The next waves: the globalization of International Migration Weeks 4 & 7

-This chapter discusses the following:1. The Arab Region 2. Arab Migration to oil-rich Arab states 3. Arab Migration to non-oil-producing states

-Long before the end of the cold war, new poles of financial, manufacturing and technological power had emerged in the oil-rich Arab states and in East Asia. Oil-producing areas outside the Arab region, such as Nigeria, Venezuela, and Brunei, have also become important areas of immigration. -Economic and social dislocation, political unrest, authoritarian rule and technological backwardness create conditions conducive to emigration. (The focus of this chapter is on current trends in international migration to, from and within the Arab region). The next waves of migrants will come from the Arab region mainly, as the authors claim that Africa is continent with a mobile/movable population. Much of the international migration will continue to be intra-regional, but many migrants will also desire to go to Europe, or North America. -It is noteworthy to include this information included in the slides: Recent estimates place the total number of Syrian refugees in Jordan at over 500,000. "Zaatari" refugee camp has become the fourth largest city in Jordan. It provided a boost in support for the Muslim Brotherhood, Jordans best-organized opposition, thereby adding to the tension the Hashemite Kingdom faces. Hosting 500,000 refugees has already cost Jordan over $800 million since the Syrian war began. The refugee influx has placed a huge burden on already overstretched water and power supplies, as well as housing and education, which has rendered subsidy cuts necessary. The government has raised the prices of fuel and commercial electricityand bread and water are expected to follow soon. The country is also home to 1.8 million Palestinian and 450,000 Iraqi refugees.

The Arab region:

"The Arab region" does not only include the Arab states of North Africa and West Asia, but also non-Arab states in the region such as Turkey, Iran and Israel. The term refers to a geographical, rather than a political or ethnic area. Within it there are four key migrant labor subsystems: 1. Emigration from the Mediterranean littoral to Western Europe. 2. Arab Labor migration to oil-producing states 3. Migration to non-oil-producing Arab states.

4. East and South Asian labor migration to oil-producing states. (Our discussions will be mainly on the first three points).

-There are also large refugee flows, especially to Iran and Turkey, and the mass immigration for settlement to Israel. Most Arab migrants leave their states due to the unexpected lack of basic rights, as forced migration is linked to the failure of the political systems.

North Africa and Turkey: (Labor issues with Europe)

By 2002 Morocco and Turkey had the largest populations of emigrants in the EU, with 2 to 3 million of their citizens residing as third country nationals. Moroccan communities lived in Italy, Spain and Netherlands and France, where just over 500,000 Moroccans reached in 1999 (France), "The colonial legacy shaped all North Africa flows, but less completely in the Moroccan case". The greater dispersion ( )of the Moroccan population was linked to the French decision more or less to suspend further recruitment of foreign labor in 1974. In 1973, Algeria unilaterally "its side only" suspended further emigration of its citizens for employment in France following a wave of violence against Arabs. Franco-Algerian tensions over immigration strengthened during the presidency of Valery Giscard d'Estaing (1974-81), who sought to deny renewal of residency and employment to hundreds thousands of Algerians. It was in this context that the Algerian President Boumedienne declared that nothing could stop the movement of persons from places like Algeria towards Europe. Afterwards the election of President Mitterrand in 1981 eased Franco-Algerian tensions as the French government abandoned the effort to induce Algerian repatriation () . Unexpectedly, the Algerian President died in 1991, and Algeria soon began its long descent into civil war, a conflict that took 120,00 lives between 1991 and 2001 (where Algerians who were in Afghanistan returned Algeria especially after the end of their war against the USSR and the early war of US against Afghanistan in 2001). France severely restricted issuance of visas to Algerians, making it very difficult for Algerians to leave even if they had family members residing in France. On the other hand, Morocco and Tunisia closed their borders with Algeria to prevent the spread of the conflict and were quite successful in doing so. Migration did play a role in the civil war, as returning Afghanis, Algerian volunteers who fought against Soviet Union troops and allies in Afghanistan during the 1980's, returned to Algeria in the wake of the Soviet evacuation. The fighting in Algeria spilled over to France, and thus many Algerians and other North Africans were arrested for suspected ties to Al-Qaida in the aftermath of 11 September events. -In December 2001, Algeria signed an agreement with the EU, following in the footsteps of Morocco and Tunisia. The free trade agreements call for free movement of goods, services, firms and capital and adopt certain competition rules of the EU. But how the evolving relationship with the EU would affect population movement was unclear. -The conferral ( )of the EU partnership status was part of an EU strategy to stabilize the western Mediterranean and reduce population movements towards the EU. Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco came under pressure to co-operate. Algeria obliged by stepping up border enforcement along its long and leaky borders with Libya and Niger. Migrants from sub-Saharan African travelled through Niger and Libya, and sought to transit through Algeria and Morocco to Europe. Other continued to Europe from Libya. The dimensions of these movements are unknown, but they are very large and have resulted in many deaths, as African migrants die in vast deserts. In on such incident near Dirkou in the North of Niger in 2001, at least 23 migrants died but the toll may have been much higher.

Other measures in Morocco, in 1995, 444 sub-Saharan Africans were captured for attempting illegal migration. In 2000, 10,000 were captured!! Overall, Moroccan security services captured 19,307 attempting illegal migration in 1999 and 25,613 in 2000. -Moroccan relations with Spain and the EU deteriorated after the signature of the partnership agreement. Disagreements over population movements figured centrally, but there were also disputes over fishing rights, the former Spanish Sahara and Spanish possession of a small island just off the coast of Morocco. -The situation of Turkey is similar to and differed from the Maghrebi cases. As it looked like Morocco in having large expatriate population in the EU. It had received possibly as many as 4 million refugees and migrants fleeing political instability and economic distress in its region. On the other hand, it differed in the extensive labor emigration, as it may have become an obstacle to its entry into the EU. In 1990's, Turkey's asylum policy was heavily criticized by Europeans before reforms were undertaken to support Turkey's policies with those of the EU. -A key difference between Turkey and North African states arose from Turkey's ottoman heritage. Traditionally, the Turkish Republic's immigration policy was not interested in some resemblance to Israel's law of return or Germany's policy towards ethnic Germans. As the Ottoman Empire expanded, the government ordered Muslim subjects to settle in recently acquired areas, a process termed "Surgun". In 1922, the Turkish republic emerged, and by 1934, a law of resettlement was promulgated which authorized ethnic Turks from areas formerly comprising the Ottoman Empire to emigrate to and settle in the Turkish republic. -By 2000, Turkey had rewritten its immigration law so as to extend asylum beyond the traditional preference given to ethnic Turks from abroad. In 1980's and 1990's, Turkey received several million Iranians, Afghanis and Iraqis who were not formally recognized as refugees, but whose residency was tolerated by the Turkish government. Note: Turkey's bid for full membership in the EU would necessitate further reform of Turkish immigration and refugee policies, perhaps ending the informal policy of toleration.

Arab Migration to oil-rich Arab states:

This movement is mainly a male workers movement, from the poorer to the richer Arab states (which has taken an enormous political significance). In the 1970's and 80's Libya hired large numbers of Egyptians and Tunisians. But when relations between Egypt and Libya went wrong (Sadat's foreign policy towards the west and Israel; especially that Libya's foreign policy is against USA), thousands of Egyptian migrants were expelled. Since 1989, citizens of the four other Maghreb Union states (Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania and Algeria) have theoretically been able to enter Libya freely, under the terms of the Treaty of Marrakesh which created the Union of Arab Maghreb. But the regional integration framework has had little effect. Libya enjoyed the highest per capita income in Africa, estimated at $5410 in 1990. Accordingly migration to Libya by sub-Saharan Africans became more prevalent in the 1990's as Libya's influence in African politics and diplomacy grew, in counterpoint to its poor relations with US and UK. Periodically, with the case with Egyptians and Tunisians, violence erupted, as hundreds of Africans were killed in a massacre in 2000. The

killings were followed by a massive mass departure of Africans, some of whom later returned to Libya. Libyan Authorities captured thousands of African migrants in detention camps in the south of Libya, where some migrants were executed for rebellion or attempting to leave Libya. Anyway -this is really funny- the influx continued as desperate Africans risked everything in the hopes of finding a job in Libya or going on from there to Europe. Libya provides an extreme example of the interconnection between international migration and foreign policy issues. In Iraq, the ruling part "Ba'ath" regards freedom of entry, residence and employment for non-Iraqi Arabs parallel with the idea of pan-Arab unity and nationhood as Saddam claimed. In 1975, Iraq signed a treaty with Egypt to encourage settlement of Egyptian farmers in Iraq. But Iraq unilaterally renounced the agreement in 1977 after Sadat's visit to Israel (Sadat is a major problem for all Egyptian migrants I see :P), but in 1980 allowed millions of Egyptian migrants to be employed and take residence. It was estimated that there were about 1.25 million Egyptians working in Iraq in 1983. The number of Asian migrants in Iraq was declining in favor of Arab migrants, while the opposite trend was occurring in the oil-rich Gulf States to the south. Asians were preferred in the Gulf States for the following reasons: 1- Less expensive to employ, more efficient, obedient and manageable. 2- They were used to leaving their families at home. 3- Many Asians were Muslims. While, Arabs were not preferred for the following reasons: 1-The fear of bringing and spreading radical social and political concepts (the leftist and pan-Arab ideas promoted by Arab expatriates called for the abolition of monarchies in the Gulf) Palestinians were viewed as politically subversive. They were involved in efforts to organize strikes in Saudi oil fields and in civil strife in Jordan and Lebanon. Also Yemenis were involved in anti-regime activities.. 2- Many young Arabs regarded borders as artificial lines and preached for a single Arab nation. (Example could be now the MB in UAE). 3- The regional distribution of the oil-generated wealth 4-The fear of the Egyptianization of the local dialects and culture. After 1991 war, the Egyptians were suspected too like the Yemenis. 5- Stereotypes.

In conclusion, Expatriates have often been perceived by the nationals as disloyal to their hosts and even as potentially dangerous political agents who spread hostile ideas or work as a fifth Column for the benefit of foreign powers.

Important facts about the Arab migration to the GCC: -Transfer of funds from migrant labor exceeded the value of regional trade in goods as well as official capital flows. -Unlike in Western Europe, where foreign workers have only complemented the national workforce, in the GGC they have become the dominant labor force. -In 2004, the GGC states were inhabited by 12.5 million foreigners, who constituted 37% of the total population -This has posed security, economic, social and cultural threats to the local population. -There are Labor market strategies recently to create employment opportunities for nationals and to limit the dependence on the expatriate labor.

Arab Migration to non-oil-producing states:

Arab migration to non-oil-producing states within the Arab region is quantitatively and geopolitically less significant than migration to the oil-producing states. Jordan is an example, by the mid 1970's about 40% of the domestic workforce was employed abroad, primarily in the Gulf. Much of their migrants were skilled, but much labor force from Syria and Egypt skilled too took their place. Iran also became the world's most important safe place for refugees by the early 1990's. It succeeded in sending back large numbers of Afghan refugees and announced that all Afghan refugees had to leave in 1997. However, 1.5 million Afghan refugees remained in 2000 and their numbers increased during the USled invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.

Omar