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This document is a brief submitted by Gina Turcotte to the Kennebec County Superior Court appealing a decision by the Secretary of State. The brief was filed on July 15, 2013 as required under Rule 80C. It includes a table of contents, table of authorities, and sections on standard of review, definitions, factual background, and argument. Turcotte is appealing a decision by the Secretary of State in the case of Gina Turcotte v. Secretary of State, Docket No. AP-13-17.
Deskripsi Asli:
GINA TURCOTTE v. STATE OF MAINE, SECRETARY OF STATE - PETITIONER'S RULE 80C APPELLATE BRIEF
This document is a brief submitted by Gina Turcotte to the Kennebec County Superior Court appealing a decision by the Secretary of State. The brief was filed on July 15, 2013 as required under Rule 80C. It includes a table of contents, table of authorities, and sections on standard of review, definitions, factual background, and argument. Turcotte is appealing a decision by the Secretary of State in the case of Gina Turcotte v. Secretary of State, Docket No. AP-13-17.
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This document is a brief submitted by Gina Turcotte to the Kennebec County Superior Court appealing a decision by the Secretary of State. The brief was filed on July 15, 2013 as required under Rule 80C. It includes a table of contents, table of authorities, and sections on standard of review, definitions, factual background, and argument. Turcotte is appealing a decision by the Secretary of State in the case of Gina Turcotte v. Secretary of State, Docket No. AP-13-17.
Hak Cipta:
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Format Tersedia
Unduh sebagai PDF, TXT atau baca online dari Scribd
95 STATE STREET AUGUSTA, MAINE 04330 GINA LYNN TURCOTTE 3 Washington Street Place, Unit 1, Augusta, Maine July 15, 2013 Re: GINA LYNN TURCOTTE v. SECRETARY OF STATE Docket No. AP-13-17 Dear Michele: Enclosed you will find Petitioner's brief under Rule 80C as required to be ftled July 15, 2013 pursuant to Petitioner's motion for enlargement of time which was granted. A copy of the brief has been mailed or hand delivered to Respondent on this day. J ; ; t ~ ~ GINA LYNN TURCOTTE Cc: Assistant Attomey General Donald W. Macomber
KENNEBEC COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
Docket No. AP-13-17
GINA TURCOTTE
Petitioner/APPELLANT
v.
SECRETARY OF STATE
Respondent/APPELLEE
RULE 80C PETITION
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
DUE AND SUBMITTED ON JULY 15, 2013
Gina Turcotte Petitioner/APPELLANT 3 Washington Street Place, Unit 1 Augusta, Maine TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 2 of 57
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. TABLE OF CONTENTS
II. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
IV. PLAIN MEANING RULE
V. DEFINITIONS
VI. DIAGRAM OF NATURAL ORDER
VII. IMPERATIVE JUDICIAL NOTICE VIII. INTRODUCTION IX. STATEMENTS OF THE ISSUES TO BE REVIEWED X. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
XI. ARGUMENT
XII. RELIEF REQUESTED
XIII. CONCLUSION
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II. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
DIAGRAM OF NATURAL ORDER Ecclesiastic Deed Poll, Statement of Identity, Certificate of Authority, Entitlement Order, Acknowledgement of Deed; Certificate of Live Birth; Writ of Mandamus and Replevin
BLACKS LAW, 4 th and 9 TH Bouviers Law, 6 th
MERRIAM WEBSTER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: The Orphaned Right: The Right to Travel by Automobile, 1890-1950, Dr. Roger Isaac Roots, J.D., Ph.D., Oklahoma City University Law Review, Summer, 2005, 30 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 245
Maine Constitution, Article 1: Section 1. Natural rights. Section 2. Power inherent in people. Section 3. Religious freedom; sects equal. Section 4. Freedom of speech. Section 5. Unreasonable searches prohibited. Section 6. Rights of persons accused. Section 6-A. Discrimination against persons prohibited. Section 8. No double jeopardy. Section 9. Excessive bail, cruel or unusual punishments prohibited. Section 19. Right of redress for injuries.
Plain Meaning Rule State v. Harris, 730 A. 2d 1249 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1999 Merril v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 745 A.2d 378 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2000 In the Matter of Nadeau, 2007 ME 21 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2007 TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 4 of 57
Motor Vehicles Rules 29-250 SECRETARY OF STATE BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES Chapter 1: Rules For Administrative Suspension Relating To Demerit Point Accumulation, Convictions And Adjudications Chapter 2: Rules For Administrative Hearings Chapter 3: Physical, Emotional And Mental Competence To Operate A Motor Vehicle Chapter 13: Rules Governing Driver License Restriction
Maine Rules of Civil Procedure RULE 80C
Maine Statutes 5 MRSA 9052. Notice 5 MRSA 9056. Opportunity To Be Heard 5 MRSA 9059. Record 5 MRSA 10001. Adjudicatory Proceedings 5 MRSA 10003. Right To Hearing 5 MRSA 10004. Action Without Hearing 5 MRSA 11001. Right To Review 5 MRSA 11005. Responsive Pleading; Filing Of The Record 5 MRSA 11006. Power Of Court To Correct Or Modify Record 5 MRSA 11007. Manner And Scope Of Review 29-A MRSA 112. Notice Of Hearing 29-A MRSA 1258. Medical Advisory Board 29-A MRSA 1251. License Required 29-A MRSA 1309. Reexamination Of Incompetent Or Unqualified Operators 29-A MRSA 1407. Change Of Location Or Status 29-A MRSA 2458. Suspension or revocation of license 29-A MRSA 2482. Notice of suspension or revocation of license TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 5 of 57
29-A MRSA 2485. Decision; Appeal
Maine Cases Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d 643, 649 (Me.1969). State v. Granville, 336 A.2d 861, 863 (Me.1975) Fickett v. Maine KEN-AP-02-57 Melanson v Secretary of State 2004 ME 127 DiPietro v. Secretary of State, 802 A. 2d 399 - Me: Supreme Judicial State v. Savard, 659 A. 2d 1265 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1995 Centamore v. Dep't of Human Services, 664 A.2d 369, 370 (Me. 1995) CWCO, Inc. v. Sup't of Insurance, 1997 NrE 226, 6, 703 A.2d 125S, 1261 Imagineering v. Superintendent of Ins., 593 A.2d 1050, 1053 (Me. 1991) Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d 643, 649 (Me.1969) State v. Granville, 336 A.2d 861, 863 (Me.1975) Carrier v. Secretary of State, 60 A. 3d 1241 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2012 McGee v. Sec'y of State, 2006 ME 50, 896 A.2d 933 Estate of Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co., 2012 ME 62, 55 A.3d 411 Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, 896 A.2d 271 Ashe v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 2003 ME 147, 838 A.2d 1157 Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Estate of Faulkner, 2008 ME 149 957 A.2d 94
Georgia General Assembly House Bill 7 http://www1.legis.ga.gov/legis/2011_12/sum/hb7.htm
United States Code Title 18, 31(6) Title 18, 31(10)
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United States Cases Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US 1 - Supreme Court 1824 Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 425 - Supreme Court 1886 Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 - Supreme Court 1886 Mattox v. United States, 156 US 237 - Supreme Court 1895 Smith v. Allwright, 321 US 649 - Supreme Court 1944 Payne v. Massey, 145 Tex. 237, 196 S.W.2d 493, 495 (1946) City of Louisville v. Sebree, 214 SW 2d 248 1948 Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573 1889 City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445 1898 Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193 1908 Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583; 46 S.Ct. 605 (1926 Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367 - Va: Supreme Court 1930 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105 - Supreme Court 1943 Brooks v. State, 258 SW 2d 317 - Tex: Court of Criminal Appeals 1953 Miller v. United States, 230 F. 2d 486 - Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit 1956 Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A. 2d 869 - RI: Supreme Court 1958 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 US 1 - Supreme Court 1958 Callas v. State, 320 SW 2d 360 - Tex: Court of Criminal Appeals 1959 United States v. Guest, 383 US 745 - Supreme Court 1966 Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 P. 2d 46 - Idaho: Supreme Court 1966 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 - Supreme Court 1966
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STANDARD OF REVIEW At this stage of appeal, the standard of review is de novo, Because the Superior Court acted as an intermediate appellate court, we directly review the Secretary of State's decision. McGee v. Sec'y of State, 2006 ME 50, 5, 896 A.2d 933. We review issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo. Id. We first look to the plain meaning of the statute, interpreting its language "to avoid absurd, illogical or inconsistent results," Estate of Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co., 2012 ME 62, 12, 55 A.3d 411 (quotation marks omitted), and attempting to give all of its words meaning, Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, 11, 896 A.2d 271. When a statute is unambiguous, we interpret the statute directly, without applying the rule of statutory construction that "prefers interpretations that do not raise constitutional problems," McGee, 2006 ME 50, 18, 896 A.2d 933, and without examining legislative history, Ashe v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 2003 ME 147, 7, 838 A.2d 1157, or the agency's interpretation, Cobb, 2006 ME 48, 13, 896 A.2d 271. "We look to legislative history and other extraneous aids in interpretation of a statute only when we have determined that the statute is ambiguous." Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Estate of Faulkner, 2008 ME 149, 15, 957 A.2d 94. "A statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations." Estate of Joyce, 2012 ME 62, 12, 55 A.3d 411. [emphasis added] PLAIN MEANING RULE PETITIONER incorporates the plain meaning rule and consistently applies it throughout this entire action, as clearly and expressly standardized by Maine Supreme Judicial Court in: State v. Harris, 730 A. 2d 1249 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1999, The sole issue before us is one of statutory construction. "Statutory interpretation is a matter of law, and we review the trial court's decision de novo." Estate of Jacobs, 1998 ME 233, 4, 719 A.2d 523, 524 (italics added). "If the meaning of the language is plain, we must interpret the statute to mean exactly what it says." [5] Marsella v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 585 A.2d TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 8 of 57
802, 803 (Me.1991) (quotations omitted). "Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, there is no occasion for resort to rules of statutory interpretation to seek or impose another meaning." Marsella, 585 A.2d at 803 (quotations omitted). "[N]othing in a statute may be treated as surplusage if a reasonable construction applying meaning and force is otherwise possible." Struck v. Hackett, 668 A.2d 411, 417 (Me.1995) (quotations omitted)." Merril v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 745 A.2d 378 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court (2000), The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is the plain meaning rule. When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to any other rules of statutory construction. See State v. Harris, 1999 ME 80, 13, 730 A.2d 1249, 1251 In the Matter of Nadeau, 2007 ME 21 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2007, Because the word "knowingly" is defined in the Code and because its definition is plain and unambiguous, we are not free retroactively to give the word a different meaning. "Knowingly" is defined in the Code of Judicial Conduct as "denot[ing] actual knowledge of the fact in question." M. Code of Jud. Conduct II(3)(J). ... See generally, Merrill v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 2000 ME 16, 11, 745 A.2d 378, 384 ("The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is the plain meaning rule. When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to any other rules of statutory construction."). DEFINITIONS PETITIONER gives judicial notice that the following definitions are incorporated as defined herein: 1. administration. The management or performance of the executive duties of a government, institution, or business. 2. apparatus. See MACHINE. A device or apparatus consisting of fixed and moving parts that work together to perform some function. 3. CHRISTIANITY. The religion established by Jesus Christ. Christianity has been judicially declared to be a part of the common law of Pennsylvania. TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 9 of 57
4. church. In a moral or spiritual sense this word signifies a society of persons who profess the Christian religion; and in a physical or material sense, the place where such persons assemble. The term church is nomen collectivum; it comprehends the chancel, aisles, and body of the church. 5. conscience. The moral sense of right or wrong; esp., a moral sense applied to one's own judgment and actions. In law, the moral rule that requires justice and honest dealings between people. 6. constitution. The fundamental and organic law of a nation or state that establishes the institutions and apparatus of government, defines the scope of governmental sovereign powers, and guarantees individual civil rights and civil liberties. The written instrument embodying this fundamental law, together with any formal amendments. In British constitutional law, the constitution is a collection of historical documents, statutes, decrees, conventions, traditions, and royal prerogatives. Documents and statutes include Magna Carta (1215), the Bill of Rights (1689), and the European Communities Act (1972). The implied parts of a written constitution, encompassing the rights, freedoms, and processes considered to be essential, but not explicitly defined in the written document. 7. corpus. [Latin "body"] The property for which a trustee is responsible; the trust principal. Also termed res; trust estate; trust fund; trust property; trust res; trust. 8. deed poll. A deed made by and binding on only one party, or on two or more parties having similar interests. 9. doctrine. A principle, esp. a legal principle, that is widely adhered to. 10. DRIVER. (Bouviers 6 th ) One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals. 11. driver. A person who steers and propels a vehicle. TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 10 of 57
12. driver's license. The state-issued certificate authorizing a person to operate a motor vehicle. 13. driving. The act of directing the course of something. 14. ecclesiastical. Of or relating to the church. 15. fee simple. An interest in land that, being the broadest property interest allowed by law, endures until the current holder dies without heirs; esp., a fee simple absolute. 16. freehold. An estate in land held in fee simple; any real-property interest that is or may become possessory. 17. Indefeasible: (Of a claim or right) not vulnerable to being defeated, revoked, or lost. 18. Independent. Not subject to the control or influence of another. 2. Not associated with another (often larger) entity 3. Not dependent or contingent on something else. 19. Institution. An elementary rule, principle, or practice. 20. justice. The fair and proper administration of laws. 21. liberty. Freedom from arbitrary or undue external restraint, esp. by a government. A right, privilege, or immunity enjoyed by prescription or by grant; the absence of a legal duty imposed on a person. "[Liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626 (1923). 22. natural liberty. The power to act as one wishes, without any restraint or control, unless by nature. 'This natural liberty ... being a right inherent in us by birth .... But every man, when he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 11 of 57
valuable a purchase; and, in consideration of receiving the advantages of mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to those laws, which the community has thought proper to establish." 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 121 (1765). 23. religious liberty. Freedom - as guaranteed by the First Amendment to express, without external control other than one's own conscience, any or no system of religious opinion and to engage in or refrain from any form of religious observance or public or private religious worship, as long as it is consistent with the peace and order of society. 24. License. A permission, usu. revocable, to commit some act that would otherwise be unlawful; esp., an agreement that it is lawful for the licensee to enter the licensor's land to do some act that would otherwise be illegal. 25. private morality. A person's ideals, character, and private conduct, which are not valid governmental concerns. 26. OPERATE. (Blacks Law, 4 th ) This word, when used with relation to automobiles, signifies a personal act in working the mechanism of the automobile ; that is, the driver operates the automobile for the owner, but the owner does not operate the automobile unless he drives it himself. Beard v. Clark, Tex.Civ. App., 83 S.W.2d 1023, 1025. 27. operate. to perform a function; exert power or influence. 28. privilege. A special legal right, exemption, or immunity granted to a person or class of persons; an exception to a duty. _ A privilege grants someone the legal freedom to do or not to do a given act. It immunizes conduct that, under ordinary circumstances, would subject the actor to liability. 29. public. Open or available for all to use, share, or enjoy. TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 12 of 57
30. punishment. A sanction - such as a fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed against a person who has violated the law. "Punishment in all its forms is a loss of rights or advantages consequent on a breach of law. When it loses this quality it degenerates into an arbitrary act of Violence that can produce nothing but bad social effects." Glanville Williams, Criminal Law 575 (2d ed. 1961). 31. punitive. Involving or inflicting punishment. 32. religion. A system of faith and worship usu. involving belief in a supreme being and usu. containing a moral or ethical code; esp., such a system recognized and practiced by a particular church, sect, or denomination. In construing the protections under the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, courts have interpreted the term religion quite broadly to include a wide variety of theistic and nontheistic beliefs. 33. remedial. Affording or providing a remedy; providing the means of obtaining redress <a remedial action>. 2. Intended to correct, remove, or lessen a wrong, fault, or defect <a remedial statute>. 3. Of or relating to a means of enforcing an existing substantive right <a remedial right>. 34. absolute right. A right that belongs to every human being, such as the right of personal liberty; a natural right. 2. An unqualified right; speci., a right that cannot be denied or curtailed except under specific conditions 35. secta. Roman law. A group of followers, as of a particular religion or school of philosophy, law, etc.; a religious sect; a group adhering to a distinctive doctrine or to a leader. 36. secular. Worldly, as distinguished from spiritual. 37. sentiment. an attitude, thought, or judgment prompted by feeling; a specific view or notion. 38. spiritual. Of or relating to ecclesiastical rather than secular matters. TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 13 of 57
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IMPERATIVE JUDICIAL NOTICE
Before PETITIONERs mother conceived and gave life to PETITIONERs physical body, PETITIONER was I AM; the Divine Spirit, who consciously chose to inhabit the physical vessel of flesh, blood and bones of the human body to have an experience as a human being. Each atom and cell of this physical vessel which PETITIONER inhabits to travel across this land is infused with the spark of the Creator; I AM one with the light, one with Creator, the Alpha and the Omega, without beginning nor end, without time. Natural Order of Law and Authority irrefutably begins with and is irrevocably governed by GOD and GODS LAW which includes, but are not limited to, Laws of Common Sense, Truth & Justice, Laws of Grammar and Proper Use of Words which can be considered by all men and women to be the higher laws of the universe. Higher Laws are natural common laws which govern the behavior of every man, woman and child without exception beholding our allegiance to our own private Sovereign Ruler of the Universe and only according to our own private consciences and which our feelings, thoughts, words and beliefs are not to be regulated or injured by any government, sect or private individual. PETITIONER, in alliance with every other man, woman and child, are collectively The People, and in whose authority our government was created and instituted for our benefit and who have an unalienable and indefeasible right to institute government, and to alter, reform, or totally change the same, when our safety and happiness requires it as guaranteed by Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution of the State of Maine. As a cooperative and collaborative group with a specific mutual purpose and goal, The People create the GRAND JURIES, the TRIAL JURIES and the ELECTIONS which are some of the tools and machinery by which behaviors that violate the CONSTITUTION are remedied and by which itself is protected, enforced, and amended as needed. The body of the CONSTITUTION articulates provisions which created the TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 15 of 57
EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE and JUDICIAL branches of government which were also instituted for our protection and benefit and which each officer is Trustee of the Public Trust with such power having been bequeathed to them by The People upon swearing their public oath to uphold and protect the Constitution, adhering to ethical and moral principles above any private gain. Within each branch of government are public offices and officers who are vested with specific legal duties, authorities and rights for the benefit of The People: the Executive Branch includes PRESIDENT, GOVERNOR, MAYOR and ALL PUBLIC OFFICERS; the Legislative Branch is divided into the HOUSE which represents citizens based on district populations and the SENATE which represents citizens on an equal state basis; and the Judicial Branch which is divided into the SUPREME COURT, the APPEAL COURT, the TRIAL COURT, and ALL LOWER COURTS AND TRIBUNALS. Three branches of government were created with the intention to be a system of checks and balances to ensure The Peoples representatives act with ethical, moral and lawful behavior in full adherence and loyalty to The People in whose power and authority they institute all federal, state, and local laws, statutes, codes, regulations, rules, orders and ordinances for the purpose of establishing justice, insuring tranquility, providing for our mutual defense, promoting our common welfare, and securing to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of life, liberty and the pursuit of prosperity and happiness, and with the irrevocable power to alter, reform, or totally change the same, when our safety and happiness requires it, which is a modern-day human experience in this third-dimensional world on planet Earth. PETITIONERs third-dimensional vessel of flesh, blood and bones was born into the Turcotte family on December 17, 1968, now simply known as Gina Lynn, who is a freeborn inhabitant, natural heir to the Divine Estate, Beneficiary to the Divine Trust, freeholder in fee simple absolute, one of the Posterity expressed in the Preamble of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Maine, to wit, We the people of Maine, in order to establish justice, insure tranquility, provide for our mutual defense, promote our TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 16 of 57
common welfare, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of liberty, acknowledging with grateful hearts the goodness of the Sovereign Ruler of the Universe in affording us an opportunity, so favorable to the design; and, imploring God's aid and direction in its accomplishment, do agree to form ourselves into a free and independent State, by the style and title of the State of Maine and do ordain and establish the following Constitution for the government of the same. The Constitution for the State of Maine was structured after and in acquiescence with the Constitution for the United States, each of which are documents of a dual nature: 1. the Constitution is a trust document, and 2. it is the articles of incorporation which created a unique trust res and estate of inheritance for each inhabitant. It is a tenet of law that in order to determine the intent of a writing one must look to the title, the Empowerment Clause in statute, which in the case of the Constitution is the Preamble. In writing the Constitution the founders followed the common law of England which stretches back some 1000 years. The Preamble fulfills the requirements necessary to establish a trust. It identifies the Grantor(s), Statement of Purpose, Grantee(s), Statement of Intent, Written Indenture, and the name of the entity being created and is written and constructed as a trust so that it would have the thrust of ageless law. Let us take a look: WE THE PEOPLE (Grantors) of the United States (from or out of) in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty (statement of Purpose) to ourselves and our posterity (Grantees/heirs unnamed), do ordain and establish (Statement of Intent) this constitution (Written Indenture) for the United States of America (name of the entity being created). The trust res is in the Articles of the Confederation and the Declaration of Independence. The intent of the constitution was to bequeath freedom, life, TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 17 of 57
liberty and the pursuit of happiness to themselves and their posterity. The founders intended to secure and pass on the sovereignty of the people to the people of future generations of Americans, in perpetuity. PETITIONERs rights are derived from the land upon which she stands and her relation, or status, to that land. In America these rights originated with the Articles of Confederation and the Declaration of Independence and are attached to the land called America (The Laws of Real Property). PETITIONERs status, or relation to that land, is determined by the laws of Descent and Distribution. PETITIONERs right to freedom, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is her inheritance as bequeathed to her via the Constitution of the United States of America and upon which the Constitution of the State of Maine was drafted and enacted. The constitution granted the government the power and authority to administrate and to carry on corporate functions. Under the common law, inherent rights cannot devolve to a 'body politic' through a corporation. Rights only devolve to human beings as through and by way of a trust. Under the constitutional law, in order to determine the meaning of a written instrument the court must look to the title. In this case, once again, it is the Preamble. Pursuant to the laws of real property that have been in existence from the beginning, the Preamble clearly shows a freehold in fee simple absolute in it. Freeholds in fee simple were instruments of trust, not corporate. "Our Posterity" cannot be speaking of a corporate entity because posterity can only mean a living man or woman, and only by birth and nativity. The Articles of the Constitution are the Articles of Incorporation that established Congress as Trustees of the Trust and defines their power and authority as well as their limitations. Annexed to the Constitutional Trust is a will-like structure, the Amendments. The Trust and the trust res were already in existence when the will/codicil (Amendments) were added some four years later. The Amendments do not constitute the Trust in fact, they are annexed to the Trust as a codicil (a supplement or addition to the will, not necessarily TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 18 of 57
disposing of the entire estate, but modifying, explaining or otherwise qualifying the will in some way.) A Trust, once completed and in force, cannot be amended or altered without the consent of the parties in interest, except under reserved power of amendment and alteration. An amendment is ordinarily possible by parties in interest and against parties without vested interest. Prior to enactment of the 14th Amendment, the freeborn inhabitants, citizens of the states, were the parties in interest. The 14th Amendment created the 14th Amendment legal fiction citizen GINA LYNN TURCOTTE who does not have a vested interest in the trust or the trust res. The 14th Amendment can be viewed as a codicil to the will that republished the constitution with new meaning, changed the intent behind it and turned it into a testamentary instrument with capabilities of being used against the PETITIONER through a seemingly voluntary revocation. When PETITIONERs mother provided evidence of her birth and applied for a social security number on PETITIONERs behalf, and when PETITIONER mistakenly claimed be a United States citizen, who is a party with no vested interest in a freehold, the trust or the trust res, the PETITIONER was literally declared to be deceased; therefore, the decedent (PETITIONER) retains no legal interest in the property and PETITIONER, in her new capacity as a legal fiction citizen, is then coerced to act as Executor of PETITIONERs own estate. PETITIONER, a freeholder and Beneficiary to the trust, has been tricked and coerced by the Trustees into testifying against herself when applying for a social security number, drivers license, or when signing an IRS 1040 form, and which the Trustees have mislead PETITIONER into believing are all mandatory. The Trustees have breached the trust having amended the will for their own personal profit and gain at the expense of the true heirs. PETITIONER has unwittingly, without full disclosure, become the Executor; the Trustees have become the Beneficiaries to the trust through Laws of Donations, effectively stealing PETITIONERs Divine Inheritance. A breach of trust of fiduciary duty by a Trustee is a violation of the TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 19 of 57
correlative right of the Cestui Que Trust and gives rise to any correlative cause of action on the part of the Beneficiary for any loss to the estate Trust. This rule is applicable in respect to both positive acts or negligence constituting a breach of fiduciary duty by the Trustee. A Trustee's breach of fiduciary duty falls within the maxim that 'equity will not aid one who comes into court with unclean hands.' When the Trustee's breach is by an act of omission the Beneficiary can scrutinize the propriety of the Trustee. A Beneficiary must always have full disclosure and full knowledge of the material facts and circumstances. A Beneficiary must also have had knowledge of and understood their rights and have no obligation to search the public records to obtain said knowledge. The Trustees have committed acts of omission, misrepresentation, deceit and deception in order to mislead and coerce PETITIONER into giving up her beneficial interest in the trust and the trust res. The Trustees have compelled PETITIONER, a freeholder in fee simple, to accept benefits 'under the will' as perverted by the 14th Amendment, without freedom of choice for failure of full disclosure thereby preventing enforcement of contractual rights to property bequeathed to her by the will. The Trustees are trying to repudiate the Trust, employing a lifetime of propaganda and programming enforced through threats, violence and coercion, and failing to provide notice to the Beneficiary of the repudiation which must now be brought home and lawfully remedied. The Doctrine of Election dictates, that a party shall not be permitted to insist at different times upon the truth of two inconsistent and repugnant positions, according to the promptings of his own interest, as to first affirm and later disaffirm a contract, or the like Myers v. Ross, D.C., 10 F.Supp. 409, 411, in connection with testamentary instruments is the principle that one who is given a benefit 'under the will' must choose between accepting the benefits and asserting some other claim against the testator's estate or against the property disposed of by the will. PETITIONERs right as a Beneficiary to elect whether to take 'under the will' or 'against the will' is a personal privilege to her which may be controlled by the creditors of the Beneficiary. If PETITIONER elected to take TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 20 of 57
against the will then creditors can claim no right or interest in the estate contrary to PETITIONERS election. Acceptance of benefits 'under the will' constitutes an election precluding PETITIONER from enforcing contractual rights to property bequeathed by the will. This rule is subject to the qualification that acceptance of a benefit 'under the will', when made in ignorance of the Beneficiaries rights or under a misapprehension or misrepresentation as to the condition of the Testator's estate, does not constitute an election upon full knowledge and disclosure. In the beginning God gave men and women dominion over all things, as Beneficiaries of the Divine Trust. The founding fathers of the United States of America created the constitution for the United States, an estate trust, to pass sovereignty of the people onto the people of future generations, in perpetuity. In America today, upon giving birth, a mother is compelled, under deceptive coercion and without full factual disclosure, to apply for the creation of a Cestui Que Vie trust, creating a 14th Amendment paper citizen of the United States. Upon receipt of the mother's application the Trustees establish a trust under the error of assumptions that the child has knowingly elected to accept the benefits which are bequeathed by the will, 'under the will'. The Trustees further assume that the child is incompetent, a bankrupt and lost at sea and is presumed to be dead until the child reappears, knowingly reestablishes living status, challenges assumptions of any acceptance of the benefits 'under the will' as being one of free choice with full knowledge of the facts and thereby redeems the estate. Under the assumption that the child is a 14th Amendment citizen, the child's footprint is placed by the hospital upon the birth certificate creating a slave bond which is sold to the federal reserve, who then converts it into a negotiable instrument and establishes a second Cestui Que Vie trust. The child's parents are coercively deceived to apply for a social security number for the child, unwittingly testifying that the child is a 14th Amendment paper citizen of the United States, not a party in interest to the trust or the trust res, and assumed to be dead after 7 years, and when the federal reserve cannot TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 21 of 57
seize the physical child, they file for the issue of the salvage bond and the child is presumed to be legally dead. When a child is Baptized by the church, the Baptismal certificate is forwarded to the Vatican who converts the certificate into a negotiable instrument and creates a third Cestui Que Vie trust. These three trusts represent the enslavement of the property, body and soul of the child. The civil administration, UNITED STATES, continues to operate today under this triple crown of enslavement based on the error of assumptions that we are 14th Amendment citizens of the United States based on the breach of trust by the Trustees. PETITIONER has been lost in the sea of illusion, her divine estate placed in trust. PETITIONER has awakened to the truth, so long hidden from her, and now redeems her estate. PETITIONER hereby acknowledges and accepts the deed and her right as lawful and proper owner of the estate with exclusive right of use of all land, tenements and heredimants thereof, to have and to hold in fee simple forever. This freehold in fee simple has been held under an assumed lease for forty-four years. Said fee has been held in abeyance, in expectation, remembrance, and contemplation in law there being no person in esse, in whom it can vest and abide: though the law has considered it as always potentially existing, and ready to vest whenever a proper owner appears. It is hereby established, in fact, that PETITIONER, who was given the name Gina Lynn when she was born on December 17, 1968 into the Turcotte family, is the proper owner of the estate GINA LYNN TURCOTTE in whom vests and abides to have and to hold in fee simple forever. Freely born, sovereign people have a common law and constitutionally- protected right to travel on the roads and highways of this land as maintained by their government on their behalf and specifically for their use and benefit. Licensing of private, not-for-hire travelers cannot be required of free sovereign private people because taking on the restrictions of a drivers license requires the surrender of and creates encumbrances upon PETITIONERs inalienable TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 22 of 57
right to travel in her private property. In England in 1215, the Magna Carta enshrined the right to travel in Article 42, to wit, It shall be lawful to any person, for the future, to go out of our kingdom, and to return, safely and securely, by land or by water, saving his allegiance to us, unless it be in time of war, for some short space, for the common good of the kingdom: excepting prisoners and outlaws, according to the laws of the land, and of the people of the nation at war against us, and Merchants who shall be treated as it is said above. Where rights secured by the Constitution of the United States and the State of Maine are involved, there can be no rulemaking or legislation that would abrogate those rights. A claim or exercise of a constitutionally-protected right cannot be converted into a crime. There can be no remedial action, civil sanction or criminal penalty imposed because PETITIONER lawfully exercised her constitutionally-protected rights. PETITIONER has the inalienable right to use public roads unrestricted in any manner so long as she is not damaging property or violating rights of others. The government is effectively restricting PETITIONERs freedom of locomotion by requiring PETITIONER to obtain a drivers license and thus violating PETITIONERs common law and constitutionally-guaranteed right to travel upon the public highways and possess and enjoy private property during her pursuit of safety, prosperity and happiness. Justice Potter Stewart noted in a concurring opinion in Shapiro v Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) that the right to travel is a right broadly assertable against private interference as well as governmental action. Like the right of association...it is a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all. The Articles of Confederation had an explicit right to travel; but, holding that the right to travel is so fundamental the Framers thought it was unnecessary to explicitly include it in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The PETITIONERs right to travel upon public ways in her private property is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 23 of 57
but a common right which every individual has under their right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. Under this guarantee, the PETITIONER may, under normal conditions, travel at her inclination along the public highways or in public places using her private property in any way she deems suitable while conducting herself in an orderly and decent manner; thus, the Trustees do not have the power to abrogate the PETITIONERs right to travel upon the public roads in her private property by passing legislation forcing her to waive that right and allegedly converting it into an alleged privilege of a drivers license which is in fact not a privilege according to 29-A MRSA 1251 which in fact mandates all Maine residents immediately apply to obtain a drivers license. 29-A MRSA 1251 is prima facie evidence of RESPONDENTs willful violation of Maine Constitution, Article 1, Section 6-A, No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of that person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof. When PETITIONER registered her automobiles with RESPONDENT or obtained a drivers license, she did so only reluctantly and under duress, blatant intimidation, willful nondisclosure, criminal conspiracy, aggravated fraud and governmental corruption in order to preserve whatever minimal freedoms are remaining. American history can easily be written in two parts: America before the arrival of automobiles and America after automobiles. Motorized vehicles altered everything from the demographic distribution of American society to the ways Americans live and work to the normative balance of home and family life Nineteenth century Americans would scarcely recognize the immense quilt of laws which govern highway travel today. With the exception of the Civil War, nothing before or since has so fundamentally altered America's scheme of rights and freedoms as that of the laws now governing highway travel. Today, the vast majority of Americans voluntarily submit to a variety of registration, identification, and licensing schemes in order to travel by automobile. Today's laws [were] once viewed as unconstitutional. The hand of the State now extends TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 24 of 57
over aspects of travel in ways which would have been impossible according to common law precedents familiar to earlier Americans. Prior to the nineteenth century, courts generally held the public roadways were open to all users without regard to the travelers' methods or means of transport. Licenses or other indicia of governmental permission were thought unnecessary or even violative of [constitutionally-protected] rights. But widespread disdain and fear of the automobile led twentieth century policymakers to push aside these long-standing constitutional barriers in order to regulate motorized driving. This new regulatory approach was justified on the grounds that motor vehicles were too dangerous to operate unlicensed and that traffic injuries were increasingly on the rise. The Orphaned Right, Dr. Roots Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US 1 - Supreme Court 1824, The word "license," means permission, or authority; and a license to do any particular thing, is a permission or authority to do that thing; and if granted by a person having power to grant it, transfers to the grantee the right to do whatever it purports to authorize. Title 29, Chapter 7: OPERATORS' LICENSES of the Maine Revised Statutes can be expanded and literally defined under plain meaning rules, and in accordance with Blacks Law, Bouviers Law, and Merriam Webster, as, A revocable permission given to an individual to exert power or influence over private property which actions would otherwise be unlawful, later repealed. The Maine Legislature then enacted Title 29-A, Chapter 11: DRIVER'S LICENSE, which can be expanded and literally defined under plain meaning rules, and in accordance with Blacks Law, Bouviers Law, and Merriam Webster, as, A revocable permission given to an individual who is employed by another in steering or directing the course of a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, including horses, mules or other animals, for a fair wage paid to the driver by its employer for the drivers safe and proper conduct while in control of the conveyance for which conduct and control would otherwise be unlawful. to wit: a driver operates the automobile for the owner, but the owner does not operate the automobile unless he drives it himself. Beard v. Clark, Tex. Civ. TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 25 of 57
App., 83 S.W.2d 1023, 1025. The Trustees (legislators) who are empowered by, through and on behalf of the inhabitants of this state, have publicly memorialized a notable difference regarding the inherent meaning of the words operator and driver by which they knowingly and intentionally substituted the word driver in place of the word operator under 29-A MRSA when referring to any drivers license to control or operate a motorized vehicle on the public highways of this state. The Maine legislature publicly acknowledged through their intentional use of the word driver within 29-A MRSA that the action which they feel requires a drivers license is not that of a private action of enjoying and using ones personal property on a public roadway, but instead a drivers license for contractual for-hire employment for the purpose of controlling, steering and directing the course of a motor vehicle or animal in the drivers employment by another with a fair wage paid for the drivers time, energy and labor. United States Criminal Code, Title 18, 31(6) defines motor vehicle as every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo. United States Criminal Code, Title 18, 31(10) defines used for commercial purposes as the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit. 29-A MRSA 1253(2) Compliance with federal law. dictates, The State must comply with the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, Public Law 99-570, Title XII, the federal Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, Public Law 106-159, 113 Stat. 1748 and regulations adopted under those Acts in issuing or suspending a commercial license. In the case of any conflict between the federal statute or regulation and a statute or rule of this State, the federal statute or regulation must apply and take precedence. [emphasis added] 29-A MRSA 101(42) defines "motor vehicle" as a self-propelled vehicle TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 26 of 57
not operated exclusively on tracks but does not include: A. A snowmobile as defined in Title 12, section 13001; B. An all-terrain vehicle as defined in Title 12, section 13001, unless the all-terrain vehicle is permitted in accordance with section 501, subsection 8 or is operated on a way and section 2080 applies; and C. A motorized wheelchair or an electric personal assistive mobility device 29-A MRSA 101(42) directly conflicts with 18 U.S.C. 31(6). 29-A MRSA 101(91) defines vehicle as a device for conveyance of persons or property on a way. Vehicle does not include conveyances propelled or drawn by human power or used exclusively on tracks or snowmobiles as defined in Title 12, section 13001 or an electric personal assistive mobility device as defined in this section. 29-A MRSA 101(50) defines "owner" as a person holding title to a vehicle or having exclusive right to the use of the vehicle for a period of 30 days or more. 29-A MRSA 101(59) defines "public way" as a way, owned and maintained by the State, a county or a municipality, over which the general public has a right to pass. 29-A MRSA 101(75) defines street or highway as a public way. 29-A MRSA fails to establish any clear difference between a private automobile and a commercial motor vehicle as required by 18 U.S.C. 31(6); therefore, 29-A MRSA 1253(2) mandates that 18USC 31(6) take precedence. It is a matter of this record that License #1491178 is Class C which is not a commercial drivers license (CDL) and which has never had commercial endorsements. It is a matter of this record that License #1491178 shows no offenses involving intoxication or serious bodily injury. PETITIONER has been defrauded and coerced ad infinitum since February 3, 1989 through RESPONDENTs willful nondisclosure effectively coercing and intimidating PETITIONER to obtain a drivers license whereby she unknowingly waived her sovereign right to travel without earning a fair wage in TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 27 of 57
her private property without being restricted by unlawful and unconstitutional governmental encumbrances. PETITIONER alleges that RESPONDENT has violated her freedom of religion as protected by Maine Constitution Article 1, Section 3, by coercively restraining PETITIONER in exercising her personal liberty to worship GOD in the manner and season most agreeable to PETITIONERs own conscience. PETITIONERs religious beliefs oblige PETITIONER to reject all external authorities, both secular and spiritual, which are not aligned with the dictates of PETITIONERs own conscience and personal sense of morality, including PETITIONER rejecting all organized, unorganized, incorporated and unincorporated governmental, political and religious sects. PETITIONERs religious beliefs prohibit all seizures and conversions of PETITIONERs natural inherent rights through PETITIONER coercively obeying RESPONDENTs assumed authority to convert PETITIONERs possession and use of private property and her right of free locomotion into an alleged privilege, and an actual statutory mandate to obtain a drivers license which is required for PETITIONER to use, enjoy, defend and protect her private property. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 425 - Supreme Court 1886, An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Through RESPONDENTs stealthy encroachment through the use of ambiguous statutes and rigid administrative rules, the corporate state body politic stole PETITIONERs religious freedom and personal liberty and sold it back to her as a drivers license. This stealthy encroachment process of the corporate state against PETITIONER depended on time and propaganda for its success. Most humans live perhaps 85 years; the corporate state enjoys eternal life. As each succeeding generation dies off, the next generation fails to remember the lessons and history of the previous generation which the corporate state depends upon in order to perpetuate. Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 - Supreme Court 1886, It is the TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 28 of 57
duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Mattox v. United States, 156 US 237 - Supreme Court 1895, We are bound to interpret the Constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted Smith v. Allwright, 321 US 649 - Supreme Court 1944, Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be thus indirectly denied. Payne v. Massey, 145 Tex. 237, 196 S.W.2d 493, 495 (1946),A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful. The object of a license is to confer a right or power which does not exist without it. City of Louisville v. Sebree, 214 SW 2d 248 1948, Specifically or technically speaking, [a] license means to confer on a person the right to do something which otherwise he would not have the right to do-a special privilege rather than a right common to all persons. By looking back at historical disputes regarding roads, rivers, and other ways of passage, we clearly see that public property is nothing more than property held in common tenancy for use by each and every individual. Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573 1889, Personal liberty, which is guaranteed to every citizen under our constitution and laws, consists of the right of locomotion,-to go where one pleases, and when, and to do that which may lead to one's business or pleasure, only so far restrained as the rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573 1889,"The right to travel is a part of the liberty of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law...." City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445 1898, A license being regarded as a privilege can not possibly exist with reference to something which is a right, free and open to all, as is the right of the citizen to ride over the highways by motor vehicle, or horse vehicle in a reasonable manner. Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193 1908, This Court has said with TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 29 of 57
respect to an unconstitutional law that the matter stands as if the law had not been passed. Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583; 46 S.Ct. 605 (1926), it would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited, and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of Constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence. [emphasis added]
Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367 - Va: Supreme Court 1930, The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day; and under the existing modes of travel includes the right to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purposes of life and business. It is not a mere privilege, like the privilege of moving a house in the street, operating a business stand in the street, or transporting persons or property for hire along the street, which a city may permit or prohibit at will. TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 30 of 57
The exercise of such a common right the [RESPONDENT] may, under its police power, regulate in the interest of the public safety and welfare; but it may not arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict it, nor may it permit one to exercise it and refuse to permit another of like qualifications, under like conditions and circumstances, to exercise it. Taylor Smith, 140 Va. 217, 124 S.E. 259; Ex parte Dickey, 76 W.Va. 576, 85 S.E. 781, L.R.A. 1915-F, 840; Hadfield Lundin, 98 Wash. 657, 168 Pac. 516, L.R.A. 1918-B, 909, Ann. Cas. 1918-C, 942. The regulation of the exercise of the right to drive a private automobile on the streets of the city may be accomplished in part by the city by granting, refusing, and revoking, under rules of general application, permits to drive an automobile on its streets; but such permits may not be arbitrarily refused or revoked, or permitted to be held by some and refused to other of like qualifications, under like circumstances and conditions. It has been said that when the State or a city has the power to prohibit the doing of an act altogether, it has the power to permit the doing of the act upon any condition, or subject to any regulation, however arbitrary or capricious it may be; and may lawfully delegate to executive or administrative officers an uncontrolled and arbitrary discretion as to granting and revoking permits or licenses to do such acts; Taylor Smith, 140 Va. 217, 124 S.E. 259, 263; State ex rel. Crumpton Montgomery, 177 Ala. 221, 59 So. 294; State Gray, 61 Conn. 39, 22 Atl. 675; City of St. Joseph Levin, 128 Mo. 588, 31 S.W. 101, 49 Am.St.Rep. 577; Brown Stubbs, 128 Md. 129, 97 Atl. 227. This doctrine has been pronounced most often in cases involving the granting, refusing, and revoking of licenses or permits to sell intoxicating liquors, or to do other things which because of their character are, or tend to be, injurious, as for instance keeping a gambling house or a bawdy-house, or operating a junk or pawn shop; and it has also been applied to cases involving permits or licenses to transport persons or property for hire along the streets. See Taylor Smith, supra, and cases there cited. But this doctrine has no application to permits issued for the purpose of regulating the exercise of the common right to operate a private TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 31 of 57
automobile on the streets of a city, in the usual and ordinary way, to transport the driver's person and property. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105 - Supreme Court 1943, It is contended, however, that the fact that the license tax can suppress or control this activity is unimportant if it does not do so. But that is to disregard the nature of this tax. It is a license tax a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution. Miller v. United States, 230 F. 2d 486 - Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit 1956, The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot thus be converted into a crime. Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A. 2d 869 - RI: Supreme Court 1958, The use of the automobile as a necessary adjunct to the earning of a livelihood in modern life requires us in the interest of realism to conclude that the right to use an automobile on the public highways partakes of the nature of a liberty within the meaning of the constitutional guarantees of which the citizen may not be deprived without due process of law Cooper v. Aaron, 358 US 1 - Supreme Court 1958, No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court in saying that: If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery . . . . United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 136. United States v. Guest, 383 US 745 - Supreme Court 1966, The constitutional right to travel from one State to another, and necessarily to use the highways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized. In Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, invalidating a Nevada tax on every person leaving the State TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 32 of 57
by common carrier, the Court took as its guide the statement of Chief Justice Taney in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492: "For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States." Although the Articles of Confederation provided that "the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State," that right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event, freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution. See Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 274; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 97; Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 177 (concurring opinion), 181 (concurring opinion); New York v. O'Neill, 359 U. S. 1, 6- 8; 12-16 (dissenting opinion)... Although there have been recurring differences in emphasis within the Court as to the source of the constitutional right of interstate travel, there is no need here to canvass those differences further. All have agreed that the right exists. Its explicit recognition as one of the federal rights protected by what is now 18 U. S. C. 241 goes back at least as far as 1904. United States v. Moore, 129 F. 630, 633. We reaffirm it now. Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 P. 2d 46 - Idaho: Supreme Court 1966 The right to operate a motor vehicle upon the public streets and highways is not a mere privilege. It is a right or liberty, the enjoyment of which is protected by the guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. Arrow Transportation Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Com'n, 85 Idaho 307, 379 P.2d 422 (1963); State v. Kouni, 58 Idaho 493, 76 P.2d 917 (1938); Packard v. O'Neil, 45 Idaho 427, 262 P. 881, 56 A.L. R. 317 (1927); Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 207 P. 724 (1922); Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963); People v. Nothaus, TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 33 of 57
147 Colo. 210, 363 P.2d 180 (1960); Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal.2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950); Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d 620, 35 A.L.R.2d 1003 (1952); Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52 (1951); Ballow v. Reeves, 238 S.W.2d 141 (Ky.1951); Berberian v. Lussier, 87 R.I. 226, 139 A.2d 869 (1958); Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878 (1st Cir. 1953). Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 - Supreme Court 1966,Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them. Under obligation to RESPONDENTs unconstitutional licensing rules which violate PETITIONERs freedom of religion, free speech, rights against self- incrimination and illegal search and seizure, PETITIONER unwillingly reported the existence of a prior medical condition which she mistakenly thought may impair her safe operation of her private property in order to prevent being harassed by RESPONDENTs law enforcement, court and licensing agents. PETITIONER innocently failed to comply with RESPONDENTs rules by not promptly and perpetually changing her physical and mailing address each and every time she changed domiciles, which recently has been every week or every few months, then when PETITIONER exercised her right of locomotion by automobile without knowing that the drivers license had been suspended, she was immediately profiled as an incompetent driver and a criminal and subjected to excessive police power, coercion, intimidation, prejudice, harassment, arrest, assault, battery, kidnapping and false imprisonment by law enforcement, executive and judicial agencies in clear violation of federal and state constitutions. PETITIONER has never been accused of operating under the influence of any intoxicating chemicals nor of refusing to submit to a chemical test nor of needing to submit to any chemical test nor of any type of negligent, unsafe or reckless operation since the license was first issued in 1989. RESPONDENT cannot lawfully require PETITIONER to obtain a license to exercise a fundamental private liberty to travel in PETITIONERs select method of transportation on a free, open public roadway because those roadways are TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 34 of 57
reserved for public use and maintained by sovereign people as tenants in common. The body politic STATE OF MAINE would not exist without the free acknowledgement, support and participation by the free sovereign inhabitants. INTRODUCTION This action is being brought to challenge the authority of and decision by STATE OF MAINE, SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLE to mandate, issue and then arbitrarily suspend license #1491178 on January 5, 2010 pursuant to Medical Rules 29-250, Ch. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) and 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) despite RESPONDENTs issuance of three (3) consecutive years violation free credits for 2008, 2009 and 2010 and without having any evidence that PETITIONER was incompetent to safely control an automobile or that she posed any risk whatsoever to the public at large as clearly evidenced by the administrative record filed by RESPONDENT on May 29, 2013. PETITIONER does not object to RESPONDENTs filing the administrative record untimely because RESPONDENTs tardy behavior proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that RESPONDENT presumes they will receive bias and favoritism, despite having thirty (30) years practice with Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, which is prima facie evidence of the basic principle at the crux of this petition RESPONDENT and their agents routinely and habitually violate the Maine Constitution and act outside the boundaries of law and fair play presuming their behavior will be condoned, supported and justified by the courts. PETITIONER makes imperative judicial notice that 29-A MRSA 1251(1) states, Except as provided in section 510, subsection 1, a person commits an offense of operating a motor vehicle without a license if that person operates a motor vehicle on a public way or parking area: A. Without being licensed. Violation of this paragraph is a Class E crime, which is a strict liability crime C. Without a license issued by this State if a resident of this State for more than 30 days but fewer than 90 days. Violation of this paragraph is a traffic infraction; TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 35 of 57
D. Without a license issued by this State if a resident of this State for more than 90 days. Violation of this paragraph is a Class E crime, which is a strict liability crime E. With a license issued by this State that expired within the previous 90 days. Violation of this paragraph is a traffic infraction. PETITIONER makes imperative judicial notice that 29-A MRSA 1251 (1-A) mandates every living man, woman and child over the age of sixteen (16) who [w]ithin 30 days of becoming a resident of this Stateshall apply to obtain a license in accordance with section 1301. Except as provided in section 510, subsection 1, a person who fails to comply with the requirement of this subsection and operates a motor vehicle on a public way or parking area commits: A. A traffic infraction if the person has been a resident for less than 90 days; or B. A Class E crime if the person has been a resident for at least 90 days. Evidently as shown by 29-A MRSA 1251, when the word shall is used without any qualifiers or exceptions, the definition must be taken literally and within the boundaries of the plain meaning rule which does declares the possessing and enjoying the use of a drivers license is not at all a privilege as this court and other courts in this state have alleged and adjudicated. There exists no absolute right to obtain and hold a driver's license. Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d 643, 649 (Me.1969). The driver's license is a privilege to which certain rights and responsibilities attach and for valid reasons involving public safety may be granted or withheld. State v. Granville, 336 A.2d 861, 863 (Me.1975); Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d at 649. Petitioner claims 29-A MRSA 1251 violates the Maine Constitution, Article 1, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A and 24 in that mandatory licensing under 29-A MRSA 1251 prohibits private, unregulated and unalienable use of private property on all public ways or parking areas without having physical possession of a proper drivers license, and which applies to all TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 36 of 57
private property defined as a self-propelled vehicle not operated exclusively on tracks but does not include: A. A snowmobile as defined in Title 12, section 13001; B. An all-terrain vehicle as defined in Title 12, section 13001, unless the all-terrain vehicle is permitted in accordance with section 501, subsection 8 or is operated on a way and section 2080 applies; and C. A motorized wheelchair or an electric personal assistive mobility device. Evidently, according to certain sections of Title 29-A of the Maine Revised Statutes Annotated, it is a traffic infraction or a strict liability crime to obtain private property as defined to be a self-propelled vehicle not operated exclusively on tracks and to use it for its intended purpose outside the physical limits of the owners private land without a proper drivers license even when that property is not used for commercial purposes in compliance with 18 USC 31(6). A public way are roads which are financed by, created by, maintained for and used by sovereign people of this state by paying certain administrative fees, taxes, surcharges, and remedial penalties for traffic infractions and strict liability crimes. RESPONDENT suspending PETITIONERs drivers license violates her inherent unalienable right of possessing and enjoying private property in the pursuit of and attempt to obtain basic safety and happiness into a traffic infraction or strict liability crime depending solely on the length of time residence is claimed to be within the boundaries of this state. The alleged administrative record submitted by RESPONDENT on May 29, 2013 is inconsistent, contradictory and does not justify RESPONDENTs successive repeated refusals to grant mandatory administrative hearings after being notified by PETITIONER on March 18, 2013 that required notices and her actual knowledge of authority and subject matter of the suspension, or her right to an administrative hearing, did not occur until early March 2013. RESPONDENTs repeated refusal to grant compulsory pre-suspension and post-restoration administrative hearings despite the uncontested facts of TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 37 of 57
the administrative record was contrary to law in that it was based on an interpretation inconsistent with statutory and constitutional duties, was made upon unlawful procedure, was affected by bias or by error of law, was unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record and was arbitrary and capricious. RESPONDENT cannot suspend or revoke any license with arbitrary and capricious motives without a shred of evidence to support the suspension and without first following strict procedural due process as strictly required by the Constitution. RESPONDENT issuing PETITIONER violation free credits for years 2008, 2009 and 2010 does not justify any type of license suspension because clearly no evidence exists of unsafe operation, obvious incompetence or of being any type of danger to the public immediately prior to the administrative suspension on January 5, 2010. RESPONDENTs sole purpose for communicating with PETITIONER in November and December 2009 was to induce PETITIONER to comply with an obligatory medical evaluation which was not provoked by any adverse reports of unsafe operation or incompetency and which was a blatant violation of PETITIONERs freedom of religion, freedom of speech, rights against self incrimination, illegal search and seizure, due process and equal protection. The administrative record shows that PETITIONER did not receive two (2) notices sent by RESPONDENT in November and December 2009 requiring her submission to the unconstitutional medical evaluation and then initiating an indefinite suspension for failure to comply with the medical evaluation request. The administrative record does not indicate RESPONDENT complied with 5 MRSA 9052, 5 MRSA 10003(1), 5 MRSA 10004(3), or 29-A MRSA 2482(1). RESPONDENT coercively used 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) to compel PETITIONER to fulfill a compulsory and unconstitutional medical evaluation and coercively forced her to revise her mailing address which was clearly contrary to law in that it was a blatant violation of PETITIONERs freedom of TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 38 of 57
speech, right against self incrimination, illegal search and seizure and equal protection. RESPONDENTs actions were based on an interpretation inconsistent with clearly expressed statutory and constitutional duties, was made upon clearly unlawful procedure, was affected by bias or by error of law, was not supported by substantial evidence on the whole record and was clearly arbitrary and capricious. PETITIONER affirms that, during a thorough and detailed review of the record which was filed on May 29, 2013, PETITIONER noticed RESPONDENT has submitted absolutely no evidence whatsoever to support or defend their arbitrary and capricious actions suspending License #1491178 on January 5, 2010 under 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D), stating PETITIONER Is incompetent to drive a motor vehicle. PETITIONER states that, as a matter of fact and which is abundantly evidenced within the record as submitted by RESPONDENT, there IS evidence of one or more of the following: 1. Governmental fraud. 2. Governmental complicity. 3. Governmental conspiracy to deprive PETITIONER of constitutionally secured rights. 4. Intentionally or negligently falsifying or altering official public records. 5. Blatant incompetence or willful disregard for written laws, rules and procedures.
PETITIONER outlines the following facts as filed with this court on May 29, 2013 by RESPONDENT, Tab 2, Certified Driving Record, page 1 of STATE OF MAINEs certification that the paper to which they attached is a true copy of the records of their office at the DEPARTMENT OF STATE as sworn to by SECRETARY OF STATE Matthew Dunlap on May 22, 2013 under the GREAT SEAL OF THE STATE OF MAINE.
TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 39 of 57
DRIVER RECORD REPORT-2 PRINTED 05/22/13 09:18:31
ENTRY DATE ACTION DATE DESCRIPTION 05/29/07 05/25/07 CONVICTION SPEEDING 79 MPH IN A 65 MPH ZONE VIOLATION-DATE: 05/17/07 (002153985/D-VB) 05/29/07 05/25/07 CONVICTION VIOLATION SEAT BELT LAW VIOLATION-DATE: 05/17/07 (002153985/D-VB) 01/01/10 12/31/09 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS 03/08/11 12/31/10 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS
PETITIONER makes imperative judicial notification that the line item for 05/22/13 excerpt shows CONVICTION SPEEDING 79 MPH IN A 65 MPH ZONE does in fact PRECEDE CONVICTION VIOLATION SEAT BELT LAW and 123108 ~ VIOLATION FREE CREDITS is in fact MISSING.
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Tab 3, BMV files, page 3, illustrated BELOW which was excerpted from the record submitted by the RESPONDENT , DRIVER RECORD - REVIEW REQUESTED PRINTED 04/02/13 09:03:10
DELETE DATE ACTION DATE DESCRIPTION 05/25/07 CONVICTION VIOLATION SEAT BELT LAW VIOLATION-DATE: 05/17/07 (002153985/D-VB) 05/25/07 CONVICTION SPEEDING 79 MPH IN A 65 MPH ZONE VIOLATION-DATE: 05/17/07 (002153985/D-VB) 123108 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS 111009 USPS RETURNED MD-LT-01 ON 111009 122909 USPS RETURNED MD-LT-18 ON 122809 123109 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS 030811 010510 DELETED DRV SUSP INDEFINITE (BMV) FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH MED. EVAL REQ FL FILE MED EVAL RESTORED: 03/08/11 123110 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS
PETITIONER makes imperative judicial notification that the line item for 04/02/13 excerpt shows CONVICTION VIOLATION SEAT BELT LAW does in fact PRECEDE CONVICTION SPEEDING 79 MPH IN A 65 MPH ZONE and 123108 ~ VIOLATION FREE CREDITS is in fact PROPERLY INCLUDED.
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Tab 3, BMV files, page 3, illustrated BELOW which was excerpted from the record submitted by the RESPONDENT, DRIVER RECORD - REVIEW REQUESTED PRINTED 03/20/13 09:43:58 DELETE DATE ENTRY DATE ACTION DATE DESCRIPTION 05/29/07 05/25/07 CONVICTION VIOLATION SEAT BELT LAW VIOLATION-DATE: 05/17/07 (002153985/D-VB) 05/29/07 05/25/07 CONVICTION SPEEDING 79 MPH IN A 65 MPH ZONE VIOLATION-DATE: 05/17/07 (002153985/D-VB) 010109 123108 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS 111009 111009 USPS RETURNED MD-LT-01 ON 111009 122909 122909 USPS RETURNED MD-LT-18 ON 122809 010110 123109 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS 030811 110109 010510 DELETED DRV SUSP INDEFINITE (BMV)
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH MED. EVAL REQ FL FILE MED EVAL RESTORED: 03/08/11 030811 123110 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS [diagonal line part of official record] PETITIONER makes imperative judicial notification that the line item for 03/20/13 excerpt shows CONVICTION VIOLATION SEAT BELT LAW does in fact PRECEDE CONVICTION SPEEDING 79 MPH IN A 65 MPH ZONE and 123108 ~ VIOLATION FREE CREDITS is in fact PROPERLY INCLUDED. TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 42 of 57
It should be obvious to the reader that a serious discrepancy and error has occurred in the maintenance of official motor vehicle records and which does in fact significantly compromise the integrity of RESPONDENTs evidence and motivation to prosecute PETITIONER. It is evidenced within this record under Tab 2, Certified Driving Record, that the RESPONDENT certified the PETITIONER was issued ONLY 2 YEARS VIOLATION FREE CREDITS for years 2009 and 2010. It is also evidenced within this record, in two distinct locations under Tab 3, BMV files, that the RESPONDENT certified the PETITIONER was in fact properly issued 3 YEARS VIOLATION FREE CREDITS for years 2008, 2009 and 2010. PETITIONER states that she was previously employed full time, in good standing, by STATE OF MAINE, BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLE from January 2007 through April 2008 in the OUI/Habitual Offender Unit which did in fact afford PETITIONER with expertise, a thorough education, comprehensive knowledge and special skills to expertly and correctly assess a driver record and its individual line items. PETITIONER affirms that the information under Tab 3, BMV files, is perfectly accurate. PETITIONER alleges that the information under Tab 2, Certified Driving Record, was intentionally falsified or negligently erroneous in order to weaken PETITIONERs affirmative defenses and her likelihood of prevailing in this case and its criminal companion case. PETITIONER alleges that RESPONDENTs efforts to cloud the courts judgment through filing deceptive and fraudulent records of evidence has been unsuccessful in spite of their exacerbated efforts to prevent PETITIONER from exercising her lawful, constitutionally-guaranteed rights. The alleged administrative record shows that the violation free credit issued for year 2010 was in fact issued on March 8, 2011 which is the same day RESPONDENT restored the license without requiring reinstatement fees, civil sanctions or administrative charges after PETITIONER filed a completed TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 43 of 57
medical evaluation from PETITIONERs doctor affirming minimal/no risk of unsafe operation for any medical issues. RESPONDENT restoring the license without reinstatement fees, civil sanctions or any administrative charges and immediately issuing violation free credits on March 8, 2011 for 2010 are two pieces of prima facie evidence that the medical suspension is not now, and never has been, a traffic violation or strict liability crime and which has no assigned civil or criminal penalty of any kind and cannot be used as a prior offense under 29-A MRSA 2412-A. Upon RESPONDENT restoring the license on March 8, 2011 with medical affirmation of competency, PETITIONER demanded removal of all medical restrictions from the license which were revealed to still be active many months later violating the equal protection clause and requiring a second demand for removal retroactive to March 8, 2011. Upon further review, PETITIONER observed that RESPONDENT still has not removed the medical restriction from license 1491178 and which now shows a mandatory evaluation date of 2014 in clear violation of PETITIONERs right to equal protection under the constitution and laws of this state. An incorrect mailing address is not by itself, and cannot be used as any evidence of incompetency rising to the level of being a threat to public safety, or being any type of justification for suspension under Medical Rules 29-250 Ch. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) and 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D), without being combined with adverse reports or other indications of dangerous operation. RESPONDENT erred when they knowingly and willfully failed to provide ample public notice of an alleged threat to public safety, knowingly failing to consult the medical advisory board prior to suspending the license, nor does the RESPONDENTs administrative record have any clear convincing evidence to justify a suspension under Medical Rules 29-250 Ch. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) and 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) all of which violated many constitutional protections. RESPONDENT violated the Maine Constitution, as well as 5 MRSA 10004(3), by extending the administrative suspension beyond 30 days totaling TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 44 of 57
427 days and then again violating those same constitutional protections when it failed to notify PETITIONER on March 8, 2011 of her right to demand administrative hearings when PETITIONER completed and submitted the required medical evaluation. RESPONDENTs decision to illegally extend the January 5, 2010 medical suspension beyond the clear statutory limitation of 30 days was the direct and proximate cause for PETITIONER being prosecuted on July 5, 2011 for a strict liability crime under 29-A MRSA 2412-A with violation dates of February 10, 2011 (AUGDC-CR-2011-512 dismissed) and March 7, 2011 (AUGDC-CR-2011- 513 guilty via coerced illegal plea agreement). PETITIONER makes imperative judicial notice of the fact that if the RESPONDENT had adhered to the strict guidelines of MRSA, and particularly to 5 MRSA 10004(3) and had released the medical suspension on the 31 st day, then PETITIONER would not have been charged and convicted of operating after suspension in AUGDC-CR-2011-513 nor would the pending companion case AUGSC-CR-2012-286 be whatsoever pending or in existence. PETITIONER filed a timely request for post-conviction review of the coerced plea agreement for AUGDC-CR-2011-513 on July 6, 2012 which was denied in September 2012; PETITIONER filed an immediate request for reconsideration which was denied in November 2012. PETITIONER was not informed by RESPONDENT and was unaware of the statutory authority for the medical suspension on January 5, 2010, or her rights attached thereto, because she never received or saw any written notice from RESPONDENT until March 2013 while reviewing evidence for pending action AUGSC-CR-2012-286. PETITIONER instantly demanded proper administrative hearings to challenge RESPONDENTs statutory authority to suspend the license in January 2010 under Medical Rules 29-250 Ch. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) and 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) without any clear convincing evidence on the record, nor receiving adverse reports or other indications of dangerous operation. RESPONDENT knowingly and willfully violated protections of the Maine TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 45 of 57
Constitution when refusing, three times, to grant administrative hearings upon PETITIONERs proper written requests in March and April 2013 at all times indicating PETITIONERs demands were made untimely but without providing clear and convincing evidence that PETITIONER had received actual notice or knowledge on March 8, 2011 of her right to demand administrative hearings. RESPONDENT knowingly violated protections of the Maine Constitution when suspending license 1491178 for incompetency without clear evidence of adverse operation, failing to provide notice or preliminary hearing, retaining suspension beyond clearly stated statutory limitations, and refusing to provide administrative hearings thrice demanded in March and April 2013. Double jeopardy was effectively invoked when criminal charges were illegally filed and successfully prosecuted on July 5, 2011 under 29-A MRSA 2412-A(1)(A) via a coerced plea agreement resulting directly from the medical suspension of January 5, 2010 and being the direct proximate cause for the pending action under AUGSC-CR-12-286 and which prompted this 80C action.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE REVIEWED
1. WHETHER 29-A MRSA 1251, 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D), 29-A MRSA 2412(1-A)(A) AND MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3 VIOLATE MAINE CONSTITUTION.
2. WHETHER THREE YEARS CONSECUTIVE VIOLATION FREE CREDITS EARNED DIRECTLY PRIOR TO SUSPENSION IS EVIDENCE OF BEING A THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY AND JUSTIFYING SUSPENSION UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D).
3. WHETHER INCORRECT MAILING ADDRESS IS CLEAR CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF INCOMPETENCY RISING TO THE LEVEL OF BEING A THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY JUSTIFYING SUSPENSION UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D).
4. WHETHER RESPONDENT ERRED WHEN THEY FAILED TO PROVIDE PUBLIC NOTICE OF A THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY.
5. WHETHER RESPONDENT CONSULTED MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD PRIOR TO SUSPENDING LICENSE UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D). TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 46 of 57
6. WHETHER RESPONDENTS ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD HAD CLEAR CONVINCING EVIDENCE JUSTIFYING LICENSE SUSPENSION UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) AND 29- A MRSA 2458(2)(D).
7. WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS WHEN SUSPENDING LICENSE UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D)WITHOUT ANY ADVERSE REPORTS, CLEAR CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF VIOLATIONS, OR CONSULT WITH THE MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD.
8. WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED 5 MRSA 10004(3) BY EXTENDING ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION ON JANUARY 5, 2010 BEYOND 30 DAYS TOTALING 427 DAYS ENDING ON MARCH 8, 2011.
9. WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS ON MARCH 8, 2011 BY FAILING TO NOTIFY PETITIONER OF RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING.
10. WHETHER RESPONDENT KNOWINGLY VIOLATED DUE PROCESS WHEN REPEATEDLY REFUSING TO PROVIDE MANDATORY ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, THRICE DEMANDED IN 2013.
11. WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED MAINE CONSTITUTION WHEN SUSPENDING FOR INCOMPETENCY WITHOUT EVIDENCE, FAILING TO PROVIDE NOTICE OR PRELIMINARY HEARING, RETAINING SUSPENSION BEYOND STATUTORY LIMITATIONS, AND REFUSING TO PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE POST-RESTORATION HEARINGS THRICE DEMANDED IN 2013.
12. WHETHER DOUBLE JEOPARDY WAS INVOKED WHEN CRIMINAL CHARGES WERE FILED AND SUCCESSFULLY PROSECUTED ON JULY 5, 2011 RESULTING DIRECTLY FROM THE MEDICAL SUSPENSION OF JANUARY 5, 2010 AND BEING DIRECT PROXIMATE CAUSE FOR PENDING ACTION AUGSC-CR-12-286. FACTUAL BACKGROUND PETITIONER is one of the freeborn, living, breathing, sovereign inhabitants of the republic of Maine. PETITIONER has given lawful and properly certified notice reclaiming and redeeming her sovereign status effectively nullifying all unlawful contracts in May 2012, hereby attached to this Motion as exhibits, those notifications consisting of Ecclesiastic Deed Poll, Statement of Identity, Certificate of TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 47 of 57
Authority, Entitlement Order, Acknowledgement of Deed and a certified copy of the Certificate of Live Birth, to the following governmental and court authorities: a. STATE OF MAINE, DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF VITAL RECORDS, 244 Water Street, STATE HOUSE STATION #11, AUGUSTA, MAINE b. Magistrate, Kennebec County Probate Court, 95 State Street, Augusta, Maine c. Charles E. Summers, Jr., 148 State House Station, Augusta, Maine 04333 d. William J. Schneider, 6 State House Station, Augusta, ME 04333-0006 e. Basilica of the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception, 400 Michigan Avenue, Northeast, Washington, D.C. 20017 f. U.S. Attorney General, Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee, U.S. Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20530-0001 g. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, U.S. Department of State, 2201 C Street NW, Washington, DC 20520 On August 23, 2012, PETITIONER certified mailed Writ of Mandamus and Replevin, hereby attached to this brief as exhibits, to the following governmental authorities: Mike Pool, Director, Bureau of Land Management Washington Office, 1849 C Street NW, Rm. 5665, Washington DC 20240
Carole Carter-Pfisterer, Assistant Director, Bureau of Land Management, Human Capital Management , 1849 C Street NW, Rm. 5611, Washington, DC 20240
Department of Health and Human Services, Vital Records, SHS #11, Augusta Maine PETITIONER has been continuously and unlawfully coerced since February 3,1989 through willful nondisclosure and governmental fraud to TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 48 of 57
request a drivers license whereby unknowingly waiving her sovereign right to travel in her private conveyance for private non-commercial purposes without being restricted by unlawful encumbrances. PETITIONER has been continuously and unlawfully coerced since February 3, 1989 through willful nondisclosure and governmental fraud to request vehicle registration plates whereby unknowingly waiving her sovereign right to travel in her private conveyance for private non-commercial purposes without being restricted by unlawful encumbrances. Georgia General Assembly House Bill 7 repeals drivers license requirements for common law reasons which can be found here: http://www1.legis.ga.gov/legis/2011_12/sum/hb7.htm 11/15/10: House Prefiled; 01/12/2011: House First Readers; 01/24/2011: House Second Readers; to wit: Free people have a common law and constitutional right to travel on the roads and highways that are provided by their government for that purpose. Licensing of drivers cannot be required of free people because taking on the restrictions of a license requires the surrender of an inalienable right; In England in 1215, the right to travel was enshrined in Article 42 of Magna Carta: It shall be lawful to any person, for the future, to go out of our kingdom, and to return, safely and securely, by land or by water, saving his allegiance to us, unless it be in time of war, for some short space, for the common good of the kingdom: excepting prisoners and outlaws, according to the laws of the land, and of the people of the nation at war against us, and Merchants who shall be treated as it is said above. Where rights secured by the Constitution of the United States and the State of Georgia are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation that would abrogate these rights. The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime. There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon an individual because of this exercise of constitutional rights; TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 49 of 57
American citizens have the inalienable right to use the roads and highways unrestricted in any manner so long as they are not damaging or violating property or rights of others. The government, by requiring the people to obtain drivers' licenses, is restricting, and therefore violating, the people's common law and constitutional right to travel; In Shapiro v Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), Justice Potter Stewart noted in a concurring opinion that the right to travel "is a right broadly assertable against private interference as well as governmental action. Like the right of association...it is a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all." The Articles of Confederation had an explicit right to travel; and we hold that the right to travel is so fundamental that the Framers thought it was unnecessary to include it in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights; The right to travel upon the public highways is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will but the common right which every citizen has under his or her right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his or her inclination along the public highways or in public places while conducting himself or herself in an orderly and decent manner; and Thus, the legislature does not have the power to abrogate the citizens' right to travel upon the public roads by passing legislation forcing the citizen to waive the right and convert that right into a privilege. PETITIONER peacefully asserts her sovereignty and personal liberty to freely possess private property liberated from all governmental interferences and encumbrances which is a guaranteed right to every citizen under our Constitution and common equity laws. RESPONDENT cannot require or issue a license to exercise a fundamental liberty of not-for-hire traveling. RESPONDENT cannot require or issue a license to exercise a fundamental liberty of possessing private property. TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 50 of 57
RESPONDENT cannot require or issue a license to exercise a fundamental liberty of using ones own personal property as one deems suitable. RESPONDENT cannot require or issue a license to exercise ones right to use public highways for private non-commercial traveling in ones conveyance of free choice. RESPONDENT cannot require enrollment of private data into RESPONDENTs registration records. Any person who travels in an automobile which is not registered, without proper vehicle registration plates, and who uses that private unregistered conveyance for private travel purposes does in fact put herself at very high risk for being arrested and imprisoned for failure to do a thing which patently violates Bill of Rights, 4 th Amendment and Maine Constitution, Article 1, Section 5 protections against unlawful search and seizure of persons, papers and things, The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from all unreasonable searches and seizures. 29-A MRSA 1251 is prima facie evidence of RESPONDENTs willful infringement of protections under the Maine Constitution. Any person who registers an automobile or obtains a license with the RESPONDENT complies reluctantly only under duress, blatant intimidation, willful nondisclosure, criminal conspiracy, aggravated fraud and governmental corruption. Any person who innocently fails or knowingly refuses to comply with registration and licensing rules and who exercises the right of locomotion by automobile is immediately categorized as a criminal and subjected to intimidation, harassment, arrest, assault and kidnapping by law enforcement and judicial agencies in violation of federal and state constitutional protections. A persons right to locomotion is a sacred right beholden to everyone. A license is a grant or permission that is often assigned and documented by way of a piece of paper which affords the licensee to do an act that would otherwise be unlawful. TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 51 of 57
Exercising ones right to travel and right to locomotion has never been unlawful. Being sovereign has never been unlawful. RESPONDENT cannot require or issue a license to exercise a fundamental liberty to travel in ones chosen conveyance on a free, open public way which is reserved for use by the sovereign people as tenants in common. 17-A MRSA 2(19). Definitions state an "organization" means a corporation, partnership or unincorporated association. 17-A MRSA 2(20). Definitions state a "person" means a human being or an organization. RESPONDENT, State of Maine, Secretary of State is a legal corporation and a registered corporate person. 17 MRSA 2931. Prohibition. A person may not, by force or threat of force, intentionally injure, intimidate or interfere with, or intentionally attempt to injure, intimidate or interfere with or intentionally oppress or threaten any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege, secured to that person by the Constitution of Maine or laws of the State or by the United States Constitution or laws of the United States. Section 2 of the Bill of Rights clarifies that all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that Magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them. Article 1, Section 2 of the Maine Constitution, states, All power is inherent in the people; all free governments are founded in their authority and instituted for their benefit; they have therefore an unalienable and indefeasible right to institute government, and to alter, reform, or totally change the same, when their safety and happiness require it. Article 4 of the Amendments to the Federal Constitution and Article 1, Section 5 of the Maine Constitution, declares, The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from all unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall issue without a special designation of the place to be searched, TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 52 of 57
and the person or thing to be seized, nor without probable cause -- supported by oath or affirmation. RESPONDENT has violated and prevented due process of law. RESPONDENT has violated PETITIONERs constitutionally protected rights. RESPONDENT has unclean hands and cannot prevail pursuant to maxims of law. Callas v. State, 320 SW 2d 360 - Tex: Court of Criminal Appeals 1959, This Court has held that there is no such license known to Texas law as a "driver's license". See Hassell v. State, 149 Tex. Cr.R. 333, 194 S.W.2d 400; Brooks v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 546, 258 S.W.2d 317. Brooks v. State, 258 SW 2d 317 - Tex: Court of Criminal Appeals 1953, The information upon which this conviction was predicated alleged that appellant did then and there unlawfully drive and operate a motor vehicle upon a public highway while his drivers license was suspended. In Hassell v. State, 149 Tex.Cr.R. 333, 194 S.W.2d 400, 401, we said: "There being no such license as a `driver's' license known to the law, it follows that the information, in charging the driving of a motor vehicle upon a public highway without such a license, charges no offense." See also Holloway v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 237 S.W.2d 303. Because the information fails to charge an offense, the judgment is reversed and the prosecution ordered dismissed. ARGUMENT A. 29-A MRSA 1251, 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D), 29-A MRSA 2412(1-A)(A) AND MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3 VIOLATE MAINE CONSTITUTION. 29-A MRSA 1251, 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D), 29-A MRSA 2412(1-A)(A) AND MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3 violate PETITIONERs rights to possess, enjoy and protect private property under Art. 1, Sec. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A, 9, and 24 of the Maine Constitution as well as PETITIONER being required to report PETITIONERs medical conditions being a violation of PETITIONERs natural TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 53 of 57
rights as protected by Art. 1, Sec. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6-A, 9, 19 and 24 in that RESPONDENT forces PETITIONER to speak PETITIONERs medical condition and then RESPONDENT seizes PETITIONERs medical records for RESPONDENTs review so RESPONDENT can seize PETITIONERs alleged privilege to drive which is masked as a statutory mandate at RESPONDENTs command after being required to get a drivers license to use PETITIONERs private property on public roads which are paid for, maintained and used by the public (PETITIONER), and when RESPONDENT requires PETITIONERs medical conditions to be disclosed pursuant to Motor Vehicle Rules as PETITIONER legally complied with, RESPONDENT then imposes excessive penalties and punishments outside of the realm of reasonable proportions and turns the innocent mistake, which does not rise to the offense of a civil action, into a criminal offense and then denies PETITIONERs right to redress PETITIONERs injuries with RESPONDENT about the original medical reporting requirement and basis for their alleged authority for their subsequent suspension for innocently forgetting to disclose PETITIONERs physical whereabouts every thirty days while PETITIONER was unwillingly transient.
B. RECEIPT OF VIOLATION FREE CREDITS DOES NOT JUSTIFY ANY TYPE OF SUSPENSION.
This argument wins on its own.
C. AN INCORRECT MAILING ADDRESS IS NOT CLEAR EVIDENCE OF INCOMPETENCY RISING TO THE LEVEL OF BEING A THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY OR JUSTIFICATION FOR SUSPENSION UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) .
There is no legal precedent supporting a suspension imposed under 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) for innocently forgetting to change an address when TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 54 of 57
not coupled with other dangerous or negligent actions.
D. RESPONDENT ERRED WHEN THEY FAILED TO PROVIDE PUBLIC NOTICE OF A THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY.
If RESPONDENT had posted mandatory public notice in November and December 2009 of the impending suspension of license 1491178 on January 5, 2010, PETITIONERs family and friends who read the local news religiously would have promptly notified PETITIONER of the public notice and PETITIONER would have promptly changed her address and complied with the medical evaluation request under duress and RESPONDENTs fraudulent coercive tactics.
E. RESPONDENT DID NOT CONSULT MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD PRIOR TO SUSPENDING LICENSE UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) VIOLATING THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES.
There is no evidence that RESPONDENT consulted with the Medical Advisory Board or any other medical professional in consultation about PETITIONERs incompetency prior to suspending the license.
F. RESPONDENTS ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD DOES NOT HAVE ANY CLEAR EVIDENCE JUSTIFYING SUSPENSION UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) VIOLATING THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES.
The lack of evidence speaks for itself and supports PETITIONERs claims of constitutional violations.
TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 55 of 57
G. RESPONDENT ERRED WHEN SUSPENDING LICENSE UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) WITHOUT ANY ADVERSE REPORTS, CLEAR EVIDENCE OF DANGEROUS VIOLATIONS, OR CONSULT WITH THE MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD.
The lack of evidence speaks for itself and supports PETITIONERs claims of constitutional violations.
H. RESPONDENT VIOLATED 5 MRSA 10004(3) BY EXTENDING ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION BEYOND 30 DAYS TOTALING 427 DAYS.
The evidence speaks for itself in that the RESPONDENT had no basis to preserve this suspension for 427 days despite its alleged authority.
I. RESPONDENT ERRED ON MARCH 8, 2011 WHEN FAILING TO NOTIFY PETITIONER OF RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS.
RESPONDENT had an obligation on March 8, 2011 to verbally notify PETITIONER of her rights to an administrative hearing and the authority of the suspension upon their recorded knowledge that postal mail had twice been returned to them and that PETITIONER had no actual knowledge of said notices or the contents therein.
J. RESPONDENT KNOWINGLY VIOLATED DUE PROCESS WHEN REFUSING TO PROVIDE MANDATORY ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS.
This argument needs no explanation.
TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 56 of 57
K. RESPONDENT KNOWINGLY VIOLATED MAINE CONSTITUTION WHEN SUSPENDING FOR INCOMPETENCY WITHOUT EVIDENCE, FAILING TO PROVIDE NOTICE OR PRELIMINARY HEARING, RETAINING SUSPENSION BEYOND STATUTORY LIMITATIONS, AND REFUSING TO PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE POST-RESTORATION HEARINGS THRICE DEMANDED IN 2013.
RESPONDENT has no evidence to justify any type of suspension and then failing to properly notify PETITIONER of her rights and then denying PETITIONERs rights to be heard after discovering two years later that RESPONDENT had deemed PETITIONER incompetent without just or good cause, evidence, facts or opinions to support any such sentiment or judgment.
L. DOUBLE JEOPARDY WAS INVOKED WHEN CRIMINAL CHARGES WERE FILED AND SUCCESSFULLY PROSECUTED ON JULY 5, 2011 UNDER 29-A MRSA 2412-A(1)(A) RESULTING DIRECTLY FROM THE MEDICAL SUSPENSION OF JANUARY 5, 2010 AND BEING DIRECT PROXIMATE CAUSE FOR PENDING ACTION AUGSC-CR-12-286.
PETITIONER was prosecuted in separate criminal proceedings on July 5, 2011 under coercive tactics by former A.D.A Steven Parker with full knowledge that the medical suspension had been DELETED FROM THE RECORD and continued to intimidate PETITIONER with excessive fines, an expressed and clear intention to seek imprisonment and punitive damages if PETITIONER did not agree to a plea agreement, which PETITIONER unwillingly agreed to and expressly reserved her unalienable rights on and for the record on July 5, 2011 in open court.
RELIEF REQUESTED 1. Declaratory judgment that RESPONDENT violated PETITIONER's rights and protections of the Maine Constitution Article 1, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A, 8, 9, 19 and 24. 2. Void AUGDC-CR-2011-512/513 and directly refund all related monies. 3. Void all open and closed related companion cases in superior, district and violation bureau courts. 4. Release bail bond ($300) and bail conditions for AUGSC-CR-20 12-286. 5. Order RESPONDENT to remove and delete the medical restriction on license # 1491178 which is scheduled for review in 2014. 6. Order RESPONDENT to flag license #1491178ME as "DO NOT STOP" on the national driver registry on grounds of religious freedom. 7. Give PETITIONER leave to file civil rights suit against RESPONDENT. 8. All other legal, punitive, and compensatory remedies as deemed just. 9. All other equitable remedies as deemed just and appropriate. CONCLUSION Common law has returned. Maritime law has gone back out to sea. PETITIONER stands on solid ground with absolute clean hands, no evidence of malevolent motives or behaviors, with full transparency and truth, under GOD's LAW ONLY and rejecting all man-made statutory laws which violate her natural rights and explicit protections of those rights expressed in the Maine Constitution. The time has come for all men and women to speak the truth, honor the truth, speak only facts with full transparency and complete accountability when errors and mistakes are committed. When injuries occur, the injured has full rights to require redress and remedy of those injuries despite the alleged immunity against prosecution for negligent, capricious, arbitrary and blatantly illegal use of words under GOD:t':d herein. DATED: July 15, 2013 Gina Lynn Turcotte TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 57 of 57
AWARD_19141 Salah Laku It is further ordered that the Company shall pay the total amount of
RM132,000.00 to the Claimant through the Claimants' solicitor's, Messrs Shanker
& Arjunan, within 30 days from the date of this Award subject to statutory
deductions, if any.