LAIYONGHAI

Buddha-nature and Human Nature: A Discussion of the Differences and Similarities between the Teachings of Confucianism and of Buddhism, and Their Mutual Influences
Buddhisms profound and longlasting impact o n Chinas traditional culture has come to b e increasingly acknowledged and understood. At the same time, the great impact that Chinas traditional culture has on the teachings of Buddhism has also come to be increasingly studied and emphasized by the circles of Buddhist teachers. Thus, the study of the relationship and interaction between Buddhism and Chinese culture has become a major component of the current study of culture. Because both Buddhism and Chinese culture are subjects that entail the study of massive numbers of texts and documents, and both cover a vast territory, at this point we have no intention, or the capacity, t o discuss the two, or their relationship, in such a way as to touch on every facet. What we intend to do is simply to explore, to the extent of our limited capabilities, both the relationship and interaction between the theory of Buddha-nature (Foxing), which is the core problem of Buddhist teachings, and the theory of human nature (renxing), which is a fundamental issue of traditional Confucian teachings.
L a i Yonghai, Foxing yu renxing-lun ru fo zhi yitong ji xianghu yingxiang, in Zhaceyunjiu (Studies in philosophy), no. 11 (1989), pp. 55-61. The author is a member of the Dcpartmcnt of Philosophy, Nanjing University.
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Buddhisms abstract ontology and Confucianisms doctrine of humanism (renbenzhuyi) On the subject of the distinction between Buddhism and Confucianism, Mr. Liang Shuming once said:
Confucianism never says anything that is divorced from the condition of human beings. Where it plants itself is where humanity plants itself. Whatever i t may say, in the end it always comes back to humanity; it does not go outside of, or beyond humanity. The same is not true of Buddhism. It stands, rather, on a plane far above that of humanity. It always speaks outside of, and in transcendence of, humanity, and whatever it says, in the end, it does not come back to humanity; instead, it ultimately comes back to Buddha. The former is an earthly, worldly teaching-its method and laws are of this world. The latter is a teaching that does not belong to this world but is transcendent of it-its laws and methods are to go out of this world. The differences between the two are therefore plain to see.

Mr. Liangs viewpoint is indeed insightful, and it seems t o hit the nail o n the head with regard to the linc of demarcation between Buddhism and Confucianism. This is because, to be sure, t h e tcachings of the Confucianist schools, from that of Confucius himself and Mcncius to that of t h e neo-Confucianists
(fhuejin), though the words a r e many and the teachings copious, t h e main and essential principle underlying all of them is t h e principle a b o u t humanity. I t discusses t h e original and fundamental nature of Man, discusses the moral cultivation of humanity, and its purpose, Ultimately, is to teach human beings to be, or become, sagely, saintly human beings. This is not true of Buddhism. Although Buddhist teachings and doctrines may be extremely broad-indeed, they claim to encompass Eightyfour Thousand Paths of the Law-the ultimate and essential point of convcrgcnce is nothing b u t the question of describing and explaining what it means to be Buddha-what is the es-

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sence of Buddha? Does a numan being possess Buddha-nature? Is it possible for a human being to become Buddha, or attain Buddha-hood? And if a human being can become Buddha, then on what basis, and how may a human being become Buddha? The Confucianists teaching about humanity is generally known as the theory of human nature. As for Buddhisms teachings about Buddha, it is the theory of Buddha-nature which makes up the core question in all of Buddhism as a whole (but particularly with Mahayana Buddhism). The term Foxing (Buddha-nature) is the Chinese translation of the Sanskrit term Buddha-ata. It is also sometimes rendered as Fojie (Buddha-dhatu, or the state, or realm, of Buddha), as Fozang (Buddha-tipitaka, or the treasury of Buddha), as Rulai jie (Tathagata-dhatu, or the realm of That Which Is as It Is), or as Rulai zang (Tathagata-tipitaka, or t h e treasury of That Which Is as It Is). Buddha-nature is also the cause, o r seed (yin), of the enlightenment of all living things, and the reason for the possibility of all living things becoming Buddha. This is t h e most basic and general understanding of the concept of Buddha-nature on the part of Buddhist circles in China. However, the term for nature in Buddha-nature was originally the term dhatu in Indian Buddhism, which is translated in Chinese as jie,or realm (but which in the original has the meaning of substance, o r reality.) And so by Buddhanature, we also mean to refer to the substance-nature or substance-essence of Buddha. Subsequently, with the ongoing development of Buddhism as a teaching, the meaning of dhatu also continuously changed and evolved. By the time of the dominance of Mahayana Buddhism, the term dhatu came to acquire an even deeper meaning, and came to be a synonym for metaphysical truth. In this way, then, the term Buddhanature came to possess ontological significance. If we go back all the way to the most foundational theory of Buddhism, namely, t h e doctrine of causation, however, we would say that from that perspective Buddhism negates ontological reality, or ontological substance. Moreover, we would

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also discern that it was precisely in opposition to the theory of the noumenon of the divine and self in the religious teachings of Brahmanism that Sakyamuni founded and established his doctrine of causation. Nevertheless, in the same way that the growth and development of all intellectual cultures is never simply a matter of outright and simplistic repudiation of tradition, at the same time that Buddhism rejected and opposed the traditional Brahmanistic idea of the noumenon of the divine and self, it also subconsciously assimilated Brahmanisms methods, or modes, of thought. In the early and primitive stage of Buddhisms development, this assimilation was expressed in latent forms, but as Buddhism continued to grow and develop, this assimilation gradually became expressed and was revealed. For example, in the latter stage of the dominance of Hinayana (Theravedic) Buddhism, to overcome the contradiction that there was no noumenon for reincarnation within the doctrine of retribution and reincarnation Cyebao lunhui), the doctrine of pudgala began to make its appearance. A s the noumenological subject for the continuity between the past and the future and the subject of reincarnation and retribution, this pudgala became, in reality, a kind of reality of substance in a different guise. Naturally, in a strict sense, this reality or substance is still not conceived as ontological reality, or nournenon. The appearance of the theory of ontological reality in Buddhism, one would probably have to say, came after the appearance of the theory of the prajna, or wisdom, reality of appearance (boyo shkiang shuo). Owing to the fact that at the same time that the latter-dayprajnn theorists swept away all appearance they also discussed at length the reality of appearance of all dharma (law, or truth, or doctrine), and thus took reality of appearance to be the origin of all dharma; reality of appearance became an ontological reality, or nournenon that put on Buddhist garments. And, finally, the theory of Buddhanature, which is based now on the theory of theprajna reality of appearance, gave much discussion to such concepts as Tathagata-tipitaka (Rulai zang in Chinese, or the Treasury of

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That Which Is as It Is) and Faring wuo, or the Self of Buddhanature, and so t h e doctrine of Divine Self, which early Buddhism discarded, was invited t o return through the back door. Thus, the theory of Buddha-nature, the core of Mahayana Buddhism, came to b e established, in terms of epistemological form, entirely o n the foundation of an abstract ontology. It was very difficult for the Chinese before the time of the Jin and Song dynasties to comprehend the meaning of the doctrine of reality of appearance and the theory of Buddhanature insofar as they did possess a n ontological significance. This is because the traditional method of thinking in ancient China was closer t o the theory of origins or sources-for example, the theory of essential energy (jingqi), the theory of the Five Elements (wuing), the theory of the Natural Being of the Original Spirit (yuanqi ziran), and so on. Therefore, in ancient Chinese thought the concept of procreation (chansheng) often replaced the concept of realization (tixian),and when that happened, there was a very serious misinterpretation of the teachings of Indian Buddhism. In particular, there was, in ancient China, a deeply rooted idea of the soul of the individual that possessed an ontological significance. Thus, when the traditional Chinese notion of soul was applied to understand the Buddhist doctrine of Buddha-nature, assuming the imperishability of the soul, and the immortality of the spirit was understood to be a fundamental meaning of Buddhism and Buddhist law, then these became the major characteristics of Chinese Buddhism in the Wei and Jin periods. In reality, there is a very great difference between ancient Chinas doctrine of the soul and the doctrine of Buddha-nature in Indian Buddhism in terms of their respective modes of thinking. In the case of the former, the notion of soul refers to the soul of the individual; in t h e case of the latter, t h e concept refers t o the ontological reality of the universe; the two should in no way be confused. Nevertheless, because Chinese intellectual and philosophical circles prior t o the times of the Wei and Jin dynasties practically had no concept of noumenon (benti),

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Chinese thinkers were not able to understand accurately or grasp the related ideas in Buddhism. In the Wei and Jin periods, metaphysics (xuanxue) became popular. The metaphysicians of the time were very adept at discussing the questions of being (you) and nonbeing (wu),and indeed delighted in absorbing themselves in efforts of the mind in order to comprehend the meaning of noumenon (benti), or root-substance. In this way the concept of ontological reality gradually became something understood and accepted by the intellectual circles of China. It is only because of this, and in its wake, that in the time between the Jin dynasty and the Song dynasty (of the Southern dynasties period) the Buddhist monk Zhu Daosheng inaugurated the discussion of the Chinese theory of Buddha-nature, and began to explain more accurately a doctrine of Buddha-nature that was based on the theory of ontological reality. In fact, within the parameters of Buddhist teaching, it is not only the theory of Buddha-nature that is established o n the foundations of a notion of the noumenon of Buddha-ness (Fo benti); the totality of Mahayana Buddhism itself stands, and depends, on a certain abstract noumenon. This noumenon may be called many names-Zhenru (or the Truth as It Is), shixiang (or Reality of Appearance),fajie (or the Sphere of the Law), or Foxing (or Buddha-nature)-no matter how varied the descriptions and terminology, however, the essence is still the same; they all mean the ontological origin of the universe and all things (laws) within it. For, in Buddhist teaching, all things of being (wanyou) in the world, and in the universe, including all living things, are but some kind of false image, some illusion or hallucination; only Buddha-nature, or the reality of appearance is real. In this perspective, the purpose, for anyone, to study Buddhism and to learn its teachings and ways is nothing but to realize and verih ones own Buddha-nature and thus revert to ones ontological reality, shed of all illusions. Therefore, in the teachings of Buddhism, Buddha-nature or reality of appearance, as the abstract ontological reality, is both the point of departure and the point to which all returns.

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Let us now examine the teachings of Confucianism, which we may assume to b e Chinas traditional culture. The central meaning in the teachings of Confucianism, in a certain specific sense, may b e summed up in o n e w o r d - r e n , or humanity. The fulcrum of the thought of Confucius himself, the founder of the school of Confucianism, is the teaching of human kindness (renxue). From an etymological perspective, ren is the combination of two human beings. The book Shuowen offers the following definition: Ren, intimacy, formed of ren (human being) and er (two). What Confucius did was t o endow the term ren with moral and ethical properties, and then use it to explain and describe the relationship that exists among human beings. In the book Lun yu (The analects of Confucius), Confucius used and explained the notion of ren in various ways. Sometimes it is simply defined as caring for other people. Then there is the saying: Because you wish to be edified yourself, so edify others; because you wish to be fulfilled yourself, so fulfill others. There is also the famous saying: Never visit upon other people that which you d o not wish for yourself. Although these and other sayings may not be entirely the same in meaning, they all point to a certain relationship between self and others, or between o n e human being and another. If indeed we say that the doctrine of human kindness is the focus of the teachings of Confucius, then the concept of humanity would be the point on which the entirety of Confuciuss teachings stand. O n e might well argue that there is, to date, no completely united consensus regarding the status of Confuciuss teachings in the intellectual history of China, but it is undeniable and generally acknowledged that the focus of Confuciuss attention was humanity and that he strove with all his intellectual might to elevate the status of humanity. Specialists in the research of intellectual history in modern and contemporary times have repeatedly pointed out that the concept of human kindness in Confuciuss thinking represented a historic discovery of humanity; it is this discovery that turned peoples eyes away from the heavens and pointed them toward

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human beings. Such an argument is in conformity with historical reality. We must remember that Confucius lived in the times of the Eastern Zhou dynasty, which was an epoch in which Heaven (tian) and God (shen) ruled over everything. Although Confucius did not actively and publicly reject the concepts of Heaven and God, he did, repeatedly, emphasize that if one does not understand this life, how can one even begin to understand the life hereafter? Should one be incapable of serving the interests of living people, how can one expect to be capable of serving the interests of dead spirits? and Let us not talk of bizarre things, things of unknowable power, things that are of disorder, and things of God. This intellectual inclination to emphasize the affairs of human beings, and stay aloof from the dead spirits and divinities indeed had a shocking impact o n the intellectual circles of the Spring and Autumn era. It awakened the sages and celebrity thinkers of the time to turn their eyes away from the patterns of t h e heavens (tianwen) to the patterns of humanity (renwen). Since then, the idea of humanism (renben zhuyi), which takes human beings as its intellectual and moral core, has always been at the center of the mainstream of Confucianist teaching and learning. In the school of Confucianism, Mencius occupies a position that is merely a step beneath that of Confucius himself, and Mencius is often called the Second Sage. T h e fulcrum of Menciuss teaching is in the theory of human nature and the doctrine of benevolent government (remheng). The core of the doctrine of benevolent government is t o advocate that there must first be a caring mind that cannot stand to see human beings suffer before there can be a governmental system that would not stand for the suffering of humanity. O n the other hand, the theory of human nature is dedicated to the exploration of the original nature (benxing) of humanity. Both take humanity as their object and their point of ultimate rest. All subsequent Confucianists have followed the same lines of thought as those of Confucius and Mencius. The vast majority of their teachings and arguments would not be far removed

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from t h e concept of humanity. They saw humanity as the moral character of Heaven and Earth, as the mind of the universe, or as t h e refined energy and spirit of the five elements. There was, to be sure, some deviation in the line of thought followed by Dong Zhongshu in the H a n dynasty, in that h e advocated the mutual charismatic correspondence between Heaven and humanity (tianrengunying). However, even there he could not completely divorce himself from the idea of humanity. He still considered human beings to be that which is exalted over all things and is most precious in all the world. Another hightide of Confucianist teaching came in the Song dynasty. At the time, under the influence of the Buddhist ideas of Buddha-nature as ontological reality (Foxing benti) and the ontological reality of the nature of the mind (xinxing benti) the Song Confucianists also began to speak of the ontological reality of the Way of Heaven (tiunduo benti) and the ontological reality of the nature of the mind (xinxing benti). They declared: The Great Origin of the Way comes out of Heaven, and The universe is nothing but my mind; my mind is nothing but the universe. Nevertheless, even then, the purpose of the neo-Confucianists (Zkue jia) in reasoning out the original source of Heaven, Earth, and All Things was for the sake of being able to explain humanity, explain human nature, and explain t h e norms of interhuman morality and ethics. All the copious teachings and writings of the neo-Confucianists return simply to one purpose-to teach people how to discipline the mind and cultivate ones nature, how to retain the principles of heaven and discard the desires of humanness and how to become a sagely or saintly human being. Although, because the Confucianist teachings of the time were profoundly influenced by the Buddhist theory of Buddha-nature, and therefore carried with them a n unusually pungent flavor of religiosity, their ultimate interest and purpose still rested with humanity. In short, to a very considerable extent, the teachings of Confucianism are simply teachings about human beings, or about humanity. They are teachings about the relationship among hu-

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man beings, and a moral philosophy that is based on the concept of humanity. They are unlike Buddhism, which starts with an abstract ontology as the point of departure and returns to the abstract ontology as the point where it alights. There may very well be other specific distinctions and differences between Confucianism and Buddhism, but we should probably acknowledge this particular difference to be the one that is surely the most fundamental. At this point, there is a question that should be discussed. When people talk about the doctrine of humanism (renben zhuyi) in Confucianism they tend to connect it with the doctrine of humanism in Western thought. Unquestionably, because both are doctrines of humanism, there must be common points shared by the two, and these would be that they both focus on humanity, both take human beings as the center of thought, and both strive to elevate the status of human beings. Nevertheless, because of the different social-historical conditions between China and the West (including the differences in intellectual and cultural background), these two doctrines of humanism are not entirely similar in intellectual content. In particular, there is a substantial difference between the two in terms of what they understand and mean by humanity. When Western humanists look at the human being, they tend to approach it from the biological, or physiological angle, in which they then consider the human being as an individual entity that possesses emotions, will, and rational intelligence. When the Confucianists deal with the concept of humanity, they would more often than not emphasize the human beings social charactcr or group nature, and approach the subject therefore from the angle of the relationships between one human being and another or between the human being and the society, considering the human being as a member of a society or a social group. If we are to say that in the Western concept of humanism the human being is often comparatively lacking in social character, then we would also have to say that in the humanism of Confucianism, to use the words of Max Weber, the human being would not have

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yet formed a kind of independent personality for himself or herself. In reality, for the human being to be human, the criteria should be both biological and social; the human being has to be an independent entity, yet also a member of a group. In this sense, the exchange between Chinese culture and the culture of the West, indeed between Chinese culture and any foreign culture, is absolutely necessary and essential.

The theory of Buddha-nature in Buddhism and the theory of human nature in Confucianism
Confucianism emphasizes humanity; Buddhism emphasizes abstract ontology; this difference between the two philosophies has led to many discrepancies and divergences between Confucianism and Buddhism on fundamental points of view. First, although both Confucianism and Buddhism emphasize the theory of nature, they differ in what they mean by nature (Xing). When Buddhism speaks of nature, it generally refers to the original nature of the abstract ontological reality; when Confucianism speaks of nature, it refers primarily to the original nature of humanity, or human beings. Second, because the ontological reality for Buddhism is abstract and not personal, or personified, when Buddhism speaks of nature, it tends generally to approach the question from t h e angle of t h e distinction between contamination and purity. For Confucianism, o n the other hand, humanity is a social living being, and the subject of morality. Therefore, when Confucianism speaks of nature, it tends to approach the argument from the stance of the distinction between good and evil (i.e., the question of whether human nature is good or evil). In the past, there have been Buddhist scholars that have discerned this difference between Buddhism and Confucianism, but they have not been able to indicate why this difference exists or where, methodologically speaking, it comes from. I n fact, this distinction between Confucianism and Buddhism exists because they are exploring different issues.

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Naturally, this discrepancy between Confucianism and Buddhism is not an absolute one. In particular, since the Tang and Song dynasties, because Buddhism came to b e affected by the traditional Chinese culture with its emphasis on human nature and human nature of the mind, it (that is, Buddhism) also began to gradually follow the path of emphasizing human nature and the questions of the nature of the [human] mind, and more and more Buddhists began to discuss nature (Xing) in terms of good and evil. At the same time, Confucianist teachings began to be affected by the Buddhist teaching of taking Buddhanature as an ontological reality, and so there also appeared within Confucianist teachings a tendency to take human nature and the nature of the mind as ontological categories. For example, consider the first united Chinese Buddhist sect, which made its appearance first in the Sui dynasty, namely, the Tiantai (Heavenly Terrace) sect; it gave much attention to the discussion of the nature of the mind (xinxing). In general, the teachings of the Tiantai school gave the highest priority and focus to the concepts and doctrines of Madhyamaka (Middle Way) reality of appcarance. T h e Tiantai Buddhists often considered Madhyamaka reality of appearance as tantamount to Buddhanature, as the original source of all dharma (phenomena, or law). This idea clearly carries with it traces of Indian Buddhisms emphasis on the abstract noumenon, and yet, at the same time, when the Tiantai school discussed the reality of appearance of all dharma, it frequently brought the notion of the variety of the real phenomena of things back to the conccpt of the concentrated mind-the mind of o n e thought (yinianxin).It believed that the mind is the root of all dhamza; the mind is the totality.2 This meant that in its teaching, the mind is the ontological source of all dharma, that is, the common root source of all phenomena. Here we can see that the teachings of the Tiantai school have already shifted from Indian Buddhisms emphasis on the abstract ontology to the emphasis on the mind. The Tiantai school spilled a great deal of ink over the discourse and explanation of the statement Among

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these three-the Mind, Buddha, and All Living-there is no difference, which is found in the Huayun jing (the Flower Splendor sutra). H e r e t h e creed is that the mind of self okh), the mind of All Living (zongshengxin) and the mind of Buddha (Foxin) are equal and are mutually inclusive, or mutually possessing. This argument, to a certain degree, connected the mind of Buddha as an abstract ontological entity with t h e mind of self and t h e mind of All Living as a specific, substantive nature of the mind. Second, the Tiantai school also summed up Buddha-nature-as an abstract ontological entity-as the mind of enlightenment (juexin). It said: What is enlightenment in Buddhas terms is mind in natures term^."^ It also said: The superior state of tranquility is what we call Buddha-nature; when one can directly view the nature of the mind, we call that the superior t r a n q ~ i l i t y . In ~ these ways, Buddhist schools of thought have summed up the concept of Buddha-nature and t h e idea of becoming, or fulfilling Buddha-hood (chengfo) as the nature of t h e mind and viewing introspectively and retrospectively the source of the mind, respectively. There is also a similar situation in the Huayan school. To begin with, the Huayan school took the Huayan jing (Lotus sutra) as its foundation, and the tenet of The Mind of Purity and Clarity Harbored in the Self-nature of Tathagata-That Which Is as It Is pointed to an abstract ontological entity from which is born all things. However, as the Huayan school began t o explain o t h e r related ideas of t h e Huayan jing, it frequently concretized or specified the Mind of Purity and Clarity Harbored in the Self-Nature of Talhagata-tipitaka as a mind of spiritual knowing which then comes to possess a subjective flavor. Furthermore, the school also uses the categorization of the ignorant (mi) and the enlightened (wu) to classify and separate all living (zongsheng) from the Buddhas (zhu fo). It said: It is because there is a difference-some are ignorant and some are enlightened-that there are those that belong to all living and there a r e those who belong to the B ~ d d h a s . ~

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Moreover, when the Huayan school explains the theory of unlimited causation (wujin yuunqi), it frequently demonstrates t h e mutual entrance and mutual presentation of all things through the sayings: Turn around according to the mind, and each according to the viewing of the mind. Naturally, we must acknowledge that when t h e Tiantai school and the Huayan school of Buddhism spoke of the mind (xin),we cannot as yet say that they were referring entirely to the human mind or to the mind in the concrete, or a specific, particular mind of a person. To a certain extent, the term still carried with it the character of an abstract ontological meaning. Therefore, we can only say that the Tiantai schools and the Huayan schools emphasis on the nature of the mind exemplified a certain tendency. However, when we come to the Chan school, and its advocation of approaching the mind is approaching Buddha (zhixin zhifo) and its teaching of summing everything up in self-nature (zixing) and the mind of self (zixin), then the specificity and concreteness of mind would be developed to yet a new level. In the classical text of the Chan school, the Tun jing (Platform sutra), a most fundamental concept is that the mind is Buddha (xin zhifo). After the death of the Monk Weineng, the founder of the Southern School of Chan, the idea of mind is Buddha was pushed to the extreme. By the time of the latter Chan school, the True, Constant Mind only had already taken the place of the Tripitaka and the Twelve Volumes of Sutras (i.e., the texts of teaching) and, to a very considerable degree, the worship of Buddha has been transformed into the worship of the mind. What we should point out is that for the Chan school, the concept of mind no longer contains the rich flavor and nature of an abstract ontological entity the way it did for the Tiantai and Huayan schools. Rather, it has become even more humanized and concretized. In fact, the way in which thc Chan school reformed traditional Buddhism rests specifically on the foundation of the way in which it transformed the implications of

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mind, and this transformation itself began with Weinengs teaching of shifting the focus of Buddhist vision and perception from t h e abstract ontology to the real, and practical human being. O n e of the salient characteristics of Weinengs Buddhist teaching is that he liked to speak about human beings directly, about human mind, and human nature, rather than deal with metaphysical and abstractly philosophical deductions and argumentations as did the Buddhist thinkers before his time. For example, in the Platform sutra, Weineng repeatedly discussed Buddha-nature from the angle of human nature. He said: The nature of human beings of the world is pure, like the clear blue sky; its benevolence is like the sun; its wisdom is illuminated like the moon, human nature is originally pure. It is because of false thoughts that the Real Being As It Is is covered up; without false thoughts nature would be simply pure and clean. H e also claimed: The nature of human beings of the world is originally pure and clean; all things reside in their own self-natures. This idea, and way of posing things, which sums up Buddha-nature in the real and practical sense of human nature, is very different from the idea in traditional Buddhism that ascribes Buddha-nature to an abstract ontology. T h e shifting of the focus of vision from the abstract ontology to human beings also led to another fundamental transformation in Chinese Buddhism, which is to shift the focus from the traditional emphasis on transcendentalism (chushi) or other-worldliness to the emphasis on this-worldliness and mundane-ness (in fact, ru shi,or entering the world) and to the advocation of seeking a way to become emancipated, or liberated, within the world, rather than out of it. At this point, we are faced with the following question: Why is it that there are, in terms of ideological and intellectual content, these fundamental transformations in the Chan school, which is, for all intents and purposes, the representation of Chinese Buddhism? Unquestionably, Chinas economic conditions and political systcms in traditional times all played a significant role in shaping these transformations. Nevertheless, if

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we were to dwell on the angle of intellectual and cultural background, we could probably argue that the intellectual style of Confucianism, with its emphasis on humanity and o n the real and practical, most certainly was a major reason for all these transformations in the thought of Chinese Buddhism. We must admit, nevertheless, that to look at the impact of Confucianist thought-as a major part of Chinas traditional culture-on the teachings of Buddhism would be to look at only o n e side of the issue. In the interaction and relationship between Confucianist teaching and Buddhist teaching, the dynamics of influence is often not one-sided, but two-directional. In other words, because Buddhism was introduced into China, it did receive the impact of Chinas traditional culture, and so gradually became sinified, but it also, and often, in turn, influenced Chinas traditional culture itself, so that in time this traditional culture of ancient China would come to bear the deep and indelible imprint of Buddhism itself. This is expressed in a particularly clear fashion in the Confucianist teachings from the Tang and the Sui dynasties on. For example, although for many centuries the Confucianist teachings have placed their emphasis on humanity, on human nature, and did not speak of an abstract ontology, since the times of the Sui and the Tang dynasties, Confucianist teachings began to go against the tradition of eschewing ontology, and began to espouse a theory of the ontology of the nature of the mind in which unity of Heave n and Humanity is conceived. Moreover, in the area of the teachings regarding the methods of mental and spiritual cultivation and disciplining of human character, Confucianist teachings also came to receive the influence of the Buddhist methods of disciplining behavior, or conduct modification (xiu Xing)-the rules of illuminate the mind and reveal nature (rningxin jiun Xing), viewing the source of the mind introspectively Cfan p u n xin yuan), and so on. Confucianist teachings then began to speak of such things as revert to the persons nature cfu Xing), reverting to goodness (shun fun), cultivating the mind and nurturing nature (xiuxin yungxing), and so forth.

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The book, Fuxing shu (On reverting t o nature), written by the Tang dynasty thinker Li Ao, is a specially notable piece of writing for those that would wish to study the impact of Tang and Song dynasty Buddhist teachings on the teachings of Confucianism. T h e Fuxing shu is in three chapters. T h e first chapter is a general discourse on human nature and human temperament, and a discussion of the character of the sage. The second, middle chapter discusses the methods of becoming a sage. The last chapter exhorts people to strive in their efforts to become cultivated in sagely nature and character. T h e book as a whole takes as its own mission to restore the tradition of the teaching (duotong) of Confucius and Mencius, and rests on the textual authority of such scriptures as Zhou yi (The Z h o u book of changes), Daxue (Great learning), and Zhongyong (The way of the mean). Its supreme moral paradigm is to open up peoples earnest and sincere minds and to illuminate them, to arrive at the state of moderation and harmony, and to eliminate petulent emotions but revert to true human nature. Indeed, it prescribes that if people would not try too hard to think and speculate, or worry too much, they would not give rise to these petulent emotions and could then return to their true nature-that is the only way. On the surface, it seems that the book is essentially Confucianist-for the greater part it is based on the Confucianist classical texts; most of what it says is cast in Confucianistic language, and its purpose lies in restoring and reviving the tradition of the teaching of Confucius and Mencius. However, if we penetrated into the deeper parts of thought therein, it would not be difficult for us to discover that in intellectual intent and method of expression, there is much of this book that is approximate with and correspondent to the theory of Buddha-nature in Chinese Buddhist teachings, so much, in fact, that one might even say in a certain sense the Fuxing shu was using the language of Confucianism to discuss the Buddhist theory of Buddha-nature. Confucianist teachings received a n even stronger influence from Buddhist teachings in the Song and Ming dynasties. T h e

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vast majority of the Song and Ming neo-Confucianist ( h u e ) thinkers opposed Buddhism, and yet at the same time many of them also smuggled in a great deal of the Buddhist theory of Buddha-nature under the manner of anti-Buddhism. In this way, Song-Ming neo-Confucianism became a vast and eclectic system of the philosophy of human life with the Confucianist texts of Lun yu (The analects of Confucius), Mencius, Daxue (Great learning), and Zhongyong (The way of the mean) as its general framework, with Buddhisms theories of mind and nature (or the nature of the mind) as its outline and backbone, and with restoring the Principle of Heaven; Eliminate t h e Desires of Human Flesh as its standard. Beginning with Zhou Lianxi (Zhou Dunyi), the Song neoConfucianist scholars greatly turned around the traditional style of the Confucianists that scarcely pays attention to the subjects of nature and the divine destiny (tiunrning)and simply does not pay any attention at all to ontology. In place of this style, they substituted a cosmology, or worldview, that has the notion of the unity of Heaven and humanity as a characteristic and a theory of human nature that takes the nature of the mind as an ontological base. The teachings of Master Zhou (Dunyi) carried with them a very heavy characteristic of focusing on the meaning of the Way of Heaven as ontology (tiunduo benti), or human nature as ontology (renxing benti). O n the one hand, he pulled the concept of the Way of Heaven (a classical Confucianist concept) to the level of human ethics. O n the other hand, he at the samc time pulled the concepts of human ethics up to the conceptual level of the Way of Heaven. Furthermore, the purpose for his pulling the Way of Heaven to the level of human ethics-or ethicizing the concept of the Way of Heaven-was precisely so that he could raise human ethics to the level of a cosmology, or to transform ethics into the Way of Heaven. The essential purpose of the book Tuijitu shuo (A discourse on the meaning of the diagrams of the Taiji, or the Supreme Ultimate) was, as articulated, to illuminate the source of the principles of Heav-

FALL 1991 21

en; to study t h e beginning and the end of All Things. However, when it comes to the point of rest, the discourse often returns to the general norms of humanity, of human nature, of human morals and ethics, and of human relationships. T h e purpose for Zhous search for the illumination of the source, or beginnings, of Heaven and Earth and All Things was to demonstrate, ultimately, that the major source of the Way was coming o u t of Heaven. T h e lines of reasoning and intellectual development followed by this theory were essentially the same as those followed by t h e theory of Buddha-nature in t h e Buddhism of the Sui and Tang dynasties in humanizing the concept of Buddha-nature-that is, pulling Buddha-nature into the realm of human nature-so that, in the end, human nature may be pulled to the level of Buddha-nature. Another major Confucianist scholar of the early Song dynasty, Zhang Zai, was equally deeply influenced by the teachings of Buddhism. Among the Song Confucianists, Zhang was the o n e who rejected Buddhism with the greatest vehemence. Indeed, he disparaged the Buddhists teachings of the emptiness of nature (xingkong) and transformation of illusion (huanhua), and said with dripping sarcasm that the Buddha sees the mountains and the rivers and the great land as mere blight. And yet, from an epistemological angle, Zhang Zai was also t h e o n e t o be most significantly influenced by Buddhist teaching. The teachings and the scholarship of Master Zhang may be described as the first system of philosophical thought in the history of Chinese philosophy to contain, and possess, a rigorous meaning of ontology. Furthermore, one may even say that his doctrines of the nature of Heaven and Earth (tinndi zhixing) and the nature of the quality of energy and spirit (qizhi zhi Xing) were the first theories in history to attempt to explain human nature and its essential, or ontological, quality through the perspective of the categories of ontological essence (ti) and applicatory use (yong). This theory overcame the theoretical contradictions and intellectual difficulties that had been con-

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sistently encountered by all sorts of theories of human nature in the past, and pushed all the theories of human nature in history, in the aspect of theoretical thinking, forward by a major step. Furthermore, it also opened up a new path for the theory of human nature in Song-Ming neo-Confucian thought, and became, indeed, a pioneer before its own time, for the concepts of the nature of Heavens mandate and the nature of human energies and qualities and the distinction between Heavens principle and human desires. Zhang Zais theory of human nature indeed made an indelible contribution to the general body of the theory of human nature that was pursued and posited by all the Song and Ming scholars, and, from an epistemological perspective, this theory was an outcome of Buddhisms ontological philosophy. The two Chengs (the brothers Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi) also held a two-faced attitude toward t h e teachings of Buddhism. While opposing and rejecting them, o n the o n e hand, they also absorbed and assimilated from them, o n the other. They believed that Buddhism belonged to the category of the unethical and the unreasonable and enjoined scholars to distance themsclves from the teachings of Sakyamuni as much as they would distance themselves from obscene sounds and false beauty. O n the other hand, however, they heaped praise o n the three components of learning of Buddhismnamely, t h e teachings of disciplines of abstinence (jie, in Chinese, and vinaya, in Sanskrit), of meditative tranquility (ding, or dhyana), and of wisdom (hui, or prajna). For the Chengs, the principle of their three-step access to learning and moral cultivation, namely sitting in quietude, application of the mind of respect, and arriving at knowledge, was, to a certain extent, deduced out of the inspiration of the three branches of Buddhist teaching-discipline, meditation and wisdom. The attitude that was held by Zhu Xi, the grand compositor of t h e teachings of neo-Confucianism (lixue) toward Buddhism was, in general, similar to that held by Zhou Dunyi and the Chengs. On the one hand, Zhu Xi opposed and dis-

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paraged Buddhism, believing that the teachings of Chan d o the greatest damage t o the Way, and just t h e fact that it abolished the Three Key Rules of Relationships, and the Five Norms of Human Morals, alone, stands as a tremendous, unpardonable sin.6 O n t h e other hand, however, h e also absorbed and assimilated a great deal of the ideas of Buddhism, particularly the Buddhist theory of the nature of the mind and the methods of cultivating and nurturing the mind. Therefore, the teachings of Master Z h u contained in many areas a very heavy, pungent flavor of Buddhism. For example, the concepts of the principles of Heaven (tiunZi) and the nature of the mandate of heaven (tiunmingzhixing) that Zhu Xi speaks of come quite close to the concept of Buddha-nature as espoused by the Chan sect in Buddhism. If one were to say that the concept of Buddha-nature as espoused by the Chan sect is largely an idea of the human mind and human nature but covered up with an outer garment of Buddha-nature, then o n e would also be compelled t o admit that when Zhu Xi spoke about the principle of Heaven and t h e nature of the mandate of Heaven he was talking of a moral ontology that has been modified in the Buddha-nature sense; there may be small differences o n the surface between these two, but no real o r major difference in content beneath the skin. Further, the idea in Zhu Xis thought that human beings and material objects and Heave n and Earth a r e all of t h e same, single original (or root) nature, that was in fact merely a variant of the Buddhist teachings that there is n o difference between the mortal and the sacred, All Living is Buddha, and Of the myriad kinds of things, every o n e is Buddha. Moreover, there is an implicit harmony between the idea of fulfilling nature, then knowing Heaven that Z h u Xi espoused and the idea of revealing nature, becoming Buddha that the Chan sect of Buddhism espouses. Finally, Zhu Xis arguments regarding how the sage teaches people t o maintain t h e principle of heaven and eliminate human desires are clearly reprints of the Buddhist ideas of eliminating false impressions to verify the truth.

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If the h u e neo-Confucianists could be so deeply affected by the teachings of Chan Buddhism, how much more deeply would the xirucue (school of the mind) neo-Confucianists be influenced? O n the question of the mind and nature, Zhu Xi differed in his opinion from the teachings of Chan. He advocated that a rigorous line of distinction be drawn between the mind and nature. He believed that the mind belonged to the category of the spirit, or energy (qi), whereas nature belonged to the category of principle (Zi) and that, therefore, the mind and nature were two different things, not one and the same. Using mainly the Chan sects methodology of thought, or epistemology, as his foundation, Lu Jiuyuan, on the other hand, criticized Zhu Xi o n this subject, opining that Z h u was simply piling structure upon structure, like building one house on top of another needlessly. Instead, he advocated that nature and principle could both be brought back to, and brought into, the one mind. He said:
A thousand ages ago, a sage emerged; he had this mind, and he

had this principle. Ten thousand ages hence, a sage will emerge, and he will have the same mind and the same principle. In the East, in the West, in the North, and in the South, there are and will be sages emerging, and they will be of the same mind and the same prin~iple.~

He also said: There is one mind and one principle; this mind and this principle; there is really no room for any other. In fact there really is not much difference between this idea of the mind is the principle (xin zhi li) on the part of Lu Jiuyuan and the Chan Buddhist sects idea of the mind is Buddha (xin zhi fo).This is because what Lu Jiuyuan meant by mind, similar to the meaning of the term mind in Chan Buddhism, is an ontology that encompasses the universe and all time, past and present and future. Furthermore, in the area of the methodology of cultivating and nurturing the mind, Lu went even further, to echo Chan Buddhisms teaching of illuminate the mind and reveal nature (rningxirzjiclrucing) with his own idea of de-

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velop and illuminate the original mind (fuming benxin). As for how t o develop and illuminate this original mind, Lu Jiuyuan emphasized that the way cannot be sought for outside of the self, and ask of thyself, revert to thyself. He believed that the original mind (bemin) was something that every person possesses within, and that while it is correct to apply the effort to ones own self, there is really no sense, o r need, in trying to find t h e way outside of ones self. This is similar t o the advocation of Chan Buddhism that the selfs mind is Buddha, and there is no need to seek for the truth elsewhere. In short, the similarities between the teachings of Lu Jiuyuan and Chan Buddhism, and the degree to which Lu entered into Chan Buddhism, are great and extremely profound. O n e piece of evidence may be that when Zhu Xi and the neo-Confucianists of subsequent ages criticized the arguments and the style and intentions of Lu Jiuyuan, they have often said that it is all the teachings of Chan; only the name and label is changed, and the learning of Jinxi [Lu Jiuyuan] is really and truly Chan learning,9 and in general one may say that [Lu] was using the principles and meanings of the Chan school; however, o n the outside he always falls back o n the language of the sages, in order t o stretch these words as much as possible to fit t h e meanings of Sakyam~ni.~ Another representative of the Song-Ming School of Mind (ximue) philosophy, Wang Yangming, went even further than did Lu Jiuyuan in the area of absorbing from and assimilating the teachings of Chan Buddhism. O n the foundation of Lus teaching, Wangs teaching went as far as to espouse the notion that everything, from the trilling of the birds to the smiling of the flowers, from the towering of the mountains to the flowing of the rivers, was simply the evolving and transforming of ones own mind, and nothing more. He advocated that conscience or good knowing (Ziangzhi)gave birth to heaven and earth, and created, o r formed the spirits and the powers; that this Zianghiwas the genius of creation and the root of all things. In precisely this way, Wang Yangming pushed the philosophy of

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the mind t o its very extreme, and made this philosophy much closer and more in harmony with the absolutistic idealism of Chan Buddhism. Of all the ideas in the teachings of Wang Yangming, the most influential was, unquestionably, the doctrine of fiangzhi (good knowing, or conscience, or intuitive moral knowledge). This Ziangzhi is, in fact, the notion of ontological reality in Buddhist teaching, similar to what the Chan Buddhists mean when they refer to the original face of human beings and things (benlai mianmu). Wang Yangming himself admitted as much. He said:
The liangzhi, or power to know good morally is nothing more than a faculty in human beings for the principle of heaven and for nature to be illuminated, to become aware of, to be dis-

covered and revealed; just truth, sincerity, pity, and compassion is its original substance [or ontology]. On another occasion, Wang said: The original face is what the sages of our school of teaching call fiangzhi, or the power to know good.12 In addition to this, in the area of the methods of cultivating proper behavior, the teachings of Wang Yangming also resemble the teachings of Chan Buddhism in many ways. Chan Buddhism holds that the Buddha-nature is pure and clean to begin with; it is only because of its being covered by some alien dust, such as worries and troubles, that it cannot see itself. If one could separate oneself from the illusions of phenomenon (Zi xiung) and rid oneself of thoughts (wu nian), one would be able to attain Buddha-hood, or at least become a Bodhisattva. For his part, Wang Yangming believed that the original substance or essence (benti, or ontological reality) of the human mind was clear and clean to begin with, but because of the accumulated practices of seltish desires and contamination, the human mind could no longer see itself clearly. If a person could learn, and thus eliminate these areas of blindness, he would recover the clear and illuminated original essence of the

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mind, that is, the Zhngzhi, and then he would not be far from being a sage or a saint. The Monk Huineng once used the analogy that human nature was originally pure just as the sky was always clear, and the sun and the moon always shone, and only because of the covering of the dark clouds did the sky become unclear, to explain the relationship between accidentality and the influence of alien dust and worries. Wang Yangming also had his argument that the moral knowing of the sage is like the clear sky without a single cloud; the moral knowing of the good man is like the sky with a few lightly floating clouds; and the moral knowing of the foolish man is like the sky with dark and looming clouds. One of the major characteristics of Chan Buddhisms methodology of moral conduct cultivation is its strong emphasis on not establishing the teaching of words, but pointing directly to the source of the mind, not to rely on the teaching of the sutras, and transcending Buddha and the patriarchs of tradition. For his part, Wang Yangming also taught a methodology of cultivation in which he opposed being restrained and obstructed by the words of the classical texts and by the meaning of the writings. H e believed that the six classics are all merely records of my mind. He emphasized that the learner must have confidence in himself, and must not speculate after, or emulate, or rely on the classics and the texts. Instead, he advocated that people should arrive at the faculty of moral knowing by their intuition (zhiZiangzhi) and accomplish a virtuous nature (cheng dexing); d o not waste your energies and your efforts in the heaps of old papers. The same is true of the latter-day scholars of the Wang school; they, too, resembled the latter-day Chan Buddhists in their advocacies concerning the methodology of moral and knowledge cultivation. Latter-day Chan Buddhists, in the area of the methodology of cultivation, moved from the doctrines of directly pointing to the source of the mind and sudden enlightenment and revelation of true nature to the theories of a total laissez-faire method of following nature, caring naught for food or sleep, and so on. As for the latter-day

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followers and scholars of the Wang Yangming school, since the time of people such as [Wang Gen] Xinzai and [Wang Ji] Longxi, they, too, took to the style of naturalism and nonactivity. They believed that everything, every vision-colors of all kinds, the flight of birds in the air, and the jumping of fish in t h e stream, is nothing but the vacillation of a moment of heaven, that such things as the falling of the petals of a flower and the chirping of a bird, the towering of the mountain or the flowing of a river, were all merely the revelation, or the expressive outflowing, of the intuitive moral mind, the Zianghi So they advocate that the effort to arrive at human nature is to be rooted in nature; outside of nature there is really nothing to be taught, to not move a single one of the seven emotions, the Heavenly Lord is at peace; but if there is the merest thought, the moment it is sprouted, the Mind Horse will become wild. They also said: If you can gather in and restrain this mind, then you are a good man; when you can restrain it to the extent that the mind becomes naught, then you will know nature and Heaven. In other words, they seek to teach people to strive to reach the point of being just as naive as a young child, a kid, and then every piece of laughter and every playful action will be just as natural as the phenomena of fish leaping or birds flying. They said: It is in fact such that our human minds and bodies can be so lively. Whether in intellectual content or in intellectual style, the teachings of Wang Yangming and the teachings of the latter-day scholars of the Wang school were extremely close to those of Chan Buddhism; in fact, so close that it became difficult to tell which was the teaching of Chan Buddhism and which was the teaching of Wang. That is why later thinkers simply called the teaching of Wang Yangming Chan teaching. Buddhist ethics and the rules of moral relationships and behavior in Confucianism While the Song and Ming dynasty neo-Confucianists were profoundly affected in their mode of thought and even the con-

F f i 1991 29

tents of their thought by Buddhism, and particularly by Chan Buddhism, nevertheless, in the area of the rules of moral relationships and in ethics, the neo-Confucianists, and, indeed, the ancient Confucianists of China themselves, adopted an attitude of rejecting and repudiating Buddhism resolutely. This is a major reason leading to t h e protracted and intense conflict between Confucianism and Buddhism. T h e ethical teachings, indeed, doctrines, of Confucianism formed the intellectual foundation for the clan-law (zonsfa)system in ancient and traditional China. In particular, the theory of The Three Rules of human relations, and the Five Norms (sun gang wu chang), which served as t h e core of the ethical doctrine of Confucianism, was the key to this foundation of Chinas traditional zongfia system. Further, these Three Rules and Five Norms can be reduced, from a certain perspective, to simply two concepts-loyalty (zhong) and filial respect (xiao). Loyalty means that the vassals and subjects of t h e state must be loyal and faithful to the sovereign, t h e ruler. Filial respect means that all people, as children, must be respectful and obedient to their parents. T h e idea that such loyalty and filial respect and obedience are the basic rules of ethics and the first among all disciplines of conduct has t h e deepest and most longlasting roots and influence in Chinas traditional society. It is for this reason that Confucianism frequently used this to attack and reject Buddhism. In order to survive and develop o n Chinese soil, Buddhism had long engaged itself in attempts to explain itself and defend itsel arduously, and yet, because Buddhism, ultimately, is a transcendental religion, there are, indeed, many fundamental differences between the ethical thought it espouses and the ethical thought of Confucianism. Consequently, through the age of the Tang and Song dynasties, the ethical thought of Buddhism continued to be a major target of the attack by Confucianists. This situation, historically, raised a problem for Chinese Buddhism-unless it made some changes in its own ethical view, it would be very difficult for Buddhism to survive in China over the long run, much

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less be developed in any significant way. This very practical and realistic need ultimately compelled Chinese Buddhism in the Tang and Song periods to come up with a rather significant adjustment of its own view of ethics. In the beginning, Buddhism saw itself as a foreign guest in China, and therefore it advocated that its adherents not b e restrained, o r constrained, by the customs and the rites of the secular world in which they lived. It opposed the ritual of kneeling and kowtowing to rulers and parents, and, in the area of ethical thinking, it also rejected the notion of assimilating and adapting to circumstances, but used the concept of turning back t h e root and seeking t h e original meaning of t h e Greater Filial Respect (da xiao) to boycott the secular practices of serving ones parents or keeping the rites of Confucianist piety. However, under the influence of Chinas traditional culture, in the Tang and Song periods, Buddhism began to make certain transformations in this area. For example, the renowned Buddhist monk of the Song dynasty, Qi Song, wrote a treatise, entitled Xiuo fun (Discourse on filial respect) that discussed and explained the Buddhist teachings on filial respect in a comprehensive way. In this essay he claimed: All religions and teachings honor the notions of filial respect for ones parents, and Buddhism exalts it in particular. He said: Filial respect is the rule of Heaven, the essential principle of Earth, and the rightful practice of Man, the virtue of the sage begins with filial respect. Furthermore, hc listed parents as one of the Three Major Foundations of All Under the Sun. He advocated that the rules of discipline for the sons of Buddhism must demand that they take from the resources of their mendicant robes and their mendicant bowls [that is, the financial resources with which the Buddhist establishment is supported] in order that they may first succor their parents. This went against the teachings of t h e Greater Filial Respect that Buddhism had supported in the past, and instead came much closer to the teachings of filial respect as always espoused by Confucianism. Ming dynasty Buddhist monks, moreover, wrote

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such things as Xiuowen shuo (Records of stories of filial respect in the faith), Guangxiuo xu (A preface to promote the broader practice of filial respect), and so on, in which Buddhists discussed the principles of filial respect at length. Moreover, in Song and Ming society, filial monks appeared frequently, and they advocated such things as carrying out the ritual of the lamentation of the mind for three years after the death of a parent, and so on. All these demonstrate q u i t e fully and adequately that since the Tang and the Song periods, Chinese Buddhism had become moralized in the Chinese traditional fashion to a certain extent. At the same time, these examples also demonstrate that quite often the tradtional Confucian culture has a tremendous power in transforming any kind of imported alien culture. In addition, the traditional Confucianist philosophy of ethics n o t only impacted t h e doctrines and teachings of Chinese Buddhism profoundly in t h e area of t h e concepts of filial respect, but also had a great impact on Chinese Buddhism in general in the area of the notions of human relations and their norms, especially the Five Norms. In traditional times, many of Chinas Buddhist monks and believers in the religion frequently and customarily equated Buddhisms Five Rules of Abstinence (wu jie) with Confucianisms Five Norms of human relationships. For example, in the period of the Southern dynasties, Yan Zhitui pointed out, in his Guixin biun (Essay o n reverting to the mind) that: When the disciplines are set u p for the novices in the teaching internally, five types of restrictions are established; these are similar to the Five Norms of benevolence and principled righteousness that are written in the outer books. Similarly, the Xi00 Zun of the aforementioned Qi Song of the Song dynasty also equated the Five Abstinences of the Buddhists with Confucianisms Five Norms. Furthermore, he said: Confucianism and Buddhism are both the teachings of sages; even though they come from different sources, they end in the same place-rder, thus expressing the belief that the two religions of Confucianism and Buddhism share the same

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destination, even though they follow different paths. In truth, from the Tang and the Song dynasties on, Confucianist teaching and Buddhist teaching have indeed become increasingly confluent, and the teachings of neo-Confucianism, which became so strong and popular in the Song and Ming periods, were precisely a product of this confluence. Finally, there is one question that must be pointed out here, and pointed out with emphasis: Why is it that Chinese Buddhism after the Sui and Tang dynasties would be humanized and ethicized? In regard to this question, we believe that it might not be correct for us simply to assume that these transformations were merely and simply posturings or concessions on the part of Buddhism in adapting t o Chinas traditional thought just so that it might avoid being assaulted and rejected. Instead, we believe that these transformations took place because Chinese Buddhism after the Sui and Tang eras no longer focused its attention on the issue of an abstract ontological reality the way that traditional Buddhism did earlier. Rather, it had become a religion that increasingly focused its attentions on human beings, had increasingly reduced the concept of the abstract ontology to the observation of real human nature, and had become a secularized and humanized religion. Consequently, to pay attention to the practical and realistic ethical relationships among human beings has become an internal need for Chinese Buddhism after the Sui and Tang periods; it is not simply a matter of concession or strategy. Notes
1. Liang, Zhongguo wenhua yu Zhongpo zhexue (Chinese culture and Chinese philosophy), p. 429. 2. See Fahua manyi (The mysterious meanings of the Fahua jing-the Dhartnapundarikasutra), pt. 1, vol. 1, in the Tukho Tripituka, vol. 33, p. 685. 3. See Dasheng zlziguan fumen (The entrance to the law of Mahayana cessation of view), vol. 2. 4. See Zhiguan dayi (The essential meaning of cessation of view), in the TaLho Tripitaka, vol. 46, p. 406.

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5. See Da Huayun jing luece (An outline of the greater Lotus sutra). 6. See Zhu, Xu jinsilu (Sequel to the record of recent meditations), pp. 224,229. 7. See Lu, Za shuo (Random and miscellaneous arguments). 8. See Zhu Wen Gong wenji (The collected writings of Mr. Zhu Wen), vol.
47.

9. See Zhu Ziyulei (The analects of Master Zhu), vol. 124. 10. See Zhu Wen Gong wenji, vol. 35. 11. See Wang, Letter in Reply to Nie Wenwei 12. See Wang, Letter in Reply to Lu Yuanjing.