3G-WLAN Convergence: Vulnerability, Attacks Possibilities and Security odel

u!a""ad S!er
%aculty o& 'lectrical 'ngineering ( Co")uter Science, *nstitute &or #eleco""unication Syste", Ne+t Generation Net,orks *ntegration -AV., #ec!nical /niversity 0erlin1 %okus %raun!o&er #eleco""unication *nstitute 0erlin, Ger"any s!er2&okus3&raun!o&er3de

#!o"as

agedan$

%aculty o& 'lectrical 'ngineering ( Co")uter Science, *nstitute &or #eleco""unication Syste", Ne+t Generation Net,orks *ntegration -AV., #ec!nical /niversity 0erlin1 %okus %raun!o&er #eleco""unication *nstitute 0erlin, Ger"any "agedan$2&okus3&raun!o&er3de
di&&erent levels o& WLAN access net,ork ;C=3 #!e )ro)ose 3G-WLAN security "odel is designed in aligned ,it! 3GPP tec!nical s)eci&ications to secure *P ulti"edia Subsyste" -* S. ;D= services on to) o& WLAN access net,orks by )roviding security and )rivacy solution to users as ,ell as net,ork )roviders3

,eaknesses o& security in AbstractIn this paper we present the vulnerability, threats and GS and ot!er >G net,orks3 attacks for Third Generation (3G) networks converged with *n re&erence o& 3G security: W !" and propose the security #odel addressing the roa#ing;3= identi&ies t!e security and non$roa#ing security scenarios% &any threats against 3G )rinci)les and ob8ectives, ;?= network resources can be realised by attacking the W !" access !ig!lig!ts t!e security t!reats network, therefore it is i#portant to identify the security and re9uire"ents, ;@= re'uire#ents for 3G$W !" inter$working and choose a security e+)lains t!e access security solution that is robust and dyna#ic to different levels of W !" access network% The proposed architecture is based on the&or *P-based services and ;A, ()tensible !uthentication *rotocol ((!*) for +,I&?= discuss t!e security !uthentication - .ey !gree#ent (!.!) and authori/ationarc!itecture3
procedures, and secure tunnel establish#ent using I.(v0 #!e security and data (Internet .ey ()change) *rotocol to #ini#i/e security threats% )rivacy is a big c!allenge in We will also discuss the ter#ination of fake or forge W !" t!e convergence o& session to protect the user confidential infor#ation on vulnerableteleco""unication and wireless link% The develop#ent is part of ,ecure ,ervice *nternet tec!nologies because *rovisioning (,,*) 1ra#ework of I* &ulti#edia ,yste# (I&,) at any single security solution is 3Gb Testbed of 1okus 1raunhofer%

not suitable to )rovide security3 #!e Keywords- Third Generation Networks, Vulnerability, Threats co")lete integration o& di&&erent access and Attacks, Authentication and Key Agreement), Secure Tunnel. tec!nologies causes "uc! vulnerability and t!e !ackers 43 *N#567/C#*6N get access to steal &inancial and #!e "a8or security c!allenge o& ,ireless net,orking and con&idential in&or"ation3 #!e "obile co""unication is to )rotect net,ork resources and/S* -/ser Service *dentity secure end users3 Additional security "easures are re9uired to odule. can be used re"otely cou) ,it! t!e interce)tion o& data on t!e radio inter&aces and via WLAN client &ro" serial, illegiti"ate access to "obile services3 #!e interce)tion o& in&rared, or 0luetoot! user:s data breaks t!e con&identiality o& user:s in&or"ation and connection to act as a s"art t!e illegiti"ate use o& services cause "as9uerading and &alse card reader3 #!is in&rastructure c!arging t!e users3 %irst ti"e t!e security "easures ,ere taken is vulnerable involving "any into account in second-generation digital cellular syste"s e3g3 access tec!nologies like in GS -Global Syste" &or obile co""unications. *n&rared, 0luetoot! or net,orks ;<= by user aut!entication and user data Bi)erlan>3 *n &act "any t!reats con&identiality3 #!ese net,orks utili$e c!allenge-res)onse "ec!anis"s to aut!enticate users to )revent t!e &raudulent useon 3G net,orks in&rastructure o& "obile services3 #!e "ain security &la,s in t!e GS "ay be understood by net,orks are: -i. user cannot aut!enticate t!e serving net,ork attacking t!e WLAN access and causes t!e &alse base station attack and -ii. inde&inite reuse net,ork3 #!ere&ore it is o& tri)let aut!entication vector to launc! re)lay attack3 #!e i")ortant to identity t!e #!ird Generation Partners!i) Pro8ect -3GPP. ;>= !as ado)ted security re9uire"ents &or 3Gan en!anced security &ra"e,ork &or t!e /niversal obileWLAN inter-,orking and c!oose a security solution t!at #eleco""unication Syste"s -/ #S. to overco"e t!e is robust and dyna"ic to

#!e )a)er is organi$ed as: section ** describes di&&erent WLAN access scenariosE section *** e+)lores vulnerability, security treats and attacks )ossibilitiesE section *V is about t!e security "ec!anis"s to )rotect 3G net,ork resources and user in&or"ation over WLAN and last section concludes t!e ,ork3

3@3 3GWLAN ACC'SS SC'NA5*6S #!ere are t,o )ossible scenarios o& 3G net,orks ,it! WLAN access )oints3 A. 3G Home Network over WLAN Architecture *n t!e &irst scenario, t!e WLAN Access Gate,ay -WAG. ;<>= resides in 3G !o"e net,ork as s!o,n in &igure <3 #!e !o"e net,ork kno,s !o, t!e user is accessing WLAN net,ork3
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#!e !o"e 3G net,ork inter&aces to ot!er 3GPP net,orks via t!e inter-o)erator W# re&erence )oint3 #!e 3G AAA )ro+y relays access control signaling and accounting in&or"ation to t!e !o"e 3G AAA server uses W# re&erence )oint3 *t can also issue c!arging records to t!e visited net,ork o&&line c!arging syste" ,!en re9uired ;<>=3 #!e 3G net,ork inter&aces to WLAN access net,orks via Wa re&erence )oint3

%igure <3 3G Home Network and WLAN Internetworking

*& t!e user is using t!e S* -Subscriber *dentity Card. or /*CC -/niversal *ntegrated Circuit Card. t!at !ave WLAN access, t!e !o"e net,ork "ay decide at any ti"e to allo, t!e access o& t,o or "ore net,ork devices si"ultaneously3 #!ere are t,o )ossibilities to access t!e WLAN access net,ork3 1) WLAN Direct IP Access #!e AC - edia Access Control. address o& user device can be used to )er&or" "ulti)le sessions in WLAN direct *P access3 *& aut!entication atte")t is )er&or"ed by anot!er device ,it! di&&erent AC address and t!e AAA -Aut!entication, Aut!ori$ation and Accounting. server s!ould be able to detect it since t!is is &raud situation3 2) WLAN 3G IP Access #!e control o& si"ultaneous sessions in WLAN 3G *P access is di&&erent t!an in WLAN direct *P access3 #!e user is connected to t!e 3G net,ork using t!e W-APNs -Wireless Access Points.3 W!en user activates W-APN, an *F'v> -*nternet Fey '+c!ange. ;4= e+c!ange is initiated and *F' SA and *PSec SA ;<G= are establis!ed as discussed in section *V3 #!e *F'v> )rocedure is aut!enticated using '+tensible Aut!entication Protocol -'AP. S* or 'AP AFA ;<<= by AAA server3 *n t!is ,ay AAA server is a,are t!at a ne, WAPN is activated3 #!e "ec!anis" to control si"ultaneous sessions is to li"it t!e nu"ber o& W-APNs to be activated by t!e user ;C=3 B. 3G Roami ! Network over WLAN Architecture *n t!is scenario t!e WAG -WLAN Access Gate,ay. resides in t!e visited net,ork ,!ere P7G -Packet 7ata Gate,ay. is in !o"e net,ork as s!o,n in &igure >3 #!e !o"e net,ork is res)onsible &or access control3 #!e c!arging records can be generated in t!e visited and1or t!e !o"e 3G net,orks3 #!e W" and Wo re&erence )oints are intra-o)erator3

DH

#!e attackers "ay )revent user to access t!e 3G services and "ay setu) rogue services like )ro)aganda3

>3 )ecurit' Re*uireme ts <H Leakage o& /S* in&or"ation like aut!entication data
and session keys over WLAN are t!e "a8or security t!reats to be )rotected and related inter&aces are Wa, Wd and W+3
S e c u r i t y ( A R E S ' 0 7 ) 0 7 6 9 ! 7 7 ! " 0 7 # ! 0 $ 0 0 % ! 0 0 7

%igure >3 3G Visited Network and WLAN Internetworking

t i o n a l C o n f e r e n c e o n A v a i l a b i l i t y , S e c o n d I n t e r n a R e l i a b i l i t y a n d

A<3 3G-WLAN V/LN'5A0*L*#*'S AN7 A##ACFS

#!e security &unctionality re9uire"ents on t!e ter"inal side involve /S* to be used re"otely &ro" t!e WLAN client t!roug! a serial, in&rared, or 0luetoot! connection3 #!e detail vulnerabilities, security t!reats and attacks scenarios on 3G syste"s over WLAN access net,orks are discussed as &ollo,s:

A. $u% era&i%it' (hreats #!e user o& 3G services accessing WLAN access net,ork "ay &aces t!e &ollo,ing t!reats:

<H #!e attackers "ay obtain users con&idential

in&or"ation like credential during aut!entication over WLAN3 ,!en accessing t!e 3G services3

>H #!e attackers "ay trace user by )er"anent identity 3H #!e attacker "ay i")ersonate to get )ersonal
in&or"ation about t!e user3

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?H #!e attackers "ay utili$e 3G services o& t!e victi" to

)er&or" deceit&ul activities3

@H #!e attackers "ay by-)ass access control and

aut!entication )rocess to get services &ree o& cost3

AH #!e attackers "ay i")ersonate a legiti"ate user to get

&ree 3G services and t!e victi" ,ill be c!arged by t!ese services3 )rocess &or getting services ,it! out bills3

CH #!e attackers "ay be inter&ering ,it! t!e c!arging

<H A&ter getting credentials, attacker can access t!e <H Any local inter&ace and involved devices s!ould be
)rotected against eavesdro))ing3 services o& legiti"ate user, ,!ile t!e legiti"ate user is denied to access3

>H W!enever so"eone tries to re"otely access /S* ,

so"e sort o& alert ,ill be sent e3g3 "essage like allo, or disallo, in order to aut!ori$e user:s access3 sc!eduling all access to t!e /*CC3

>H *")ortant *P-net,ork attacks in connection ,it! rogue 3H #!e attacker could use &ake con&iguration or control

AP1net,orks are service s)oo&ing attacks, ,!ere t!e attacker i")ersonates servers like 7NS or 7BCP ;C=3 "essages suc! as A5P or *C P "essages to redirect a userIs tra&&ic3 #!e A5P s)oo&ing could also be used to redirect t!e APIs tra&&ic, e3g3 AAA "essages generated by t!e AP ;C=3

3H #!e /*CC !olding device is res)onsible &or ?H #!e /S*

security reuse ,ill be in consistent ,it! current security setting and ensure t!at user security is not co")ro"ised ;C=3

33 )ecurit' Attacks )ce arios

*n a ty)ical WLAN-3G inter-,orking scenarios t!e attacker can set u) a rouge access )oint -AP. &or e+a")le atte")t to get &ree access, "odi&y legiti"ate user tra&&ic or launc! denial o& service attack3 ost o& t!e attacks lunc! at WLAN access net,ork "ay !ave i")lications on 3G net,orks3 #!e attacks can be de)loyed re"otely over t!e *nternet by setting u) a radio 8u")er in a !ots)ot to t!e WLAN to beco"e a legiti"ate user3 #!e &ollo,ing are t!e )ossible attacks on 3G t!roug! WLAN access net,orks3 1) Attacks at WLAN +ser ,*ui-me t #!e user ter"inals "ay be in&ected by viruses, #ro8an !orses or ot!er "alicious so&t,are3 #!ese )rogra"s o)erate ,it!out t!e kno,ledge o& t!e user on !is ter"inal to launc! "ulti)le ty)es o& attacks:

3. Attacks at WLAN Access Network I .rastructure <H Attacks can be launc!ed at WLAN access net,ork >H #o )er&or" any ty)e o& attacks inside t!e WLAN
access net,ork, t!e attacker needs access to t!e net,ork3

in&rastructure e3g3 Access Points, LAN connecting APs, 't!ernet s,itc!es etc3

3H #!e WLAN is )artially a ,ired net,ork, and attacker

"ay !ook u) to t!at )art o& t!e net,ork3 *n )ublic s)aces t!e APs and corres)onding ,ired connections "ay be )!ysically accessible by attackers3 on *P address, t!ere e+ists a t!reat o& *P address s)oo&ing attack against WLAN access net,ork3 *V3 3G-WLAN S'C/5*#J
'CBAN*S S

?H %or WLAN 7irect *P Access i& t!e c!arging is based

<H /S*

is used to store user aut!entication credentials and a #ro8an residing in t!e ter"inal can send &ake re9uests to t!e /*CC and &or,ard c!allenge-res)onse results to anot!er obile Station3 #!is ty)e o& attack is launc!ed inside t!e ter"inal and it does not involve e+ternal link bet,een t!e ter"inal and /*CC ,!ic! is assu"ed to be )!ysically secure ;C=3 o)eration activities and &or,ard to anot!er "ac!ine3

*n t!is section, ,e ,ill discuss di&&erent "ec!anis"s including user identity )rivacy, aut!entication and key agree"ent, establis!ing secure tunnel and &ake session identi&ication ( ter"ination to secure 3G net,ork assets and user:s con&idential in&or"ation over WLAN access net,orks3 A. Hi#i ! o. +ser I#e tit' *t is i")ortant to !ide user identity and location on t!e radio inter&ace so t!at an attacker cannot get t!e )er"anent identity3 #!is &eature is ac!ieved by assigning t!e te")orary identity -)seudony"s, re-aut! *7. to t!e user ;<3=3 #!e AAA Server is res)onsible to generate t!ese identities during aut!entication )rocess in t!e &or" o& encry)ted * S* -*nternational obile Subscriber *dentity. by using Advanced 'ncry)tion Standard -A'S. ;<?= in 'lectronic Code 0ook -'C0. "ode ,it! <>D bit key si$e as s!o,n in &igure 33 #!e WLAN /ser '9ui)"ent -W-/'. stores t!e te")orary identity and uses it in t!e ne+t aut!entication3 A'S
Plain * S*
-in 'C0 ode.

>H #ro8ans "ay "onitor user keyboard or sensitive data 3H

alicious so&t,are residing on di&&erent !osts can be used to launc! 7istributed 7oS -77oS. attacks against a target3

>. Attacks .rom Attacker ,*ui-me t or Access Poi t

Several ty)es o& attacks are )ossible i& t!e attacker !as access to a la)to) ,it! WLAN inter&aces or Access Point3 %or so"e WLAN tec!nologies, layer > control signaling are not integrity )rotected and causing 7oS attacks3 *& t!ey are not )rotected t!e attacker can easily eavesdro) on t!e tra&&ic bet,een a user and AP3 #!is ty)e o& attack can cause di&&erent t!reats3 %or e+a")le:

<H #!e attacker could "odi&y t!e user tra&&ic or divert t!e
tra&&ic to anot!er net,ork3

'ncry)t ed * S*

>H #!e attacker could also &ake a net,ork or a

co""ercial site to get access to credit card in&or"ation3 aut!entication to get credentials o& t!e legiti"ate user3

Fey
%igure 33 Aut!entication and Fey Agree"ent Procedure

3H #!e attacker can act as a "an-in-t!e-"iddle during t!e

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%igure ?3 USIM EAP AKA Procedure

)rivacy *n su))ort is WLA used by t!e N 3G!o"e *P net,ork access, and t!e Waut!en /' ticatio received a n iste")orary )er&or identity in "ed ina )revious a aut!enticat )rotect ion, it ,ill ed use it in tunnel t!e tunnel ,!ic! aut!enticat )rovid ion )rocess es ;C= ,!ic! encry) ,ill be tion, e+)lained integrit in y subsection )rotect 73 ion #!e and te")orary re)lay )rotect identity to is ion3 #ouser assigned establi not &or a s! tunnel long ti"e &ast re-so t!at user aut!en can not be ticatio traced3 *& n isidentity used to)rivacy is s)eed used but u) t!et!e AAA )roced server &ails ure3 *&to identi&y identit t!e user by its y

te")orary identity, t!e AAA server ,ill re9uest t!e ne+t one in t!e &ollo,ing t!e order:

<H %as
t reaut !e nti cat ion *7

<H Pse identi&y t!e

udouser by its ny reaut!enticat ", ion >H Per identity, "a t!e AAA nen server ,ill re9uest t!e t W-/' to *7 send its %or )seudony e+a") "3 *& t!e le, i&AAA W-/' server still does not is using recogni$e t!e t!e )revio )seudony usly ", it s!all issued re9uest t!e W-/' to reits aut!en send ticatio )er"anent identity3 n identit #!is y butre)resents AAA a breac! in server t!e cannot )rovision

o& user identity )rivacy3 *t de)ends u)on net,ork security )olicy ,!et!er to allo, clients to acce)t re9uests &ro" t!e net,ork to send t!e clear te+t )er"anent identity3 *& t!e client re8ects a legiti"ate re9uest &ro" t!e AAA server, it ,ill be denied to access t!e service ;C=3

n f e r e n c e S e c o n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o o n A v a i l a b i l i t y , R e l i a b i

l i t y a n d S e c u r i t y ( A R E S ' 0 7 ) 0 7 6 9

! 7 7 ! " 0 7 # ! 0 $ 0 0 % ! 0 0 7

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B. ,AP Authe ticatio a # /e' A!reeme t 0A/A) Proce#ure #!e WLAN access aut!entication signaling are e+ecuted bet,een W-/' and 3G AAA server and based on '+tensible Aut!entication Protocol -'AP. ;<<=3 #!ese signals are trans)orted over t!e KWa: re&erence )oint by standard "ec!anis" ,!ic! are inde)endent on t!e s)eci&ic WLAN tec!nology and based on standard 7ia"eter )rotocol ;<@= ,!ic! uses *PSec &or signaling security )rotection3 *& t!e user is roa"ing t!an t!e WLAN aut!entication signaling are trans)orted over KWd: re&erence )oint bet,een AAA Pro+y and AAA Server3 #!ese signals are carried out bet,een AAA server and Bo"e Subscriber Server -BSS. over KW+: re&erence )oint3 #!e W-/' and AAA server su))ort bot! 'AP AFA and 'AP S* "et!ods but ,e ,ill only discuss t!e 'AP AFA ,!ic! is reco""ended by 3GPP &or / #S3 A W-/' ,it! a /S* re9uests t!e aut!entication "et!od ,!ic! is e+)lain in &igure ?3 #!e W-/' sends its identity -)er"anent, )seudony", etc3. to t!e AAA server3 *n t!e &irst aut!entication, t!e identity ,ill be * S* and t!e "essage containing t!e identity ,ill also indicate t!e aut!entication "et!od to be used3 *n succeeding aut!entications, t!e te")orary identity ,ill be used3 #!e associated aut!entication "et!od ,ill not be "odi&ied by t!e W-/'3 A&ter t!e reorgani$ation o& user identity and 'AP "et!od, t!e AAA server gets Aut!entication Vectors -AVs. ;<A= &ro" Bo"e Subscriber Server -BSS.3 #!e aut!entication vector is calculated as: A$ 1 RAND23R,)24/2I/2A+(N 'ac! AV -called / #S 9uintet. consists o& &ive )ara"eters: 5ando" nu"ber 0RAND), e+)ected 5es)onse 03R,)), Ci)!er Fey 04/)5 *ntegrity Fey 0I/) and Aut!entication token 0A+(N) and can be derived as "entioned in ;<A=3 #!e AAA server re9uests again t!e user identity and t!e W-/' res)onds ,it! t!e sa"e identity it used in t!e 'AP 5es)onse1*dentity "essage3 #!e identity received in t!is "essage ,ill be used by t!e AAA server in t!e rest o& t!e aut!entication )rocess3 #!e AAA server c!ecks t!at user WLAN access )ro&ile is available or not3 *& not, t!e )ro&ile is retrieved &ro" BSS and AAA Server veri&ies t!at t!e user is aut!ori$ed to use t!e WLAN service3 #!e ne, key "aterial is derived &ro" *F and CF ,!ic! is re9uired by 'AP-AFA, and so"e e+tra key "aterial "ay also be generated &or WLAN tec!nology s)eci&ic con&identiality and integrity )rotection3 A ne, )seudony" and reaut!entication *7 "ay be c!osen and )rotected using 'APAFA generated key "aterial3 #!e AAA Server sends 5AN7, A/#N, essage Aut!entication Code - AC. ;<A= and t,o user:s identities: )rotected )seudony" and )rotected reaut!entication *7 to W-/' in 'AP 5e9uest AFA-C!allenge "essage3 #!e W-/' runs / #S algorit!" on t!e /S* and /S* veri&ies t!at A/#N is correct3 *& ok, t!e net,ork is aut!enticated3 *& A/#N is incorrect, t!e ter"inal re8ects t!e aut!entication3 #!e second veri&ication is se9uence nu"berE i& it is out o& order, t!e ter"inal initiates a sync!roni$ation )rocedure3 *& A/#N is correct, t!e /S* co")utes 5'S, *F and CF ;<A=3

#!e W-/' derives re9uired additional ne, key "aterial &ro" t!e ne, co")uted *F and CF &ro" t!e /S* , c!ecks t!e received AC ,it! t!e ne, derived key "aterial3 *& a )rotected )seudony" and re-aut!entication identity !ave received, t!en t!e W-/' stores t!e te")orary identity-s. &or &uture aut!entications3 #!e W-/' calculates a ne, AC value and )rotecting t!e 'AP "essage ,it! t!e ne, key "aterial3 W-/' sends 'AP 5es)onse1AFA-C!allenge containing calculated 5'S and t!e ne, AC value to AAA Server and it c!ecks t!e received AC and co")ares L5'S to t!e received 5'S3 *& all co")ares are success&ul, t!e AAA Server sends 'AP 5e9uest1AFA-Noti&ication "essage to W/'3 *n res)onse to 'AP Noti&ication &ro" client, AAA Server sends t!e 'AP Success "essage to W-/'3

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%igure @3 USIM Fast Re-Authentication Procedure

Second International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES'07) 0-769 -!77 -!"07 #!0$00 % !007

4. 6ast Re7Authe ticatio Proce#ure W!en aut!entication )rocesses !ave to )er&or" &re9uently, it can cause !eavy net,ork load and band,idt! congestion3 *n t!is situation it is "ore e&&icient to )er&or" &ast reaut!entications3 #!e &ast re-aut!entication )rocess allo,s t!e WLAN-AN -Access Net,ork. to aut!enticate )reviously aut!enticated user in a lig!ter )rocess as s!o,n in &igure @, instead o& )er&or"ing again &ull aut!entication3 , %ast reaut!entication re-uses keys )reviously derived during &ull aut!entication3 #!is )rocedure is brie&ly e+)lained as &ollo,s:

<H #!e W-/' sends t!e 'AP 5es)onse to AAA server via
W-AN in t!e re)ly o& 5e9uest &ro" W-AN3

>H #!e AAA server sends 'AP 5e9uest1AFA 5e-

Aut!entication to W-/' via W-AN, containing Counter, Nounce, AC, )rotected ne+t aut!entication *7 and result *7 )ara"eters3 containing Counter, AAA server3 AC and result *7 )ara"eters to

3H #!e W-/' sends 5es)onse1AFA 5e-Aut!entication ?H A&ter t!e veri&ication, t!e AAA server sends success
noti&ication in 'AP1AFA Noti&ication to client and t!e client sends back AFA Noti&ication in t!e 'AP 5es)onse3 "aterial to t!e W-/'3

<H #!e )rocedure is bet,een AAA server and W-/'3 #!e

'AP )ackets are )rotected by t!e keys generated &ro" &ull aut!entication )rocess and t!e link layer keys are rene,ed in WLAN Access Net,ork -AN.3 re9uired &or &ast re-aut!entication during t!e )rocess o& &ull aut!entication3

>H #!e AAA server and W-/' stores t!e credentials

<H A&ter t!is t!e AAA server sends 'AP success and key

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D. (u e% Authe ticatio a # Authori8atio #!e P7G -Packet 7ata Gate,ay. is t!e end device on net,ork side &or tunnel and W-/' and AAA server use *nternet Fey '+c!ange -*F'v>. )rotocol as s)eci&ied in ;4= to establis! t!e tunnel3 #!e 'AP "essages over *F'v> ,ill be e+c!anged bet,een AAA server and WLAN client via P7G t!roug! W" inter&ace3 #!e P7G e+tracts t!e 'AP "essages received &ro" t!e W-/' over *F'v>, and sends t!e" to t!e AAA server over 7ia"eter3 #!e co")lete )rocedure is e+)lained in &igure A3

not )er&or"ed )reviously, t!en t!e AAA server s!all initiate t!e WLAN registration to t!e BSS3 6t!er,ise, t!e AAA server s!all co")are t!e AC address, VPL N -Visited Public Land obile Net,ork. *dentity and t!e WLAN access net,ork in&or"ation o& t!e aut!entication e+c!ange ,it! t!e sa"e in&or"ation o& t!e ongoing sessions3

<H %irst, t!e W-/' and PG7 e+c!ange *F' initiation to

negotiate cry)togra)!ic algorit!"s, e+c!ange nounces and )er&or" 7i&&ie-Bell"an e+c!ange3 containing user *7 ,it! ot!er *F' )ara"eters ;C= and t!e P7G sends 'AP 5es)onse to AAA server containing user *7 and WLAN APN3 aut!entication vector -AV. &ro" BSS, and sends AFA c!allenge to P7G3

>H #!e W-/' sends *F'-Aut!entication 5e9uest to P7G

3H #!e AAA server do,nloads t!e user )ro&ile and ?H #!e P7G sends *F' 5es)onse to /' containing its
*7, certi&icate, re9uest *7 and AFA c!allenge3 #!e W/' re)lies ,it! AFA c!allenge and P7G &or,ards AFA c!allenge to AAA server3

@H #!e AAA server )er&or"s veri&ication and in case o&

success&ul aut!entication, it sends 'AP success and key "aterial to P7G3 establis! t!e tunnel bet,een t!e"3 #!ere e+ist t!e &ollo,ing risks ,!en sending t!e * S* in t!e tunnel set-u) )rocedure:

AH Ne+t t!e W-/' and P7G e+c!anges *F' "essages to

<H #!e )rotected tunnel is encry)ted but not

aut!enticated at t!e "o"ent o& receiving t!e user identity -* S*.3 #!e *F'v> "essages, ,!en using 'AP, are aut!enticated at t!e end o& t!e 'AP e+c!ange3 So in case o& a "an-in-t!e-"iddle attack t!e attacker could be able to see t!e * S* in clear te+t, alt!oug! t!e attack ,ould eventually &ail at t!e "o"ent o& t!e aut!entication ;C=3 situations "ay be in t!e VPL N -Visited Public Land obile Net,ork.3 #!is is not a signi&icant )roble" i& t!e !o"e net,ork o)erator trusts t!e P7G o& t!e visited net,ork o)erator ;C=3

>H #!e * S* is visible to t!e P7G, ,!ic! in roa"ing

@3 6rau# Detectio a # WLAN )essio (ermi atio

#!is section describes !o, to use AAA server accounting start "essage to detect a &raud si"ultaneous session in WLAN 7irect *P Access3 A&ter t!e co")letion o& 'AP1AFA )rocedure t!e AAA server receives an accounting start "essage &ro" WLAN AN3 #!e AAA server veri&ies t!at a corres)onding aut!entication )rocedure !as been co")leted3 *& t!ere is no ot!er ongoing WLAN Access session &or t!e client detected by t!e AAA server, and t!e WLAN registration &or t!is client is

%igure C3 Fraud Detection and Session Termination

*& t!e in&or"ation is t!e sa"e as ,it! an ongoing session, t!en t!e aut!entication e+c!ange is related to t!e ongoing session, so t!ere is no need to do anyt!ing &or old sessions3 *& it is t!e sa"e client but ,it! a di&&erent AC address, or ,it! a di&&erent VPL N identity or ,it! di&&erent radio net,ork in&or"ation t!at is received t!an in any ongoing session, t!e AAA server t!en considers t!at t!e aut!entication e+c!ange is related to a ne, WLAN access session3 *t ,ill ter"inate an old WLAN access session a&ter t!e success&ul aut!entication o& t!e ne, WLAN Access session, based on t!e )olicy ,!et!er si"ultaneous sessions are not allo,ed, or ,!et!er t!e nu"ber o& allo,ed sessions !as been e+ceeded3 *& t!e AC addresses -old and ne,. are e9ual and t!e WLAN radio net,ork

Second International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES'07) 0-769 -!77 -!"07 #!0$00 % !007
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in&or"ation received is di&&erent &ro" t!e old one, t!e ne, session is considered to be a &raudulent one and t!e AAA server ter"inates t!e ne, session3

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3GPP, #S 333>G3 VC3G3G ->GG@-<>., 3G SecurityE MAccess Security &or *P-based services -5elease C.N3 3GPP, #S 333<G> VC3<3G ->GGA-<>., 3G SecurityE MSecurity Arc!itecture -5elease C.N3 3GPP, #S 333>3? VC3<3G ->GGA-GA., 3G SecurityE MWireless Local Area Net,ork -WLAN. *nternet,orking Security -5elease C.N3 3GPP #S >33>>D *P ulti"edia Subsyste" -* S., Stage > 1 3GPP> L3SGG<3-GG>-G v<3G,,,,33g))3org3 7ra&t-iet&-i)sec-ikev>-<A3t+t, Se)te"ber >GG?: Q*nternet Fey '+c!ange -*F'v>. ProtocolQ3 S3 Fent, 53 Atkinson M*PSec 'nca)sulating Security Payload, 'SP, *PSec 'SPN, *'#% 5%C >?GA -<44D.3 *'#% 5#C 3C?D, Q'+tensible Aut!entication Protocol -'AP.Q3 7ra&t-arkko-)))e+t-ea)-aka-<>, A)ril >GG?: Q'+tensible Aut!entication Protocol et!od &or / #S Aut!entication and Fey Agree"ent -'APAFA.Q3 3GPP, #S >33>3? VC3G3G ->GG@-<>., MWireless Local Area Net,ork -WLAN. *nternet,orking Syste" 7escri)tion -5elease C.N3 7ra&t-arkko-)))e+t-ea)-aka-<3, 6ctober >GG?: Q'+tensible Aut!entication Protocol et!od &or / #S Aut!entication and Fey Agree"ent -'AP-AFA.Q3 *'#% 5%C 3AG>, ->GG3. M#!e A'S-C0C Ci)!er Algorit!" and *ts /se ,it! *PSecN3 P3 Cal!oun, O3 Loug!ney, '3 Gutt"an, G3 Rorn, O3 Arkko, M7ia"eter 0ase ProtocolN, *'#% 5%C 3@DD -Se)3 >GG3.3 3 S!er, #3 agedan$: QNet,ork Access Security anage"ent -NAS . odel &or Ne+t Generation obile #eleco""unication Net,orksQ, *'''1*%*P A#A:>GG@, >nd *nternational Works!o) on obility A,are #ec!nologies and A))lications - Service 7elivery Plat&or"s &or Ne+t Generation Net,orks, ontreal, Canada, 6ctober <C-<4, >GG@, Proceeding S)ringer-Verlag LNCS 3C??-G>A3, 0erlin Beidelberg >GG@, ))3 >A3->C>3 !tt):11,,,3congresbcu3co"1"ata>GG@3 %okus %raun!o&er #!ird Generation ,,,3&okus3&raun!o&er3de1nationalS!ost3 %okus %raun!o&er 6)en ,,,3&okus3&raun!o&er3de1i"s3 Source beyond * S #estbed,

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#!is )a)er )rovides an arc!itectural and i")le"entation )ers)ective o& 3G Net,ork over WLAN security "odel3 #!e )ro)osed "odel is based on 3GPP tec!nical s)eci&ications and )rotocols to use 3G services over WLAN access net,orks in a secure and )rotected ,ay3 #!is researc! ,ork is )art o& Secure Service Provisioning -SSP. %ra"e,ork ;?= to )rovide secure services to 3Gb #estbed ;<C= and * S Playground at %okus %raun!o&er ;<D= )roviding researc! and develo)"ent in&rastructure &or validating and i")le"enting *P ulti"edia Syste" -* S. and Ne+t Generation Net,orks -NGNs. services and )rotocols3 V*3 ACFN6WL'7G'
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Second International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES'07) 0-769 -!77 -!"07 #!0$00 % !007

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