TATEL vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC FACTS: Residents of barrio Sta.

Elena filed complaints against the petitioner because of the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside his warehouse which affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor, and dust emitted by the machine. A committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to in estigate the matter. !he committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with narrow roads and the surrounding residential houses. Resolution "o. #$ was passed by the %unicipal &ouncil of Virac declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the pur iew of Article '$( of the "ew &i il &ode.. Respondent municipal officials further contend that petitioner)s warehouse was constructed in iolation of *rdinance "o. +,, series of +$-#, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of #.. meters from said block of houses to a oid loss of li es and properties by accidental fire. /etitioner assailed the alidity of the ordinance and a erred that what is prohibited is the construction of warehouses and not the use of the warehouse for storage of abaca and copra. 0t also contended that the ordinance is discriminatory since other warehouses are allowed to operate within the icinity without being prosecuted. ISSUES: 1hether *rdinance "o. +,, S. +$-# of the %unicipality of Virac is unconstitutional and oid HELD: 2es. *rdinance "o. +,, series of +$-#, is a legitimate and alid exercise of police power by the %unicipal &ouncil of Virac and is not unconstitutional and oid as claimed by the petitioner. !he &ourt also emphasi3ed the criteria of a alid ordinance as follows4 5+6 0t must not contra ene the &onstitution or any statute7 5#6 0t must not be unfair or oppressi e7 5,6 0t must not be partial or discriminatory7 5(6 0t must not prohibit but may regulate trade7 5-6 0t must be general and consistent with public policy7 and 5'6 0t must not be unreasonable.

LLDA vs CA FACTS: Sec( 586 of the charter of 99:A pro ides that the 99:A shall ha e the exclusi e ;urisdiction to issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any pro;ects or acti ities affecting the said lake. !hen RA <+'., the 9ocal =o ernment &ode of +$$+, that municipality in the 9aguna 9ake region interpreted the pro ision of this law to mean that newly passed law ga e municipal go ernment the exclusi e ;urisdiction to issue fishing pri ileges within their municipal waters. Sec +($ of RA <+'. states that municipalities shall ha e exclusi e authority to grant fishery pri ileges in the municipal go ernment assumed the authority to issue fishing pri ileges and fish pen permits. >nregulated fish pen occupied almost +?, of the entire waters which is iolation of 9aguna lake carrying capacity. 99:A ser ed notice to the general public to the concerned owner who illegally constructed their fish pen and fish cages. @ish pen owner filed in;unction against 99:A on the ground that pro ision of 99:A had been repealed by RA <+'.. ISSUE: 1hether or not 99:A or the town or municipalities comprising the region should exercise ;urisdiction o er 9aguna 9ake the issuance of permits for fishery pri ileges HELD: 99:A has the exclusi e ;urisdiction to issue permits within the 9aguna 9ake Region. !he charter of 99:A should pre ail o er RA <+'..

LIM vs. PACQUING FACTS: !he &ity of %anila granted Association of :e elopment &orporation to operate ;aiAalai pursuant to *rdinance "o. <.'-. /etitioners argued that Republic Act "o. $-( entitled, BAn Act to /rohibit 1ith Corse Races and Dasque /elota =ames 5EaiAAlai6, And !o /rescribe /enalties @or 0ts ViolationF, effecti ely remo ed the power of the %unicipal Doard of %anila to grant franchises for gambling operations. !hey argued that the term Glegislati e franchiseG in said act is used to refer to franchises issued by &ongress. *n the other hand, Association of :e elopment &orporation contends that Republic Act "o. (.$ which created the %anila &hapter gi es legislati e powers to the %unicipal Doard to grant franchises, and it does not specifically qualify the word Glegislati eG as referring exclusi ely to &ongress. 0f such is the case, then Rep. Act "o. $-( did not remo e the power of the %unicipal Doard and consequently it was within the power of the &ity of %anila to allow A:& to operate the ;aiAalai in its ;urisdiction. ISSUE: 1hether R.A. (.$ gi es the &ity of %anila the authority to grant franchise. HELD: 0t is clear from the foregoing that &ongress did not delegate to the &ity of %anila the power Gto franchiseG wagers or betting, including the ;aiAalai, but retained for itself such power Gto franchiseG. 1hat &ongress delegated to the &ity of %anila in Rep. Act "o. (.$, with respect to wagers or betting, was the power to Glicense, permit, or regulateG which therefore means that a license or permit issued by the &ity of %anila to operate a wager or betting acti ity, such as the ;aiAalai where bets are accepted, would not amount to something meaningful unless the holder of the permit or license was also franchised by the national go ernment to so operate. %oreo er, e en this power to license, permit, or regulate wagers or betting on ;aiAalai was remo ed from local go ernments, including the &ity of %anila, and transferred to the =ames and Amusement Doard by Executi e *rder "o. ,$#. !he net result is that the authority to grant franchises for the operation of ;aiAalai frontons is in &ongress, while the regulatory function is ested in the =AD.

VILLACORTA vs. BERNARDO FACTS: !his is a petition for certiorari against a decision of the &ourt of @irst 0nstance of /angasinan annulling an ordinance adopted by the municipal board of :agupan &ity. !he ordinance in question is *rdinance ##, or BAn *rdinance Regulating Subdi ision /lans o er parcels of land in :agupanF, passed by the %unicipal Doard. !he court a quo declared the ordinance as oid because it conflicts with and expands Act ($', which is a national law. @irst of all Sec.+ of the ordinance requires that all subdi ision plans be submitted to the &ity Engineer before it can be appro ed by the :irector of 9ands. Sec. , of the ordinance further pro ides that a certification of the city engineer is needed before registration of subdi ision plans can be made with the Register of :eeds. Section # also pro ides a ser ice fee for subdi ision plans. 9astly, the ordinance also imposes a penalty for iolations committed. All of the aforementioned sections of the ordinance contra enes Act ($' as the latter does not require submission of plans to the city engineer, nor the issuance of a certification by the same, nor does it pro ide any penalties. !he &ity of :agupan argues that the ordinance brings to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the go ernment. ISSUE: 0s *rdinance ## alid, considering the laudable purpose for its enactmentH HELD: "*. !he powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held alid when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and?or make a general law subordinated to a local ordinance. !his ad ice is especially addressed to the local go ernments which exercise the police power only by irtue of a alid delegation from the national legislature under the general welfare clause. 0n the instant case, *rdinance "o. ## suffers from the additional defect of iolating this authority for legislation in contra ention of the national law by adding to its requirements.

CRUZ vs. PARAS FACTS: !he municipal corporation of Docaue, Dulacan prohibits the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such as clubs employing hostesses. 0t is contended that the ordinance assailed as in alid is tainted with a nullity, the municipality being de oid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling, petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were iolated as the license pre iously gi en to them was in effect withdrawn without ;udicial hearing. !he issue is whether or not a municipal corporation can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such as clubs employing hostessesH ISSUE: 1hether the act of the %unicipality of Docaue is legalH HELD: "*. 0t is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. !hey may be regulated but not pre ented from carrying on their business. All that petitioners would ha e to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no businesses could legally open, would be sub;ect to ;udicial correction. !hat is to comply with the legislati e will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs sub;ect to appropriate regulations. 0n the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business

QUEZON CITY vs. ERICTA FACTS: !he Iue3on &ity &ouncil passed *rdinance "o. '++J, SA'( regulating the establishment, maintenance and operation of pri ate memorial cemetery or burial ground within the ;urisdiction of Iue3on &ity Section $ of said ordinance states that4 At least six 5'6 percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and ha e been residents of Iue3on &ity for at least - years prior to their death, to be determined by competent &ity Authorities. !hen, the Iue3on &ity &ouncil passed a resolution requesting the &ity Engineer, Iue3on &ity, to stop any further selling and?or transaction of memorial park lots in Iue3on &ity where the owners thereof ha e failed to donate the required 'K space intended for paupers burial. /ursuant to this petition, the Iue3on &ity Engineer notified respondent Cimlayang /ilipino, 0nc. in writing that Section $ of *rdinance "o. '++J, SA'( would be enforced. Respondent Cimlayang /ilipino filed with the &ourt of @irst 0nstance of Ri3al Dranch LV000 at Iue3on &ity a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary in;unction, seeking to annul Section $ of the *rdinance in question. 0t alleged that the same is contrary to the &onstitution, the Iue3on &ity &harter, the 9ocal Autonomy Act, and the Re ised Administrati e &ode. !he trial court rendered the decision declaring Section $ of *rdinance "o. '++J, SA'( null and oid. /etitioners argue that the taking of the respondent)s property is a alid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. ISSUE: 0s Section $ of the ordinance in question a alid exercise of the police power HELD: "o.!here is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six 5'6 percent of the total area of an pri ate cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a pri ate cemetery to benefit paupers. 0nstead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to pri ate cemeteries.

ORTIGAS COMPANY AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. FEATI BANK FACTS: *n %arch (, +$-#, plaintiff, as endor, and Augusto /adilla y Angeles and "ati idad Angeles, as endees, entered into separate agreements of sale on installments o er two parcels of land, known as 9ots "os. - and ', Dlock ,+, of the Cighway Cills Subdi ision, situated at %andaluyong, Ri3al. *n Euly +$, +$'#, the said endees transferred their rights and interests o er the aforesaid lots in fa or of one Emma &ha e3. >pon completion of payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in fa or of Emma &ha e3. Doth the agreements 5of sale on installment6 and the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that4 !he parcel of land sub;ect of this deed of sale shall be used the Duyer exclusi ely for residential purposes :efendantAappellee, maintains that the area, has been declared a commercial and industrial 3one, per Resolution "o. #<, dated @ebruary (, +$'. of the %unicipal &ouncil of %andaluyong, Ri3al and the sub;ect lots thereunder were acquired by it Gonly on Euly #,, +$'# or more than two 5#6 years after the area had been declared a commercial and industrial 3one. *n or about %ay -, +$',, defendantAappellee began construction of a building to be de oted to banking purposes. !he following day, plaintiffAappellant demanded that the construction of the commercial building on the said lots be halted. !he latter refused to comply, contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the 3oning regulations. Decause of this, *rtigas M &*. 9!: 5plaintiffAappellant6 filed a complaint with the trial court, accompanied by a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary in;unction, against @EA!0 Dank 5herein defendantAappellee6. !he trial court dismissed the complaint as well as its motion for reconsideration. ISSUES: 1hether the trial court erred when it failed to consider that the %unicipal &ouncil had the power to nullify the contractual obligations assumed by defendantA appellee. HELD: 2es. 1ith regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendantAappellee N referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding !ransfer &ertificates of !itle issued to defendantAappellee N it should be stressed, that while nonAimpairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., Gthe power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.

BALACUIT vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE FACTS: B*rdinance '(. N *rdinance penali3ing any person, group of persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any mo ie or other public exhibitions, games, contest or other performances to require children between se en 5<6 and twel e 5+#6 years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but should charge only oneAhalf of the said ticket.F /etitioners filed before the &@0, that the said ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, oid and unenforceable. !he petitioners contend that *rdinance '(. is not within the power of the %unicipal Doard to enact as pro ided for in Sec. +-5n6 of RA -#,, the &harter of the &ity of Dutuan. /etitioners maintain that *rdinance '(. iolates the due process clause of the &onstitution for being oppressi e, unfair, un;ust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and iolati e of the right of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the theater owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for ;ust admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge. ISSUE: 1hether *rdinance '(. is alid and constitutional HELD: "*. !his &ourt agrees with the petitioners that the ordinance is not ;ustified by any necessity for the public interest. !he police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. !he e ident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who ha e to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themsel es. A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding sa ings for the parents7 howe er, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these sa ings. !he ordinance does not only make petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penali3es them for failure to comply with it. @urthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficult in its implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since effecti ity of the ordinance, children o er +# years of age tried to pass off their age as below +# years in order to a ail of the benefit of the ordinance. !his &ourt see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressi e upon the business of petitioners.

Sanga ang vs IAC FACTS: >pon the instruction of %akati %ayor 2abut, studies were made on the feasibility of opening streets in DelA Air Village calculated to alle iate traffic congestion along the public streets ad;acent to DelAAir Village. !he studies re ealed that subdi ision plan of DelAAir were appro ed on a condition that its ma;or thoroughfares connecting the public streets and highway shall be opened to public traffic. 0t is only necessary in the interest of the general public to open to traffic to traffic to Annapola, %ercedes, Oodiac, Eupiter, "eptune, *rbit and /aseo de Roxas. !he petitioner contended that Eupiter streets are for the exclusi e use of DAVA residents. !hey also appeal that the demolition and opening of *rbit streets has loss of pri acy of DAVA residents and depri ation of property without due course. ISSUE: 1hether the %ayor of %akati may order the opening of the streets HELD: 2es. !he opening of Eupiter Street was warranted by the demands of the common good, in terms of traffic congestion and public con eyance, same as the opening of *rbit Street. !here is no taking of property or expropriation without ;ust compensation. !he act of the mayor is in the concept of police power.

PILAPIL vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: /ri ate respondent &olomidas purchased a parcel of land and claimed a road right of way which leads towards the "ational Road and ends at the portion of petitioner /ilapil)s property where a camino vicinal exists all the way to said "ational Road. !he &olomidas tried to impro e the road or camino vicinal, but the /ilapils harassed and threatened them. !he /ilapils also threatened to fence off the camino vecinal. ISSUE: 1hether &olomidasP act of impro ing the camino vicinal legalH HELD: "*. !he property of pro inces, cities and municipalities is di ided into property for public use and patrimonial property. !he first consists of the pro incial roads, city streets, municipal streets, squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public ser ice paid for by the said pro inces, cities or municipalities. 0n the present case, it is beyond dispute that the establishment, closure or abandonment of the camino vecinal is the sole prerogati e of the %unicipality of 9iloan. "o pri ate property can interfere with such a right. >nder Datas /ambasa Dlg. ,,< 5!he 9ocal =o ernment &ode6, the Sangguniang Dayan had the power to adopt 3oning and subdi ision ordinance or regulations sub;ect to the pro ision of existing laws, and to pro ide for the construction, impro ement, repair and maintenance of municipal streets, a enues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places, regulate the use thereof and prohibit the construction or placing of obstacles or encroachments on them. A camino vecinal is a municipal road. 0t is also property for public use. /ursuant, therefore, to the abo e powers of a local go ernment unit, the %unicipality of 9iloan, through the Sangguniang Dayan had the unassailable authority to 5a6 prepare and adopt a land use map, 5b6 promulgate a 3oning ordinance which may consider, among other things, the municipal roads to be constructed, maintained, impro ed or repaired and 5c6 close any municipal road

MACASIANO vs. DIOKNO FACTS: !he %unicipality of /araQaque passed an ordinance which authori3es the closure of certain streets and the establishment of a flea market theron. !hrough a resolution passed by the municipal council, the mayor entered into a contract for the operation maintenance and management of a flea market with respondent /alanyag, a ser ice cooperati e. /etitioner Drig. =en. %acasiano, /"/ Superintendent of the %etropolitan !raffic &ommand, ordered the destruction of said stalls. /etitioner %acasiano wrote /alanyag gi ing the latter ten 5+.6 days to discontinue the flea market otherwise the market stalls shall be dismantled. !he trial court howe er upholds the alidity of the ordinance. ISSUE: 1hether the ordinance is constitutionalH HELD: 2es. !he property of pro inces, cities and municipalities is di ided into property for public use and patrimonial property. 5 Art. 423, Civil Code). 0n the present case, the local roads are used for public ser ice and therefore considered public properties. /roperties of the local go ernment which are de oted to public ser ice are deemed public and are under the absolute control of &ongress. 5 rovince o! "amboanga del #orte vs. City o! "amboanga.) Cence, local go ernments ha e no authority whatsoe er to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is ested upon them by &ongress. Section +. of the 9ocal =o ernment &ode pro ides closure of roads N BA local go ernment unit may likewise, through its head acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian and in accordance with e$isting law and the provisions o! this Code, close any barangay, municipal, city or pro incial road, street, alley, park or square. #o such way or place or any part thereo! shall be closed without indemni!ying any person pre%udiced thereby. A property thus withdrawn !rom public use may be used or con eyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or con eyed.F

CRUZ vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT FACTS: /adre Rada market was authori3ed to be operated as a public market of the &ity of %anila by irtue of Resolution "o. #,., as amended by Resolution "o. (.', both series of +$($. !he management of said market represent by petitioner &ru3 wrote %ayor Villegas that the management was withdrawing threeAfourths of the area of the market from the direct super ision and control of the &ity !reasurer)s *ffice effecti e on Eune +-, +$<., and from said date the withdrawn portion shall cease to function and operate as a public market. %ayor Villegas allowed the withdrawal of the market as a public market in line with the decision that upheld the right of the operators of the Elcano %arket to withdraw their property from its use as a public market stating, among others, that appro al for the withdrawal by the &ity of %anila is not e en necessary. Cerein pri ate respondents questioned the said order. !he trial court declared the order alid, in its amended decision, which was re ersed by the &ourt of Appeals. ISSUE: 1hether the &ity %ayor may alidly withdraw /adre Rada %arket as a public market. HELD: "*. Git is axiomatic that only the power that created it can withdraw it.G !he %ayor had no legal authority to, by himself, allows the petitioner to withdraw the ma;or portion of /adre Rada %arket from its use as a public market, thereby also withdrawing it from the city)s constant super ision. !he establishment and maintenance of public markets is by law among the legislati e powers of the &ity of %anila. Since the operation of /adre Rada %arket was authori3ed by a municipal board resolution and appro ed by the &ity %ayor, as pro ided by law, it follows that a withdrawal of the whole or any portion from use as a public market must be sub;ect to the same ;oint action of the Doard and the %ayor. !he %ayor of %anila, by himself, cannot pro ide for the opening, operations, and closure of a public market.

HEIRS OF !UANCHO ARDONA vs. REYES FACTS: !he /hilippine !ourism Authority wishes to expropriate #J# hectares of land for de elopment into integrated complexes of areas with potential tourist alue. /etitioners filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of /ublic >se. !hey contend that the land is already for land reform and that it should seek the appro al of the &ourt of Agrarian Relations. &@0 granted writs of possession. /etitioners brought instant petition before S& to en;oin execution. !he basic issues are whether or not there is nonAcompliance with the Bpublic useF requirement under the eminent domain pro ision of the Dill of Rights7 whether or not there is disregard of the land reform nature of the property being expropriated7 and whether or not there is impairment of obligations of contracts. ISSUE: 1hether /!A has authority to expropriate such landH HELD: 2es. !here is compliance with the requirement of public use. !he statePs power of eminent domain extends to the expropriation of land for tourism purposes although this specific ob;ecti e is not expressed in the &onstitution. !he policy ob;ecti e of the framers can be expressed only in general terms such as social ;ustice, local autonomy, conser ation and de elopment of the national patrimony, public interest, and general welfare among others. !o include specific programs like tourism as express constitutional pro isions would make the &onstitution more prolix than a bulk code and would require the framers to be impossibly prescient. !he particular mention in the &onstitution of agrarian reform, among others, merely underscores the magnitude of the problems sought to be remedied by these programs. !hey do not preclude nor limit the exercise of the power of eminent domain for such purposes like tourism and other de elopment programs. !he concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. !he idea that Bpublic use is strictly limited to clear cases of Buse by the publicF has been discarded.

CHIONGBAN vs. ORBOS FACTS: /ursuant to Article L, Section +J of the +$J< &onstitution, &ongress passed RA "o. '<,(, the *rganic Act for the Autonomous Region in %indanao. 0n the ensuing plebiscite held on "o ember +', +$J$, four pro inces N 9anao del Sur, %aguindanao, Sulu, and !awiAtawi N oted in fa or of creating an autonomous region. Article L0L, Section +, of RA '<,( authori3es the /resident to merge existing regions. *n *ctober +#, +$$., /resident &ora3on Aquino issued Executi e *rder "o. (#$ pro iding for the reorgani3ation of the administrati e regions in %indanao. /etitioners contend that Article L0L, Section +,, of RA "o. '<,( is unconstitutional because it unduly delegates legislati e power to the /resident and pro ides no standard for the exercise of said delegated power. 0n addition, petitioners challenge the alidity of E* "o. (#$ on the ground that the power granted by RA '<,( to the /resident is only to merge Regions 0L and L00 but not to reorgani3e the entire administrati e regions in %indanao. ISSUE: 1hether the act of the /resident in reorgani3ing the administrati e regions in %indanao is alidH HELD: 2es. !he choice of the /resident as delegate is logical because the di ision of the county into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local go ernment but also the direction of executi e departments which the law requires should ha e regional offices. 1hile the power to merge administrati e regions is not expressly pro ided in the &onstitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the /resident to facilitate the exercise of the power of general super ision o er local go ernments 5Abbas s. &*%E9E&6. !he regions themsel es are not territorial and political di ision like pro inces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are mere groupings of contiguous pro inces for administrati e purposes. !he regrouping is done only on paper. 0t in ol es no more than a redefinition or redrawing of the lines separating administrati e regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrati e super ision of local go ernment units by the /resident and ensuring the efficient deli ery of essential ser ices. @inally, the reorgani3ation of administrati e regions in E* "o. (#$ is based on rele ant criteria, to wit4 +6 contiguity and geographical features7 #6 transportation and communication facilities7 ,6 cultural and language groupings7 (6 land area and population7 -6 socioAeconomic de elopment programs in the regionsP '6 existing regional centers adopted by se eral agencies7 and <6 number of pro inces and cities.

MAGTA!AS vs. PRYCE FACTS: 1hen /A=&*R opened a branch in &agayan de *ro, there was an instant opposition from different sectors of the community, including the local go ernment. 0n fact, the %ayor of the city of &agayan de *ro brought this instant petition attacking among others, gambling as intrinsically harmful and citing arious pro isions of the constitution and se eral decisions of the court. !he Sannguniang panglungsod passed an ordinance prohibiting the operation of casinos in their place. ISSUE: 1hether the Sangguniang /anglungsod may pass an ordinance prohibiting the operation of casinos HELD: "*. !he power of /A=&*R to centrali3e and regulate all games o chance remains unimpaired. /: +J'$ has not been modified by the 9ocal =o ernment &ode, which empowers the local go ernment to pre ent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law. &asino gambling is authori3ed under /: +J'$. !his decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Cence, it was not competent for Sangguniang /anglungsod of &agayan de *ro city to enact ordinances prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and prohibiting the operation of casinos. !hose ordinances are contrary to /:+J'$ and the public policy announced therein, therefore ultra ires and oid.

ALVAREZ vs. GUINGONA FACTS: /etitioners questioned the constitutionality of R.A. <<#. entitled BAn Act &on erting the %unicipality of Santiago, 0sabela into an 0ndependent &omponent &ity to be known as the &ity of Santiago.F /etitioners claim that the %unicipality of Santiago has not met the minimum a erage annual income required under Sec. (-. of the 9ocal =o ernment &ode by arguing that 0nternal Re enue Allotments are not income but merely transfers and?or budgetary aid from the national go ernment and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing. Cence, the certification issued by the Dureau of 9ocal =o ernment @inance of the :epartment of @inance, which indicates SantiagoPs a erage annual income to be /hp #.,.<(,-J+.$< is inaccurate as the 0nternal Re enue Allotments were not excluded from the computation. ISSUE: 1hether such is part of re enueH HELD: 2es. /etitioners asse erations are untenable because 0RAPs form part of the income of 9ocal =o ernment >nits. !he funds generated by 9=>Ps from local taxes, 0RAPs and national wealth utili3ation proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local go ernment and are used to finance its operations sub;ect to specified modes of spending the same as pro ided in the 9ocal =o ernment &ode and its implementing Rules and Regulations. @or instance, not less than twenty percent 5#.K6 of the 0RAPs must be set aside for local de elopment pro;ects. As such, for purposes of budgetary preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the 9=>, among others, the 0RAPs and the share in the national utili3ation proceeds are considered items of income.

TY vs. TRAMPE FACTS: !he respondent court ruled that the schedule of market alues and the assessments based thereon prepared solely by respondent assessor are alid and legal, they ha ing been prepared in accordance with the pro isions of Sec. #+# of R.A. <+'.. 0t held also that said &ode had effecti ely repealed the pre ious law on the matter, Sec. $ of /.:. $#+, which required, in the preparation of said schedule, ;oint action by all the city and municipal assessors in the %etropolitan %anila area. ISSUE: 1hether the tax imposed is under the municipal assessors ;urisdictionH HELD: "o. Sec. $ of /.:. $#+ requires that the schedule of alues of real properties in the %etropolitan %anila Area shall be prepared ;ointly by the city assessors in the districts created therein7 while Sec. #+# of R.A. <+'. states that the schedule shall be prepared Bby the pro incial, city and municipal assessors of the municipalities within the %etropolitan %anila Area for the different classes of real property situated in their respecti e local go ernment units for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned . . .F 0t is ob ious that harmony in these pro isions is not only possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistent with the legislati e intent and policy. Dy reading together and harmoni3ing there two 5#6 pro isions, the &ourt arri e at the following steps in the preparation of the said schedule as follows4 +. !he assessor in each municipality or city in the %etropolitan %anila area shall prepare his?her proposed schedule of alues, in accordance with Sec. #+#, R.A. <+'.. #. !hen, the 9ocal !reasury and Assessment :istrict shall meet, per Sec. $, /.:. $#+. 0n the instant case, that district shall be composed of the assessors in Iue3on &ity, /asig, %arikina, %andaluyong and San Euan, pursuant to Sec. + of said /.:. 0n this meeting, the different assessors shall compare their indi idual assessments, discuss and thereafter ;ointly agree and produce a schedule of alues for their district, taking into account the preamble of said /.:. that they should e ol e Ba progressi e re enue raising program that will not unduly burden the taxpayers.F ,. !he schedule ;ointly agreed upon by the assessors shall then be published in a newspaper of general circulation and submitted to the Sanggunian concerned for enactment by ordinance, per Sec. #+#, R.A. <+'.. Dy this harmoni3ation, the Boperati e principle of decentrali3ationF pro ided under Sec. ,, R.A. <+'. encouraging local go ernment units to Bconsolidate or coordinate their efforts, ser ices and resourcesF is fulfilled. 0ndeed, the essence of ;oint local action for common good so cherished in the 9ocal =o ernment &ode finds concrete expression in this harmoni3ation.

!AVIER vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Respondent /ro incial Doard of Antique abolishes the office of the /ro incial Engineer. /etitioner questioned the said action and contends that the abolition was a circum ention of the constitutional mandate on security of tenure and intended only to weed out pro incial officials and employees who opposed the /ro incial DoardPs candidacy in the +$<+ election. Respondents argue that the abolition was moti ated by an inadequate allotment for materials, salaries, and operating expenses at the *ffice of the /ro incial Engineer, and that the power of the /ro incial Doard to create an office carried with it the power to abolish it. ISSUE: 1hether the dismissal is alidH HELD: 2es. Section +J of Republic Act "o. -+J- 59ocal Autonomy Act6, then still in force, empowered pro incial go ernments to create, among other positions, the office of a pro incial engineer. 1hile the law did not expressly est on pro incial go ernments the power to abolish that office, absent, howe er, any contrary pro ision, that authority should be deemed embraced by implication from the power to create it. Section #, of the Act, in fact expressed that an Bimplied power of the pro ince x x x 5should6 be liberally construed in its fa orF and Bany fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in fa or of local go ernment and it should be presumed to exist.F !he abolition of the office in the present case could ha e well been ;ustified except for the con exity of circumstances attendant to the decision process taken by the board. !he &ourt is not prepared, howe er, to conclude a clear case of bad faith on the part of respondents.

MARIANO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS FACTS: /etitioners assail section # of R.A. <J-( as unconstitutional on the ground that it did not properly identify the land area or territorial ;urisdiction of %akati by metes and bounds, in iolation of section +. of the +$J< &onstitution in relation to Sections < and (-. of the 9ocal =o ernment &ode ISSUE: 1hether R.A. <J-( was unconstitutional by not pro iding the exact area of the land co ered HELD: "*. !he delineated area of the proposed city of %akati pro ides that4 SE&. #. &ity of %akati. N !he %unicipality of %akati shall be con erted to highly urbani3ed city to be known as the &ity of %akati, hereinafter referred to as the &ity, which shall comprise the present territory %unicipality of %akati of %etropolitan %anila area o er which it has ;urisdiction bounded on the northeast by /asig Ri er and beyond by the &ity of %andaluyong and the %unicipality of /asig7 on the southeast by the %unicipalities of /ateros and !aguig7 on the southwest by the &ity of /asay and the %unicipality of !aguig7 and on the northwest, by the &ity of %anila. !he importance of drawing the precise strokes of territorial boundaries cannot be o eremphasi3ed. !he boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial ;urisdiction of the local go ernment unit. Deyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Any uncertainty in the boundaries will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of go ernmental powers which ultimately will pre;udice the peoplePs welfare. !his is the e il sought to be a oided by the 9ocal =o ernment &ode in requiring that the land area be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical description.

BASCO vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION FACTS: /A=&*R was created and was granted a franchise to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos within the territorial ;urisdiction of the /hilippines. 0ts operation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino B/hilippine !ouristF. Subsequently, /: +J'$ was passed to enable the go ernment to regulate and centrali3e all games of chance authori3ed by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following, among others, declared policy. Bb6 !o establish and operate clubs and casinos, x x x 5+6 generate sources of additional re enue x x x, 5#6 create recreation and integrated facilities which will expand and impro e the country&s e$isting tourist attractions, and '3)minimi(e, i! not totally eradicate, all the e ils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally pre alent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct in ol ement.F 0t is reported that /A=&*R is the third largest source of go ernment re enue. Dut the petitioners are questioning the alidity of /: +J'$. !hey contend that /: +J'$4 +6 constitutes a wai er of the right of the &ity of %anila to impose taxes and legal fees and #6 its exemption clause is iolati e of local autonomy. ISSUE: 1hether /: +J'$ is null and oid HELD: /: +J'$ is not null and oid. !heir contention is without merit for the following reasons4 a. !he &ity of %anila, being a mere %unicipal corporation, has no inherent right to impose taxes. !he &harter or statute must plainly show an confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it. b. !he &harter of the &ity is sub;ect to control by &ongress, which has the power to create and abolish %unicipal corporations due to its general legislati e powers. 0f congress can grant the &ity the power to tax, it can also pro ide for exemptions or e en take back the power. c. !he power of local go ernments to regulate gambling thru grant of franchise, licenses or permits was withdrawn and was ested exclusi ely on the "ational =o ernment. "ecessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees, which is a consequence of the issuance of licenses or permits, is no long ested in the &ity. d. 9ocal go ernments ha e no power to tax instrumentalities of the "ational =o ernment. /A=&*R is a go ernment owned or controlled corporation with an original charter. As such, it should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.

*therwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or sub;ected to control by a mere local go ernment. LIMBONA vs. MANGELIN FACTS: 0n +$$J, /resident Estrada issued E* no. (Jto facilitate the process of enhancing the capabilities of local go ernment units in the discharge of their functions and ser ices. !he o ersight committee has been tasked to formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for its effecti e implementation. !he B:e olution Ad;ustment and Equali3ation @undF was created to address the funding requirements of the program. !he :D% was directed to set aside an amount to be determined by the committee based on the de olution status appraisal sur eys undertaken by the :09=. !he initial fund was to be sourced from the a ailable sa ings of the national go ernment. !he committee has been authori3ed to issue the implementing rules and regulations go erning the equitable allocation and distribution of said fund to the local go ernment units. !he pro ince of Datangas represented by =o ernor %andanas, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to declare as unconstitutional and oid certain pro isions contained in the =AA of +$$$, #..., and #..+, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of /-billion of the 0RA for the 9ocal =o ernment Ser ice Equali3ation @und and imposed conditions for the release thereof. ISSUE: 1hether the assailed pro isions in the =AAPs of +$$$, #..., and #..+ and the *&: resolutions iolates the constitutional precept on local autonomy HELD: 2es. !hey are iolati e of the constitutional precept on local autonomy. As the constitution itself declares. 9ocal autonomy, both administrati e and fiscal, means a more responsi e and accountable local go ernment structure instituted through a system of decentrali3ation. @iscal autonomy includes the power of the 9=>s to among others, allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. !he assailed pro isions in the =AAPs of +$$$, #..., and #..+ and the *&: resolutions effecti ely encroach on the fiscal autonomy en;oyed by the 9=>s. !hey cannot be upheld.

TAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS FACTS: D/ JJ- was enacted to create a new pro ince, to be known as the /ro ince of "egros :el "orte, in the 0sland of "egros. 0t pro ides, among others, that BSec. (. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new pro ince which are the areas affected x x x.F /etitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional and it is not in accordance with the 9ocal =o ernment &ode Sec ,, A. L+ of our &onstitution mandates that, B"o pro ince, x x x may be created, x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in the local go ernment code, and sub;ect to the appro al by a ma;ority of the otes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.F Sec. +$< of the 9ocal =o ernment &ode enumerates the condition which must exist to pro ide the legal basis for the creation of a pro incial unit and these requisites are4 BA pro ince may be created if it has territory of at least three thousand fi e hundred square kilometers, x x x.F /ublic respondents argue that D/ JJ- should be accorded the presumption of legality, claiming that the said law does not infringe the &onstitution because the requisites of the 9ocal =o ernment &ode ha e been complied with. !hey further argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the /ro ince of "egros *ccidental, not included in the area of the new /ro ince of "egros del "orte, did not fall within the meaning and scope of the term Bunit or units affected.F ISSUE: 1hether D/ JJ- is constitutional HELD4 "o, D/ is not constitutional. 0t can be plainly seen that the constitutional pro ision makes it imperati e that there be first obtained Bthe appro al of a ma;ority of otes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected.F !hus, it is inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing pro ince would necessarily be substantially altered in order that there can be created the proposed new pro ince. !wo political units would be affected4 the first would be the parent pro ince because its boundaries substantially altered and the other would be of those in the area subtracted from the parent pro ince to constitute the proposed pro ince.

F "#$s vs D#% "n FACTS: /ursuant to the pro ision of Sec +, par 5d6of RA <##< 5Dases &on ersion and :e elopment Act of +$$#6. %ayor Richard =ordon of *longgapo &ity was appointed chairman and chief executi e of SD%A. !he appointment was question by the petitioners contending that Sec +, par 5d6 infringes the pro ision of Sec <, first par., Art 0LAD of the &onstitution, which states that B "o electi e official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure. Respondent contended on the other hand that the appointment is allowed for by Sec $( of the 9ocal =o ernment &ode which permits the appointment of a local electi e official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary function of the office. ISSUE: 1hether Sec. +, par 5d6 iolates the constitutional proscription against the designation or appointment of electi e official to other go ernment post HELD: 2es, it iolates the constitutional proscription. !he fact that the expertise of an electi e official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment. 9ocal =o ernment &ode, particularly Sec. $( is not determinati e of the constitutionality of Sec. +,, par 5d6 of RA <##< for no legislati e act can pre ail o er the fundamental law of the land.

V% an&$va vs Cas'an$(a FACTS: !here is in the icinity of /ublic market of San @ernando, /ampangga a strip land what is commonly known as talipapa. !he petitioner claim that they ha e the right to remain and conduct business in the area by irtue of a pre ious authori3ation granted to them by municipal go ernment while the respondent deny this and ;ustify the demolition of their stalls as illegal consideration on public property. %unicipal &ouncil of San @ernando adopted Res. "o. #+J authori3ing #( members of @ernando >nited %erchant and !raderPs Association to construct permanent stags. !he action was protested while the case is pending, the council adopted Res. "o. #$ which declared the sub;ect area B the parking palce and as the public pla3a, impliedly re oking Res "o. #+J. !he decision was apparently not enforced, the petitioner is not e icted the Associations of &oncerned &iti3en and &onsumer of San @ernando, /ampangga filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Res. #$ to restore the sub;ect property to its original and customary use as a public pla3a. VicenteA. %acalino, as officer in charge of the *ffice issued resolution to demolish the stalls in the area.

Iss&$: 1hether public pla3a is susceptible for contractual obligation H$ (: A public pla3a is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the sub;ect of lease or any contractual undertaking. Article +#<+ states that Bcommunal things that cannot be sold because they are by their nature outside commerce of are those for public use, such as pla3as, streets, common lands, ri ers, fountains etc.,F !he petitioner has no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contract.

CITY OF MANILA vs. CA FACTS: 0rene Sto. :omingo buried her husband in a lot at the "orth &emetery, which was leased to her by the &ity of %anila for a period of fifty years. @ull payment of the rental therefor of /-.... is e idenced by the said receipt which appears to be regular on its face. Delie ing in good faith that, in accordance with Administrati e *rder "o. -, Series of +$<-, of the &ity %ayor of %anila, prescribing uniform procedure and guidelines in the processing of documents pertaining to and for the use and disposition of burial lots and plots within the "orth &emetery, etc., sub;ect 9ot in which the mortal remains of the late Vi encio Sto. :omingo were laid to rest, was leased to the berea ed family for fi e 5-6 years only, it was certified as ready for exhumation. !he authorities of the cemetery authori3ed the exhumation and remo al from sub;ect burial lot the remains of the late Vi encio Sto. :omingo, Sr., placed the bones and skull in a bag or sack and kept the same in the depository or bodega of the cemetery. Subsequently, the same lot in question was rented out to another lessee so that when the plaintiffs herein went to said lot on All Souls :ay in their shock, consternation and dismay, that the resting place of their dear departed did not anymore bear the stone marker which they lo ingly placed on the tomb. 0ndignant and disgusted o er such a sorrowful finding, 0rene Sto. :omingo lost no time in inquiring and was told that the remains of her late husband had been taken from the burial lot in question. ISSUE: 1hether the operations of the cemetery is a corporate or proprietary function of the &ity. HELD: 2es. !he operations of the &ity of %anila of the cemetery is a corporate function. !he "orth &emetery is a patrimonial property of the &ity of %anila which was created by resolution of the %unicipal Doard of August #<, +$., and Eanuary <, +$.(. !he administration and go ernment of the cemetery are under the &ity Cealth *fficer, the order and police of the cemetery, the opening of gra es, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of the same are under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. !he &ity of %anila furthermore prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the use and dispositions of burial lots and plots within the "orth &emetery through Administrati e *rder "o. -, s. +$<-. 1ith the acts of dominion, there is, therefore no doubt that the "orth &emetery is within the class of property which the &ity of %anila owns in its proprietary or pri ate character. @urthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in fa or of the pri ate respondents. Cence, obligations arising from contracts ha e the force of law between the contracting parties.

MANILA vs. TEOTICO FACTS: =enaro !eotico file a complaint for damages against the city of manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police for the damages he had sustained when he fell inside an unco ered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on /. Durgos A enue as he stepped down from the curb to aboard a ;eepney. &ity of %anila howe er contends that the present case is go erned by Section ( of Republic Act "o. (.$ 5&harter of the &ity of %anila6 and not by Article #+J$ of the &i il &ode, because Republic Act "o. (.$ is a special law intended exclusi ely for the city of manila.&@0 rendered a decision fa oring the city of %anila, the &ourt of Appeals affirmed the &@0Ps decision but ordered city of %anila to pay damages. ISSUE4 1hether the case is go erned by Section ( of Republic Act "o. (.$ HELD "o. !he case is not go erned by Section ( of Republic Act "o. (.$ but by Article #+J$ of the &i il &ode. 0n Article #+J$ of the &i il &ode, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defecti e roads or streets belong to the pro ince, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. 1hat said article requires is that the pro ince, city or municipality ha e either Gcontrol or super isionG o er said street or road. E en if /. Durgos A enue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its Gcontrol or super isionG by the &ity of %anila, under Republic Act (.$.

!IMENEZ V. MANILA FACTS: !he e idence of the plaintiff 5petitioner herein6 shows that in the morning of August +-, +$<( he, together with his neighbors, went to Sta. Ana public market to buy GbagoongG at the time when the public market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater. After purchasing the GbagoongG he turned around to return home but he stepped on an unco ered opening which could not be seen because of the dirty rainwater, causing a dirty and rusty fourA inch nail, stuck inside the unco ered opening, to pierce the left leg of plaintiffApetitioner penetrating to a depth of about one and a half inches. After administering first aid treatment at a nearby drugstore, his companions helped him hobble home. Ce felt ill and de eloped fe er and he had to be carried to :r. Euanita %ascardo. :espite the medicine administered to him by the latter, his left leg swelled with great pain. Ce was then rushed to the Veterans %emorial Cospital where he had to be confined for twenty 5#.6 days due to high fe er and se ere pain. ISSUE: 1hether &ity of %anila is liable HELD: 2ES. !his issue has been laid to rest in the case of City o! )anila v. Teotico 5## S&RA #'$A#<# R+$'JS6 where the Supreme &ourt squarely ruled that Republic Act "o. (.$ establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the &ity of %anila for Gdamages or in;ury to persons or property arising from the failure of city officersG to enforce the pro isions of said Act, Gor any other law or ordinance or from negligenceG of the &ity G%ayor, %unicipal Doard, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said pro isions.G >pon the other hand, Article #+J$ of the &i il &ode of the /hilippines which pro ides that4 /ro inces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or in;uries suffered by any person by reason of defecti e conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works under their control or super ision. constitutes a particular prescription making Gpro inces, cities and municipalities ... liable for damages for the death of, or in;ury suffered by any person by reasonG T specifically T Gof the defecti e condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or super ision.G 0n other words, Art. +, sec. (, R.A. "o. (.$ refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the ob;ect, thereof, while Article #+J$ of the &i il &ode go erns liability due to Gdefecti e streets,

public buildings and other public worksG in particular and is therefore decisi e on this specific case. GUILATCO vs. CITY OF DAGUPAN FACTS: 0t would appear from the e idences that on Euly #-, +$<J, =uilatco, while she was about to board a motori3ed tricycle at a sidewalk located at /ere3 Dl d. accidentally fell into a manhole located on said sidewalk, thereby causing her right leg to be fractured. As a result thereof, she had to be hospitali3ed, operated on, confined, at first at the /angasinan /ro incial Cospital. She also incurred hospitali3ation, medication and other expenses to the tune of / J,.-,.'- or a total of / +.,...... in all, as other receipts were either lost or misplaced7 during the period of her confinement in said two hospitals, plaintiff suffered se ere or excruciating pain not only on her right leg which was fractured but also on all parts of her body7 the pain has persisted e en after her discharge from the %edical &ity =eneral Cospital on *ctober $, +$<J, to the present. :espite her discharge from the Cospital plaintiff is presently still wearing crutches and the &ourt has actually obser ed that she has difficulty in locomotion. @rom the time of the mishap on Euly #-, +$<J up to the present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter, as she has difficulty of locomotion in going up the stairs of her office, located near the city hall in :agupan &ity. She earns at least / <#.... a month consisting of her monthly salary and other means of income, but since Euly #-, +$<J up to the present she has been depri ed of said income as she has already consumed her accrued lea es in the go ernment ser ice. She has lost se eral pounds as a result of the accident and she is no longer her former ;o ial self, she has been unable to perform her religious, social, and other acti ities which she used to do prior to the incident. ISSUE: 1hether &ity of :agupan is liableH HELD: !he liability of public corporations for damages arising from in;uries suffered by pedestrians from the defecti e condition of roads is expressed in the &i il &ode as follows4 Article #+J$. /ro inces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or in;uries suffered by, any person by reason of the defecti e condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or super ision. 0t is not e en necessary for the defecti e road or street to belong to the pro ince, city or municipality for liability to attach. !he article only requires that either control or super ision is exercised o er the defecti e road or street.

MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE vs. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION FACTS: /ursuant to Sangguniang Dayan Resolution, the %unicipality of /araQaque filed a complaint for expropriation against pri ate respondent, o er two parcels of land to be used for a sociali3ed housing pro;ect. Respondent filed an answer and alleged that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because the complaint was filed pursuant to a resolution and not an ordinance as required by RA <+'. and that the cause of action, if any, was barred by res ;udicata. ISSUE: 1hether such is alidH HELD: A local go ernment unit cannot authori3e an expropriation of pri ate property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. !he 9ocal =o ernment &ode, particularly Section +$ expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the municipal council will not suffice.!he power of eminent domain is lodged in &ongress, which may delegate the exercise thereof to 9=>)s. !he latter, when authori3ed by &ongress, is sub;ect to the legislature)s control and restraints imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. Cence, the State or its authori3ed agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate once all the legal requirements are complied with. !o rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain but also clearly defeat social ;ustice. !he petition is denied without pre;udice to petitioner)s proper exercise of its power of eminent domain o er the sub;ect property

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: !he Sangguniang /anlalawigan of petitioner passed a resolution in +$JJ authori3ing the pro incial go ernor to purchase or expropriate pri ate property contiguous to the pro incial capitol for the purpose of establishing a pilot farm for nonA food and nonAtraditional agricultural crops and housing pro;ect for the go ernment employees. !he land sought to be expropriated belongs to the San Eoaquins, which at the time the complaint is filed, the go erning law was D/ ,,< which authori3es expropriation by mere resolution of the municipal council. !he &ourt of Appeals suspended the expropriation proceedings and requires petitioner to submit the requisite appro al of the :AR to con ert the classification of the property from agricultural to nonAagricultural. Cence, the present petition. ISSUE: 1hether such is alidH HELD "*. !he power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by &omprehensi e Agrarian Reform 9aw 5&AR9 or RA ''-<6 particularly Section '- which requires the appro al of the :AR before a parcel of land can be reclassified. &AR9 does not intimate in the least that 9=>)s must first secure the appro al of :AR before petitioner can institute the necessary proceedings. !he authority of :AR to appro e or disappro e con ersions of agricultural land cannot extend to the exercise of eminent domain, otherwise :AR will ha e the authority to scrutini3e whether the expropriation is for a public use or not. *rdinarily, it is the municipal council that determines whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated is for public use, the same being an expression of legislati e policy. !he courts will inter ene only when no real or substantial relation is established between the undertaking and public use. >nder the new concept, public use means public ad antage, con enience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and prosperity of the whole community. 0n the present case, the expropriation for the establishment of pilot de elopment center is for a public purpose.

PATALINGHUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: !he Sangguniang /anglunsod of :a ao &ity enacted ordinance number ,',, for the expanded 3oning ordinance of :a ao &ity. Section J of which pro ide that funeral parlors shall be established not less than -. meters from any residential structures, churches and other institutional buildings. /etitioner commenced the construction of his funeral parlor, but his permit to construct the building was cancelled because the construction of the funeral parlor was within the -.Ameter radius measured from the nearest residential structure owned by 1ilfred !eepot, which is leased by laundry businesses. /etitioner argued that !eepot)s building is for commercial purposes since a business was being undertaken therein, and its classification as residential in tax declaration is not conclusi e. ISSUE: 1hether such was considered commercial 3oneH HELD: 2es. E en if !eepot)s building was declared for taxation purposes as residential, once a local go ernment has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for 3oning purposes must pre ail. @urthermore, a tax declaration is not conclusi e of the nature of the property for 3oning purposes. >nder Section ## of the Real Estate !ax &ode, tax declaration does not bind a pro incial or city assessor. 0n fact, a piece of land declared by the tax payer as residential may be assessed by the pro incial or city assessor as commercial because its actual use is commercial. %ore importantly, the declaration of the said area as a commercial 3one through a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power

FRIVALDO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS FACTS: *n %arch #., +$$-, @ri aldo filed his &ertificate of &andidacy for =o ernor. 9ee, another candidate, filed a petition w? the &*%E9E& praying that @ri aldo be disqualified for not yet being a citi3en of the /hilippines. :uring the elections, @ri aldo garnered the highest number of otes. 9ee filed a petition praying for his proclamation as the elected go ernor. At J4,. pm of Eune ,., +$$-, 9ee was proclaimed go ernor. @ri aldo filed a new petition w? &*%E9E& seeking the annulment of the Eune ,. proclamation of 9ee and his own proclamation. Ce alleged that on Eune ,., +$$-, at #4..pm, he took his oath of allegiance as a citi3en of the /hilippines after his petition for repatriation under /.:. <#- w?c he filed with the Special &ommittee on "aturali3ation in September +$$( had been granted. !he issue is whether or not repatriation of @ri aldo alid and legalH ISSUE: 1hether @ri aldo can be electedH HELD: Repatriation is alid and legal. >nder /hil law, citi3enship may be reacquired by direct act of &ongress, by naturali3ation or by repatriation. %oreo er, @ri aldoPs repatriation seasonably cures his lack of citi3enship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and hold office as go ernor. Ce possessed the citi3enship requirement on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Section ,$ of 9ocal =o ernment &ode must be liberally construed. !he law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citi3enship, unlike that for residence and age. "ow, an official begins to go ern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. @urthermore, Sec ,$ speaks of GIualificationsG of GE9E&!0VE *@@0&0A9SG, not of candidates. 9iterally, such qualifications should thus be possessed when the electi e official begins to go ern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed. 9eePs argument that the citi3enship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate registered as a oter as under the law a G oterG must be a citi3en of the /hilippines is untenable. 0f the law intended the citi3enship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered oter, then it would not ha e made citi3enship a SE/ARA!E qualification. !he law abhors a redundancy. 0t therefore stands to reason that the law intended &0!0OE"SC0/ to be a qualification distinct from being a V*!ER, e en if being a oter presumes being a citi3en first.

GREGO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS FACTS: Dasco was remo ed from his position as :eputy Sheriff by the S& upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrati e complaint lodged by a certain "ena !ordesillas.5"ew 9=& "*! yet in effect then6. Subsequently, Dasco ran as a candidate for councilor and won 5"ew 9=& already in effect6. After his term, Dasco sought reelection twice and won on both reelections. /etition for disqualification was filed against Dasco, using section (. 5b6 of the 9=&U but dismissed. !he issue is whether or not the petition for disqualification was correctly dismissed ISSUE: 1hether dismissal was alidH HELD: "o. 0t was correctly dismisses. Sec. (. 5b6 of the 9=& does not apply retroacti ely to those remo ed from office before it took effect on Ean. +, +$$#. DascoPs election to office as city councilor in the +$JJ, +$$# and +$$- elections wipe away and condone the administrati e penalty against him, thus restoring his eligibility for public office. 0t must be noted that there was nothing to condone in the first place. Dasco was "*! sub;ect to any disqualification at all under Sec. (. 5b6 of the 9=&, which applies only to those remo ed from office on or after Ean. +, +$$#. 0n iew of the irrele ance of the issue posed by petitioner, there is no more reason to dwell on the matter.

MERCADO vs. MANZANO FACTS: Ernesto S. %ercado and pri ate respondent Eduardo D. %an3ano were candidates for ice mayor of the &ity of %akati in the %ay ++, +$$J elections. !he other one was =abriel V. :a3a 000. !he results of the election were as follows4 Eduardo D. %an3ano +.,,J-, Ernesto S. %ercado +..,J$( =abriel V. :a3a 000 -(,#<- ) !he proclamation of pri ate respondent was suspended in iew of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto %amaril who alleged that pri ate respondent was not a citi3en of the /hilippines but of the >nited States. ISSUE: 1hether %an3ano can alidly be elected as Vice %ayor ha ing dual citi3enshipH HELD: 2es. !he disqualification of pri ate respondent %an3ano is being sought under V(. of the 9ocal =o ernment &ode of +$$+ 5R.A. "o. <+'.6, which declares as Gdisqualified from running for any electi e local position4 . . . 5d6 !hose with dual citi3enship.G !his pro ision is incorporated in the &harter of the &ity of %akati. o begin with, dual citi3enship is different from dual allegiance. !he former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. @or instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citi3ens of a state which adheres to the principle of %us sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of %us soli. Such a person, ipso !acto and without any oluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citi3en of both states :ual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positi e act, loyalty to two or more states. 1hile dual citi3enship is in oluntary, dual allegiance is the result of an indi idual)s olition.

DAVID vs COMELEC FACTS: 0n his capacity as barangay chairman of Darangay <<, Oone <, 8alookan &ity and as president of the 9iga ng mga Darangay sa /ilipinas, Alex 9. :a id filed a petition for prohibition to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second %onday of %ay +$$<. /etitioner 9iga ng mga Darangay Iue3on &ity &hapter represented by its president Donifacio %. Rillon filed a petition Gto seek a ;udicial re iew by certiorari to declare as unconstitutional. +. Section (,5c6 of R.A. <+'. which reads as follows4 5c6 !he term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three 5,6 years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second %onday of %ay +$$(. #. &*%E9E& Resolution "os. #JJ. and #JJ< fixing the date of the holding of the barangay elections on %ay +#, +$$< and other acti ities related thereto7 ,. !he budgetary appropriation of /(.. million contained in Republic Act "o. J#-. otherwise known as the =eneral Appropriations Act of +$$< intended to defray the costs and expenses in holding the +$$< barangay elections. Doth petitions though worded differently raise the same ultimate issue4 Cow long is the term of office of barangay officialsH /etitioners contend that under Sec. # of RA ''-, G5t6he term of office of barangay officials shall be for fi e 5-6 years . . .G !his is reiterated in RA ''<$. /etitioners further a er that although Sec. (, of RA <+'. reduced the term of office of all local electi e officials to three years, such reduction does not apply to barangay officials because 5+6 RA ''<$ is a special law applicable only to barangays while RA <+'. is a general law which applies to all other local go ernment units7 5#6 RA <+'. does not expressly or impliedly repeal RA ''<$ insofar as the term of barangay officials is concerned ISSUE: 1hether the term of the barangay officials should be limited only to three years

HELD: 2es. 0n light of the brief historical background, the intent and design of the legislature to limit the term of barangay officials to only three 5,6 years as pro ided under the 9ocal =o ernment &ode emerges as bright as the sunlight. !he cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and gi e effect to the intent of the law. And three years is the ob ious intent. FARINAS vs BALBA

FACTS: &arlito D. :omingo was a member of the Sangguniang Dayan of San "icolas, 0locos "orte. *n %arch #(, +$$(, he resigned after going without lea e to the >nited States. !he %ayor, Angelo Darba, recommended Edward @arinas to fill the acancy. Ce is also recommended by the Sangguniang Dayan of San "icolas directed to the %ayor. !he resolution regarding to the recommendation was submitted to Sangguniang /anlalawigan of 0locos "orte in compliance with Section -' of the 9ocal =o ernment &ode. Sangguniang /anlalawigan disappro ed the resolution for the reason that the authority and power to appoint Sangguniang Dayan members are lodged to the =o ernor. *n the other hand, despite the disappro al, the respondent still appointed @arinas. 9ater on, he took an oath. *n Eune +(, +$$(, petitioners filed with the R!& of 0locos "orte a petition quo warranto and prohibition. !he !rial &ourt uphold the appointment. ISSUE: 1ho can appoint the replacement in case of a permanent acancy in Sangguniang Dayan caused by the cessation from office of a member who does not belong to any political part. HELD: !here is only one go erning appointment to Sanggunian Dayan. Any acancy therein caused by the cessation from office of a member with or without a political party must be made by the =o ernor upon the recommendation of the said Sanggunian.

BUNYE vs ESCAREAL FACTS: !he Sandiganbayan pre enti ely suspended petitioners from office pending trial for iolation of a pro ision of the AntiA=raft and &orrupt /ractices Act for enacting B8apasiyahan Dlg (-F, and based on which they forcibly took the management and operation of the new public market in Alabang from &ooperati e named 8ilusang %agtitinda. /etitioner assailed said, suspensions will toll the operations of the 9=> without the mayor, Vice mayor and ' councilors who were suspended, one that nothing can possibly compromised or hampered by their remaining office since the proceeding will no longer be for the purpose recei ing e idence, hence, they insisted that the order suspending them should be set aside as a gra e abuse of the &ourtPs decision. ISSUE: 1hether or not petitioners arguments alid to reconsider the SandiganbayanPs order of suspension HELD: "o. !he court found no merit in the petitioners argument s. !he sole ob;ecti e of an administrati e suspension is to pre ent the accused from hampering the in estigation with his influence and authority o er possible witness or to keep him from recei ing e idence, that pre enti e suspension is %andatory. !he fear of the petitioner that the %unicipal corporation of %untinlupa will be paraly3ed for $.days when are pre enti ely suspended is remote. !here will still remain J councilors who can meet as the Sanguniang Dayan.