State of nature according to Rousseau and Hobbes Phil 1 9/9/2012 Prof.

Alan Kim The Savage In the State of Nature According to Rousseau and Hobbes Rousseau challenges Hobbess conception of the state of nature and abstracts vigorously all human attributes that can be traced back to society. Hobbes believes that when left to our own individual judgments in the state of nature, conflicts would occur. He contends that passions overrule rational judgments and serve as the source of conflict. Rousseau is critical of this idea, and argues that primitive man in the state of nature is characterized by timidity and an ignorance of vice, and hence the savage is not naturally inclined to engage in conflicts. This essay first lays out the summary of Hobbess conception of the state of nature and then proceeds to discuss Rousseaus criticism of Hobbess model. According to Hobbes, men are equal both in the facilities of the body and mind1 (Leviathan XIII, 80) and it is because of this equality of abilities that leads to diffidence and subsequently makes men enemies of themselves (Leviathan XIII, 81). Hobbess state of nature is characterized by continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short (Leviathan XIII, 82). This is a result of war caused by diffidence, competition and glory. Men invade, using violence, for gain, safety and reputation (Leviathan XIII, 81). Hobbes believed that there is no notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice (Leviathan XIII, 83) in the state of nature plagued with war. In war, there is no common power, no overarching authority that upholds the law, and when there is no law, there can be no injustice (Leviathan XIII, 83). Hobbes argues that justice and injustice are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude (Leviathan XIII, 83). In this state of nature, there is no concept of propriety and dominion (Leviathan XIII, 83) and one of the passions that incline men to peace is the fear of death (Leviathan XIII, 84).
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Hobbes, T. 1955. Leviathan. Oakeshott, M., ed. Oxford: Blackwell.

2 Rousseau shares a similar view on the natural equality of the savage but he does not believe that the fear of death could be possible in the savage, because an animal will never know what death is, knowledge of death and its terrors being one of the first acquisitions which man gains on leaving the animal condition2 (Inequality, p. 89). Since the savage is characterized by purely animal functions and driven by the simple impulsion of nature (Inequality, p. 101), the only fears the savage have are pain and hunger. Rousseau believed that mans fear of death is an unnatural passion that can only emerge within society, contrary to Hobbess argument of the fear of death being one of the passions that incline men to peace (Leviathan XIII, 84). Unlike Hobbes, Rousseau argues that primitive mans desire for self-preservation does not have the effect of conflicts and war of all against all (Leviathan XIII, 81) Man in the state of nature is at peace as he is not tormented by passions and arguing about a state different from his own (Inequality, p. 97). He can obtain everything he needs from nature. The savage only has to worry about attacking a prey (for food) or avoid being attacked by other predatory animals, self preservation being the savages only concern (Inequality, p. 86). Rousseau further points out Hobbess own premise, which states the same cause that prevents savage from using his reason prevents him at the same time from abusing his faculties, (Inequality, p. 99) to argue in his favor. Hobbess claim that man is naturally evil because he has no idea of goodness cannot hold precisely because the savage does not know what it is to be good (Inequality, p. 99). It is the lack of desire or calm of the passions (Inequality, p. 99) and ignorance of vice that prevents the savage from doing evil. How can the savage engage in evil acts if he does not have knowledge of good and evil?

Rousseau, J.-J. 1984. Discourse on the Origins of Social Inequality. Cranston, M., trans. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
2

3 Hobbess model of the state of nature is built upon the assumption that conflicts will always arise amongst small groups and individuals. First off, Rousseau believed that primitive man has no need to live in a community. The family does not exist in the state of nature and the human species is one in which each individual lives in isolation. The savage in the state of nature is timid (Inequality, p. 82). In the beginning the savage is easily frightened by any fresh scene when he cannot measure the physical good or evil to be expected, or compare his strength to the dangers he is to meet (Inequality, p. 83). He would soon be able to measure himself against the other animals and the primitive man, being more agile and robust than other animals, is capable of defending himself against other wild beasts (Inequality, p. 83). An advantage that primitive man has is that he can arm himself with physical objects and thus he can choose between flight and combat (Inequality, p. 83). Since animals do not naturally make war on man except in a case of self-defense or from extreme hunger (Inequality, p. 83), it is not likely that the savage is naturally inclined to engage in conflicts in the state of nature. Contrary to Hobbess state of war, Rousseau regarded natural pity as an element of mans natural goodness and believed that compassion is a natural virtue that can be seen both in animals and the savage. A perceiving animal identifies itself more intimately with the suffering animal(Inequality, p. 101). This identification is infinitely closer in the state of nature than in the state of reasoning(Inequality, p. 101). Hobbess model of the state of nature being a war of every one against every one (Leviathan XIII, 82) is based on the premise that selfpreservation in the state of nature is a conscious desire, reducing all human behavior to the single postulate of individual self-preservation. There is no way for any man to secure himself, so reasonable [] by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can [] till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation

4 requireth (Leviathan XIII, 81). Rousseau argues that both self-preservation and natural pity are principles- to account for the observable behavior of primitive men, and that animals do preserve themselves as species and hence Hobbess philosophy is inadequate in accounting for mans original, animal condition in the state of nature. It is therefore very certain that pity is a natural sentiment which, by moderating in each individual the activity of self-love, contributes to the mutual preservation of whole species (Inequality, p. 101). Hobbess conception of the state of nature is pessimistic and fraught with divisive struggle. He makes the assumption that man would succumb to selfish passions and engage in conflict in the state of nature. Rousseau offers a more conjectural explanation of the state of nature and attempts to isolate characteristics that antedate mans sociability. By considering mankind as a biological species, Rousseau, in my opinion, succeeds in his conjecture that inequality is not likely to be perceived in the state of nature.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Hobbes, T. 1955. Leviathan. Oakeshott, M., ed. Oxford: Blackwell. Rousseau, J.-J. 1984. Discourse on the Origins of Social Inequality. Cranston, M., trans. Harmondsworth: Penguin

DANIEL OON WEI RHEN