By Ryan Vlko THE BATTLE OF ISSUS After defeating the Persian forces at the battle of Granicus, and bringing

Asia Minor into submission, Alexander turned south towards Syria and eventually Egypt. Other than the resistance of individual cities, the only force which stood in his way was the Persian army, which Darius had just finished gathering while Alexander was conquering Asia Minor. The Persians did not keep a large standing army, but in the face of invasion, they responded with the full forces of their kingdom.1 Arrian claims Darius commanded a force of 600,000 soldiers, and Diodorus claims the Persian numbers were 400,000 foot and 100,000 horse. An accurate number of their forces will probably never be reached, but all sources agree that the Persians greatly outnumbered the Macedonians. It is difficult to reconstruct the war plans of the two armies, but the sources do offer some insight, albeit contradictory. Shortly after the death of Memnon, while Darius was gathering his forces, Diodorus recounts a debate in which Charidemus advises the king against assembling all his forces for one battle. Instead, he says that the king should give him command of a large army (100,000 soldiers) and keep the rest for himself in order ensure the continued submission of the rest of his kingdom. So long as at least a third of his force consisted of Greek mercenaries, Charidemus said he would defeat Alexander. Darius Friends opposed Charidemus, and the Athenian lost his cool and attacked the Persians for lack of courage. His overtly frank words displeased Darius and so he was executed as a result. After this episode, Darius could not find another commander equal to the task of assuming Memnons command, so he resolved to lead the army against Alexander himself. Arrian claims that once he had levied his forces and consolidated them at Babylon, Darius selected a plain in Assyria which would allow him to deploy his full forces, and he waited for Alexander to meet him. However, since he was delayed in Tarsus by illness, occupied by the games in Soli, and distracted by his raids on the Cilician highlanders, Alexander did not go to meet Darius. So Darius, taking this as a sign that Alexander was not willing to fight in an open field, immediately advanced towards Cilicia with the intent of hunting down Alexander and his army.2 Q. Curtius recalls another debate, occurring amongst the Persians and the Greek mercenaries about how to react to Alexanders seeming unwillingness to fight on wide ground.3 According to Curtius the debate occurred after Darius had left the plains of Mesopotamia, and he had advanced so far towards Alexander that if he should withdraw at that point, it would be interpreted as retreat. Therefore, the debate probably occurred when he reached Sochi, located in Syria, about 30 km away from the coast of the Gulf of Issus (in the Mediterranean). The Greeks advised Darius to go back and return to the spacious plains of Mesopotamia; or, if he disapproved of that plan, that he should at least divide his countless forces and not allow the entire strength of his kingdom to fall under one stroke of Fortune. Here the same theme of Charidemus is repeated. However, the Persians (probably the group of courtiers called Friends who accompanied Darius) slandered the mercenaries
Q. Curtius, 3.8.9-10. Arrian, 2.6. 3 Q. Curtius, 3.8.
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By Ryan Vlko and successfully swayed Darius. According to Arrian, Amyntas, a Macedonian deserter, also advised Darius to remain at Sochi. Curtius claims that Darius responded to the mercenaries by saying that if he should proceed to withdraw, he would undoubtedly be handing over his kingdom to the enemy; that the result of wars depends on reputation and one who retreats is believed to be in flight. In fact, there was hardly any reason for prolonging the war; for, especially since winter was already at hand, there would not be sufficient supplies for so great a multitude as his, in a devastated region which had been laid waste in turn by his own forces and by the enemy. Besides, his forces could not be divided if the custom of his forefathers was observed, who always opposed their entire strength to a crisis in war. He added that Alexander was using the mountains as a refuge, and so the Persians must go on the offensive and force a battle. Arrians account is suspicious. He appears to be vindicating Alexander, who may have been criticized in posterity for not going to meet Darius in the open plains. In fact, Arrian superstitiously paints a picture of a Persian king destined to surrender his empire to those who were superior, and throughout his portrayal Darius delivered the victory easily to Alexander and his force.4 Nevertheless, Darius sent his royal treasure to Damascus with a large contingent to guard it, and he marched his forces through the Amanian Gates (which pass through the northern Amanus Mountains in southeastern Asia Minor) as soon as he heard that the Macedonians had taken possession of the southern passes of the Amanian Mountains in southern Syria (only about 20km from him as the bird flies).5 His intention must have been to cut the Macedonian forces in half. The sources mention that Darius received word that Alexander was ill at Tarsus before he had crossed the Euphrates, but there is no mention that Darius knew that Alexander had recovered by the time he reached Sochi.6 Therefore, he most likely thought that Alexander was still in Tarsus (located on the northern coast of the Gulf of Issus in Asia Minor) with a large force, and that he sent the rest of his army to secure the gates which allow passage into Asia Minor from Syria. It must be observed that at this point in the war Darius could have had no idea that Alexander intended to take his campaign all the way to the edge of the known world, to the lands of southern Russia and India, all the way to the Indian Ocean. His kingdom had existed for centuries, and the only real precedent of European invasion was Xenophon with his force of 10,000. At this point Darius was fighting to retain Asia Minor, Syria and possibly Egypt, but not the entire Persian Empire. This explains why, when he reached Issus, he was surprised to learn that Alexander was already near Iskenderun with his whole force. In fact, when Alexander learned that Darius was at Sochi, he marched to Issus. Curtius reveals a discussion between Alexander and his generals, and he claims that Parmenion expressed the opinion that no other place was more suitable for a battle. For there the forces of both kings would be equal in number, since the narrow space could not contain a multitude of men; his men ought to avoid a plain and the open fields where they might be caught and crushed in a pincer maneuver. He feared that they might be
Arrian, 2.6.6-7. Diodorus, 17.32.3. 6 Q. Curtius, 3.7.1-2.
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By Ryan Vlko defeated, not by the enemies valor, but by their own weariness; fresh Persians would constantly be coming to the front, if they were allowed to take more open order.7 Curtius claims that Alexander accepted this advice and decided to remain in the land between the Amanian Mountains and the Gulf of Issus. Despite his surprise, Darius still assumed that Alexander was avoiding battle by marching further south, and he probably thought that his enemys intention was to delay until winter, which would put Darius in the difficult position of providing for a large army for an extended period of time. In actuality, Darius had surprised Alexander by crossing the Amanus Mountains through the unguarded Bahce Pass, and now he was in the position to block Alexander from receiving supplies and communications from Macedonia, which was exactly the situation he wanted, because this would force Alexander to enter battle before the winter. Alexander had left his sick and injured troops, along with the siege train, at Issus before marching further south, and Darius captured these. He then decided to pursue Alexander from the rear, and he marched his forces up to the Pinarus River. Near Iskenderun, Alexander received news that Darius had taken Issus. Despite his surprise, Alexander was delighted, because Darius was playing right into his plan. At that moment he turned his army around and marched at full speed towards the Persians. At the Pinarus, Darius learned that Alexander was marching towards him, much to his surprise. At that moment, he fortified the river and prepared for battle there. At this point a historical reconstruction becomes quite difficult. All ancient sources agree that the Macedonians met and fought the Persians at the Pinarus River, but since there is no longer a river called the Pinarus, doubt looms over the location of the battle, so modern scholars have attempted to locate the battlefield by following ancient descriptions. The most authoritative and detailed source is Callisthenes, whose words are handed down to us by Polybius in a lengthy criticism of his work. Bosworth gives a good summary of modern attempts to locate the battlefield, saying that originally there was a general accord that the battle occurred at the Payas River.8 Hammond, who visited the area and has done extensive research, argues in favor of this location. He gives three pieces of evidence to support his claim.9 Using Callisthenes description he argues that when Alexander heard that Darius was 100 stades (18.5 km) away, he was at Myriandrus, which is right near Iskenderun. The distance from Iskenderun to the Payas River is 20 km. The other river, at which many scholars claim the battle was fought, is the Deli Cay River, and the distance from Iskenderun to the Deli Cay is 30 km. Second, Hammond recals that when Alexander first came to wide ground he was about 40 stades away from Darius. Coming from the south, the first point at which one encounters wider ground after the Jonah Pass is near Erikli, which is about 8 km from the Payasroughly 40 stades. On the other hand, when one comes within 40 stades of the Deli Cay, the ground is already 4 km wide. Lastly, the distance from the mountains to the sea in 333 BC at the battlefield was 14 stades (2.6 km). Currently, that distance at the Payas River is 4
Q. Curtius, 3.7.8-9. Bosworth, A.B. A Historical Commentary on Arrians History of Alexander, p.203-4. 9 Hammond, N.G.L. Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman, p.96-7.
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By Ryan Vlko km, and at the Deli Cay it is 6.7 km. Hammond explains that the Payas River is constantly depositing sediment on the coast, pushing it further into the sea. He cites evidence for this ongoing process. In Arrian 2.7.2, the coast formed a bay, but presently it sticks out into the sea, especially around the part at which the river flows. In explaining the physical change of the coastline, he adds that the course of the river has changed since the fourth century BC, for Callisthenes writes that the river ran diagonally from the foot of the mountains to the sea. However, after A. Janke conducted his own survey of the area, he criticized the accepted theory that the battle occurred at the Payas. Instead, he placed the battle at the Deli Cay River, 11km north of the Payas. His conclusions directly contradict those of Hammond in at least two respects. First, he asserts that at the Payas there is no room for a 40-stade approach march by Alexander, as described by Callisthenes; 40-stades south of the Payas Alexander would still have been in the coastal defiles of the Cilician Gates, says Bosworth. Second, he argues that the terrain would not allow for the battle to play out according to the description of the ancient sources. Referring specifically to Arrians claim10 that Alexander led the Companion cavalry at full charge against Darius left wing, Janke argues that there is no place on the Payas River which would allow such a charge.11 Hammond himself admits that the point of the river at which Alexander would have crossed is full of boulders which render a cavalry charge impossible, but he counters Jankes argument by saying that it was not the cavalry whom Alexander led in charge, but rather the Royal Brigade of Hypaspists, who were foot-soldiers.12 The passage in Arrian certainly permits this. To this discussion Bosworth adds that the Deli Cay does not fit Callisthenes description in any way. Bosworth introduces another argument, which he indicates is the one he accepts, namely that of Kromayer and Freya Stark, who both traveled to the area. They assert that the battle could have, and most probably did, take place at the Kuru Cay stream, located between the Payas and Deli Cay. Bosworth writes, The banks apparently are steep enough to give some justification to Callisthenes description and at the same time permit a cavalry charge.13 The contradictory evidence of Hammond and Janke regarding the width of the area which lies 40-stades south of the Payas has not been reconciled. Nevertheless, based on Callisthenes description, the battle could not have taken place at the Deli Cay. The most probable locations are the Kuru Cay and the Payas, depending on whether one accepts Hammond or Jankes assertion about the terrain lying 40-stades south of the Payas, for if Janke is correct, then one should seek a river located further north. The details of the battle are completely different, depending on the location of the battle. But at any rate the battlefield did not allow the Persians to exploit their numerical superiority, because they met Alexander in a narrow pass, bound on one side by the sea and on the other by mountains. Callisthenes account supports Hammonds claim that Alexander led an infantry charge, for he writes, Darius and
Arrian, 2.10.3. Bosworth, A.B. A Historical Commentary on Arrians History of Alexander, p.203. 12 Hammond, N.G.L. Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman, p.104. 13 Bosworth, p.204.
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By Ryan Vlko his officers determined to draw up their whole phalanx on the ground occupied by his encampment, as it then was, and to defend his front by the river, which flowed right along his camp.14 It would have been unwise for Alexander to lead a frontal cavalry charge against the Persian infantry, especially with a river between them and a fortified embankment. The result was that Alexanders charge penetrated the Persian left. After putting them to flight, Alexander wheeled his forces towards the center, which was commanded by Darius. Alexander led a cavalry charge at Darius, but he was stalled by the resistance of Darius bodyguard, and the Persian king was able to flee. Alexander pursued him, while leaving Parmenio and the rest of his forces to finish the battle and defeat the Persian right wing.

14

Polybius, Bk. XII, Ch. 17.