Competing Identities in Interwar Yugoslavia: Identity Formation in a Newly Established State Connie Robinson

Copyright 2003 by Connie Robinson and TCDS

Introduction: Created in the aftermath of World War I, the first Yugoslav state joined together several national groups who had survived many centuries of foreign control and domination, who shared similar political, strategic and economic interests along with the need for collective security against the great powers, and who shared similar language and ethnic backgrounds. However, each national group brought unique and separate historical and cultural traditions and memories that had developed in differing socioeconomic conditions and political structures.1 From its formation in 1918 to its collapse during World War II, the first Yugoslav state tried to build a working government that was considered legitimate by its constituent groups while protecting its territorial sovereignty from strong external aggressors. The politics of the interwar period reveals the struggles, aspirations, and goals of the constituent national groups as they try to develop a working government that would provide collective security, political and economic arrangements yet enable them to maintain a unique identity with distinctive cultural and historical traditions. What is striking in reading the historical accounts of pre-World War I era and the period between World War I and World War II is the importance given to the creation and articulation of an inclusive national identity that would be separate from the national identities already used yet would be capable of unifying diverse groups with different histories and cultures. A Yugoslav national identity was seen as a way to bring these diverse groups together by emphasizing the ethnic and linguistic similarities between the groups and downplaying potentially divisive differences.2 However, in many ways, the Yugoslav national identity was a truly invented identity and thus had to compete with other, more resonant national identities that had framed cultural, social and political life for many generations. The Croatian and Serbian national

Ivo J. Lederer, Nationalism and the Yugoslavs, Nationalism in Eastern Europe, edited by Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, University of Washington Press: 1969, pg. 397. Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War, Yale (2001). John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country, 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press (2000). Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics, Cornell University Press (1984). 2 Dimitrije Djordjevic, The Idea of Yugoslav Unity in the Nineteenth Century, The Creation of Yugoslavia 19141918, edited by Dimitrije Djordjevic, Clio Press: Oxford England (1980).

3 identities were supported by their own versions of nationalism that articulated political goals, interests and agendas that supported specific power relations. Framework for Analyzing National Identity: In this paper, I would like to propose a framework for analyzing nationalism and national identity that uses discourse/textual analysis while situating political discourse within its historical and structural context. By placing political discourse within its particular historical and In my research, I am focusing on the structural context, it is possible to illuminate the contestation over national identity within the public sphere and its effects on the state and politics. process in which the Yugoslav national identity was conceptualized and then competed with the Croatian and Serbian national identities during the period between World War I and World War II.3 My specific interest is how these differing conceptions of national identity and their corresponding nationalist ideologies framed political discourse by providing legitimacy to certain goals and interests while denying that legitimacy to others and impacted the state formation process because of their influence on the various groups and parties definition of good government. This convergence of identity and culture, expressed in national identity, as it intersects with the state formation process reveals the strength and resonance of nationalism because it utilizes social, religious and cultural traditions that are important for many people far removed from everyday politics and melds the interests of ordinary people with those involved in politics. This convergence defines what is acceptable within politics and legitimates (or not) the activities, agendas and aspirations of the politicians and other actors involved in making the state as well as the outcomes of the political and institutionalization process in the actual structures of governance. Nationalism can then be seen as a discursive framework that should be analyzed within the realm of normal politics rather than from the periphery.4 As a political ideology, its saliency comes not from its use by extremist supporters to condone violence but because it used to address issues that are central to any political system: most importantly, it seeks to define the

At this time, I will only use Croatian and Serbian national identities and nationalisms as counterpoints to Yugoslav national identity and nationalism in order to keep the project manageable. While Macedonia, Slovenia and Montenegro are important parts of this story, much of the literature and scholarship focuses on Serbia and Croatia and their battle for supremacy within the Yugoslav state. Future research hopefully will allow me to broaden this picture. 4 Craig Calhoun, Nationalism, University of Minnesota Press (1997).

4 territorial, legal, and political boundaries of the state, the mutual responsibilities and obligations of the state and individual, and the parameters of citizenship. What makes the case of Yugoslavia particularly interesting for such analysis is while Yugoslavism or Illyrianism, as it was conceived in Croatia during the early 1800s, was a recognizable political discourse during the nineteenth century, Yugoslavism did not have real political saliency until after the formation of the first Yugoslav state in 1918. So, the Yugoslav state was created before there was a Yugoslav nation but in a territory where two nations, Croatian and Serbian, were in search of a state. This allows the scholar to interrogate the theories of nationalism by utilizing a relatively short and compact historical record and contrasting the different political and socioeconomic conditions and historical legacies between the national groups. In order to understand the dynamic situation in interwar Yugoslavia, I have two goals for my research. First, I will attempt to analyze nationalism as a discursive framework in which certain cultural or social markers are politicized in order to develop recognizable boundaries between groups, which could be used to conceptualize a national identity capable of supporting a newly established state. Second, in order to understand the saliency of nationalism, I will attempt to situate the Yugoslav, Serbian, and Croatian national identities within their specific historical contexts, specifically looking at the ways in which the social and political structures inherited from the past influenced national identity and was in turn influenced by that identity. At this initial stage of my research, I will analyze the writings and activities of the intellectual and political elite during the interwar period in Yugoslavia as they conceptualized and promoted particular national identities and nationalist political ideologies, specifically analyzing how they relied on specific cultural markers to demarcate the various national identities. The materials produced by the intellectual and political elite take on significance because they were pivotal players in the political scene and actively sought to infuse their ideals, conceptions and agendas into the formation and institutionalization of the first Yugoslav state. In their writings, they conceptualized and legitimated the various identities and provided the justification that made

5 those identities politically salient. Then, through their personal and political activities they

actively lobbied for political agendas that promoted and supported those identities. As an entry point, I will focus on articles, editorials and other materials published by the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. I have chosen to focus on the two Academies because their archives and libraries appear to be the most complete repositories of historical documents within Yugoslavia. In addition, the Academies and their members were and have been active promoters of the culture and history of their national group and thus occupy a unique position within civil society. The history and background of the Croatian Academy is particularly interesting. It was founded by Bishop Josip Strossmayer in 1861 to promote South Slav culture and history and was initially named the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences. During the Ustashe regime, its name was changed to the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences. It reverted to its original name the Yugoslav Academy - under Tito. In 1991, after Croatian independence, it became the Croatian Academy of Arts and Science once more. Since 1887, it has published an annual journal called Ljetopis, or Annals. This journal will be particularly useful because its contributors witnessed the political and cultural dynamics of the last century and were required to respond according to the current political climate. Some of the earliest expressions of the Yugoslav identity should be found within its volumes and then it should be possible to trace the Croatian and Yugoslav conceptions of identity, culture and state throughout the last century, and how they competed with each other and responded to the Serbian identity being espoused by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. The Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences was established at the same time as a counterpoint to the Yugoslav/Croatian Academy and has within its archives many materials that illuminate their efforts to promote their vision of a Yugoslav and Serbian state as appropriate and respond to Croatian nationalist aspirations.5 I also utilize articles and editorials from major newspapers, autobiographies and biographies of the major political figures, and material published by political parties, nationalist organizations and religious institutions among others.

Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences, www.mahazu.hazu.hr/ENG. Also, Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, www.beograd.com/sanu.

6 I have decided to focus on the intellectual and political elite in interwar Yugoslavia for several reasons. First, in contrast to other settings where the middle class played pivotal roles, the intellectual and political elite appear to the primary political actors during the time period immediately prior to the formation of the first Yugoslav state and during the interwar period. They were immediately recognizable as distinct from the peasantry, for example, through their education and ability to travel which provided exposure to Western European political thought and trends. Also, they either already occupied powerful political or military positions either within the Serbian monarchy or through their activities against the two empires or had gained prestige within cultural, social and religious circles. From what I have read so far, there appears to be virtually no distinction between the intellectual elite and political elite because those who would be considered the intellectual elite often became political actors through their own activities or because the state enlisted them into one of its ministries. The only distinction would appear within the political elite, between those holding office and actively lobbying for political change, and those with high position in the military, or the military elite.6 Second, the classic literature on nationalism has emphasized the role of the intelligentsia as the primary inventors of the nation and nationalism.7 However, I would like to adopt a slightly different approach, utilizing a model first articulated by Miroslav Hroch. In Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe, Hroch develops a typology of national movements within Europe in which each national movement can be seen as going through three phases: Phase A (the period of scholarly interest), Phase B (the period of patriotic agitation) and Phase C (the rise of the mass national movement). Hroch considers Phase B to be the most important because it is during this phase that certain political actors recognize the political saliency of the national history, traditions, and cultures previously articulated during Phase A and seek to develop a political agenda aimed at emancipation, independence, or some other political activity

Dubravka Stojanovic, Party Elites in Serbia 1903-1914; Mile Bjelajac, Military Elites Continuity and Discontinuities: The Case of Yugoslavia, 1918-1980; Ljubinka Trgovcevic, Serbian Intellectuals in Foreign Universities in the 19th Century; Published by Association for Social History, www.udi.org.yu. One of my goals in this project is to do an in-depth sociological analysis of who these intellectuals were. 7 See, for example, Eric Hobsbawm, Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe 1870-1914, in The Invention of Tradition, edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, Cambridge University Press (1983) and Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge University Press (1990).

7 directed in favor of the preservation of the nation.8 Phase B is the period that most scholars of nationalism and national movements emphasize. However, most scholars appear to miss the contestation that occurs during Phase B as the intelligentsia choose certain national traditions to emphasize, and others to ignore, and as certain political goals are articulated while minimizing others. At this juncture, I believe that the literature on civil society and the public sphere is the most important for highlighting the contestation that occurs within Phase B, especially when the goals of most nationalist agendas are state-oriented in some form. The model most apt for illuminating this contestation is that provided by Eiko Ikegamis multiple publics theory. Each group of elites, intelligentsia, and other political actors can be viewed as a social network which creates a public through its internal ties and through links to other groups. Within this public space, cultural production and identity construction takes place. Further, continual communication and associations create a public that confer legitimacy and assist in maintaining power. As each network competes within the political sphere, they are contesting each others claims to legitimacy, political aspirations, and institutional and structural goals that either preserve their groups hegemony or protect it from other groups.9 The outcome of the contestation the national identity - will ultimately dependent upon the relative ability and strength of a particular group to articulate a particular vision of a national identity and defend that vision against other groups with their own visions. Theoretical Implications: The conceptualization of an identity relies on signifiers, rules, and guidelines which allow individuals and groups to assess the situation, think, interact, and act accordingly. At the first instance, the assessment will be based upon the individuals prior experiences and knowledge. As distance increases, the individual will increasingly rely on definitions passed down and given by others.
8

The primary source of information will be the individuals family and close social

Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations, Columbia University Press (2000), first published by Cambridge University Press (1985), pgs. 22-30. See also, Miroslav Hroch, From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe, Becoming National, edited by Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, Oxford University Press (1996), pgs. 60-77.

8 circle but then secondary sources such as the church and school will be used eventually moving up the social scale to national and racial groups. In times of confusion and change, when the individual and those closest to him or her are unable to provide meaning, secondary sources will be sought out as they look for a reasonable definition of the situation.10 Identity attempts to answer the question Who am I, and at the same time, the question who I am not. The conceptualization of the other is a crucial element in the development of an identity. On a basic level, the individual is able to see and thus define the other through face to face contact and interaction with other individuals. As similarities and, but arguably more importantly, differences are observed between individuals and groups of individuals, meanings will be constructed and ascribed to those similarities and differences. Group identities are able to categorize similarities and differences for the individual and provide a point of reference for attribution of meaning. National identity provides a meaningful and cohesive framework around which individuals can gather; nationalism provides a definition of who does not belong within that same group and politicizes the differences. Arguably, one of the most important functions of the concepts of nation and nationalism is to define the boundaries of the community and/or public sphere and then influence and determine the parameters of citizenship and even the boundaries of the state. Nationalism, however defined by scholars and utilized by nationalists, ultimately relies on border creation and maintenance, supported by shared histories, cultural forms, and other criteria such as language or religion. Daniele Conversi argues that [n]ationalism is both a process of border maintenance and creation. Hence, it is a process of definition.11 Borders provide a framework for national identity; by drawing a line between who belongs and who does not belong serves to both create and maintain group identity and solidarity. However, the borders are often fluid and

Eiko Ikegami, A Sociological Theory of Publics: Identity and Culture as Emergent Properties in Networks, Social Research, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Winter 2000). 10 Anthony Smith argues that there are three typical conditions or situations that lead the emergence of ethnic myths and consequently, a strong sense of national identity: 1) prolonged periods of warfare; 2) perceived or actual threat of secularization of a culture or a clash of cultures that reveals its potential weaknesses; and 3) commercialization that threatens to break down a communitys isolation or change its existing economic structure. Anthony Smith, National Identity, University of Nevada Press (1991), pg. 84. 11 Daniele Conversi, Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as Boundary Maintenance and Creation, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pg. 77.

9 subject to change, changing also the identities that are based on the borders. In times of turmoil and confusion, greater emphasis is placed on cultural and ethnic markers which make up the boundaries between groups. Cultural artifacts and other cultural phenomena such as language are utilized to provide easily recognizable markers which distinguish groups from one another, recognizable by both the insider and outsider. For example, a national language, through its expression, incorporates shared meanings and symbols which make up collective memories and traditions. Effective and efficient communication requires both the speaker and audience to use and understand a common language and ascribe the same meanings to words. Language is often used to demarcate those who belong in the in-group and those who do not. Two people who speak the same language not only share a semantic understanding but also share common histories, traditions, and memories which can be invoked through the spoken word. However, in nationalism, as with race and ethnicity, it is not the cultural content the shared meanings, histories and traditions - within certain social boundaries that is significant but the meaning attributed to the cultural signifiers and the boundaries they represent. behind the categories.12 Not all cultural markers are significant, only those markers that are deemed salient through social and political processes and through struggle and conflict and that make up the boundaries between groups. In this sense, religion, language, statutes, flags take on certain meaning not because of intrinsic qualities within themselves but through what they represent to both the communities within and without the boundaries. Cultural markers are used to define boundaries between groups. The content of the cultural markers remains important sociologically because it reveals how the group sees themselves and how they perceive others its self image. However, [i]f we are trying to define ethnic or national identity, then what matters is what the boundaries are, especially peoples self-descriptions of themselves vis--vis others.13 As David McCrone notes, [i]t is not a question of wording, but of the power-laden symbolism which lies

12 13

David McCrone, The Sociology of Nationalism, Routledge (1998), pg. 25. McCrone, pg. 29.

10 The process of boundary creation and maintenance moves beyond the cultural and social identity formation process and enters the political realm when group members attempt to institutionalize and legalize the boundaries in order to gain political opportunities; protect their social, economic and political interests; and preserve their privileged position against outsiders. Citizenship is one example which reveals the political embodiment of boundaries because the rules of citizenship determines who is eligible for state benefits and who is not. Rogers Brubaker conceptualizes the state as a membership organization where certain individuals are allowed memberships and others are not. Entrance to and participation in the membership organization is granted through citizenship laws. However, while conceived in a formal and legal sense, citizenship is an increasingly salient social and cultural fact. modern nation-state and state system14 As Brubakers term suggests, social closure is provided by boundaries which can identify insiders and separate them from outsiders. By using informal classification systems transferred up from the society below, the state establishes and institutionalizes criteria for membership through its citizenship laws. Rogers Smith argues that [c]itizenship laws also literally constitute they create with legal words a collective civic identity. They proclaim the existence of a political people, in ways that often become integral to individuals senses of personal identity as well.15 The delineation of the nation and the distinctions between groups can best be understood as boundary markers that are used to reinforce group solidarity but also to create a categorization scheme that can legitimate and/or reinforce power relations through institutionalization of those boundaries through the political and legal spheres. In this sense, nationalism gains resonance because it draws upon on historical memories and cultural and social traditions to provide legitimacy to its political goals while utilizing the boundary markers provided through social categorization based on nationalism to determine who the beneficiaries of its political activities are. Nationalism articulates a relationship between identity, culture and state and uses that As a powerful instrument of social closure, citizenship occupies a central place in the administrative structure and political culture of the

14 15

Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Harvard University Press (1992), pg. 23. Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History, Yale University Press ( ), pg. 31.

11 relationship to confer legitimacy upon the state, provide a framework for political institutions and structures, and even define the boundaries of normal politics such as who is eligible for citizenship, what is appropriate political discourse and who has the right to make claims against the state. The study of nationalism can not be limited to either how it influences national independent movement (good nationalism) or extremist genocidal acts of violence (bad nationalism) but should be analyzed within the realm of normal politics because it defines and articulates the boundaries of state and citizenship, the responsibilities of the state to its citizens, and confers legitimacy upon the state. Further, by approaching nationalism from the perspective of civil society or the public sphere within which there are multiple publics, the scholar can grapple with the contestation and competition that exists between groups as they seek to influence or fight against the state, whether it be an empire, totalitarian regime, or democratic state. Rather than seeing nationalism solely as the results of the activities of the intelligentsia or the state (state-sponsored nationalism designed to support a state after it has already been established), this approach would allow us to view national identity as the outcome of contestation in which the form it takes is not necessarily the same form its nationalist promoters sought. specific historical, political, and social context. The success or failure of a particular national However, because its boundaries or even identity is ultimately dependent on the relative strength or weakness of its promoters within a content may be different from originally intended by its promoters, the resulting national identity must be viewed as a compromise and can remain a volatile focus point for politics until new historical memories, cultural traditions, or political structures are available to provide an point of unity between the diverse groups. This is particularly relevant for Yugoslavia. The conceptualization of the Yugoslav national identity was the result of fierce contestation between different groups within a specific security and political contest when the first Yugoslav state was established. Yet, while the idea of the Yugoslav nation was put into motion with the first Yugoslav state, it did not change into a recognizable, salient national identity until World War II, which was experienced in much the same way by all South Slavs regardless of national membership.