North American Philosophical Publications

A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification Author(s): David B. Annis Reviewed work(s): Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Jul., 1978), pp. 213-219 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009716 . Accessed: 16/10/2012 23:12
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American Volume

Philosophical 15, Number

Quarterly 3, July 1978

VI. A CONTEXTUALIST THEORY EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

DAVID
I. FOUNDATIONALISM, COHERENTISM, CONTEXTUALISM AND

OF

B. ANNIS
a consistent and comprehensive set of statements is

is the theory that every statement FOUNDATIONALISM is justified which ul? empirical timately must derive at least some of its justification
from a special such Such class of basic statements which have at

not sufficient for justification.2 Theorists of epi stemic justification have tended to stress founda
tionalism and coherentism, and in general have

overlooked

or

ignored

third
contextualist in the

kind

of
denies

theory,
that

least some degree of justification

support statements. statements minimal may

independent
derive from does

of the
other not

contextualism. The namely, are basic there statements

foundationalist's

foundationalism

sense and that coherence is sufficient for justifi? to contextualism cation. According both theories
overlook cation. contextualist contextual In what to essential parameters justifi? a version I follows of a develop

it does not deny require certainty or incorrigibility; the revisability of all statements, and it allows an or important role for intrasystematic justification
coherence.1 The main objections to foundationalism

theory.3

have been statements

statements

(a) the denial of the existence of basic and (b) the claim that even if such
were not mythical, such an impoverished

II.

The

Basic

Model?Meeting

Objections

The
here

basic model
is that

of justification
being able

to be developed
to meet certain

of a person's

basis would never justify all the various statements we normally take to be justified. to foundationalism has been the coher? Opposed
ence theory of justification. According to coheren

objections.
whether or

The
not

objections
they are met

one must
are relative

meet

and

to certain

goals. Since the issue is that of epistemic

the goals epistemic reasonable not be. Two are epistemic in nature. With goal accepting whereas relative of our epistemic

justification,

tism a statement is justified if and only if it coheres with a certain kind of system of statements. Although there has been disagreement amongst coherentists in is and specifying the explaining what coherence
explanations and nectedness, special these system of statements, have been the key elements in con? chief ob? consistency, The

to one respect some statement be may to a different it may goal goals are having true

beliefs
epistemic existing

and

avoiding
such and

having
as simplicity, maximization

false

beliefs.
conservation of

Other
of

goals beliefs,

explanatory

to the coherence within truth and the avoidance of error.4 jection 1For a discussion see of minimal William P. Alston, foundationalism "Has Foundationalism Been Refuted?", Philosophical Studies, vol. 29 (1976), pp. 287-305; James W. Cornman, "Foundationalism Versus Nonfoundational of Empirical Theories Justification," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 14 (1977), pp. 287-297; David B. Annis, "Epistemic Foundationalism," Philosophical Studies, vol. 31 (1977), pp. 345-352. 2Recent are found discussions of coherentism in Keith Lehrer, (London, Knowledge Rescher, 1974), chaps. 7-8. Nicholas and the Idea of Cognitive The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 61 (1974), pp. 695-708, "Foundationalism, Coherentism, Systematization," and his The Coherence Theory of Truth (London, of Lehrer's coherence "Foundational 1973). Criticism theory is to be found in Cornman, Versus Nonfoundational Theories of Empirical and in my review of Lehrer in Philosophic, vol. 11 (1976), pp. 209-213. Justification," Criticism of Reseller's version is found inMark Pastin's "Foundationalism in Redux," paper, an abstract of which appears unpublished in the The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 61 (1974), pp. 709-710. 3 the key contextualists have been Peirce, Dewey, and Popper. But contextualist and theories are also Historically hints, suggestions, to be found in Robert Ackermann, Belief and Knowledge (Garden City, New York, 1972). Bruce Aune, Knowledge, Mind, and Nature (New York, 1967). John Austin Sense andSensibilia (London, 1962). Isaac Levi, Gambling with Truth (New York, 1967) for a decision-theoretic The Uses of Argument (London, Human Understanding approach. Stephen Toulmin, 1958). Stephen Toulmin, (Princeton, New. Jersey, in Ethics (Carbondale, Induction and Justification 1972). Carl Wellman, Challenge and Response: Justification Illinois, 1971 ). F. L. Will, (Ithaca, New York, On Certainty 1974). Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York, 1953). Ludwig Wittgenstein, (Oxford, 1969). 4 For a of epistemic discussion goals see Levi, Gambling with Truth. 213

comprehensiveness. has been that theory

power will be assumed

to be subsidiary

to the goals of

214

AMERICAN

PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY

Given these goals, if a person S claims that some statement h is true, we may object (A) that S is not in a position to know that h or (B) that h is false. Consider (A). Suppose we ask S how he knows that h
and eve2,. of his he that one may object e not is does e-en ?en false, provide for h, S's specific from support adequate reasoning or that there to h is fallacious, is evidence i such e-en reasons that the conjunction of e ?en and i does not provide responds . .,en for the by truth giving of h. We us various reasons

which
in upon

either disappoints
some habit of

an expectation,
expectation. an course . ."

or breaks
(6.46g)5 As

Dewey

puts it, it is only when

. . incidents straight occasioning forward

"jars, hitches,

breaks,
of

blocks,. the smooth

interruption of behavior"

occur

that doubt

arises.6 Thus
an

for S to be held
it must be a

accountable

for answering a real life

objection,

manifestation
occasioned by actual

of a real doubt where

situation. Assuming

the doubt
that

is
the

subjective be
his person's

probabilities
epistemic

a person
attitudes

assigns
and that

reflect
these

the
are

adequate
raised responses There to

support
his to our are also

for h. These
for e-en

objections
as well

may
as to

reasons

objections. cases where

a person the may

is not

required do the

to give reasons for his claim that h is true. If S claims

to see not a brown book across But we room, still require reasons. usually that object in do into not we

person
example, situations. general

is not in a position
that So require it would the even

to know by arguing,
reliable we falling to

for
such in

is not person in cases where objections

reasons,

cate?

gories
But

(A) or (B) can be raised.

be too strong In a condition require time new a

person to be able tomeet M possible objections

into evidence these categories. be discovered may the truth of some as the distant result

falling

the product of his confrontation with the world, the above point may be expressed as follows. S is not if in general it required to respond to an objection would be assigned a low probability by the people S. questioning If an objection must be the expression of a real doubt caused by the jars of a real life situation, then such objections will be primarily local as opposed to call into question the global. Global objections a or a at held time of beliefs whole certain totality local objections call into realm of beliefs whereas question a specific belief. This is not to say that a real not occur that would situation might prompt a If the nuclear having experienced global objection.
radiation and dramatic of a third increase world war, error there rate was a sudden in the of perceptual

of advances

in our scientific
question

knowledge
some

which
statement

would
h. Even

call

into

though

beliefs of the visual

about them be as It must has error. would objection the assumed

sort, we would
that the

be more

hesitant

we

in fact have that evidence now, it is logically possible that we have it so it is a possible to h now. If the person had to meet the objection
to be he would in a different and have objection, one he is the better than presently epistemic position new to have in evidence have in, that is, he would order to

do not

a class. audience objecting and the avoidance truth seekers, To meet a way

of truth goals epistemic not critical If they were not raise appropriate i, S must respond

of

objections. in such

they an as to

would

respond to be have

to the objection. in a better

The position

objectors to raise

also the

produce
not

within

the objecting
universal rejection case

group
of

a general
i or at least

but
the

necessarily In

objection.
answered

But
should

the objections
not require

to be

raised

and
in

general
objection.

recognition
the

of the diminished
latter S may,

status of i as an
for example,

the participants

to be

a new epistemic position. What is being asked is whether the person in his present position is justified in believing h. Thus the person only has to answer current objections, that is, objections based on the
current evidence available. a question not make that it an falls into one S must must to Peirce, is the be of Merely uttering our does categories answer. To demand an expression of a

i might be true, it only point out that although the support of e? (one of his reasons for decreases believing h) a very small amount and hence he is still justified in believing h. There are of course many ways in which S can handle an objection. He might indicate that it is not of the type (A) or (B) and so is
not relevant. He may respond that and that it is just He an idle

a response real doubt.

objection the objection

remark not prompted

no reason for for his objector and thinking reasons

by real doubt,
it is true. he can raise

that is, there is

may any and of ask the the ob?

According Such doubt some

doubt
we of

is an uneasy and dissatisfied

to free surprising ourselves. phenomenon,

state from which

result experience

struggle "some

jections of the type (A) or (B) in response. Again

give take is based on real objections responses.

the

5 C. S. Peirce, 6 John Dewey,

and Paul Weiss Collected Papers, vol. 6, ed. by Charles Hartshorne 1965). (Harvard, On Certainty. 1949), p. 315. See also Wittgenstein's Knowing and the Known (Boston,

CONTEXTUALIST

THEORY

OF

EPISTEMIC

JUSTIFICATION S must be able

215 to meet

III.

The

Social

Nature

of

Justification

relative

to the

issue-context,

When
this has Suppose ordinary

asking whether
to be we considered are interested

S is justified
relative in whether trained

in believing
issue-context. Jones, has

h,
an the

all current objections falling into (A) and (B) which express a real doubt of the qualified objector-group
where social theories the objectors information?the of others?plays are critical beliefs, an truth seekers. Thus and part in information, important

to an

non-medically

person, he

general
his

information
to our

that polio is caused by a virus. If

question is that remembers the

response

for it in part determines what objec? justification, tions will be raised, how a person will respond to
them, cation and what responses is the actual the objectors will accept.

paper reporting that Salk said it was, then this is given good enough. He has performed adequately
the issue-context. for But the M.D. suppose degree. the Here context we is expect an a examination

Perhaps
theory

the most

neglected
social

component
practices

in justifi?
and norms

lot more. If the candidate simply said what Jones as we in him would take did, being very deficient
knowledge. Thus relative to one issue-context a

of justification of a culture of community of people. Philosophers have looked for universal and a priori But consider this in the principles of justification. context of scientific inquiry. There certainly has
been refinement and in testing the methods in science. and discovery Suppose techniques that of at a

person
justified

may
relative

be justified
to another

in believing
context.

h but

not

issue-context iswhat specific issue involving h is being raised. It determines the level of under? must S that and exhibit, and it knowledge standing The
determines ample degree, ordinary an objector-group. appropriate in the context of the examination the appropriate group trained is not people, For for the the M.D. class but of ex?

t in accordance with the best methods then for discovery and testing in a scientific developed domain by critical truth seekers, S accepts theory T. It is absurd to say that S is not justified in accepting time
T since at a would theory. same Thus later time lead to a refinement the acceptance to the standards of those of at a t, S techniques different

non-medically

qua?

relative

examiners. lified medical The importance (value or utility) attached to the outcome of accepting hwhen it is false or rejecting h
when it is true is a component of the issue-context.

is justified
The

in accepting
conclusion

T.
follows if we consider a case

a certain drug will help Suppose the issue iswhether cure a disease in humans without harmful effects. In
such a situation we are much more demanding than

involving two different groups existing at the same time instead of two different times as in the above example. Suppose S is an Earth physicist and accepts T on the basis of the best methods by developed
Earth physicists at t. Unknown to us the more

if the question were whether

of animals. would But in the In both be the cases same, the group searchers. proof strengthen

itwould
namely,

help in the case

they would case. former the

objector re? qualified a bit more require quite in fact do Researchers appropriate conditions in

physicists on Twin Earth reject T. Sis still in justified accepting T. To determine whether S is justified in believing h advanced
we must consider the actual standards of justification

or weaken

justificatory critical the

relation
when researcher

to the importance
would have may is a increase

of the issue. If accepting

consequences, significance it comes required when

h
the

h is false

of the community of people to which he belongs. More specifically we determine whether S is justified in believing h by specifying an issue-context raised within a community of people G with certain social
practices and norms of justification. This determines

level in testing h.
Man social animal and yet to

the tend to ignore

parameter can overlook. that

level

of understanding
and the objector-group

and
standards

knowledge
he is to

is

the justification
this no fact. adequate But

of beliefs philosophers
this theory when is one of contextual justification

to have expected The appropriate

is a subset

satisfy. of G. To

be justified in believing their objections in a way

and norms. It follows that justification the actual

h, S must be able to meet that satisfies their practices

theory social must be natura?

According
sketched

to the contextualist
above, to some asking

model
whether

of justification
some person S

is justified
relative

in believing
specific

h, we must
issue-context

consider
which

this
de?

lized. In considering
cannot neglect

the justification
practices

of beliefs we
and norms

the level of understanding and knowledge the appropriate required. This in turn determines For S to be justified in believing h objector-group. termines
7 See for example Michael Cole

of justification of a group. Psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists have started this study but
much more and work is necessary.7 1971). 'Thinking (JNew York,

et al., The Cultural Context of Learning

2l6

AMERICAN

PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY

The
been Positivists of tion

need

to naturalize
in the recent

justification
philosophy science?the

theory has
of science. structure abstrac? But much of to

Suppose

that the Joneses

a broken not one whether

are looking for a red chair

in their they house. can The issue subtle discern

recognized stressed

logic of

replace context is thus

theories, from

confirmation, as science actually is

explanation?in on. carried

the main
such an

thrust of recent philosophy

approach inadequate.

of science is that
as practiced

shades of color. Nor is it an examination in physics the person to have detailed is expected where of the transmission of light and color knowledge
Furthermore perception. on a correct tance hinges who has the necessary of nothing identification. perceptual great Mr. concepts impor? Jones and

Science

the yields justified beliefs about the world. Thus study of the actual practices, which have changed The present through time, cannot be neglected. tenor in the philosphy of science is thus toward a historical and methodological realism.8 From the fact that justification is relative to the
social practices and norms of a group, it does not

normal vision points at a red chair a few feet in front of him and says "here is a red one." The appropriate
objector-group have general consists knowledge of normal about the perceivers standard who con?

follow
and goals

that

justification
norms truth

they cannot be criticized is somehow subjective. The

are and and epistemic the avoidance hence of error. have In

nor
as

that
their as

practices
so far

they fail to achieve these goals they can be criticized. For example the Kpelle people of Africa rely more on the authority of the elders than we do. But this if they found it led to authority could be questioned too many false perceptual beliefs. An objection to a
practice must of course be real, that is, the doubt

error. In such ditions of perception and perceptual situations which we are all familiar with generally there will be no objections. His claim is accepted as that someone objects that justified. But imagine there is a red light shining on the chair so itmay not be red. If Jones cannot respond to this objection
when it is real, then he is not in an adequate cognitive

must

be

the result
of

of

some jar or hitch

Furthermore such

in our
objec?

position. But suppose he is in a position to he knows about the light and the chair since he saw it yesterday in normal light. will accept his claim. A belief is contextually-basic if given
context the appropriate objector-group

reply that is still red Then we an

does

issue
not

experience or the

the world.

tions will always be local as opposed

practice yield norm and that our experiences practice not as result another

to global.
of is

Some

the world

require the person to have reasons for the belief in order to be in a position to have knowledge. If the
objector-group context. in the requires Thus reasons, in the first then it is not basic above situation

problematic.

A real objection
practice. form of neutral This subjectivism. observation

presupposes
does Just language epistemic

some other
commit there in science position us is no

accepted
to some

however

Jones's

belief

that

there
whereas

is a red
it is not

chair
basic

here
in

is
the

theory so there is no one can

contextually-basic situation. second Consider the case

standard-neutral

that

either

where

the

objector-group

adopt.
objectivity

But

in neither
and rational

case
criticism

does
are

it follow
lost.9

that

does not require S to have reasons for his belief that h in order to be in a position to have knowledge and
where or the case where his claim, they accept they reasons case and his claim. In either accept reasons. is no of If an regress appropriate are the members of which critical objector-group, require there

Argument IV. The Regress have who accepted foundationalism Philosophers have generally offered a version of the infinite regress in support of it. Two key premises in the argument
argument are the denial of a coherence theory of

truth seekers, have

issue-context, then

no real doubts
the person's belief

in the specific
is justified.

The belief justification and the denial that an infinite sequence motivated of reasons is sufficient to justify a belief. But there is
another option to the conclusion of the argument V. There

has withstood
objectors.

the

test of verifically

A contextualist besides foundationalism. theory of the sort offered above stops the regress and yet does
not sense. require basic statements in the foundationalist's

Objections are several

to objections

the

Theory to the contextualist

theory

offered

and

their main

thrust

is that

the

8 For a discussion to of science see Frederick of the need to naturalize Suppe, "Afterword-1976" theory in the philosophy justification Illinois, 1977). appear in the 2nd edition of his The Structure of Scientific Theories (Urbana, 9 See Frederick in The and his "Afterword-1976" of Scientific Theories" "The Search for Philosophic Understanding Suppe's observation in science and the lack of a theory-neutral of objectivity Structure of Scientific Theories for a discussion language.

CONTEXTUALIST

THEORY

OF

EPISTEMIC

JUSTIFICATION

217

conditions
gent. one The

for justification
objections be able are as

imposed
follows.

are
First

too strin?
accord?

ing to the theory offered,

must

to be justified
a

in believing
class

h
of

to meet

restricted

required of S that he be able to state the standards of that he satisfies them. justification and demonstrate is required is that he be able to meet real What objections. This may sometimes require him to discuss
standards given is not but a not always. Furthermore since a case expect he is not where S to have the it is not relative reasons counterexample belief. Consider we would example a case of to an for

(A) and (B). But objections falling into categories this ignores the distinction between being justified and showing that one is justified. To be justified is just to satisfy the principles of justification. To show that one is justified is to demonstrate that one satisfies these principles and this ismuch more demanding.10 For example S might have evidence that justifies his belief that h even though he is not able to articulate the evidence. In this case S would not be able to show that he was justified. h requires Second, if to be justified in believing that one be able tomeet the objection that h is false, then the theory ignores the distinction between truth and justification. A person can be justified in a even statement it is false. believing though Finally the theory requires S to be in a position to
answer all sorts But of this objections from a perspectives. assume For example unaware countries certain experiment. not the is to require again two scientists that each other's first work of variety too much. in different perform S1 gets measure? one a

justified issue-context

his belief
or what his

that h. Suppose when

reasons are

asked how he knows

able to say anything.

We certainly would not take him as justified in his belief. We may not be able to articulate all our evidence for h but we are required to do it for some of the evidence. It is not enough that we have evidence for h; it must be taken by us as evidence and this places us "in the logical space of reasons, of justifying
and being able to justify what one says."12

The first point in response to the next objection is that epistemic justification makes a claim to know? ledge. To be epistemically justified in believing h is to if the goals of be in a position to know h. Furthermore are truth and the of avoidance epistemic justification
error, then one ought not accept false statements.

of

The

scientist

result and concludes

does get result

that h. The
(due to

second scientist S2
incorrect

From an epistemic point of view to do so is objection? able. Hence the falsity of h at least counts against the person's being justified.
However the contextualist account offered does

ments) require of ? that he be aware of S2s experiment and be able to refute it is to impose an unrealistic burden on him in order for his belief to be into justified. It is to build a defeasibility requirement the justification condition. One approach to hand? has been to add the ling the Gettier problem condition that in order to have knowledge, besides must true not the belief, having justified justification be defeated. Although there have been different
characterizations or unrestricted version of defeasibility, has been a core that a component statement i

.To

not ignore the distinction

cation. Meeting on an objection

between
does

truth and justifi?

not entail show?

ing the objection

agreement the

is false.
response.

It only
So the

requires
objection

general
may

still be true. Thus S may be justified in believing h since he can meet the objection when h is in fact false.
Furthermore response has an to be in order objection of the expression to a require real doubt. a

defeats the justification evidence case i is true and the conjunction

provide adequate support for

e provides h just in o? i and e does not

according to

Since it is possible for verifically motivated objectors not to be aware of the falsity of h, this objection will not be raised, so S may be justified in believing h even though it is false.
The situation is complex however since there are

A.11 But

the contextualist in order for S to theory presented be justified in believing h, he must be able to meet the objection that there is defeating evidence. In reply to the first objection, the theory offered does not ignore the distinction between being jus? It is not tified and showing that one is justified.

the falsity of h implies S is not justified in h. believing Suppose that Jones is at a party and wonders whether his friend Smith is there. Nothing he of great importance hinges on his presence; he is there. Perhaps he simply wonders whether would not mind a chat with Smith. He looks about
and asks a few guests. They have not seen him there.

cases where

10 Alston in "Has Minimal this distinction discusses Foundationalism Been Refuted?." See also his "Two of Types The Journal of Philosophy,vol. A Neglected Form of Privileged Access," Foundationalism," 73 (1976),pp. 165-185, and "Self-Warrant: American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 13 (1976), pp. 257-272. 11 The best discussion isMarshall Swain's "Epistemic Defeasibility," of defeasibility American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 11 (1974), pp. I5~26 12 Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality (London, 1963), p. 169.

2l8

AMERICAN

PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY to them. express of excusability moral and In we case. learn One the need

In such a situation
Smith is not there.

Jones

is justified

in believing looking
Merely

rules conditions

general case by

Imagine
for Smith,

now that Jones

a suspected

is a police officer
at the party.

only

consider

legal

negligence

to realize

assassin

looking
guests

about
is certainly

casually
not

and

checking
If Smith

with
turns

a few
out to

the full complexity of excuses, an area still to be studied despite Austin's well known plea a number
of years ago.

adequate.

be hiding in one of the closets, we will not conclude that Jones was justified in his belief only it turned out false. He displayed gross negligence in not checking
more an thoroughly. issue-context There we are require cases the where person relative S to to put

himself in such an epistemic position that h will not turn out to be false. In this case the falsity of h is non in believing h in non excusable. To be justified
excusable that cases, This S must is not be able to meet h is false. required in excusable the objection cases.

In response to the third objection it should be noted that epistemic justification is not to be taken h in part determines what other lightly. Accepting I will and do. Furthermore believe I can infect things the minds of others with my falsehoods and thus affect their further beliefs and actions. So to be epistemically justified requires that our claims pass some the test of criticism. This point has motivated to build a defeasibility philosophers requirement
into The does not the conditions of justification.13 theory may them above presented be a defeating to raise /must however statement contextualist do this. There

Assume that h is some very complicated scientific in and himself the best S evidential very theory puts position at the time. Even if the truth of h is very
important, the falsity of h is excusable. The com?

i but S need meet

group raises it. For

this objection

only if the objector

it, be the ex?

plexity of the issue and the fact that S put himself in the best position possible excuses S from the falsity of h so he is still justified. But not all excusable cases involve a complex h nor being in the best position possible. Suppose that Smith has an identical twin brother but the only living person who knows this is
the there brother. was a Furthermore twin brother. there If Jones is simply are no returns records a book that to

pression of a real doubt. But it is perfectly possible for verifically motivated people to be unaware of /.
Furthermore the concept of epistemic excusa?

bility applies to defeating evidence. Suppose there is i. S may still be justified in his defeating evidence even though he is belief that h in the issue-context
unable context, to meet the the objection. Relative to the issue their appropriate objector-group with

Smith's house and mistakenly

(where the issue-context

gives it to the brother

whether he re?

turned
importance

the borrowed
hinges on

book
to whom

and nothing
he gave it),

of great
he is still

standards of justification and available information, may not expect of S that he be aware of i. Perhaps the h is very complicated. issue involving Thus his
failure In contexts know all of to meet the the experiment we would where the defeating case evidence we can is excusable. issue imagine to the first scientist scientist. But we not may

justified in his belief that he gave it to his friend Smith. Although Jones could have put himself in a about their better position (by asking questions
friendship), there was no reason for him in the

of experiment issue-contexts demand

expect the other

this. Nevertheless

context to check further. People did not generally know about the twin brother and Smith did not
notice context, any peculiar members of behavior. the appropriate Given the issue objector-group

still require that he be in a position to say something if informed about it. For about the other experiment
example well, times under every has and he might indicate the similar controlled for believing with that he knows a it was the number area of performed gotten experiment results,

would not expectJones to check further. So he evinces no culpability when his belief turns out to be false.
Excusability what the standards able, Part thus depends on the issue-context and their avail? appropriate of justification of S. expect of assimilating given objector-group, and the information

carefully reason

conditions, that the

performed so he has is

experiment

replicable
something

with
wrong

similar results. Thus

the other

there must
experiment.

be

Requiring
our epistemic of standards, as is minimal way

the scientist
seems not

to be able
to be overly

to respond
demanding.

in the

the case with

learning the

both
conditions

legal and moral

excusability.

standards,
Such con?

is
VI. Contextualism theories of is an foundationalism Summary alternative and to the traditional It

ditions are highly context dependent and itwould be to formulate if not impossible extremely difficult
13Carl Ginet, "What Must Be Added to Knowing to Obtain

coherentism. 21 (1970),

Knowing

That

One

Knows?,"

Synthese, vol.

pp.

163-186.

CONTEXTUALIST

THEORY

OF

EPISTEMIC

JUSTIFICATION

210,

in the of basic statements denies the existence sense (although it allows con foundationalist's textually basic statements), and it denies that coher? is suf? ence as it traditionally has been explained ficient for justification. Both theories overlook con Ball State University

textual parameters
the issue-context and information,

essential
and social thus

to justification
the value and of

such as
h, social norms of

practices

justification. justification

the In particular cannot be ignored. Received

social

nature

of

April

14, igyy