World War I: The Effects of Germanys Implementation of Unrestricted Submarine Warfare on Diplomacy

Cindy Chu
Due Tuesday May 29th, 2012

I have read and understood Hunter College High Schools rules on plagiarism and the work herein is my own, apart from properly referenced resources and quotations. X______________________________

Global IV: Kleinfeld, Period 2

Picture of the UC-97 credited to the Eastland Disaster Historical Society 0 http://www.eastlanddisaster.org/uc97

World War I (1914-1918) marked the beginning of an era with a new interpretation of war. Being the first war that functioned on a truly global scale, the First World War embodied the essence of total war, which, according to the Encyclopedia Britannica, is defined as one that involves contenders [who] are willing to make any sacrifice to obtain a complete victory.i In other words, a total war is one in which an all-or-nothing mentality is adopted by its belligerentsa mindset exemplified by Germanys phases of unrestricted submarine warfare throughout World War I. Even though Germans knew that allowing U-boats to sink on sight would pose a potential threat to neutral nations, ii consequently skewing the delicate balance of the war against Germanys favor, they weighed the possibility of victory through effective use of submarines to a greater extent than the risk of absolute failure. Placing its goal of glory above respect for diplomatic relations and morality, as well as regard for collateral damage, Germany was willing to relinquish its honor, as perceived by other nations, in the hopes of achieving the greater triumph of success in war. Thus, the foundations of diplomacy and international law evolved during World War I as Germanys unrestricted U-boat campaigns increasingly challenged the limits of political discretion and maritime traditions while setting new boundaries in the context of modern, total warfare. Germanys declarations of unrestricted submarine warfare provoked distrust of German ethics and intentions by neutral nations, America in particular, thereby escalating the scope and pace of the war to a considerably greater degree. On February 4, 1915, Germany issued an official proclamation concerning the sinking of merchant ships without warning, which had been occurring on an irregular basis since October 26, 1914.

Its second clause stated that neutral ships, too, will run a risk in the War Zone, which consisted of all waterways surrounding Britain and Ireland.iii If countries needed reason to join the war, this announcement proved to be the initial spark, eventually culminating in powers that previously claimed neutrality resolving to enter the war opposing Germany. The United States association with Germany serves as a primary example of how diplomatic relations shifted through the usage of U-boats in World War I. American involvement in the war had originally been proclaimed as neutral, but sided slightly more with the Allies as it engaged in active trade with Britain prior to and during the times when Germany applied unrestricted submarine warfare.iv However, Germanys deliberate attack on merchant vessels, including Americas neutral ships, caused American-German relationships to show signs of mounting tension. When the RMS Lusitania was sunk without warning by German U-boats on May 7, 1915, killing 1,257 passengers, of which 124 were Americans,v President Woodrow Wilson of the United States retaliated with an ultimatum, pressuring Germany to either stop the use of unrestricted submarine warfare or risk American intervention in war.vi In spite of the limited range and impact of the first unrestricted U-boat operation, with only twenty-one functioning U-boatsvii and twentyone percent of ships sunk by German submarines in 1915 being done so without warning,viii the repercussions were irreparable, with single, isolated cases being displayed as typical of German barbarity. When President Wilson, during a speech, referred to the sinking of the Lusitania as singularly tragical and unjustifiable [and] a truly terrible example of the inhumanity of submarine warfare,ix he expressed the opinions of the

standard American, who was undoubtedly enraged by the unwarranted loss of American lives. Although Germany soon put an end to the first chapter of unrestricted U-boat warfare in response to Americas threats,x the trust and integrity between the two nations had been severely compromised, leaving America poised to join the Allied powers. This drastic turn of events came about predominantly due to a lack of foresight on the part of German admirals, who decided to make use of unrestricted warfare prior to properly assessing the possible detriments of doing so. While German diplomats and politicians were more tactful than Germanys military leaders and overall society in terms of deciding whether to commence unrestricted submarine campaigns, they had less authority to implement their decisions because of the belligerent nature of total war. Unrestricted submarine warfare was insistently encouraged by Germanys most influential military figures and aggressively defended by its populous, which lobbied on behalf of the U-boat movement.xi Nonetheless, German administrative and governmental leaders were more cautious to adopt this controversial method of combat without first considering the results of such actions, xii mainly the adverse response of neutral powers. On August 31, 1916 a German conference was held to decide whether unrestricted submarine warfare should be resumed. Gottlieb von Jagow, Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, contested the firm assertion made by Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, Chief of the Admiralty Staff of the Navy, who said that it was necessary to use all means in [Germanys] power [to destroy] Englands ocean commerce, which demanded the employment of unrestricted U-boat warfare.xiii Secretary von Jagow likened the response of neutral nations to

Germany, should there have been a resumption of unrestricted warfare, as that of men to a mad dog against whom the hand of every man will be raised.xiv During this conference, Imperial Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, a reputable and prominent statesman who happened to be a major opponent against the use of unrestricted submarine warfare, also imputed his conviction that America would surely join the Allied cause if Germany were to once again resort to sinking without warning.xv However, as this meeting did not sufficiently resolve several issues between military and governmental standpoints, the matter of lifting U-boat restrictions was delayed. Another conference was held on January 9, 1917 in an attempt to satisfy both parties,xvi yet differed from the prior, inconclusive assembly due to a greater degree of military-monopolization, which yielded results of a particularly pugnacious approach. At this second convening of German leaders, the only man with a diplomatic backbone was Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, who still believed that the U-boat war might postpone the end of hostilities.xvii Per contra, several military figures were present, with General Field Marshal Paul Ludwig Hans Anton von Beneckendorff und von Hindenburg expressing with the utmost conviction that Germany [needed] the ruthless U-boat war to start from February 1, 1917.xviii The chancellor, being outnumbered and under increasing pressure from the general populace,xix conceded that unrestricted submarine warfare was the last card and if the military authorities [considered] the U-boat war essential, [then he was] not in a position to contradict them.xx Later that day, the Kaiser, ruler of the German people, was persuaded by the events of the conference to follow Marshal von Hindenburgs recommendation, irrespective of American antagonism, announcing the

continuation of unrestricted submarine warfare beginning on the first of February.xxi The transfer of power and public backing in the midst of World War I from levelheaded negotiators to impulsive generals, seen through the gradual diminishment of envoys effects on major pronouncements, symbolized the progression of the wars character from that of a diplomatic standing to a militant and combative one. Despite the fact that there was no international law regarding the inherently offensive and hostile nature of unrestricted maritime warfare during World War I, Germany broke a moral code and left a lasting impact by questioning the basis of traditional war procedure. Though the Declaration of London, presented at the London Naval Conference of 1908-1909, was considered by many to be the core of the international prize court during the First World War,xxii it had neither been ratified nor recognized to have effects by the belligerents of the war when it began.xxiii While this legislation would have would have legally prohibited the unannounced sinking of all merchant ships had it been put into effect, as it specified, Before the vessel is destroyed all persons on board must be placed in safety, in Chapter IV, Article L,xxiv it did not have a legitimate hold over naval tactics through World War I. Instead, as public opinion virtually directed acceptable terms of law during a time when the massacre of civilians, which merchants would be considered to be, was thought of as inhumane, legal trivialities depended on perspective.xxv Therefore, while Germanys actions relating to Uboat warfare garnered much criticism from other countries, Britains seemingly backhanded naval tactics did not. For example, during the first unrestricted submarine campaign, Germany reasoned that neutral ships could be attacked because the British

government allowed, even encouraged, merchantmen to be armed and British ships to disguise themselves by flying neutral flags,xxvi which generated ambiguity as to whether ships were actually neutral. However, as Britains course of action had been established throughout history as ruse de guerre, an acceptable practice that both war and merchant ships could make use of,xxvii it was not openly admonished and German justifications were completely debased. This bias towards unconventional war tactics led to a rude awakening for the Germany, including the unintended consequence of America breaking its neutral status and joining the Allied forces on April 6, 1917 as a result of German admirals and generals refusing to call off the unrestricted U-boat campaign that began in February of that year.xxviii The United States entrance into World War I ultimately generated Germanys defeat, as it supplied additional manpower to the Allies,xxix giving them the slight advantage that was necessary to win the war. Hence, Germanys reluctance to yield to orthodox means of naval warfare crossed the line of justice and ensued in the definitive conclusion of World War I, putting an end to Germans anticipation of exaltation while forcing a humiliating defeat upon them instead. Germanys unrestricted submarine warfare functioned as a challenge to the constraints of war, testing the many facets of diplomatic and time-honored traditions while leading to the start of the first total war. The innate quality of unrestricted warfare as something that incites anger and feeling of injustice, coupled with the fact that German generals rejected the idea of putting an end to it for the sake of peace, gave rise to a bitterness towards Germany from the Allied and neutral powers. This antipathy grew, following the time when Germans implemented their second unrestricted U-boat

campaign in 1917, bringing America into the war after it severed diplomatic relations with Germany. As total war entails a sacrificexxx made on the part of belligerents, the risk taken by German generals, in supporting unrestricted use of submarines as a desperate last resort, serves as one of the causes of World War Is status as a total war. Also during the war, the evolution of the concept of war can be seen as internal burdens in Germany regarding U-boat restrictions weakened the resolve and tenacity of diplomatic statesmen, who underwent major criticism from military figures and an impatient, discontent populace. The U-boat war undeniably played an essential role in earning World War I the label of a total war as it exemplified the frantic scramble for victory while neglecting the prospect of outrage from countries around the globe. If the breach in diplomacy resulting from Germanys unrestricted submarine campaigns did not contribute to the transformation and progression of war throughout World War I, from simply another typical war to a contemporary, total war, then it is not known what does.

Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. "total warfare," by William L. Hosch and Amy Tikkanen, last modified November 14, 2007, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/600428/total-war. ii Edward G. Lengel, "Unrestricted Submarine Warfare," Military History 28, no. 5 (January 2012): 21, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx? direct=true&db=a9h&AN=66892896&site=ehost-live. iii John Terraine, Business in Great Waters: The U-Boat Wars, 1916-1945 (New York: Putnam, 1989), 9. iv Robert C. Stern, Battle Beneath the Waves: The U-Boat War (London: Arms & Armour, 1999), 25. v Terraine, 10 vi Lengel, 21. vii Philip K. Lundeberg, "The German Naval Critique of the U-Boat Campaign, 1915-1918," Military Affairs 23, no. 3 (Fall 1963): 109, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1984204. viii Terraine, 10. ix Ibid., 11. x Stern, 23. xi Lengel, 21.

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William Jameson, The Most Formidable: Thing The Story of the Submarine from Its Earliest Days to the End of World War I (London: R Hart-Davis, 1965), 12. xiii "Excerpts From a German Conference on Unrestricted Submarine Warfare," in Official German Documents Relating to the World War, trans. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 1923), 1154-1163, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Excerpts_ From_a_German_Conference_on_ Unrestricted_Submarine_Warfare. xiv Ibid. xv Ibid. xvi "U-boat Conference of 9 January, 1917," in Official German Documents Relating to the World War, trans. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 1923: Oxford University Press, 1923, 1923), 1320-1321, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/ Uboat_Conference_of_9_January, 1917. xvii Ibid. xviii Ibid. xix Ibid. xx Ibid. xxi Jameson, 15. xxii Charles H. Stockton and Charles S. Sperry, "[The London Naval Conference]," in Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1907-1917), (APRIL 23 AND 24, 1909) (American Society of International Law), 3: 67, http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 25656372. xxiii Terraine, 5. xxiv "The London Naval Conference" (London, February 26, 1909), World War I Document Archive, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_London_ Naval_Conference. xxv Jameson, 12. xxvi Lundeberg, 110. xxvii Jameson, 149. xxviii Terraine, 16.
xxix xxix

Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. total warfare

Bibliography Excerpts From a German Conference on Unrestricted Submarine Warfare. In Official German Documents Relating to the World War, translated by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1154-1163. New York: Oxford University Press, 1923. http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Excerpts_From_a_German_Conference_on_Unr estricted_Submarine_Warfare. This German conference among Dr. v. Bethmann-Hollweg (Imperial Chancellor), General Field Marshal v. Beneckendorff, v. Hindenburg (Chief of the General Staff), Dr. Helfferich (Secretary of State of the Interior), v. Jagow (Secretary of State of the Foreign Office), Lieutenant General Wild v. Hohenborn (Minister of War), Admiral v. Capelle (Secretary of State of the Imperial Navy Department), Admiral v. Holtzendorff (Chief of the Admiralty Staff of the Navy), Lieutenant General Ludendorff (First Quartermaster General), and Admiral Koch speculated on Americas neutral position and the effects that a renewed bout of unrestricted submarine warfare might have on Americas decision. Jameson, William. The Most Formidable: Thing The Story of the Submarine from Its Earliest Days to the End of World War I. London: R Hart-Davis, 1965. This book explains the use of submarines from the time of their invention and also has a portion on submarine warfare during WWI because of its importance in changing the purpose of submarines. It also narrates history in a manner that provides insight as to what specific causes of decisions made were. Lengel, Edward G. Unrestricted Submarine Warfare. Military History 28, no. 5 (January 2012): 21. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct= true&db=a9h&AN=66892896&site=ehost-live. This article explains Germanys internal tensions regarding the unrestricted aspect of submarine warfare. The author covers the issue of diplomacy between Germany and belligerents in the war in a concise, effective manner, thereby supporting my thesis. The London Naval Conference. London, February 26, 1909. World War I Document Archive. http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_London_Naval_Conference. This is a primary source describing the International Law presented before WWI, which Germany, USA, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Netherlands and Russia attended. It gives a sense of background to WWI despite the fact that it wasnt passed.

Lundeberg, Philip K. The German Naval Critique of the U-Boat Campaign, 1915-1918. Military Affairs 23, no. 3 (Fall 1963): 105-118. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1984204. This article covers the uses of and opinions on German U-boats during WWI when compared to the reasons why they were used in an unrestricted manner and the response from neutral nations and belligerents alike. Diplomacy during the war is emphasized and the use of U-boats in affecting diplomacy is touched upon. Stern, Robert C. Battle Beneath the Waves: The U-Boat War. London: Arms & Armour, 1999. This book shows submarine warfare from the POV of soldiers who lived through it; also, this gives some depth to the timeframe of and mentality behind the submarine war in WWI. Technology is the focus of this book, which doesnt contribute much to my thesis, but lays out the background of U-boat warfare. Stockton, Charles H., and Charles S. Sperry. [The London Naval Conference]. In Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1907-1917), 61-89. Vol. 3. (APRIL 23 AND 24, 1909). American Society of International Law. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25656372. This conference proceeding specifically explains the maritime law, if it could even be called that (since its shown to be neither concrete nor binding), existing before World War I amongst nations of power around the world. Terraine, John. Business in Great Waters: The U-Boat Wars, 1916-1945. New York: Putnam, 1989. This book provides an in-depth evaluation of nations viewpoints regarding unrestricted submarine warfare throughout the course of WWI, including many quotes by statesmen and military leaders. It is invaluable to my papers structural support and thesis. U-boat Conference of 9 January, 1917. In Official German Documents Relating to the World War,, translated by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 13201321. New York: Oxford University Press, 1923: Oxford University Press, 1923, 1923. http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/U-boat_Conference_of_9_January,_1917. This conference was between Dr. v. Bethimann-Hollweg, Imperial Chancellor of Germany and Germanys military leaders (General Field Marshal v. Beneckendorff, v. Hindenburg, Chief of the General Staff, and Lieutenant General Ludendorff, First Quartermaster General) about the resuming of unrestricted U-boat warfare. This conference is absolutely necessary to my argument that German politics continued to change in a radical manner since the 1916 conference.

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