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CHAPTER North And South At War, 18611865

(Note: The last two chapters focused on the key questions of the avoidability and/or inevitability of the monumental Civil War. f people before the war had had historical foresi!ht and could have seen the true horror of the four"year fi!ht to the death which was to follow# do you think that leaders mi!ht have worked harder to find a compromise solution$ %i!ht the North have let the &outh !o in peace$' 1. Lincoln, Fort Sumter, and War Aims (pp. 434438) a. (ead the )incoln quote leadin! off the chapter carefully. )incoln had a unique opportunity and responsibility to define the ob*ectives of the conflict from the +nion perspective. ,e clearly does not say that an ob*ective of the war is to free the slaves. What is the -central idea. for )incoln$ /// Why did he think that lettin! the &outh !o in peace would make the idea of popular !overnment -an absurdity.$

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b. )ist three of the more practical reasons for resistin! southern secession mentioned by the authors in the first section. /// Then put a (0' or a (' by each one# dependin! on whether or not you feel that the problem was serious enou!h to have used force to keep the &outh in the +nion. (0' or (' (1' (2' (3' c. )incoln4s problem of unitin! the North to resist southern secession was aided when southern soldiers fired first# on the federal 5ort 666666666 in the harbor at 6666666666666# &outh Carolina# in 6666666 of 1781. ,e knew that the balance of power could be tipped by the crucial border states of 66666666666# 66666666666# 666666666666# 666666666666# and 666666666666. ,ow were )incoln4s stated war aims desi!ned to appeal to these slave"holdin! border states$

2. Balance o Forces (pp. 438441) )ist below some of the relative stren!ths of both the North and &outh (assumin! that a stren!th of one side is a weakness of the other' !oin! into the war. &9+T, N9(T,

3. Forei!n "n#ol#ement (pp. 441444) a. ,ow do the authors define the differin! attitudes toward southern independence between the :uropean aristocracy and the masses of workin! people$ (1' ;ristocracy: (2' %asses: b. Two incidents almost brou!ht <ritain# which needed cotton imports from the &outh# into the war. 9ne was the 666666666 ;ffair in which the +.&. took two Confederate diplomats off an :n!lish ship. The other involved the willin!ness of the <ritish to build ships for the &outh# which could be used for raids such as that of the 666666666666666 (ship name'# on northern shippin!. 4. Lincoln and Li$erties (pp. 44444%) a. The authors imply here that )incoln4s personality and temperament were better suited to national leadership in an emer!ency than =efferson >avis because >avis was too particular about followin! his own Constitution. )ist two e?amples of )incoln4s e?ercise of arbitrary power. /// What do you think of such actions in wartime$ (1' (2' (3' 9pinion:

b. ;lthou!h most fi!htin! men on both sides were volunteers# the 666666666 (North or &outh' had a deeper pool of manpower. )ookin! at the draft laws# cite an e?ample for both North and &outh to support the char!e that it was -a rich man@s war but a poor man@s fi!ht.. (1' North:

(2' &outh:

&. 'conomic Aspects o War (pp. 44%4&() a. ()ote* +ou s,ould ,a#e a $asic understandin! o -,o pa.s t,e ,u!e cost o i!,tin! a -ar. 'speciall. tr. to !rasp t,e in lationar. impact o a !o#ernment /ust printin! more paper currenc. to pa. its $ills.) The 666666666666 (North or &outh' was better able financially to pay for the war. ;s you read the section be!innin! on p. AAB# put a (0' in the column of the side that relied most heavily on each of these three means of financin!# and a (' in the other column. N9(T, &9+T, (1' Ta?es and tariffs:

(2' <onds and borrowin!: (3' Crintin! money: b. Compare and contrast how the North and the &outh emer!ed from the war economically. (1' North:

(2' &outh:

c. >urin! the war# many women went into industrial employment for the first time. n the -carin! professions#. >r. :liDabeth 666666666666 helped or!aniDe the +.&. 666666666666 Commission (predecessor to today4s (ed Cross' and Clara 6666666666 helped e?pand and transform the 666666666666 profession.

CHAPTER 20 TERM SHEET North and South at War


0a!es 434438 5ort &umter (;pril 1781' (ichmond# Ea. <order states North4s war aims 0a!es 438441 (obert :. )ee -&tonewall. =ackson +lysses &. Frant 0a!es 441444 Trent ;ffair (1781' The Alabama The -)aird rams. >ominion of Canada (178B' %a?imilian/%e?ico (1783' 0a!es 44444% =efferson >avis <lockade Writ of Habeas Corpus Conscription )aw (1783' -Three"hundred dollar men. >raft riots 0a!es 44%4&( ncome ta? %orrill Tariff ;ct (1781' -Freenbacks. War bonds (=ay Cooke G Co.'

National <ankin! &ystem (1783' ,omestead ;ct of 1782 +.&. &anitary Commission

Furnace

CHAPTER ! C"#"$ War, 18611865

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(Note: The review in this chapter of the military leaders, strategies, and key battles can t fully convey the shear magnitude of the conflict or the often horrendous human aspects of the Civil War! However, it is important to have a solid overview of the military strategies involved and of those turning points that could have gone either way and thereby greatly influenced the world we live in today!' 1. Strate!. and 'arl. Battles (pp. 4&14&1) The authors contend that had the North prevailed at the first -picnic"like. <attle of 66666666 (un (*ust south of Washin!ton' in =uly 1781# southern states mi!ht have been re"admitted on easy terms. <ut after the bloody 6666666666666666 Campai!n# in which +nion forces under youn! Feneral Feor!e 66666666666666 failed to take the Confederate capital of 66666666666666# Eir!inia# the +nion strate!y turned to -total war.. )ist the si? elements of the new northern strate!y mentioned on pp. AHHIAH8$ 1. 2. 3. A. H. 8.

2. Antietam and 'mancipation, 1812 (pp. 4&1412) a. Note the importance of the embar!o on southern ports (keepin! cotton in and war supplies out'. &outherners tried to !et around the embar!o# partially throu!h the use of their ironclad ship named the 666666666666666# which in 1782 was challen!ed by the Northern -cheesebo? on a raft#. the 6666666666666666. b. :mboldened by his successes# Confederate Fen. (obert :. 6666666 advanced his army into northern territory and# in &eptember 1766666# was en!a!ed at ;ntietam Creek# in the western part of the state of 66666666666666. This bloody battle was militarily a draw. ,owever# list the two reasons why the authors call this en!a!ement -the most decisive of the Civil War.. (1' (2' c. What were )incoln4s ob*ectives in issuin! the :mancipation Croclamation$ ,ow did this proclamation si!nal a chan!e in northern war aims$ (1' 9b*ectives:

(2' Chan!ed war aims:

d. Why was the proclamation technically less than it appeared$ Why do the authors summariDe by sayin! -. . . where he could he would not# and where he would he could not.$

e. ;bout 66666666666 blacks *oined the army after :mancipation# representin! about 6666percent of +nion forces# includin! the famed %assachusetts HAth# which attacked 5ort Wa!ner in &outh Carolina (dramatiDed in the feature film "lory'. 3. War at 2idpoint (pp. 412418) ;fter ;ntietam# )incoln tried a variety of new !enerals# who proceeded to chase )ee4s army around northern Eir!inia. )ee and his brilliant lieutenant -&tonewall. 666666666666 were then encoura!ed by a stunnin! victory at C66666666666666666 to advance into the North a!ain in the hope of breakin! the +nion will to fi!ht. 5or three days in =uly 176666# at the Cennsylvania town of F666666666666666# his troops assumed the unaccustomed offensive role a!ainst du!"in +nion ;rmy troops under Feneral Feor!e F. 666666666666. ;fter the famous -char!e. by troops under Confederate Feneral Feor!e 66666666666 on the last day# )ee was forced to withdraw. ,is army would fi!ht on for two years but was never a!ain a real threat. n the west# the +nion strate!y was to capture the mouth of the %ississippi at New 9rleans and then for Feneral +lysses &. 6666666666 to move south and capture the rest of the river. This was accomplished with the +nion victory at E666666666666666 on the day after the Confederate defeat at Fettysbur!. The remainder of the western strate!y involved the brutal march under +nion Fen. William Tecumseh 6666666666666 from the Cumberland %ountains# throu!h the burnin! of ;6666666666 ("one With The Wind'# finally reachin! the sea at &avannah. 4. 0olitics o War (pp. 4184%1) 9b*ections to the war were always stron! in the North# especially amon! -Ceace. >emocrats mostly in the %idwest and the so"called 66666666666666 (a poisonous snake'# who openly obstructed the war (usin! many tactics perfected later by Eietnam War protesters'. )incoln treated these critics harshly and# in 178A# formed a political coalition between (epublicans and -War. >emocrats called the 6666666666 Carty# which " to balance the ticket " chose as )incoln4s runnin! mate the -War. >emocrat from Tennessee# ;ndrew 666666666666. )incoln was re"elected a!ainst the >emocratic candidate# the erstwhile Feneral 6666666666666. &. War3s 'nd and Lincoln3s 4eat, (pp. 4%14%4) ;fter Fettysbur!# Frant was made commander of all +nion armies and proceeded to chased )ee around the Eir!inia countryside in a series of bloody battles until )ee was forced to surrender at 6666666666666666 Court ,ouse in ;pril 176666. )ess than two weeks later# )incoln was killed at 66666666 Theater by southern sympathiDer =ohn Wilkes 666666666. )incoln and his Eice Cresident =ohnson had many of the same views about quickly bindin! up the wounds of war and lettin! the &outhern states back into the +nion on relatively easy terms. Why then do the authors ar!ue on p. AB3 that the hi!hly contentious battle with Con!ress over a harsh or !entle -reconstruction. policy after the war would have turned out much differently (and $etter5) had )incoln lived$ /// ;ny thou!hts on this hypothetical conclusion$

1. 6e lections (pp. 4%44%&) 9ver 6666666666 men were killed or seriously wounded in this war (more t,an in ALL ot,er 7. S. -ars com$ined5) and J6666 billion was spent. >espite this toll# the authors reflect a northern perspective and are pretty positive about the outcome. )ist three positive results of the war cited by the authors. /// Then# on the ri!ht side# come up with two or three counterar!uments or differin! interpretations that mi!ht be put forward by skeptics or southern partisans. Cositive (esults Counterar!uments

(1' (2' (3'

CHAPTER 21 TERM SHEET Furnace o! C"#"$ War


0a!es 4&14&1 -9n to (ichmondK. <ull (un (=uly 1781' Fen. -&tonewall. =ackson Fen. Feor!e %cClellan Ceninsula Campai!n (sprin! 1782' Fen. (obert :. )ee &even >ays4 <attles 0a!es 4&1412 #errimack (1782' #onitor &econd <attle of <ull (un (;u!ust 1782' Fen. =ohn Cope ;ntietam (&eptember 1782' :mancipation Croclamation (&eptember 1782' Thirteenth ;mendment (178H' 0a!es 412418 Fen. ;mbrose <urnside 5redericksbur! (>ecember 1782' Fen. -5i!htin! =oe. ,ooker Chancellorsville (%ay 1783'

Fen. Feor!e %eade Fettysbur! (=uly 1783' Cickett4s Char!e Fettysbur! ;ddress (November 1783' Fen. +lysses &. Frant 5orts ,enry and >onelson (5ebruary 1782' &hiloh (;pril 1782' ;dm. >avid 5arra!ut New 9rleans (sprin! 1782' Eicksbur! (=uly 1783' Chattanoo!a (fall 1783' Fen. William Tecmseh &herman <urnin! of ;tlanta (&eptember 178A' -%arch to the &ea. &avannah (>ecember 178A' 0a!es 4184%1 :lection of 178A -Ceace >emocrats. -Copperheads. Clement Eallandin!ham +nion Carty ;ndrew =ohnson >em. Feor!e %cClellan 0a!es 4%14%4 Wilderness campai!n (%ay"=une 178A' ;ppomatto? (;pril 178H' )incoln assassination (;pril 178H' =ohn Wilkes <ooth

0a!es 4%44%& >eath toll %onetary cost