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Agenda Setting in a Culture of Fear : The Lasting Effects of September 11 on American Politics and Journalism
Matthew D. Matsaganis and J. Gregory Payne American Behavioral Scientist 2005 49: 379 DOI: 10.1177/0002764205282049 The online version of this article can be found at: http://abs.sagepub.com/content/49/3/379

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American Behavioral 10.1177/0002764205282049 Matsaganis, Payne / Politics, Scientist Spectacle, T errorism

Agenda Setting in a Culture of Fear

The Lasting Effects of September 11 on American Politics and Journalism
Matthew D. Matsaganis
University of Southern California

American Behavioral Scientist Volume 49 Number 3 November 2005 379-392 2005 Sage Publications 10.1177/0002764205282049 http://abs.sagepub.com hosted at http://online.sagepub.com

J. Gregory Payne
Emerson College

Agenda setting has been developed, expanded, and employed in numerous studies as an analytical tool that affords an understanding of not only how our political reality is formulated but also how realities can be manufactured. However, as the authors argue, by grafting agenda setting and media systems dependency theorytwo different traditions in mass communication theoryit is possible to better account for changes in the agenda-setting process because of shifts in the power relationships between all actors involved, especially under conditions of increased threat; conditions similar to those the American public has lived in since the September 11 terrorist attacks. Illustrations from Campaign 2004 complement this analysis. The authors suggest that it is critical to understand the dynamics of the making of mediated realities so as to alert readers of the importance in furthering critical media literacy skills necessary for the public to distinguish between facades and facts. Keywords: agenda setting; media systems dependency; mediated reality; terrorism; politics; journalism; media

ays before Decision 2004, in The New York Times Magazine, journalist Ron Suskind (2004) recalled a meeting with a senior White House aide 2 years earlier. The topic concerned an article Suskind had written for Esquire in the summer of 2002. The White House was displeased with the article, as it was critical of the administration and particularly of Bushs former communications director Karen Hughes. Suskind elaborated,
The aide said that guys like me were in what we call the reality-based community, which he defined as people who believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality. I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. Thats not the way the world really works anymore,

379

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he continued. Were an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while youre studying that realityjudiciously, as you willwell act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and thats how things will sort out. Were historys actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do. (p. 44)

At the time, Suskind (2004) admitted, I didnt fully comprehend [the statement], but . . . I now believe [it] gets to the very heart of the Bush presidency (p. 44). To the reader, the White House aides definition of realitya product of the empires willmay seem mind boggling at first glance, just as it did to Suskind (2004). The pomposity of the statement may be repulsive to many, but one must marvel at its candor, its sincerity, and its in your face bluntness. This article suggests that the statement reflects a clear understanding of how policy, media, and public agendas are built and set in an electronic age where realities are manufactured, packaged, and sold just like a Broadway production, a Hollywood blockbuster, or a prime-time reality television show. In an era where sound bites are preferred over sound arguments, where Goffmanesque nuances (e.g., Goffman, 1982, 1995) trump substantive discourse, where celebrity spectacles permeate the increasingly permanent campaign landscape, the challenge is for scholars, students, practitioners, and citizens to fully engage in the study of this phenomenon, which all too often permeates our political communication process. The purpose of this article is to provide a synoptic overview of the evolution of agenda setting in our effort to explore and better understand its characteristics at work in the formulation of the real as well as manufactured reality in which we live. Our goal is to highlight the dynamics of the making of such mediated realities so as to alert readers of the importance in furthering critical media literacy skills necessary for the public to distinguish between facades and facts. The initial section provides a synopsis of agenda-setting research followed by illustrations from Campaign 2004 and discussion that both complement and challenge extant research and the need for further investigation of such a political communication dynamic.

Setting the Stage: Agenda Setting and the Manufacture of Reality

During the past 30 years, more than 350 studies have been conducted on agendasetting theory, as reflected in the work of Lippmann (1922); Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1948); Lazarsfeld and Merton (1964); Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954); Cohen (1963); McCombs and Shaw (1972); Funkhouser (1973); and Cobb and Elder (1983). This body of knowledge based on the agenda-setting paradigm continues to develop, expand, and modify, with additional agents introduced as vitally active in the ongoing global communication evolution. For instance, Dearing and Rogers (1996) removed the agenda-setting concept from the confining media-public relational framework and defined it as a dynamic, ongoing competition among issue proponents to gain attention of media professionals, the public, and policy elites. . . . The study of agenda-setting is the study of social change and of social stability (p. 2). In political terms, an agenda is a general set of political

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controversies that will be viewed at any point in time as falling within the range of legitimate concerns meriting the attention of the polity (Cobb & Elder, 1983). Likewise, an issue is defined as a conflict between two or more identifiable groups over procedural or substantive matters relating to the distribution of positions or resources (Cobb & Elder, 1983). However, as Dearing and Rogers noted, many social problems never become issues because issues require exposurecoverage in the mass mediabefore they can be considered public issues (p. 2). Whether the Machiavellian control freak or the casual consumer of politics, one must appreciate the ability in political communication to influence and potentially control the political agenda and, thus, the communication dynamic within the designated public sphere. In agreement with the notion that the agenda-setting process fundamentally is a political process, Dearing and Rogers (1996) identified three of its main components: the media agenda, the public agenda, and the policy agenda. Earlier studies conclude that the media must first decide on the priority of the issues to be addressed (media agenda). Subsequently, the media agenda affects or interacts with what the public thinks (Littlejohn, 1999, p. 346). Finally, the public agenda is to affect the policy makersdecisions or a view regarding what issues are more important (policy agenda). Recent research, however, suggests that this process is not solely linear. Dearing and Rogers (1996) have argued for circular models of the agenda-setting process that include certain directional relationships (p. 75). Studies by Roberts and McCombs (1994), Semetko and Canel (1997), Tedesco (2001), and others, for example, acknowledge the influence of the policy agenda on the media agenda, especially in the context of political campaigns. As Dearing and Rogers noted, the relationship of media reporters and policymakers is symbiotic, in that journalists need access to the sources of the news and policymakers need coverage of their proposals and actions (p. 74). Moreover and especially given our focus, it is important to note that a number of studies suggest that political leadersand the president in particularcan have significant influence on the medias agenda (Bosso, 1987). The opening quote of this article from Suskind (2004) on the power of the presidency to manufacture alternative realities as part of the agenda-setting function further illustrates the pressing need to grapple with this phenomenon, especially within the context of terrorismcertainly a strong and rhetorically captivating emotional appeal that permeates the global political landscape. The relationship of media and public agendas is still largely seen as unidirectional, with the media exerting influence over the public. Nonetheless, as Littlejohn (1999) noted, Actual events have some impact on both the media and the public agenda (p. 346). Events such as the terrorist spectacle attacks in the United States, Saudi Arabia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Egypt have monumental short- and long-term impact in agenda setting. All are dramatic narratives in the continuing and ubiquitous terrorist script that has a deep psychological hold on the global public. Politicians, in responding to spectacle events of this type, have a tendency, either knowingly or unknowingly, to exploit such obtrusive media shared events for their own political purposes. Critics of Bush make this charge when the president explains most of his foreign policies to be

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rooted in the 9/11 attack on America. To skeptical publics, there is no casual, legitimate link to substantiate the presidents policies. To Bush and his supporters, the global war on terror is of paramount importance in protecting American and freedomloving people worldwide from future attacks. Validity of such claims is dependent on ones value system and the perceived credibility of the source of the message and agents involved in the dialectical encounter. Nonetheless, not all events have such significant rhetorical power. And for these happenings the question remains, What events are selected to receive attention and how much attention do they actually getand why? McCombs and Reynolds (2002) asserted that broad portraits of the agenda-setting role of the media reveal strong effects of unobtrusive issues and no effects for obtrusive issues (p. 8). Obtrusive issues are defined as those that we experience personally, whereas issues that we know only through the media are referred to as unobtrusive. Furthermore, McCombs and Reynolds suggested that all human beings have a need for orientation. This concept is based on Tolmans (1948) idea that we form maps in our minds to be able to navigate through external reality. The rationale he offered regarding the need we have to create such cognitive maps appears similar to the concept of pseudoenvironment proposed by Lippmann (1922). The need for orientation depends on (a) how relevant one feels a specific issue is to him or her and (b) how uncertain one is about his or her position or views on a specific issue. When relevance and uncertainty are high, then the need for orientation is also high (McCombs & Reynolds, 2002). The unanswered question is whether perceptions of how unobtrusive an issue actually is can be manipulated, especially when the need for orientation is high. In examining the most recent presidential campaign in the United States and in subsequent discourse, members of the Bush administration have constantly referred to an obtrusive issuethe 9/11 attacksas what veteran political ad guru Tony Schwartz (1995) would characterize as a hot button appeal in coalescing support for an unobtrusive issuethe Iraq War. Furthermore, the Iraq War has evolved into an even more unobtrusive issue with the growing number of U.S. casualties, the publics growing weariness, the celebrity spectacle status of Cindy Sheehan and her campaign, and the antiwar movement. Would our increased familiarity with the issueSheehan, deaths, and so forthsuggest that it is evolving, much to the chagrin of the Bush administration, from an unobtrusive issue into an obtrusive one?

Determinants of Dependency in the Relationships Between Agenda-Setting Actors

By defining the concepts of issue and agenda-setting process in political terms, Dearing and Rogers (1996) illustrated that as proponents of media systems dependency theory (MSD) have suggested (Ball-Rokeach, 1998; Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976; DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1989), our focus must be on the relationships that have been formed and that are evolving or degenerating within a specific societal system, to understand the manifestations of various power struggles and different levels

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of intensity at work in this dynamic. MSD focuses on the relationships between agenda-setting actors (i.e., the administration, the media, and the people). It highlights any change and describes the conditions that invite modification. Moreover, when looking at the agenda-setting process through the lenses of MSD, one can more fully appreciate and comprehend the strategies available to powerful actors in modifying the conditions that foster stronger (or weaker) dependency relationships. At a micro-societal level, relations between individuals and the media are thought to vary along three of the five distinct dimensions. MSD theory recognizes in all relationships between societal components and at all levelsmacro, meso, and micro (a) intensity, (b) goal scope, and (c) referent scope (Ball-Rokeach, 1998). As Ball-Rokeach, Power, Guthrie, and Waring (1990) noted, micro MSD relations are defined by
the extent to which attainment of an individuals goals is contingent upon access to the information resources of the media system, relative to the extent to which attainment of media system goals is contingent upon resources controlled by individuals. (p. 250, italics added)

Ball-Rokeach (1998) defined intensity as the perceived exclusivity of resources for goal attainment. For individuals, intensity is operationally defined as perceived helpfulness of media in attainment of personal goals (p. 19). Conversely, BallRokeach defined goal scope as the range of goals implicated in an MSD relation. For individuals, this refers to goals of understanding (social and self), orientation (social orientation, referred to as interaction, and self orientation, referred to as action), and play (social and solitary) (p. 19). Finally, referent scope was defined by Ball-Rokeach as the number of units party to a relation; from the individual side of the relation, this refers to the number of media forms implicated in a relation (p. 19). In the present analysis, we focus on the concepts of intensity and goal scope. A more in-depth discussion of the concept of referent scope would necessitate examining the dependency relations between, for instance, individuals and the different media (e.g., mainstream television, local radio, regional newspapers, the Internet) they depend on to get information that would help them deal with everyday life situations or extraordinary events. In micro-MSD theory, the relationship of media and individuals is seen as invariant with respect to the two conceptual dimensions of MSD relations not mentioned abovestructure and resource scope. Structure was defined by Ball-Rokeach (1998) as the degree of asymmetry in control over dependency-engendering resources (p. 19), whereas resource scope was conceptualized as the range of resources implicated in a relation. From the individual side of the relation, only the dissemination resource is directly implicated (p. 19). As per the structure of the relationship between media and individuals, that is considered to be highly asymmetrical (Ball-Rokeach, 1998) to the advantage of the media. To better understand the relationship between the media and the political establishment in the macro context, one must consider the subtle changes that may occur, especially in the structure of the relationship. In cases where the administration chooses to

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render an issue (e.g., national security, terrorist threat) unobtrusive, in McCombs and Reynoldss (2002) words, that is done by limiting informational access to the media about the particular issue or issues. As a result, the structure of the media-administration relationship is skewed; what was once a symmetrical relationship becomes more asymmetrical. Journalists depend more and more on government sources (intensity increases) to accomplish their goals (i.e., social understanding and orientation). At the macro level of analysis, the range of resources available to both the media and the administration is vast, as both parties have the capacity to create/produce and disseminate information. Bennett (2005 [this issue]) highlighted some of the troublesome pseudojournalistic products at this level in his article on news reality television showsstories that appear to be news and grab the interest of the public yet lack credible sources and facts. Readers can also reflect on this dynamic as it pertains to the public, media, and governmental agents within the context of the Hurricane Katrina tragedy, the largest natural disaster in U.S. history, and how in this example of a real event, the media proved instrumental in highlighting the lack of adequate and timely response by governmental agencies in dealing with the unprecedented human suffering.

The Need for Orientation, Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Threat

Ball-Rokeach (1998) identified a number of possible sources of variation in MSD relations. At the personal level, the perception of ones personal environs is viewed as critically important and a factor that will affect the intensity and scope characteristics of an individuals MSD relations via his or her personal goals. In this context it is important to estimate if a person perceives his or her environs as being relatively threatening, marked by (pervasive) ambiguity, or both (Hirschburg, Dillman, & BallRokeach, 1986; Loges, 1992, 1994). Pervasive ambiguity has been defined by BallRokeach (1973) as the lack of information that is crucial in defining a given situation. Given Maslows (1943) hierarchy of needs, one can readily understand the compelling threat that acts of terrorism present, in the wake of 9/11, to members of the public and how rhetorical agents can employ this threat in their persuasive appeals. McCombs and Reynoldss (2002) discussion regarding the conditions under which the media agenda is likely to affect the public agendanamely, the need for orientation, uncertainty, and personal relevanceechoes the foregoing conceptualizations of pervasive ambiguity and threat, as well as key MSD hypotheses regarding how ambiguity and threat affect micro-MSD relations. The proponents of MSD theory assert that ambiguity and perceptions of threat would signify relatively problematic environs, as opposed to nonproblematic environs, where individuals are confident in their own ability to comprehend and respond to their environment. It is hypothesized that problematic environs intensify and broaden micro MSD relations by increasing motivational investment in understanding, orientation, and play goals (Ball-Rokeach, 1998, p. 20). Therefore, in times of unrest, crisis, or postcrisis, such as 9/11 and other global terrorists attacks or natural

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Matsaganis, Payne / Politics, Spectacle, Terrorism 385

disasters vividly portrayed in the media, publics experience more problematic environs and turn to their respective leadership and media experts for messages of calm and instruction. The media, as a key actor in the agenda-setting process, is not immune to ambiguity, threat, and problematic environs. The need for orientation for journalists becomes greater under these conditions as well. As individuals seek to understand what is happening around them, they turn to the media, which in turn, feeling the urgency to respond to their audiences, seek information from sources judged as relevant given the issue(s) at hand. Past events have witnessed a flood of experts from ideological think tanks and organizations jockeying to provide their perspectives on an issue. The ethical task for the media is more difficult as the number of truly credible sources at their disposal shrinks.

The Political-Media Complex

Since 9/11, the Bush administration has successfully changed the power equation between the political establishment and the media. The administration has made the medias need to provide 24/7 programming work to its advantage and as a result, journalists are more and more dependent on government sources for information. The most salient, illustrative, and oft-cited example of this dependency is embedded reporting and the ethical questions that arise from such a practice of a reporter having access, but access to one side in the conflict only. The Iraq War provided journalists with an historic opportunity to join soldiers side by side in combat. Yet according to many critics, the price paid was journalistic objectivity. Within this contrived context, it is dubious to expect independent, truly unbiased reporting providing the American public with the facts of what is actually happening in Iraq. The concern among critics is that such reports are products of journalists totally dependent on military and government sources for their information. Furthermore, under the threat of losing access, embedded journalists have to abide by Pentagon rules regarding how much of a story can be disclosed to the public. Critics voicing a counterargument decry that embedded reporters put soldiers at risk by revealing to audiences geographic and other pertinent contexts that could aid the enemy. The challenge for the viewer, within this articles context, is that the war is an unobtrusive issue. The media are the only sources of information. There is a journalistic expectation that reporting will be fair and objective. Yet the intensity of the dependency relationship between the media and the government has become alarmingly high and complicated by various other contextual, economic, and marketing variables, in addition to the journalistic ethics. In the case of the media, under pressure to keep the 24/7 news cycle fed with stories of intrigue and spectacle, it is critical that its members have access to a steady flow of information. A most recent example that reflects this nepotistic dynamic is the Hurricane Katrina crisis and the publics need to know the events and how the government and related organizations met the needs of those affected in the most devastating natural disaster to hit the United States.

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The conundrum within this troubling context is that journalists have become more and more dependent on government sources. Suffice it to say, in times of crisis such as that of a terrorist attack or a natural disaster, government sources of information become more influential. Publics are looking for guidance from trustworthy sources. The objective for leadership in any crisis situation is to control the message and the communication and to have highly credible leadership as spokespeople (Matsaganis & Payne, 2002). Yet control of communication in a crisis has its perilsespecially in a free and democratic society. The lack of independent, unbiased, truly informative news reporting is partially a product of the searing spectacle events of 9/11 and its lingering and chilling effect on the public, the media and governmental officials, and the publics growing penchant for infotainment-oriented stories. Such a change in the dynamics of the relationship between policy actors (administration) and media has had significant effects on the agenda-setting processes and, therefore, on the political processes on which the American democracy has relied since its inception.

The Lasting Effects of Terrorism: Democracy Blindfolded?

Tuman (2003) defined terrorism as a communicative process with rhetorical dimensions. As a communicative process it involves a sender (the terrorist), a receiver (the target audience[s]), a channel of communication (the medium or media), and a message. As Tuman noted,
The message is not the violence or destruction itself; rather, it is encoded within such activity. In this way, terrorism as a communication process has a rhetorical dimension that is independent of the simple coercion associated with violence for its own sake. (p. 18)

The act of terrorism may yield a response (the one the terrorist sought or not) from one or more of the targeted audiences, although that is not always the case. It is generally seen as a bidirectional process in which the real goal of the communicated message . . . may be considered persuasion (Tuman, 2003, p. 23).1 Tuman (2003) argued, however, that employing a definition of terrorism serves two key purposes: (a) it marginalizes the terrorists and their supporters, in part by disallowing any claims to legitimacy for their arguments and motivations; and (b) it highlights a contrast between us and them. Echoing Kenneth Burke, Tuman wrote,
All political movements and conflicts inevitably require lines to be drawn, sides to be defined, and allegiances (or their absence) declared. . . . An important feature of definitions and labels to which they supply meaning . . . is to create an implicit contrast and comparison between what is normal, acceptable, and desirable and what is abnormal, unacceptable, and undesirable. This allows the audience for such rhetoric to distinguish between the in-group and the outsiderthe other. (pp. 40-41)

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Matsaganis, Payne / Politics, Spectacle, Terrorism 387

In the case of September 11 in the United States, al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden sought to deliver a powerful threat to the American governmentdemanding that the administration change its foreign policies in the Middle East. The tragedy and devastation solidified the line of division between them and us, between the terrorists and Americans. The groups on both sides of the line grew larger and larger as Bush proclaimed and warned the world that you are either with us or against us (Cable News Network, 2001). The others included the terrorists (i.e., al Qaeda, the Taliban,) and eventually grew to include Iraq, the axis of evil (White House, 2002), and finally, all the supporters of tyranny.2 The us group was initially composed of the United States but eventually evolved to include the coalition of the willing in Iraq and finally, all who treasure freedom. Three years after September 11 and as the war against one of the members of the axis of evil continued, terrorism dominated much of the political discourse. In spite of its proclamation not to take advantage of 9/11, the Republican Party held its national convention in New York City within weeks of the third anniversary of the attack, with numerous visual and verbal reminders and references to the victims of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the Pennsylvania crash site. As the 2004 elections grew closer, the them and us groups experienced further refinement in definition. America itself was divided into two groups. For the Bush campaign, Senator Kerry and the Democrats were no longer in the us group. They did not understand what was at stake; and Kerry, a decorated Vietnam veteran, was deemed unfit to be president at a time of war against terrorism. Furthermore, throughout the campaign, there were fluctuations in the colorful threat meter. It is interesting that after the election, such references to the level of threat seem to have disappeared from the daily agenda of the media, until the London bombings in July of 2005, when the threat level was raised from Code Yellow (elevated) to Code Orange (high). But even then, the change involved only the public transportation systems across the nation (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2005). From a rhetorical perspective, many would argue that the Bush administration has managed to keep the entire country in crisis mode for close to 5 years. Terrorism has been the justification for a preponderance of the administrations foreign policy. Terrorism has dominated the administrations agenda since September 11. As in the case of September 11 and the Iraq War, the administration has solidified its role as the key source (and in some cases the only source) of information accessible to the media. The agenda of the media, constantly in search of stories to feed the 24-hour news cycle tapeworm and to increase their ratings shares, has therefore been highly reflective of and dependent on the administrations agenda. The rise of infotainment and the emergence of what Bennett (2005) labeled the reality news frame have exacerbated the situation, as media have become more hungry for fast-food news (i.e., cheap and quickly accessible from a few or just one reliable source) and the individual has become a voter by remote control, choosing between good and evil, between black and white, regardless of whether the incarnations of good and evil are reality show stars or political figures debating issues of national security and the economy, among others.3

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As claims of the administration prove to be right, as well as erroneousas with the rationale for the war in Iraq being Husseins stockpiling of weapons of mass destructionthe credibility and veracity of media and government have become inextricably linked.4 As the dependency between the media and the administration increases, their agendas become more and more similar. The result has short-term benefits but also long-term consequences. For instance, the nations premiere news media now admit they were lax in exploring the veracity of claims of the administration regarding weapons of mass destruction, as well as claims made by the administration that were counter to the facts (see Bennett, 2005). Bennett (2005) noted that in hindsight, the ombudsmen for both The New York Times and The Washington Post concluded that
the basis for the dubious war coverage was not really bad journalism but just the opposite: The effort to make stories big front-page scoops by favoring inside sources making dramatic claims that would warrant less prominent coverage if they were qualified by counterclaims. (p. 369)

Because of the asymmetrical structure of their relationship with the media, a stronger than usual need for orientation, and the continuous increases in the levels of perceived threat and ambiguity, individual citizens become more and more dependent on the media to understand what is going on around them (goals of social/self understanding) and to decide how to act (goals of social/self orientation). The agenda-setting process is very well understood in Washington. Tuman (2003) wrote that
democratic countries manipulate their messages by practicing public relations (a more politically acceptable term of propaganda) by providing their own version of the facts for news media, replete with their own briefing sessions, their own supply of experts and authorities to quote and the time-honored tradition of spin. . . . Though this kind of response pales in comparison to elimination of all media or strict control of state media, it is nevertheless a method of manipulating how mass media present and report messages about terrorism, and it again allows the state to benefit from diminished or little lasting criticism. (pp. 122-123)

Conclusion
It is clear, especially in the era in which we live, that, as Dearing and Rogers (1996) have stressed, the agenda-setting process is very much an important part of the political process. The basic dynamics of this process have been discussed and highlighted and continue to be refined by agenda-setting scholars. What frequently is overlooked in extant research is the degree of importance and the different types of goals or objectives the involved actors seek to accomplish in the process, the resources they have at their disposal, and the environmental or situational conditions that determine the level of (inter)dependency between key stakeholders. MSD highlights such variables and provides the analytical tools for a more nuanced understanding of how relationships between actors at all levels of analysis (micro to macro) change with time. From a

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more Machiavellian perspective, perhaps, MSD affords an understanding of how one would try to increase the power differential of the actors involved and, therefore, how to make the agenda-setting process work to his or her benefit. In the aftermath of the September 11 crisis spectacle, the need for credible information and a well-orchestrated attempt to respond to terrorists provided the administration, in essence, with carte blanche in its strategic responses. As in any crisis of this type, all other stakeholders involved in the agenda-setting process turned to leadership, in this case, the national administration, for guidance. The administration, given its authority and leadership position, was called on to provide the holding environment for the American public to engage in adaptive work (Heifetz, 1994). Such a holding environment was necessary for people to begin to cope with the tragedy inflicted on their country, their city, their neighborhoods, and their families. However, how such leadership is operationalized reveals much about the agents involved. This administration has realized, as would any rhetorically savvy group, the persuasive power of fear of terrorism within any public and especially that of America in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. The debate on the long- and short-term impact and effectiveness of its policies and the degree to which it has influenced/controlled the agenda-setting dynamic will continue to be debated and discussed. A major theme of this discussion on agenda setting and Campaign 2004 can be summed up as follows. Preserving a sense of problematic environs, in MSD terms, ensured that media and individuals would remain dependent on what seemed to be the most credible source of information, the government. For a sizeable number of the American public as well as others globally, connecting an obtrusive issue (i.e., September 11) to an unobtrusive issue (i.e., the war on Iraq) was a credible link, given the fear and terror experienced on 9/11 and the fear of an armed tyrannical regime. The introduction of the threat meter reminded every American every single day that fear and terror and death were just around the corner. In such a culture of fear and uncertainty, perhaps it is unreasonable to expect the media to remain unaffected. In this case, the dependency relationship between administration and media grew stronger, aided first of all by the incessant need of the media to provide programming 24/7 and in an era of celebrity spectacle, to have sources of continuous information. In such a crisis mode, government officialsactive, retired, experts real and pseudofilled the void. Within this context, embedded reporting answered a need to knowregardless of the degree of veracity, objectivity, or journalistic compromise. The media will continue to mix news and entertainment into an infotainment assemblage. The result is that reality shows, reality news frames, and plain reality become concepts that are often misused or used interchangeably (Bennett, 2005). Moreover, the cultivation of the culture of fear has made the Burkean gap separating the us from the them dangerously wide. The creation of two camps, the good and the evil, us and the others, is a powerful rhetorical tool that this and other administrations, here and abroad, have used on numerous occasionswhether the goal was to identify allies and foes in the Iraq War, to identify members of the axis of evil, or to separate those who chose war in the name of freedom (e.g., Bush and the

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Republican Party) from those who were depicted as not understanding the challenges of post-9/11 (e.g., Kerry and the Democratic Party). At this point a qualification is necessary. Although much of our analysis focuses heavily on the actions of the Bush administration, there is not strong enough evidence to suggest that the configuration of power relationships between stakeholders in the agenda-setting process would have been entirely different had the 2000 or 2004 elections turned out differently. Our goal has been to provide an analytical framework that affords a nuanced understanding of how the agenda-setting process has changed during the course of the past 4 to 5 years and its practical implications. Recent polls suggest declining approval by the public for the administration and the news media. News coverage and commentary suggesting that the campaign against the axis of evil is not yielding the results promised; media coverage of acts of antiwar activists such as Cindy Sheehan in Crawford, Texas; and growing public skepticism in the wake of Hurricane Katrina may be indicative of an impending sea change in the agenda-setting process and the power relationships between agenda-setting actors.

Notes
1. Tuman (2003) noted that
some would differ with this last point, seeing terrorism as coercion and suggesting that persuasion and coercion are different and distinct concepts. But these distinctions ignore the fact that coercive terrorism is really just a different form of persuasion. If persuasion involves using rational arguments and logic to enable someone to reach a decision of his or her own free will, terrorism meets that standard as well. (p. 23)

2. In his second term inauguration speech, Bush stressed that it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world (White House, 2005). 3. Bennett (2005) defined the reality news frame as a de-contextualized account based on a documented element of an event that becomes journalistically repackaged in a different story frame. The resulting news reality frame blurs the connection between the news reality and its original surrounding context (p. 370). 4. Vice President Cheneys insistence that there was a connection between the Hussein regime and the September 11 tragedy is yet another illustration of how the Bush administration managed, in a climate of perpetual fear, to essentially dictate the medias agenda. Cheney asserted on numerous occasions that Saddam Hussein had had long-established ties with al Qaeda, even though the September 11 commission found no collaborative relationship between Iraq and the terrorist organization (Pincus & Milbank, 2004; Eggen, 2004).

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Matthew D. Matsaganis (B.A., National & Capodistrian University of Athens, Greece; M.A., Emerson College, Boston; M.A., Annenberg School, University of Southern California) was formerly a journalist and is currently a doctoral candidate and lecturer at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California. His research focuses on political and organizational communication, media economics and the political economy of the communication industries, urban environment and urban community transformation, and globalization and networked governance. He has published in journals such as Human Communication Research, American Behavioral Scientist, and Media Ethics and the Encyclopedia of International Media and Communications. He has presented studies at the International Communication Association, the International Studies Association, the National Communication Association, and the International Association for Business Disciplines. J. Gregory Payne (Ph.D., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) teaches in Emerson College and as an adjunct faculty member at Tufts University and Yale. He has authored academic and popular articles, book chapters, and proceedings and has participated in forums, conferences, and conventions internationally on topics related to political communication, health communication, media, ethics, leadership, negotiation, crisis, and risk communication. He is on the advisory board of the Journal of Health Communication, Media Ethics, Journal of Promotional Management, and Communication Quarterly. Dr. Payne has been the guest editor for American Behavioral Scientists special issues on the U.S. presidential campaign for every election since l988. He is currently President of the International Association of Business Disciplines and has served as speechwriter for political leaders in the United States and abroad. Throughout his career, he has provided expert commentary to print and electronic media outlets such as USA Today, The New York Times, The Boston Globe, Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, Newsday, CNN, Fox News, Sky News, MSNBC, Arab News, BBC, ABC, CBS, and NBC (tv and radio). He is the cofounder and general director of the SaudiAmerican Exchange, the first grassroots, public diplomacy effort in the wake of 9/11 between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

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