The Dangers of US Interventionism Author(s): Alan P. Dobson Source: Review of International Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Jul.

, 2002), pp. 577-597 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097812 . Accessed: 01/10/2011 06:22
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Review

of International

Studies

(2002),

28, 577-597

Copyright

? British

International

Studies

Association

The dangers of US
ALAN P. DOBSON

interventionism

President about Boiled than the

Clinton goals these They

and of

. . . have

spoken foreign

often policy. in more

American have are and

down, 200 years.

not changed to ensure the continued freedom of our

security,

prosperity,

people.1

Madeleine Albright,

Secretary of State, 1998

Abstract.

Both

policy which

articles

about

US

post-Cold warned the

War America

foreign

policy

and

the In what

recent

rhetoric the

of US policymakers
power', against

appears
Senator

to be slipping back
Fulbright

into the language of the 'arrogance of

in the 1960s. follows, about light on

USA's

style of foreign policy;

its criteria for intervention;

of impact a view with interventionism

its invasion of Panama;

theories some

its

its intervention capabilities; in the international sphere

in Bosnia; and will be examined criticisms

contending to casting in the

changes how the

USA

has responded to the world outside

Fulbright's its conclusion of US world by intervention specifically into and

its boundaries
addressing exits from of

after the Cold War. Finally,

recent of the past, the whens,

in the
essay whys some of

light of Senator draws towards and wherefores non-Cold democracy War

of US

the key questions international crises. enthusiastic calls for

It explores the US to

the problems posed by continuity and change in the struggle to adjust US foreign policy to a
and examines the wisdom spread abroad.

Introduction

These

than they answer. Few would argue about the beg more questions in of and but there have always freedom, desirability, security, prosperity principle, been disputes about how best to achieve them in a turbulent and often violent a international its history, these matters have occasioned setting. Throughout contentious debate about how the USA ought to relate to the rest of the world. In how should it spread the light of liberty abroad and try to nurture particular, democracy? Should it concentrate on creating a domestic example others would wish words

or actively promote to emulate, in foreign realms? democracy by intervening Two statements, one pronounced by Chairman Fulbright of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when the Vietnam War was escalating out of control, the other at the end of the first month of the NATO bombing by Secretary of State Albright, these radical alternatives. campaign against Serb forces in Kosovo, demonstrate
1 M. Albright, 'The Testing of American 11: 6 (1998), pp. 50-64.

Foreign

Policy',

Foreign

Affairs,

577

578
In our assets

Alan P. Dobson
excessive and denying involvement our own in the affairs people that of other countries of we their are not living off our we are also

only

the proper

enjoyment

resources,

denying the world the example of a free society enjoying its freedom to the fullest. This is
indeed for a nation regrettable Edmund Burke said, 'Example the NATO Summit, During coordinated effort to consolidate to teach democracy aspires is the school of mankind, and and as to other nations, because, learn at no other'.2 they will will discuss the need for a promote economic

the President democracy

our partners in Southeast Europe,

integration and provide moral and material

on law and Our of respect for the explicit goal into an should rights of all. be to transform part of

support to those striving to build societies based

the Balkans from the continent's source primary not want the current for a new institutions generation are

conflict

instability to be

of peace?so strengthened

integral to others, the prelude are prevented, that future wars and the rights of all preserved.3

the European We do mainstream. a solid foundation we want to build economies grow, democratic

The

like the early 1960s rhetoric of nation building, latter sounds rather disturbingly economic and those extravagant assertions about of Rostow) growth' (Walt 'stages to It also and burden sustain liberty (John Kennedy). any any price carrying paying of the of in the claims about the demise assertive multilateralism spirit challenges in Somalia in 1993. Recently, no less than at the onset of the aftermath of difficulties in Vietnam, Cold War, or in its most violent development the rhetoric of the USA has often ambition

idealism and overarching reverberated with the language of overstatement, In its most proactive for the spread of democracy and the free market. to in the affairs of other the US it been intervention has of form, desirability applied or of under the cloak This essay focuses either multilateralism.4 states, unilaterally, on these issues and the changed conditions, which now, more than ever, seem to into an interventionist role in world affairs.5 beckon US policymakers In the post-Cold War world, Albright had a sense of being 'Present at the as at onset of the had Dean Acheson had the Creation' of a new dispensation, just Cold War, but she did not translate that sense of change into anything that should 'The test of our leadership, although fundamentally complicate foreign policymaking. in specifics, is essentially the same as that confronted far different by Acheson's . . .The challenges we face, compared to those confronted by previous generation.

2 3

J.W. Fulbright, The Arrogance Books, of Power (New York, Vintage 1966), p. 21. 20 April before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secreary of State, Madeleine Albright 1999. The importance of 1999, text from the United States Information Service, 21 April so far as Albright was concerned because of her bullish the terrain was very important understanding not Vietnam" 'The "Munich, for attitude on US interventionism: slogan became a familiar shorthand to intervene against that great powers have an obligation her view that action is better than inaction,

to weigh States gives this country the moral evil, and that the unique history of the United standing in on the side of good in almost any global trouble spot', from Thomas W. Lippman, Madeleine and the New American Diplomacy Press, 2000). (Boulder, CO: Westview Albright 4 to the New Foreign-Policy A Guide Norman Debates', Podhoretz, 'Strange Bedfellows: Commentary, 'Now (during the Clinton all of a 1999, www.commentarymagazine.com. administrations), was sounding to Podhoretz, the sudden, the liberal community positively bloodthirsty'. According cause of this was a combination of multilateralism, and altruism, ibid., legitimising US interventions, pp. 10-11. 5 2001 outrages in the USA by many months. the 11 September Early drafts of this article predated events have gone beyond beckoning and are now propelling Those the USA into more intervention, in the affairs of other states. Nevertheless, and militarily, the note of caution that this diplomatically 11 September than before 2001. article sounds is perhaps now even more important December

The dangers of US

interventionism

579

are harder to categorize, more diverse, and quicker to change. But the generations, stakes have not changed.'6 But trying to categorise the elements of continuity and change is not quite so easy as Albright might have us believe, and successful strate of the gies for practical action depend, at least in part, on an accurate understanding to President Bush's terrain in the theatre of operation. What has happened 'new order', the constraints of relative economic decline, and the reordering of US policy dictated by concerns of strategic overstretch? Do they not count any more? in the first place, or has the collapse of the Soviet Were they over-exaggerated liberated the USA from most of their impact? Does the shift from a superpower a on to one which subscribes to, or, world, bipolar unipolar depending interpretation to a multipolar the unipolar moment than in the world, not count more Does the rise and rise of non-state economic specifics? complex interdependence, acts of terrorism, the proliferation of functional economic regimes and international not impact in ways that fundamentally organisations change the foreign relations of states? Does the growing importance of international norms and human rights and the global commons?health, and drug concerns? food, environmental population, consensus on a nucleus of values, which could facilitate not create an international through in ways that depart radically from past practice, which multilateral interventions were frequently constrained the much-vaunted decline by Cold War rivalries? Does at state least the not radical of diminish inhibitions (or transformation) sovereignty about intervention? And finally, does the interplay between realism and idealism not go on as a defining feature of US foreign policy style with profound consequences for its content? Fully answering these questions may be beyond the scope of this but demonstrate the of must the that if be addressed essay, they complexity agenda are or to claims be modified. Albright's supported, refuted, In what follows, the USA's style of foreign policy, its criteria for intervention in the affairs of other states, and scholarly attempts to explain the international terrain will be examined with a view to casting some light on how and why the USA has after the Cold War. This examination responded to the world outside its boundaries will include assessments of US interventions in Panama to see how and Bosnia actual practice fits with the prescriptions laid down by policymakers. Finally, in the of US in Senator criticisms of recent interventionism the light Fulbright's past, the draws its towards conclusion the essay by specifically addressing key questions of the US and wherefores of intervention into and exits from international whens, whys some of the problems crises in the post-Cold War world. It explores posed by continuity and change in the struggle to adjust US foreign policy to a non-Cold War world and examines the wisdom of enthusiastic to spread calls for the US In will abroad.7 it become that there is often clear democracy apparent doing this, world

6 7

Present at the Creation Ibid., pp. 51 and 64; D. Acheson, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969). see: Michael For a representative selection of views on US democracy and its problems promotion Promotion: and Cox, G. John Ickenberry, Takashi Inoguchi, American Democracy Impulses, Strategies Press, 2000); Bruce W. Jentleson, American Foreign Policy: The (Oxford: Oxford University Impacts in the 21st Century World (New York: W.W. Norton, Dynamics of Choice 2000); Stanley Hoffman, in the Post-Cold War Era (Maryland: Rowan Disorders: Troubled Peace and Littlefield, 1998); James M. Scott (ed.), After the End: Making US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World (Durham NC:

Duke University 'America's Misguided Press, 1998); Theo Farrell, Mission', by Force: US Democracy Intervention in the Post-Cold War World (Cambridge: Press, 2000), Military Cambridge University review article of Karin von Hippel in International Affairs, 76: 3 (2000), pp. 583-92.

580 water

Alan P. Dobson what policymakers between practical

say policy should be and what actually transpires, to explain practice.8 In a reasoning and attempts field dependent upon good practical reasoning to obtain the results desired, there is something slightly ironic that so many academics, not normally associated with the to assist policymakers. be concerned should But, at least, even though practical, their advice were to appear dubious, are made accurately shortly. one should expect them to explain the terrain in and unambiguously. Whether this is the case or

between and confusion

which decisions not will be explored

Style

The USA, during the last twenty years of the Cold War, became concerned with in US and George Shultz both saw as excessive fluctuations what Henry Kissinger As Secretaries of State, they espoused different behaviour. policies: Kissinger and publicly rejected it, but they both saw the embraced linkage; Shultz consciously and negotiation with the Soviets to make the world safer need for active engagement and to promote US interests. Either of them could have written: 'Moral exuberance It was my conviction had inspired both over-involvement and isolationism. that a rational interests would provide a ballast of restraint concept of our fundamental of continuity.'9 This is in fact Kissinger and an assurance speaking, and he was that after addressing a significant specific (as well as general) danger: the possibility internationalism and the religious-like the over-exuberant calling to defend demo there would be a retreat into an equally dangerous cracy that had led to Vietnam, to play their power isolationism that would leave the field clear for the communists Indeed, under President Carter there was a games. That danger never materialised. with his pursuit of human rights. In threat of a different kind, of over-involvement fact, in the end, the onset of the Second Cold War had more to do with Soviet over with their invasion of Afghanistan, exuberance than American, of a deployment new generation stance generally on Third of nuclear missiles, and their aggressive World matters. This is not to say that the USA did not provoke and/or react in the Reagan It did. But the realism respectively of George Shultz forcefully. on the Soviet side kept the spirit of and Gorbachev Administration and Shevardnaze arms build-up. alive despite harsh rhetoric and a massive pragmatism Ironically, however, of the Soviet system became by the mid 1980s, as the structural weaknesses to exploit by a renewed emphasis on the the USA saw fresh opportunities ostensible, value of international support for democracy. This might have been seen previously as idealistic over-involvement, but in the hands of Reagan and Shultz it became a to in calculated realist the Cold War and pursue US carefully ploy gain advantage was fully articulated in 1985, but much earlier in interests. The Reagan Doctrine June 1983 Shultz outlined it to the US Senate: 'The forces of democracy around the

I have dealt with this problem under a rather different focus and Economic 1933-1991: Embargoes, Of Sanctions, Warfare 2002), ch. 11. 9 Years (London: Weidenfeld The White House H.A. Kissinger, p. 65.

in US Economic (London:

Statecraft Routledge/Taylor

for Survival & Francis, 1979),

& Nicolson/Michael

Joseph,

The dangers of US

interventionism

581

world merit our standing with them: to abandon them would be a shameful betrayal ?a betrayal not only of brave men and women but of our highest ideals.'10 With the in 1961 similar rhetoric from John Kennedy benefit of post-Vietnam hindsight, the hindsight of knowing the outcome of sounds extravagant and unrealistic. With sounds simply like a well-calculated the Cold War the Reagan Doctrine realist tactic for the pursuit of US interests. From Kissinger to Shultz there was an attempt (even under the more ambiguous to reorient US foreign policy to a more of the Carter Administration) policies assessment of US interests. Ironically, by the mid 1980s part pragmatic, hard-nosed to support democracy of this new realism involved a renewed commitment through out the world. No and extravagant idealistic longer was this seen as a dangerous It would demonstrate over-commitment. Instead, concrete pay-offs were expected. the bankruptcy of the Soviet regime, encourage dissent within the Soviet Union, the orbits of satellites like Poland, and challenge the international help destabilise to the amazement of communism. Much of neorealists, the Soviet pretensions use not overt of state Union because of the within the anarchic power collapsed and the corrosion of beliefs within the system, but because of internal problems Soviet empire, which were partly the result of America's of democratic promotion values.11 This had impact on what followed because of the efficacy those values of the communist seemed to have had in accelerating the dissolution establishment. some US policymakers While tried to sustain pragmatic consideration of US national interests, at the same time, the lexicon of the foreign policy debate became infused with both the international of democracy, most triumphalism famously in 'The End of Francis and the democratic essay expressed Fukuyama's History',12 in such phrases as 'democracies do not go to war with each peace theory. Coined other', and National ment of democracy such language and to the 'enlarge Lake's commitment Anthony in his September 1993 'enlargement speech', ideas gained currency.13 The new foreign policy agenda of the cautious form of USA, which had set course in the 1970s for a more pragmatic was now recontaminated what seemed like realism, by being remarkably conceptions of old fashioned Wilsonian idealism. The difference was that with the 'end of to pursue democratic it was a realistic objective values history' internationally, whereas when the world was riven between democracy and a succession of powerful Security Adviser and free markets'

10 G. 11

Schultz, Triumph and Turmoil: My Years as Secretary Scribner's, of State (New York: Charles 1993), p. 526. J.L. Gaddis, 'International Relations and the End of the Cold War', International Theory Security, is the leading (in the language of post-positivists/postmodernists) IR 17, 1993, pp. 5-58. If neorealism then no wonder have had an intellectual field day. Whether that the postmodernists all metanarrative, other pre-postmodern of international in the way relations are metanarratives explanations/accounts but for an interesting that postmodernists and for allege is another matter, critique of neorealism see respectively to the metanarratives ideas about a possible alternative of pre-postmodernism in Alan P. Dobson (Andover, and Reconstructing and G. Evans, Deconstructing (ed.) with S. Malik UK: Ashgate, the Cold War: 1999), Alastair Murray, 'Reconstructing the Cold War

The Evolution of a the Cold War', pp. 25-44, and Charles Reynolds, pp. 44-67. Consuming Paradigm', 'Explaining 12 F. Fukyama, The National 16 (1989), pp. 3-16. 'The End of History', Interest, 13 M. Doyle, and Foreign Affairs', and Public Affairs, 12 (1983), 'Kant, Liberal Legacies Philosophy see his 'Peace, Liberty and Democracy: recent exposition for a more Realists and Liberals pp. 205-35; a Legacy', in Cox et al., American Democracy Promotion Contest American (n. 7 above); J. Dumbrell, UK: Macmillan, Foreign Policy: Carter to Clinton 1997). (Basingstoke,

582

Alan P. Dobson

it had not been. Democratic totalitarian opponents, enlargement became one of the of US foreign policy, but the way the Cold War ended gave a mis buzz-concepts of the pursuit of democratic values abroad leading impression of the compatibility with the realist agenda in the new world order.14

Criteria

in the Why, how, when, and where to engage US forces overseas have been questions forefront of American minds, since the Vietnam imbroglio. These are important and for liberal democracies, which on the one hand particularly problematical questions affirm the sanctity of autonomous state sovereignty in domestic affairs, but trumpet abroad the universalism of human rights on the other. There is insufficient space here the academic literature on this question,15 but for our purposes it is more to get some idea of what the USA presently practises. During the last important seems to have been largely decade or so, the political morality of US interventionism taken for granted under the guise of nurturing democracy or providing humanitarian help, and debate has simply centred on calculations of costs and exit strategies.16 the end of the Cold War liberated the USA from some longstanding Although new constraints and for multilateral up systemic opened possibilities security oper ations, there remained substantial worries and concerns about future US interven tionism. Back in 1984, Defense at the National Press Secretary Caspar Weinberger, Club on 28 November, the which down laid Doctrine, promulgated Weinberger guidelines for the overseas use of military power. 1. Our vital interests must be at stake. 2. The issues are so important for the future of the United that we are prepared to commit enough forces to win.
14

to review

States

and our allies

form of US realism, see Robert S. Litwak, Detente and the Nixon Doctrine: 1969-76 Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, (Cambridge: Cambridge University fascinating insights into the Cold War, spiced with some traces of Western see John L. Gaddis, We triumphalism, 'Perhaps the pond had simply dried up [for totalitarianism]', Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History Press, (Oxford: Clarendon 1997), p. 295. For the latter part see Raymond of the Cold War, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Garthoff, to Reagan Nixon DC: Brookings view of the end Institute, (Washington, 1985). And for a provocative see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross of the Cold War, Stein, 'The Cold War ended when Soviet to domestic leaders became committed reform and to a concept of common security that built on the For the pragmatic American Foreign Press, 1984). For and when Western leaders reassured and reciprocated', We All Lost the reality of nuclear deterrence, Cold War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Press, 1994), p. 376. University T.G. Weiss, D.P. Forsythe and R.A. Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview to the cosmopolitan-communitarian Press, 1994), appendix A. A good introduction debate in IR is in C. Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative (Hemel Approaches UK: Harvester in its broader political Vvlieatsheaf, 1992). This debate Hempstead, theory incarnation was sparked off by Michael Sandel in his Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge the ideas of John Rawls in his A Theory of Press, 1982 [2nd edn. 1998]), which challenged University Justice on this debate is S. Press, 1971): the best commentary (Cambridge MA: Harvard University

15

Mulhall and A. Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). 16 This is not to ignore the cutting-edge on justice and its work by American political philosophers for multiculturalism and international relations. For entry into this field, see Will implications An Introduction, Political Philosophy: 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Kymlicka, Contemporary Press, 2002).

The dangers of US 3. We 4. We 5. We 6.

interventionism

583

have clearly defined political and military objectives, which we must secure. have sized our forces to achieve our objectives. have some reasonable assurance of the support of the American people. to combat only as a last resort.17 US forces are committed

nor did they receive These criteria did not ignite a moral debate inWashington, at the State Department, unanimous counterpart agreement. Weinberger's George Shultz, believed that the USA had to be both more assertive and prepared to take in greater risks, as indeed his department had done over the US invasion of Grenada was driven by the State Department.'18 1983?The entire Grenada operation of intervention in his failure to reflect the moral complexities Despite Weinberger's on them within or to get consensus the Reagan Administration, guidelines, they nevertheless demanded a general official guideline until the end of the Cold War constituted their refinement. The end of the Cold War accelerated a trend to see the concept of security in a in different light. Liberated from the constraints of bipolarity, which was bedrocked, of the two superpowers, less security terms, on the respective nuclear deterrents traditional notions of security began to gain currency. This was part of a general

away from seeing the nation state as the primary actor. The result of studies that explored what Arnold Wolfer's benchmark article had called the inherently ambiguous concept of security.19 After the confines of superpower military rivalry for over forty years, all branch of IR studies was liberated and able to consider more that had previously been pushed to the periphery or totally definitions broadly-cast excluded from consideration by the imperative of survival in a nuclear-perilous to writers in his widely world. According such as Buzan, read People, States and Fear,20 there was need for radical change which would crime, drugs, incorporate shift in IR studies was a proliferation in the early 1950s being locked into of a sudden this into studies of security and identity among other factors health, economics, communities. These ideas further complicated of the international conceptions terrain that confronted the USA after the end of the Cold War. The main American first to emphasise the importance of response was in terms of three priorities: to and human and the first, democracy largely complementary rights; secondly, of the free market; and thirdly, emphasis on regional advocacy of and expansion on two priorities, or directly on US that either its first security problems impacted some of the national interests that were now more flexibly defined to incorporate new security thinking.

Years in the Pentagon C. Weinberger, Books, (New York: Warner Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical 1990). 18 Shultz, Triumph and Turmoil, p. 343. 19 A Wolfers, 'National Security as an Ambiguous Science Quarterly, 67 (1952), Symbol', Political pp. 483-92. 20 recent B. Buzan, People States and Fear (Hemel Hempstead, UK: Simon & Schuster, 1991). For more of increasing globalisation discussion about security under conditions and the changing character of see Martin state sovereignty character of sovereignty is still hotly contested), (albeit that the modern and International Relations Shaw, Global Society 1994). For an interesting debate which (Cambridge, and on different attitudes towards modern security questions light on post-Cold War a debate between Barry Buzan and David Held see 'Realism vs Cosmopolitanism: sovereignty Review of International conducted Studies, 24 (1998), pp. 387-98. McGrew', by Anthony casts

17

584

Alan P. Dobson

President George Bush and his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, reoriented US policy to regional conflicts. As Powell put it, the Cold War 'US?Soviet standoff imposed a sort of bipolar lock on the world and, inmany held the world ways, together. That lock has been removed. New tectonic plates shift beneath us, causing instability in a dozen different places.'21 The Cold War with its nuclear dangers might be over, but 'America must shoulder the responsibility of its no We must The last best of earth has other choice. There would lead.'22 power. hope as some advo be no wild oscillation into isolationism, away from internationalism as the right-wing Republican Pat Buchanan, but while regionalism was cated, such or new in the focus, the actual criteria for going staying out seemed remarkably similar to those enunciated by Weinberger under the previous dispensation. The new strategy envisaged by Bush and Powell involved dealing with capabilities armed forces as 'Conceptually we refer to our new capabilities-oriented "the Base Force". This concept provides for military forces focused on the Atlantic in other regions and on continued nuclear region, the Pacific region, contingencies deterrence.'23 Powell further explained that: and threats.
When a 'fire' starts circumstances. important, Relevant clearly to evaluate armed the forces, we need require committing we seek to achieve Is the political include: questions objective and understood? Have all other nonviolent defined failed? policy means that might the be situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered

Will military

force achieve the objective? At what cost? Have the gains and risks been
by force, develop the consequences?24

How might analyzed? further and what might

At

the end of Bush's presidency Powell recorded a litany of successful US missions: well with the new post-Cold War security agenda. Ranging from they harmonised a in to limited dictator Panama and force in the support democracy using removing to in both the US Somalia and international citizens rescuing Philippines, embassy in Iraq, from Liberia, to mounting the Gulf War and humanitarian relief operations
Somalia, Bangladesh, Russia and Bosnia the reason 'for our success is that in every

instance we have carefully matched

tives.'25

the use of military

force

to our political

objec

But just how accurately does this sum up the US experience during these crucial hinge years of the closing of the Cold War and the opening onto a new world order? One of the things that Bush had suggested was that there was indeed something new in international relations because of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Just what this newness consisted of is subject to various interpretations, but amidst the clamour of debate certain claims seemed to be widely heard: no more bipolar world; more scope for co-operation and multilateral and action; more scope for freedom, democracy on that broader conception the free market; and more ability to concentrate of same War to which nuclear had the At the Cold security priorities pushed periphery. as refined by Bush and to the Weinberger rules of engagement time, according Powell, there would be more need to look to regional crises and assess US policies

21 C. Powell, 'Enormous 22 Ibid., p. 33. 23 Ibid., p. 41. 24 Ibid., p. 38. 25 Ibid., p. 39.

Power,

Sobering

Responsibility',

Foreign

Affairs,

70: 5 (1992),

pp. 32^16,

at 41.

The dangers of US

interventionism

585

in power and likely outcomes. US intervention objectives, by carefully balancing to gauge the extent to which the new Panama in 1989 provided an early benchmark US foreign policy fitted in practice with its template of criteria for, and aims of,
intervention.

The

invasion of Panama

The

A one-time recruit of the CIA when problem was General Manuel Noriega. in the 1970s, Noriega in the late 1980s was now no friend of Bush had been Director the USA. He voided the May 1989 Panama elections and remained stubbornly in as Bush claimed on 20 December in justification of the US power threatening, and the integrity of the Panama Treaty: in invasion, American lives, democracy addition he was an active agent in the illegal drugs industry.26 The range of concerns reflected the broad criteria of the new security agenda and its regional focus. How ever, the new template was not always closely followed. There were no concerted a multilateral response to the crisis (weak attempts at mediation attempts to mount by the OAS soon failed), and even the weighing up of costs and benefits appeared to be more cavalier than one might have expected. What Senator Fulbright once termed 'the arrogance of power' was rather too evident in the final decision to intervene. In the key decision-making discussions, 'George Bush sat like a patron on a bar

stool coolly observing a brawl while his advisers went hard at it.'27National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft wanted to know possible casualty numbers and what would got away. No one could give him answers. But it was anticipated happen if Noriega that a lot of 'real estate would get chewed up' and that there would be 'chaos' in the early stages. In other words there was no guarantee that if American to Powell: that they would be able to control the situation. According
The key issue remained whether we had sufficient provocation to act. We had

forces went

in

reasons?

Noriega's
American Panama. dictator . . .The away from

contempt for democracy; his drug trafficking and indictment, the death of the
to our treaty rights to the canal with the threat this unreliable to Noriega, there was George Bush's personal unspoken, antipathy nose at I his the States. shared that United distaste. thumbing Marine, And, continued questions the decision at hand. of his chair and rose. thick and fast, until it started after said. to look had as if we were had his . . .But 'Okay, then Bush, let's do it', he figure ruling a third-rate

drifting

everyone

say, gripped

the arms

'The hell with

it'.28

So much, one might say, for careful and objective application of the rules of engage over the Western ment. Old fashioned and the long US hegemony Hemisphere tradition of unilateral military action there tell us more about the invasion of Panama than the new security agenda, the rules of engagement for regional crises, democratic to Panama necessarily and the desirability of multilateral enlargement, operations. With regard there does indeed seem to be continuity in US foreign policy, though not quite in the way that Albright was later to talk of it. But then is the

26

US Foreign Policy, p. 133. Dumbrell, 27 C. Powell, A Soldier's Way (London: Hutchinson, 28 Ibid., p. 425.

1995), p. 424.

586

Alan P. Dobson

character of the Panama operation really surprising, because for all the talk of new and realist in his foreign policy. world orders Bush remained stubbornly conservative Even in the Gulf War, while it seemed to promise much for the future with co one could also from Russia and with the imagery of multilateralism, operation account for affairs in traditional realist terms invoking national interests over oil because of operation supplies and the need to get others to pay for the military fears about US overstretch and relative economic decline. Furthermore, continuing while Powell and others later held up the Gulf War as a prime example of how to one of the cardinal contemporary intervene in a regional crisis, nevertheless rules of was not engagement applied. An exit strategy was never fully worked out. Ten years on, substantial US military forces still police the area and seek to ensure the success of mass destruction. The end scenario is mission concerning weapons similar to the Korean experience and both should tell us something of the uncannily in an attempt to control situations. Neither the strategy for dangers of intervening or for the Gulf War appear to have been clear at the outset: in Panama, if Panama had escaped, things could have run out of control; in the Gulf, the absence Noriega of an effective exit strategy means that a running out of control is still possible. of the UN Thus despite the declaratory about the way rhetoric, there remained uncertainty the international about both the system had changed and considerable ambiguity of its criteria for engagement in style of US foreign policy and the application looked set to disperse that regional crises. For a while, the Clinton Administration ambiguity and come out and commit the USA more fully and actively to democratic causes and human rights, and multilateralism humanitarian through enlargement, such as the UN, NATO and the OAS. To see whether or the media of organisations not this materialised, Bosnia is a good test case, however, before looking at US on interven in Bosnia, we need to review Clinton's intervention policy positions so far has into our considerations, which tionism and introduce another element only been given passing mention: US capabilities in the post-Cold War world.

Criteria again?Clinton and capabilities In 1992 Bill Clinton new administration.

administration's

policy on interventionism?

won the presidential election and in January 1993 ushered in a Clinton committed the USA to a much more proactive position on intervention through assertive multilateralism. On appointing Madeleine Albright as the US Permanent Ambassador to the UN in January 1993, he explained that to play a 'central and with the end of the Cold War the USA was well placed team, including National Security positive role for peace'.29 Several in the Clinton to the UN and Secretary Lake and Albright, both as Ambassador Adviser Anthony to an active US policy that would not shy committed of State, were enthusiastically away from intervention and which upheld the principle of expanding both the free It was widely expected that the review Clinton ordered of market and democracy.30
29

from Michael G MacKinnon, Quoted Friend? Fairweather (London: Frank 30 Albright. Lippman, Madeleine

The Evolution Cass, 2000),

of Peacekeeping p. xv.

Policy

Under

Clinton:

The dangers of US

interventionism

587

operations, which emerged in 1994 as PDD 25, would follow in the peacekeeping wake of the administration's enthusiasm for assertive multilateralism. But, it did not. Between its inception and the issuing of the report came disaster in Somalia when 18 1993 by under UN operational US Rangers, command, were killed on 3 October a local bandits. As and partly result, partly because of Congressional pressures and key figures within his because of lack of courage on the part of Clinton PDD 25 by May 1994 had been turned into a much more cautious government, than had originally been expected.31 'Clinton ultimately signed a reversal of what he had intended to sign 14 signalled a complete and adopted a cautious set of months earlier.'32 He rejected assertive multilateralism Doctrine. guidelines that harked back to theWeinberger-Powell The concern with capabilities is threefold: first, without the debate capability about criteria for intervention ismoot; secondly, relatively reduced capabilities have been closely linked with more emphasis on multilateral and thirdly, one operations; to is that not only should there be sufficient capability line of ethical argument intervene, but itmust also be of a quality and quantity to be able to produce more in the first place. For the efficacious results than if intervention were not undertaken policy document document which present
come

only
later.

the first

two points

will

be addressed,

consideration

of the third will

An early survey of post-Cold War literature observed that 'most multilateralists are skeptical of the argument that the United States has either the capability or the to lead the world.'33 That perception of shortfall in capability was partly prerogative formed as a result of the debate about US decline that had raged in the 1980s and it not as some form of idealist version of led some US realists to see multilateralism, a more as but effective way of implementing US collective and security, cheaper national and Fall resources. In his Rise of relatively diminishing interests under conditions Great the Paul of Powers,34 Kennedy's theory imperial overstretch of to in US the germane 1980s, but it was contemporary appeared experience to in Bound in Samuel Lead,35 challenged, among others, by Joseph Nye Huntington or Renewal?'36 and Susan Strange in 'The Persistent Myth of 'The US?Decline

The anti-declinist Lost Hegemony'.37 arguments range from the claim that Kennedy used a misleading baseline from which to calculate US economic strength, that is, the US position in 1945 was grossly inflated because of the short-term effects of World War II, to claims that he had misunderstood the nature of modern economic is still preponderant. The complexity of power and that in all key sectors the USA nature of the concept of power, and the contin the modern world, the ambiguous in a of states, even states as powerful as the USA, gencies that afflict the position to resolve this debate satisfactorily. it impossible constantly changing world, make

31 MacKinnon, Destler,

annex 1, PDD 25; Steven Kull and I.M. and in particular Evolution of Peacekeeping, the Public: The Myth Misreading of a New Isolationism (Washington,DC: Brookings Institute, 1999). 32 Evolution MacKinnon, p. 32. of Peacekeeping, 33 in International K.W. Styles, Case Histories Politics (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), p. 132. 34 P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987). 35 to Lead: The Changing Nature Power (New York: Basic Books, J.Nye, Bound 1990). of American 36 'The Clash of Civilisations', S. Huntington, 72: 3 (1993), pp. 22^19. Foreign Affairs, 37 S. Strange, 'The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony', International 41: 4 (1987), Organisation, pp. 551-74.

588

Alan P. Dobson

it is difficult not to be impressed by Martin Walker's in the meantime, However, 'can no longer be described as burdensome'.38 claim that the price of US hegemony The 1996 cost of the US military was less than 4 per cent of GDP?the smallest a 1940. For this the USA maintained since percentage outlay technologically superior and arsenal, a powerful Rapid Deployment Force, had 20,000 troops in Bosnia, the waters off Taiwan and in the 100,000 in Europe and Asia respectively, patrolled Persian Gulf, and enforced the no-fly zone in Iraq, to name only the highest profile roles. The conduits of US hegemony US international military still ring apparently it safe for the world, keeping liberalism, the free market, and democracy.39 By 1998, rate and inflation down, and GDP growth running at 4 per with the employment some were 'The American academics cent, talking of a Second American Century. the "German is in the eighth year of sustained growth that transends economy and the "Japanese miracle" of earlier decades'.40 There are still doubting miracle" but they speak with muted voices compared to the heady declinist days of Thomases, is at issue for us in all this are suggestive conclusions about the two the 1980s. What issues at hand: the US presently does still have the capability to continue to intervene on a massive scale in the affairs of other states (irrespective of what might be the case in the near future); and, if it wishes, to do so unilaterally, though multilaterally may often be a preferred option in order to gain the moral high ground and spread
costs.

Intervening

in Bosnia

As

came into office there were still ongoing debates within Washington Clinton in international affairs: options ranged from a neo about the future role of the USA or multilateral to unilateral interventions either to fortress America, isolationist or democratic causes. In the election interests, or for humanitarian protect US campaign Clinton had been critical of Bush and had spoken out in favour of a more positive US policy on Bosnia. However, at the same time the most resonant anecdote of the 1992 election was: 'its the economy stupid'. Clinton expended most of his on domestic in the early years of his first administration issues, or on energies Free Trade Area. On Bosnia issues such as the North American foreign economic line until 1995 was that both rhetoric and policy fluctuated wildly. But, the bottom a a itself and formal the USA maintained distance between peacekeeping

and military intervention, though it provided intelligence supplies and helped to alliance. Nevertheless, Clinton averred that there were no broker the Bosnian-Croat a more vigorous US interests directly involved and public opinion did not mandate the Bottom-Up line. However, while the rhetoric and policy prevaricated, Review of was the in released 1993 and initiated strategy by president military September appeared to confirm the internationalist and Wilsonian idealist aspects of Clinton's

38 M. Walker, World Policy Journal, 13: 1 (1996), pp. 18-26, at 21. 'The New American Hegemony', 39 and the Question in Geir Lundestad Alan P. Dobson, of Hegemony', 'Britain, the USA (ed.), No End to Alliance: and Future (Basingstoke: the United States and Western Europe, Past, Present Macmillan, 1998), pp. 134-67. 40 A Second American M.B. Zuckerman, 77: 3 (1998), pp. 18-31. Century', Foreign Affairs,

The dangers rhetoric. Apart from the more

of US

interventionism

589

conclusions about maintaining techno predictable the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological and restricting logical superiority the emphasis was on regional conflicts, US ability to deal with two major weapons, ones simultaneously, and the fostering of democratic to values and preparedness in multilateral and unilateral intervention peace enforcement 'participate effectively that could include peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, operations counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities.'41 So, regional intervention policy was still the main focus with a stronger commitment than Bush's to democratic The enlargement. death of US soldiers in Somalia in October 1993 and the subsequent US withdrawal him more had impact on Clinton's but neither the cautious, policy and made nor public opinion Administration turned sharply away from internationalism and US policy in Bosnia was transformed in 1995, despite PDD 25, with the commit ment of 20,000 US troops, the launching of the Holbrooke mission which led to the and the now ongoing US military in Bosnia.42 Was this presence Dayton Accords commitment brought about because of a purposeful ism and democracy? Warren Bass gives an emphatic He speaks of the USA 'Blundering into Boldness'.
The

to humanitarian intervention 'no' in answer to that question.

State Department's Bosnia that most most senior officials, study confirms foreign policy were the president to learn in June 1995 that U.S. himself, notably surprised troops might soon be on their way to Bosnia the administration whether liked it or not. The confusion on the ground stemmed from an earlier presidential decision the situation that, should become intervene chaotic to help would to prevent enough the blue helmets UNPROFOR flee. . . While . . . . from an NATO functioning, to limit U.N. intervention would failure would

be dangerous and humiliating,

NATO destroy send the

theWhite House figured that reneging on its promise to

of its credibility has been and devastate an already frayed it.43 alliance. . .

remains

. one Clinton adviser called "the single most difficult decision of [Clinton's] What
presidency?to troops to Bosnia" made without anyone realizing

US

in Bosnia does not appear to have been decided on because of any intervention was hardly a primary threatened US interest; democratic directly enlargement humanitarian but the ethnic cleansing of consideration; pay-offs were forthcoming, and little action?and the previous years only brought forth wordy condemnation to go in was not precipitated final decision moral outrage; only by humanitarian was paid was not an issue. US to exit strategy; and capability lip-service as intervention appears in the White the result of contingency, poor administration lack of careful consideration of what appeared to be a limited engagement overuse UN forces pull out), and of idealistic rhetoric which helped to (to help create a more receptive domestic US response to intervention in Bosnia when it
came.44

House,

actually

in regional So, where does all this leave US policy and its criteria for intervention crises? From what has been argued so far it is clear that there is some mismatch

41

C.W. Kegley and E.R. Witkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation (New York, St. Martin's, 1995), p. 415. 42 see Kull and Destler, Misreading For US public opinion and Somalia the Public. 43 W. Bass, 'The Triage of Dayton', at 99. 77: 5 (1998), pp. 95-108, Foreign Affairs, 44 see William For an insight into the early administrative chaos in the White House Inside the Doyle, to Clinton Oval Office: The White House (London: London House, Tapes From FDR 1999).

590 between

Alan P. Dob son

theoretical models/explanations of the post-Cold War world and the as as of US well between actual and foreign policy, policy guidelines experience lies with the complexity drawn up by US policymakers. Part of the problem of the to War of world and the models deal with of it lies it, part inadequacy post-Cold with unclear thinking that mixes up and confuses practical reasoning with explan to believe in rules of engagement that ation, and part of it lies with a tendency to in faith the USA from their power prevent generate over-optimistic becoming in the affairs of other states. over-entangled

The new scenario?defining

the terrain

The

world,

of how to conceptualise and how to deal with the post-Cold War questions have brought forth a bewildering array of answers which are often mutually theory with an inclination incompatible. The range covers the following: hegemony to the idea of a unipolar system with great scope for US intervention;45 a back-to in which there are at present no potential hegemonic chal the-future multipolarity overseas US military presence;46 a fear of lengers to justify a large counterbalancing

which would the problem civilisations of morally compound clashing justifying a neorealist cross-cultural scenario of nuclear proliferation which interventions;47 driven enlargement dangerous;48 democratic commons and the demands of the global by complex interdependence to the world, which would but in the eventually bring peace and prosperity to democracies remain the of whether meantime challenged by question existing to their transitional the intervene or not in states during phase democracy;49 of regional and competitive blocs in an anarchic world emergence system where blocs replace states as the main actors. And all these are largely at the policy level. Once one turns to more purely theoretical innovations the possible oriented even more with the postmodernist/post-positivist attack on proliferate perspectives prohibitively economic what they claim to be the metanarratives of traditional IR (that is, explanations with or convention-based some form of truth claim based on a foundational, epistemo and the emphasis on deconstruction, the celebration of a multi logical position) narrative and the claim that any dominant is the plicity of different narratives so many different and competing to theoretical models product of power. With the very problem it set out to solve, from, IR studies may be compounding a so that it can be to in the way system represent conceptually simplified namely, most and action of all to avoid effective taken, understood/explained importantly choose would make intervention

45

to Lead; T. Smith, American Hegemony; 'In Defense of Intervention', Foreign Nye, Bound 73: 6 (1994), pp. 34-47; Zuckerman, Second American Affairs, Century. 46 J.Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: in Europe After the Cold War', International Instability 15: 1 (1990), pp. 5-57. Security, 47 Clash of Civilisations. Huntington, 48 International 18 (1993), K. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Relations', Security, pp. 44-79. 49 A Strategy for the 21st Century J.R. Huntley, Pax Democr?tica: UK: Macmillan, 1998); (Basingstoke, Doyle, Liberal Legacies. Walker,

The dangers of US war.50 But,

problems.

interventionism security agenda also

591 has

the confusion

does

not

end here. The

new

to security, best exemplified embraces The new approach by Buzan,51 which but does economic, identity and other security concerns and which de-emphasises not abandon states in favour of security communities, has been forcefully challenged Baldwin criticises Buzan for intermingling by Baldwin and Freedman. conceptual and empirical the analysis, which he claims creates confusion. 'Understanding different kind of intellectual exercise from concept of security is a fundamentally specifying the conditions under which security may be attained. Indeed, conceptual clarification the search for the necessary conditions of security, logically precedes a concept of of such [empirical] conditions because the identification presupposes about conceptual clarity and its role in security studies security.'52 If agreement cannot be agreed upon by security experts then what hope is there for the poor and time to make a decision? benighted policymaker who is pressed by circumstance and often mutually Thus, not only do we have a bewildering range of incompatible and scenarios to represent international models relations, but we also have radical about what security is and how it is to be pursued. disagreement at least in its declaratory Freedman's criticism ismore straightforward,
Once labelled rich, reach that generates anything a 'security problem', and is certainly inclusive, inappropriate broad, conclusions conceptual anxiety the field or threatens risks

nature.

unsuitably

the quality of life in some respect becomes Such an agenda is conceivably losing all focus. are likely to but it can also be off-puttingly Practitioners vague. if they insist on squeezing issues that vary so widely into one, toward with framework threats.53 geared dealing military

So, from an agenda that, among other things, sought to broaden the concept of in the new post-Cold security to make itmore relevant and useful for policymakers War dispensation, has arisen. So far as Baldwin yet another academic disagreement are concerned and Freedman the new security scholarship is conceptually confused and inappropriately focused: one might note that these are the very same criticisms levelled at 'old security studies'. As we have noted, there is little doubt that the USA has the capability and what notion ceptual for intervention, but exactly what kind of world it is intervening in of security it should develop appear to be ontological and con challenges that IR studies have done as much to obfuscate as to clarify.

The character

of the new US

foreign policy

In this perilously complex world what has been the dominant the dominant rhetoric has shifted towards idealism, Certainly

style of US response? even if actual practice

50

some interesting on post-Cold War IR theory see Georg comments TR Theory After Sorensen, the Cold War', Review of International Studies, 24 (1998), pp. 83-100, though I think that the a middle and postmodernism of adopting does not solve the advocacy ground between positivism addressed. problem 51 Buzan, People, States and Fear. 52 D. of Security', Review of International 'The Concept 23 (1997), pp. 5-26, at 8. Baldwin, Studies, 53 L. Freedman, 110 (1998), pp. 48-63, at 53. 'International Security: Changing Targets', Foreign Policy, For

592
has

Alan P. Dobson
retained a degree of caution and But, one of the earlier

pragmatism.54

argu

ments

claimed that US idealism in the post-Cold War scenario had moved closer to realism in that its goals seemed to be more achievable. Democratic has triumphalism had impact. In 1994 an article in the leading policy journal Foreign Affairs lamented Clinton's failure to pursue this agenda vigorously.

Much suffering could be spared if the United States, working with other countries through multilateral institutions like the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS),
or NATO, decisively historical missed took a clear to enforce on what in world is not tolerable position will in areas where the collective such efforts affairs could and then moved results. is being A produce War world

to give structure opportunity and will be ever more difficult

to the post-Cold and meaning to recover later.55

This

liberal

democracy number of assumptions, debate between cosmopolitans and communitarians and always (or nearly always) tends to identify the position of the USA with the collective good. These ideas have In Pax arisen in various forms in the rhetoric and policy statements of the USA. with R. the of Lawrence James Democr?tica, Huntley, approbation Eagleburger, an alliance of democracies, to foster economic and proposes working together in promoting that would be able to act multilaterally one democratic it would be that was But, community. enlarging peaceful states. In considering intervene to put right the wrongs of non-democratic identifies the realist rub for multilateralism: implement this, however, Huntley security communities At least initially, the United
committed it should immobilize not to war be the voting must against or Portugal, be possible for Luxembourg, in the face of a preponderant the Alliance its will;

democratic and enforce

to enlarge interventions agenda envisaging widespread standards of conduct and human rights, operates from a at the heart of the which both beg important questions

an ever ready how to to

States probably would not accept a situation inwhich it could be

On calculated. the other carefully or even France or Britain alone, majority.56 hand, to

in this idealistic game that respect for force majeure could It seems rather anomalous is not infallible) and that there should is what trump right (assuming that the USA be one rule for the strongest and another for all the rest. In fact this new idealism on three very shaky foundations: to be premised first that there are no appears to Western liberal democracy worthy of serious consideration; alternatives second are inherently peaceful and hence that they do not go to war with that democracies each other; and thirdly that under US leadership there will be a growth of multi exhibits a closed mind that seems to be alien to lateral actions. The first assumption the very tradition that has spawned it. The second, even if it were true, would still states. And the third has not only pose problems for relations with non-democratic the serious defect identified and glossed over by Huntley, but also a series of defacto on global warming; to act decisively its namely: US unwillingness problems reluctance to pay its UN dues; and?
American reservations surfaced during the past year in negotiations to ban anti-personnel

landmines,
54

to prohibit the use of child soldiers, and to establish an international criminal

and the Promotion of

See Michael 'Wilsonianism The Clinton Administration Cox, Resurgent? in Cox et al., American Democracy Promotion, pp. 218^-3. Democracy', 55 Smith, In Defense p. 35. of Intervention, 56 Pax Democr?tica, p. 164. Huntley,

The dangers of US
court. hard In each to weaken case, Washington of it. Because to bypass paid lip service these reservations, States to the proposal the international while

interventionism
U.S.

593

community rights

worked negotiators a has shown law.57

new willingness

the United

in strengthening

human

The conclusion from all this live up to its own professed the the USA ismanipulating is thus no different purpose

is that on the one hand, in practice, the USA does not ideals. From this perspective it looks to outsiders as if language of idealism to further its own interests and its from that which uses traditional forms of power for

achieving security in an anarchic world order. On the other hand US rhetoric suggests that realism and idealism are reconciled by the implicit claim that American ideals are universally valid?democratic and promotion of the free enlargement market?and that the USA has the power to realise this by the implicit assumption new world order?4a to give structure and meaning to the historical opportunity the debate between the post-Cold War world.'58 This attitude not only dismisses too lightly, it also raises important practical and communitarians cosmopolitans a life of its own, these is the danger of rhetoric acquiring problems. Among states where popular pressures and demands can turn the in democratic particularly rhetoric around to press decision-makers into more consistency with their expressed ideals than they ever intended. The act of juggling national interests with altruistic then becomes lopsided towards ideals until it leads into expensive national interest costs. If the rhetoric of idealism continues to suggest itmight be otherwise, or that there is no difference between the ideals of the USA and those of other states at worst imprudent and then at best there will be confusion, properly understood, or commitments that will neither benefit the USA the world community. expensive ideals In other words, the USA may be in danger of another bout of the 'arrogance of as it its way in the world, sometimes under the cloak of unilaterally makes power' to spread democracy and the free market. To illustrate more clearly multilateralism, inherent in this, the argument will shortly the dangerous consequences practical return to the issue of criteria for US intervention. So far I have suggested that IR models of the post-Cold War world and the new security agenda have done little to make the job of practical and strategic reasoning easier. Indeed, the conflicting by policy-makers opinions about what the world out there is really like and what an appropriate security agenda might be may have more and confused than it has helped them. This is partic puzzled policymakers when the for the time being, to have been seems, ularly worrying capability question in the international in favour of US ability to act widely decided sphere, either or In with American intervention intact short, unilaterally multilaterally. capability as Vietnam and with inhibitions about intervention weakening recedes, as traditional notions of state sovereignty wane, and as the end of the Cold War has removed the countermoves of opposing the time for US superpower, danger by another we have interventionism appears to be ripe. On the style of US foreign policymaking seen that there has been a revival of Wilsonian idealism that has gained considerable seems a more it because than before to try to realistic enterprise leverage, partly

57

K. Roth, Bows 'Sidelined on Human Rights: America 2. In early 2001 Clinton signed up to the establishment little chance of the US Senate ratifying that. 58 Smith, In Defense p. 35. of Intervention,

11: 2 (1998), pp. 2-6, at Out', Foreign Affairs, of an international criminal court, but there is

594

Alan P. Dobson

In weighing liberal democracy. the ideals of American up implement globally whether or not to take action, the scales now seem to be on a table tilted in favour of intervention. However, while many feel that the table should be tilted in this way, it is instructive to note that the intellectual foundations upon which it rests are shaky, the it can confuse, and mislead, rhetoric that surrounds and hopes for complicate an on seem and based multilateralism over-simplistic analysis. This over-optimistic simplicity
strategies.

is evident

in the criteria

for intervention

and the unwarranted

faith

in exit

Intervention

and exit strategies

Much of the debate about criteria for US intervention has fed off the longstanding concern the difficulty of about just wars, but at the same time has neglected those that might be incurred because of events calculating moral costs, especially assessments of running out of control, in favour of emphasis on rather mechanical in and exiting from a foreign state. In an article in the the problems of intervening two important issues that have often been late 1980s Gordon Graham highlighted in more recent times. He begins the crucial part of his argument overlooked by claiming that the key features of just war theory are:
Intervention their must be will intervention cause. Those in a good who The evil and be successful. intervene damage must which have the a reasonable intervention that hope entails must

be judged proportionate

to the harm it is designed to remedy.59

that many of the terms in this definition may be interpreted Graham acknowledges to suit the state interests of the intervener and will thus in effect be communitarian or universal values, but he claims that there as cosmopolitan values masquerading are some objective '. . .whether the intervention standards that could be agreed. as a just cause, a a state state is that conceives indeed cause, just contemplated by in Central it is that of fact . . .,'60 If the USA will be a matter says intervening in order to promote democracy America the intervention will depend upon: and defend civil rights, then the justice of

freedoms for the individual do not at present that the the case that democratic its being exist, more of such institutions make the emergence do actually likely, and that the steps employed are likely to be greater to the inhabitants than benefits of Central of such a result, America, the evident costs.61

there are criteria that can be used to assess the effectiveness of interven come as a event. not This the should after tions, surprise as the key only to is: Do Graham for action work? believes that be asked of strategies they question fall. But he wants to this criterion exposes how short of the mark most interventions In short but

Review of International 13: 2 (1987), G. Graham, 'The Justice of Interventionism', Studies, recent work which of essays in sheds light on these issues is the collection pp. 133^47, at 142. A more and Secular Perspectives (Princeton, NJ: (ed.), The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious Terry Nardin Princeton Press, 1996). University 60 The Justice of Interventionism, Graham, p. 142. 61 Ibid., p. 143.

59

The dangers of US say more than this. He

interventionism

595

believes that two features of intervention strongly mitigate against success, irrespective of the quality or quantity of the means of intervention. in countries where culture The first is lack of control by the intervener, especially The second problem is that intervention by and values may not be fully understood. definition is something short of conquest and thus in the end, once the exit strategy has been implemented, the intervener is dependent upon third parties for consolid or success might have been achieved. This factor, forward whatever ating carrying more than anything the problem of controlling in the situation else, compounds at the order to effect change?the heart of intervention. every goal

Conclusion

sense of democratic that sees US triumphalism has encouraged an over-optimism ideals and interests reconciled through the idea that the US system is good, and is good everywhere else. That in turn has spawned much what is good in Washington unwarranted and analytically unsophisticated about the efficacy of US propaganda in support of democracy, led multilateralism the free market, and the protection of human rights. It has also elevated concern about the technicalities of exit strategies over grand strategy priorities and the moral considerations that should properly be addressed in any talk of intervention in another state. Such thinking fails to come to terms with in the cosmopolitan-communitarian identified the incompatibilities to the continuing disjunctions between debate, and it fails to give sufficient weight the interests of states and between the interests of states and conceptions of world communities. Asserting that there is an identity between the interests and ideals of

and an ideal world community for the simply will not do. It is dangerous it is dangerous for everyone else. The challenge is to balance interests and ideals in an heterogeneous world, and reconcile the desirable with the possible. This to make should not be read as the traditional conservative prescription of bromides this imperfect world tolerable. Much hangs on 'desirable and possible' here. There may be much more agreement among states about abstract moral principles (even and thus they cannot meet the though they cannot be logically demonstrated for being regarded as foundational in the strict sense) than the com conditions munitarians allow. And there are more practical problems about the application of allow because of historical 'agreed' moral principles than the cosmopolitans legacies, and geographical and the requirement for judgement and developmental positions, action in circumstances where information is incomplete and effects can only be the possible and the desirable inadequately calculated. Thus, on this understanding, are more ambitious than in the usual conservative and are primarily agenda, the USA USA: I have neither space, nor ethical problems. However, practical and not cosmological in order to make the point do I need to convince the reader to accept this position, of practical in any forceful intervention about the importance judgement by one state in the affairs of another. A precondition for any kind of effective action involves a sensitive appreciation of seems a little complacent the way the world is. On this Albright in her insistence that only the specifics have changed when it appears to many that the system is changing. Economic is a reality, as are the challenges of environmental interdependence

596

Alan P. Dobson

These changes affect the disease, and uneven economic development. degradation, notions of security and the idea of state sovereignty and that in turn is modifying ethical and practical constraints on intervention. However, no theory as yet seems to have captured the richness and complexity of the international terrain, and yet there we more that it is rich and complex need is consensus narrative explan (perhaps can a reliable until match the Nor has ations theory challenge). theory provided or a guaranteed route to appropriate framework for decision-makers. analysis here (even though he glosses over Perhaps Freedman provides a useful perspective both ontological style military state manner, while economic themselves more to effective treatment to the problem and conceptual will understanding problems) with his view that security in the old continue to be dealt with in the traditional nation commons and the global issues lend problems

action. With by multilateral specific reference of intervention, there are no clear and simple answers, even when the of the systemic terrain. The bring with them a sensitive appreciation policymakers case studies demonstrate that no matter how many times the Panama and Bosnian are refined and revised, and no matter how carefully policy rules of engagement makers dissect the problem of exit strategy, when the time to make decisions comes situations may they cannot be taken in accordance with a rational formula. Different of rules and have similarities, but not enough to allow for a mechanical application as Graham are always present intractable problems highlights, procedures. Also, in controlling in other countries, in of inherent difficulties situations the clash of values and cultures (the cosmopolitan-communitarian issue) particular and these problems are compounded by the need to hand over to third party hands once the exit strategy is effected. Attention thus be most might appropriately directed, not at an efficient exit strategy, but at what happens afterwards, which will of inevitably refocus attention on the priorities of grand strategy and the morality interventionism. It is to say that should never be mounted. This is not to say that interventions more are and with than any unexpected dangers always complex fraught they formula or model has so far captured and that more reserve is required than has been in evidence in much recent literature, which sees the present world situation as an opportunity to take an aggressive lead in defending and spreading for the USA the benefits of liberal democracy and human rights abroad.62 Strategies are about practical reasoning that allows us to move from one situation to another in order to for assessment here is: does it, or achieve specified results. The criterion appropriate because did it work? This is different from explanation where one accurate? To answer the latter kinds of question ability to refer to some form of criteria to demonstrate truth here is used not as an absolute, but in the sense than that, or that this ismore accurate than that). Part the question is, is it true, or must have, in principle, the truth or accuracy (the word that this is closer

to the truth of the difficulty with IR as a is that it has not provided sufficiently clear criteria to establish its claims discipline about the terrain. It has also often glossed over the moral domain, and tended to

62

The

an interesting edited collection contains Promotion, range of by Cox et al., American Democracy on these matters; in John and Theo Farrell 'Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations', in the Contemporary Studies Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) Baylis et al., Strategic and pessimists with regard to the viability of interventionism. the idea of optimists suggests essays

The dangers of US confuse practical reasoning their different perspectives

interventionism

597

assumptions. Policymakers in the recent past, and by practical and strategic thinking, which give has happened sufficient scope for moral and avoid the confusion between practical arguments strategic thinking and explanation. Some, who agree with the practical implications of what has been argued here, may take comfort from the conservative victory of George W Bush over the more liberal AI Gore, but complacency should not set in.While conservatives may not succumb so easily to the call of idealism as liberals, they are more susceptible to patriotic as the desire to vanity and that can be just as dangerous a route to interventionism promote ideals. Both lead to an arrogance of power. even for the enormously In this interdependent and interdependent world, 1966 for Senator the international role of USA, powerful Fulbright's prescriptions the USA would not work. Nevertheless, his warnings should still be heeded. They have been echoed recently by Charles William Maynes in his 'US Unilateralism and its Dangers' which has a different focus, but a rather similar message to what has been argued here. In particular, the need to safeguard against a particular kind of an uncritical reinforced and mindset, rhetoric, which by extravagant portrays unreflective and its mission picture of the USA wonderful that this quote exemplifies danger. When so states the few other with US analysis agreed why in the world. Maynes gives a was Madeleine asked Albright of and action towards Iraq, she are the indispensable nation, we stand

with explanation. Even when the theories speak clearly, as they proceed cannot be reconciled from different of what might be better served by narrative explanations

we replied: 'it is because we are America, see further into the future.'63 No doubt Fulbright often heard similar senti tall?we ments echoing from theWhite House of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson.

63

Charles (1999),

William Maynes, pp. 515-18.

'US Unilateralism

and

Its Dangers',

Review

of International

Studies,

25: 3