory if it directly intended the i,a"e. /n these cases it is p*re intellect alone that ,akes the 4*d",ent tr*thf*lly. &o p*t this latter point differently, +hen +e say that e)tension is not !ody, +e are referrin" precisely not to either e)tension or !ody !*t to the distinction !et+een the t+o, +hich :!eca*se !oth the s*!4ect and the predicate act*ally involve e)tension; no i,a"e can directly present and +hich only the intellect can "rasp sec*rely.O#FP Gor the second ti,e in the Regulae the role, or at least one of the f*nctions, of the p*re intellect is e)plained :the first +as in >*le 1#, +here p*re intellect +as assi"ned the task of settin" *p the initial ter,s of a pro!le,;. /t ,i"ht appear on first "lance that it de,onstrates the po+er of the intellect to rise

a!ove i,a"ination. B*t the tenor of the passa"e is at odds +ith this concl*sion. /t r*les o*t, in "eneral, philosophical entities that do not fall *nder the i,a"ination, that is, a!stract entities that are entirely separated fro, a s*!4ect, fro, so,ethin" in +hich they inhere. .hen there is so,ethin" i,a"ina!le or portraya!le in i,a"ination, the intellect does +ron", and risks error, !y tryin" to 4*d"e on its o+n. /n prescindin" or t*rnin" a+ay fro, the tr*e i,a"e the intellect tends to overlook +hat is act*ally incl*ded in the idea= it is as tho*"h the intellect can easily Cfor"etC +hen it is not presented +ith an i,a"e, or +ith so,e other kind of concrete o!4ect. 8oreover, the kind of case in +hich the passa"e allo+s O#FP Descartes does not so ,*ch for!id one to i,a"ine anythin" in this case as consider the i,a"ined thin"s an indirect o!4ect that ,*st !e looked a+ay fro, in order for the intended ne"ation to !e tr*e= or, ,ore precisely, it is to its o+n +ay of takin" and not takin" i,a"es that the intellect ,*st directly attend, not to the i,a"es the,selves. ( ?$F ( kno+in" !y p*re intellect is a very li,ited, ne"ative kno+led"e. @ll the e)a,ples "iven involve privation or ne"ation :note that Cs*rface is a li,it of !odyC and the like involve the privative notion of li,it;. So,e insi"ht into the iss*e can !e "ained fro, the state,ent that, in the case of Ce)tension is not !ody,C p*re intellect alone Chas the fac*lty of separatin" this kind of a!stract entities.C /t is only in s*ch an a!stract real,, in the a!stract, indirect takin" of thin"s, that these state,ents are tr*e. Behind this assertion is pro!a!ly the thesis of @ristotelianAScholastic philosophy that a fac*lty cannot 4*d"e of for,s in a +ay that e)ceeds its proper po+ers. Dision can perceive +hite, it can even distin"*ish +hite fro, !lack, !l*e, red, and so forth, !*t it cannot 4*d"e that a +hite thin" is s+eet= for this there is re3*ired the co,,on sense. Co,,on sense and the other internal senses can 4*d"e of s*ch partic*lar differences !*t not of the "enera or for,s= for this one needs intellect. <et intellect does not operate +itho*t a phantas,= that is, tho*"ht is intellect !*syin" itself a!o*t a phantas, in order to "rasp +hat that phantas, stands for !y ,eans of the for, actively a!stracted in intellect.O#%P >*le 1F a"rees insofar as it is the intellect that is properly said to *nderstand !y attendin" to the tr*e ideas in phantasia. Bne is a!le in phantasia to ,ake separate i,a"es +hen the proposition in 3*estion allo+s it= +hen the proposition is a!o*t different aspects of an ine)trica!le +hole, then the differential attention of intellect alone can track the difference. B*t +hen intellect "oes it alone, it is not capa!le of ,akin" positive 4*d",ents tr*thf*lly= rather, it is only a!le to note differences !y +ay of severely restrictin" the ,eanin"s of ter,s and a!stractin" the, fro, all i,a"es.O#6P &his +o*ld see, to !e connected +ith the intellect6s capacity of notin" si,ple nat*res: +hen properly prepared it can reco"ni7e the, in thin"s, and it can reco"ni7e the difference !et+een s*ch nat*res, !*t it cannot define their essences. Properly prepared intellect can only e)perience si,ple nat*res= there is no deeper sense in +hich they can !e said to !e Ckno+nC !y intellect. B*t this is to reinforce that intellect6s f*nction is to ena!le *s to distin"*ish and reco"ni7e, to "rasp si,ilarities and differences. /n co,parison to so,e other traditional notions of intellect this O#%P /n this respect, Descartes arrives at a si,ilar concl*sion, in that he denies that one can ever co,e into possession of a nat*re or an a!straction +itho*t the direct-or, in the case of ne"ations, indirectpresence of a phantas,. O#6P &his helps thro+ li"ht on the point Descartes ,ade in >*le 1? :@& L F15-F19; a!o*t limit not !ein" a si,pler nat*re than the thin"s fro, +hich it is a!stracted. @ltho*"h he +as +illin" to allo+ that the ne"ations of si,ple nat*res are the,selves si,ple nat*res for ,ethodolo"ical convenience, limit is an act of ne"ation or privation that can !e applied indifferently to this or that nat*re. Li,itation is a

f*nda,ental act of intellect rather than a si,ple nat*re that appears in itself. ( ?$% ( see,s not very po+erf*l, !*t it nevertheless is, precisely !eca*se it allo+s a freedo, fro, the !r*te force of the "iven taken as an *ndifferentiated +hole, or as a +hole differentiated only !y corporeal processes :as in f*nctions of the !rain and nerves;. .hatever is presented to *s +e can co,pare or contrast +ith other thin"s not i,,ediately present, thin"s +e can call *p fro, ,e,ory or prod*ce !y the reco,!inative po+ers of i,a"ination-that is, of the kno+in" force actin" in phantasia. /ntellect allo+s *s to artic*late tho*"hts directed to thin"s, !*t +hen left to itself it is ,*te and inartic*late. /n sayin" that Ce)tension is not !odyC intellect is in effect 4*d"in" that its +ay of attendin" to thin"s is differentiated= that is, this 4*d",ent is not a!o*t the thin" !*t a!o*t the intellect6s +ay of actin". &his leaves a pro!le,, ho+ever: can all these thin"s !e said of the intellect +hen it reco"ni7es +hat is entirely noncorporeal, for instance, +hat +illin" or i"norance is, or that ,y !ein" i,plies 0od6sQ &he ans+er, / think, is t+ofold. Bne part has to do +ith o*r e)pectations of Descartes. /nsofar as +e 4*d"e fro, o*r kno+led"e of +hat he +rote later, +e +ant to find anticipations of it earlier. &here is nothin" +ron" +ith this= indeed it is pro!a!ly a necessary pre4*d",ent that ind*ces *s to read the noncanoniA cai +orks of any ,a4or a*thor. B*t +e ,*st avoid the pitfalls of an e)cessively teleolo"ical readin", that is, ass*,in" that the later positions are present in nuce in the earlier or that they +ere an inevita!le o*tco,e. @ltho*"h the Descartes of the Regulae has set o*t on the +ay of ideas, it is not !y the +ay of do*!tin", a via negativa, !*t !y the via positiva of kno+in". @ltho*"h he *nderstands intellect to !e as different fro, !ody as !lood is fro, !one :@& L F1%;, this is not yet the !asis of a tr*ly d*alistic ,etaphysics. @ltho*"h the intellect is +hat kno+s in the proper sense, the activity of p*re intellect that he descri!es in >*les 1# and 1F is only a ,o,entary step !ack fro, the i,a"inative real,, and no+here does he state or even s*""est that dealin" +ith pro4lems involvin" perfectly intellect*al or spirit*al nat*res is s*!stantially different fro, dealin" +ith other nat*res, especially since there are si,ilarities and analo"ies that he is +illin" to co*ntenance !et+een the spirit and the !ody. &he second part of the t+ofold ans+er a!o*t the incorporeal has to do +ith +hat +e have learned a!o*t intellect6s actin" on its o+n. /t acts pro)i,ately and for the ,ost part in con4*nction +ith phantasia. /t can a!stract fro, phantasia, !*t then it risks error= +hat it can tr*thf*lly achieve in prescindin" fro, the corporeal is an a+areness of its o+n +ay of attendin" to and "raspin" the corporeal. .hen it tr*thf*lly 4*d"es that Ce)tension is not !ody,C it is not attendin" to the corporeal ideas !*t rather to its +ay of attendin" to ideas, and in this sense s*ch a 4*d",ent is still related to the corporeal= it is a potential involve,ent +ith the corporeal rather than an act*al involve,ent. Gor e)a,ple, intellect +o*ld not tr*thf*lly !e 4*d"in" ( ?$6 ( that e)tension is not !ody if it ,ade s*ch a 4*d",ent havin" never e)perienced the e)tended real, or not recallin" +hat kind of e)perience the 4*d",ent is a!o*t. B*t then it is clear that intellect can attend to its o+n activity +ith i,a"es :+hat Descartes refers to as its refle) conte,plation of itself= @& L F??AF?#;: its kno+in", not kno+in", do*!tin", +illin", to na,e the fo*r that Descartes e)plicitly ,entions :@& L F19;. 8ost of this attention to self +ill !e related to, if not a4out, activity in the !ody :+hich incl*des sensation, i,a"ination, and loco,otion;. &he 3*estion then !eco,es: is it possi!le for intellect to attend to itself in co,plete a!straction fro, the !ody and i,a"inationQ Gor the editations, the ans+er +o*ld see, to !e a decisive yes,O#EP !*t the ans+er for

the Regulae is less clearAc*t. /t is evident that there is a Cdepth di,ensionC to intellect attendin" to itself, for the case of Socrates, +ho !y do*!tin" that he kno+s anythin" co,es to kno+ that he do*!ts, i,plies that there is an intrication of nat*res in the p*rely intellect*al real, :@& L F?1;. 1ven ,ore s*""estive are Descartes6s assertions that / can kno+ that !eca*se / e)ist, 0od e)ists and that !eca*se / *nderstand, / have a ,ind distinct fro, !ody :@& L F?1AF??;. &hey lead *s to s*spect that Descartes had already +orked o*t the ar"*,ents of the editations. <et i,portant ele,ents are ,issin". &he ar"*,ent for 0od6s e)istence re3*ires a distinction !et+een the for,al and o!4ective reality of ideas, of +hich there is no trace in the Regulae , and the editations' radical distinction of thinkin" and e)tension is present in the Regulae in at ,ost attent*ated for,. Since 0od as the fo*ndation of o*r personal !ein" is a very old the,e in Christian tho*"ht-not to ,ention the contrast of !ody and so*l -+ith a partic*larly pertinent for, of it in the ar"*,ents of @*"*stine,O#5P the notion that o*r e)istence i,plies 0od6s is not in itself distinctive or re,arka!le. /f the ,ethod of the Regulae is any indication, Descartes pro!a!ly tho*"ht that s*ch tr*ths +ere potentially evident !y int*Ait*s. By not confrontin" the 3*estions of e)istence the Regulae prescinds fro, these ,atters, and it leaves open +here, ho+, and at +hat level nat*res are i,plicated in one another. Descartes 4*stifies >*le 1F6s len"thy disc*ssion of intellect*al and i,a"inative approaches to e)tension !y e)pressin" his fear that it is not s*fficiently lon" to prevent people fro, fallin" into error, Cso preocc*pied are the in"enia of ,ortalsC :@& L FF6;. &he practitioners of "eo,etry and arith,etic ordinarily think they are dealin" +ith n*,!ers a!stracted fro, all s*!4ects, lines that have no +idth, s*rfaces that have no depth, and so on, all thin"s that he has sho+n to !e false. >ather than "o on +ith s*ch a criti3*e, he t*rns in the r*les that follo+ to a positive acco*nt of ho+ o!4ects sho*ld !e conceived, that is, i,a"ined. O#EP Chapter E +ill "ive *s so,e reasons to !e less certain of this, ho+ever. O#5P Gor e)a,ple, in !ook l$ of the !onfessions. ( ?$E ( &he ,ethod of the Regulae is calc*lated to e)plicate ho+ +e can *nderstand thin"s thro*"h the aspects they display. /t is a rationali7ation of the coherentist psycholo"y of rese,!lance characteristic of his earliest tho*"ht. B*t it is also the !e"innin" of the reification as nat*res of the aspects *nder +hich thin"s appear. .hat a nat*re is, is a,!i"*o*s: it is an aspect, a +ay of takin" a thin", !*t it is also ontolo"ically a,!i"*o*s and appears to take on an increasin"ly independent e)istence. &he evol*tion of the nat*res doctrine did not have solely ontolo"ical conse3*ences, of co*rse, for Cnat*resC is also the ans+er to the 3*estion, C.hat is :,ost; kno+a!leQC @s the nat*res *nder+ent a chan"e in conception, so too did the fac*lties of i,a"inin" and kno+in".

0. T0IN)IN+ I,A+INATION -EYOND T0E RE+ULAE

&hinkin", as the yo*n" Descartes conceived it, +as an activity, one that +as constantly challen"ed to respond to the chan"in" deliverances of the sensitive fac*lties. :Consider, for e)a,ple, the !ompendium musicae's dyna,ic, i,a"inative +ay of conceivin" a son" o*t of the individ*al notes.; /n the Regulae this activity +as conceived as havin" t+o ,a4or co"nitive for,s, int*it*s and ded*ctio. Disc*rsive reasonin" is descri!ed ,any ti,es as a ,ove,ent of co"itation, once even as a ,ove,ent of i,a"ination. Since neither int*it*s nor si,ple ded*ctio can !e ta*"ht, the r*les +ere desi"ned to call attention to the, and ho+ they ,i"ht !e practiced and honed and to re"*late those activities of co"itation re3*irin" a co,ple) ,ove,ent of tho*"ht fro, one thin" to another. /nt*it*s ,i"ht see, to !e perfectly passive, !*t in fact it is defined as a "raspin"A!eholdin" !y a p*re

and attentive ,ind. &he ,ind and its o!4ect ,*st !e p*rified and prepared, attention ,*st !e caref*lly directed, and the ,ind ,*st take hold of its o!4ect. Beca*se of this activity Descartes did not need to ,ake the distinction of the Go*rth 8editation !et+een the intellect that perceives ideas :+itho*t assent or dissent; and the +ill that ,akes 4*d",ents. &he ,ind or, ,ore si"nificant !eca*se of the i,plications of its na,e, the vis co"noscens, kno+in" force, !rin"s a si"nificant co,ponent of +ill into kno+in" and i,plicitly ,akes it ,ore activity than receptivity. &he vis co"noscens can act on its o+n, !*t the "reatest part of its activity is in and thro*"h phantasia. @ccordin"ly, the ,odel for kno+in" that the Regulae presents is a thinkin" thro*"h i,a"es: the distinct and easy "rasp of the aspects they present, and the kno+in" po+er +endin" its +ay a,on" i,a"esnotin", co,parin", for,in", and transfor,in" the,-in order to arrive at the tr*th of any 3*estion. /n the acco*nts of co"itation and i,a"ination "iven in the si"nificance. @ltho*"h i,a"ination is ,enA ( ?$5 ( tioned as part of thinkin" in the Second 8editation, in the Si)th it is e)cl*ded fro, the essence of the thinkin" thin"= and in the &hird 8editation thinkin" is apparently transfor,ed fro, the active "raspin", co,parin", and ,ovin" of tho*"hts into the ,ore passive perception of ideas that are in oneself or one6s ,ind innately. Bne perceives ideas, one has the,. /,a"ination itself there!y !eco,es 4*st another +ay of havin" ideas. /,a"inin" is si,ply conte,platin" the shape or i,a"e of a corporeal thin" :@& D// ?5;= +hen the ,ind i,a"ines it t*rns to+ard its associated h*,an !ody and looks at so,ethin" in the !ody that confor,s to an idea *nderstood !y the ,ind or perceived !y the senses :@& D// E#;. >*le 1? had defined i,a"ination as an activity, as the application of the vis co"noscens to the phantasia in order to for, ne+ fi"*res. .here has the activity of thinkin" and i,a"inin" "oneQ @s +e shall see in the follo+in" chapters, the activity of thinkin" :and the activity of i,a"inin"; did not disappear in the later Descartes !*t +as o!sc*red !y the static i,plications of thinkin" and i,a"inin" *nderstood as the perceivin" of ideas. /n depictin" these activities the later Descartes6s voca!*lary displaces a psycholo"y of fac*lties +ith a *nitary po+er :the ,ind; standin" opposite and vie+in" a relatively fi)ed o!4ect. &his ne+ psycholo"y nevertheless falsifies the "en*ine lo"ic of the editations, +hich, as the lon" philosophical and theolo"ical tradition of ,editation +o*ld lead one to e)pect, re3*ires a hi"hly active, disc*rsive process of thinkin" thro*"h +hich one is a!le to perceive certain *nities and finally arrive at a conte,plative state. &he voca!*lary and psycholo"y of the Regulae are closer to the tr*th than the editations. <et one ,*st also concede that the psycholo"ical lo"ic of the Regulae, +ith its division of the act of disc*rsive kno+in" into parts, favored the red*ction of kno+in" to the si,ple ,ental havin" of ele,ental ideas, and !y *nder,inin" ,e,ory the Regulae left the +ay open to a static intellect*alis, devoid of concreteness. &his, / contend, +as contrary to Descartes6s deepest intentions, +hether +e look to 16?5 or 16F1. &he havin" and ,anip*latin" of i,a"es !eco,es, in the later Descartes, a so*rce of *ncertainty. /n i,portant respects the later philosophy deprives i,a"ination of co"nitive force. <et in the later Descartes the very activity of ,editatin" is ,odeled on i,a"inative disc*rsiveness, and i,a"ination retains co"nitive relevance precisely as a dyna,ic, prod*ctive activity. &his occ*rs first and fore,ost in his ,athe,atics and physics, !e"innin" +ith &e onde . So it is to &e onde that +e t*rn in order to !e"in locatin" the traces of i,a"ination in the later Descartes. editations, there is a difference of no little

( ?$9 (

PART III Imagination in t$e Later P$i(osop$'

( ?11 (

SI9 Fa;/(ating Science Le ,on.e an. t$e Imagine. *or(. o% ,at$ematica( P$'sics
/n late 16?9, Descartes asked 8ersenne for infor,ation a!o*t the parhelia :!ri"ht spots seen in the vicinity of the s*n, also kno+n as s*n do"s; that had recently !een o!served near Grascati, /taly, in hopes that he ,i"ht e)plain the, accordin" to his optics :to 8ersenne, 1# 2ove,!er 16?9, @& / 69A Eo;. &his research 3*ickly "ave +ay to plans for a +ork a!o*t the +hole of physics, +hich already in early 16#o he pro,ised +o*ld !e finished !y 16## :to 8ersenne, 1% @pril 16#o, @& / 1#E;. &he na,e he "ave it +as &e onde, The #orld. /t is, properly speakin", a cos,olo"ical physics "ivin" an acco*nt of the nat*re and ori"ins of the *niverse. Gro, Descartes6s correspondence it is clear that +hen he first started in3*irin" into parhelia he e)pected a local sol*tion. .e can only spec*late a!o*t +hat ,ade hi, resort instead to the "lo!al sol*tion of a co,prehensive physics. &his "lo!al approach ,arks a ,a4or depart*re fro, the proced*res o*tlined in the Regulae. &he ,ethod of the Regulae +as !ased on the pre,ise that everythin" that is kno+a!le is e)periencea!le either directly :in int*it*s; or indirectly :thro*"h ded*ctio; and that everythin" e)perienceAa!le is linked in a net+ork of proportional relationships. Bne co*ld !e said to kno+ in the f*ll and proper sense once one had ascertained the deter,inate proportions that related the thin" in 3*estion stepA!yA step +ith respect to vario*s, interconnected, si,ple nat*res. 8oreover, one co*ld often solve a pro!le, +itho*t "oin" !ack to ,a)i,ally si,ple nat*res !y takin" one6s !earin"s fro, ,e,!ers of proportionate series that +ere a!sol*te in only a relative sense. @s lon" as one co*ld esta!lish a kno+a!le relationship of the thin" in 3*estion to so,e other thin" or thin"s that ,ade the relevant participated nat*re s*fficiently evident, one co*ld proceed to the sol*tion in local ter,s, even if the thin"s did not contain the nat*re perfectly, 4*st !y settin" *p the e3*ational "eo,etry correspondin" ( ?1? ( to the relevant proportions. &his pro!le,Asolvin" net+ork th*s had a certain syste,aticity o+in" to the proportional relations, !*t it +as not tr*ly a syste, !eca*se the nat*res in 3*estion co*ld !e en*,erated only after the fact of e)perience. &here +as no a priori +ay of constr*ctin" all possi!le derivative nat*res fro, these, ,*ch less any +ay of deter,inin" +hether one had e)perienced all nat*res that are accessi!le to h*,an !ein"s. &his +as one of the lessons of >*le 1?6s s*""estion that ne+ colors ,i"ht !e constr*cted o*t of others that had already !een e)perienced: the inherent proportions ,i"ht ,ake this feasi!le for one +ho co*ld see nor,ally or had seen at least a fe+ colors, !*t a ,an !lind fro, !irth co*ld *nderstand only the "eo,etrical representation, not the e)perienced nat*re, of color.

A. +OD AND T0E CREATED PO*ERS OF I,A+INATION

Upon ,ovin" to 9olland in late 16?5 or early 16?9, Descartes devoted nine ,onths to 3*estions of ,etaphysics and co,posed a short ,etaphysical treatise, no+ lost. S*""estions that this +as the first draft of the editations have !een lar"ely disco*nted, and since his correspondence for the ne)t several years concentrates on scientific 3*estions, there is very little evidence to allo+ a reconstr*ction of even the ,ain lines of approach taken !y this treatise. B*t in a series of letters to 8ersenne !e"innin" 1% @pril t6#o, Descartes did anno*nce and e)plain an i,portant concl*sion he had reached, that 0od, the allApo+erf*l creator of everythin" that is, had created eternal tr*ths. &ho*"h they ,i"ht have !een created other+ise, they +ere the f*nda,ental charter for the created +orld and everythin" that transpires in it, and it +as possi!le for the h*,an !ein" to kno+ the, !eca*se they +ere in!orn in o*r ,inds.O1P @re these eternal tr*ths to !e fo*nd in the Regulae Q Perhaps not. @fter all, in that +ork tr*th or falsity is said to pertain to 3*estions and 4*d",ents, +hich typically derive fro, the co,!ination or addition of nat*res :@& L F#?, F?$;, and for this reason alone the eternal tr*ths cannot !e si,ply identified +ith ,a)i,ally si,ple nat*res, especially since >*le 6 proposes co,parin" thin"s +ith respect to nat*res as an alternative to the search for @ristotelian s*!stances, essences, and the like. B*t in another sense the eternal tr*ths are present in the Regulae. &he s*!class of nat*res that pertain to !oth corporeal and spirit*al thin"s, the Cco,,on notions,C are the links !y +hich +e connect si,ple nat*res to one another. Gor e)A O1P Descartes takes *p the eternal tr*ths in the letters to 8ersenne of 1% @pril, 6 8ay, and ?E 8ay 16#o :@& / 1#%A1%F; and ret*rns to the topic in a letter to 8ersenne of ?E 8ay 16#5 :@& // 1#FA1%#;. &he the,e appears also in the editations and the Principles = see chap. E, Sec. @, !elo+. ( ?1# ( a,ple, if A is the sa,e as ! , and - is the sa,e as ! , then A is the sa,e as - = and if A can !e related to ! in +ay $ , +hile - cannot, then there ,*st !e so,e difference !et+een A and - :@& L F19;. &hese co,,on notions are evidently not so si,ple as, say, the nat*re of e)tension or do*!t= the first of the e)a,ples +o*ld see, at the very least to co,po*nd the si,ple nat*res of sa,eness or e3*ality and *nity :+hich ,akes A a thin" discri,ina!le fro, - and ! ;. &heir int*ita!ility +o*ld th*s rese,!le ,ore that of e)tended ded*ctions than of firstAorder or even secondAorder int*itions.O?P .hat is especially interestin" is that these co,,on notions lie at the fo*ndation of the ,athe,atics of proportionality: the f*nda,ental a!ility to set *p e3*ations and ine3*alities is e)pressed in s*ch for,*las. /ndeed, these e)a,ples ,i"ht !e said to reflect ,ore clearly than ,athe,atical disciplines like arith,etic and "eo,etry +hat the character of ,athesis *niversalis is. &he tho*"ht that these co,,on notions are at least part of +hat Descartes had in ,ind in the 1% @pril 16#o letter is f*rther s*""ested !y the conte)t in +hich he raises the iss*e of eternal tr*ths: in the first instance it is ,athe,atical tr*ths that are called eternal. &he s*!se3*ent letters do not f*rther clarify +hat kinds of tr*ths are eternal, apart fro, a re,ark in the letter of ?E 8ay 16#o that they are the essences of e)istin" thin"s: C/t is certain that he O0odP is as ,*ch @*thor of the essence as of the e)istence of creat*res: no+ this essence is no other thin" than these eternal tr*thsC :@& / 1%?;. &he ,a4or iss*e disc*ssed in the letters is rather the relationship of these tr*ths to the o,nipotence and o,niscience of 0od. Descartes6s position is that eternal tr*ths are not to !e conceived alon" @*"*stinian lines as e)e,plary ideas in the ,ind of 0od that are coeval +ith hi,. &his @*"*stinian notion +o*ld i,ply that the reason of 0od and the reason e)istin" in the *niverse he created, incl*din" reason in h*,an !ein"s, are !asically the sa,e. /nstead, the tr*ths are to

!e considered creat*res ,ade !y 0od and th*s e)ternal to his essential Bein". Conse3*ently they do not "ive *s direct insi"ht into the ,ind of 0od, and +e cannot say that the *niverse !ased on the, e)ists in accordance +ith divine reason. /n 0od, says Descartes, +ill, reason, and act are identical, so that it is +ron" to say that 0od +illed to create the *niverse !eca*se it +as reasona!le :or the !est possi!le one, etc.;. S*ch state,ents i,ply a division !et+een 0od6s po+er and *nderstandin". /nstead one sho*ld say that 0od created the *niverse !eca*se he +illed it so and that his acts of creatin", thinkin", and +illin" are identically one. Conse3*ently eternal tr*ths are tr*e not !eca*se they are reasona!le !*t !eca*se O?P @ firstAorder int*ition ,i"ht !e of, say, the n*,!ers #, F, and E, and of addition and e3*ality= a secondAorder int*ition +o*ld !e CF a # J E.C 2ote that the int*ition of CF a # J % a ?C +o*ld re3*ire a hi"herAorder int*ition: F a # and % a ?, !oth !ein" reco"ni7ed as e3*al to E, are then reco"ni7ed as e3*al to one another. ( ?1F ( they are created-that is, si,*ltano*sly +illed, *nderstood, and ,ade to !e-!y the Lord of the *niverse. /n the conte)t of ,edieval de!ates a!o*t the relative no!ility of intellect and +ill, it +as "enerally a"reed that, since 0od +as radically one and si,ple, s*ch distinctions of po+ers are ,ade in accordance +ith h*,an reason rather than as they are act*ally present in 0od. /n h*,an !ein"s every act of intellection involves a +illin" :a nat*ral appetite for +hat the intellect kno+s;, 4*st as every act of +ill re3*ires so,e li"ht of intellect. &h*s advocates of the pri,acy of intellect in h*,an !ein"s :e."., &ho,as @3*inas; as +ell as advocates of +ill :e."., Kohn D*ns Scot*s; "ave d*e attention to the copresence of the other po+er. &he controversy +as cr*cially i,portant, ho+ever, precisely !eca*se it concerned ho+ h*,an !ein"s o*"ht to conceive 0od and +hat difference it ,akes to the h*,an conception of self and the created *niverse. Since h*,an !ein"s are ,ade in the i,a"e and likeness of 0od, ho+ is that likeness e)pressed, and ho+ ,i"ht it !e perfectedQ /n *s, +ill and intellect are not radically one= ho+ then do +e co,e to ,ost rese,!le 0od in the *lti,ate senseQ /s it intelAlection that perfects o*r !ein", in the for, of the !eatific conte,plation of 0od in the afterlife, or is it +ill, o*r p*rified and li,itless love of the allA"ood CreatorQ &he tr*th, as the controversialists of the 8iddle @"es presented it, e,!raced !oth po+ers, !*t the e,phasis on one or the other had conse3*ences for the conception of the path+ay that +as ,ost choiceA+orthy in this life and of the nat*re of o*r e)istence in the ne)t. &he pro!le, +ith the "reater no!ility of intellect is its i,plication that 0od created the +orld as he did !eca*se it +as the :divinely; reasona!le thin" to do. B*t then 0od6s reason see,s to li,it his po+er: he cannot do +hat is *nreasona!le +itho*t ceasin" to !e 0od. &he "reater no!ility of the +ill reinstates 0od6s o,nipotence= the only thin" that restrains 0od6s po+er is his !ein", that is, he cannot do anythin" that +o*ld s*!vert that very !ein" and po+er.O#P @ ,edieval analo"*e to +hat is no+ called BckAha,6s ra7or, the principle that entities are not to !e ,*ltiplied +itho*t necessity, +as provided !y the contrast !et+een the a!sol*te po+er and the O#P Speakin" ontolo"ically, that 0od can do nothin" to i,pair his o+n !ein" and po+er is not a li,it at all, !eca*se it in effect asserts that 0od is 0od and cannot not !e 0od. P*t in this +ay, the principle of noncontradiction, +hich the ,edieval no,inalists did not consider a li,it on the po+er of 0od, is si,ply an e)pression of 0od6s !ein" and po+er. Bn the iss*e of noncontradiction Descartes +ent f*rther than they, in that he "ranted that 0od co*ld violate the principle of noncontradiction at least as it has ,eanin" to h*,an !ein"s :+hether 0od has s*ch a principle is 3*estiona!le;, !*t he fir,ly held

that 0od co*ld do nothin" to contravene his o+n !ein" and po+er :this principle is *lti,ately the "*arantor of 0od6s veracity in the editations, since to deceive +o*ld reveal an i,perfection in 0od, a defect in his !ein";. Gor a disc*ssion, see 9ans Bl*,en!er", The &egitimacy of the odern Age, trans. >o!ert 8. .allace :Ca,!rid"e: 8/& Press, 195#;, esp. pt. ?, chap. F. ( ?1% ( ordinate po+er :potentia a4soluta and potentia ordinata ; of 0od. .hat 0od can do a!sol*tely is *nli,ited= ho+ever, "iven that he has ordered thin"s as they are, he has also freely chosen that thin"s sho*ld re,ain +ithin that order. &herefore +e can tr*st it. &he evidence of that order +o*ld not, ho+ever, li,it his a!ility to *ndo it at so,e f*t*re ti,e, nor does it "ive h*,an !ein"s any special insi"ht into his !ein", +ill, or intellect. /t is +ithin this conte)t that +e ,*st *nderstand Descartes6s clai,s in letters of 16#o a!o*t o*r kno+led"e of 0od and his po+er. .hatever +e can conceive 0od to do, that he ,ost certainly can do= !*t +hat +e conceive as i,possi!le is not necessarily i,possi!le for the @llAPo+erf*l. B*r ,inds cannot ,eas*re +hat is i,possi!le for 0od= rather, +e reckon accordin" to +hat 0od6s ordination has ,ade possi!le, accordin" to the eternal tr*ths he has created, and this ordination ena!les *s to conceive of the h*,anly possi!le, the h*,anly i,possi!le, and so,e s,all portion of the divinely possi!le. &he only thin" i,possi!le for 0od is not to !e 0od. .hether this i,possi!ility allo+s *s to kno+ so,ethin" positive a!o*t 0od !eco,es an iss*e only in the Discourse and the editations. &he notion of 0od6s a!sol*te po+er *nder,ines any si"nificant analo"y or proportionality !et+een his !ein" and that of his creat*res. .hatever +e kno+ is kno+n only !y virt*e of the eternal tr*ths that 0od has created. @s the essences of e)istin" thin"s they "overn all 0od6s creat*res= therefore they for, the !asis only for analo"ies !et+een creat*re and creat*re, not !et+een creat*re and 0od.OFP Clearly this ,etaphysical t*rn precipitates a crisis for the *niversality of the ,ethod of the Regulae, !eyond any tensions to +hich it +as already s*!4ect. /ts pretended scope +as everythin" that is kno+a!le. @,on" the si,ple tr*ths that it pro,ised +e co*ld kno+ +as that ,y o+n e)istence i,plies 0od6s, and it even clai,ed that +hat +e co*ld "en*inely kno+ a!o*t 0od and other theolo"ical ,atters, as distin"*ished fro, +hat pertains to faith :+hich is a ,atter of +ill;, +as s*!4ect to the sa,e prescriptions of ,ethod :@& L #E$;. B*t if there is no proportionality !et+een 0od and his creat*res, then there is no +ay for the ,ethod of the r*les, !ased on nat*res and the proportion of o!4ects6 participation in the,, to !rin" *s to any kno+led"e of hi, +hatsoever. Bf co*rse >*le 1? had already stip*lated that the nat*res +e p*t to"ether !y i,p*lse fro, a s*perior po+er +ere infalli!le and o*tside the scope of the art the Regulae teaches :@& L F?F;. &his +o*ld pres*,a!ly apply, for e)a,ple, to Descartes6s 4*d",ent a!o*t his three drea,s of 1$A11 2ove,!er 1619 that OFP &here is an e)ception: !et+een 0od and the creat*re (omo sapiens there e)ists an analo"y, one that +e can kno+, ho+ever, only !eca*se Script*re tells *s that +e are ,ade in his i,a"e and likeness. / shall disc*ss this f*rther, especially as it enters into Descartes6s later conception of o*r relationship to 0od. ( ?16 ( the Spirit of &r*th had descended on hi, and even perhaps to individ*al 4*d",ents +ithin his detailed interpretation of the drea,s, for instance that the dictionary in the third drea, represented the s*, of the sciences and the collection of the poets, +isdo, and science con4oined. 9o+ far +o*ld this infalli!ility e)tendQ &o all the 4*d",ents of poets :and philosophers tooQ; ,ade !y dint of enth*sias,Q

B*t then one has to +onder +hether any spirit*al, Bly,pian, or intellect*al ,atters also lie !eyond the scope of the ,ethod and th*s +o*ld have to !e 4*d"ed !y different standards. &he fail*re of analo"y +ith respect to heavenly thin"s threatens to *nder,ine the le"iti,acy of any Regulae Alike proced*res, e)cept perhaps in the ,ost ,*ndane ,atters. &he eternal tr*ths "*arantee that the *niverse is kno+a!le. &hey are ,ade innate in *s !y 0od= at least in that respect they rese,!le the ori"inal seeds of tr*th the Regulae had va*nted. 9o+ever, the kno+a!ility of the eternal tr*ths is different fro, the kno+a!ility of thin"s accordin" to the Regulae. &he i,a"ination and si,ple nat*res no lon"er have the stat*s they had in that +ork= they too are transfor,ed !y the fail*re of proportionality analo"y.

-. T0E I,A+INATIVE REPLICATION OF T0E *ORLD IN LE ,ONDE

&he difference co,es o*t clearly in the openin" chapters of &e onde. /t !e"ins !y distin"*ishin" !et+een Cthe sensation +e have of it OJ li"htP, that is, the idea of it +hich for,s in o*r i,a"ination thro*"h the inter,ediation of o*r eyes, and +hat is in o!4ects that prod*ces this sensation in *s.C CGor altho*"h each of *s is co,,only pers*aded that the ideas +e have in o*r tho*"ht are entirely like the o!4ects fro, +hich they proceed, / nonetheless see no reason +hich ass*res *s that this is so. . . . <o* kno+ +ell that +ords, havin" no rese,!lance to the thin"s they si"nify, do not cease to ,ake *s conceive the,, and often even +itho*t o*r takin" note of the so*nd of the +ords, nor of their sylla!lesC :@& L/ FA%;. Since +ords, +hich are esta!lished !y ,ere convention, have the po+er to ,ake *s conceive thin"s they do not at all rese,!le, +hy can it not have happened that nat*re esta!lished in *s Ca certain si"n that ,akes *s have the sensation of li"ht, altho*"h this si"n has nothin" in it that is like this sensationQC Descartes proceeds ,ore !y "ivin" e)a,ples of the lack of rese,!lance than !y disp*tin" in principle the rese,!lance thesis :that the ideas +e have in tho*"ht really rese,!le their intended o!4ects;. .hen +e hear and conceive a so*nd there is nothin" in the idea that is like its ca*ses, +hich are the vario*s ,ove,ents of ,o*th, ton"*e, and !reath= to*ch, +hich ,any think is the ,ost certain of the senses, does not relia!ly "ive *s ideas that are like the o!4ect :the idea of ticklin" rese,!les nothin" in ( ?1E ( the feather, and a soldier +ho thinks he is +o*nded !eca*se a !*ckle is ,akin" hi, *nco,forta!le does not have an idea correspondin" to the ca*se;. &h*s there is no necessity that idea ,*st rese,!le o!4ect. 2evertheless, Descartes disclai,s havin" proved anythin" +ith these reflections other than that they "ive *s reason to do*!t that +e already kno+ +hat li"ht is= and the openin" of the second chapter, C/n .hat the 9eat and the Li"ht of Gire Consists,C ,akes clear +hat is at iss*e. .hen +e see a fla,e in !*rnin" +ood, +e o!serve +ith o*r eyes that it ,oves and separates fro, one another the s,all parts of the +ood and transfor,s the s,allest parts into fire, air, and s,oke, so that the lar"er parts are red*ced to cinders. &ho*"h another ,i"ht therefore i,a"ine, if he pleases, in this +ood the for, of fire, the 3*ality of heat, and the action +hich !*rns it as co,pletely different thin"s, as far as / a, concerned, +ho fear that / +ill deceive ,yself if / s*ppose so,ethin" ,ore than +hat / see ,*st necessarily !e there, / a, content to conceive there the ,ove,ent of the parts. :@& L/ E; @fter reflectin" on the kinds of parts and ,otions there ,*st !e in fire, he "oes on to e)plain ho+

particle ,otion is s*fficient to e)plain !oth heat and li"ht. 9eat, +hen it is stron", is a species of pain= +hen ,oderate, it is a species of ticklin". C@s for li"ht, one certainly can also conceive that the sa,e ,ove,ent that is in the fla,e s*ffices to ,ake *s sense it.C B*t since the treatise is a!o*t li"ht, !efore acco*ntin" for sensation he needs to e)plain the nat*re of li"ht at so,e len"th !y developin" the principles of physics and ,otion. /n fact, Descartes does not redee, the pro,ise to e)plain sensation in &e onde, since this +ork treats of the physical properties and propa"ation of li"ht= the e)plication of ho+ li"ht affects the eye occ*rs in the co,panion treatise, &'(omme :8an;, +hich presents the ,echanical syste, of nerves, ani,al spirits, and pineal "land. 9o+ever, at the end of chapter 1#, &e onde does offer a notion key to e)plainin" sensation: C2o+ it ,*st !e kno+n that the ,en of this ne+O%P +orld +ill !e of s*ch nat*re that +hen their eyes are p*shed in this fashion they +ill have a sensation of it 3*ite like that +hich +e have of li"htC :@& L/ 9E;. &he e)planation of seein" +ill therefore !e in ter,s of ,otions that sti,*late the connection esta!lished !y nat*re !et+een events in their si"nAcharacter :here, the ,otion of li"ht; and ideas :the perception of l*,inosity, color, shape, distance, etc.;. @t first "lance, &e onde looks like the ne)t lo"ical step after the Regulae. &he latter e)plored the in+ard li"ht of nat*re, in the so*l, and sho+ed O%P /t is a ne9 +orld in that he is !*ildin" *p a hypothetical +orld parallel to the present one, +ith the "oal of sho+in" that the ,odel e)plains reality. See i,,ediately !elo+ on this Cfa!leC of the ne+ +orld. ( ?15 ( ho+ its ill*,ination co*ld !e *sed to "rasp the *nity of all kno+in"= the for,er e)plores the o*t+ard li"ht in the conte)t of the f*nda,ental la+s of e)ternal nat*re. &he Regulae left 3*estions of physical reality and physical tr*th to the physicist= in &e onde, Descartes is takin" *p precisely these 3*estions 3*a physicist. <et in decisive +ays &e onde represents a rep*diation of the Regulae 6s standpoint. &he cr*) of the rep*diation is that i,a"es do not need to have intrinsic co"nitive val*e= h*t, al,ost parado)ically, the i,a"ination nevertheless plays a cr*cial co"nitive role in &e onde es ,ethod. &he co"nitive val*e of the corporeal ideas is ,ini,i7ed, if not co,pletely eli,inated. &hey do not correspond, in "eneral, to the thin"s of the +orld. >ese,!lance, +hich had !een at the root of Descartes6s earliest ,*sin"s on kno+led"e and +hich +as f*nda,ental to the analysis of the de"ree of participation of thin"s in nat*res ela!orated in the Regulae, is s*!verted !y reflections on co,,onplace events in +hich sensation !ears no si,ilarity to ca*se. &he "ap that >*le 1? had potentially opened !et+een the +ay thin"s participate in nat*res in reality and ho+ they are kno+n accordin" to nat*res in the ,ind is +idened in &e onde to a chas,, e)cept for a fe+, 3*ite privile"ed, e)tensional nat*res. Sensation is ,ore si,ilar to pain than to co"nition= that is, +hatever for, the sensation has is d*e to the Clan"*a"eC of the correspondence !et+een these ,echanical si"nals and the ideas that need in no +ay rese,!le the,, a correspondence that has !een instit*ted !y nat*re for o*r selfApreservation rather than for kno+led"e. .hat is trans,itted !y the physical processes leadin" *p to the sense or"an :and, in the !ody, *p to the pineal "land; is ,otion or press*re, not an i,a"e. &e onde does not a!andon the co"nitive *se of i,a"ination, ho+ever= 3*ite the contrary. <et, in an irony the delicio*sness of +hich Descartes ,*st have relished, this co"nitive *se is esta!lished in a fa!le descri!in" a +orld of i,a"ination. 8any other thin"s re,ain for ,e to e)plain here, and / +o*ld !e 3*ite happy to add so,e reasons Oor ar"*,entsP to render ,y opinions ,ore tr*thlike OvrayAse,!la!lesP: B*t so that the len"th of this disco*rse ,i"ht !e less !orin" to yo*, / +ant to envelop part of it in the

invention of a fa!le, in the co*rse of +hich / hope that the tr*th +ill not fail to appear s*fficiently, and that it +ill !e no less a"reea!le to see than if / e)posed it 3*ite naked. :@& L/ #1; /,,ediately there !e"ins the ne+ chapter, n*,!er 6: C&hen allo+ yo*r tho*"ht for a little +hile to "o o*t !eyond this +orld, in order to co,e to see another co,pletely ne+ one, +hich / +ill ca*se to !e !orn in its OJ tho*"ht6sQP presence in i,a"inary spaces.C &hese are the spaces pres*,ed to lie !eyond the celestial va*lt, spaces that so,e philosophers clai, are infinite-Cand they ,*st certainly !e !elieved, since it is they ( ?19 ( the,selves +ho have ,ade the,.C B*t Descartes +ill not re3*ire *s to "o all the +ay to infinity, only far eno*"h so that the present +orld +ill pass fro, vie+. C@nd after +e have stopped there in so,e deter,inate place, let *s s*ppose that 0od creates ane+ all aro*nd *s so ,*ch ,atter that, on +hatever side o*r i,a"ination ,i"ht !e e)tended, it no lon"er perceives any place that is e,pty.C C@ltho*"h o*r i,a"ination see,s a!le to !e e)tended to infinity, and this ne+ ,atter has not !een s*pposed to !e infinite, +e can +ell s*ppose all the sa,e that it fills spaces ,*ch "reater than those +e shall have i,a"ined.C &o avoid criticis, and controversy, ho+ever, Descartes advises *s to restrict o*r i,a"ination to a space no lar"er than that enclosed !y the real fir,a,ent and allo+s that 0od +ill have created this ne+ ,atter so that it e)tends indefinitely in every direction-for there is ,ore appearance Oof tr*thP, and +e have ,*ch ,ore the po+er, to prescri!e li,its to the action of o*r tho*"ht than to the +orks of 0od. 2o+, since +e are takin" the li!erty of fei"nin" this ,atter to o*r fantasy, let *s attri!*te to it, if yo* please, a nat*re in +hich there is nothin" at all that anyone cannot kno+ as perfectly as is possi!le,C to +it, a nat*re characteri7ed !y e)tension and ,otion :@& L/ #1A##;. &he fa!le "oes on, chapter after chapter, e)tendin" the e)planatory po+er of this i,a"ined +orld. 6/,a"ine6, 6s*ppose6, 6conceive6, 6think6 are all *sed as essentially synony,o*s in this fa!le, this e)tended +ork of the i,a"ination. B*t even in the precedin" five chapters of &e onde the synony,y holds, and indeed already in his description of fire Descartes en*nciated the cardinal principle that "overns this *se of i,a"ination: others ,ay i,a"ine fire, heat, and !*rnin" as they like, !*t /, C+ho fear deceivin" ,yself if / s*ppose so,ethin" ,ore than +hat / see ,*st necessarily !e there, a, content to conceive here the ,ove,ent of its partsC :@& L/ E;. Bnly +hat is a4solutely necessary is to !e i,a"ined as present, only that +itho*t +hich it +o*ld !e impossi4le to conceive the thin" at all. Bne ,i"ht note in passin" that in this and other passa"es of &e onde there is occasionally a connotative difference !et+een 6i,a"ine6 and 6conceive6, +hich, +e recall, +ere synony,s in !oth the !ompendium musicae and the Regulae : others, +ho are careless and do not o!serve the principle of parsi,ony, imagine, +hereas / clearly and necessarily conceive. B*t the *nderlyin" synony,y holds, for !oth ter,s refer to the depictive capa!ilities of the i,a"inative po+er. 8oreover, the str*ct*re of this i,a"inin" still retains the f*nda,entally referential topolo"y that characteri7ed the earlier Cartesian i,a"ination: "iven an o!4ect in sense, / can *se fi"*res to conceive it= "iven an o!4ect or pro!le, to !e investi"ated, / can *se nat*ral series and proportional ,athe,atics to represent relevant aspects, and even +hen / ,*st foc*s all ,y i,a"inative po+ers on 4*st a fe+ partic*lars / preserve this reference thro*"h ,arks ,ade on paper. 9ere in &e onde, / look caref*lly at a piece of !*rnin" +ood and find the ,ini,al aspect ( ??$ (

*nder +hich / ,*st conceive the thin". B*t, as the fa!le +ill sho+, this ,ini,al aspect t*rns o*t to !e s*fficient to acco*nt perfectly for the nat*re, action, and 3*alities of physical nat*re. /f / take ,atter to !e si,ple e)tension, and if / p*t that ,atter in ,otion, then in i,a"ination, in ,y fantasy, / can conceive a ne+ *niverse that t*rns o*t to !e perfectly parallel to the present one. @nd apparently / do not need to !e "*ided constantly !y reference to the e)istin" +orld or to look to other series or"ani7ed accordin" to different si,ple nat*res= instead, / si,ply evolve i,a"inatively everythin" that is i,plicit in the fo*ndation of the ne+ +orld. Bf co*rse, this description leaves o*t t+o essential ne+ the,es: ,y i,a"ination ,akes the spaces that it conceives, and ,y i,a"inin", in order to !e tr*thf*l, ,*st !e "*ided !y a fe+ f*nda,ental la+s of ,otion that are not si,ply proper to i,a"ination. 1)cept at its li,its, in the diffic*lties created !y the need for an e)plicit doctrine of nat*res, the Regulae did not ,ake a sharp distinction !et+een nat*res as they are in the ,ind and as they ,i"ht !e in nat*re. &here +as no reason to ,ake it sharp, for the ,ethod the +ork ela!orates +as predicated on the analo"ical str*ct*re of tho*"ht and reality &he spatiality of o*r i,a"inin"s and the spatial e)tension of the !odily or"an of i,a"ination, phantasia, therefore s*pported one another, and one e)pected as +ell a ,*t*al s*pport !et+een these t+o kinds of spatiality and the spatiality of the physical +orld. @ltho*"h >*le 1? allo+ed a difference in the +ay nat*res ,i"ht !e in thin"s and in the ,ind, it did not disp*te that they e)isted in !oth: it +as only the +ay in +hich they +ere 4oined to"ether that +as possi!ly different. 8oreover, the traces of e)planation that Descartes "ave of the physical processes conveyin" the i,pression of the thin" to the senses and *lti,ately to phantasia and the kno+in" force s*""ested that it +as inte"ral, ri"id, and instantaneo*s-th*s there sho*ld !e no discrepancy !et+een the thin" as it is and the corporeal idea in kno+led"e. &e onde, in contrast, !e"ins ,ore hypothetically, and the do*!t cast on the rese,!lance thesis s*!verts any cas*al analo"y !et+een the psycholo"ical, the physiolo"ical, and the physical. /n the Regulae one co*ld take ,ore or less for "ranted that the spatiality of the phantasia or"an ,ade fillin" it +ith the fi"*res of sense and i,a"ination possi!le. /n &e onde, ho+ever, the i,a"inin" thinker does not so ,*ch take spatiality for "ranted as prod*ce it pheno,enolo"ically, and prod*ce it as infiniteor, to *se lan"*a"e consistent +ith a distinction ,ade later in the Principles, indefinitely e)tenda!le. &his space is *lti,ately intended to !e a replica or i,a"e of the +hole of real space, !*t that is precisely the difference !et+een the Regulae and &e onde : in the for,er, i,a"ination prod*ces individ*al i,a"es= in the latter, it ,akes the space that is the sine 3*a non of any fi"*ration +hatsoever. /,a"ination has taken on the f*nction of ( ??1 ( replicatin" the +hole of space, not 4*st specific and locali7ed proportional relations. &his !rin"s *s to the second ne+ the,e. .ithin this space / can create all sorts of different fi"*res and nat*ral ,otions: circ*lar, spiral, para!olic, helical, crosshatched, 7i"7a", and so on. /ndeed, there is no li,it to the possi!ilities to !e dra+n fro, the i,a"ination itself. &he control on this variety has to co,e fro, the *nderstandin". Gro, the i,,*ta!le nat*re of 0od / can ascertain that each individ*al part of ,atter al+ays contin*es to re,ain in the sa,e state *nless collisions +ith other parts force it to chan"e that state and that +hen one !ody p*shes another it cannot "ive the other any ,otion e)cept !y losin" as ,*ch of its o+n at the sa,e ti,e. 8otion "overned !y these la+s Cis so easy to kno+ that 0eo,eters the,selves, +ho a,on" all ,en have !een ,ost st*dio*s in conceivin" very distinctly the thin"s they +ere considerin", have 4*d"ed it si,pler and ,ore intelli"i!le than their s*rfaces and lines= it appears as +ell fro, their havin" e)plicated the line thro*"h the ,ove,ent of a point, and the

s*rface thro*"h that of a lineC :@& L/ #9;. /n considerin" >*le 1?, +e noted that Descartes s*""ested that all differences in appearances co*ld !e represented !y the infinity of "eo,etrical fi"*res, a s*""estion f*rther !olstered !y his reflection that since the i,pression on the sense or"an ,*st !e spatially e)tended, the sensation too ,*st share in the nat*re of e)tension :@& L F1#;. &he s*""estion stops short of ar"*in" that the sense 3*alities are nothin" ,ore than e)tension, or that the only thin" in the physical +orld that can !e trans,itted is ,otion, in +hich case the sensation per se +o*ld have to co,e solely fro, the ,ind6s o+n CinterpretationC of the ,otion re"arded as a si"nal. /ndeed, the very sa,e passa"e i,plies that Descartes still thinks that colors, flavors, odors, and the like do inhere in the physical +orld. &e onde takes the decisive step of eli,inatin" all 3*alities other than the e)tensional and the ,otive fro, the physical +orld= and &'(omme "oes still f*rther in clai,in" that all there is, *p to and incl*din" the s*rface of the pineal "land, is e)tension and ,otion. 8oreover, &e onde even alters the conception of +hat is ,ost f*nda,entally easy for the ,ind to acco,plish. @s the 3*otation at the end of the last para"raph sho+s, it is not so ,*ch "eo,etrical fi"*ration as spatial ,otion that is si,plest for the ,ind to "rasp= "eo,etry itself is derived fro, ,otion. &he stepA!yAstep ,otion of co"itation in the Regulae, +hich at !est ,i"ht !e red*ced to an int*it*sAlike s+eep +itho*t pa*se thro*"h all the steps +ith the +hole never lost fro, vie+ or, in fort*nate cases, to an act of instantaneo*s int*it*s of so,ethin" co,ple), is replaced in &e onde !y the co"nitive s*periority and prefera!ility of co"itative ,otion thro*"h the spaces of i,a"ination. &he constancy of the look of thin"s, and the fir, hold :concept*,; that the ( ??? ( p*re and attentive ,ind has on the,, +o*ld th*s !eco,e a res*lt, rather than a ca*se, of co"itation6s preli,inary +ork, not to say creation.

C. T0E DYNA,IC I,A+INATION OF ,AT0E,ATICAL ,ET0OD

&he derivation of "eo,etry fro, ,otion needs f*rther precision for *s to appreciate +hat it i,plies. Girst of all, properly speakin" it is i,a"ination, the operations in phantasia :henceforth to !e identified !y Descartes as the conarion, or pineal "land;, for +hich ,otion in space is the si,plest thin". &he Regulae had identified the phantasia as a really e)tended thin", a !ody, +here the i,a"es for,ed !y sensation and !y i,a"ination in"eni*, had their proper place :@& L F1F;. &he i,a"ination +as so constit*ted that the easiest thin" for it +as to concentrate on one thin" :the perfection of this kind of concentration +as int*it*s;= ne)t easiest +as the co,parison of one thin" +ith another, to deter,ine +hether or not they +ere the sa,e or, +ith the identification of an aspect *nder +hich to look at the,, +hether they participated e3*ally or not in the nat*re deter,inin" that aspect :the perfection of this kind of concentration +as the si,plest ded*ctio, +hich itself co*ld !e done +ith s*ch perfect concentration that it a,o*nted to an act of int*it*s;. /n cases of ,ore co,ple) o!4ects and considerations it +as necessary to add a ,ental ,otion, +hich Descartes called !oth the ,otion of co"itation and the ,otion of i,a"ination. @t each step of the operation the i,a"ination +o*ld note the o!4ects, !rin"in" the, ,o,entarily to the foc*s of attention, so that the inherent proportions of participation in nat*res and the order of one +ith respect to the other +o*ld !eco,e clear. &he proportional ,athe,atics *sin" lines and rectan"les :and possi!ly point fi"*res and other dia"ra,s; a,o*nted to a *niversal instr*,ent for translatin" the proportional participation in nat*res into a perspic*o*s for,. B*t the ,athe,atics :e)pressed in the co,,on notions or a)io,s of "eo,etry and al"e!ra;, the act*al prod*ction of the fi"*res, and the total e)tended space of the phantasia as !odily or"an had no special priority= the phantasia +as the place +here the o47ects as o!served and the nat*res

in +hich they participated co*ld appear, as +ell as the place +here the geometric re+presntations of those thin"s had their loc*s. 8athesis *niversalis +as a discipline ,ade possi!le !y this corporeal for*, for the perspic*o*s representation of nat*res. &e onde in so,e +ays re,ains faithf*l to this sche,a, yet +ith the cr*cial e)ceptions that it radically eli,inates all nat*res other than ,athe,atical e)tensional ones and raises ,otion thro*"h space to ca*sal pri,acy. 8athe,atical entities the,selves arise as a secondary pheno,enon, at least if they are to !e intelli"i!le and certain. /t is the ,otions of points ( ??# ( thro*"h space that "ive rise to lines and c*rves, the ,otions of lines that prod*ce s*rfaces, and the ,otions of planes that !rin" a!o*t deli,ited !odies. &h*s the possi!ility of artic*latin" space, the prere3*isite for "eo,etry, is a conse3*ence of ,otion. &he Regale had r*n *p a"ainst a !ottleneck pro!le, in the trans,ission of the i,a"e fro, sense or"an to phantasia. .hat precisely +as trans,ittedQ @n i,a"e. B*t is the i,a"e present at every point !et+een the o!4ect and the sense or"an, and !et+een the sense or"an and the phantasiaQ &he Regulae did not teach that ail this inter,ediation +as ,otion and nothin" !*t ,otion= the farthest it "oes in that direction is to *se e)a,ples of instantaneo*s trans,ission of ,otion :as fro, one end of a pen to the other; to ill*strate the instantaneo*s trans,ission of the i,pression to the e)ternal and internal sense or"ans. /s the i,pression, then, the sa,e as the i,a"eQ &his is +here the acco*nt of the Regulae !eco,es f*77y. /t +as precisely !eca*se there +as an e)tended i,pression that Descartes felt 4*stified in representin" it !y so,e co,ple) "eo,etrical fi"*re. /t is at least possi!le that the i,pression ,ade on the eye !y, say, a d6@n4o* pear has, first of all, a "eneral, pearAshaped o*tline and that +ithin this o*tline there is i,pressed, in very fine lines, a pattern that corresponds to the yello+ color. :2evertheless, Descartes says that the sense or"ans, or rather their first i,pervio*s ,e,!rane, "et a ne+ fi"*re fro, so*nd, odor, and flavor, and these 3*alities pres*,a!ly have to !e *nderstood as in the o!4ect itself= see @& L F1?AF1#.; /t co*ld +ell !e that the or"an is also disposed so that it can take on the color itself= there is nothin" in Descartes6s acco*nt to for!id this, and +hen all is said and done the "eo,etrical fi"*re of the color co*ld !e nothin" ,ore than the pro!le, solver6s +ay of representing one color in differentiation fro, others. 2evertheless, Descartes6s very hesitancy on this point ,*st have ,ade hi, reali7e that translatin" the i,pression of color on the or"ans into "eo,etrical for, co*ld o!viate the i,pression of color as s*ch, so that only the "eo,etry and ,otion, not the colored i,a"e perceived !y the ,ind, +o*ld !e a!sol*tely necessary in the physical and physiolo"ical acco*nt of trans,ission. 'no+in" the o*tco,e, +e can spec*late f*rther that a little ,ore reflection ,*st have led hi, to reali7e that no color or other non"eo,etrical 3*ality +as needed even in the ori"inal colored o!4ect itself. Color and the other soAcalled secondary 3*alities th*s ,i"ht !elon" to the ,ind rather than to the +orld. &he ne+ acco*nt of trans,ission, then, had to "o so,ethin" like this: Li"ht, instantaneo*sly trans,itted, as an instantaneo*s press*re, preserves the "eo,etrical pattern of the o!4ect it ill*,inates. &his pattern is i,pressed in the sense or"an, +hence the press*reA,otion is instantly trans,itted to the phantasia, +here the "eo,etrical pattern is reprod*ced. &he ,ind, attendin" to this pattern in the phantasia, sees the o!4ect not ( ??F ( as a "eo,etrical pattern !*t as a yello+ pear, !y virt*e of a Clan"*a"eC of ideas correspondin" to

si"nals, a lan"*a"e instit*ted !y nat*re. &his ne+ e)planation has several advanta"es. Bne is that there is no 3*ality !ottleneck in the process: the e)tension of the ori"inal is co,,*nicated +itho*t essential defor,ation to the phantasia, +itho*t the loss, either te,porary or per,anent, of any 3*alities that tr*ly inhere in the ori"inal o!4ect. &he e)tension present in the or"an phantasia corresponds ,ore or less acc*rately to the e)tension of the o!4ect !eca*se 0od "*arantees it thro*"h the eternal tr*ths he created. &his points to the second advanta"e: the phantasia and the o!4ect !oth participate in the sa,e si,ple nat*re in si,ilar +ays. Bf co*rse, the phantasia ,ay have t+oAdi,ensional rather than threeAdi,ensional fi"*res represented on its s*rface :tho*"h there is no reason to think that the fi"*res in the phantasia of the Regulae are not threeAdi,ensional, +ithin it or at least penetratin" the s*rface;,O6P !*t even so there +o*ld s*!sist a strict ,athe,atical correlation !et+een the i,a"e and the o!4ect. &he ideas in i,a"ination +o*ld th*s !e of e)actly the sa,e nat*re as the e)tended !odies, and that nat*re 3*a "eo,etrical +o*ld !e perfectly perspic*o*s. @ corollary is that the ,ore co,pletely one *nderstands the physical +orld to !e p*re e)tension, the ,ore co,pletely perspic*o*s and intelli"i!le that +orld +o*ld !e. &e onde th*s retains as si,ple nat*res all of +hat *sed to !e called the co,,on sensi!les, and so one can still have a science !ased on the, ,ore or less as o*tlined in the Regulae. /ndeed, this science +ill no+ !e p*rer, !eca*se it is no lon"er a 3*estion of havin" si,ple nat*res pl*s a ,athe,atics of proportion to acco*nt for the de"ree of participation in those nat*res. &he si,ple nat*res are no+ of the sa,e type as the ,athe,atics of proportion= ,athe,atical si,ple nat*res are intrinsic to the ,athe,atics of proportion. &he fi"*res that are i,a"ined in the phantasia no lon"er 4*st represent a de"ree of participation in a nat*re, they participate in that nat*re +holly :and th*s are a!sol*te;. &he representer :e."., a line ,ade lon" eno*"h to represent a specific vol*,e;, the fi"*re in phantasia it represents :e."., the i,pressed fi"*re of a sphere;, and the o!4ect that prod*ces that idea :the sphere; are all of the very sa,e nat*re, and a strict syste, of proportion :itself e)tensionally represented; can therefore e)actly descri!e their relations to one another. &he sche,e of the Regulae is th*s "reatly si,plified and ,ade *nifor, in its ontolo"ical character. /n addition, the i,a"ination no+ has the intrinsic capacity to deal +ith O6P Kohn Sch*ster ar"*es that in the Regulae the i,a"es ,*st !e t+oAdi,ensional fi"*res for,ed on the s*rface of the phantasia "land= see Sch*ster, CDescartes6 athesis 6niversalis, C 6FA69. >eadin" !ack+ard fro, the later philosophy this is pla*si!le, !*t / see nothin" in the early philosophy and science to r*le o*t the threeAdi,ensionality of i,a"es in phantasia, especially +hen one recalls that Descartes insists in the Regulae that +hat is e)tended ,*st !e threeAdi,ensional. ( ??% ( dyna,ic pro!le,s as +ell as static ones. /n the Regulae ,otion +as one si,ple nat*re a,on" others= yet altho*"h so,e corporeal o!4ects are at rest, to solve pro!le,s concernin" the, it is necessary for the ,ind to e)ercise itself in the ,otion of i,a"ination !y passin" thro*"h s*ccessive i,a"es. &his ,otion is e)trinsic to the thin" in 3*estion. B*t if ,otion t*rns o*t to !e second only to e)tension in f*nda,entality, and if it is the *lti,ate principle of the deter,ination and deli,itation of that e)tension into parts, then the ,otion of i,a"ination ,ay reflect the real character of ,otion in the e)ternal +orld and si,*ltaneo*sly !e the instr*,ent of dyna,ic e)planation. .hat this ,eans !eco,es ,ore evident !y reconsiderin" Descartes6s fa!le in &e onde. &he fa!le is a protracted hypothesis constr*cted on +hat it is a!sol*tely necessary to pres*ppose as e)istin" in corporeal pheno,ena, the ,otion of parts. Before co,,encin" the fa!le in chapter 6, Descartes esta!lishes only a fe+ !asic facts. Girst, +e do not need to think that all the e)perienced 3*alities of

thin"s are in those thin"s, only ,otion. Second, the parts of ,atter are in ,otion, and this is s*fficient to e)plain 3*alities like heat and li"ht in fire. &hird, in all ,acroscopic !odies there ,*st !e s,all, ,o!ile parts invisi!le to the senses= once a !ody or part !e"ins to ,ove it +ill tend to contin*e the ,otion= !odies +ith their parts at rest +ith respect to one another are solid or hard +hereas those +ith parts perpet*ally a"itated are fl*id. Go*rth, there is no void or vac**,= therefore all !odies co,pletely fill the space they occ*py and all space !et+een !odies is filled +ith yet others= th*s ,otions of !odies in this plen*, of ,atter are possi!le only if ad4oinin" !odies also ,ove :and !odies ad4oinin" the,, etc., +ith the conse3*ence that ,atter ,oves alon" contin*o*s paths that ,*st *lti,ately close on the,selves, vortices or cycles;, and the senses are capa!le only of perceivin" chan"es in s*ch ,otions :if there is no chan"e, there is no sensation;. Gifth, there are three kinds of ele,ents differentiated !y si7e: the s,allest and fastestA,ovin" !ein" the ele,ent of fire= the ne)t lar"er and also slo+er, air= and the lar"est and slo+est, earth. &hese kinds are deter,ined or prod*ced not as nat*ral species !*t as a res*lt of a !alance of forces tendin" to !*ild *p and !reak do+n !odies. &hese CfactsC already see, to i,ply ,ost of the fa!le= at the very least they provide the !asic ,aterial that serves as ele,ents s*fficient to e)plain the real +orld. B*t a case can !e ,ade that the facts of chapters 1 thro*"h % are no ,ore hypothetical than the ori"inal clai,s that +e can clearly see the necessity of !odies !ein" in ,otion and can do*!t the relia!ility of sensation, !eca*se these facts are lo"ically ed*ced fro, the necessity of !odily ,otion. Bnce one "rants the necessity of parts in ,otion, one ,*st consider the kinds into +hich the parts and ,otions can !e lo"ically divided. &hat there ,*st !e different si7es is as evident to si"ht as that there is ,otion. &hat these different si7es correspond to different physical and ( ??6 ( percept*al effects is also evident. 9avin" allo+ed the necessity of ,otion, one ,*st decide +hether that ,otion is in a void or in a plen*,= if the latter, one ,*st acco*nt for ho+ any ,otion at all is possi!le. &he only really pro!le,atic ,atters here are the clai,s that there are precisely three kinds of ele,entOEP and that there can !e no void, !*t at least in the latter case Descartes concedes that he has ,ade the point pla*si!le rather than certain. Bne can concl*de that, !y and lar"e, the first five chapters e)plore the si,ple nat*res of ,otion and !ody, *nderstood in their necessary interconnection. @nd therefore &e onde !e"ins +ith +hat the ,ethod of the Regulae re"arded as a necessary preli,inary to solvin" pro!le,s, the ascertain,ent of nat*res in +hich the thin"s that appear participate. <et the ,ethod is not 3*ite the sa,e, for &e onde does not constr*ct ordered or proportioned series of thin"s leadin" *p to these si,ple nat*res, and its real !e"innin" is do*!t a!o*t the f*ll reality of appearances. &o !e"in +ith the latter: &he do*!t of the first chapter is not the radical do*!t of the editations. /t does not play the role of *nder,inin" tr*st in the senses, !*t of tr*st in those 3*alities that are not seen to !e o!vio*sly necessary. @s in the Regulae, one has an o!4ect in vie+ and is tryin" to conceive it *nder its vario*s aspects. B*t *nlike the Regulae, an a!sol*te priority is "iven to certain nat*res !eca*se of their necessity. .itho*t the, it +o*ld !e i,possi!le to conceive in any +ay at all the thin" that is +ithin vie+. /f a partic*lar aspect does not i,,ediately and evidently display !ona fide indispensa!ility, then it is set aside. @ltho*"h this strict*re co*ld !e seen as a nat*ral o*tco,e for so,eone +ho had already practiced the ,ethod of the Regulae and !*ilt *p a f*nd of nat*ral series, there is so,ethin" ,ore at +ork here, for the Regulae +as a"nostic on the 3*estion of the e)act character of the physical reality of the thin"s analy7ed and did not i,,ediately enforce any partic*lar aspect *nder +hich the thin" +as to !e vie+ed. /n fact, the very necessity that drives &e onde a,o*nts to a ne+ si,ple nat*re that did not occ*r as a nat*re in the Regulae.O5P B*t this !rin"s *s to the reali7ation that si,ple nat*res have *nder"one a reeval*ation, even a

revol*tion. @lready in >*les 1? and follo+in" Descartes had sho+n a predilection for representin" the di,ensions or aspects defined !y nat*res +ith ,athe,atical fi"*ration= the nat*re color :+hich apparently is not a si,ple nat*re, since in every case e)tension is involved OEP /n principle, Descartes allo+s that there are !odies inter,ediate in si7e !et+een the three classes, !*t he conceives the, as !ein" in a process of !reakin" do+n to the ne)t lo+er or !*ildin" *p to the ne)t hi"her. O5P >*le 1? had ,entioned that so,e nat*res are fo*nd in necessary co,!ination, !*t necessity itself +as not taken *p as a the,e. /t is not accidental that necessity appears the,atically in Descartes6s tho*"ht at the sa,e ti,e as do*!t, for it is pree,inently in tryin" to escape apparent necessities thro*"h do*!t that one finds oneself forced to !o+ to the real necessity of f*nda,ental tr*ths. ( ??E ( +ith it, altho*"h it cannot si,ply !e red*ced to e)tension; is represented, at least in its diversity, !y vario*s "eo,etrical patterns. B*t this case of ,athe,atical fi"*ration in the Regulae +as really a ,ne,onic device= 4*st as the letters a, 4, and c co*ld stand for line len"ths, so a hatched s3*are co*ld stand for a partic*lar h*e. 8oreover, the techni3*e of vie+in" thin"s in series did ,ake the ,a)i,ally si,ple nat*re privile"ed, !*t in the co*rse of pro!le, solvin" it +as not al+ays necessary to vie+ the *lti,ate nat*re in 3*estion !*t only a relatively a!sol*te thin" :th*s color co*ld !e the last or hi"hest ter, in vie+, even if it t*rned o*t not to !e a tr*ly si,ple nat*re, provided that the pro!le, +as s*fficiently deter,ined there!y;. &his allo+ed a certain fle)i!ility a!o*t ho+ far it +as necessary to p*sh analysis, and it treated all appearances, or rather all nat*res, +hether si,ple or co,posite, as kno+a!le. /ndeed, i,plicitly there +ere t+o kinds of kno+a!ility in the Regulae. &he first co,es !y +ay of locally co,parin" si,ilar thin"s +ith one another and deter,inin" their relative participation in a nat*re :>*le 1F presents this as the essence of order as opposed to ,eas*re= @& L F%1;. &his co,parison creates an ordered series of thin"s all sharin" in a sin"le nat*re, and it is fo*nded on the !iplanar str*ct*re of Descartes6s early theory of i,a"ination: the plane of the o!4ects *nder consideration and the plane of the nat*re in +hich it participates. &he second kind of kno+a!ility has to do not so ,*ch +ith partic*lar thin"s that appear as +ith the interrelationship of the nat*res the,selves. 0atherin" si,ilar thin"s to"ether in a series points to the e)istence of the co,,on nat*re, !*t the sa,e thin" is at the sa,e ti,e si,ilar to other thin"s in different series, +hich point to other nat*res. &here is nothin" in this ,ethod that forces one to think that any t+o partic*lar nat*res stand in a necessary or hierarchical relationship to one another. 1)tension ,i"ht +ell al+ays acco,pany color +itho*t !ein" s*!ordinate or s*perordinate to it= and certainly it is pla*si!le that the +ei"ht of a thin" and its color ,i"ht have no intrinsic relationship to one another as nat*res. Bne ,i"ht call this latter kind of kno+in" a variant on the 3*estion Plato e)plored in his late dialo"*es: in +hat +ays do nat*res or for,s participate in one anotherQ &his is no lon"er a 3*estion a!o*t appearances and their proportional relations !*t a!o*t the for,s of appearances and their lo"ical s*!ordination and s*perordination. /t is in this real, that one has to talk a!o*t necessary relations, and it is in this real, that i,a"ination ,*st *lti,ately "ive +ay to intellection. Perhaps the f*nda,ental *nsolved pro!le, in the Regulae, then, is that it "ave the i,a"ination a co"nitive f*nction that has different ai,s fro,-and so is not alto"ether co,,ens*ra!le +ith-the +ork of intellection= and the analo"y !et+een the int*it*s of the eye and the int*it*s of the ,ind !reaks do+n precisely on the iss*e of the necessary interconnections of nat*res. /,a"ination can

( ??5 ( carry the ,ethod locally, +hen it is a 3*estion of co,parin" thin"s +ith respect to a sin"le nat*re, !*t +hen vario*s nat*res have to !e co,pared +ith one another as s*ch, and not 4*st insofar as a proportional order or ,eas*re can !e esta!lished !et+een the,, it is no lon"er co,petent to decide :altho*"h i,a"ination still has the f*nction of presentin" concrete speci,ens of the nat*res;. @nother +ay of p*ttin" this is that i,a"ination is a necessary and s*fficient co"nitive tool +hen a 3*ite restricted, local analysis is needed, !*t !eyond this locale it is not s*fficient, since it is not co,petent to ans+er the 3*estion +hether anythin" a!o*t the ori"inal synthesis presented to it is necessarily the case. /n fact, one ,i"ht say 3*ite si,ply that for i,a"ination synthesis ,*st !e given, , either in a partic*lar thin" that appears to it or in a pattern of appearance :+ithin +hich the i,a"ination can prod*ce ne+ appearances that nevertheless do not transcend the pattern;= !*t it is only intellect that can *nderstand the character and necessity of syntheses as s*ch. &his e)ceeds the po+ers the Regulae clai,ed, even for intellect, for in >*le 1F +e +ere told that altho*"h in reality a !ody +o*ld !e an ori"inal *nity of corporeality, e)tension, and shape, in the mind +e approach it as a co,posite of these three nat*res, +hich ,*st first !e *nderstood discretely and then so,eho+ co,!ined !y tho*"ht. &his points to the *lti,ate dead end into +hich the Regulae +as threatenin" to trap Descartes: the +ay of kno+in" and the +ay of e)istence risked !ein" forever separate if the physics of the +orld failed to s*pport the psycholo"y of the Regulae, and o*r very conception of the ori"inal !ein" of a thin" +o*ld end !y !ein" reflective of o*r tho*"ht rather than of the thin" itself. /n &e onde the intellect takes co,,and of i,a"ination ,*ch ,ore decisively than in the Regulae. Br, ,ore acc*rately, intellect defines a real, in +hich i,a"ination can freely proceed, as lon" as the i,a"ination re,ains faithf*l to the essential, si,ple nat*re that is proper to it and as lon" as it o!serves the ,archin" orders laid do+n !y intellect. &he first aspect is sec*red !y reco"ni7in" the necessary e)tension and ,o!ility of everythin" that appears to sense and i,a"ination and *nderstandin" phantasia as itself an e)tended and ,o!ile ele,ent that not ,erely represents !*t also shares the nat*re of the e)tension and ,o!ility o!served in the e)ternal +orld= th*s it can prod*ce a proportional copy of the ori"inal rather than a ,ere representation, and anythin" that transpires in phantasia can possi!ly e)ist in e)ternal e)tension as +ell. &his provides an ontolo"ical "ro*ndin" for the hypotheses of Descartes6s science.O9P &he second O9P Despite the apparent *se of analo"ies in +orks s*ch as &e onde and the Discourse essays, then, one sho*ld distin"*ish the, fro, Descartes6s early *nderstandin" of analo"y as s*!sistin" !et+een different real,s: since phantasia and the space of the created *niverse share the sa,e nat*re, any i,a"inative analo"y is really a copy to scale of +hat does or ,i"ht occ*r in the +orld. ( ??9 ( aspect is sec*red only !y intellect6s reco"nition that there are certain f*nda,ental la+s "overnin" e)tension and ,otion as they appear in sense and i,a"ination, la+s that have !een laid do+n !y 0od. &he la+s of ,otion derive their tr*th not directly fro, o!servation !*t fro, their perspic*o*s necessity and their consonance +ith 0od6s i,,*ta!ility. &his ,eans that the intellect is servin" not 4*st as a co"nitive po+er !*t also as a la+"iver or, !etter, a r*le "iver :see @& L/ FE for the distinction;. /n reco"ni7in" +hat is necessary in order for sensation and i,a"ination to e)perience +hat they do, intellect si,ply accepts the nat*re of space and the divisi!ility and ,o!ility of ,atter, !*t in reco"ni7in" +hat 0od6s i,,*ta!ility i,plies for the real, of ,otion it lays do+n r*les for ho+ i,a"ination is to f*nction in its in"enial aspect. .hen the intellect applies itself to phantasia to +ork

+ith the i,a"es already for,ed there, +hat >*le 1? had defined as in"eni*, proper, it +ill reco"ni7e that fi"*res arise in e)tension thro*"h ,otions= and if the ,otions in phantasia are to !e like those of the +orld-and th*s if the space of the phantasia is to !e artic*lated like the space of that +orld-the ,otions presented there ,*st follo+ those sa,e r*les. B*t-this is perhaps the ,ost i,portant conse3*ence for science-this ,eans that !y follo+in" these r*les one can artic*late the phantasia in parallel +ith the real +orld +itho*t constant reference to that real +orld. &hat is, one can develop e)tended, narrative hypotheses that +ill in essence !e tr*thf*l acco*nts of the +orld= one can tell fa!les that i,itate the real +orld !eca*se the ontolo"ical nat*re and ,o!ility of the fa!le6s ,aterial s*!strate :phantasia; is the sa,e as that of space. /n another sense, ho+ever, this is not i,itation or ,odelin" at all: the likeness co,es a!o*t as a res*lt of the essential sa,eness of phantasia and e)ternal e)tension. &he ,otions of phantasia are the ,otions of the +orld. &he ,otions in phantasia, identical in nat*re +ith the ,otions of the +orld, are also the ,otions that esta!lish all the fi"*res of "eo,etry. &he infinite :or rather indefinite; divisi!ility of ,atter corresponds to the indefinite divisi!ility of "eo,etrical space, and the act*al ,otions of tiny particles-so tiny that so,e of the, ,i"ht !e no lar"er than "eo,etrical points-are perfectly replicated !y the ,otions of "eo,etrical entities. Gort*nately the intrinsic proportional iso,orphis, of every portion of space to every other helps ens*re that one does not need to attend to the act*al ,ove,ent of every s,allest part, neither in the real nor in i,a"inary space. B*t in the *niverse of &e onde, the c*rves descri!a!le !y al"e!raic e3*ations and "enera!le !y ri"idly interconnected ,otions that had dra+n Descartes6s interest as early as 1619 have a ne+ relevance and tr*th. /t is no s*rprise that Descartes !e"an to develop in earnest the dyna,ic, "eo,etrical al"e!raic ,athe,atics that is fo*nd in the 0eometry :La 0So,eAtrie, p*!lished 16#E; in the early 16#$s. /n the last analysis, that is, in the infinitely fine analysis of +hich only ( ?#$ ( 0od is capa!le, the ,otions in space are ,otions of all the points or point particles, tho*"h in physical e)perience ,any portions of space consist of points that are stationary +ith respect to one another :e."., the parts of a rotatin" sphere do not ,ove +ith respect to one another even tho*"h the sphere as a +hole is ,ovin" +ith respect to its s*rro*ndin"s;. B*t +hatever the case a!o*t the sit*ation of partic*lar points, every point of space is s*!4ect to the r*les of ,otion en*nciated in &e onde. 1very point contin*es in its state, of rest or ,otion, as lon" as it does not collide +ith others. &he tendency of every ,ovin" point is to ,ove in a strai"ht line. Bther points or particles, the,selves tendin" in a certain direction, i,press a ne+ i,p*lse and direction on any point they i,pin"e *pon. .hat this ,eans in partic*lar is that instr*,ents like the proportional co,passes that Descartes had invented and conceived aro*nd 16?$ can !e *sed to represent the contin*o*s evol*tion of the ,otion of points s*!4ect to ,*ltiple forces of this kind. /f a pen is affi)ed to so,e point of the co,pass and the co,pass ,an*ally e)panded, the path traced o*t !y the pen is one that a point +o*ld follo+ if it +ere s*!4ected to forces of collision or press*re fro, i,,ediately s*rro*ndin" particles, forces that correspond to the chan"in" len"ths and directions of the se",ents of the co,pass and that are trans,itted alon" the co,pass6s slidin", pivotin" fra,e :these se",ents co*ld in effect stand for vectors of force;. .hat this i,plies, a"ain in the final analysis, is that the nat*re of e)tension and the r*les of ,otion have as a conse3*ence that the ,otions of real !odies +o*ld al+ays and every+here !e descri!a!le !y al"e!raic c*rves.O1$P &his does not ,ean that +e have the ,ental or co,p*tin" capacity to trace o*t all of the, in any partic*lar case :perhaps only 0od can;, !*t at least +e can *nderstand the, in principle. &he 0eometry, far fro, !ein" a develop,ent to !e e)plained !y Descartes6s discovery of a sol*tion to a partic*lar "eo,etrical pro!le,,O11P

O1$P &his is not strictly tr*e, !eca*se a point, or a "eo,etric entity consistin" of an infinite n*,!er of conti"*o*s points :i.e., anythin" that has real e)tension;, co*ld have an infinite n*,!er of forces i,pin"in" at a "iven ,o,ent-indeed this ,*st !e the case in the infinite, infinitesi,al analysis of forces of +hich only 0od is capa!le. &he ,otions of s*ch a point or entity +o*ld not, in "eneral, !e descri!a!le !y an al"e!raic polyno,ial, altho*"h they co*ld !e appro)i,ated !y an infinite series of s*ch polyno,ials. B*t the discovery of these ,athe,atical tr*ths lay in the f*t*re. O11P &h*s the Papp*s pro!le, :@& D/ #5?A#5E;, altho*"h i,portant for stirrin" Descartes to rene+ed ,athe,atical activity in the early 16#$s, +as ,ore an e)trinsic than an intrinsic ,otivation. Bn the Papp*s pro!le,, see Shea, agic of .um4ers and otion, 6$A6?= 1,ily >. 0roshol7, CDescartes6 Unification of @l"e!ra and 0eo,etry,C in Descartes: Philosophy, athematics and Physics, ed. Stephen 0a*kro"er :Bri"hton, S*sse): 9arvester Press &oto+a, 2K.: Barnes and 2o!le Books, 195$;, 1%6A165= and 9.K.8. Bos, CBn the >epresentation of C*rves in Descartes6 6CSo,Strie,6C Archive for (istory of )Bact %ciences ?F :1951;: ?9%A##5, esp. ?95A#$#. ( ?#1 ( is ,ore f*nda,entally a deepenin" of the i,a"inative, proportional fo*ndation of ,athe,atics and spatiality that had !een a staple of his approach to ,athe,atics for ,ore than a decade. Bne sho*ld note a f*rther, ,ost dra,atic conse3*ence that can !e dra+n fro, the shift in the *se of i,a"ination fro, the Regulae to &e onde : the i,a"iner is actin" in the i,a"e and likeness of 0od. /n the letters to 8ersenne disc*ssin" eternal tr*ths, Descartes took pains to point o*t that, in 0od, +illin", *nderstandin", and actin" are one. &he eternal tr*ths that 0od le"islated are his creations, in accord +ith his +ill and *nderstandin" !*t not coeval +ith hi, or a necessary e)pression of his nat*re. &hey co*ld have !een 3*ite other than they are, and so not even the ,ost f*nda,ental tr*ths of ,athe,atics and lo"ic are necessary for the divine ,ind. Z*ite clearly h*,an !ein"s cannot !e like 0od in this soverei"n po+er of creation. 9*,an !ein"s do not al+ays *nderstand +hat they +ill or +ill +hat they *nderstand, and the sa,e holds tr*e of the relationship !et+een *nderstandin" and actin"= ,oreover, h*,an actions do not al+ays accord +ith h*,an +ill. <et even in the Regulae Descartes proposed the *lti,ate "oal of his pro4ect as the deter,ination of h*,an +ill !y intellect= !ein" a!le to solve any pro!le, +hatsoever +o*ld ,ake intelli"ent action possi!le in all sit*ations +here there +as a solva!le pro!le,. 9e proclai,ed that the Regulae +as a!o*t +hat +as possi!le for human kno+led"e, !*t he also !elieved that +hatever +e can kno+ +e can kno+ +ith certainty and that +hat +e cannot kno+ can !e certainly kno+n to !e *nkno+a!le. Descartes6s nineA,onth in3*iry into ,etaphysical 3*estions :see @&/ 1FF; apparently "ave !irth to the certainty that +e cannot penetrate into the ,ind of 0od. .e cannot kno+ +hat he kno+s, nor can +e kno+ his reasons for ,akin" thin"s as they are. 2evertheless, +e can kno+ so,ethin" a!o*t 0od6s !ein" as e)pressed in his creation: na,ely, that he can ,ake these thin"s and that he can do anythin" +e can conceive hi, as doin". &he li,itless +ill, *nderstandin", and po+er of 0od is !eyond o*r ken, h*t the concrete evidence of his !ein" that is the created +orld +e can kno+ !eca*se he ,ade for it certain eternal tr*ths i,planted in *s. .itho*t reco"ni7in" these eternal tr*ths o*r actions and i,a"inin"s are ai,less and +anderin"= !*t +ith the, o*r actions !eco,e directed and tr*e. &his ,*ch does not ,ark *s yet +ith any special likeness to 0od. Bne ,*st reflect f*rther on +hat is involved in reco"ni7in" the eternal tr*ths and +hat it leads to. >eco"nition here is not tri""ered !y a ,echanical action !*t is p*rs*ant to the search for tr*th. Bne ,*st +ill the tr*th in order to co,e to kno+ it. @fter reco"ni7in" tr*ths one can resist their force and :irrationally; ref*se to !e "*ided !y the,. B*t if one accepts the,, one is deli,itin" the +ill and !rin"in" it into *nity +ith intellect, and havin" done this, one can !rin" one6s actions into confor,ity +ith a +ill

( ?#? ( properly infor,ed !y intellect, that is, a +ill that can !e tr*ly effective. &h*s the h*,an !ein" +ho kno+s and accepts eternal tr*ths co,es to rese,!le 0od ,ore closely in the *nity of +ill, intellect, and action. 8ost of these concl*sions sho*ld not !e partic*larly s*rprisin"= they so*nd a variation in Descartes on ,edieval co,,onplaces that 0od is radically one and si,ple and that o*r ai, is to kno+ his tr*th and live in accordance +ith his +ill !y +illin" it o*rselves. .hat is ne+ and s*rprisin" is the conse3*ence for i,a"ination and o*r *nderstandin" of the physical +orld. &he +orld created in phantasia in the fa!le of &e onde is ,ade in accordance +ith the eternal tr*ths 0od created= it is in fact a h*,an recreation of the +orld in i,itation of 0od, and insofar as the i,a"ination follo+s the eternal tr*ths in that reAcreation it +ill arrive at a res*lt 4*st like that of the *niverse +e live in. 0ranted that 0od has "iven *s all the ,aterials necessary for this reAcreation-the space of phantasia, the eternal tr*ths, o*r li!erty to a!stract o*rselves fro, the "iven +orld-neverAtheless, it is +e +ho i,a"ine a space o*tside the present space, it is +e +ho set in ,otion o*r o+n phantasia, it is +e +ho have po+er over it. .e can even i,a"ine thin"s there that are not possi!le in this +orld *nder the eternal tr*ths created !y 0od, a necessary conse3*ence of o*r freedo, of +ill. B*t +e cannot enforce 4*st any +illed alternatives as tr*e, !eca*se they +ill not in "eneral cohere as 0od6s creation does, and they +ill not have the perspic*ity that co,es only +ith the act*ally created eternal tr*ths. /f +e +illf*lly try to p*t so,ethin" into o*r fa!le that does not accord +ith the tr*ths, it +ill o!sc*re the story= if +e follo+ the tr*ths, everythin" in the fa!le +ill !e clear and evident and +ill !e capa!le of f*rther develop,ent in detail, precisely !eca*se o*r i,a"ination is actin" in accord +ith the eternal tr*ths.

D. T0E NE* P0YSIOLO+Y AND T0E RECONCEPTION OF P0ANTASIA

@t the end of chapter 1# of &e onde, Descartes pro,ises to "ive a f*rther description of ho+ the ,otions of li"ht ca*se h*,an sensations, !*t that is not taken *p e)cept in &'(ornme, +hich !e"ins !y e)tendin" the fa!le to incl*de ne+ h*,an !ein"s Cco,posed, as +e are, of a so*l and a !odyC :@& L/ 119;. &he acco*nt "iven there of the physiolo"y of perception is in so,e s,all !*t si"nificant +ays at odds +ith the i,a"ination constr*cted in &e onde. /n o*r reconstr*ction of Descartes6s conception of i,a"ination on the threshold of &e onde +e did not pay special attention to the physiolo"ical 3*estions involved. @s / have pointed o*t earlier, Descartes !e"an his anato,ical researches no later than early 16#$, and other evidence points to ( ?## ( a !e"innin" in 16?5 or 16?9.O1?P &o flesh o*t the hypothetical psychophysiolo"y of >*le 1? it +o*ld have !een necessary for Descartes to st*dy the ,edi*, !y +hich the ,otions that !ear o!4ective infor,ation are carried to the !rain and also the or"an or or"ans of the !rain that receive the i,pression. Bne ,i"ht e)pect that a f*ller acco*nt +o*ld say ,ore a!o*t ho+ and !y ,eans of +hat the i,pression on the sense or"an is passed alon". &he physics of &e onde does not directly e)plain ho+ patterns or i,a"es are trans,itted, ho+ever. &he physics of li"ht is a ,echanics of p*shin": the action of l*,ino*s !odies, +hich consist of the finest, fiery ele,ent, is to p*sh the particles of the second, airy ele,ent !y virt*e of those l*,ino*s !odies6 very rapid rotatory or vortical ,otion. Li"ht is th*s not itself a particle !*t a press*re carried thro*"h the particles of the second ele,ent. Beca*se the *niverse is a plen*, and !eca*se Descartes

conceives of the particles of the second ele,ent as i,,ediately to*chin" one another, this press*re is instantaneo*sly trans,itted in all directions fro, the l*,ino*s !ody. Bne can i,a"ine a *niverse of !illiard !alls packed to"ether, representin" the second ele,ent, and the l*,ino*s !ody pressin" o*t si,*ltaneo*sly over the entire s*rface +here it contacts the second ele,ent. &he press*re res*lts in not so ,*ch a ,otion as a tendency to ,otion. &his tendency to ,otion is said to follo+ the sa,e la+s as ,otion itself and so proceeds in strai"ht lines. &h*s, +itho*t !ein" a particle travelin" thro*"h space or an *nd*lation of a ,edi*,, li"ht is propa"ated in the fa,iliar +ay. Descartes leaves *ne)plained the details of ho+ this tendency to ,otion is refracted and reflected in the third and second ele,ents= ho+ever, he does apparently refer to the Dioptrics, notin" that the e)planation "iven there, +hich *ses the ,odel of collisions of hard !odies to e)plain reflection and the analo"y of a tennis racket strikin" a !all for refraction, has to !e ,odified to the circ*,stances of the plen*, and the propa"ation of li"ht as press*re.O1#P Lackin" the ,echanis,s that +o*ld clarify this, +e ,ay do*!t that a pla*si!le ,odification co*ld !e ,ade, !*t apparently Descartes sa+ no pro!le, in principle.O1FP &h*s the Dioptrics read in con4*nction +ith &e onde "ives the ass*rance that the theory of foc*sin" rays on the retina :first presented !y Kohannes 'epler; can !e easily converted into a theory of the foc*sin" of lines of press*re. &his ,eans that, at least *p to the retina, physics can "ive a co,plete acco*nt of ho+ O1?P See Seppcr, CDescartes and the 1clipse of /,a"ination,6 and C/n"eni*,, 8e,ory @rt, and the Unity of /,a"inative 'no+in" in the 1arly Descartes.C O1#P &he acco*nt of li"ht is "iven in chaps. 1# and 1F of &e Dioptics is at @& L/ 1$?. onde :@& L/ 5FA1$#;. &he all*sion to the

O1FP &he e)planation +o*ld have to acco*nt for ho+ the li"ht press*re6s direction of ,otion is chan"ed at the s*rface !et+een one !ody and another. ( ?#F ( infor,ation a!o*t the confi"*ration of o!4ects in the +orld can !e trans,itted to the eye and reconstit*ted there +itho*t any si"nificant loss of precision. .hat happens thereafterQ /n &'(omme the ans+er depends on anato,y. &he retina is dotted +ith nerve ends, +hich have correspondin" ends at the interior s*rface of the cavity in +hich the conarion, or pineal "land, is to !e fo*nd. .henever the retinal nerves are ,oved !y li"ht press*re they p*ll at the sa,e instant the parts of the !rain fro, +hich they co,e, and open !y the sa,e ,eans the entrances of certain pores that are on the internal s*rface of this !rain, thro*"h +hich the ani,al spirits that are in its concavities i,,ediately !e"in to take their co*rse, and "o on to spread thro*"h these into the nerves, and into the ,*scles, +hich serve to ca*se, in this ,achine, ,ove,ents entirely si,ilar to those to +hich +e are nat*rally incited, +hen o*r senses are to*ched in the sa,e +ay. :@& L/ 1F1; &his e)planation is predicated on the co,posite str*ct*re of the nerve fi!er. /t is conceived as an essentially hollo+ t*!e +ith a fi!er r*nnin" do+n the center. &he fi!er trans,its a p*ll that ori"inates in the sense or"an, +hile the hollo+ is filled +ith ani,al spirits that are responsi!le for actions initiatin" +ithin the !ody. &he p*ll on the fi!er at the retina opens pores in the interior cavity of the !rain, +hich act of openin" sets off a flo+ of spirits fro, the !rain cavity into the nerve hollo+= the flo+ of spirits ca*ses the ,*sc*lar contractions. B*t of co*rse not 4*st one nerve is involved in any sensation !*t a ,*ltit*de. &he retina has ,any s*ch nerve ends= each operates independently of its nei"h!ors. @n Ci,a"eC fallin" on the retina is th*s !roken *p into ,yriad discrete channels of ,echanical action !y the different nerve endin"s *pon +hich its vario*s parts fall.O1%P

&here are t+o pec*liarities in &'(omme's acco*nt of nerve action that deserve special attention: the nerves operate !y p*llin" rather than p*shin", and there is a co,plicated nerve str*ct*re that contrasts +ith the si,plicity of the Regulae's acco*nt. 0iven the press*re ,echanis, of li"ht, there is so,ethin" very odd a!o*t descri!in" the effect on the nerve as a p*ll rather than a p*sh. Up to the retinal s*rface the action of li"ht is p*shlike, a press*re. 1ven in >*le 1? the action !et+een the eye and the phantasia +as descri!ed as an i,pression. Gor so,e as yet inapparent reason, Descartes decided in &'(omme on a ,echanical acco*nt that incl*des a reversal in the direction of tendency to ,otion. &his does not contradict the fo*ndations of DesA O1%P &his does not in principle r*le o*t all interaction of the parts of the i,a"e, ho+ever. Gor e)a,ple, +hether or not the p*ll on a "iven nerve opens a pore in a certain +ay co*ld depend on a,plification or inhi!ition !y the other nerves= or the flo+s of the spirits in the !rain cavity co*ld !e pro"ra,,ed to co,pensate for the deco,position of the i,a"e at the nerve ends in the sense or"an. B*t Descartes did not disc*ss s*ch thin"s. ( ?#% ( cartes6s physics, since in &e onde he caref*lly distin"*ishes !et+een the 3*antity and the direction of ,otion. &he for,er ,*st !e preserved in the syste,, !*t direction is deter,ined independently, and so in principle it is possi!le for a 3*antity of ,otion to !e reoriented in any direction +itho*t addition to or s*!traction fro, that 3*antity. .e ,i"ht si,ply concl*de that at the sensory or"an the str*ct*re of the nerves is so constit*ted that a p*shin" ,otion is converted into a p*llin" one. <et there is still so,ethin" co*nterint*itive a!o*t this. .hy not si,ply ,aintain a p*shin" force and, if it proves necessary for Descartes6s f*rther acco*nt of physiolo"ical f*nctionin", allo+ for, say, a ,otionAreversin", valvelike action at the pores in the !rain cavityQ Did Descartes lose confidence in the a!ility of the nerves to trans,it a p*shin" ,otionQ @ possi!le e)planation arises fro, a co,parison +ith the >*le 1? acco*nt. >*le 1? had talked in ter,s of an i,pression on the first opa3*e ,e,!rane, the retina, an i,pression that +as instantly carried to the co,,on sense that in t*rn i,pressed it on the phantasia. .hat +as i,pressed +as seallike= the i,pression +as the fi"*re or i,a"e pressed into the ,e,!rane or !ody !y the act of li"ht. B*t can this happen physically, "iven the !ody6s anato,yQ /f >*le 1?6s sche,e is to hold *p, +e ,*st conceive of so,ethin" connectin" the retina to the co,,on sense. 1ven tho*"h >*le 1? ,entions nerves only in connection +ith ,otion and not perception, it see,s reasona!le to !elieve that in the Regulae Descartes tho*"ht of so,ethin" nervelike as trans,ittin" the i,pression. B*t there is no evidence at all that at the ti,e of +ritin" >*le 1? Descartes attri!*ted to the nerves a co,ple) str*ct*re. 9e ,entions no ani,al spirits, no hollo+s, no t*""in" central fi!ers. &he character of the e)planation in ter,s of i,pression stron"ly s*""ests that, insofar as he had even raised the 3*estion for hi,self, he tho*"ht of the ,edi*, as so,ethin" ,ore or less ri"id that is nevertheless capa!le of preservin" the fi"*re of an ori"inal i,pression. .hat sort of st*ff +o*ld this have to !eQ /t co*ld not !e too solid, like a staff, since a press*re applied to any sin"le point at one end +o*ld !e trans,itted indiscri,inately to the other, as tho*"h the press*re had !een applied e3*ally over the entire cross section. &his possi!ility, +hich +o*ld !e readi7ed in the case of any nor,al press*re applied to a solid, +o*ld entail a loss of infor,ation: the specific point of press*re application +o*ld !e irrecovera!le at the opposite end. &he staff co*ld not !e too li3*id, either, since then the ,otion +o*ld !e i,,ediately dispersed in all directions. &he fact is that there is no ordinary ,aterial that +ill achieve the desired effect, if press*re or ,otion is +hat is trans,itted.O16P O16P /f the nerves +ere ,ade o*t of transparent ,aterial or Descartes6s second ele,ent, they co*ld of

co*rse f*nction as optical fi!ers trans,ittin" li"ht and i,a"es. B*t this +o*ld !e accepta!le only in a contrafact*al fa!le. ( ?#6 ( &h*s the properties of ,atter defeat the holistic trans,ission of an i,pression or i,a"e, +hich +as a desiderat*, of the >*le 1? hypothesis. Undo*!tedly on the !asis of anato,ical st*dy, Descartes ca,e to re4ect holistic trans,ission in favor of +hat one ,i"ht call analytic trans,ission. Besides the 3*estion of ho+ a *nifor, nerve co*ld trans,it an inte"ral !*t differentiated i,a"e, there +as the pro!le, that the optic nerve is co,posed of ,any s,aller nerves and that the retina has not a sin"le nerve receptor !*t ,*ltit*dino*s receptors. @t the very !est, then, an i,a"e +o*ld have to !e !roken do+n into ,any parts, trans,itted alon" separate channels :nerve strands; thro*"h the optic nerve to the !rain, and there so,eho+ reasse,!led into a +hole. /t is clear even fro, a sche,atic consideration that there +ill !e a loss of detail *nless the receptors are so packed to"ether that no spaces are left !et+een. B*t even if they are, one +o*ld a"ain r*n into the pro!le, of the ina!ility of a nerve or nerve strand to trans,it i,a"es :or parts of i,a"es; inte"rally. &he sol*tion is to for"et a!o*t the i,a"e or i,a"e i,pression as +hat is trans,itted and instead to s*!stit*te so,e kind of ,otion conveyed as a si"nal rather than as an i,a"e. Bnce a"ain, an instantaneo*s p*shin" ,otion +ill not do, since the nerves are si,ply too soft and pliant to fill the !ill. &he alternative is to have a p*llin" ,otion, +hich can !e ,ore or less instantly trans,itted in nonri"id ,aterials *nder appropriate circ*,stances, for e)a,ple, a cord already p*lled fairly ta*t. Since the hollo+ t*!*lar str*ct*re that Descartes ascri!ed to the nerve is not one that any ,odern anato,ist +o*ld !e a!le to verify, it see,s likely that he interpreted into the anato,y he kne+ a variant of Stoic pne*,atic physiolo"y that +o*ld allo+ the nerves to perfor, the do*!le d*ty that the Regulae had left in the dark: the central fi!er trans,its the p*ll, and the rest of the cha,!er serves as a cond*it for ani,al spirits that prod*ce selfAinitiated !ody ,otion. S*rprisin"ly, despite the pri,acy of ,otion, Descartes never f*lly a!andoned the lan"*a"e of i,a"es. /n !oth &'(omme :@& L/ 1E%A1EE; and the Dioptrics :@& D/ 1?5A1#$; he descri!es ho+ the openin" and closin" of the pores at the ends of the optical nerve fi!ers in the !rain concavity trace a fi"*re on the internal s*rface of the concavity correspondin" to the i,a"e on the retina= the differential spirit flo+ fro, the pineal "land that is ind*ced !y the openin" and closin" of the pores prod*ces the trace of another correspondin" fi"*re on the pineal "land. /ndeed, he reserves the ter, 6idea6 in the proper sense for the trace on the pineal "land. 2o+, a,on" these fi"*res, it is not those that i,press the,selves on the or"ans of the e)terior senses, or in the interior s*rface of the !rain, !*t only those that trace the,selves in the spirits on the s*rface of the "land, +here the seat of the i,a"ination, and of the co,,on sense, is, that ,*st !e taken for the ideas, that is for the for,s or i,a"es that the rational so*l +ill consider ( ?#E ( i,,ediately +hen, !ein" *nited to this ,achine, it +ill i,a"ine or sense so,e o!4ect. :@& L/ 1E6A1EE= e,phasis in ori"inal; 8ore than a decade later, in the Passions of the %oul :16F9;, the d*ality of ,otion and i,a"e rec*rs= Descartes descri!es the process of sensation first as a trans,ission of ,otion !*t later as a trans,ission of i,a"es :cf. @& L/ ##5A##9, #F6 +ith #%%A#%6;.

.hat re,ains hidden fro, vie+ is the +ay in +hich the so*l is 4oined to the pineal "land and +hether the interior or only the s*rface of the "land is relevant to i,a"ination. &he 3*otation in the previo*s para"raph fro, &'(omme s*""ests that in i,a"inin" it is only the s*rface fi"*res that co*nt. B*t in the Passions, i,a"inin", directin" ,ental attention, and vol*ntarily ,ovin" the !ody are all associated +ith the po+er of +ill to act in the "land in +hatever +ay is re3*ired for drivin" the spirits to+ard the !rain pores so that the so*l ,i"ht perceive thin"s in the appropriate fashion. &he pheno,enolo"ical re3*ire,ents of &e onde's disc*ssion of p*re i,a"inary space +o*ld see, to favor an alternative: that the po+er of the so*l e)tends thro*"ho*t the +hole "land and that it is +ithin its three di,ensions that the fa!*lar replica of e)ternal space is prod*ced. Bne +o*ld then also have a si,ple criterion for discri,inatin" i,a"inin" and sensin". /n the acco*nts of &'(omme and the Dioptrics it is not i,,ediately evident ho+ +e can distin"*ish a pineal "land s*rface trace ,ade !y sensation fro, one ,ade !y i,a"ination. 9o+ do people kno+ the difference !et+een the,Q .hy do they not conf*se the, +ith one another, +ith i,a"inin" ,istaken for sensations and vice versaQ /f i,a"ination +ere an activity +ithin the "land, ho+ever, or the res*lt of an in+ard action that co*ld !e ,apped or traced o*t+ardly on the s*rface, +hereas sensation +ere at the s*rface alone or the res*lt of an in+ardA,ovin" process, there +o*ld !e a physiolo"ical correlate of this difference. @t any rate, the f*rthest Descartes +ent in his description of the physiolo"y of the i,a"ination +as the passa"e in the Dioptrics that e)plained ho+ +e perceive the distance of o!4ects. /n the first place, the eye chan"es its shape accordin" to the distance of an o!4ect= Cin the ,eas*re that +e chan"e it in order to proportion it to the distance of the o!4ects, +e chan"e also OaP certain part of o*r !rain, in a fashion that is instit*ted !y 2at*re for ,akin" o*r so*l perceive that distanceC :@& D/ 1#E;. .e ordinarily do this +itho*t any conscio*s activity, 4*st as +e adapt the shape of o*r hands to any ,aterial o!4ect +e "rasp +itho*t havin" to think a!o*t it. 8oreover, a !lind ,an +ith a stick in each hand is a!le Cas tho*"h !y a nat*ral 0eo,etryC to deter,ine an o!4ect6s distance= si,ilarly o*r t+o eyes, havin" sli"htly different perspectives, or even a sin"le eye that ,oves so that on the retina there are traced lines proportioned to the si7e and distance of o!4ects, allo+ *s to perceive the distance: Cand this thro*"h an ( ?#5 ( action of tho*"ht that, !ein" only a co,pletely si,ple i,a"ination, does not stop envelopin" in itself a reasonin" co,pletely si,ilar to +hat S*rveyors do +hen !y ,eans of t+o different stations they ,eas*re inaccessi!le placesC :@& D/ 1#5;. 1ven the relative distinctness or indistinctness of the shape seen or the stren"th or +eakness of li"ht reflected fro, the o!4ect can ena!le *s Cnot properly to see !*t to i,a"ine its distanceC :@& D/ 1#5A1#9;. Differences in the shapes, colors, and li"ht "ive *s a co,parative perspective that ,ay allo+ *s to 4*d"e distances as +ell. /t is hard to kno+ +hat to ,ake of this. &he passa"e ,aintains a central role for i,a"ination that is si,ple yet involves an i,plicit 3*asiAtri"ono,etric reasonin" :!y si,ilar, i.e., proportional, trian"les;. &he i,a"ination +orks !y a kind of proportionali7in" f*nction that is !eneath conscio*sness proper, yet that f*nction is called a thinkin" and reasonin". .as Descartes pict*rin" to hi,self an act*al, realA ti,e process of i,a"inal calc*lation-for e)a,ple, a stepA!yAstep ,anip*lation of "eo,etric len"ths of the kind to !e fo*nd in the RegulaeS Br a dyna,ic prod*ction of space and "eo,etry as in &e ondeS Br a contin*o*s "eneration of ,ore co,ple) c*rves fro, less co,ple) ones as in the 0eometryS .o*ld this reasonin" take place on the s*rface of the "land, in its interior, or not in the "land !*t in ,ind aloneQ 9e does at least s*""est the relevance of the third di,ension of the "land in !oth sensin" and i,a"inin" !y analo"i7in" the chan"e in shape of the eye in foc*sin" on o!4ects to the hand6s adaptin" its shape +hen it "rasps an o!4ect= this chan"e in the eye co*ld correspond to a chan"e in the

!rain in a ,anner ordained !y 0od or nat*re to ,ake o*r so*l perceive distance. @ reasonin" that is like tri"ono,etric calc*lation !*t is very si,ple, a lo"ic of s*rface traces that nevertheless penetrates !eneath the s*rface, an irresol*tion !et+een i,a"es and ,otions-these are si"ns of a fer,ent of tho*"ht that re"arded i,a"ination as i,portant eno*"h to allo+ tensions and inconsistencies to e,er"e in p*!lic, in Descartes6s p*!lished scientific +ritin"s. <et they appeared else+here, too, perhaps !elo+ the threshold of discri,ination for ,ost readers, !*t nevertheless there: i,a"ination as activity, an activity that ,i"ht transcend itself to "rasp, +illin"ly, the hi"hest, spirit*al tr*ths. / a, referrin" not to the +ritin"s of his yo*th !*t to the +ork that philosophers take as the keystone of Cartesianis,, the editations. @nd so it is to this and other +orks of the f*lly ,at*red philosopher that +e ,*st finally t*rn. ( ?#9 (

SEVEN Imagination an. t$e Acti&it' o% T$o/g$t

&he proof for the e)istence of 0od in the editations cr*cially depends on the h*,an capacity for a positive idea of infinity :@& D// F%AFE, 1#EA1#5, #65A#69;. &his positive idea co*ld scarcely !e e,!odied in i,a"ination, +hich cannot distinctly conceive ,anyAsided fi"*res ,ore co,plicated than trian"les, rectan"les, and penta"ons, ,*ch less infinity. Understandin", in contrast, can 3*ite as easily conceive a tho*sandAsided fi"*re as a trian"le. &he e)tra effort of ,ind needed to i,a"ine so,ethin" in addition to *nderstandin" it Descartes cites as clear evidence of the difference !et+een imaginatio and intellectio pura :@& D// E?AE#;. &o *se loc*tions !orro+ed fro, the Regulae, the p*re and attentive ,ind has in "eneral an easy and si,ple "rasp of the intellect*al thin"s, not of the i,a"ined ones.

A. I,A+INATION5 INFINITY5 AND ETERNAL TRUT0S

@lready in the 1% @pril 16#$ letter to 8ersenne, in +hich the topic of eternal tr*ths +as raised, Descartes had said that the infinite 0od co*ld not !e i,a"ined. C/t +o*ld !e rash to think that o*r i,a"ination reaches as far as his po+er.C 9e re,arks that his +ish +as for Cpeople to "et *sed to speakin" of 0od in a ,anner +orthier, / think, than the co,,on and al,ost *niversal +ay of i,a"inin" hi, as a finite !ein".C /n the concl*din" para"raph of the letter, after respondin" to 3*eries 8ersenne had ,ade a!o*t ,athe,atical infinity, Descartes points o*t that finite reasonin" cannot "*ide *s in thinkin" a!o*t the infinite :@& / 1F%A1F6;. Gro, this ti,e on+ard, +henever Descartes +rites a!o*t i,a"ination he al,ost invaria!ly portrays it as a co"nitively li,ited po+er.O1P &his contrasts O1P Disc*rsive reasonin" also is li,ited in contrast +ith p*re seein" accordin" to the li"ht of reason. See, for e)a,ple, the replies to 9o!!es, @& D// 19$A191. ( ?F$ ( +ith his *sa"e as late as ?$ 2ove,!er 16?9. /n a letter to 8ersenne he said that the capacity of the i,a"ination to e,!race all tho*"hts that enter the h*,an spirit-in Latin Descartes +o*ld have +ritten ingenium - is *nli,ited. >eactin" ne"atively to a proposal !y a certain 8onsie*r 9ardy for a *niversal lan"*a"e, Descartes s*""ested constr*ctin" the pri,itive +ords and letters of s*ch a lan"*a"e

C!y ,eans of order, that is, esta!lishin" an order a,on" all the tho*"hts that can enter into the h*,an spirit, the sa,e as there is one nat*rally esta!lished a,on" n*,!ersC= 4*st as one can 3*ickly learn ho+ in an *nkno+n lan"*a"e Cto na,e all the n*,!ers *p to infinity, +hich are in any case an infinity of different +ords,C one ,i"ht do the sa,e +ith Call the other +ords necessary for e)pressin" all the other thin"s that fall in the spirit of h*,an !ein"s.C B*t he do*!ted that 8. 9ardy +as thinkin" of this, !eca*se it depends on the tr*e Philosophy= since it is other+ise i,possi!le to en*,erate all the tho*"hts of ,en, and to p*t the, in order, nor even to distin"*ish the, in a +ay so that they are clear and si,ple, +hich is in ,y opinion the "reatest secret one can have for ac3*irin" the "ood science. @nd if so,eone had +ell e)plained +hat are the si,ple ideas that are in the i,a"ination of ,en, o*t of +hich everythin" they think is co,posed, and if it had !een received !y everyone, / +o*ld conse3*ently dare to hope for a *niversal lan"*a"e very easy to learn, prono*nce, and +rite, and +hat is the chief thin", +hich +o*ld aid 4*d",ent, representin" to it as distinctly as possi!le all thin"s, so that it +o*ld !e al,ost i,possi!le to !e deceived. :@& / 5$A51; &he i,a"ination as presented here is at the very least a!le to face *p to the task of en*,eratin" infinity and in so,e +ay a!le to conceive it !y ,eans of the +ellAordered process of representin" thin"s. &he strictly ,athe,atical *ses of i,a"ination in the earliest ,athe,atical +ritin"s had allo+ed i,a"ination to "rasp infinity as the ter,in*s of a +ellAordered process of "eo,etric and al"e!raic constr*ctions.O?P Bf co*rse, even then Descartes ,i"ht have a"reed that the h*,an in"eni*, is not +ell adapted for distinctly i,a"inin" a tho*sandAsided fi"*re= yet the in"eni*, had e)A O?P See Sepper, CDescartes and the 1clipse of /,a"ination,C #5#A#5F. /n the physical and ,athe,atical +ritin"s fro, the 16?$s Descartes often *ses the i,a"ination +ords +hen a ,athe,atical constr*ct is applied to a physical sit*ation :e."., lines of press*re i,a"ined in a vessel of +ater, @& L E$;, a physical or "eo,etrical entity is conceived as *nder"oin" a dyna,ic transfor,ation :e."., the "eneration of a conic section thro*"h the rotation and ,otion of lines, @& L ?#?A?##;, or a process of indefinite addition or division is *ndertaken +ith a "eo,etrical fi"*re :e."., dra+in" indefinitely ,any lines parallel to a "iven line, @& L E%;. Bften eno*"h the i,a"ination is in effect conceivin" a li,it to the *nendin" reiteration of a proced*re or reapplication of a concept :e."., the indefinite parallels 4*st ,entioned, @& L E%, and the *nendin" division of space or ti,e, @& L E#, E%;. @nd altho*"h the early C1)cerpta ,athe,aticaC do not *se the i,a"ination +ords, they nevertheless sho+ ho+ indefinitely e)pandin" al"e!raic series of s*,s and differences, +hich are displayed in ta!*lar for,, can !e *sed to e)press the len"th of the side of any re"*lar poly"on inscri!ed in a cricle +ith *nit radi*s :i.e., !y e)tendin" the n*,!er of ter,s indefinitely one can deter,ine the len"th of the side of an inscri!ed re"*lar n A"on for ar!itrarily lar"e choices of n = see @& L ?5%A?9E;. &his early physical and ,athe,atical +ork ,*st have convinced Descartes that the i,a"ination co*ld 3*ite easily handle a +ellAordered infinity. ( ?F1 ( pedients for !reakin" do+n, se3*encin", and s*rveyin" pro!le,s, so that they co*ld !e scanned, s*rveyed, and finally resolved. /n >*le E he adAvetted to ho+ +e can kno+ that the area of a circle is "reater than that of any other plane fi"*re +ith the sa,e peri,eter. @ll that +as re3*ired +as to sho+ it held tr*e for so,e partic*lar fi"*res. /nd*ction allo+s the concl*sion to !e e)tended to all others :@& L #9$;. &he fact that he did not "ive details of the proof is not i,portant. .hat co*nts is that he !elieved that his ,ethod of i,a"ination allo+ed one to enco,pass in principle an infinity of possi!ilities +itho*t needin" to e)a,ine each one. @s >*le 5 re,arks, Cnothin" can !e so ,*ltiple or dispersed that

!y the en*,eration +e are doin" here it cannot !e circ*,scri!ed +ithin certain li,its and disposed *nder a fe+ headin"sC :@& L #95;. /t is scarcely credi!le, then, that this Descartes +o*ld have a"reed +ith the Second 8editation6s assertion that +e cannot conceive !y i,a"ination all the chan"es a piece of +a) is s*!4ect to, or +ith the Si)th 8editation6s clai, that one can distinctly conceive plane fi"*res +itho*t i,a"inin" the,. @fter all, accordin" to the Regulae, errors of intellect are for the ,ost part d*e to o,ittin" the concrete o!4ect of tho*"ht, +hich in these cases ,*st !e i,a"ined. &he later Descartes a!andons the co"nitive necessity of i,a"inin" all 3*antities, that is, of all ,a"nit*de :contin*o*sly e)tended; and n*,!er :discretely n*,era!le;. Like the r*les of ,otion in &e onde, this, too, is connected to the doctrine of eternal tr*ths en*nciated in @pril 16#$. &he eternal tr*ths, here and in later conte)ts, have first of all to do +ith f*nda,ental ,athesis, that is, not 4*st ,athe,atics !*t all those notions +hose kno+led"e is co,,on to all disciplines. /n that first letter he told 8ersenne that he +as treatin" in his physics Cseveral ,etaphysical 3*estions, and partic*larly this: that the ,athe,atical tr*ths, those that yo* have na,ed eternal, have !een esta!lished !y 0od and depend entirely on hi,, 4*st as ,*ch as all the rest of creat*resC :@& / 1F%;. /n &e onde he refers to the eternal tr*ths on +hich ,athe,aticians !ase their ,ost evident proofs, Cfollo+in" +hich 0od hi,self has ta*"ht *s that he arran"ed everythin" in n*,!er, in +ei"ht, and in ,eas*reC :@& L/ FE;.O#P O#P Later, in the CGifth >eplies,C Descartes says that denyin" the eternal tr*ths +o*ld a,o*nt to ,aintainin" that the +hole of "eo,etry +as false :@& D// #51; and calls Ci,,*ta!le and eternalC Cthe essences of thin"s, and those ,athe,atical tr*ths that can !e kno+n a!o*t the,C :@& D// #5$;. /n the CSi)th >eplies,C the eternal tr*ths are !oth ,athe,atical and ,etaphysical tr*ths created !y 0od :@& D// F#6;, and they see, to pertain to the entirety of creation :@& D// F#?;. /n the C&hird >eplies,C the Cconcepts or ideas of eternal tr*thC are associated +ith the essences of thin"s :@& D// 19F;. /n part 1 of the Principles, para"raphs F5A%$ contrast eternal tr*ths, Chavin" no e)istence o*tside o*r co"itation,C +ith perceptions of thin"s and their affections= these para"raphs "ive e)a,ples of eternal tr*ths like CB*t of nothin" co,es nothin",C C/t is i,possi!le for the sa,e thin" !oth to !e and not to !e,C C.hat has !een done cannot !e *ndone,C C&hat +hich thinks cannot not e)ist +hile it thinksC= they also approve the alternative na,e 6co,,on notions6 :@& D///@ ?#A?F;. Para"raph E% places the kno+led"e of assertions like CB*t of nothin" co,es nothin"C o*tside the notions of 0od and o*r ,ind and !efore or alon"side the kno+led"e of corporeal nat*re and of the senses :@& D///@ #5;. ( ?F? ( &he eternal tr*ths +ere presented in the @pril 16#$ letter as e)a,ples of ,etaphysical topics Descartes had !een considerin" d*rin" the previo*s fe+ ,onths. &he letter affir,ed his conviction that he had fo*nd a +ay to prove ,etaphysical tr*ths ,ore certainly than "eo,etrical ones. &he root of these ,etaphysical concerns he descri!ed as Cthe o!li"ation that all +ho possess reason have of *sin" it principally in the endeavor to kno+ 0od and to kno+ the,selves: /t is +ith this that / atte,pted to !e"in ,y st*dies= and / +ill tell yo* that / +o*ld not have kno+n ho+ to find the fo*ndations of Physics if / had not so*"ht the, !y this ro*teC :@& / 1FF;. &hose +ho assert that the 4*stification of ,athe,atics and the physical sciences or the ref*tation of skepticis, is Descartes6s chief concern ,*st overlook this confession of his f*nda,ental orientation, a confession that is consistent +ith his path of philosophi7in" fro, 1615 on+ard. /t is +hat the first r*le of the Regulae called the search for +isdo, and +hat >*le 5 called Cthe no!lest e)a,ple,C investi"atin" one6s o+n po+ers of kno+in". C/f as a 3*estion so,eone proposes to hi,self to e)a,ine all tr*ths to the co"nition of +hich h*,an ratio s*ffices :+hich, it see,s to ,e, o*"ht to !e done once in life !y all those +ho serio*sly st*dy to arrive at a "ood ,ind;,C the person +ill discover, in accordance +ith the art ta*"ht !y the Regulae, that nothin" can !e kno+n +itho*t intellect= this, in t*rn, +ill lead directly to the en*,eration of the only

other instr*,ents of kno+in", sense and i,a"ination :@& L #9%A#96;.

-. IDEAS AND T0E I,A+INATIVE PATTERN

@ro*nd 16#$ Descartes +as approachin", !*t only approachin", the divide !et+een i,a"ination and intellect characteristic of the late philosophy. /n the Regulae they still cooperate in nearAperfect har,ony. &e onde, altho*"h restrictin" the scope of i,a"ination, ass*res for it an infalli!ility +hen it is confined to evident properties of e)tension. /n this sense, the eternal tr*ths, +hich "*arantee the applica!ility of p*re ,athesis to e)tension, provide the fo*ndations of physics. &he contin*in" disc*ssion of eternal tr*ths in the 16#$ correspondence +ith 8ersenne ind*ced Descartes to e,phasi7e that infinity lies !eyond ( ?F# ( the ordinary conceptions of people, +ho prefer i,a"inin" to kno+in". @nd in 16#5, Descartes rec*rred to the intert+ined pro!le,s of infinity, i,a"ination, intellect, and eternal tr*ths in ans+er to 8ersenne6s 3*estion a!o*t +hether there +o*ld still !e a real space if 0od had created nothin". @t first +e think the 3*estion is !eyond o*r ,ind6s po+er, !*t it e)ceeds only the po+er of i,a"ination-4*st like those other e)istence 3*estions a!o*t 0od and o*r so*ls. /ntellect can kno+ that there +o*ld !e not only no space !*t also no eternal tr*ths, for e)a,ple that the +hole is "reater than its parts :@& // 1#5, ?E 8ay 16#5;. Descartes event*ally separated the iss*e of o*r kno+led"e of n*,!er fro, that of e)tension. &his is evidenced !y the editations' clai, that +e can have a clear intellect*al perception of trian"les even +itho*t i,a"inin" one. .hat *nderlies the clai, is a distinction that he dre+ in correspondence +ith Princess 1li7a!eth in 16F# and that is also present in the Principles. &here are very fe+ Cpri,itive notionsC that for, ori"inals on the pattern of +hich +e for, all o*r other kno+led"e: and there are only a very fe+ of these notions= since, after the ,ost "eneral, of !ein", of n*,!er, of d*ration, etc., +hich are appropriate to everythin" that +e can conceive,OFP +e have, for !ody in partic*lar, only the notion of e)tension, fro, +hich follo+ those of fi"*re and of ,ove,ent= and for the so*l !y itself, +e have only that of tho*"ht, in +hich are co,prised the perceptions of *nderstandin" and the inclinations of +ill= finally, for so*l and !ody to"ether, +e have only that of their *nion, on +hich depends that of the force that so*l has to ,ove the !ody, and the !ody to act on so*l, in ca*sin" its senti,ents and its passions. :@& /// 66%, ?1 8ay 16F#; &he !asic conceptions of n*,!er and of eternal and ,athe,atical tr*ths are essentially "ro*nded in the stock of notions that are ,ost pri,itive of all, prior even to the distinction !et+een !ody and so*l or e)tension and thinkin". &his is +hat !eca,e of the Regulae's doctrine of nat*res co,,on to !oth ,aterial and intellect*al thin"s. &hese nat*res, or notions, e)pressi!le in !oth reai,s !*t not proper to either, are kno+a!le only !y intellect. 2evertheless, Descartes retained the idea that ,athe,atics is "reatly aided !y i,a"ination *ntil the end of his life.O%P Contrary to the Regulae, Descartes no+ assi"ns the principal ca*se of errors to o*r atte,pts to *se i,a"ination in order to conceive of so*l, or so*l ,ovin" !ody. &his ,arks a revol*tion in the tho*"ht of one +ho OFP /n the Principles, pt. l, par. F5, Descartes attri!*tes special stat*s to the notions of s*!stance, d*ration, order, and n*,!er, +hich apply e3*ally to e)tension and thinkin" :@& Dilla ??A?#;.

O%P Gor e)a,ple, to Princess 1li7a!eth, ?5 K*ne 16F# :@& /// 691A69?; and in conversation +ith Gran7 B*r,an :@pril 16F5= @& D 1E6A1EE;. Descartes refers to the ingenium mathematieum and mathesis ingenium thro*"ho*t this latter passa"e. ( ?FF ( aro*nd 16?$ had clai,ed that +ind co*ld si"nify spirit and li"ht kno+led"e and +ho in the Regulae had attri!*ted error to a !adly co,posin" intellect that did not resort to i,a"ination and sense. /f one is Cartesian, this revol*tion +ill appear as :finally; "ettin" thin"s ri"ht. <et the revol*tion in an i,portant sense does not chan"e anythin" a!o*t Descartes6s *niverse e)cept perhaps to re"ro*p the vario*s po+ers of sense, i,a"ination, and intellect differently, into different constellations: their relative positions re,ain, !*t the +ay in +hich +e see the, relatin" to one another chan"es. 2o sin"le set of concepts can rationali7e every one of Descartes6s adversions to i,a"ination fro,, say, 16#E on+ard. <et it is possi!le to sche,ati7e the later *nderstandin" *nder a s,all n*,!er of headin"s. 1. /f the early theory of i,a"ination stressed its activity, the later philosophy intensified a locali7ation and restriction of the activity that had already !e"*n in the >e"*lae. &he distinction !et+een co,,on sense and i,a"ination still present in >*le 1? +as a!andoned, the po+er of ,ind that +as responsi!le for i,a"inin" +as a!sol*tely differentiated fro, the associated !odily f*nctions, and its direct activity in the !ody +as restricted to the pineal "land. ?. /n the later philosophy, especially in disc*ssions postdatin" the 8editations, it is not the kno+in" force or intellect that acts on i,a"ination !*t rather the +ill. /n the later philosophy, +ill co,es to !e *nderstood as the pri,ordial activity of so*l, +hereas intellect is a passivity. &herefore one has to distin"*ish the receptive aspect of i,a"ination, in +hich the ,ind attends to the i,pression, trace, or enforced ,ove,ent of the pineal "land, fro, the prod*ctive for,ation of i,a"es !y +illin". /n t*rn, one ,*st distin"*ish !et+een the conte,plation of those i,a"es that are for,ed in the pineal "land !eca*se of the actions of the sense or"ans, nerves, ani,al spirits, or other parts of the ,echanical syste, of the !ody fro, i,a"es that are prod*ced !y an a*tono,o*s act of +ill. #. G*rther,ore, a sharper distinction +as dra+n !et+een the fi"*re in the or"an and the idea perceived in conscio*sness than +as the case even as late as L69o,,e. .hat is i,pressed in phantasia or the pineal "land is not +hat one directly e)periences in thinkin". >ather, the trace in the "land so,eho+ "ives rise to an idea in conscio*sness. &here ,ay !e so,e rese,!lance !et+een the t+o, !*t there need not !e. &hese tendencies and distinctions re3*ire one to conceive i,a"ination alon" the follo+in" lines: &he or"an of i,a"ination takes on fi"*res chiefly in t+o +ays, thro*"h sensation and thro*"h the act of i,a"inin". &he receptive part of ,ind :intellect; can !e t*rned !y the +ill to+ard the ( ?F% ( pineal "land= +hen the fi"*res or traces there co,e fro, the sense or"ans the res*lt is sensation, +hereas i,a"inin" proper occ*rs +hen the +ill ,akes a ne+ i,pression in the !rain +ith the C+indo+s Oof the sensesP closedC :@& D 16?;, an i,pression of +hich the intellect takes note. /n conscio*sness one does not in any case si,ply re"ister the presence of the fi"*re or trace in the i,a"ination or"an= the idea is not the or"an trace. 8oreover, !esides the senseAdirected and +illA "overned traces in the or"an there can also !e an *ndirected and *n"overned prod*ction of i,a"es that res*lt fro, stirrin"s in the nerve and ani,al spirit syste,, one res*lt of +hich is drea,s.

@ltho*"h Descartes had *sed the ter, 6idea6 in his early philosophy, it initially and typically ,eant the i,a"e or look of a corporeal thin". 1ven in the Discourse on the ethod 6idea6 is often *sed in this sense, altho*"h it also takes on the ne+er ,eanin".O6P .ith the editations, Descartes introd*ces the ne+ sense +ith pro"ra,,atic intent. /t is in effect a "enerali7ation of the corporeal sense: 6idea6 refers to the look of thin"s in conscio*sness, to the for,s of tho*"hts. /n the CSecond >eplies,C in co,plyin" +ith the re3*est for a ,ore "eo,etric or synthetic presentation of the content of the editations, he e)plicidy defines the ter,. @fter specifyin" that 6co"itatio6 is anythin" in *s in a +ay that +e are i,,ediately conscio*s of it,OEP 6idea6 is defined as that for, of any co"itation +hatever, thro*"h the i,,ediate perception of +hich / a, conscio*s of this very sa,e co"itation. . . . @nd th*s / call 6ideas6 not only i,a"es depicted in phantasia= no+ here / in no +ay call these ideas, insofar as they are in the corporeal phantasia, that is, depicted in a certain part of the !rain, !*t only insofar as they infor, the ,ind itself t*rned to+ard that part of the !rain. :@& D// 16$A161; 1arlier in the CSecond >epliesC he distin"*ishes the nat*re of the idea fro, that of Ci,a"es of ,aterial thin"s depicted in phantasiaC= the idea proper is Conly that +hich +e perceive !y intellect either in apprehendin", or in 4*d"in", or in disc*rsive reasonin"C :@& D// 1#9;. Bne of the ,ost revealin" characteri7ations of the idea is in the C&hird >eplies,C to &ho,as 9o!!es. Contrary to 9o!!es, +ho resol*tely interprets ideas as corporeal or even as na,es, Descartes atte,pts to sho+ that there e)ist "en*inely noncorporeal ideas. 9e *ses the ter, 6idea6 O6P Gor instance, contrast the strictly corporeal *se of @& D/ %%A%6 to the ideas of 0od and so*l of #FA #%. OEP 9e contin*es: C&h*s all operations of +ill, intellect, i,a"ination, and senses are co"itations. B*t / have added 6i,,ediately,6 to e)cl*de thin"s that follo+ fro, these, as vol*ntary ,otion indeed has co"itation for its principle, !*t nevertheless it is not co"itationC :@& D// 16$;. ( ?F6 ( for everythin" that is i,,ediately perceived !y the ,ind, to s*ch an e)tent that, +hen / +ant and / fear, !eca*se / si,*ltaneo*sly perceive that / +ant and / fear, this sa,e volition and fear are n*,!ered !y ,e a,on" ideas. @nd / have *sed this +ord !eca*se it +as already co,,onplace a,on" Philosophers for si"nifyin" the for,s of perceptions of the divine ,ind, altho*"h +e reco"ni7e no phantasia in 0od= and / had none apter. :@& D// 151; .hat is s*rprisin" is that this s*""ests that ideas in the noncorporeal sense are conceived !y an analo"y to the divine ,ind, !*t the divine ,ind taken contrafact*ally as tho*"h it possessed the apparat*s of the internal senses that +o*ld allo+ it to perceive. &hese passa"es sho+ that even if the idea is ,eant to !e distin"*ished, as residin" in the ,ind, fro, the corporeal for, or shape in o!4ects or in the phantasia pineal "land, the very concept is desi"ned in analo"y to and accordin" to the lo"ic of the corporeal idea and the syste, of sensin" and i,a"inin". So the +orkin"s of p*re intellect are *nderstood as analo"ical to those of i,a"ination, altho*"h those +orkin"s in the ,ost proper sense e)cl*de the i,a"ination. &his lo"ic of analo"yA+ithAe)cl*sion is e)hi!ited in an e)chan"e +ith Pierre 0assendi :in the CGifth B!4ections and >epliesC;, +ho ar"*ed that the ,ind6s s*pposedly clear *nderstandin" of a chilia"on +as ,erely ver!al and so 4*st as Cconf*sedC as that of the i,a"e and that it involved at least an indistinct pict*re of a fi"*re +ith ,any an"les :@& D// ##$A##1;. Descartes responded that since +e can kno+ ,any thin"s ,ost clearly and distinctly

a!o*t it, it cannot !e perceived either conf*sedly or ,erely in na,e. .e have an *nderstandin" of the +hole fi"*re even if +e do not i,a"ine the +hole. &hese pheno,ena of a+areness sho+ that *nderstandin" and i,a"ination differ not 4*st in de"ree in a sin"le ,ental po+er !*t as t+o co,pletely different ,odes of operation. CGor +hich reason in intellection ,ind *ses itself alone, !*t in i,a"ination conte,plates corporeal for,. @nd altho*"h 0eo,etric fi"*res !e entirely corporeal, nevertheless, +ith respect to the, these ideas thro*"h +hich they are *nderstood, +hen they OJ the ideasP do not fall *nder i,a"ination, are not to !e considered corporealC :@& D// #5FA#5%= note the !iplanarity of idea and fi"*re;. &h*s one has a criterion of the difference: intellection is easier than i,a"ination and is reco"ni7ed in its *ni3*eness !y a process and !y res*lts that are different fro, those of the corporeally dependent i,a"ination. Descartes therefore see,s ready to ar"*e that +e kno+ not 4*st n*,!er apart fro, i,a"ination !*t also "eo,etry. 0assendi +as ri"ht to detect a,!i"*ity here, for +hat can it possi!ly ,ean to *nderstand a chilia"on in co,plete and *tter a!straction fro, i,a"ination, not ,erely +itho*t a distinctly conceived tho*sandAsided fi"*re in phantasia !*t +itho*t any ( ?FE ( fi"*re or even any sense of spatiality at allQ /n the period of the Regulae, Descartes ,i"ht hi,self have considered this to !e a ,onstrosity of !adly applied intellect, the sit*ation par e)cellence +herein !y not i,a"inin" thin"s concretely the intellect affir,s a!s*rdities. Can the ,ind have a concept of e)tension +itho*t any for, of i,a"ination +hatsoeverQ /n ans+erin" +e need to !e caref*l not to take Descartes6s selfA*nderstandin" in a ,ore e)tre,e sense than he intended. 1arlier in the CGifth >eplies,C Descartes insists that / also often distinctly sho+ed that ,ind can operate independently of the !rain= for nat*rally no *se of the !rain can !e for *nderstandin" p*rely, !*t only for i,a"inin" or sensin". @nd altho*"h +hen i,a"ination or sense is stron"ly accessed :as happens +hen the !rain is dist*r!ed; the ,ind is not free for easily *nderstandin" other thin"s, +e nevertheless e)perience that +hen i,a"ination is less stron" +e often *nderstand so,ethin" 3*ite different fro, it: as +hen in the ,idst of sleepin" +e notice +e a)e drea,in", there is a certain need of the i,a"ination so that +e !e drea,in", !*t that +e notice +e a)e drea,in" re3*ires only intellect. :@& D// #%5A#%9; /n the @ristotelianAScholastic theory of kno+in" !y a!straction fro, phantas,s there +as virt*al *nani,ity that kno+in" proper :i.e., the activities of intellect and disc*rsive reason; +as not the operation of any or"an, !*t that +as not to say that in h*,an !ein"s one co*ld kno+ +itho*t the assistance of the or"ans that prod*ced the phantas,. Descartes is not ar"*in" differently in this passa"e. Clearly he does not ,ean that +e can notice and *nderstand that +e are drea,in" in the co,plete a!sence of drea,in"-3*ite the contrary-!*t that there is nothin" at all in the activity of the !rain, or of i,a"ination as the havin" of traces in phantasia, that is itself a for, of kno+in" or the proper instr*,ent or or"an of kno+in". 'no+in" !elon"s to intellect alone.O5P &his is also one of the lessons of the piece of +a) e)a,ple, at the end of the Second 8editation: +e have !eco,e acc*sto,ed since childhood to think that +e see thin"s like the piece of +a) +ith o*r senses, !*t nothin" in the senses kno+s or perceives the +a) as +a). &he i,a"ination, altho*"h it can conceive different appearances that the +a) ,i"ht ass*,e, cannot e,!race the indefinite, see,in"ly infinite variety that is possi!le. Bnly the intellect is po+erf*l eno*"h to conceive the *nity of s*!stance thro*"h all the appearances and O5P of co*rse, Descartes +ent ,*ch farther to+ard the location of intellect in an or"an than +o*ld have

!een accepta!le to ,ost @ristotelians !y clai,in" that the so*l +as partic*larly sit*ated in the pineal "land. Bne sho*ld notice that the distinction !et+een the *ses of intellect and i,a"ination that Descartes ,akes in the passa"e is si,ilar to the acts of intellect Con its o+nC in the Regulae, +hen intellect is *sed to set *p a pro!le, in initial ter,s and to conceive ne"ations. See chap. %, Sec. 0, a!ove. ( ?F5 ( possi!ilities, and it is intellect itself that perceives the e)istence of ,ore possi!ilities than / have ever sensed or i,a"ined. &he intellect transcends the li,itations of sense and i,a"ination, and the a!ility of the ,ind to i,a"ine !eyond the already or previo*sly "iven depends on this transcendin" po+er. &he proper o!4ects of intellect are the thin"s that it can perceive even in sensi!les and i,a"ina!les that do not !elon" per se to those sensi!les and i,a"ina!les: the ideas of the essences of thin"s :like the +a)ness of the +a); and the eternal tr*ths. So, for e)a,ple, +hen +e see that one piece of +a) is lar"er than another, and a third is lar"er than the first, +e are Cseein"C these thin"s !y virt*e of intellect, not of sense or i,a"ination, and seein" that the third is lar"er than the first as a conse3*ence of the first t+o perceptions is a 4*d",ent of +ill !ased on a clear seein" !y intellect. .e of co*rse can also note, in t*rn, the principle of transitivity :/f ! is "reater than - and - is "reater than A, then ! is "reater than A ;, +hich is properly speakin" even farther re,oved fro, the partic*lar sensations and i,a"inations, altho*"h the principle can !e e)pressed thro*"h thin"s in i,a"ination and in the e)ternal +orld. &hese tr*ths are "raspin"s !y the +illAoriented intellect, "raspin"s that are intrinsically shapin"s or infor,in"s of the ,ind, that is, tho*"htA"raspin"s. @nother, ,ore intellect*alistic rather than vol*ntarisAtic +ay of p*ttin" this is that the appearances of thin"s are ill*,inated !y the li"ht of reason that 0od has ,ade part of o*r f*nda,ental nat*re and that is the essence of *s insofar as +e are perceivin" !ein"s. &h*s it !eco,es evident +hy Descartes insisted that the eternal tr*ths e)ist in the ,ind alone. &his does not ,ean that the e)ternal +orld is in no +ay to*ched !y the eternal tr*ths :as tho*"h physical o!4ects do not o!ey the principle of transitivity +ith respect to lar"e and s,all; !*t that to find the principle one ,*st look to the ,ind. &here is no principleAthin" Co*t there.C &he e)hi!ition of the principle can take place thro*"h thin"s that are Co*t there,C !*t the only place that e)hi!ition :or appearance; "en*inely occ*rs is in ,ind. &he positions of the Regulae and the Si)th 8editation on intellect and i,a"ination are not so far apart, then. &he Si)th 8editation does not intend to investi"ate i,a"ination for its o+n sake !*t tries to deter,ine +hether i,a"ination as a fac*lty of ,ind is s*fficient to esta!lish the e)istence of so,ethin" corporeal. &he first task is to ass*re that it is distinct fro, intellection: that is +hat the chilia"on e)a,ple acco,plishes. &he second is to *se this difference to esta!lish that so,ethin" different in nat*re fro, intellect act*ally e)ists. /,a"ination *naided !y sense ,akes this no ,ore than pro!a!le. C@ltho*"h / investi"ate everythin" acc*rately, nevertheless / do not yet see that any ar"*,ent can !e dra+n fro, the distinct idea of corporeal nat*re that / discover Oor inventP in ,y i,a"ination ( ?F9 ( that necessarily concl*des that !ody e)istsC :@& D// E#;.O9P .hile notin" that / can i,a"ine thin"s that are perceived even !etter !y sense, like color, so*nd, odor, and pain-+here*pon the ,editation proceeds to investi"ate sense-Descartes re,arks that these thin"s "o !eyond the i,a"ery of Cthat corporeal nat*re that is the o!4ect of p*re 8athesisC :@& D// EF;. &his repeats the for,*la 6p*re

,athesis6 that occ*rred shortly !efore, at the end of the Gifth 8editation: C2o+ indeed inn*,era!le Othin"sP, so,e a!o*t 0od hi,self and other intellect*al thin"s, so,e also a!o*t all that corporeal nat*re that is the o!4ect of p*re 8athesis, can !e plainly kno+n and certain for ,eC :@& D// El;. &he Gifth 8editation, +hich is rifled CBf the essence of ,aterial thin"s= and a"ain of 0od, that he e)ists,C takes as an e)a,ple of the ideas of thin"s other than 0od and ,yself :Cinsofar as they are in ,y co"itationC and in order Cto see +hich of the, are distinct, +hich conf*sedC; the i,a"ination of 3*antity. C2a,ely, / distinctly i,a"ine 3*antity, +hich philosophers co,,only call contin*o*s, or the e)tension in len"th, !readth, and depth of this 3*antity or, !etter, 3*antified thin"= / n*,!er in it vario*s parts= / assi"n any ,a"nit*des, fi"*res, positions, and local ,otions to these parts, and any d*rations to these ,otionsC :@& D// 6#;. /t is in i,a"ination, then, that +e have a distinct notion of that nat*re that is the essence of ,athe,atics and physics, e)tension. Bnce / i,a"ine 3*antity-+hich, if +e dra+ in advance on the e)plicitation of the actions of +ill in the postA editations period :see Secs. D and 1, !elo+= this e)plicitarion is in confor,ity +ith the dyna,ic ,athe,atical i,a"ination of &e onde ;, is an action of the +ill in phantasia perceived accordin" to the idea of e)tension-/ can ,ake f*rther active "raspin"s of it, artic*latin" e)tended 3*antity in +ays that appear *nder the ideaAfor,s of n*,!er, ,a"nit*de, fi"*re, position, ,otion, d*ration. B*t a"ain the 3*estion intr*des: 9o+, then, can Descartes assert that he has a clear and distinct *nderstandin" of a fi"*re like the chilia"on +itho*t an i,a"eQ @ltho*"h it is possi!le that here lies an *lti,ate *nintelli"i!ility, there is a ,ore charita!le interpretation. Descartes "rants in the Si)th 8editation that, Con acco*nt of the *sa"e of al+ays i,a"inin" so,ethin" +henever / co"itate a!o*t a corporeal thin", / perhaps represent to ,yself so,e fi"*re conf*sedlyC :@& D// E?;= th*s in thinkin" a chilia"on / ,i"ht represent to ,yself an i,a"e that is no ,ore appropriate to a chilia"on than to a ,yria"on. &he passa"e does not necessarily i,ply O9P &his reasonin" s*""ests that necessity in ,athe,atics does not ordinarily re3*ire ar"*,ent !*t can "et !y +ith the clear seein" of int*it*s. &he kind of necessity re3*ired for the certain e)istence of !odies ,*st co,e fro, ar"*,ents, not 4*st the int*it*sAseein" of corporeal i,a"es. Gor passa"es relevant to this distinction, see the preface to the Grench edition of the Principles :@& /L@ ?; and the conversations +ith B*r,an :@& D 1E6A1EE;. ( ?%$ ( that this *se or c*sto, is inessential to thinkin" a!o*t corporeal thin"s, nor that eBtension is here!y conf*sedly i,a"ined= in fact, it +o*ld appear instead that e)tension is i,a"ined as s*ch in this c*sto, of co"itation, only it is not caref*lly artic*lated !y the ,ind6s distinct attention to its parts. 8oreover, this a!sent artic*lation into fi"*ral parts, +hich to !e present re3*ires that the acies mentis, the sharp ed"e of the ,ind, !e applied so that the sides, the an"les, and the area are "rasped si,*ltaneo*sly :all +hich +o*ld de,and a "reat effort of the so*l in the activity of i,a"inin";, is not necessary for *nderstandin" the penta"on or the chilia"on in distinction fro, other fi"*res. 1ven in the Regulae the tho*"ht that a chilia"on is not a ,yria"on +o*ld !e acco,plished !y intellect, not i,a"ination. &he intellect is in principle capa!le of ,akin" s*ch artic*lations and s*ch distinctions of n*,!er-or, to e,phasi7e the activity, of articulating and num4ering -!*t this capacity far o*tstrips the a!ility of a h*,an !ein" to act*ally, co,pletely, and distinctly carry o*t the artic*lation in a present i,a"e. &o prod*ce a clearly and distinctly perceiva!le "eo,etrical i,a"e, the i,a"ination ,*st constit*te a real fi"*re that e,!odies in concrete for, an i,plication and intrication of nat*res, !oth si,ple and co,ple). &he h*,an in"eni*, is often not *p to the task. 2either is the intellect, !*t its task is the different one of "raspin" li,ited aspects that need virt*al rather than concrete reali7ation.O1$P

&hese possi!ilities of applyin" the sharp ed"e of the ,ind-even the possi!ility of distinctly conceivin" spatiality or e)tension in p*re for,, as +as done at the !e"innin" of the si)th part of &e onde -a,o*nt to no less than ideas in their innateness. .hen Descartes pointed o*t to 9o!!es that callin" an idea innate did not ,ean that it +as al+ays sho+in" itself to *s, C!*t only that +e have in o*rselves the fac*lty of elicitin" itC :@& D// 159;, he +as pointin" to, +itho*t na,in", this +illA!ased po+er of dra+in" the for,s of co"itation o*t of o*rselves and applyin" and distin"*ishin" the, appropriately. @ll ideas as perceived are "iven their f*nda,ental for, !y 0od6s instit*tion of o*r nat*re= those that +e control-as opposed, for e)a,ple, to the sensations of the e)ternal +orld that +e do not control, altho*"h even they appear in accordance +ith the instit*tion of o*r nat*re-+e can s*,,on forth at +ill :altho*"h ho+ the +illin" is perceived is a"ain a ,atter of the instit*tion of o*r essence as thinkin" thin"s and o*r nat*re as h*,an !ein"s;.O11P /n this sense, +e ChaveC the idea of e)tension in the p*rely spirit*al po+er of the +ill to elicit it, even +hen there is nothin" that +e are actively i,a"inin", and all the artic*lations of O1$P it +o*ld do*!tless !e fr*itf*l to consider this distinction of Descartes in li"ht of the Scholastic distinction !et+een first and second intentions. O11P See Sec. C, !elo+, on the distinction !et+een o*r essence as thinkin" thin"s and o*r nat*re as h*,an !ein"s. ( ?%1 ( +hich that +illin" is capa!le can, in so,e +ay, !e perceived !y the ,ind even in the a!sence of an i,a"e. &he Gifth 8editation i,plicitly e)plains this, since, as an investi"ation of that corporeal nat*re that is the essence of p*re ,athesis and of ,atter, it is +orkin" in +hat Descartes *nderstands as the distinct real, of i,a"ination. &he ,editation discovers in e)tension not ,erely that thin"s th*s vie+ed in "eneral are to ,e plainly kno+n and transparently seen, !*t !eyond this also !y attendin" / perceive inn*,era!le partic*lars a!o*t fi"*res, a!o*t n*,!er, a!o*t ,otion, and si,ilar thin"s, the tr*th of +hich is so open and in a"ree,ent +ith ,y nat*re, that provided that / first *ncover these thin"s, / see, not so ,*ch to learn so,ethin" ne+ as to !e re,inded of thin"s that / already kne+ !efore, or to t*rn for the first ti,e to these thin"s that +ere lon" in ,e, altho*"h / had not !efore t*rned the "a7e of the ,ind to these. :@& D// 6#A6F; &hat is, e)tension is so constit*ted :!y 0od; that havin" the "eneral idea of it :in i,a"ination;, or f*rther artic*latin" it in accordance +ith Ctr*e and i,,*ta!le nat*res,C as the ne)t para"raph calls the,, is i,plicit and in perfect a"ree,ent +ith ,y nat*re. &hese nat*res or essences are +ays in +hich / take hold of or conceive e)tension !eca*se ,y nat*re +as created !y 0od precisely as it is-in accordance +ith the eternal tr*ths, as Descartes re,inded 8ersenne in 16#5. Bnce +e *nderstand these nat*res or essences and ho+ they i,plicitly contain +hat +e do not i,,ediately perceive, +e can ar"*e !y analo"y that 4*st as a trian"le has certain properties and not others, even +hen +e are not attendin" to the,, so does 0od have the property of e)istence= the tr*th of e)istence is involved in the very idea of 0od, 4*st as the tr*th of the relations de,onstrated !y a "eo,etrical theore, is involved in the very idea of a "eo,etrical o!4ect. &hese involve,ents are i,posed !y the essences, not !y an ar!itrary act of ,ind. /n the Gifth 8editation, Descartes responds to an iss*e that had !een raised !y >*le 1?: +hether thin"s as "rasped !y the ,ind are like real thin"s, and +hether error is a ,atter of the ,ind6s ,isco,posin"

ele,ents :the nat*res of the Regulae ; that are tr*e in the,selves. @s thinker / cannot "*arantee the tr*th of +hat ,y ,ind p*ts to"ether, !*t the constancy of the i,plications of tr*ths in so,ethin" ele,entally "iven to ,e !y nat*re, even +hen / do not attend to those i,plications, ass*res ,e that so,e com4inations of nat*res are si,ply "iven as s*ch. &he Regulae had not reached the level of tho*"ht at +hich this co*ld !e settled. /t had only analy7ed as nat*res the +ays of "raspin" thin"s and post*lated that co,ple) nat*res +ere in so,e +ay co,posites of si,ple nat*res= so,e co,ple) nat*res ,i"ht !e necessary, others contin"ent, so,e ,i"ht co,e a!o*t thro*"h i,p*lse, others thro*"h con4ect*re, yet others thro*"h ded*ction ( ?%? ( :@& L F?1AF?F;. &he !asis for these distinctions +as not ,ade the,atic, ho+ever. &he Regulae in its ,ethod had even allo+ed +ide latit*de to the co"nitive *se of fictions for i,a"inin" artificial di,ensions alon" +hich thin"s co*ld !e "rasped in the process of pro!le, solvin". 2at*res in the editations, ho+ever, are no lon"er aspects or a)es alon" +hich thin"s can !e co,pared, eval*ated, and arrayed, !*t nat*res in the sense that >*le % had dis,issed: nat*res as the essences of e)istin" thin"s. &he later philosophy can nevertheless !e vie+ed as retainin" a cr*cial ele,ent of the Regulae's conception of nat*res as aspects. @spects are *sed in order to isolate essences, +hich, to !e precise, are :e)cept in the case of 0od; potentially e)istin" essences.O1?P &he editations in partic*lar sho+s ho+ one can distin"*ish the corporeal aspect fro, the noncorporeal aspect precisely !y attendin" to the ina!ility of the corporeal aspect to enco,pass or even to e)hi!it the aspect 6tho*"ht6. &his can !e reco"ni7ed only thro*"h the direct e)perience of act*al tho*"ht :in ,editation;, pree,inently in the act of do*!tin" the e)istence of everythin", even of the do*!t itself. &he potentially e)istin" essences ,*st !e enacted in co"itation, and in co"itation the ,ind is capa!le of co,parin" and distin"*ishin" +hat is si,ilar and +hat is different, tho*"h +itho*t the strict deter,ination of proportion that had !een the "oal of the Regulae. &he enact,ent of the co"ito, for e)a,ple, is vie+ed *nder the three aspects of e"o, tho*"ht, and !ein", +hich are nevertheless ine)trica!ly *nited in the e)perience of the act*ality. 1)plorin" this act*ality opens *p a ,ore distinct notion of the thinkin" aspect as it is +holly contained in the act of the thinker :distinct first of all fro, !ody, !*t secondarily distin"*ished into the different kinds or aspects of thinkin";, and the e)ploration of this act*al thinkin" and its tho*"hts opens *p the ne+ di,ension of its ina!ility to acco*nt for its o+n e)istence :*nder the aspect of ca*se;. &he ca*sal aspect then opens *p the ro*te to the e)perience of the necessity of the *nli,ited perfection of 0od as the only s*pport for the act*al thin" / have e)perienced ,yself to !e in the co*rse of ,editation.O1#P &h*s the kind of aspect*al analysis of thin"s introd*ced in the Regulae prod*ces a +ay of arrivin" at an e)perience of the synthesis of the aspects in realities :not in fictions ,ade *p !y co"itation;, and these syntheses :the thinkin" e"o, for e)a,ple; lead in t*rn to ne+ aspects that point to the *lti,ate synthesis of all, 0od. CGor certainly / *nderstand in ,any +ays that that Oidea of 0odP is not so,ethin" fictitio*s dependin" on ,y O1?P Co,pare +hat the Principles has to say a!o*t attri!*tes in pt. l, pars. %1A%5, @& D///@ ?FA?E. O1#P /n the intellect6s discovery that it is finite, and thro*"h this the reco"nition of posifive infinity, there is an analo"y to the po+er of the intellect in the Regulae : it is the only fac*lty capa!le of reco"ni7in" the positive tr*th e)pressed in ne"ation. ( ?%# (

co"itation, !*t the i,a"e of a tr*e and i,,*ta!le nat*reC :@& D// 65;. &hat Descartes called this idea an i,a"e is not s*rprisin" in vie+ of +hat he told 9o!!es, that 6idea6 indicates the for,s of the none)istent divine fac*lty of phantasia. 8ore si"nificant, it ,eans this: that the idea is like an i,a"e, an infor,in" of a perceptive po+er, that relia!ly refers to and derives fro, a synthesis that is nat*rally instit*ted, that is, a tr*e and i,,*ta!le nat*re. &he idea is to the nat*re as the i,a"e is to the corporeal reality. Both ideas and i,a"es are f*nda,ental looks or aspects of thin"s that !ear the likenesses of their ori"inals. &hat these aspects the,selves are s*scepti!le of a consistent and relia!le *npackin" of involve,ents and i,plications :ideas opened *p !y their aspects;, their compleBity of truth, is the s*rest ,ark of their !earin" rese,!lance to the correspondin" realities. Gor the ,at*re Descartes, tho*"ht is artic*lated !y ideas 4*st as i,a"ination is artic*lated !y fi"*ration, and all tho*"ht, havin" an idea and an o!4ect to +hich that idea refers :!y virt*e of its o!4ective reality the idea points !oth to its e)istence as an essence and to possi!le and real individ*al instantiations;, is intrinsically !iplanar-this in a sense even ,ore f*nda,ental than in the Regulae, +hich +as satisfied +ith a ,ore spec*lative, that is to say, hypothetical, !iplanarity.

C. I,A+INATION IN T0E ,EDITATIONS6 T0E ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY OF T0OU+0T

&he editations tells *s !oth that i,a"ination is not re3*ired for ,y essence, for the essence of ,y ,ind :@& D// E%;, and that it is in accordance +ith, proper to, Cconsentaneo*sC +ith ,y nat*re :@& D// 6F;. &here is no contradiction !eca*se of the precise 3*alifications ,ade and i,plied in the ter,s *sed. /,a"ination is not re3*ired for ,y essence, that is, ,y essence insofar as / a, a thinkin" thin" and Cinsofar as it OJ the force of i,a"inin"P differs fro, the force of *nderstandin".C Beca*se /, the ,editator, have seen that ,y thinkin" is distinctly conceiva!le +itho*t the ass*,ption of the e)istence of any real corporeal thin" in it or connected +ith it, and !eca*se / have ,ana"ed to think ,y !ein" :or possi!le nonA!ein"; deli!erately and prolon"edly in arrivin" at the tr*th of CS*,, e)isto,C / clearly and distinctly see that ,y thinkin" as thinkin" does not have any intrinsic, essential dependence on the corporeal. 9avin" later, in the Si)th 8editation, noted that i,a"inin" a chilia"on re3*ires an effort additional to that of conceivin" it intellect*ally, / clearly and distinctly kno+ that the po+er of i,a"inin" is not identical +ith the po+er of *nderstandin", that the t+o are separa!le in principle. /,a"ination is not essential to thinkin" as thinkin". <et i,a"inin" is so nat*ral to ,e as the !ein" / a, that there is nothin" in it rep*"nant to ,y essence as thinker= f*rther,ore, altho*"h this is not taken *p the,atically in the editations itself :see ( ?%F ( C@ppendi) to Gifth B!4ections and >eplies,C @& D// ?1#;, i,a"ination is cr*cial to ,e as a h*,an !ein", that is, as that *nion of !ody and so*l that, altho*"h it is strictly speakin" *nintelli"i!le to ,e, is constantly evidenced !y daily life. &h*s i,a"ination is not essential to ,y thinkin" as thinkin", !*t it is proper to ,y nat*re as a thinkin", !reathin", actin" h*,an !ein". &his nat*re is, of co*rse, the real, of +hat Descartes had in the Regulae called in"eni*,. &he Regulae ad directionem ingenii had investi"ated the kno+in" po+ers of the h*,an !ein", an investi"ation called the no!lest task for co"nition, a task that had to !e *ndertaken once in each person6s life. &he editations, altho*"h it appears *nder the "*ise of a ,etaphysics or first philosophy, takes on its ,etaphysical si"nificance precisely !y e)plorin" the capa!ilities and li,its of the sensitive and co"nitive po+ers. /ndeed, it is in essence a psycholo"ical, anthropolo"ical ,etaphysics, a ,etaphysics !ased in the direct evidence of the activities and receptivities of the h*,an !ein".

/n co,parison +ith the Regulae, ho+ever, the editations is less san"*ine a!o*t kno+led"e and +isdo,. &he Regulae had !een *ndertaken in the confidence that anythin" +e kno+ is kno+n +ith the sa,e certit*de as every other ite, of kno+led"e. 1ven tho*"h e)tended ded*ctions and en*,erations co*ld strain the capacities of h*,an in"eni*,, in principle all kno+in" +as e3*al in certit*de. &he editations, !y !e"innin" +ith skepticis,, introd*ces at the o*tset a criterion of differential d*!ita!ility-so,e thin"s are ,ore do*!tf*l than others-that s*""ests the e)istence of differential kno+a!ility as its inverse. Dependin" not so ,*ch on a net+ork of interrelated thin"s and nat*res as on a hierarchy of certainties, the editations esta!lishes 0od as ,ost kno+a!le of all, the self so,e+hat less so :and dependent on 0od;= least kno+a!le are sensations, +hich are ,ore for the sake of preservin" self than of tr*th. &his is not to say, ho+ever, that the Regulae is not in several +ays a prere3*isite to a editations Alike o*tco,e. Gor one thin", the Regulae esta!lished for Descartes the pri,acy of the pheno,enolo"ical space of the conscio*s appearances, and in the first instance a correlated co"nitive pri,acy of the space of i,a"ination. By decidin" to !ase kno+in" on the co,parison +ith respect to the ,ore, the less, and the sa,e of thin"s as they are "rasped !y the ,ind, he set o*t on the +ay of ideas that +as a !asic characteristic of his later philosophy, indeed of ,odern episte,olo"y. Second, the Regulae set *p strict criteria for kno+in" !y "ivin" pride of co"nitive place to the clear "rasp of thin"s in int*it*s and the derivative !*t nevertheless fo*ndational tho*"htA,otion of ded*ction. &hird, it raised the 3*estion :ans+ered positively there; of the co"nitive relevance of the senses and i,a"ination to kno+in". Go*rth, it c*l,inated in the post*lation of an o,nipresent active force in all co"nitive operations, the vis co"A ( ?%% ( noscens. @nd, fifth, it ca,e to the threshold of the ,etaphysical pro!le,, specifically over the iss*e of +hat nat*res are and +hether they are in thin"s in the sa,e +ay that they are in ,inds. &here is a si)th prere3*isite that has i,,ediate relevance to the 3*estion of the i,a"ination in the editations. &he Regulae had ar"*ed for the pri,acy of i,a"inative techni3*es in the process of kno+in", in the ,otion of tho*"ht= altho*"h the kno+in" force co*ld act on its o+n, as p*re intellect, any o!4ect of tho*"ht that in any +ay involved participation in a nat*re co*ld !e represented !y a proportionali7in" and seriali7in" ,athesis *niversalis. &he editations +o*ld see, to teach the nearAirrelevance of the i,a"ination to the ,ost profo*nd philosophical tasks. <et it is easy to *nderesti,ate the de"ree to +hich even the editations is favora!le to and dependent on the i,a"ination :even i,a"ination conceived in the narro+ sense as the capacity for entertainin" corporeal i,a"es;. /n the Regulae, i,a"ination +as the +ork of the kno+in" force in the phantasia or"an= it +as the dyna,ic prod*ction, reprod*ction, and transfor,ation of i,a"es. /f +e e,phasi7e this active character of i,a"ination, then the +ork of i,a"ination in the editations appears pervasive. /t is al,ost o!vio*s, once pointed o*t, that the entire Girst 8editation is an e)ercise in i,a"ination p*nct*ated !y insi"hts of intellect into +hat the e)ercise reveals. Descartes first recalls his sensations, ho+ they have +orked and failed. 9e conceives +hat it +o*ld ,ean to do*!t his physical presence sittin" !efore the fire !y Cdo*!lin"C his vie+ of it: he e)periences it, and he i,a"ines hi,self e)periencin" it as real altho*"h the reality is fallacio*s, for e)a,ple, !y i,a"inin" ho+ a ,ad,an ,i"ht e)perience the +orld. 9e recalls the *nreality of drea,s and there*pon rei,a"ines his e)perience as a drea,, then revie+s the contents of the drea, to see +hether so,e part of it re,ains s*!stantial. 9e i,a"ines a deceivin" 0od, alternatively a less than o,nipotent 2at*re, that deceives

hi, or ,akes hi, s*!4ect to error. Ginally he concl*des +ith the ,arvelo*s i,a"inary fiction of the ,ali"n de,on that devotes all its efforts to ,akin" hi, err. &here is indirect testi,ony in @drien Baillet6s 1691 !io"raphy of Descartes that not only s*pports takin" the Girst 8editation as i,a"inative !*t also s*""ests that the entire +ork is conceived accordin" to the ,odel of i,a"ination. @ccordin" to Baillet6s ,ar"inal note, Descartes6s close friend Cla*de Clerselier recorded in a ,e,oir so,ethin" told hi, !y his !rotherAinAla+, 9ectorAPierre Chan*t, +ho helped arran"e Descartes6s invitation to the co*rt of Z*een Christina of S+eden. Descartes Chad often e)plained in conversationC that he Chad never e,ployed !*t very fe9 hours per day on tho*"hts that occ*py the i,a"ination, and very fe9 hours per year on those that occ*py the *nderstandin" alone.C ( ?%6 ( 8. Chan*t referred the first tho*"hts to ,editation, for +hich 8. Descartes +anted, accordin" to hi,, one to "ive fe+ ho*rs per day= and the second to conte,plation, in +hich o*r philosopher did not dee, it necessary to e,ploy ,any ho*rs in an entire year, nor even in all one6s life. @ccordin" to this idea, 8. Descartes called the +orks of the i,a"ination ,editation, and those of the *nderstandin", conte,plation. :@& L ?$#= e,phasis in ori"inal; Chan*t6s report !ears ,ore than s*perficial rese,!lance to a passa"e in the ?5 K*ne 16F# letter to Princess 1li7a!eth, +hich rese,!lance stren"thens its credi!ility. /n that letter Descartes !e"ins !y assertin" that there are three kinds of pri,itive notions: those of so*l, those of !ody, and those of the *nion of the t+o. Bnly p*re *nderstandin" conceives so*l= !ody can C!e kno+n !y *nderstandin" alone, !*t ,*ch !etter !y *nderstandin" aided !y i,a"inationC= the pri,itive notions of the *nion of !ody and so*l are kno+n o!sc*rely !y *nderstandin", even +ith the help of i,a"ination, !*t they are kno+n Cvery clearly !y the senses.C 8etaphysical tho*"hts e)ercise p*re *nderstandin" and fa,iliari7e *s +ith so*l= ,athe,atics, e)ercisin" principally the i,a"ination, ena!les *s to for, very distinct notions of !ody. CGinally, it is in the *ses of life and ordinary conversations, and in a!stainin" fro, ,editatin" and st*dyin" thin"s that e)ercise the i,a"ination, that one learns to conceive the *nion of the so*l and the !ody.C 9e "oes on to assert that the chief r*le he has al+ays o!served in life is this: that / have never e,ployed !*t very fe+ ho*rs, per day, in tho*"hts that occ*py the i,a"ination, and very fe+ ho*rs, per year, in those that occ*py the *nderstandin" alone, and that / have "iven all the rest of ,y ti,e to the rela)ation of the senses and the repose of the spirit= / even co*nt a,on" the e)ercises of the i,a"ination all serio*s conversations and everythin" +hich re3*ires havin" attention. :@& /// 691A69#; &he t+o passa"es taken to"ether create an a,!i"*ity a!o*t i,a"ination6s role in ,editation. &he passa"e, in Descartes6s o+n +ords, fro, the letter to 1li7a!eth does not directly ali"n ,etaphysical tho*"hts +ith ,editations, !*t the ali"n,ent appears to !e s*""ested !y parallelis,. @fter assi"nin" :l; ,etaphysical tho*"hts and so*l to p*re *nderstandin", and :?; ,athe,atics and !ody to i,a"ination, he "ives the conception of the *nion of !ody and so*l to the senses, especially in the ordinary practices and conversations of life. 9e e)pressly e)cl*des fro, the latter :1; ,editatin" and :?; st*dyin" thin"s that e)ercise the i,a"ination. &he e)cl*sion of ,editation th*s see,s to correspond to an e)cl*sion of ,etaphysical tho*"hts, and the e)cl*sion of the st*dy of thin"s e)ercisin" the i,a"ination to an e)cl*sion of ,athe,atics. B*t if for Descartes it literally "oes +itho*t sayin" that conceivin" the *nion of !ody and so*l is not facilitated !y ,etaphysics, then it is *nlikely that ,editation corresponds to

( ?%E ( ,etaphysical tho*"hts. 8oreover, it is 4*st as easy to read Ca!stainin" fro, ,editatin" and st*dyin" thin"s that e)ercise i,a"inationC as ,eanin" that one ,*st a!stain fro, ,editatin" on those thin"s that e)ercise the i,a"ination as +ell as a!stain fro, st*dyin" the,. &his readin" is all the ,ore defensi!le in that Descartes calls serious conversation and everythin" re1uiring attention e)ercises of i,a"ination. /n that case the 6,etaphysical tho*"hts6 that e)ercise p*re *nderstandin" +o*ld refer to ,etaphysical tho*"hts as achieved and conte,plated :the o!4ects of @ristotle6s theoria;, rather than to the tho*"hts actively p*rs*ed !y a ,ind en"a"ed in a disc*rsive search for ,etaphysical tr*ths. Chan*t6s report as narrated !y Baillet ,ay th*s !e 3*ite acc*rate: 68editation6 +as *sed !y Descartes to indicate an e)ercise of the i,a"ination. &his +o*ld not !e an alto"ether e)traordinary thin" for an ed*cated and +ellAread ,an of the seventeenth cent*ry to say, for the +ork of the i,a"ination has lon" had a key role in the "reat ,editative traditions of .estern Christianity. /n the 8iddle @"es the cardinal for,*lation of the psycholo"y of ,editative and conte,plative practice ca,e fro, the School of St. Dictor in Paris, especially in the +ritin"s of 9*"h of St. Dictor and his s*ccessor, >ichard of St. Dictor. &heir teachin" +as advanced !y @3*inas in the C&reatise on Conte,plationC of the %umma theologiae, O1FP and it +as still canonical for the Kes*its of the late si)teenth and early seventeenth cent*ry as they developed their *nderstandin" of spirit*al e)ercises.O1%P 9*"h defined ,editation in the ,ost "eneral sense as a species of co"itation: Ca repeated co"itation that investi"ates the ,ode and the ca*se and the reason of every sin"le thin". 8ode: +hat it is. Ca*se: +hy it is. >eason: in +hat +ay it is.CO16P /n CDe ,odo dicendi et ,editandi,C 9*"h "ave a f*ller state,ent a!o*t ,editation and the specific role it plays in the O1FP %umma theolagiae, /lae /la, 33. 1E9A15?, esp. 3. 15$, art. #, o!4. 1 and ad 1. @3*inas cites approvin"ly >ichard6s state,ent that 6conte,plation is the rational so*l6s perspic*o*s and free !eholdin" Ocontuitus P of the thin"s !ein" e)a,ined= ,editation, ho+ever, is the rational so*l6s int*ition Ointuitus P occ*pied in the search for tr*th= +hereas co"itation is the rational so*l6s lookin" Orespectus P that is prone to +ander.C O1%P S.v. C8editation,C (istorisches #Rrtet4uch der Philosophie, %:96#= and Dictionnaire de spiritualit*, l:51#. &he latter sho+s that the participants in the Kes*it de!ate over the relation !et+een i,a"ination, co"itation, ,editation, and /"natian Capplication of the sensesC for the ,ost part si,ply accepted the Dictorine fra,e+ork as a "iven. Gor a disc*ssion of the nat*re of Kes*it spirit*ality and the role of i,a"ination therein, cons*lt @ntonio &. De 2icolas, Po9ers of Imagining: Ignatius de &oy ola. A Philosophical (ermeneutic of Imagining through the !ollected #orks of Ignatius de &oyola 9ith a translation of these 9orks, fore+ord !y Patrick 9eelan, S.K. :@l!any: State University of 2e+ <ork Press, 1956;. O16P 9*"h of St. Dictor, CDe ,editatione,C in %iB "puscules %pirituels, ed. >o"er Baron, So*rces Chr Stiennes, no. 1%%, S Srie des &e)tes 8onasti3*es d6Bccident, no. ?5 :Paris: 1ditions d* Cerf, 1969;, FF. /t appears in 8i"ne, Patroiogiae &atinae, 1E6: 99#A995, *nder the title CDe ,editando se* ,editandi artificio.C ( ?%5 ( "eneral econo,y of psychic activity, 3*ite apart fro, any specific o!4ect, reli"io*s or other+ise. Co"itation is +hen the ,ind is passin"ly to*ched !y the notion of thin"s, +hen the thin" itself is presented i,,ediately to the rational so*l !y its i,a"e, either co,in" in !y sense or arisin" fro, ,e,ory. 8editation is the assid*o*s as +ell as sa"acio*s reconsideration of

co"itation, strivin" to e)plain so,ethin" o!sc*re, or pro!in" to penetrate so,ethin" hidden. Conte,plation is the rational so*l6s perspicacio*s and free int*ition Oint*it*sP into thin"s needin" e)a,ination that are diff*sed all a!o*t.O1EP /n this passa"e ,editation is ,ore than 4*st a species of co"itation. /t stands inter,ediate !et+een co"itation and conte,plation. Co"itation and ,editation are alike in !ein" disc*rsive po+ers of the rational so*l or ,ind :ani,*s;= conte,plation is i,,ediately apprehensive :int*itive;. @ll three stand in relation to the central ,anifold of sensory and ,e,orative e)perience. Co"itation !e"ins +ith the sensory and ,e,orative i,a"es of thin"s, in the presence of +hich the ,ind is to*ched !y a notion :or concept;= reconsideration of these co"itations +ith the ai, of discovery constit*tes ,editation= and the reco"nition of so,ethin" f*nda,entally *nifyin" or pervadin" the ,anifold is conte,plation. &hese psycholo"ical conceptions +ere in fact i,plicitly rooted in the !asic psychophysiolo"y of the internal senses and the *se of the i,a"ination !y intellect in !oth its disc*rsive practice :ratio; and its i,,ediate apprehensions :intellection;. >ichard of St. Dictor, +ho follo+ed 9*"h6s psycholo"y closely, +as, even ,ore than 9*"h, the ackno+led"ed ,aster of the theory of conte,plation, especially in the +orks -en7amin a7or and -en7amin inor. /n the -en7amin a7or, he re,arks that Cco"itation OisP fro, i,a"ination, ,editation fro, disc*rsive reason, conte,plation fro, intelli"ence.CO15P &ho*"ht, cogitation, !e"ins +ith the i,a"e= the i,a"e6s presence passin"ly to*ches the ,ind +ith notions. &his +o*ld appear to !e at least a co,ponent of the classic f*nction of the vis co"itativa in renderin" 4*d",ents a!o*t partic*lar thin"s, that is, in ,ovin" fro, ,ere re"istration of sensations to 4*d",ents like C&hat6s a tree.6 8editation then rec*rs to these i,a"eAind*ced co"itations in a disc*rsive search for tr*th. Ginally, the O1EP CDe ,odo dicendi et ,editandi,C Patrologiae &atinae 1E6: 5E%A55$= see p. 5E9. &he Dictionnaire de spiritualit*, 1$:91?, does not re"ard this +ork as 9*"h6s, !*t there is an al,ost identical state,ent in the certainly a*thentic C2ineteen 9o,ilies on 1cclesiastes,C Patrologiae &atinae 1E%: l 16A11E :+here, in partic*lar, intuitus is replaced !y contuitus ;. O15P 8i"ne, Patrologiae &atinae, 196: 66. Bn the roles >ichard ascri!es to i,a"ination in the different sta"es of ,editation and conte,plation, see >ay,ond D. DiLoren7o, C/,a"ination as the Girst .ay to Conte,plation in >ichard of St. Dictor6s 6Ben4a,in 8inor,6C in edievalia et (umanistica, n.s., no. 11. ed. Pa*l 8a*rice Clo"an, EEA95 :&oto+a, 2.K.: >o+,an and Littlefield, 195?;. ( ?%9 ( ,ind is !lessed +ith a penetratin" look that reco"ni7es *nity in the diversity of the ,editated co"itations. @ltho*"h 9*"h and >ichard had theolo"ical p*rposes, their for,*lation of the psycholo"y of i,a"ination, co"itation, ,editation, and conte,plation is perfectly "eneral, tr*e for all o!4ects of the ,ind. /n this sense, Descartes6s Girst 8editation is 3*ite strictly ,editational.O19P Gor e)a,ple, !y callin" to ,ind i,a"es of ,yself seated !y a fire, +earin" a +inter dressin" "o+n, holdin" a piece of paper in ,y hands-i,a"es that have to*ched the ,ind +ith notions-/ reflect and reAreflect on ho+ / or anyone else ,i"ht do*!t that these thin"s, ,y hands, ,y +hole !ody are here. /n the co*rse of this / "ain vario*s insi"hts into the so*rce of ,y conviction= other notions occ*r to ,e, stirred !y other i,a"es and co"itations :C9o+ +o*ld a ,ad,an 4*d"e all thisQC;, *ntil it occ*rs to ,e that in sleep so,ethin" happens al,ost every ni"ht that is 3*ite si,ilar to the ,ad e)perience as / have i,a"ined it. @nd so forth. .orries over the certainty of ,athe,atics of co*rse co*nt as !oth ,editation and i,a"ination, since for Descartes ,athe,atics and the essence of ,ateriality e)ercise the i,a"ination in p*rest for,.

.e perhaps !e"in to see +hy Descartes told 1li7a!eth that serio*s conversations and ,atters re3*irin" attention co*nt a,on" e)ercises of O19P Gor so,e key interpretations of Descartes6s editations as havin" roots in reli"io*s traditions, see 1tienne 0ilson, )tudes sur le role de la pens*e m*di*vale dans la formation du syst*me cart*sien, 1t*des de Philosophie 8SdiSvale, no. 1# :Paris: K. Drin, 19#$;, 156A15E= Pierre 8esnard, CL6@r!re de la sa"esse,C in Descartes, Cahiers de >oya*,ont, Philosophie, no. ?, ##6A#F9 :Paris: 1ditions de 8in*it, 19%E;, and the disc*ssion follo+in" !et+een 1. .. Beth and 8artial 0*ero*lt, pp. #%$A#%9= @,Slie Bksen!er" >orty, ed., )ssays on Descartes' ' editations5 :Berkeley, Los @n"eles, and London: University of California Press, 1956;, especially the first three essays: >orty6s C&he Str*ct*re of Descartes6 editations5 :pp. 1A?$;, L. @ryeh 'os,an6s C&he 2aive 2arrator: 8editation in Descartes6 editations C :pp. ?1AF#;, and 0ary 9atfield6s C&he Senses and the Gleshless 1ye: &he 8editations as Co"nitive 1)ercisesC :pp. F%AE9;= and Bradley >n!id"e, CDescartes6s editations and Devotional 8editations,C 'ournal of the (istory of Ideas %1, no. 1 :199$;: ?EAF9. Gor ,ore "eneral reflections on the ,edieval and early ,ode, *se of i,a"ination for ,editative p*rposes, see David Greed!er", The Po9er of Images: %tudies in the (istory and Theory of Response :Chica"o: University of Chica"o Press, 1959;, 161A191.X9>Y &here is also a s,all !ody of literat*re on do*!t as an e)ercise of i,a"ination. 1specially i,portant are De!ra B. Ber"offen, CCartesian Do*!t as 8ethodolo"y: >eflective /,a"ination and Philosophical Greedo,,C in Greedo,, ed. 0eor"e G. 8cLean, Proceedin"s of the @,erican Catho lic Ph ilosophical @ssociation %$ :19E6;: 156A19%= and Bernd >ath,ann, CL6/,a"ination et le do*te: 1ssai s*r la "enRse de la penske cartSsienne,C Papers on Grench SeventeenthACent*ry Literat*re 5, no. 1% :1951;: %EAE#. Gor an a*thoritative, standard interpretation of i,a"ination in the 8editations, see 8artial 0*ero*lt, Descartes6 Philosophy /nterpreted accordin" to the Brder of >easons, trans. >o"er @rie+. ? vols. :8inneapolis: University of 8innesota Press, 195FA195%;, ?: ?9A##. Gor an analysis of co,petin" trends and innovations in the *nderstandin" of ,editation in early seventeenthAcent*ry Grance, see 8ino Ber"a,o, L6@nato,ia dell6ani,a: Da Granhois de Sales a GSnelon :Bolo"na: /l8*lino, 1991;. ( ?6$ ( i,a"ination. &hro*"ho*t his career Descartes had *nderstood ,athe,atics as pree,inently the ,athe,atics of proportion, and his *niversal ,athe,atics +as conceived as !ased in the strictly proportional participation of thin"s in nat*res :in the ,at*re philosophy, the participation +as li,ited to the nat*re e)tension and its proper ,odes= in the earlier philosophy, he had conceived the nat*res ,ore !roadly;. /n so,e of his initial enco*nters +ith the po+er of i,a"ination, ho+ever, for e)a,ple, in his drea,s of 1$A11 2ove,!er 1619 and in the i,a"ery of poets, he reco"ni7ed an intellect*al *se of corporeal thin"s to fi"*re spirit*al thin"s: sy,!ols, analo"ies, intellect*al i,a"es. &his intellect*al *se +as analo"ical to the *se of fi"*res to conceive corporeal thin"s. Serio*s conversation and st*dy, +hich certainly descri!e the Girst 8editation, especially insofar as it is a conversation of the ,editator +ith hi,self, appear to !e a lo"ical e)tension fro, the intellect6s *se of i,a"es to its *se of +ords. &his e)tension +o*ld have !een facilitated !y Descartes6s reconception of the pro!le, of the possi!le rese,!lance of i,a"e and i,a"ed aro*nd 16#$ :and e)pressed in !oth &e onde and the Dioptrics ; in ter,s of the !asic nonrese,!lance of +ords to their o!4ects. 2evertheless, +ords s*,,on to ,ind vario*s kinds of fi"*res and ideas, and in the Regulae, Descartes had introd*ced the *se of letters to stand for i,a"es. &herefore serio*s conversation and st*dy can !e conceived as a kind of i,a"inin" ,ore co,,onplace than that of "eo,etry and poetry, as the ,ost fre3*ently occ*rrin" for, of disc*rsive reason applied to the f*ll ran"e of h*,an concerns. /f Descartes conceived the, as i,a"inative !y a kind of analo"y, it is not the first ti,e, nor +ill it !e the last, that +e catch hi, in this

type of ar"*,ent.

D. *ILL5 I,A+INATION5 DOU-T6 +RASPIN+ T0E O-<ECT OF T0OU+0T

1veryone kno+s that the editations !e"ins +ith do*!t, or rather +ith the ,editator6s reflection that he has taken false thin"s for tr*e, and that this !eco,es a reason for +onderin" a!o*t the fir,ness of the rest of his kno+led"e. /n "eneral, the ,editator ,otivates his do*!t not !y anythin" intrinsic to a partic*lar e)perience or ,e,ory :i.e., there is not a C,arkC attendin" e)perience that i,,ediately si"ns it as tr*e; !*t !y reflectin" that he has 4*d"ed the sa,e thin" differently accordin" to different considerations: for e)a,ple, the !*ildin" that fro, a distance looked ro*nd t*rns o*t to !e s3*are close *p. @ltho*"h +e ordinarily ass*,e that the closeA*p look that contradicts the distant one is veridical, all that ,atters for ,otivatin" do*!t is that +e reco"ni7e there are contradictory, tho*"h each in its o+n +ay apparently 4*stified, 4*d",ents a!o*t the sa,e thin". ( ?61 ( /n 9*"h of St. Dictor6s tripartite sche,e, these openin" ,oves of the Girst 8editation are 3*ite clearly ,editation, that is, a reflection on or reconsideration of tho*"hts :co"itationes; arisin" either directly fro, the +orld !y +ay of sense or indirectly !y +ay of ,e,ory. .hat +e have e)perienced in sense is no+ tho*"ht fro, the ne+ perspective of havin" do*!ts. &h*s the Girst 8editation is co"itatively !iplanar. Perhaps it is even ,*ltiplanar, if the rec*rsion of co"itation to +hat it has previo*sly tho*"ht al+ays introd*ces a ne+ plane :th*s one ,i"ht rec*rsively +onder a!o*t the do*!t a!o*t the shape of the distant to+er;. Gor no+, ho+ever, +e can !e satisfied +ith 4*st the t+o planes. Let *s foc*s ,ore intently to see +hat is at iss*e. S*ppose at this ,o,ent yo* are "a7in" o*t a +indo+ at a distant !*ildin", a to+er on the hori7on. &here is a ha7e, so that aerial perspective !l*rs the sharpness of detail. <o* drive past that to+er every day on the +ay to +ork, so yo* kno+ it has, say, a he)a"onal cross section. .hile "a7in" at it no+ yo* +onder +hy it looks the +ay it does and str*""le to recall its appearance on !ri"ht, clear days +itho*t ha7e. <o* try to s*,,on *p a !it of yo*r colle"e physics to see +hether there is so,e principle that can e)plain +hy +hat is really an"*lar looks ro*nded, and yo* try to i,a"ine scenarios not previo*sly e)perienced-at least not as far as yo* can re,e,!er. /t see,s to ,e pheno,enolo"ically ri"ht to say that in this ,ental activity +e are directly e)periencin" the !iplanarity of tho*"ht-or, to p*t it in ter,s appropriate to this st*dy, the fre3*ently shiftin" !iplanarity of the co"itative process. .hile yo* are lookin" at the hori7on yo* are also +onderin", that is, ,editatin", and in conscio*sness the sense perception and the +onderin" are takin" place at different levels. /t is diffic*lt to hold too ,any different thin"s in ,ind at different levels, ho+ever. Gor e)a,ple, yo* can think a!o*t the vie+ fro, *p close as yo* look into the distance, !*t at that ,o,ent the do*!tin" is displaced !y a co,parison. &he sit*ation is perhaps triplanar no+, +ith the do*!tin" thinker callin" to ,ind the past scene a"ainst the !ack"ro*nd of the present scene. B*t here +e ,i"ht keep in ,ind the 4*stice of the ad,onition of the Regulae to li,it one6s in"eni*, to t+o thin"s at a ti,e. Perhaps keepin" three planes si,*ltaneo*sly in vie+ e)ceeds o*r ordinary capacities= perhaps the apparent triplicity is the res*lt of a rapidly s+itchin" attention rather than a "en*ine copresence. /f yo* close yo*r eyes and co,pare a ,ore recent +ith a ,ore re,ote scene, so that the t+o of the, are apparently placed into a sin"le plane, and then try to i,a"ine yet a third scene, it is pro!a!ly not possi!le to attend to all three at once, and even the si,*ltaneo*s i,a"inin" of 4*st t+o can !e fra*"ht +ith diffic*lty. /n each of these cases, at least t+o of the fo*r aids to kno+led"e cited !y the Regulae :sense, i,a"ination, ,e,ory, intellect; are !ein" e,ployed.

( ?6? ( /f +e perfor, the kind of activity / have !een descri!in", +e +ill act*ally !e en"a"ed in ,editation in the traditional sense of the ter,. @ltho*"h it is an activity of tho*"ht that calls on ,ore than i,a"ination in the narro+est sense of pict*rin" corporeal thin"s, it does fall +ithin the !roader notion characteristic of Descartes6s early philosophy. @nd certainly the s*!4ect ,atter of the entire Girst 8editation, +hich "oes as far as do*!tin" ,athe,atical tr*ths :and to*chin" on the notion of 0od and po+erf*l spirits, tho*"h these are not the,selves so ,*ch s*!4ect to do*!t as to ,ethodical *se;, falls +ithin the p*rvie+ of i,a"ination. &he province of the Girst 8editation is therefore the real, of the i,a"ina!le, and the ,editation necessarily involves s*,,onin" into i,a"ination all i,a"ina!le thin"s and tryin" to conceive-here, to i,a"ine really and concretely-+ays in +hich they can !e do*!ted. 8oreover, act*ally *ndertakin" ,editation, as opposed to readin" and 4*d"in" the propositions that the ,editatin" narrator affir,s, helps clarify +hy the editations !ears its title. 8editation is an intensive, prolon"ed act of thinkin"-one ,i"ht say Cco"itationC in the !road sense-directed to+ard insi"ht into *nifyin" tr*ths ordinarily o!sc*red !y the variety of the thin"s r*n thro*"h in disc*rsive tho*"ht. /n an @ristotelian vein, one ,i"ht say that ,editation is the con4*rin" of phantas,s that ena!le one to attain the species that ,akes thin"s properly intelli"i!le. &o "o on in this vein, one can add that thinkin" is i,possi!le +itho*t this kind of ,ental disc*rs*s. &he 3*estion for a tr*e reader of the editations is +hether this +ay of conceivin" the +ork fits Descartes6s intentions. /f Descartes is interpreted as a te)t!ook rationalist, the ans+er +o*ld !e no. &hat is, the proper o!4ects of sense and i,a"ination are not intrinsic to the essence of the thinkin" thin", and so thinkin" +itho*t i,a"es or phantas,s ,*st !e possi!le. &he pre,ier e)a,ple +o*ld !e C/ think, therefore / a,.C 2o i,a"es, no phantas,s are necessary for reco"ni7in" the tr*th of this assertion= in fact, i,a"es only "et in the +ay of seein" that its tr*th rises a!ove thinkin" in i,a"es. &he ar"*,ent see,s fa*ltless. <et there are several reasons to !e *neasy +ith it. Bne is the very lan"*a"e in +hich this first tr*th, that +hich the ,editator enco*nters in its f*ll evidence, is co*ched. &he editations itself does not *se the phrase Cco"ito, er"o s*,.CO?$P >ather, it approaches this first do*!tAresistant tr*th !y recapitulating the tho*"hts of the Girst 8editation. &he Second 8editation does not si,ply contin*e= it repeats the process of the Girst. C/ +ill ,ake an effort and atte,pt once ,ore the sa,e path that / entered into yesterday, !y re,ovin" na,ely all that +hich O?$P &hey of co*rse appear in the Latin translation of the Discourse :1"o co"ito, er"o s*,, @& D/ %%5= cf. the Grench at p. #?: ie pense, donc ie s*is; and the Principles of Philosophy :@& D9U E;. ( ?6# ( ad,its even a ,ini,*, of do*!t, no less than if / had fo*nd it to !e co,pletely falseC :@& D// ?F;. .hat follo+s is a dialo"*e of the ,ind +ith itself as it tries to p*t the testi,ony of appearances o*t of co,,ission. &he ,editator s*pposes that everythin" he sees is false and +hatever ,e,ory presents is deceitf*l= he i,a"ines that he does not have senses and that !ody, fi"*re, e)tension, ,otion, and place are chi,eras. &he intent is not to e,pty the ,ind of these thin"s !*t to s*spend their ordinary validity. &hey re,ain present to conscio*sness in their ine)ha*sti!le variety !*t are red*ced to ,ere appearances. &hey are not ann*lled, !*t only their po+er to pers*ade the ,editator that they :or their correlates; act*ally e)ist. &he ,ind *ses any tricks it can to *nder,ine their ordinary testi,ony, incl*din" co*ntervailin" evidence, ad hoc hypotheses, and the fiction of the ,ali"n "eni*s. &he ,ethod of the ,editator is profo*ndly rec*rsive. @ppearances are do*!ted, they reassert their

force, they are do*!ted +ith a ne+ e)pedient. &he ,editator +onders +hether there is so,ethin" he has not tho*"ht of yet, so,ethin" resistant to do*!t= perhaps a 0od, C+ho sends into ,e these sa,e co"itations,C that is, the very sensations, i,a"inin"s, and ideas that he has !een do*!tin" :@& D// ?F;. B*t perhaps the ,editator is the a*thor of these co"itations instead. &his ,akes hi, so,ethin", does it notQ <et he has already denied that he has senses and !ody. /s he not, ho+ever, so deeply !o*nd to !ody and sense that he cannot e)ist +itho*t the,Q CB*t / have pers*aded ,yself that there is nothin" at all in the +orld, no heaven, no earth, no ,inds, no !odies.C @"ain and a"ain the appearances of sense and i,a"ination reassert their evidence, tho*"h +ith everAlessenin" force of pers*asion. &his is the rec*rsively co"itative, the meditative sit*ation par e)cellence: the atte,pt to think thro*"h, to see a *nity in, a ,anifold of appearances. @s the CsynopsisC of the editations descri!es it, Cin the second O,editationP, the ,ind that, *sin" its proper li!erty, s*pposes all that not to e)ist, the e)istence of +hich can in the least !e do*!ted, notices this cannot happen +itho*t it itself e)istin" in the ,eanti,eC :@& D// 1?;. @"ain it is clear that the ,anifold of appearances is not p*t o*t of operation= rather, the ,ind co,es to see that in all these appearances there is so,ethin" that the corporeal, sensory, i,a"inal real, cannot acco*nt for. @s the i,,ediate contin*ation of the CSynopsisC p*ts it, this discovery of self perd*rin" thro*"h the e)perience of the do*!ta!le Cis of the hi"hest *tility, !eca*se in this +ay it OJ the ,indP easily distin"*ishes +hatever pertains to itself, that is, to the intellect*al nat*re, and +hatever to !odyC :@& D// 1?;. .hat is ordinarily the foc*s for all tho*"ht, the e)periences of sense and i,a"ination, !eco,es the "ro*nd a"ainst +hich intellect tr*ly reco"ni7es itself. .hat +as foc*s !eco,es !ack"ro*nd for a ne+ point of foc*s. .itho*t this !ack"ro*nd there can !e no ne+ foc*s or ( ?6F ( fore"ro*nd= +itho*t the plane of sense there can !e no plane of intellect. Bnly after the persistent, s*ccessf*l atte,pts at do*!tin" the tr*th of sense and i,a"ination have prepared the +ay can the atte,pts to do*!t the tr*th of self, of C/ a,, / e)ist,6 !e reco"ni7ed as fail*res. .itho*t do*!t, therefore, / also a,, if he OJ the deceiverP deceives ,e= and let hi, deceive as ,*ch as he can, nevertheless he can never ,ake it happen that / a, nothin" as lon" as / shall !e co"itatin" that / a, so,ethin". So that, all thin"s havin" !een pondered s*fficiently, and pondered even ,ore Oo,ni!*s satis s*per3*e pensitatisP, finally this prono*nce,ent is to !e esta!lished, / a,, / e)ist, is necessarily tr*e, every ti,e it is proffered !y ,e, or conceived !y the ,ind. :@& D// ?%; &he tr*th of this state,ent is not self Aevident, !*t rather the act of ponderin", of the intensive co"itation of everythin" that has !een considered previo*sly, ,akes the tr*th of the co"ito appear. &he ,ind Ct*rns a+ayC fro, distractin" factors like sensation and i,a"ination +itho*t for"ettin" or for"oin" the,, 4*st as the intellect of the Regulae had to t*rn fro, the i,a"e of e)tended !ody +itho*t for"ettin" it to deter,ine that e)tension is not !ody. /t is only in the conte)t of co"itatin" everythin" in vie+ of the possi!ility of total none)istence that it is possi!le to reco"ni7e that C/ think, / e)istC is tr*e every ti,e / think it. Bne ,i"ht add*ce as co*nterevidence to ,y clai, the stat*s that C/ a,, / e)istC takes on, once the Gifth 8editation "ives +arrant to the ,e,ory of +hatever +e have once clearly and distinctly kno+n: predicatin" tr*th of the state,ent then no lon"er re3*ires a preparatory ,editation. B*t of co*rse ,e,ory cannot help *nless one has at least once in one6s life tried to do*!t the assertion and discovered its do*!tAresistance. &he criterion of do*!ta!ility esta!lished in the Girst 8editation is that of act*ally findin" a relevant +ay of do*!tin". &o one vie+ of a to+er yo* oppose another vie+, and reco"ni7e

that any deliverance of the senses ,i"ht +ell !e contradicted !y another= to the certainties of everyday life yo* can oppose the e)periences of ,adness and of drea,in"= to the reflection that at least the ele,ents or co,ponents of thin"s ,*st s*rely e)ist yo* can oppose the possi!ility that h*,an !ein"s are created falli!le or that there ,i"ht !e a !ein" that co*ld present appearances +itho*t a correspondin" reality. /t is only a"ainst the !ack"ro*nd of these reasons for do*!tin"- do*!t itself is a kind of co"itation, disc*rsive thinkin" fro, ite, to ite,, if only fro, thinkin" to e)istence and !ackthat co"itation can reco"ni7e the resistance that the co"ito offers to do*!t. /t is si,ply i,possi!le to think and at the sa,e ti,e to take the thinkin" as none)istent. Bne can of co*rse apply a do*!tin" f*nctor to the proposition C/ a,, / e)istC :let D represent do*!tin", and p the proposition, then D:p; stands for do*!tin" the proposition;, !*t that is not act*al do*!t. 2or is the do*!t of the ( ?6% ( no,inalist, +ho to every assertion co*nterposes C0od co*ld ,ake it other+ise.C &hese are pretenses of do*!t, not the real thin" in its concrete act*ality. 0en*ine do*!t re3*ires the !iplanarity of entertainin" the phantas, or idea and atte,ptin" to stand !ack fro, it in do*!t. Bne either s*cceeds in this standin" !ack-then the do*!t tri*,phs, and one has placed the do*!ted appearances at a "reater distance fro, the core of one6s e)perience-or, as in the case of the co"ito, it fails !eca*se one finds that one cannot act*ally s*cceed in steppin" o*t of the e)istence of oneself thinkin". &he for, of the ar"*,ent in the editations is, / !elieve, p*rer than that of the Discourse and Principles for,*la C/ think therefore / a,,C insofar as it is ,ore neatly ali"ned +ith the doctrines of int*it*s and nat*res fro, the Regulae. @s one clearly and attentively "rasps one6s c*rrent thinkin" of thin"s, one reco"ni7es that !ein" al+ays acco,panies the act of thinkin" :recall that in the Regulae it is al+ays !est to have an act*al instance of +hat is in 3*estion !efore the ,ind6s eye, and even the !ody6s eye, +hen that is possi!le;. .e concl*de that the Second 8editation is as ,*ch a !iplanar, ,editative co"itation as the Girst :+e have already reco"ni7ed that the end of the Second 8editation, +hich reflects on the piece of +a), is ,editational, even i,a"inatively ,editational;. .e ,ay still !e inclined to think that +e need to "o !eyond i,a"ination in order to co,e to the insi"ht of the co"ito, ho+ever. &hat is correct as far as it "oes !*t is nevertheless ,isleadin" if it is taken to i,ply that i,a"es ,*st !e eli,inated. @s early as the Regulae, Descartes had asserted only that one ,i"ht try to keep the i,a"ination as ,*ch as possi!le fro, any deter,inate i,a"es. &he &hird 8editation !e"ins +ith a reflection that one needs the hypothesis of the falsity of the i,a"es of corporeal thin"s !eca*se it is not possi!le to rid one6s ,ind of the,.O?1P Descartes is not presentin" so,ethin" like Kohn of the Cross6s first ni"ht of the so*l, the death of the so*l to e)ternal and internal sensi!ility, !*t rather havin" *s see in every activity of the ,ind the nat*re thinkin" :co"itation;. Bne does not "et rid of i,a"es !*t i,a"ines that nothin" correspondin" to the, e)ists, in accordance +ith the hypothesis of the de,on. Bne thinks thro*"h i,a"es !*t treats the, as sho+ rather than as reality. O?1P >*le 1? had noted that +hen the intellect is concerned +ith ,atters not corporeal and +ith no rese,!lance to the corporeal Cthe i,a"ination ,*st, as fa) as possi!le, !e divested of every distinct i,pression,C +hereas sensation is to !e closed off :@& L F16;. &hat is, it is strictly speakin" not possi!le to close off i,a"ination. /n co,parison the editations is ,ore insistent a!o*t the inevita!le contin*ity and o,nipresence of i,a"ination in ,ental life= i,a"ination cannot !e p*t o*t of action, so it ,*st !e disar,ed !y the co"itative po+er of do*!t. ( ?66 (

&he point / a, insistin" on is that one co,es to the tr*th of the co"ito +itho*t p*ttin" the i,a"ination o*t of operation: the intellect is s*ch that it sees thro*"h the appearances to a different kind of e)istence, the e)istence not of the o!4ects !*t of the thinkin". /t does this !y a kind of ne"ation that in the sense of the Regulae is intellect actin" on its o+n. /n >*le 1F, Descartes ar"*ed that the proposition C1)tension is not :identical +ith; !odyC is kno+n !y the intellect alone, or !y the intellect avertin" itself fro, any partic*lar fi"*res in the or"an of i,a"ination. /n the Second 8editation, C&hinkin" is nothin", it does not e)istC is so,ethin" that co*ld only !e ad4*d"ed !y intellect alone, avertin" itself fro, all partic*larities of its partic*lar ,odes and tho*"hts. /n the strict sense, the Second 8editation descri!es i,a"ination as the conte,plation of the fi"*re of a corporeal thin" :nihil aliud est imaginari 1uam rei corporeal figuram, seu imaginem, contemplari = @& D// ?5;. @t @& D// ?9, co"itation is said to for, the i,a"es of corporeal !odies. 2ote the distinction: it is the activity of thinkin" or co"itation that for,s the i,a"es :i,a"ination as prod*ctive i,a"ination;, !*t seein" i,a"es as s*ch is an act of i,,ediate apprehension, th*s called conte,plation. .hen / look at a fi"*re of a corporeal thin" as the fi"*re of a corporeal thin", / a, i,a"inin" in the narro+est, apprehensive sense of the ter,. &he ,ind adds to this ,ere apprehension of i,a"es a dyna,ic po+er of not restin" +ith a sin"le i,a"e, +hich leads co"itation and i,a"ination to for, ne+ fi"*res and to ,ove fro, one to another. B*t if there +ere only the apprehension of corporeal fi"*res, the recall of past sensations, and the variation, invol*tion, and evol*tion of i,a"es, +e +o*ld fall short of kno+led"e as Descartes *nderstands it. &his is the point of the piece of +a) e)a,ple. /,a"ination cannot enco,pass +hat the piece of +a) is, cannot co,prehend or even, properly speakin", perceive it. &hat is not to say that / have an a!stract idea apart fro, any i,a"e or sensation +hatsoever of the +a): +hen / have its i,a"e or sensation present in ,ind, / can perceive or co,prehend the +a) not !y virt*e of the partic*lar act or i,a"e in the pineal "land, nor !y virt*e of any finite n*,!er of variations in i,a"ination or sensation, !*t only !y a po+er of ,ind that sees past the diversity of all real and possi!le appearances to the +a) as +a). &hat sa,e po+er is also a!le to see thro*"h the i,a"e of the +a) to the presence of the perceiver.

E. CO+ITATION AND T0E O,NIPRESENCE OF *ILL

/n the last analysis a dispassionate reader ,i"ht still +ant to concl*de that one ,*st !e+are of Coveri,a"inali7in"C the editations and the later philosophy of Descartes. So, for e)a,ple, one ,i"ht conceive the co"ito as indeed proceedin" ,editatively thro*"h the co"itations of sensation and ( ?6E ( i,a"es and risin" to the fi"*res of intellect*al i,a"ination :like the e)pedient of the po+erf*l de,on; !*t insist finally that the ,o,ent of evidence ,*st !rin" +ith it the co,plete 3*iescence of i,a"ination. /f one ,eans !y 3*iescence that no partic*lar i,a"e needs to !e i,a"ined, and that any specific fi"*re in phantasia co*ld only te,pt *s to foc*s on its i,a"inal character rather than on the presence of thinkin"A!ein", then that is 3*ite ri"ht. B*t, !y contrast, one cannot de,and the 3*iescence of co"itation, for it is precisely in and d*rin" the reiterated atte,pts to do*!t one6s o+n e)istence that the tr*th of the thinkin"A!ein" shines thro*"h. Bne has prepared the +ay for this !y s*spendin" the reality clai,s of all appearances +itho*t ann*llin" the appearances per se. Bne looks at the,, re"ardless of their specific content and drift, as no ,ore than appearances. Bne foc*ses on the thinkin" here and no+-one6s very o+n thinkin"- and on +hat e)istence or, !etter, none)istence co*ld ,ean and sees that this present Cthin"C cannot !e conceived as not !ein". &here is nothin" in principle that prevents the ,ind fro, achievin" this end +ith corporeal i,a"es in ,ind, for one can see !eyond the partic*lar i,a"es to the presence of the co"itation. @nd if lan"*a"e is closely linked to i,a"ination-

certainly every ti,e / say to ,yself C/ a,, / e)istC a phantas, dependent on or"anic ,e,ory of lan"*a"e is evoked-then the ar"*,ent holds in an even stron"er sense. 1ach ti,e one tries to do*!t the lin"*istic for,*la one looks thro*"h it to its ,eanin". /t is this po+er of lookin"Athro*"h that is proper to intellect and that can in no +ay !e fo*nd in senation or i,a"ination taken apart fro, intellect. &o t*rn thin"s aro*nd, ho+ever, +itho*t sensation or i,a"ination there is no ,ental content to *nderstand. /n every case the intellect needs so,e presence to think a!o*t. &he *lti,ate test of ,y thesis is the case of the idea of 0od, +hich can have nothin" corporeal a!o*t it. <et even here, in the proofs of the e)istence of 0od, the core of ,y contention is still s*pported. &he &hird 8editation6s first proof, +hich ar"*es accordin" to +hat ca*ses ideas, and the second, +hich proceeds accordin" to +hat ca*ses the !ein" of a ,editator +ho is capa!le of havin" the ideas that appear to it :incl*din" that of 0od;, are !oth *nder,ined if +e take the, as eli,inatin" all previo*s sensations, i,a"inin"s, and other co"itations. .hat / do is not eli,inate the, !*t s*spend ,y confidence that they are so,ethin" o*tside of ,y conscio*sness= this is +hat introd*cin" the plane of the o!4ective reality of ideas acco,plishes. &he representative val*e the ideas have re"ardless of +hether they are for,ally reali7ed in a +or, apart fro, ,y conscio*sness is the topos that "ives the proof a content, since like anythin" else this o!4ective reality either is selfAs*!sistent :and th*s re3*ires no ca*se; or is ca*sed. / a, led to the idea of 0od :and then to his for,al e)istence; not !y t*rnin" a+ay fro, these thin"s !*t !y ,editatin" and seein" that the content of sensation and i,a"inin" leads ,e alon" a chain of present ( ?65 ( ca*sation that ,*st "o !eyond the sensi!le and the i,a"ina!le, and ,*st "o !eyond ,y finite sell /t is the chain of all this ,ental e)perience that provides the !ack"ro*nd :a planeH; a"ainst +hich the evidencin" of the tr*th can !e clearly and distinctly "rasped.O??P 1ven the last three ,editations, +hich often see, to !e ,ore treatiseAlike, retain a ,editational and at least 3*asiAi,a"inative character. Bne can certainly "rant that in the latter parts, especially in the Si)th 8editation, Descartes is intent on reachin" the fo*ndational notions of his physics, !*t his !asic "oal re,ains the sa,e: to consider thin"s and then attentively to reconsider the, in li"ht of a ne+ 3*estion. Gor e)a,ple, in the Gifth 8editation he reflects on ho+ certain ideas, ,athe,atical ones, involve a necessary entail,ent of properties that are not i,,ediately evident *ntil they are *npacked !y analysis= !y analo"y, he t*rns to the idea of 0od to sho+ that there is an entail,ent in the idea of hi, that is *nlike the entail,ent in any other idea, that of for,al e)istence. 9e is th*s seein" the idea of 0od a"ainst the !ack"ro*nd of ,athe,atical ideas, +hich are the least corporeal of all i,a"ina!le thin"s !*t nevertheless the essence of the corporeal. /n the Si)th 8editation there is a protracted ,editation on ho+ close i,a"ination can !rin" *s to the assertion of the e)istence of so,ethin" corporeal= then, a"ainst this !ack"ro*nd, Descartes sho+s that sensation can achieve the proof of +hat i,a"ination cannot, despite the fact that +e are so,eti,es deceived in o*r sensations :a reevocation of the Girst 8editation;. /n virt*ally every ,ove,ent of tho*"ht in the editations :as in the classical, pre,odern for, of ,editation;, Descartes res*,es his previo*s considerations and, +here possi!le, takes *p a"ain considerations that in one +ay or another +ere p*t aside or left inco,plete. &he editations has a sense of clos*re precisely in this ,editational character: the atte,pt to s*rvey, think thro*"h, and penetrate a field of e)perience. 9ave / not, ho+ever, ended !y conf*sin" i,a"ination and disc*rsive tho*"ht :ratio;Q 9ere a distinction !et+een the activity of tho*"ht, the reco"nitions in tho*"ht, and the o!4ects of tho*"ht is appropriate and helpf*l and is in fact intrinsic to the lo"ic of Descartes6s psycholo"y of the

O??P Descartes6s *nderstandin" of the te,porality of tho*"ht6s selfAevidencin" is ,*ch ,ore radically CpresentistC than the precedin" traditions of psycholo"y. &here is no validation of any kind of memory !efore the Gifth 8editation, so +hatever tr*th is esta!lished !efore that ,*st derive fro, the si,*ltaneo*s presence to ,ind of the different relevant planes. &he te,poral process of ,editation helps one rise to the ,o,ent +hen one is finally a!le to see past the conf*sin" ,ass of co"itations to their relationships in si,*ltaneity. Gor disc*ssions of te,porality and te,porally !o*nd attention in Descartes, see KeanA8arie Beyssade, &a Philosophie premiFre de Descartes: &e temps et la coh*rence de la m*taphysi1ue :Paris: Gla,,arion, 19E9;= and &ho,as 8. Carr, Kr., Descartes and the Resilience of Rhetoric: /arieties of !artesian Rhetorical Theory :Car!ondale: So*thern /llinois University Press, 199$;. ( ?69 ( h*,an !ein". &he t+oAi,a"inations note of the CCo"itationes privataeC conceived i,a"ination as the *se of corporeal fi"*ration, +hether the *lti,ate o!4ect +as corporeal or not. /n this sense, the Regulae *nderstood anythin" that needed to !e fi"*red o*t as *nder the s+ay of i,a"inative ,athesis *niversalis. /,a"ination +as in essence identified +ith disc*rsive thinkin" :recall the alternative *se of C,otion of co"itation6 and C,otion of i,a"inationC in >*le E;. /n the co*rse of thinkin" or ,editatin", one co,es to vario*s stoppin" points, that is, to insi"hts. /n the era of the Regale, Descartes +as +illin" to allo+ insi"hts :int*its; of ,ind or intellect and of the senses. &he editations CcorrectsC this: in the proper sense +e never int*it +ith the eyes, ears, or nose, !*t only +ith the perceptions of ,ind. /,a"ination and sensation the,selves as apprehensive po+ers are d*e, properly speakin", to the ,ind6s act of perception. Descartese incipient *nderstandin" of this, apparently in the late 16?$s, +as ,arked !y his for,al definition of i,a"ination, in >*le 1?, as the application of the kno+in" force to the phantasia or"an. &he difference !et+een i,a"ination and intellect +as therefore not so ,*ch !et+een t+o po+ers as !et+een t+o locations :or one location and the a!sence of location;= the kno+in" force +as at +ork in !oth, in the one case +ithin phantasia, in the other case +itho*t. /f instead of activity or the a"ent of activity +e e,phasi7e instead the *lti,ate o!4ect of tho*"ht, then one can 3*ite sharply distin"*ish i,a"inaAtional fro, noni,a"inational tho*"ht= the for,er deals +ith traces in the pineal "land, the latter +ith intellect*al ideas. &he trick, ho+ever, is to distin"*ish the *lti,ate o!4ect of tho*"ht fro, all inter,ediate o!4ects. /n Scholastic psycholo"y the phantas, is o,nipresent in thinkin" as an inter,ediate o!4ect= !eyond it lie !oth the a!stracted intelli"i!le species and the real thin" or thin"s to +hich the phantas, corresponds. Descartese psycholo"ical theori7in", !oth early and late, is in effect a protracted reflection on the stat*s of the phantas, as inter,ediary of tho*"ht. /n the CCo"itationes privataeC he reco"ni7ed a !iplanar po+er of fi"*rin" thin"s: an e)perience of !odies co*ld !e deepened !y conceivin" the, +ith fi"*res= in t*rn, one co*ld *se those !odies, or the ,ind6s "rasp of the,, to fi"*re spirit*al thin"s. /n the note concernin" the art of ,e,ory he +ent so far as to conceive of *nderstandin" as the evol*tion of one phantas, o*t of another accordin" to ca*se-a drea, of *nderstandin" that !e partially reali7ed in &e onde and the 0eometry. /n the Regulae, Descartes atte,pted to e)plain all kno+in" as takin" place thro*"h the ,ind6s "rasp on thin"s and identified different planes therein *nderlyin" the *niversal applica!ility of proportionali7in" ,athesis. /n the editations, Descartes starts !y tryin" to red*ce everythin" to a sin"le plane of conscio*sness- perhaps there is nothin" !eyond the p*re appearances-!*t discovers, !y the co,parative evidence of the ideas in their resistance to this red*ction, ( ?E$ (

that there are discrete planes +ithin conscio*sness :e."., sensation, i,a"ination, intellection, +ill; and in reality :0od, self, ,aterial reality;. &he editations is therefore the ,ost radical effort to e)plore +hat can !e kno+n !y +ay of fi"*res :taken in the very lar"est sense; "rasped !y and contained in the ,ind. &he ,ind is led a+ay fro, the senses, first to the po+er of i,a"ination-of callin" to ,ind, conte,platin", varyin", and interrelatin" i,a"es detached fro, i,,ediate sensation-and then to the po+er of seein" thro*"h and !eyond these, the po+er of intellection. B*t intellection, to +ork, al+ays re3*ires so,ethin", so,e o!4ect or presence that it can "rasp. Gor ,ost people ,ost of the ti,e, these are the thin"s and activities of everyday life, chiefly corporeal thin"s. Gor those +ho devote the,selves to investi"ation and st*dy, the ,ind re"rasps these thin"s in a certain detach,ent, for e)a,ple in the a!ility to reconceive thin"s *nder the for,s of ,athe,atics, and, risin" to a hi"her level, it "rasps the *niversal ,athesis !ehind all ,athe,atics. &hose +ho at least once in their life t*rn to ,etaphysical s*!4ects can a"ain re"rasp these thin"s and see !eyond the, to self. Perhaps-!*t *ntil +e "ain a clearer e)perience and *nderstandin" of Descartes and his ,editativeA i,a"inative thinkin" this is only a perhaps- +e can, for a fe+ ,o,ents, rise a!ove all sensation and i,a"ination in any and every for,, in a kind of dark ni"ht of these po+ers of so*l, and "a7e +ith p*re intellect*ality on the hi"hest spirit*al real,s. Still, as lon" as o*r nat*re is h*,an and it is part of o*r nat*re to i,a"ine and sense, this can last only a short +hile. &he key to this ina!ility to re,ain +ith the p*rely intellect*al is +hat Descartes *lti,ately identified as restlessness of so*l, a topic that !rin"s *s !ack to the 3*estions of the so*l6s activity, the i,a"ination, and, ,ost f*nda,entally of all, +ill. /n a letter of ? 8ay 16FF to Denis 8esland, a Kes*it devotee of Descartese philosophy, Descartes disc*ssed +hether h*,an !ein"s really have the volitional po+er of indifference +ith re"ard to +hatever +e see very clearly. :9e had ar"*ed in the Go*rth 8editation that +ill consists in o*r a!ility to do or not to do so,ethin", +hich pres*pposes a variety of indifference= see @& D// F$AF1.; Gor it is certain, it see,s to ,e, that Cfro, a "reat li"ht in intellect follo+s a "reat propensity of +illC= in the ,anner that, seein" very clearly that a thin" is proper to *s, it is very hard, and even, as / !elieve, i,possi!le, +hile one re,ains in that tho*"ht, to arrest the co*rse of o*r desire. B*t, !eca*se the nat*re of the so*l is to !e attentive al,ost only for a ,o,ent to a sin"le thin", as soon as o*r attention t*rns a+ay fro, the reasons that ,ake *s kno+ that this thin" is proper to *s, and +e retain in o*r ,e,ory only that it appeared desira!le to *s, +e can represent to o*r spirit so,e other reason that ,akes *s do*!t it, and th*s s*spend o*r 4*d",ent, and even perhaps ( ?E1 ( for, one contrary to it. &h*s, since yo* do not p*t li!erty precisely in indifference, !*t in a real and positive po+er of deter,inin" oneself, there is !et+een o*r opinions a difference only in na,e= for / avo+ that this po+er is in the +ill. B*t, !eca*se / do not see that it is other+ise +hen it is acco,panied !y indifference, +hich yo* avo+ to !e an i,perfection, than +hen it is not acco,panied !y it, and that there is nothin" in the *nderstandin" !*t li"ht, as in that of the !lessed +ho are confir,ed in "race, / call free in "eneral everythin" that is vol*ntary, and yo* +ant to restrict this na,e to the po+er of deter,inin" oneself that is acco,panied !y indifference. :@& /D 11%A116; @lready in the !ompendium musicae, Descartes had noted a kind of restlessness in the so*l. @ltho*"h certain si,ple har,onies +ere !etter acco,,odated to sense than others, the so*l +as not satisfied +ith these alone h*t lon"ed for variety instead. &he co,ple) rhyth,s and har,onies of son" are ,ore

satisfyin" than a constant consonance. &he i,a"ination +as the fac*lty that strove to fi"*re o*t the co,ple) *nity that ,akes a son" ,ore than a se3*ence of notes. &here is a si,ilar restlessness in findin" and solvin" pro!le,s= recall the trait in hi,self that Descartes noted of +antin" to find the ans+er for hi,self +henever he heard that a pro!le, had !een solved or a discovery ,ade. &here is also a restlessness that the Regulae +as desi"ned to adapt to h*,an in"eni*, and control, the tendency of h*,an tho*"ht to +ander +hen it is not ,ethodical and does not "ro*nd its ,ove,ents in the clear reco"nition of si,ple thin"s, a clear seein" that ,i"ht !e arran"ed in *na,!i"*o*s se3*ences never re3*irin" attention to ,ore than t+o thin"s at a ti,e. &here is the restlessness in the editations of a +ill that acts +hen it is ins*fficiently infor,ed, a ,alady that Descartes decided had to !e c*red !y dra+in" people a+ay fro, the ha!it, codified a,on" the philosophers of the School in their @ristotelian e,piricis,, of takin" sensation as the fo*ndation for even the ,ost a!stracted kno+led"e= this illAfo*nded ha!it +as to !e replaced !y the ne+ one of achievin" clear and distinct insi"hts, capa!le of preservin" oneself fro, error. &he coA,editatin" readers co*ld !e healed !y discoverin" for the,selves the innate po+er, not intrinsically corporeal or i,a"inative, that constit*tes their inner,ost !ein": the po+er of co"itation that considers +hat is present to it and "ives rise to ideas or for,s of conscio*sness and that in t*rn can "ive rise to yet other ideas. &he *lti,ate telos and the *lti,ate s*pport for this po+er is 0od, in +ho, the restlessness of the so*l co*ld finally !e stilled :as it is for an e)tended ,o,ent in the conte,plative concl*sion of the &hird 8editation;. &he shiftin" role of +ill in Descartes *nderlies a standard topic of Cartesian scholarship: the pro!le, of the chan"e in his theory of 4*d",ent !et+een the period of the Regulae and of the editations. /n the Regulae ( ?E? ( 4*d",ent is an act of intellect= in the editations and thereafter it is an act of +ill affir,in" or denyin" +hat the evidence of the intellect offers to vie+. <et this is not so ,*ch a chan"e in the nat*re of 4*d",ent as a chan"e of ,ind a!o*t the na,es applica!le to the confi"*ration of the h*,an psyche and its po+ers. &he active search for tr*th that the Regulae ai,s to direct +as driven !y the vis co"noscens6 +ill to kno+, even tho*"h Descartes did not e)pressly say this or perhaps clearly reco"ni7e it. &hat +ork does not atte,pt to deli,it or define +ill other than to ,ention in >*le 1 that one searches for tr*th not so that one can solve pro!le,s posed !y philosophical schools C!*t so that in the individ*al events of life the intellect ,i"ht sho+ forth to the +ill +hat o*"ht !e !e chosenC :@& L #61;. B*t in the intellect*al real, it is the kno+in" force that decides ho+ to take +hat it sees and +hat to do +ith it= that is, the kno+in" force "overns co"itation and its ,otions. /ndeed, in the final analysis, the kno+in" force is that co"itation and that ,otion. Co"itation is the directed action of +hat, +hen *ndirected, is an ai,less a"itation of tho*"ht.

F. PASSIONS OF SOUL5 ACTIONS OF *ILL

@ccordin" to the Regulae, +hen vis co"noscens acts in phantasia it is called i,a"ination or conception, and +hen it acts +ith phantasia on the senses it is called sensation. &he po+er of conception has a passive side, in that +hen it "rasps !y sense, i,a"ination, or intellect it is receptive= a ,a4or portion of this receptivity is or"anic :i,pressions are passed fro, e)ternal sense or"an to co,,on sense to phantasia to vis co"noscens;. B*t even ,ore f*nda,ental to conception is the active, for,ative side. 2ot coincidentally, !oth the active and the passive are *nited in the in"eni*,, defined as the vis co"noscens +hen Cit at one ,o,ent for,s ne+ ideas in phantasia, at another applies itself to those already ,adeC :@& L F16;. &hat force of ,akin" and attendin" to i,a"es, conceived ,ore "enerally !y Descartes, !eco,es the po+er of ,akin" and attendin" to ideas. Bne co*ld call it intellect*al

i,a"ination, the analo"*e of corporeal i,a"ination that allo+s *s to reco"ni7e intellect*al thin"s. /n the co*rse of his career Descartes ever ,ore e)plicitly ascri!ed this for,ative po+er to +ill and even conceived i,a"ination in the corporeal sense as a direct act of +ill rather than of kno+in". &he co"itative po+er of for,in", attendin" to, and varyin" ideas is a!ove all an act of +illin"= only the passive po+er of seein" re,ains to intellect. &herefore, co"itation, the act of the res co"itans that reco"ni7es its o+n !ein" in +hat is called the co"ito ar"*,ent, is not, as +e co,,only think, intellection= it is +illin". &he Passions of the %oul is clearest a!o*t this pri,acy of +ill, altho*"h ( ?E# ( the doctrine is already present in the Principles and 4*st !eneath the s*rface of the 1E of the Passions, rifled C.hat the f*nctions of so*l are,C says this: editations. @rticle

@fter havin" th*s considered all the f*nctions that !elon" to the !ody alone, it is easy to kno+ that there re,ains nothin" in *s that +e have to attri!*te to o*r so*l e)cept for o*r tho*"hts, +hich are principally of t+o kinds: to +it, so,e are the actions of the so*l, others are its passions. &hose that / na,e its actions are all o*r +illin"s, !eca*se +e e)perience that they co,e directly fro, o*r so*l and appear to depend only on it. K*st as, on the contrary, one can "enerally na,e its passions all the sorts of perceptions or co"nitions that are fo*nd in *s, !eca*se often it is not o*r so*l that ,akes the, as they are, and it OJ the so*lP al+ays receives the, fro, the thin"s that are represented !y the,. :@& L/ #F?; /nsofar as o*r so*ls act, they +ill. Since the !ein" of a thin" is ,ore properly desi"nated !y its f*nda,ental activity than !y its passivities, if / a, a thinkin" thin", / a, first and fore,ost a +illin" thin". &he ne)t t+o articles ela!orate the e,er"ent pri,acy of the +ill. @rticle 15. Bn .ill. B*r +illin"s, in t*rn, are of t+o kinds. Gor the ones are actions of the so*l that ter,inate the,selves in the so*l itself, as +hen +e +ill to love 0od or "enerally to apply o*r tho*"ht to so,e o!4ect that is not ,aterial. &he others are actions that ter,inate the,selves in o*r !ody, as +hen fro, the sole fact that +e have the +ill to +alk it follo+s that o*r le"s ,ove and +e +alk. @rticle 19. Bn Perception. B*r perceptions are also of t+o kinds, and the OfirstP ones have the so*l for ca*se, the others the !ody. &hose that have the so*l for ca*se are the perception of o*r +illin"s, and of all the i,a"inations or other tho*"hts that depend on it.O?#P Gor it is certain that +e are not a!le to +ant any thin" +itho*t o*r perceivin" !y the sa,e ,eans that +e +ant it. @nd altho*"h +ith re"ard to o*r so*l this +o*ld !e an action of +antin" so,e thin"s, one can say that it is also a passion in it to perceive that it +ants. /n any case, !eca*se this perception and this +ill are in effect one and the sa,e thin", the desi"nation is al+ays ,ade accordin" to +hat is no!lest= and th*s one is not acc*sto,ed to na,e it a passion, !*t only an action. @rticle 19 therefore not so ,*ch p*ts perception on an independent footin" as e)plains its connection +ith and s*!ordination to +illin", +hich is a"ain e,phasi7ed to !e active and so prior to +hat is dependent on it.

O?#P &he antecedent of this 6it6 :3*i en dependent; / take to !e 6so*l6, altho*"h it co*ld !e 6+illin"s6, an alternative that +o*ld ,ake ,y ar"*,ent stron"er. Presently +e shall see that i,a"inin"s are *nderstood in the Passions as pri,arily acts of +ill. ( ?EF ( Gor the ,o,ent it is left *nclear +hat the stat*s of Call the i,a"inations or other tho*"hts that depend on itC is= !*t only for the ,o,ent. @rticle ?$ e)plains that i,a"inations and o*r other tho*"hts are ca*sed principally !y +ill. @rticle ?$. Bf i,a"inations and other tho*"hts +hich are for,ed !y the so*l. .hen o*r so*l applies itself to i,a"ine so,e thin" that is not, as in representin" to itself an enchanted palace or a chi,era= and also +hen it applies itself to consider so,e thin" that is solely intelli"i!le, and not i,a"ina!le, for e)a,ple, to consider its proper nat*re: the perceptions that it has of these thin"s depend principally on the +ill +hich ,akes it perceive the,. &his is +hy one has the c*sto, of considerin" the, as actions rather than as passions. @rticles ?1 thro*"h ?6 take *p the re,ainin" perceptions, those Cthat are ca*sed !y the !ody,C that is, !y +ay of the nerves and the ,otions of the spirits :ani,al spirits; in *s. &hese incl*de drea,s, reveries, and ill*sions= the nerveA,ediated perceptions that / ascri!e to e)ternal o!4ects :sensation;= the nerveA,ediated perceptions of !odily sensation :h*n"er, thirst, pain, heat, etc.;= and the perceptions, ca*sed chiefly !y ,ove,ents of the spirits, that +e ascri!e to the so*l as 4oy, an"er, and the like, +hich t*rn o*t to !e the proper s*!4ect ,atter of the Passions of the %oul. .hat this ta)ono,y indicates is that o*r hope to preserve the independence fro, +illin" of intellection proper is in vain. 1very tho*"ht, every perception is ca*sed either !y !ody or !y +ill. &he i,a"ination of thin"s that do not e)ist and the consideration of solely intelli"i!le thin"s are in essence +illin"s !efore they are perceivin"s, not !eca*se of a te,poral precedence !*t !eca*se the activity is prior to the passivity. So,e of the lan"*a"e and conte)t of the Passions disc*ssion is re,iniscent of the Regulae. /n the Regulae the nerves +ere cited as the vehicle for trans,ittin" ,otions to the !ody :!*t not for conveyin" the i,pressions of the senses to the or"ans of the !rain;= Descartes refers to Cthe ,otive force or the nerves the,selvesC :vim motricem sire ipsos nervos O@& L F1FP, a phrase apparently i,plyin" that prod*cin" !odily ,otions is the f*nda,ental task of the nerves;. /n the Passions, !y contrast, the nerves are pri,arily responsi!le for the sensation of o!4ects and feelin"s of pain, heat, and so forth, !eca*se their central fi!ers trans,it ,otions prod*ced in the e)ternal +orld and even +ithin the !ody to the pineal "land. &he nerves also play a role in ,ovin" the parts of the !ody !eca*se of their pec*liar str*ct*re. &hey consist not 4*st of fi!ers !*t also of the s*rro*ndin" nerve sheath, +hich contains ani,al spirits. /t is these spirits that are the ,edi*, proper for trans,ittin" i,a"es and i,pressions fro, the pineal "land ( ?E% ( re"ion to the rest of the !ody in order to effect ,ove,ent and other so,atic chan"es. /n articles 15 and ?$, in the passa"es Cas +hen +e +ant to love 0od, or "enerally to apply o*r tho*"ht to so,e o!4ect that is not ,aterialC and C+hen o*r so*l applies itself to i,a"ine so,e thin" that is not . . . and also +hen it applies itself to consider so,e thin" that is solely intelli"i!le, and not i,a"ina!leC :@& L/ #F#, #FF;, the Passions !roaches an i,portant the,e of the psycholo"ical theory of >*le 1? of the Regulae. &here, the vis co"noscens :so,eti,es *nder the na,e 6intellect*s6; +as said

to apply itAserf to the or"an of i,a"ination and, thro*"h that or"an, to the co,,on sense, in the processes of i,a"inin", sensin", and ,ovin". @ltho*"h +hat po+er is applied to +hat other po+er or thin" chan"es fro, the Regulae to the Passions, all these passa"es raise the iss*e of attention in Descartese philosophy, that is, of the application of the ,ind to one thin" and then to another. &his the,e is at least tacit in all of Descartese +ritin"s, and it s*""ests the de"ree to +hich the 3*estion of +ill6s presence in all thinkin", of +ill as the tr*ly active aspect of so*l, is rec*rrent thro*"ho*t the entire Descartes corp*s. >e,ainin" in a sin"le tho*"ht re3*ires a resol*te +ill a!le to ,aintain the perception that is at the foc*s of its attentiveness, !*t the nat*re of the h*,an so*l is s*ch as to ,ake it diffic*lt to re,ain in a sin"le tho*"ht or to hold a sin"le o!4ect !efore o*r ,inds for very lon". &his is in fact a ne"ative characteri7ation of the h*,an ,ind as it e)ists on this earth as disc*rsive and co"itative, ,ovin" fro, one thin" to another and, in a positive sense, tryin" to achieve so,e *nity or *nitary vision or at least se3*entiality o*t of the disc*rsion. &he only defense a"ainst ,ental +anderin" is the resol*teness of the +ill that arises fro, the thirst for tr*th and the over+hel,in" attractiveness that a clear and distinct "rasp provided !y the li"ht of reason :or of "race; lends to the o!4ect of one6s attention :tho*"h, as +e have seen fro, the letter to 8esland, not even this attractiveness is s*fficient to hold the ,ind for very lon";. Co"itation is driven !y the restless desire of the +ill to !eco,e clear a!o*t its vario*s o!4ects. /t is !eca*se of a difference in the nat*re of so,e of the appearances-those that are clear and distinct !y virt*e of the li"ht of reason nat*re or the li"ht of "race-that this restlessness can so,eti,es !e 3*elled and the desire can find a s*re "*ide to the actions it initiates. 1ven +hen these restlessnessA3*ellin" appearances are present, ho+ever, it is diffic*lt for the so*l, !o*nd as it is to te,poral chan"e, to hold on to the insi"hts it has "ained. &h*s co"itation has a t+ofold condition: it is the prod*ct of the +ill, and it is the prod*ct of te,porality. /n a 6 Bcto!er 16F% letter to 1li7a!eth that disc*sses the passions and e,otions, Descartes ,akes perfectly e)plicit the role of +ill in i,a"ination. ( ?E6 ( C.hen it OJ the so*lP *ses its +ill to deter,ine itself to so,e tho*"ht that is not only intelli"i!le !*t i,a"ina!le, this tho*"ht ,akes a ne+ i,pression in the !rain, that is not a passion in it !*t an action, +hich is properly na,ed i,a"inationC :@& /D #11;.O?FP &he conse3*ences of this passa"e and the Passions' acco*nt of +ill and perception are *na,!i"*o*s. &he essence of the so*l is conceived pree,inently in its actions rather than in its passions, and the actions of the so*l are properly speakin" acts of +ill= ,oreover, imagination is one of these actions. .hat re,ains to intellect is a passivity +ith respect to !oth !ody and +ill. &hin"s happen to the so*l, and if the so*l +ills to attend to these, it is said to perceive. B*t intellect per se can do nothin" +ith these perceptions, nor can it see so,ethin" in ,ore than a ,ar"inal sense *nless +ill directs it. /f the h*,an !ein" as a+are is precisely a res co"itans, and if only t+o kinds of tho*"hts or co"itations can !e attri!*ted to the so*l, perceptions and +illin"s :see the Principles, pt. l, sec. #?, @& Dilla 1E;,O?%P the Passions reconceives these as not parallel or independent !*t as arrayed in ontolo"ical hierarchy, +ith the actions of +ill prior to the passions of intellect. /ntellection :i.e., perception; is, in the proper sense, 4*st the passive or receptive re"istration !y the so*l of its +illin". Both i,a"inin" and applyin" o*r ,ind to i,,aterial thin"s are actions of +ill. /n this +ay i,a"ination is ,ore inti,ately of the essence of the active thinkin" thin" than is the perception of intellect. @ll for,ation of tho*"hts and all transitions fro, tho*"ht to tho*"ht are acts of +ill= the seein" of the tho*"hts6 for,s is the receptivity of intellection, +hich pres*pposes that the +ill is attendin" to and has perhaps for,ed or elicited the idea that is seen. @ll disc*rsive activity of ,ind-ratio as opposed to

intellect*s-is red*ced to +illin" p*nct*ated !y occasional seein". .ith this shift in his thinkin" Descartes totally a!andons +hat had !een an i,plicit "oal of the Regulae : to red*ce disc*rsivity, the ,otion of co"itation, to a ded*ctio or an en*,eratio that ,i"ht in principle !e t*rned into an instantaneo*s, or very nearly instantaneo*s, seein". .e have already seen indirect evidence that the editations is driven !y +ill, !*t there are passa"es in +hich +ill6s pri,acy co,es to the s*rface, +hether or not Descartes intended it at the ti,e. &he Go*rth 8editation, O?FP &his passa"e in effect inserts the co,,on notions of the Regulae, instantia!le in !oth the intelli"i!le and the ,aterial real,s, deep into the heart of h*,an psycholo"y, !y s*""estin" that +hen the +ill t*rns the so*l to a tho*"ht that is !oth intelli"i!ly and ,aterially conceiva!le, the tho*"ht is necessarily instantiated !y an i,pression in the !rain. O?%P &he Principles, +hich +as p*!lished in 16FF, defines tho*"ht confor,a!ly to the definition "iven in the CSecond >epliesC to the editations, as iall thin"s that happen to *s conscio*s O!ein"sP +ithin *s, insofar as the conscio*sness of the, is in *sC :pt. 1, sec. 9, @& D///@ E;. /t calls perception and volition the t+o ,odes of thinkin" and refers to the, as operations of intellect and +ill, respectively :@& D///@ 1E;, th*s s*""estin" that !oth are activities. ( ?EE ( in concl*din" that +e never err if +e refrain fro, 4*d"in" +hat +e do not see clearly and distinctly, teaches that the +ill ,*st !e "*ided !y intellect :@& D// %9A6?;. <et +e also learn that the +ill in *s is perfect in its kind and, not !ein" restricted in any +ay or to any o!4ects, is virt*ally infinite :@& D// %6A %E;. .hen / consider ,y intellect / see that it is finite, !eca*se it does not e)tend to everythin", and / can easily conceive an even "reater intellect than ,ine, perhaps an infinite one= !*t Cit is +ill alone, or the freedo, of choice, that / e)perience in ,yself so "reat that / apprehend the idea of none "reater= to the point that it is principally this !y reason of +hich / *nderstand ,yself to !ear Oreferre P a certain i,a"e and likeness of 0odC :@& D// %E;. /n this li"ht, ,y nat*re or essence is a"ain !etter and ,ore f*lly e)pressed !y +ill than !y intellect. &here arises a parado), then: ho+ can +eak and finite intellect direct ro!*st, virt*ally infinite +illQ /f the post A editations theory of intellect and +ill +ere in force in the editations itself, this +o*ld ,ean that, since intellect is really the passive side of +ill, +ill ,*st "*ide +ill. &hat +o*ld eli,inate the parado) of the finite "*idin" the infinite, !*t leave the even "reater one of ho+ an errant +ill can "*ide itself *nerrin"ly and ho+ the passive side of ,ind, intellect, "*ides the active side, +ill. /n a sense, the post A editations theory does hold in the editations itself: it is not intellect !*t +ill that "*ides +ill. 1ven in the ter,s provided !y the editations this is so. /f / decide to a!stain fro, 4*d",ent *nless / see thin"s clearly and distinctly, there are in effect fo*r parts +ill and one part intellect involved. Decision is an act of +ill= so is a!stention= so is 4*d",ent= so is the attention to the thin" !ein" 4*d"ed. &his leaves seein" as the one part intellect, +hich in fact ends *p as a criterion for +ill6s !ein" *sed not !lindly !*t intelli"ently. 8oreover, it is 3*ite clear that the entire editations is a process directed !y +ill, the +ill to tr*th. Do*!tin" is an act of +ill, and the effort to do*!t everythin" is in effect the atte,pt to p*t ,y ,ind in a state of indifference +ith respect to the e)istence of thin"s. O?6P &he fiction of the ,ali"n de,on is introd*ced e)pressly as a device for readily ind*cin" this indifference, +hich is diffic*lt to achieve !eca*se of the inveterate ha!it of acceptin" thin"s at face val*e-and a ha!it is a ro*tini7ation of +ill. Bn acco*nt of this, as / opine, / +ill not act !adly if, the +ill !ein" t*rned directly to the contrary, / deceive ,yself and for a ti,e fei"n all those thin"s to !e co,pletely false and

i,a"inary, *ntil finally, as tho*"h the +ei"hts of pre4*dices +ere e3*ated on !oth sides, no ,ore f*lly perverse ha!it +ill t*rn ,y 4*d",ent a+ay fro, the ri"ht perception of thin"s. :@& D// ??; O?6P So,e sort of indifference to alternatives ,*st !e possi!le if +ill is to achieve the lo+est level of freedo,= see @& D// %5. ( ?E5 ( &he +ill to tr*th t*rns itself a"ainst itself, even !efore it kno+s the tr*th, for the sake of achievin" a tr*th that is still 4*st a pro,ise. /ts effective instr*,ent, a concretion of the i,a"inary ter,s of its o+n do*!t, is the ,ali"n "eni*s. 1ven the clear and distinct ideas that "*ide the +ill a+ay fro, error t*rn o*t to !e dependent on +ill. Consider the clear and distinct tr*th of C/ think, therefore / a,C or C/ a,, / e)ist.C Si,ply p*ttin" these state,ents !efore ,y intellect is not s*fficient for reco"ni7in" its tr*th, at least not +hen / first enco*nter the, in the process of ,editation. / ,*st e)ercise every reso*rce / have to do*!t the,, a!ove all, that of the +ill6s i,a"inary deceivin" de,on. @s ,*ch as / ,ay +ill it, +hen / actively try to do*!t the assertion, +hen / try to think ,yself o*t of e)istence, / fail. /t is this fail*re of the +ill to acco,plish its p*rpose of do*!tin" that is the !ack"ro*nd a"ainst +hich the clarity and distinctness of the idea can shine o*t= +itho*t this there is no clear and distinct tr*th. Clarity and distinctness is th*s a characteristic of ,y +ay of "raspin" or attendin" to ideas and not of the ideas the,selves. B*t this is a contin*ity, not a discontin*ity, in Descartese tho*"ht, for it is presa"ed already in the Regulae's acco*nt of int*it*s as the easy and distinct, the not do*!tf*l, grasp of a p*re and attentive ,ind and in the Regulae's ,ethod of preparin" the in"eni*, and its o!4ects for this kind of "raspin".O?EP .hat intellect is, then, is the passive po+er of notin" the ideas and distinctions prepared !y the +ill. /t is not an optional capacity of so*l, for +itho*t it the so*l +o*ld !e p*re, !lind +ill. B*t it is not an end in itself. /t is there in order to provide certain land,arks that ,i"ht allo+ the +ill to "*ide itself +ell. /ts no!ility is that it allo+s the so*l to reco"ni7e the li,its prescri!ed to the so*l !y nat*re, that is, !y 0od6s ordination of the *niverse and !y the eternal tr*ths that he created innate to the so*l. /ntellect allo+s the so*l to discover itself so that its +illin"s ,i"ht "*ide it +ell rather than ill. .illin" is therefore of the essence of the life of the so*l and the h*,an !ein"= intellect is the essential servant.

+. *ILL5 I,A+INATION5 AND T0E ACTIVE LIFE

&he central teachin"s of the Passions of the %oul have ,ore to do +ith the passional, e,otional life than +ith intellect and +ill. Perhaps as part of the anticipated doctrines of ,edicine and ,orals,O?5P it helps to e)plain the psyA O?EP Descartes in fact does not *se the loc*tion Cclear and distinctC of ideas !*t of the "rasp the ,ind has on ideas= th*s the for, is often adver!ial rather than ad4ectival. O?5P 8entioned in the preface to the Grench edition of the Principles as part of the tree of philosophy: the roots are ,etaphysics, the tr*nk is physics, and the !ranches are all the other sciences red*ced to three principal ones, ,edicine, ,echanics, and ,orals :@& /LB 1F;. ( ?E9 ( chophysical character of ,ost passions and "ives instr*ction in ho+ to keep the, +ithin !o*nds, +ith the *lti,ate "oal of livin" a "ood life. &he concl*din" article of the +hole +ork p*ts it as follo+s.

@rticle ?1?. &hat it is on these OJ the passionsP alone that all the "ood and evil of this life depends. Gor the rest, the so*l can have pleas*res on its o+n= !*t for those that are co,,on to it and the !ody, they depend entirely on the Passions, in a ,anner s*ch that ,en +ho, they can ,ove the ,ost are ,ost capa!le of en4oyin" the s+eetness of this life. /t is tr*e that they can also find here the "reatest !itterness, +hen they do not kno+ ho+ to e,ploy the, +ell, and +hen fort*ne is a"ainst the,. B*t .isdo, is principally *sef*l on this point, that it teaches one so to ,ake oneself ,aster of the, and to ,ana"e the, +ith s*ch skill that the evils they ca*se are 3*ite s*pporta!le, and even that one dra+s 4oy fro, the, all. :@& L/ F55; @t the end of each of the three !ooks that ,ake *p the Passions, there is at least a !rief reflection on the role of the i,a"ination and of i,a"es +ithin the passional life. @t the end of part l, in @rticle %$, Descartes e,phasi7es that altho*"h there see,s to !e a link esta!lished !y nat*re !et+een every ,otion of the pineal "land and the correspondin" tho*"hts- and, in partic*lar, !et+een the passions +e e)perience and the ,otions of "land, spirits, and !rain that represent o!4ects, chiefly as i,a"es-it is possi!le to chan"e these links thro*"h ha!it and trainin", even thro*"h a sin"le event, s*ch as a fo*l taste in a dish +e ordinarily love that p*ts *s off that food forever. @t the end of part ?, +hich treats the n*,!er and order of the passions, there is in the pen*lti,ate article :no. 1FE; an e)a,ple contrastin" the internal e,otions of the so*l, +hich are not inherently attended !y ,ove,ents of the ani,al spirits, +ith the passions proper, +hich depend on these ,ove,ents. @ ,an +ho has lost his +ife ,ay !e torn !y a sadness aro*sed !y the f*neral display and his +ife6s a!sence, Cand it can happen that so,e re,nants of love or of pity, +hich present the,selves to his i,a"ination, dra+ verita!le tears fro, his eyes, not+ithstandin" that he nevertheless feels a secret Koy in the deepest part of his so*l= the e,otion of +hich has so ,*ch po+er that the Sadness and the tears that acco,pany it can do nothin" to di,inish its forceC :@& L/ FF1;. @"ain, readin" advent*re stories can sti,*late 4*st a!o*t any passion, Caccordin" to the diversity of the o!4ects that offer the,selves to o*r i,a"ination,C passions that are nevertheless *s*ally acco,panied !y a p*re intellect*al 4oy at feelin" the,. /n @rticle ?11, the pen*lti,ate section of the concl*din" part #, Descartes offers +hat he calls the ,ost "eneral re,edy, Cthe easiest to pracrice,C a"ainst the e)cesses of passion or their so,eti,es over+hel,in" ( ?5$ ( character.O?9P Gor e)a,ple, so,e people are not a!le to keep fro, la*"hin" +hen tickled, Caltho*"h they do not take any pleas*re in it. Gor the i,pression of Koy and s*rprise that has other+ise ,ade the, la*"h for the sa,e reason, !ein" a+akened in their phantasy, ca*ses their l*n" to !e s*ddenly inflated despite the,selvesC !y the effects of the s*rro*ndin" !lood. @nd si,ilarly for those +ho are disposed to feel certain passions stron"ly: they can scarcely control the physiolo"ical reaction C+hen their phantasy is stron"ly to*ched !y the o!4ect of one of these PassionsC :@& L/ F56;. &he "eneral re,edy !e"ins +ith the consideration that C+hen one feels the !lood ,oved in this +ay one ,*st take heed and re,e,!er that everythin" that presents itself to the i,a"ination tends to deceive the so*l and to ,ake reasons appear to it that serve to ,ake the o!4ect of its Passion ,*ch stron"er than they are and those that serve to diss*ade the so*l ,*ch +eaker.C /f the passion is inclinin" *s to p*rs*e i,,ediately so,ethin" that allo+s delay, +e ,*st refrain fro, 4*d",ent and distract o*rselves +ith other tho*"hts *ntil the e,otion in the !lood has a!ated. /f the passion is ind*cin" *s to hesitate a!o*t so,ethin" that re3*ires an i,,ediate decision, the +ill ,*st consider and follo+ reasons contrary to the passion. @s

e)a,ples Descartes ,entions t+o cases. .hen +e are *nder attack +e do not have ti,e to deli!erate, !*t those acc*sto,ed to reflect on their actions can *s*ally ,ana"e to act s+iftly eno*"h. /f they are str*ck !y fear, Cthey +ill try to t*rn their tho*"ht fro, the consideration of the dan"er in representin" to the,selves the reasons +hy there is ,*ch ,ore sec*rity and ,ore honor in resistance than in fli"ht.C /f, on the contrary, they feel a desire for ven"eance !eca*se of e)cessive an"er, Cthey +ill re,e,!er to think that it is i,pr*dent to lose their life +hen one can save oneself +itho*t dishonor= and that if the contest is very *ne3*al it is !etter to ,ake an honest retreat or to ask for 3*arter than to e)pose oneself !r*tishly to a certain death.C @t first "lance the co*nsel of @rticle ?11 s*""ests that i,a"ination is the pro!le, rather than the c*re, that in "eneral one ,*st seek to co*nter!alance passions prod*ced !y vario*s i,a"es !y callin" to ,ind rational ,a)i,s of "ood and !ad !ehavior. @"ainst this one co*ld pit an inference it is possi!le to dra+ fro, the disc*ssion in part l, @rticle %$, of the association and reassociation of sensory i,a"es: i,a"ination can !e *sed to retrain or reha!it*ate the passions. So, for e)a,ple, a pho!ia of hei"hts co*ld !e re,edied not 4*st !y p*ttin" an individ*al in sec*re sit*ations at pro"ressively "reater hei"hts and re,ovin" safe"*ards one !y one, !*t O?9P &his is in addition to the specific re,edies that derive fro, the psychophysical nat*re of each passion considered individ*ally and to the possi!ility of alterin" the associations of "land ,ove,ents and tho*"hts already descri!ed. ( ?51 ( also !y havin" the acropho!e i,a"ine appropriate sit*ations and recall past e)periences so that he or she ,i"ht reco"ni7e that they +ere not as dan"ero*s as they see,ed. 8oreover, one ,*st !e caref*l of readin" too ,*ch into Descartese state,ent in @rticle ?11 that Ceverythin" that presents itself to the i,a"ination tends to deceive the so*l.C &his does not i,ply that all i,a"es al+ays deceive !*t rather, and 3*ite in line +ith +hat the editations ta*"ht, that fro, o*r early childhood +e tend to credit i,a"es and sensations +ith a "reater co"nitive val*e than they prove to have on closer e)a,ination. Pithy ,a)i,s do not operate on the level of Cco"ito, er"o s*,,C +hich is as ,*ch as possi!le a!stracted fro, the partic*lars of sense and i,a"ination, !*t rather set a different conteBt for ho+ the o!4ects presented to i,a"ination affect o*r psychophysical !ein". @s *s*al, a letter to Princess 1li7a!eth ,akes thin"s clearer +hile 3*alifyin" the p*!lished +orks. /n a letter of 8ay or K*ne 16F%, Descartes points o*t ho+ a person +ho has every reason to !e content ,i"ht nevertheless, !y i,,ersin" hi,self in tra"ic dra,as that he kno+s to !e fictions, *nder"o physiolo"ical chan"es that +o*ld prod*ce physical and psycholo"ical ,aladies. By contrast, a person +ho has every reason to feel displeas*res !*t C+ho st*dies +ith "reat care to t*rn his i,a"ination fro, the,C and re"ards only o!4ects tendin" to !rin" content,ent and 4oy +o*ld learn to !e dispassionate in 4*d"in" his ,isfort*nes and +o*ld even !e restored to health !y the physiolo"ical chan"es associated +ith those i,a"es :@& /D ?19;. /,a"ination *sed +ell can th*s "ive one control over one6s ,oods, one6s dispositions, even one6s health -that is, over the real, of the s*!stantial *nion of !ody and so*l. /n partic*lar, i,a"ination in the active sense is +hat ena!les *s to deli,it and control passive i,a"ination. .hen Descartes defines passions of the so*l in the narro+est sense of the ter,, he calls the, i,a"inin"s. @rticle ?E says that passions in this sense are Cperceptions, or senti,ents, or e,otions of the so*l, +hich one refers to it OJ the so*lP partic*larly, and +hich are ca*sed, ,aintained, and stren"thened !y so,e ,ove,ent of the Oani,alP spiritsC :@& L/ #F9;. @rticle ?6 calls these imaginings, i,a"inin"s that are dependent only on the fort*ito*s ,ove,ent of the spirits, as opposed to those i,a"e perceptions that are dependent on the

nerves, like sensations= fort*ito*s ,ove,ents of spirits are also a!le to represent to the so*l all the thin"s that are represented thro*"h the nerves :@& L/ #F5;, for e)a,ple in drea,s and reveries. @rticle ?1 precedes these refine,ents of ,eanin" +ith the !old assertion that the passions are i,a"inin"s that do not depend on the +ill :@& L/ #FF;. &hat is, there are i,a"inin"s, prod*cin" ne+ i,a"es, that co,e fro, acts of the +ill and that properly speakin" are a,on" the actions of the so*l= then ( ?5? ( there are i,a"inin"s that are the res*lt of thin"s presented to the sense :e."., thro*"h the tra"edies and co,edies that depress or lift one psychoAphysiolo"ically;= and finally the i,a"inin"s d*e to fort*ito*s ,ove,ents of the pineal "land ani,al spirit nerve syste,, +hich are directly ca*sed neither !y the senses nor !y the +ill. / shall not tarry lon"er +ith this psychophysiolo"ical theory !*t only e,phasi7e that the h*,an !ein" th*s conceived is ,entally active precisely as a +illin" !ein". &his activity is e)hi!ited in three ,ental CplacesC: :@; in the so*l alone :e."., +illin" to love 0od;= :B; in the real, of p*re e)tension :e."., i,a"inin" "eo,etric fi"*res;= and :C; in the e,!odied so*l :e."., conceivin" and i,a"inin" everyday plans and p*rposes;. B*t each of these +illin" activities has a passive side: :a; intellection in the so*l !y itself= :!; the conte,plation of the for,ed i,a"es of p*re e)tension= and :c; the perception of +hat is sti,*lated !y the traces in the pineal "land. &he passions proper to the Passions of the %oul are of kind :c;= they concern those thin"s havin" a physiolo"ical ca*se :th*s they are not for,ed !y direct action of the +ill; that is perceived in the for, of i,a"inin"s, so,eti,es clearly, so,eti,es o!sc*rely= they ran"e fro, the ,ost realistic of drea,s to the va"*est feelin"s of *nease. &h*s the Passions is chiefly a!o*t the h*,an !ein" as a passively i,a"inin" one, and as a +illin" !ein" +ho can *se +illed reason and +illed i,a"es to co*nter!alance the effects of the passive i,a"inin"s. /n the si)fold division of the h*,an actions and passions noted a!ove, +ill do,inates the active side= it e)ists as p*rely spirit*al :@; or is e)pressed as i,a"ination in the tho*"ht of p*re e)tension :B; and in the ,ental actions of everyday life :C;. B*t on the passive side, +e cannot say that intellect or perception do,inates, since they are receptive to+ard the +ill, the active i,a"ination, and vario*s states of the !ody. Bnce a"ain, the h*,an !ein" as conceived in the ,at*re philosophy of Descartes is less decisively rational or intellect*al than is co,,only tho*"ht. Understandin" ho+ and +hy Descartes artic*lated the h*,an !ein" in this +ay re3*ires reco"ni7in" the de"ree to +hich all his philosophi7in" +as a prolon"ed ,editation on f*nda,ental psycholo"y, +ith al+ays a pervasive tho*"h so,eti,es ,ysterio*s role for i,a"ination. @s at the concl*sion of the previo*s chapter, it is ill*,inatin" to consider the iss*e fro, the perspective of the doctrine that h*,an !ein"s are ,ade in 0od6s i,a"e and likeness. &he ,athe,atical i,a"ination descri!ed in &e onde, "*ided !y r*les discovera!le only to intellect, allo+ed h*,an !ein"s to replicate or ,i,ick 0od6s creation of the physical *niverse. &he doctrine e)pressed in the Passions allo+s *s to conceive a deeper sense in +hich the h*,an !ein" is ,ade in the i,a"e of 0od. &he 1% @pril 16#$ letter to 8ersenne had ar"*ed that in 0od +ill, *nderstandin", ( ?5# ( and creation are the sa,e. &his is not tr*e or possi!le for any other, created !ein", in partic*lar not for the finite h*,an !ein", +ho at the very ,ini,*, is li,ited !y 0od6s !ein" and the fact that XULY0odX ULY created the *niverse as it is and not other+ise. .e cannot contravene the eternal tr*ths= o*r a!ility to sense, i,a"ine, and think is deli,ited !y the nat*re :and the innate ideas; 0od has

i,planted in *s. 8oreover, *nlike 0od and an"els, +e are a+are creat*res s*!stantially *nited to ,atter, the fact of +hich *nion is i,pressed on *s every day !*t +hich in its f*nda,ental ho+ and +hy is nearly *nintelli"i!le. 2evertheless, 0od6s infinity and perfection are reflected in the h*,an +ill, +hich is perfect in its kind and *nli,ited. @ltho*"h +hat +e see clearly and distinctly +e al,ost inevita!ly follo+, +e retain a po+er of holdin" in a!eyance o*r assent to these thin"s-and this is in fact the ontolo"icalA psycholo"ical so*rce of the po+er of do*!t. /nsofar as 0od6s +ill and kno+led"e are one and insofar as :accordin" to the Passions ; every h*,an +illin" :action; is associated +ith a perception !y intellect :passion or reception;-leavin" aside for the ,o,ent those perceptions that are nonvolitional, like sensations, hall*cinations, and ,any e,otions-the correspondence of action and passion in +ill and intellect constit*tes a f*nctional identity !et+een volition and intellection that i,itates the radical *nity of +ill and intellect in 0od. B*t even ,ore, o*r a!ility to replicate the physical +orld in i,a"ination presented !y &e onde, o*r capacity to direct and ,odify o*r sensations, o*r i,a"inin"s, and o*r feelin"s in the psychophysiolo"ical real,, and o*r capa!ility of doin" these thin"s conscio*sly, +ith kno+led"e, all ,ake *s an i,a"e and likeness, as far as it is "ranted to h*,an !ein"s, of the po+er of 0od that overflo+s creatively into the reality of that Btherness called the *niverse. /n this sense Descartes provides a rationale for the *nity of the theoretical and practical lives that el*ded ,ost of his Christian and ancient 0reek predecessors, +ho contrasted the perfect life of conte,plation to +hat +as only secondA!est, often a very distant secondA!est: the practical, political, prod*ctive, earthly life. Descartes reco"ni7es the po+er of intellect and the pleas*res of conte,plation, !*t, "iven the *nion of so*l and !ody and the disproportion !et+een +ill and intellect, the conte,plation of tr*th cannot lon" detain the restlessness of the h*,an so*l, of h*,an in"eni*,. .hen all is said and done, the i,a"e and likeness of 0od rese,!les the Creator ,ore in +ill than in intellect. .ill is not only the active o!verse of the passive reverse intellection, it also has thro*"h phantasia or the pineal "land syste, an i,a"inative p*rchase on the created +orld that ena!les it to live there and even to conceive and ,ake +hat has never !efore !een reali7ed in it. B*r destiny as +e kno+ it nat*rally is a!ove all to +ill +ell and ri"htly, +hich re3*ires ackno+led"in" !oth o*r o+n nat*re ( ?5F ( i,planted !y 0od and the partic*larities of o*r sit*ation. 'no+in" is therefore necessary and needs to !e c*ltivated. B*t o*r !ein" is not red*ci!le to an operation of kno+in", and +e strive to perfect kno+in" not as an end in itself !*t !eca*se +e +ill to live +isely. .e increase o*r kno+in" so that +e ,i"ht live !etter, that is, so that o*r +ill ,i"ht learn to "*ide itself in en4oyin" all the "oods 0od has "ranted in the life of ,ind, of !ody, and of ,indA!ody. ( ?5% (

Conc(/sion T$in=ing an. Imagining Descartes

Descartes +as t*rned into a c*lt*ral icon already in the seventeenth cent*ry. /n the t+entieth cent*ry, he is still an icon, an icon of i,plicit or e)plicit c*lt*ral villainy, +ho is said to !e responsi!le for, or at least to have provided a ,a4or i,p*lse to+ard, a +hole ran"e of ,odern ills and p*tative ills: rationalis,, s*!4ectivis,, e"ocentris,, d*alis,, a"nosticis,, atheis,, scientis,, red*ctionis,, the ,athe,ati7ation of !ein" and nat*re. @ constellation of intellect*al co,,onplaces and stereotypes has

!een "athered aro*nd hi,. @s +ith ,ost stereotypes, there are reasons for acceptin" their pla*si!ility, !*t on closer e)a,ination ,any prove to !e oversi,plifications at !est and so,eti,es do+nri"ht falsifications.

A. I,A+ININ+ DESCARTES
Despite the rec*rrent tendency to vie+ Descartes as a ne+ !e"innin" :Cthe father of ,odern philosophyC;-a tendency evident even in his o+n +ritin"s-his tho*"ht +as deeply en,eshed in +hat preceded hi,. &he !ook that is !ein" concl*ded here, !y lookin" to a te)t*re and pattern of Descartese philosophical psycholo"y that has not !een ,*ch attended to, also testifies to the relevance of the conte)t*re of the psycholo"ical tho*"ht of the late 8iddle @"es and the early ,odern period. @ conventional readin" of Descartese psycholo"y in relation to his predecessors +o*ld likely see i,poverish,ent. &he rich psychophysiolo"y of the senses and internal senses and the *nderstandin" of the operations of ratio and intellect*s in relation to phantas,s he not so ,*ch profited fro, as si,plified and oversi,plified, to the point +here they +ere replaced !y the pineal "land syste, and the thinkin" thin"-that is, !y Cartesian ,indA!ody d*alis,. &his is itself a "rand oversi,plification, ho+ever. 9ere / shall ( ?56 ( try to e,phasi7e the need for correctin" this oversi,plification not !y recapit*latin" the contents of the precedin" pa"es !*t !y sketchin" a possi!le +ay of conceivin" Descartese path into philosophy, the o*tlines of a ne+ philosophical !io"raphy. /,a"ine Descartes as a yo*n" ,an, havin" finished school and attained a la+ de"ree. 9e is rather perple)ed a!o*t the state of the kno+led"e that has !een trans,itted to hi,. 9e can see that altho*"h ,*ch of +hat he st*died is *sef*l and edifyin", his ed*cators have not displayed a *nified, ,*ch less pers*asive, *nderstandin" of +hy and ho+ +hat they clai, to kno+ is tr*ly kno+n-th*s al,ost every s*ch clai, is in disp*te-nor is their peda"o"y infor,ed !y a clear notion of +hat it is for a h*,an !ein" to co,e to kno+ so,ethin", to discover the tr*th for hi,A or herself. B*t he also kno+s so,e thin"s, and he kno+s that he kno+s the,: so,e in ,athe,atics :tho*"h "eo,eters tire the i,a"ination +ith co,plicated fi"*res, and al"e!raists *se a c*,!erso,e syste, of r*les and *nintelli"i!le sy,!ols;, a fe+ ,oral precepts, and discoveries he has ,ade for hi,self :either spontaneo*sly or sp*rred !y hints of others;. 8ost of all, he sees that he can reco"ni7e +hen one thin" has so,e relation to another, especially +hen !oth can !e co,pared directly +ith respect to so,e partic*lar aspect. Gor e)a,ple, he can see that his horse is lar"er than his do", and he kno+s that +hen lost it is !etter to travel in a sin"le ar!itrarily selected direction than to t*rn at every +hi,. 9e !e"ins to reali7e that his a!ility to discover thin"s and reco"ni7e co,parative tr*ths operates in accordance +ith si,ply for,*la!le precepts: don6t leave anythin" o*t of acco*nt, proceed in an orderly +ay, don6t depend too ,*ch on ,e,ory, si,plify, look for analo"ies if yo* can6t find direct sol*tions. 8ost of all, take the ,eas*re of one thin" in co,parison to another= look for e3*alities, ine3*alities, se3*ences, proportions. Still, it takes an enco*nter +ith a so,e+hat ,ore ,at*re conte,porary +ho has already discovered ,any of these thin"s for hi,self to stir the yo*n" Descartes fro, a cas*alness to+ard kno+led"e. /saac Beeck,an, +ho !elieves that kno+led"e sho*ld !e pict*ra!le and so is a proponent of dia"ra,,atic and "eo,etric approaches to physical and dyna,ic pro!le,s :physico,athe,atics;, a+akens in the yo*n" Grench,an a "li,pse of +hat ,i"ht !e acco,plished if he p*t "reater effort and order into his st*dies. Descartes discovers that !y isolatin" the relevant factors in a pro!le, and representin" the, and their proportional relationships +ith plane and solid fi"*res, ,any, ,any pro!le,s !eco,e easily

solva!le. 8oreover, the ne+ Cal"e!raC and, ,ost pro,isin" of all, ne+ kinds of instr*,ents :like his proportional co,pass; can !e *sed to solve for proportions of any co,ple)ity, and, in partic*lar, arith,etic al"e!raic pro!le,s can !e solved *sin" c*rves and fi"*res that are prod*ced !y ,eans of the ri"idly ,echanical :and therefore in principle easily i,a"ina!le; ,otions of these ( ?5E ( proportionali7in" instr*,ents. &hese ,ethods can !e applied to any pro!le, involvin" 3*antities and proportions of any kind, incl*din" physical pro!le,s of ,otion, tendency to ,otion, and force. B*t ,ore i,portant, this incl*des all 3*estions concernin" anythin" that stands in so,e order or proportion to other thin"s. &here is potentially no li,it to +hat this class of 3*estions e,!races. Descartese developin" insi"ht is that a "reat and *nified ,ethod ,i"ht !e developed on these !ases. /t is an inklin" at first, rather than an acco,plish,ent, an inklin" s*pported !y his conviction that there is a deep cos,ic har,ony in accordance +ith +hich proportions and analo"ies *nite s*perficially disparate thin"s. @s he +orks to flesh o*t the insi"ht, he ,akes ,ore pro"ress in solvin" partic*lar ,athe,atical and physical pro!le,s than in conceivin" a *nified ,ethod, and the occasional inspirations do not i,,ediately lead to a co,prehensive art of discovery. Bcc*pied in travels, Descartes +orks in fits and starts. Bver ti,e he reveals !its and pieces of +hat he has done, +hich !e"ins to +in hi, a s,all follo+in" of ad,irers and "reat e)pectations fro, the learned. &o his interests in ,*sic, in "eo,etry and a "eo,etricA,echanical al"e!ra, and in ,echanics he adds optics, or rather li"ht. /f there is a har,ony in the cos,os, then it is "overned !y the principles of har,onic proportion= if +e can kno+ these har,onies, it ,*st !e !eca*se the ,aterial s*!strate of the physical *niverse allo+s for the acc*rate trans,ission of these har,onies to o*r sense or"ans. Li"ht +o*ld see, to !e the chief physicalA,echanical po+er for revealin" to *s thin"s and their proportions= if +e co*ld develop a si,ple theory of its operation to acco*nt for this revelatory capa!ility, then +e +o*ld have an i,portant "*arantee of the relia!ility of the h*,an +ay of kno+in" the +orld. &his optical +ork leads Descartes to reco"ni7e that his *nderstandin" of the senses, i,a"ination, ,e,ory, and intellect has to !e coordinated +ith this physical kno+led"e, and so aro*nd the late 16?$s he !e"ins to conceive of the anato,ical and physiolo"ical prere3*isites for the link !et+een +orld and ,ind. &his is likely the period in +hich the Regulae +as co,posed and then left off as Descartes enco*ntered ever ,ore diffic*lties of fact and principle !lockin" his ori"inal pro4ect. /n this acco*nt Descartes is p*rs*in" not the ,athe,ati7ation and physicali7ation of the *niverse !*t rather an e)plication of the fact that +e do kno+ and can learn, an e)plication consistent +ith the ,ost acc*rate investi"ations and kno+led"e of his day. &his incl*ded the philosophico,edical theory of the e)ternal and internal senses. 9e did not re4ect this psycholo"ical theory !*t tried to acco,,odate it to the proportionate cos,os that every day proves it can !e kno+n !y dint of the ordinary processes of physiolo"y and of the physical +orld, +hich reveal to *s the si"hts, so*nds, aro,as, flavors, and feel of thin"s. &he traditional psycholo"y in ( ?55 ( fact ta*"ht that sensation +as !ased on proportion, ar"*ed that there +as so,e nat*ral ,eans !y +hich the for,s in thin"s ca,e to infor, the or"ans of sense, and contended that all kno+led"e re3*ired the presence of phantas,s, +hich +ere *nderstood as artifacts of a physiolo"ical psycholo"y +ith f*nctions specially located in !rain cavities. &h*s Descartes hoped that he +o*ld !e a!le to ,ake the traditional teachin" ,ore ri"oro*s and ,ore ri"oro*sly in accord +ith kno+led"e a!o*t physical nat*re

and the h*,an !ein". /f a sensi!le species so,eho+ entered the sense or"an fro, an o!4ect !y ,eans of an intervenin" physical ,edi*,, then the trans,ission had to o!ey the principles of that ,edi*, and !e received in the or"an in accordance +ith its physical and physiolo"ical nat*re. /n addition, +hereas the psycholo"ical tradition clai,ed, in so,e of its versions, that a phantas, derived fro, o!4ects in the real +orld +as ill*,inated !y intellect to prod*ce an intelli"i!le species thro*"h +hich +e co*ld *nderstand the realA+orld o!4ect, Descartes !eca,e convinced !y his Cpheno,enolo"icalC attention to his o+n a+areness and his processes of discovery that +e can reckon only +ith +hat is already in the possession of the ,ind. /ntelli"i!le species or essences are less *sef*l for pro!le, solvin" than is co,parin" thin"s accordin" to order and proportion !y virt*e of o*r capacity to identify relevant characteristics of their appearances: aspects, di,ensions, nat*res. /t is not necessary to take this sketch f*rther, since in effect the last t+o chapters have done so. 2or is it possi!le here to deter,ine to +hat de"ree the sketch can receive additional confir,ation or sec*re datin", !eyond +hat the precedin" chapters have acco,plished. B*t the sketch and the rest of the story / have presented !e"in to s*""est so,ethin" very i,portant a!o*t the history of philosophical psycholo"y since Descartes. Descartese openin" *p of the C+ay of ideasC +as the res*lt of his atte,pt to ,ake the older psycholo"y ,ore ri"oro*s and less c*,!erso,e, yet his *nderstandin" of different planes of a+areness, his !iplanar conception of thinkin", re,ained in essential contin*ity +ith the older tradition. /t +as Cartesianis, instead and the e,er"ence of +hat +e identify as the rationalist and e,piricist poles of philosophy that t*rned a+areness into conscio*sness, a theater +ith a sin"le plane. >ationalis,, on the one hand, !e"an to conceive i,a"ination chiefly as a so*rce of error, and e,piricis,, on the other, !ro*"ht a flattened and hyper,echanical conception of i,a"ination into play !y red*cin" tho*"ht to a constr*ction, ,anip*lation, and se3*encin" of i,a"es or i,a"elike ideas. Descartes +as a pioneer of the +ay of ideas= the irony is that in traversin" it later philosophers red*ced it to a si,*lacr*, of the ori"inal. @ ,a4or so*rce of this distortion +as that those +ho ca,e after *nderstood Descartes as offerin" series of propositions and ar"*,ents that co*ld !e eval*ated conte)tlessly as clear and distinct ideas. @ccordin" to DesA ( ?59 ( cartes6s *sa"e, ho+ever, it is not ideas that are clear and distinct !*t rather o*r kno+led"e or a+areness of the,. /t is o*r +ay to ideas and the activity of thinkin" the, that ,*st !e ,ade clear and distinct= it is the activity of thinkin" that prod*ces the !ack"ro*nd a"ainst +hich the tr*th can appear clearly and distinctly, a conte)t in +hich the te)t*re of thinkin" ,akes its force tr*ly felt. @nd so, for e)a,ple, the 3*estion of +hether the editations is really ,editational is only the tip of the relevant ice!er". &he deeper 3*estion is +hether +e can decide a!o*t the tr*th of Descartes in any sense +itho*t enco*nterin" for o*rselves the artic*lated o!4ects of his tho*"ht +ithin the ,anifoldly te)t*red activity of thinkin". /t is no +onder that it +as in the seventeenth cent*ry that i,a"ination and intellect drifted apart, leadin" *lti,ately to their divorce. /t is a ,ore than Cartesian irony that Descartes never intended the divorce. @t the !e"innin" he even cha,pioned the effective pri,acy of the for,er, tho*"h he *lti,ately settled for a distinction rather than a divorce: the intellect e)ceeded the i,a"ination, and the +ill, the so*rce of i,a"ination, e)ceeded the intellect. 8oreover, he placed i,a"ination at the very heart of the sciences of nat*re, he ,ade it of their essence. @fter the divorce, ho+ever, so,eone like /saac 2e+ton !elieved that he co*ld ,ake no ,ore sava"e attack a"ainst a nat*ral philosophy like that of &e onde than to call it a ro,ance of nat*re, that is, a fi",ent of the i,a"ination, a ,ere fa!le. 9e did not, perhaps no lon"er co*ld, reali7e that !y e)tendin" the ,athe,ati7ation of nat*re he had

e)panded the *ncanny po+er of i,a"ination in science +itho*t ,aintainin" the deter,inants and controls of necessity. 8athe,atics itself ca,e to !e seen as rational, indeed paradi",atically rational. &h*s after 2e+ton the sciences +ere no lon"er i,pelled !y the insi"ht that had !een f*nda,ental to Descartes: that ,athe,atics itself is i,a"inative, that it is the e)ercise par e)cellence of i,a"ination. .hat difference does it ,ake +hether +e think of ,athe,atics as i,a"inative or rationalQ &o ans+er this +e +o*ld need a ,ore caref*l delineation of intrinsic differences !et+een i,a"ination and rationality than +e have perfor,ed hitherto. /n a sense this st*dy of i,a"ination in Descartes has !een a prole"o,enon to that delineation. Lackin" this caref*l delineation, any ans+er to the 3*estion a!o*t ,athe,atics6 place in the econo,y of the ,ind +ill !e partial and hypothetical. Still, it is +orth+hile to indicate fro, o*r c*rrent perspective the direction in +hich an ans+er that follo+s o*t Descartese insi"hts ,i"ht tend. &he i,a"ination is the for,ative ,ental po+er in +hich the corporeal +orld takes on nascent concreteness. By itself it is not a!le to reco"ni7e the !o*ndaries of its validity= seein" !eyond the li,its of the i,a"ination-!oth the li,its of specific i,a"es and the li,its of the ,ental po+er of for,in" the,-is a chief f*nction of intellect, +hich !y its nat*re is a transcendental seein", a seein" !eyond the li,its of +hat is present to conscio*sness. .hen the ( ?9$ ( intellect does not caref*lly attend to +hat i,a"ination has +ro*"ht, and if i,a"ination is not "*ided !y intellect*al insi"ht into its proper !o*ndaries, +e +ill tend to conceive thin"s other than they are. Gor a si,ilar reason, +hen intellect does not caref*lly attend to sense perception, +e take the senses as ,ore veridical than they can possi!ly !e= this, accordin" to Descartes, has !een the fate of the ,a4ority of h*,an !ein"s, a fate that the @ristotelians enshrined in theory. Gro, Descartese perspective, the person +hose i,a"ination is not properly deli,ited is likely to e)perience, conscio*sly or not, a hypertrophic "ro+th in i,a"ination6s clai,s to tr*th. Unlike sense perception, ho+ever, i,a"ination is prod*ctive, so that even +here its clai,s are e)cessive, its a!ility to prod*ce, in vie+ of partic*lar aspects, a si,*lacr*, of +hat happens and +hat is, tends to ,ask +hat is false. &he ,athe,atical physics that arose in the last decades of the seventeenth cent*ry, ,is*nderstood as rational rather than i,a"inative, +as therefore a romantic science -*nderstandin" ro,anticis, as a c*lt*ral pheno,enon predicated on the s*periority of i,a"ination to rationality. &his s*""estion need not !e taken as havin" chiefly ne"ative, ,*ch less solely ne"ative, i,plications, especially +hen +e recall that one of the iss*es raised here is +hether +e are *nder the spell of the ,odern 4*d",ent that i,a"ination is co"nitively ne*tral or even irrelevant. /n the late t+entieth cent*ry, ,*ch ,ore "enero*s in its appreciation of i,a"ination6s co"nitive *ses than the ei"hteenth and nineteenth cent*ries, the notion of early ,odern science as ro,antici7in" can !e taken in a ,ore positive sense. /n entertainin" the notion one ,i"ht very +ell +ant to reopen the 3*estion of Descartese role in the develop,ent of the ,odern sciences. Bne sho*ld enter into that e)a,ination +ith at least t+o points in ,ind: Descartes held distinct +hat those +ho ca,e after f*sed :,athe,atics and rationality;, and if he contri!*ted to the s*!se3*ent ro,antici7ation, he is nevertheless in decisive respects sit*ated on the re,ote side of the historical divide.

-. I,A+ININ+ *IT0 DESCARTES

/n this !ook it has not !een ,y principal "oal to ans+er the 3*estion +hether Descartese theory or, rather, theories of i,a"ination are tr*e. Be"innin" +ith a fe+ te)ts, so,e scarcely kno+n, others not thoro*"hly eno*"h e)plored, / have tried to present Descartes as philosophical psycholo"ist, to place this Descartes in historical conte)t, to sho+ that i,a"ination is the key to his earliest philosophy, and to

s*""est its contin*in" central i,portance for hi,. 2o+, in concl*din", / +ant not so ,*ch to prono*nce 4*d",ent-+hich, to !e a,ply 4*st, +o*ld re3*ire a +ider investi"ation-as to point to the,es and 3*estions present in the i,a"A ( ?91 ( inin" Descartes that are still "er,ane to a philosophical investi"ation of i,a"ination. &he first thin" to say is that there are fe+ philosophers +ho can ,atch Descartes in his "rasp and c*ltivation of i,a"ination. .hen he told Gran7 B*r,an that he +as Cs*fficiently i,a"inative, and e)ercised his in"eni*, in it for a lon" ti,eC :@& D 16#;, it +as so,ethin" of an *nderstate,ent. 9is e)perience +ith i,a"ination 3*alifies hi, as an e)pert. G*rther,ore, Descartes stands very close to the historical divide separatin" i,a"ination *nderstood as intrinsically protoco"nitive or co"nitive fro, an i,a"ination that is fictionally creative !*t, +hen not har,f*l, lar"ely irrelevant for p*rposes of kno+led"e. 9is o+n conception of i,a"ination *nder+ent an evol*tion that tended to+ard the ,odern dichoto,y of intellect and i,a"ination. 9is testi,ony can "ive *s insi"ht into +hy this evol*tion occ*rred as a lar"er c*lt*ral pheno,enon and +hether it +as inevita!le, and therefore also +hether there is any point in tryin" to think o*r +ay !ack into a ,ore co"nitively prod*ctive i,a"ination. &his 3*alification of Descartes as an e)pert +itness to the po+er of i,a"ination is related to another. @ltho*"h *nder very different circ*,stances, Descartes, like *s, +as atte,ptin" to reconcile +hat he had e)perienced of i,a"ination +ith +hat he kne+ fro, the science of his day= and he placed co"nitive i,a"ination *nder the ae"is of ,athesis *niversalis in a +ay that anticipates, and parallels at least in part, o*r o+n c*ltivation of physico,athe,atical i,a"ination :,entioned at the end of the precedin" section; in the hypotheses and a!d*ctions of the ,odern sciences of nat*re. .hatever the stat*s of the hypothesis of the ro,antici7ation of physical science after Descartes, then, his eBample ,i"ht "ive so,e clearer "rasp of the iss*es of principle raised !y the ,athe,ati7ation of physical science. &he !iplanarity of active ,ind has !een a central feat*re in the interpretation of Descartes / have presented. &o so,e this !iplanarity ,i"ht appear to !e 4*st a ,*ltiplied for, of the ho,*nc*l*s: the ho,*nc*l*s has not a sin"le standpoint !*t has to !ilocate or even trilocateH @n a+areness that is in and !et+een planes and that can transcend any sin"le plane into another see,s fra*"ht +ith pro!le,s. <et if one is "oin" to have any si"nificant notion of a+areness or conscio*sness, one has to locate it in so,e +ay, if not physiolo"ically then at least pheno,enolo"ically, and it see,s to ,e pheno,enolo"ically ri"ht to say that the po+er to shift attention and its point of foc*s is not accidental !*t essential to conscio*sness. &he traditional doctrines of e)ternal and internal senses +ere predicated on the e)perience of an a+areness at the level of the or"ans and on a *nified, hierarchical co,,*nity of the sensitive and co"nitive f*nctions in the livin" h*,an !ein". .hat Descartes *lti,ately preserved of this doctrine +as altered !y the notion that the f*nda,ental point of division of self fro, +orld resides in the process of sense reception. Bne co*ld t*rn this aro*nd and say that it +as precisely the e,phasis on the p*tative fact of ( ?9? ( this division that created the dis4*nct spaces of the e)ternal and internal +orlds. Bn the conscio*s side of the divide +e see, to !e a*tono,o*sly in possession of i,pressions fro, the +orld= all f*rther operations of and on the, appear to take place +ithin *s, either in the !ody :*nless the !ody itself is taken as part of the e)ternal +orld; or in the ,ind. &his point of de,arcation is not ar!itrary per se, !*t it ,ay +ell !e so in its a!sol*teness, for in a si"nificant sense ,y conscio*sness appears to !e as ,*ch

+ith and in the +orld as it is in and +ith ,y !ody. @nd even the ,at*re Descartes concl*ded thro*"h the editations that o*r over+hel,in" inclination to take the +orld as real is not entirely +ron". &he ,o!ility of !iplanar conscio*sness that +as typical of Descartese early philosophy can take *s so,e distance to+ard *nderstandin" ho+ i,a"es serve co"nitive p*rposes. &he key notions are the syste,aticity of each plane and the h*,an a!ility to "rasp one thin" in ter,s of another, +hether that connection is conventional or nat*ral, ar!itrary or !ased on rese,!lance. &he ,ost constant feat*re of ,ind in Descartese philosophy, ho+ever, is that it can co,pare thin"s, that is, reco"ni7e the, as the sa,e or different, as e3*al, "reater, or less. /f there is any certainty at all in kno+in", it ,*st e)ist at least at this level, and it ,*st !e !ased on so,e ,ini,al h*,an a!ility to "rasp rese,!lance in so,e respect :"raspin" nonArese,!lance itself operates +ithin the s*pposition of rese,!lance;. Gor this kind of co,parison to !e tr*e :i.e., ,ore than 4*st correct ad hoc, for this ti,e and place only; there ,*st !e in addition not so ,*ch a constancy of o!4ects of attention as a constant net+ork of relationships, a conte)t of syste,aticity-in other +ords, a plane. /t is, for e)a,ple, !eca*se +e have a relatively constant "rasp on relationships !et+een h*es :e."., in a +ay that allo+s *s to array the, on a chro,aticity dia"ra,;, relationships +e can evoke at +ill, and also a relatively constant "rasp on the si,ple ,echanics of elastic collisions :e."., on a !illiard ta!le; that it co*ld occ*r to so,eone to correlate the 3*alities of colors +ith certain ,echanical processes :e."., a theory that has particles of different si7es differentially reflected !y ,atter and settin" off different vi!rations on the retina-+hich is a very si,plified version of 2e+ton6s theory;. Descartes *lti,ately settled on the spatial "eo,etry prod*ced !y phantasia, re"*lated !y intellect*ally discovered principles, as the f*nda,ental s*!strate for co"nitively relevant i,a"ination. &he syste,atic relationships +ithin it, "overned especially !y the r*les of ,otion, constit*ted the *lti,ate constraints for the co"nitive *se of i,a"es. .ith all the other internal senses collapsed into i,a"ination, the possi!ilities for !iplanar a+areness +ere considera!ly red*ced :vision, co,,on sense, and ,e,ory, for instance, are all f*nctions of 4*st one or"an;. &he space of phantasia, it is tr*e, had !eco,e a replica of e)ternal space, a ,odel and sy,!ol of the e)ternal +orld= its in principle infinite divisi!ility and its ,o!ility esta!lished the !asis for a strict iso,orphis, !et+een i,a"ination and +orld, so ( ?9# ( that it co*ld still serve as an instr*,ent of co"nition. B*t !iplanar a+areness had shifted ,ore deeply in+ard, !eca*se no+ there +ere 4*st t+o places for conscio*sness to !e: either in phantasia :the pineal "land; or on its o+n. &he a!ility of a+areness to shift planes +as in the Regulae na,ed vis co"noscens, kno+in" force. /t is this po+er and its transfor,ations that / have e,phasi7ed in this !ook, ,ore "enerally *nder the r*!ric 6co"itation6, the activity of thinkin". /t is the po+er of a*tono,o*sly considerin", varyin", and for,in" i,a"es and ideas, and of ,ovin" !et+een and seein" !eyond the,. /n the very late Descartes :of the Principles and the Passions ;, the thinkin" part +as divided concept*ally :!*t not in reality; into the no!ler, active side, 9ill, and the indispensa!le !*t passive side called perception. Perception is, as it +ere, the last re,nant of ancient theoria, or conte,plation, in Descartes. &he restlessness of h*,an attention ,ade it i,possi!le to re,ain +ithin conte,plation for ,ore than a !rief ti,e, even +hen the o!4ect of it +as 0od :as at the end of the &hird 8editation;. &hat had !een a pro!le, even in @ristotle and in Christian conte,plation: h*,an !ein"s are inevita!ly dra+n !ack fro, theoria !y the de,ands of the !ody and co,,*nity life. B*t Descartes derived fro, this restlessness of attention the evidence of the self, +hich is visi!le as s*ch only in the activity of thinkin", and also evidence of the finit*de of the self, a finit*de that in t*rn pointed to the positive infinity of 0od. &hese are iss*es of ,ore than i,a"ination, of co*rse, !*t they still sho+ traces of Descartese early psycholo"y.

B*r i,a"inations f*nction +ithin this fra,e+ork in a t+ofold +ay. /,a"ination allo+s *s, +hen "*ided !y intellect, to replicate the str*ct*re and activity of e)tension. B*t it does this in only an appro)i,ate +ay. B*r ,inds are incapa!le of fillin" o*t the infinitely divisi!le detail that is conceiva!le in the act*al !ehavior of e)tension. XULY0odX ULY can :and does; kno+ this detail, +hereas h*,an !ein"s can kno+ +hat happens only in principle. .e can i,prove the specificity and e)actness of o*r *nderstandin" of e)tension :th*s of nat*re; in ,any cases and therefore also increase o*r possi!ilities for control, !*t +e can never ,aster it f*lly. &his leads to the second f*nction of i,a"ination. /t helps "*ide and direct *s in the en4oy,ent of o*r po+ers as a h*,an !ein", that is, as a *nified !ody and so*l. &he passions, +hich are d*e to this *nion, are the,selves i,a"inations or i,a"inin"s, passive ones ind*ced !y physiolo"ical ca*ses !eyond o*r control. &he i,a"inations that +e +ill, ho+ever, are *nder o*r control, and altho*"h +e cannot directly +ill chan"es in o*r physiolo"y and the associated passions, +e can +ill i,a"es that can prod*ce physiolo"ical effects capa!le of chan"in" the passions. @ctive i,a"inations th*s help *s to "ain a certain ,astery over o*rselves. Since these t+o cate"ories co,prise the vast ,a4ority of h*,an psychic activity, the character, s+eetness, and p*rpose of h*,an life depend ,ore on this ( ?9F ( constellation of i,a"inative passions and po+ers than on anythin" else. 1ven if as thinkin" !ein"s +e perceive o*rselves precisely as thinkin" and not e)tended, in o*r daily life +e deal +ith the !ody and the so*l to"ether. &his ,eans that o*r fate is to !e neither ,etaphysicians nor physicists !*t people concerned chiefly +ith the ordinary affairs of life. /f Descartes ai,s at the ,astery of nat*re, it is pri,arily the ,astery of o*r o+n, ordinary nat*re, and only derivatively that of the e)ternal +orld. @nd, *lti,ately, the passional life :in the Passions of the %oul ; c*l,inates not in selfAsatisfaction !*t in "enerosity, a spillin" over of the passion of ad,iration that e)ceeds the self and ,akes one +ell disposed to+ard others.

C. ,E,ORY5 T0IN)IN+ *IT0 DESCARTES

Bne psycholo"ical po+er that the early i,a"inative approach to kno+in" +as s*pposed to eli,inate ,ade an eni",atic ret*rn in the late philosophy. &hat po+er is ,e,ory. &he Regulae had tried to overco,e it !y the instantaneo*s "rasp of int*it*s and the pro"ressive red*ction of ded*ctio to an int*it*slike stat*s. @ll kno+led"e +as therefore on essentially the sa,e !asis, and anythin" tr*ly kno+n +as kno+n as +ell as anythin" else that +as kno+n. /n the later philosophy Descartes introd*ced a hierarchy of certainties. 0od, +ho, +e do not co,prehend, is nevertheless ,ore certain than o*r selves. .hat is perceived !y the senses is least certain of all, especially since sense +as instit*ted for preservation of the ,indA!ody *nion rather than for tr*th. &here is so,ethin" parado)ical a!o*t the editations' reevocation of ,e,ory, the specific location of +hich is the Gifth 8editation. /t provides *s, after the fact of e)periencin" f*nda,ental tr*ths, +ith the +arrant of that e)perience. By recallin", for e)a,ple, that +e have clearly and distinctly conceived 0od :and therefore his e)istence and his "oodness;, +e can !e s*re that other thin"s +e have clearly and distinctly kno+n have !een tr*ly kno+n and can in their t*rn !e recalled and *sed in confidence. .e do not have to recall the proof of the Pytha"orean theore, to *se it, only that +e have proved it previo*sly. &his po+er of ,e,ory yields the e3*ivalent of a :,odern; proposition +ith a propositional attit*de attached. B*t the s*!strate of this intellect*al ,e,ory is that +e kno+ that +e have actively tho*"ht the tr*th of the proposition in its te)t*re and conte)t*re: th*s +e re,e,!er not 4*st the fact of tr*th, +e re,e,!er that +e have eBperienced it as tr*e a"ainst a !ack"ro*nd that per,itted it to

e,er"e. Pres*,a!ly this ,eans that havin" an appro)i,ate idea of 0od ro*"hly !ased on a rather va"*e ,e,ory that +e once proved his infinity, e)istence, and "oodness +o*ld not !e eno*"h. &he idea +o*ld need to !e foc*sed, and +e +o*ld need so,e ,e,ory of the !ack"ro*nd of active tho*"ht that evidenced 0od as 0od and not 4*st as a +ord or concept*al ( ?9% ( possi!ility. By contrast, the Regulae +o*ld have *s as ,*ch as possi!le rehearse once a"ain the f*ll e)perience of tr*th in all its evidence, +itho*t reco*rse to ,e,ory. @ll that ,e,ory +o*ld do for the life of the ,ind is provide it +ith the stock of all the nat*res that in"eni*, has e)perienced= co,!ined +ith the ha!it of thinkin" those nat*res accordin" to order and proportion, it +o*ld provide to active, i,a"inative ,ind everythin" relevant to perfect kno+led"e. &he late philosophy, follo+in" the traces of i,a"ination, ret*rned to ,e,ory. Descartes did not think thro*"h the 3*estions of ,e,ory-if he did, the evidence is not preserved for *s-and therefore he cannot !e a "*ide here in as positive a +ay as in the case of i,a"ination. 9e distin"*ishes intellect*al fro, corporeal ,e,ory and also ali"ns intellect*al ,e,ory +ith ideas in their potentiality. /n the Regulae, i,a"ination is ,eant to overco,e ,e,ory= in the editations, i,a"ination and tho*"ht are s*pported !y re,e,!erin" the kno+led"e +e have had. @t the level of the !ody, the physiolo"ical traces of ,e,ory in the !rain are prod*ced !y the act*al e)periences +e have had, and they lar"ely "overn o*r partic*lar associations of i,a"es, so that the ,e,ory of corporeal i,a"es is a key to the relia!le f*nctionin" of the *nified ,ind and !ody. B*t the fact is that Descartes +rote very little a!o*t ,e,ory, and that little is ,ore eni",atic than clarifyin". Descartes th*s leaves *s in ,ore than one sense on the threshold of ,e,ory. &hat threshold is the place +here +e are ,ost falli!le and ,ost h*,an, +here +e can least think of o*rselves as a*tono,o*s, selfAperceivin", serfAcertifyin" !ein"s !eca*se +e are !o*nd !y a past history. Gro, the little +e have seen, ho+ever, it see,s likely that he tho*"ht i,a"ination a9ay from ,e,ory, *ntil, as he +orked o*t the conse3*ences of transcendin" the li,its of i,a"ination, he +as co,pelled to read,it the fact of re,e,!erin", at least in the for, of a ,e,ory of intellect*al events. 8e,ory is i,portant !eca*se it +eaves the fa!ric of o*r everyday, contin"ent lives, !*t also !eca*se it reinforces o*r e)perience and *nderstandin" of essential tr*ths. Bne ,i"ht then e)pect f*rther tho*"ht and investi"ation to reveal so,e parallels !et+een the stat*s of i,a"ination and the stat*s of ,e,ory in Descartes. /f +e are attentive, +e ,i"ht find traces of ,e,ory all alon" the path of i,a"ination, thro*"ho*t Descartese psycholo"ical philosophy. 8odernity as a concept is predicated on a contrast +ith the old, in partic*lar on co,parin" the present +ith +hat is past. /n the early ,odern a"e the standard for co,parison +as the ancient 0reeks and >o,ans :and those rep*ted +ise fro, every re,ote ti,e and place, +hether they +ere na,ed 8oses or 9er,es &ris,e"ist*s;, +ho inspired ad,iration !*t also a,!ition. &he yo*n" Descartes tho*"ht that the ancients :,ost of all the ancient ,athe,aticians; s*rpassed the ,oderns in kno+in" !eca*se they possessed the secret of ho+ to ac3*ire kno+led"e, a secret they had ( ?96 ( concealed. /t +as !ein" rediscovered in the si)teenth and seventeenth cent*ries, ho+ever= and all that it re3*ired +as attention to the possi!ilities in!orn in each h*,an !ein", possi!ilities that if developed +o*ld yield +isdo,. 9e !elieved that i,a"ination +as the key to ac3*irin" this +isdo,, in !oth theory and practice. &he later philosophy did not re4ect the "oal, it only ,odified the conception of ho+ to "et

there. /f in the co*rse of the seventeenth cent*ry, if in the +ritin"s of Descartes hi,self, i,a"ination *nder+ent an eclipse, this does not ,ean that it !eca,e irrelevant or that the pro4ect Descartes had initially envisioned lapsed. &he i,p*lse of that pro4ect carried over thro*"h the later +ritin"s and *lti,ately passed, in *nanaly7ed for,, to the Cartesians and postACartesians. &he scientific and tr*thA discoverin" po+ers of i,a"ination that Descartes had conceived did not vanish= they +ere si,ply reassi"ned in the psychophysiolo"y and the thinkin" activity of h*,an !ein"s. .e cannot say that this reassi"n,ent occ*rred in a perspic*o*s +ay, ho+ever, and not even that it +as done for "ood reasons. &he past three h*ndred years have "iven *s ,any theories of i,a"ination !*t no consens*s, nor have they "iven *s ,*ch a"ree,ent a!o*t +hat the !asic facts of i,a"ination are. .e have diffic*lty artic*latin" a coherent *nderstandin" of i,a"ination yet ,ake fre3*ent appeals to it. /s this a si"n that +e are so deeply ent+ined in it that +e can e)perience it no ,ore clearly than +e do o*r ears or eyesQ Descartes reco,,enced tho*"ht a!o*t the relevance of i,a"ination, reco,,enced it after the lon" contin*ation of @ristotle had !losso,ed in @vicenna, +as raised to a hi"her pitch in the >enaissance, and *lti,ately s*cc*,!ed to erosion !y for,*laic repetition. Both this ancient tradition and Descartese tho*"ht of i,a"ination have !een for the ,ost part hidden fro, *s. Gor cent*ries neither has !een a part of o*r e)perience= ,*ch less have they !een the o!4ect of tho*"ht. &he task of reac3*irin" the e)perience and thinkin" it thro*"h stands !efore *s. /f this task is carried o*t "en*inely in tho*"ht, it +ill !e not si,ply a s*rrender to the past !*t a reevocation of a herita"e. .hether +e are ,oderns or post,oderns, it is *nlikely that +e can "et a proper esti,ation of i,a"ination and its val*e +itho*t Descartes. Perhaps +e have no choice !*t to think +ith Descartes, and to i,a"ine +ith hi,, *ntil +e reach the point of thinkin" and i,a"inin" for o*rselves. &he parado) is that ,ost people learn ho+ to really think fro, the e)a,ple of others, !*t it is only +hen +e have !e"*n thinkin" o*rselves that +e can tr*ly think +ith another. Perhaps the sa,e is tr*e of i,a"inin", especially if it is tho*"htf*l and not 4*st +illf*l. /f that is so, and if follo+in" in Descartese traces helps *s to act accordin"ly, then there is tr*ly so,e hope that this +ork +ill have served a lar"er p*rpose than merely i,a"inin" Descartes. ( ?9E (

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Dernet, GSli). &a %piritualit* m*di*vale . Bi!liothR3*e catholi3*e des sciences reli"ie*ses. Paris: Li!rairie Blo*d T 0ay, 19?9. Doss, Stephen, ed. )ssays on the Philosophy and %cience of Ren* Descartes . 2e+ <ork: B)ford University Press, 199#. .a"ner, Stephen /. CDescartes6 Co"ito: @ 0enerative Die+.C (istory of Philosophy Luarterly = , no. ? :@pril 195F;: 16EA15$. .e!er, KeanAPa*l. &a !onstitution du teBte des 5Regulae.5 Paris: SociStS d6Sdition d6ensei"n,ent s*pSrie*r, 196F. .edin, 8ichael D. ind and Imagination in Aristotle. 2e+ 9aven: <ale University Press, 1955. .ells, 2or,an K. CDescartes6 Idea and /ts So*rces.C @merican !atholic Philosophical Luarterly JK , no. F :@*t*,n 199#;: %1#A%#%. .ilson, 8ar"aret Da*ler. Descartes: The Arguments of the Philosophers. London: >o*tled"e T 'e"an Pa*l, 19E5. ( #$% ( .olfson, 9arry @*stryn. C&he /nternal Senses in Latin, @ra!ic, and 9e!re+ Philosophic &e)ts.C (arvard Theological Revie9 PI :19#%;: 69A1##. jjjj. C&he &er,s tasa99urCDE and tasdi1CDE in @ra!ic Philosophy and &heir 0reek, Latin and 9e!re+ 13*ivalents.C oslem #orld :19F#;: 11FA1?5.

<ates, Grances @. The Art of

emory. Chica"o: University of Chica"o Press, 1966.

jjjj. Theatre of the #orld. Chica"o: University of Chica"o Press, 1969. <olton, Kohn .. Perceptual Ac1uaintance from Descartes to Reid. 8inneapolis: University of 8innesota Press B)ford: Basil Black+ell, 195F. `arlino, 0ioseffo. Dimostra2ioni harmoniche . Denice, 1%E1. jjjj. Institu2ioni harmoniche . Denice, 1%%5. ( #$E (

INDE9
A
@!sol*te, 16F A165 @!straction, ?1 , 1?$ , 1?9 n, 16# , ?FE @cceleration, %9 A61 Acies mentis,?%$ @l!ert the 0reat, ?F @l"e!ra, 1F% @l"e!raic e3*ations, 69 = e3*ivalence !et+een, and "eo,etrical c*rves, 69 AE$ @l3*iS, Gerdinand, 5# n @naclastic line, 19E @nalo"y: !reakdo+n of, !et+een 0od and ,an, ?1% = episte,olo"y of, 1$$ = and i,a"ination, E A5= as principle of cos,os, E% , E6 , 115 . %ee also 1piste,olo"y of fi"*rin" rese,!lance= Proportion= >ese,!lance= Si,ilarity @nalytic "eo,etry, 66 , 6E , 19F @nato,y, Descartes6s st*dy of, 1$9 n, ?#? A?##, ?5E @ni,al spirits, ?? . %ee also Pineal "land= Stoics @ntipathy of affections, #5 , F1 @ppetitive po+ers, 1F

@3*inas, &ho,as, 1F , ?? A?#, ?F , ?6 , ?E , ?1F = cogitativa or ratio particularis in, ?# , 55 = co"nition and sensation as proportion, F$ AF1= on ingenium,55 = vis aestimativa in, ?? A?# @rie+, >o"er, 9E n @ristotle, 9 , 56 , 9$ = co,,entators on, 1E , 19 A?5= De anima, 1% A?$, ?E = De memoria et reminiscentia, 15, 19 = and ,athe,atics, 1%F A1%%= and phantas,s, 6 , 1%% n= and philosophical psycholo"y, 1# A?$, ?1 , ?# = sensation as proportion, F$ , F1 = solvin" pro!le,s in, %F = st*dy of, at CollR"e 9enri /D at La GlRche, ?E . %ee also /,a"ination @spects, of thin"s and pro!le,s, 1$# , 11% @strola!e, #9 = mater of, #9 = rete of, #9 @ttention, 1?1 , 1F# A1FF, ?E% = differential, of intellect, ?$F @*"*stine, F1 n, 1#F , ?$6 = !onfessions,1#F , ?$6 n @verroMs :/!nA>*shd;, ?$ = i,a"ination in, ?# A?F= and the theory of internal senses, ?? , ?# , ?F @vicenna :/!n Sina;: active virt*e in, ?1 , ?? = ani,al virt*e in, ?1 = !anon of edicine,?1 A?#= co,prehensive virt*e in, ?1 , ?? = De anima, ?$ A?1, ?? n= eBtimativa in, ?? , ?# = fantasia in, ?$ , ?1 =

imaginatio in, ?$ = i,portance of Descartes, ?F = 3ita4 al+.a7at,?F = phantasia in, ?? = sensus communis in, ?$ A?1= and the theory of internal senses, ?$ A?F= virtus cogitativa in, ?? , ?# , 55 = virtus memorialis or conservativa in, ?? , ?# = vis aestimationis in, ?$ , ?1 = vis imaginativa or cogitans in, ?$ A?1, ?? , ?# = vis memorialis or meminisci4ilis in, ?$ . %ee also /ntentions :intentiones ;

Baillet, @drien, F5 n, E# , 96 n, 1%? n, ?%% , ?%E Bal7ac, KeanALo*is 0*e7 de, 9# Beck, Leslie K., % n Beeck,an, /saac, %5 A6?, 9? , 9# , 1$6 , ?56 = 'ournal, %9 , 61 , 6? , 1$% A1$5= on pict*rin" *nderstandin", 11? Ber"a,o, 8ino, ?%9 n ( #$5 ( Ber"offen, De!ra B., ?%9 n BSr*lle, Cardinal, 1%? n Beth, 1. .., ?%9 n Beyssade, KeanA8arie, ?65 n Biplanarity: of co"itation, ?61 = of co,parison, 16F = of conceivin" :si,ple; nat*res, 16F = of conscio*sness, ?% , %? A%5, 199 , ?91 A?9#= and intuitus,1F# A1FF= in editations,?%# , ?61 = vers*s *niplanarity in episte,olo"ical representationalis,, %? , %# A%F. %ee also /ntellect= Intuitus =

Planes :in conscio*sness;= /is cognoscens Bl*,en!er", 9ans, ?1F n Bos, 9. K. 8., ?#$ n Bo*tro*), Pierre, % n Brann, 1va &. 9., 9 Br*no, 0iordano, 1%F Br*nschvic", LSon, % n B*ndy, 8*rray .ri"ht, 1%# n B*r,an, Gran7, ?F# n, ?F9 n, ?91 B*sacchi, Dincen7o, 1$9 n

C
Carr, &ho,as 8., Kr., ?65 n Carr*thers, 8ary K., EE n Cartesian and Cartesianis,, ?55 , ?96 = Cartesian t*rn, 5 = ,eanin" of, in this !ook, )vi C@ Certain Speci,en of Descartes6s @l"e!ra,C 1$6 A1$9= as an art of i,a"ination, 1$5 Certainty, ?%F Chan"e*), KeanAPierre, ?% n Chan*t, 9ectorAPierre, ?%% A?%6, ?%E Che,istry, Descartes6s st*dy of, 1$9 n Clarke, 1d+in, ?$ n, ?% n Clavi*s, Christoph, 1%$ n Clerselier, Cla*de, ?%% !ogitalio : activity of vis cogitativa, ??, 5E = ety,olo"ies, 1#F = ,eanin" of, in Regulae,1#F = as ,ove,ent of tho*"ht, 1#F A1#%= as synony, of imaginatio,5 Co"itation, ?$ A?1= as act of +ill, ?E? , ?5? =

in ,editative process, ?%5 = ,otion of, 1#? A1##, ??? . %ee also @vicenna= Disc*rsive thinkin"= /,a"ination= /ntellect= &hinkin" CCo"itationes privatae,C # AF, F6 AF9, %? , %5 A6?, E? AE9, 99 , 11E , 1F1 A1F?, 1FF , ?69 = ,athe,atical constr*ction in, 66 A69 !ogitativa, 5 , ?1 . %ee also @vicenna !ogito,? , 6 , 5E , ?%? , ?6? = its tr*th re3*ires i,a"ination, ?66 Cohen, 9. G., F? n Coi,!ra, University of: co,,entaries on @ristotle, ?E A?5, 59 Cole,an, Kanet, EE n CollR"e 9enri /D at La GlRche, ?E , 1?5 = st*dy of @ristotle at, ?E Colors, # , 1% , 1$9 A11?, ??# , ?9? = as si,ple or co,ple) nat*res, 1E$ Co,,on sense, 1% , 16 , ?$F = in Regulae, ?9 , #F = as *nified field of proper senses, 16 . %ee also @vicenna Co,parison, 16F A166, 15? A15F, ?9? !ompendium musicae,% n, ## n, #E AF6, F9 , %? , 6? , E% , 11E , ?19 , ?E1 = !iplanarity of perception in, %F = i,a"ination in, FF AF6= as ,athe,atical aesthetics of so*nd, FF = ori"inality of, in ,*sic theory, F? = post*lates of, #5 . %ee also @ntipathy of affections= /,a"ination= 8*sic= Sy,pathy of affections !onarion. %ee Pineal "land Concept, 1?6 . %ee also Intuitus Conception :act of;, %?

!onceptum, 1?9 , 1E1 = and intuitus,#F !oncipere. %ee Imaginari Conscio*sness, hierarchy of, ?% Conte,plation, ?%6 , ?%E , ?%5 , ?%9 , ?66 , ?E1 . %ee also 8editation Costa!el, Pierre, 1%5 n Crap*lli, 0iovanni, 5E n, 1?% n, 1%# , 1%F n

D
Deductio, 1?F , 1?9 , 19$ A191= aid to ,e,ory, 1#% = contin*o*s vs. step+ise, 1#6 A1#E= Descartes defines, 1?6 , 1#$ A1##= as disc*rsive reasonin", 1#$ = displaced, 1#6 = distinct fro, lo"ical ded*ction, 1#$ = and i,a"inative perception of !ompendium musicae,1## = and intuitus,1#$ A1##= ,ove,ent of tho*"ht in, 1#? A1##= translation of, 1?% Ded*ction, 1?F De,on, ? Descartes, >enS: !io"raphy, #6 , ?56 A?55 :see also Discourse on the ingenii ;= chronolo"y of +orks, #6 A#E= conceived accordin" to preference of interpreter, F = early philosophy, 6 = as e)pert in i,a"ination, ?91 = as ,an of the >enaissance, EF = as *nCartesian, F , 6 AE, EF , 1$$ , ?F? , ?6? , ?5% CDe solidor*, ele,entis,C #6 A#E De+h*rst, 'enneth, ?$ n, ?% n Dianoein, 15 . %ee also Disc*rsive thinkin"= Ratio Dianoia, ?6 Di4ksterh*is, 1. K., %9 n ethod = Regulae ad directionem

DiLoren7o, >ay,ond D., ?%5 n Di,ension, 15E A159 Diophant*s, 1%1 , 16$ Dioptrics, %? , ?## , ?#6 , ?#E A?#5, ?6$ Discourse on the 6idea6 in, #$ n ( #$9 ( Discovery, EF , 9% , 96 Disc*rsive thinkin", 15 A19, 11E , ?69 , ?E6 . %ee also !ogitatio = Co"itation= Dianoia = Disc*rsive thinkin"= /,a"es= /,a"ination= Phantas,s= Ratio = &hinkin" Division of sciences, 1?? Do*!t: !iplanarity of, ?6F A?6%= and i,a"ination, 5 = in &e in onde,??6 = editations,%$ , ?6? A?6% ethod,F , ?9 , %? , 69 , E% , 19F , ?1% , ?F% , ?6% = a*to!io"raphical acco*nt in, 5% A56=

Drea,s of 1$A11 2ove,!er 1619, E# AEF, 116 A11E, 1F6 , 1%? n, ?1% A?16, ?6$ D*alis,, ,ind !ody, %$ , 55 , ?$6

E
1li7a!eth, Princess, of Bohe,ia, ?%6 , ?%9 , ?E% , ?51 1n*,eration, 1#F , 1#E , 1#9 , 151 1piste,olo"y of fi"*rin" rese,!lance, FE A%5, 1$$ = ontolo"ical *nderpinnin"s, 1%6 1ratosthenes, 6? A6# )sprit,6 , 5F , 5E

1ssences, ?%1 1ternal tr*ths, ?1? A?16, ??F , ?F? A?F#, ?F5 = and co,,on notions in Regulae,?1? A?1#= and infinity, ?#9 A?F? 1*clid, 1%$ n, 1%# = )lements of 0eometry,1%# 1*stace of St. Pa*l, 1?5 1)tension, 11$ , ?$$ A?$#, ?9# 1)ternal senses, 1# = in Regulae, ?9

F
Ga!le. %ee &e onde Gac*lty psycholo"y, 1# = displaced in late Descartes !y *nitary po+er, ?$5 Gederico, P. K., 1%5 n Gi"*ration and fi"*rin", FE , 95 A11#= of !odies, F5 A%$, %1 , E? = of intellect*al spirit*al thin"s, %E A%5 Godor, Kerry @., 1# n Gord, Stephen 9enry, % A6n Gor,: co,,*nication of, 1% = corporeal, 161 = essential, 1% = sensi!le, 1% GWti, DSroni3*e, % n Go*ndations of kno+led"e, shallo+, 196 A19E Grede, Dorothea, 1E n Greed!er", David, ?%9 n

+
0V!e, LUder, % n, 1$1 n, 1FE n 0alilei, 0alileo, 1% n 0ar!er, Daniel, %9 n 0assendi, Pierre, ?F6

0a*kro"er, Stephen, 9E n 0enerosity, ?9F 0eni*s, ,ali"n. %ee De,on 0eo,etrical co,pass, 6# A66 0eo,etrical c*rves: classification of, E$ AE1= i,a"ina!ility of, E$ AE? 0eo,etry, 1F% = dyna,ic, 19F , ??1 , ??? A?#? 0eometry, 66 , 69 , 159 A19$, 19F , ??9 , ?#$ , ?#5 , ?69 0erard of Cre,ona, ?1 0erl, 9annaABar!ara, 59 n 0ettin" a fi) on thin"s, %6 A%E 0il!ert, .illia,, 15$ = De magnete,15$ 0ilson, 1tienne, 5E , ?%9 n 0irard, >enS, 9 n 0ocleni*s, >*dolph*s, 59 A9$ 0od: idea of, ?6E A?65= o,nipotence and o,niscience of, ?1# = po+er of, ?1F A?1%= *nity of +ill, reason, and act in, ?1# A?1F 0o*hier, 9enri, #6 n, FE n, F5 n, E# , EF n 0rassi, 1rnesto, 59 n 0ray ontolo"y, 1#1 n, 19% A196 0rene, 8ar4orie, 9E n 0roshol7, 1,ily >., ?#$ n 0*ero*lt, 8artial, ?%9 n 0*ndissalin*s, ?$ n

0
9aldane, 1li7a!eth S., #1 n, 5F n 9ar,ony, %5 n, E% = reasons for Descartes6s st*dy of, E5 AE9 9arvey, 1. >*th, ?$ n, ?? nn

9atfield, 0ary, #F n, ?%9 n 9o!!es, &ho,as, 5 , ?#9 n, ?F% , ?%$ , ?%# 9o,*nc*l*s pro!le,, %# , ?91 9*"h of St. Dictor, 55 A59, 1?5 , ?%E A?%5, ?%9 , ?61 = Didascalicon,55 9*,an !ein": essence of, as thinkin" !ein", # , E , #? n, ?%1 , ?%# A?%F= finit*de of, % = as i,a"e of 0od, % n, ?1F , ?#1 A?#?, ?5? A?5F= i,a"ination directs en4oy,ent of po+ers of, ?9# A?9F= nat*re of, #? n, ?%1 , ?%# A?%F= and +ill, ?EE

I
/deas, 6 , 5E , ?F% A?F6= and !iplanarity, ?%# = in early philosophy of Descartes, %$ = innateness of, ?%$ A?%1= o!4ective reality of, %$ , %? = in Plato, 115 A119= in the Regulae,9E = representative f*nction of, in later Descartes, %$ = tr*e i,a"inative ideas, ?$# = the +ay of ideas, ?55 A?59 /,a"es: association and reassociation of, ?5$ A?51= in Christ6s *nderstandin", ?5 = in divine rapt*re, ?5 = have three spatial di,ensions, 1$? , 16% = in h*,an ecstasy, ?5 = lan"*a"e of, ?#6 = relationship to physical i,pression, ??# = in thinkin", 15 A19, ?E A?5. %ee also Phantas,s Imaginari : ,eanin" of, ## n= synony,y +ith 6concipere6, ## A#F, FF , 5F A5%, ?19 Imaginatio : distinction fro, 6phantasia6, #1 n. %ee also @verro[s=

@vicenna /,a"ination: a!stracted fro, ,e,ory, ?9% = as activity, FF AF6, %F A%%= in ani,als, 1E = in @ristotle, 16 A19= as ca*se of ,otion in ( #1$ ( !ody, #1 = central role in Regulae,#$ A#1= co"nitive *se of, F , 6 , 95 = co"nitive +eakness of, E = in !ompendium musicae,FF AF6= concept*al, in pre,odern tho*"ht, ?6 = corporeal, FE , F5 A%E= dyna,ic, ??? A?#?= eclipse of, ?96 = in Girst 8editation, ?%% , ?%9 , ?61 = as foc*s of pre,odern psycholo"y, ?6 A?E= and "eo,etrical c*rves, E$ AE?= as havin" ideas, ?$5 = identified +ith disc*rsive tho*"ht, ?69 = as indicative of chan"es in Descartes, % , 161 = and infinity, ?#9 A?F1= intellect*al, FE , F5 AF9, %E A%5, E? AE6, 116 A1?$= as inter,ediate po+er, ? = as internal sense, 5 , 1E = and &e onde,?19 A?#?= in ,athe,atics, % , 6 , 1%# A1%6, ?59 A?9$= in ,editation and conte,plation, ?%6 A?6$= in editations,1 A#, ?F6 A?E?= onde,??F A??%, ??9 A?#$= as ,odern shi!!oleth, 9 = ,otion of, replicates the +orld in &e and ,*sic, % n, FF AF6=

and narrative conte)t, 116 A11E= overco,in" +eakness in ingenium,1$F = in Passions,?E9 A?5F= pheno,enon of, 1$ = in physics, E = poetic, # AF, FE , 16? , ?6$ = as prod*ctive, # , % n= of 3*antity, ?F9 A?%$= 3*iescence of, ?6E = as re"raspin" and reconceptive, %1 = as representin" aspects and relations, 11% A116= restriction to e)tension, ?F? , ?FF = scope of, 5% A56, ?9# A?9F= in Second 8editation, ?6% = and selfAcontrol, ?51 = s*!ordinated to +ill, ?FF , ?EF A?E%, ?E6 = as s*rro"ate for ,e,ory, E5 = as synthetic po+er, F% = t+ofold si"nificance in CCo"itationes privatae,C FE = and *niversal *se of partic*lar fi"*res, 15% A156= vis*al vs. a*dial paradi", of, F9 , %F , 11E = +ork of in Regulae,15? A19#. %ee also @nalo"y= @verro[s= @vicenna= !ogitatio = Co"itation= Disc*rsive thinkin"= Do*!t= Imaginatio = ingenium = /ntellect= 8athe,atical constr*ction= 8athe,atics= 8athe,atics of proportion=

Phantasia = &hinkin"= .ill /,a"ination +ords, FF /,,ortality of so*l, 19 A?$ /,pressions, trans,ission of, in Regulae , ## . %ee also 8otion /nd*ction, 1#F , 1#9 = ,athe,atical, 1#9 /nfinity, ?#9 A?F?= of 0od, ?#9 Ingenium : acco,,odation to li,its of, 1FE = in CCo"itationes privatae,C E% = defined in Regulae,#$ , #% , 95 = Descartes6s *sa"e of, 91 A9E= ety,olo"y, 55 = and "eo,etrical constr*ction, 95 = 0ilson on, 5E A55= h*,an, 1FE = i,a"es and, 9E A95= li,its of, 9F A9%= ,eanin" in pre,odern and early ,odern tho*"ht, 55 A91= nonco"nitive i,plications of, 9% = and nonfo*ndational kno+led"e, 196 A19E= pop*lar *sa"e of ter,, 91 = re"*lation :r*les; of, 9% A96, 1FF = represents relationships, 99 A1$1= translation of, 5# A5F. %ee also @3*inas, &ho,as= Discovery= /,a"ination= athesis = 2ative endo+,ent of h*,an !ein"s Inspectio mentis,# , 6 , 15% /ntellect, 119 = a"ent, 19 , ?# , ?F :see also .ous poietikos ;=

!eco,es a"ent of all co"nition in Regulae,161 A16?= !iplanarity of, ?6E = conceives ne"ations, li,its, and lin"*istic propositions, ?$? A?$#= controls i,a"ination in &e division of po+ers of, 1F = freedo, and, ?$% = 0od6s vs. ,an6s, 16$ n= li,ited operation of, +itho*t phantas,s, ?$$ A?$E= nat*re of, 15 , 19 = passivity of, ?E6 , ?E5 = p*re intellect, 1EE , 151 , ?F6 A?FE, ?66 A?E?= receptive or passive, 19 , ?F :see also .ous pathetikos ;= as so*rce of error, 195 , ?$$ A?$1= and +ill, ?1# A?1%, ?EF A?E5. %ee also Co"itation= Disc*rsive thinkin"= /,a"ination= &hinkin"= .ill Intellectus, ?6 = as synony, of 6vis co"noscens6, 5% /ntentions :intentiones ;, in @vicenna, ?1 /nternal senses, 1F , ?$ A?6= physiolo"ical location of, ?1 A?#, ?% = in Scholastic theory of kno+in", 1?$ A1?1. %ee also @verro[s= @vicenna= Co"itation= Co,,on sense= /,a"ination= Ingenium = 8e,ory /nt*ition, 1?E = in Scholastic tho*"ht, 1?E Intuitus :or intuitus Aseein";, 1?F = active vs. passive, ?$E = onde,??1 , ??5 =

analo"y !et+een vision and kno+led"e, 1?6 , 1F$ A1F1= !iplanar, 1F# A1FF= Descartes defines, 1?6 = ety,olo"y, 1?E = of e)tension, 15F A15%= as "rasp or concept, 166 = i,provin", 1F$ A1FF= in late Scholasticis,, 1?5 = in ,editation and conte,plation, 1?E A1?5, ?%5 = in 8editations, ?69 = nat*res as possi!le o!4ects of, ?$$ = oriented !y aspects, di,ensions, and nat*res, 1?9 n= not teacha!le, 1F% = translation of, 1?F

<
Kes*its: and i,a"ination, ?E A?5= and ingenium,91 = and ,editation, ?%E = and spirit*ality, ?%E n Kohn of the Cross, ?6% K*d",ent, Descartes6s theory of, ?E1 A?E?

)
'ant, 9 'ennin"ton, >ichard, EF n 'epler, Kohannes, ?## 'lein, Kaco!, % n, 1%1 n 'oyrS, @le)andre, %9 n 'os,an, L. @ryeh, ?%9 n ( #11 (

L
Lachter,an, David >apport, % n, 1%F A1%%=

)thics of 0eometry,1%F La GlRche. %ee CollR"e 9enri /D at La GlRche Laporte, Kean, 5# n Lei!ni7, 0ottfried .ilhel,, #6 , F6 , %5 &e = onde, 6, ?5 , %? , 1$9 , 11F , 19F , ?$5 , ?11 A?#5, ?F1 , ?F? , ?F9 , ?%$ , ?6$ , ?69 , ?5? , ?5# , ?59

"lo!al approach to physics, ?11 = i,a"inative fa!le of, ?15 A?19, ??9 Lenoir, &i,othy, 1%5 n &'(omme, ?1E , ??1 , ?#? , ?#F , ?#6 A?#E, ?FF Li"ht. %ee Bptics Li,it, 1E1 n, ?$F n Ll*ll, >ay,ond, 1%F = Ars 4revis, E$ , 9# Local deter,inacy :of pro!le, sol*tions;, 115 Local ,e,ory, EE AE5 Loco,otion. %ee 8otion Lo"ic, 1?% , 1E9 = psycholo"i7ation of, in si)teenth cent*ry, 1?9 Loh,ann, Kohannes, F? n Loria, 0ino, E1 n

,
8aren!on, Kohn, ?$ n 8arion, KeanAL*c, #% n, #E n, 56 n, 1?F A1?%n, 1#1 , 1%$ n, 19% A196 8athe,atical constr*ction, %9 AE?= e)actit*de in, 65 A69= i,a"ina!ility of, 66 AE?= of irrationals, 19F n= li,its of, in Regulae,19# A19F= replicates realA+orld sit*ations in &e CCo"itationes privataeC= 0eo,etrical co,pass= 0eo,etrical c*rves= Ingenium = onde,?#$ . %ee also @l"e!raic e3*ations=

athesis, 8esola!e 8athe,atics: aided !y i,a"ination, ?F# = analysis of ancients, 1%1 , 159 A19$= arith,etic and "eo,etry of ancients, 1F5 A1F9= derived fro, ,otion in &e onde,??? A??#= Descartes6s ,ethod of analysis, 19$ = e3*ivalent to 6discipline6, 1F6 = the e)ercise par e)cellence of i,a"ination, ?59 A?9$= "eo,etry6s pri,acy in Descartes, 1%5 A1%9= i,a"ination as ,edi*, of, 1%# A1%F= as nat*ral o!4ect of ingenium,1FE A1F5= ordinary vs. hi"her, 1F9 = paradi", of kno+led"e, 1?? A1?#. %ee also @l"e!raic e3*ations= 0eo,etry= 0eometry = 8athe,atical constr*ction= athesis = Proportion 8athe,atics of proportion: e,!races +hole science of p*re ,athe,atics, 1E# = as e)pressive of relations, F9 A%5, E% , 99 A1$1= prec*rsor of analytic "eo,etry, 66 = reasons for Descartes6s st*dy of, E5 AE9= in Regulae,1%E A1%5= and si,ple nat*res, ??F = as *niversal science, 6? AE?. %ee also @l"e!raic e3*ations= @nalo"y= 0eo,etrical co,pass= 0eo,etrical c*rves= athesis = Proportion 8athe,ati7ation: of ,*sical theory, F1 AF#= as ,isleadin" topos of Descartes scholarship, #5 , F1 , F? , 1$$ , 16$ , ?5E athesis, 1%$ , ?5E = ,athetical kno+in", 1%9 A16?=

philosophical character of, 1%$ A1%1= as preparin" ingenium,1%$ = as science of order and ,eas*re, 1%1 . %ee also 8athe,atics= Proportion athesis universalis,F1 , 1%1 , 1%# , 1%5 , 1E9 , 15$ , 19? 8a77eo, Koseph @., 59 n 8eas*re, 15E , 191 A19? 8echanics, reasons for Descartes6s st*dy of, E5 AE9, ?5E 8echanis, in Regulae,## 8edicine and the theory of sense and co"nition, 5 , ?% A?6 editatio, 6 8editation: act of i,a"ination, ?%6 = Descartes6s *sa"e of, ?%6 = descri!ed, ?61 A?6?= e)ercise of i,a"ination, ?%% A?6$= profo*ndly rec*rsive, ?6# editations on $irst Philosophy,1 , ? , E , 5 , #? , ## n, %? , ?$E A?$5, ?1% , ??6 , ??E , ??5 , ?#5 , ?#9 , ?F# , ?F% A?E?, ?E# , ?E6 A?E5, ?51 , ?59 , ?9F , ?9% = Girst 8editation, 1 , ?%% , ?%9 , ?6$ , ?61 , ?6? , ?6F , ?6E = Second 8editation, ? , # , ?$5 , ?F1 , ?FE , ?6? , ?6# , ?6% , ?66 = &hird 8editation, %$ , ?$5 , ?6% , ?6E , ?E1 = Go*rth 8editation, ?E$ , ?E6 = Gifth 8editation, ?F9 , ?%1 , ?6F , ?6E = Si)th 8editation, E , ?$5 , ?F1 , ?F5 A?F9, ?%# , ?6E = Synopsis, ?6# = clos*re of thro*"h ,editation, ?65 = i,a"ination pervasive in, ?%% = i,a"inative recapit*lation in, ?6? A?6#= as psycholo"ical ,etaphysics, ?%F , ?E$ = +ill in, ?EE 8e,ory: the art of, E6 AE9, 1$F A1$%, 1$E , 1%? = defined in Regulae,#1 , 5% = Descartes6s treat,ent of, ?9F A?96= displace,ent of, !y i,a"ination, 1$# =

in 9*"h of St. Dictor, 55 = in ,*sical perception, F% , 11E . %ee also Local ,e,ory 8ersenne, 8arin, # , 1$9 n, ?11 , ?1? , ?#1 , ?#9 , ?F$ , ?F1 , ?F? A?F#, ?%1 , ?5? 8esland, Denis, ?E$ , ?E% 8esnard, Pierre, ?%9 n 8esola!e, 6? A6# 8etaphysical treatise, lost, ?1? 8ethod, 96 , 1FF A1%?= !ased on nat*re of ,ind, 1E1 = crisis of ,ethod of Regulae,?1% A?16= defined, 1F% = fi"*ration and, %5 = i,a"ination in, F , E6 AE9, 15? A19#= o!4ectAcentered, 195 = practical ai, of, !ontinues on neBt page ( #1? ( !ontinued from previous page 19E A195= *niversality of Regulae's,15# A15F 8ilha*d, 0aston, %9 nn, 1%5 n 8odel, %6 A%E 8otion: necessity of reco"ni7in", ?1E = po+er of, 1F , 55 = in Regulae, #1 , 5% = trans,ission of, in sensation, ?9 A#$, 1$9 A11$, ??# A??F. %ee also /,pressions, trans,ission of, in Regulae = Bptics 8*sic: Descartes6s theory of, #E AFF= and i,a"ination, FF AF6= ,elody and tone in, F? = p*rpose of, #E = reasons for Descartes6s st*dy of, E5 AE9=

rhyth, in, F? . %ee also !ompendium musicae

N
2ative endo+,ent of h*,an !ein"s, E% , 9? , 9% , 9E 2at*ral li"ht, 1?? = i,provin", 1?1 2at*ral po+er, 1F1 A1F# 2at*res :si,ple;: @ristotelianAScholastic, 16# = co,,on, 1E6 , 1EE = co,position of, 1E5 , ?%1 A?%#= division into three kinds, 1E% A1E6= e)perienced, not kno+n, ?$F A?$%= fo*ndation for application of phantasia,156 = in &e onde,??6 A??E= the n*,!er of, 169 = ontolo"y of, 16E = pro!le,s +ith theory of, 19% A19E= Regulae's notion of, 16# A16E, 1E% A1EE= reification of, ?$E = >*le 1?6s pres*ppositional acco*nt of, 19% = si,ple, 165 A169= threefold ,eanin" in >*le 6, 165 . %ee also @!sol*te= Participation= >espective= Si,ples :in Regulae ; 2ecessity: as ,issin" nat*re in Regulae,199 = in &e onde,?19 , ??% 2erves: f*nction of in Regulae,## = in Passions,?EF A?E%= physiolo"y and str*ct*re of, ?#F A?#6= trans,it press*re, not i,a"e, ?#6 2e+ton, /saac, 1% n, ?59 .oein,15 . %ee also Intuitus .ous, ?6

.ous pathetikos,1% , ?# , ?F , 1%F . %ee also /ntellect .ous poietikos,1% , ?F . %ee also /ntellect 2*,!ers: i,a"inary, E1 = *lti,ately distin"*ished fro, e)tension, ?F# 2*ss!a*,, 8artha C., 1E n

O
Bly,pian thin"s, E# , E% , 116 , 119 Bntolo"y vs. episte,olo"y in Regulae,199 , ?%1 = sol*tion of pro!le, in Bptics, 19E , ?11 = and li"ht, ?1E A?15= perceivin" distance, ?#E A?#5= and physics of trans,ission of li"ht, ?## A?#F= reasons for Descartes6s st*dy of, E5 AE9, ?5E . %ee also 8otion Brder, 1#9 , 16? , 191 editations,?%?

P
Papp*s, 1%1 , 16$ Park, 'atharine, ?1 n Participation, 16F A166= *niversal relevance of, 159 . %ee also @!sol*te= 2at*res= >espective Particles of ,atter, ?1E Passions, 9% , ?E# A?EF, ?E9 A?51 Passions of the %oul,E , ?#E , ?E? A?5F, ?9# , ?9F = conception of passional life in, ?E5 A?5F= pri,acy of +ill in, ?E? A?E5 Pe"haire, K*lien, ?# n Perception, ?E# A?EF= s*!4ectivi7ation of, in ,*sic, F? AF# Phantasia : distinction fro, 6i,a"inatio6, #1 n= in 0od, 5 = intelli"i!le ,atter of, in ,athe,atics, 1%# =

kinesis phantastike,1%F = or"an as +ell as activity, #1 n= participates in nat*re of its o!4ect in &e place of reApresentation, ??? = possi!le prototype for pineal "land, #1 A#?= 1uantum phantasiatum,1%F = really e)tended, ?9 A#$, ??? = in Regulae, ?9 = spatial s*!strate for co"nitive i,a"ination, ?9? A?9#. %ee also @verro[s= @vicenna= /,a"ination= Ingenium = Pineal "land Phantas,s, 6 , E , 9E = in ,e,ory art, E6 AE5= preparation of in internal senses, %# , 1?$ = p*re, real, of, 16$ A161= +hether re3*ired for thinkin", ?E A?5, ?FE A?F5. %ee also /,a"es= /,a"ination= Phantasia Philosophy: ancient, !ased on ,athesis, 1%9 , ?9% A?96= transfor,ation of Descartes6s, % , ?5% A?96 Physico,athe,atics, %9 A6?= as so*rce of intuitus+deductio+enumeratio in Regulae , 1#E Physics, ?11 , ?5E = as ,athe,atics of ,otion in &e and kno+in", 1?1 A1??= and perception, ?#? A?#6= and psycholo"y, ?% Piccolo,ini, @lessandro, 1%F Pineal "land, ??? = descri!ed, #1 n= and Descartes6s early theory of phantasia,1# = onde,??? A?#? Physiolo"y: Descartes6s reasons for st*dyin", ?5E = onde,??F =

focal point of ,indA!ody interaction, #1 A#?, ## , #F , ?#E = so*rce of flo+s of ani,al spirits, #? . %ee also Phantasia Planes :in conscio*sness;: of appearances, ?69 A?E$= as constant feat*re of Descartes6s tho*"ht, ?9? A?9#= of i,a"es and fi"*res, %# = o!4ect plane, %% , %6 A%E, 1FF = oc*lar plane, %% , %6 A%E, 1FF = relativity of, %E = relevance and, %6 = of sense and intellect, ?6F . %ee also Biplanarity= /,a"ination= /ntellect= /is cognoscens Plato :and Platonis,;, 56 , 1?5 = proportion in the divided line, 115 A119= Repu4lic, F1 = sensation as proportion, F1 = Timaeus, F1 ( #1# ( Pneuma, ?6 Poisson, 2icolas, #9 n Polyno,ial, al"e!raic, 66 Pri,itive notions, ?%6 Principles of Philosophy,F , 15% n, ??$ , ?F# , ?F9 n, ?%? n, ?6% , ?E# , ?E6 , ?E5 n, ?9# Pro!le,s and pro!le, solvin", %9 A6?, 1#E A1F$, 1E9 A19#, ?56 = i,a"ination cr*cial in, 1$F = i,perfect, 15$ = initiatin", 15$ A151= local syste,aticity of, ?1? = and ,edieval 1uaestio,1EF A1E%, 1E5 A1E9= philosophical theory of, 1EF = representin" +ith i,a"es, 1$? , 1$% A11#= s*,,ary of ,ethod concernin", 159

Procl*s, 1%# A1%F Proportion: arith,etic, #9 = constr*ction of proportionals, 6? A66= distinctly evident in phantasia,156 = "eo,etric, #9 = in perception, F$ AF1= trans,ission of, fro, +orld to sense, #5 AF?= as *niversal science of pro!le, solvin", 69 AE?, 119 = +orkin" o*t proportions, 1E# A1EF. %ee also @nalo"y= 0eo,etrical co,pass= 8athe,atical constr*ction= 8athe,atics of proportion= 8esola!e= Physico,athe,atics= >atio, ,athe,atical Proposition, 1%9 n, 1E1 , 1E5 = poorly renders propositio,1#$ Psycholo"y, philosophical: ani,als, 1F , 1E = of @ristotle, 1F A?$, ?1 , ?# = of Descartes, 6 , ?5% A?56, ?5E A?55= ,edieval disc*ssions of, 1# A1F= Platonic, ?% = pre,odern 6 = Scholastic, 1?$ = Stoic, ?% . %ee also @ppetitive po+ers= @3*inas, &ho,as= @ristotle= @verroMs= @vicenna= 1)ternal senses= Gac*lty psycholo"y= /nternal senses= 8otion, po+ers of= Physiolo"y=

Psychophysiolo"y= Sensation, po+ers of= De"etative po+ers of so*l Psychophysiolo"y: psychophysiolo"ical hypothesis of Regulae,?5 A#%, ?## = of >*le 1?, 111 Pytha"oras and Pytha"oreanis,: ,athe,atics of consonance, F? = sensation as proportion, F1

1
Z*adratri), 6? , 6E A69, E$ Z*alities: eli,ination of *nnecessary, in &e secondary, 1$% , 1$5 A11$ onde,??1 =

R
>ah,an, G., ?F n >a,*s, Petr*s, 1%F >ath,ann, Bernd, ?%9 n Ratio, ?6 >atio, ,athe,atical, #5 Reductio, 195 Regulae ad directionem ingenii,F , #E , %? , 5# A?$5, ?16 , ?15 , ?19 , ??1 , ??# , ??F , ??6 , ?#1 , ?#F , ?#% , ?#6 , ?#9 , ?F? , ?F# A?FF, ?FE , ?%$ , ?%1 , ?%? , ?%F , ?%% , ?6$ , ?61 , ?6F , ?6% , ?66 , ?69 , ?E1 , ?E? , ?EF , ?E% , ?E6 , ?E5 , ?5E , ?9# , ?9F , ?9% = a*to!io"raphical reflections, 1F5 = datin" co,position of, ?5 A?9, #E = kno+a!ility, t+o kinds in, ??E A??5= patterned on ,e,ory art, 1$# A1$%, 1%? = prere3*isite for editations,?%F A?%%= psychophysiolo"y of, ?5 A#%= 3*alities !ottleneck in, ??# A??F= str*ct*re of, 5# , 1$1 A1$?, 1%5 n, 1E9 = tensions in, 19# A199= ter,inolo"y of, 5% , 56 = the,atic e,phasis, 5# = >*le 1, 1?? =

>*le ?, 1?? A1?F= >*le #, 1?F , 1#$ A1#?, 1#F , 1#6 A1#E, 1FF = >*le F, 9E , 1FF A1%?, 1%E , 1%9 A16$, 16? , 15$ = >*le FA@, 1F6 , 1F9 , 1%$ = >*le FAB, 1F6 , 1F5 , 1F9 , 1%$ , 1%1 , 1%? = >*le %, 16? , 151 , 15E , ?%? = >*le 6, 1F$ , 1F? , 1F# , 1%6 , 16? A169, 1E? A1EF, 151 , 15F , 15E , 19% , 195 , ?1? A?1#= >*le E, 1#? , 1## , 1#F A1#6, 1#5 A1F$, 16? , 151 , 191 , ?F1 , ?69 = >*le 5, 16$ A161, 166 , 169 , 1E% , 15$ , 19% , 19E , 195 , ?F1 , ?F? = >*le 9, 1?9 A1#$, 1#% , 1F$ A1F1, 1F# A1FF, 169 = >*le 1$, 1F$ = >*le 11, 1#% = >*le 1?, ?9 A#%, 5# , 5F , 5% , 56 , 5E , 9E , 95 , 1$% , 1$9 A11?, 1FE , 16$ , 166 , 169 , 1E$ , 1E1 , 1E% A1E5, 1E9 , 19% , 19E , 195 A199, ?1? , ?1% , ?15 , ??$ , ??1 , ??# , ?## , ?#F , ?#% A?#6, ?%1 A?%?, ?69 , ?E% = >*le 1#, 1E9 , 15$ A15?, 159 , ?$# , ?$% = >*le 1F, 99 , 1$? , 1$# , 1$5 , 1E9 , 15? A19?, 19% , ?$$ A?$6, ??E , ??5 = >*le 1%, 1$? , 1$# , 19? = >*le 16, 1#% , 1#6 , 19? = >*le 1E, 19? = >*le 15, 19? , 19# = >*le 19, 19? = >*le ?$, 19? A19#= >*le ?1, 19# . %ee also !ogitatio = Co,,on sense= 1ternal tr*ths= 1)ternal senses= /deas= /,a"ination= /,pressions, trans,ission of, in Regulae = Ingenium = >estlessness of so*l= Sensation= Si,ples :in Regulae ; >elations, e)pressi!ility of, 1$#

>epresentation: lo"ic of, %? = Descartes6s pra",atis, a!o*t, 1$9 = representative f*nction of fi"*res, 11F A116 Res cogitans,5E , 9E , 15% >ese,!lance: episte,olo"ical and ontolo"ical, FE A%5= in editations,%? = ,ethod of notin", 1E$ = rese,!lance thesis, ?16 A?1E, ??$ = s*!version of, in &e Res eBtensa,15% >espective, 16F A165 >espects, 16E >estlessness of so*l, ?66 , ?E$ , ?E% , ?5# , ?9# = in !ompendium musicae,?E1 = in editations,?E1 = in Regulae,?E1 ( #1F ( >ichard of St. Dictor, 1?5 , ?%E , ?%5 A?%9 >isse, .ilhel,, 1?9 >oche,ontei), Ca,ille de, ?E n, 91 nn >odisALe+is, 0eneviRve, F n, ?E n >orty, @,Slie Bksen!er", 1E n, ?%9 n >oss, 0. >. &., #1 n, 5F n >ossi, Paolo, E6 n, EE >oy, Kean 9., % n >*!id"e, Bradley, ?%9 n onde,?15 = and sy,!ols, %$ . %ee also Si,ilarity, ontolo"ical

S
Sartre, KeanAPa*l, % Schenckel, Kohann La,!ert, E6 AE5, 1$F , 1$E , 1$5 , 11? , 161 Schofield, 8alcol,, 1E n Scholasticis,, F1 , %# =

and pro!le, solvin", 1F? Sch*ster, Kohn, #E n, %9 n, ??F n Science, ro,antic, ?9$ , ?91 Scot*s, Kohn D*ns, ?1F Seeds of tr*th in the so*l, EF AE%, 96 , 1F% A1F6, 1F5 , 1%$ , 1%9 A16$, 15% n, ?16 SelfAevidence, 11E A115, ?6F Sensation: defined in Regulae,#$ A#1= e)plained !y ,otion, ?1E = po+ers of, 1F = receptivity of, 16 Sensi!les: co,,on, 1% , 16 = e)tension as co,,on to all sensi!les, 11$ = proper, 1% Sensitive part of so*l, 9% %ensus communis. %ee @ristotle= @vicenna= Co,,on sense Sepper, Dennis L., 195 n, ?## n, ?F$ n Seriation, 16? A1EE, 15# A15F Series, 16% , 165 Shea, .illia, >., %9 nn, ?#$ n Si"net rin", as i,a"e of sensation, 16 Si,ilarity, ontolo"ical, %E A%5. %ee also >ese,!lance Si,on Kosef, % n, 1FE n Si,ples :in Regulae ;, 1?F , 16# A16F, 166 , 169 A1E1= pheno,enolo"ical vs. ontolo"ical, 1E1 . %ee also @!sol*te= 2at*res= Participation= >espective Si,plici*s, ?F n Si,plification, 1$? S,ith, 2or,an 'e,p, 9F n Space, replication of, ??$ A??1 Species, sensi!le, ##

Spirit*al: interpretation, E? AEF= as opposed to 6,aterial6, FE = as related to 6intelli"i!le6, FE . %ee also Gi"*ration and fi"*rin" %piritualia, F5 , %? Steneck, 2icholas 9ans, ?$ n, ?F n Stoics, 56 = ani,al spirits theory of, ?? , ?#6 = i,portance for Descartes, ?6 = psycholo"y of, ?? , ?% A?6. %ee also (egemonikon = Pneuma S*dhoff, .alther, ?$ n S*,,ers, David, ?1 n, F1 n Sy,!ols, %$ , E? AE#, 11F A11% Sy,pathy of affections, #5 , F#

T
&annery, Pa*l, 1%1 n &hinkin": as active, ?$E = as "en*s of i,a"ination, # = re3*ires phantas,s, 6 , E , 15 A19. %ee also Co"itation= Dianoein &i,e, ?65 n &oledo, Grancisco de, 59 &ree of philosophy, F &+o i,a"inations, FE , %$ A%5, E? , E# , 115 , 1?$ , ?69

U
Understandin". %ee /ntellect Unit, 15E , 191

V
van Berkel, 'laas, #5 n, 11? n Dan de Pitte, Grederick, #E n, 1?5 n Darro, 8arc*s &erenti*s, 1#F De"etative po+ers of so*l, 1F , 55

Dentricles of the !rain, ?# , ?% , #1 Dictorines, 1?5 , 1#1 n /is cognoscens,?9 , #$ , 5% , 16$ , ?$E , ?E? = a!ility to shift planes, ?9# = and +ill, ?E?

*
.e!er, KeanAPa*l, #E n, 1F% n, 1F6 , 1%9 n= .e!er thesis, #E nA#5n, 95 n, 1F6 , 1%9 n .edin, 8ichael D., 1E n .ells, 2or,an K., 1?9 n .ill: and indifference, ?E$ = in pineal "land, ?#E = pri,acy of, ?E? A?5F= relation to intellect, ?1# A?1%, ?#1 A?#?= resol*teness of, in tho*"ht, ?E% = to tr*th, ?E5 .olfson, 9arry @*stryn, ?1 n, ?6 n, 5% n .ords, ?16 , ?F$ , ?6$

Y
<ates, Grances @., E6 n, EE , E5 <olton, Kohn .., 56 n

>
`arlino, 0ioseffo, 6?
Preferred Citation: Sepper, Dennis L. Descartes's Imagination: Proportion, Images, and the Activity of Thinking. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1996 1996. http: ark.cdli!.or" ark: 1#$#$ ft$d%n99fd