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Divorce Law Republic of the Philippines v.

Cipriano Orbecido III 471 SCRA 114 Facts: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva and their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General sought reconsideration but it was denied. Issue: Whether or not, given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse can likewise remarry under Philippine law? Held: Yes. The intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, were Filipino citizens but, later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party was a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. However, the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. Thus, Cipriano is not capacitated to remarry.

Divorce Law Republic of the Philippines v. Crasus Iyoy 470 SCRA 508 Facts: Crasus and Fely Iyoy married on December 16, 1961 which they had five children. In 1984, Fely went to the United States and at the same year sent divorce papers to Crasus asking the latter to sign them. In 1985, Crasus found out that Fely married an American Citizen named Stephen Micklus and eventually bore him a child. Fely went back to the Philippines occasionally, including once when she attended the marriage of one of her children where she freely used the surname of her second husband in the invitations. On March 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity in their marriage in the ground of psychological incapacity since Fely unambiguously brought danger and dishonor to the family. Fely however filed a counterclaim and avouched therein that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, and jobless, the reason forced the former to left for the United States. Furthermore, Fely argued her marriage to Stephen Micklus valid since shes already an American Citizen and therefore not covered by our laws. Issue: Whether or not the abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity? Held: No. Since the evidences presented by the respondent failed to prove psychological incapacity as the Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar. As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

Divorce Law Edgar San Luis v. Felicidad San Luis 514 SCRA 294 Facts: During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit to whom he had six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, U.S.A., which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death. Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss and claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Issues: 1. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration 2. Whether or not a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code Held: In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. Petitioners cite Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Divorce Law Orlando Tongol v. Filipinas Tongol 537 SCRA 135 Facts: Orlando and Filipinas were married on August 27, 1967 and begot four children. Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, which was granted. Orlando filed a verified petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. In her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless and that their marriage is a failure. However, she claims that their marriage failed because it is Orlando who is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his obligations as a married man. RTC and the CA gave credence to the conclusion of the examining psychiatrist, Dr. Villegas, that respondent is suffering from Inadequate Personality Disorder. However, both courts ruled that the behavior exhibited by respondent does not amount to psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented in the present case is enough to sustain a finding that herein respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. Held: In sum, it is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a psychological disorder. However, the totality of the evidence presented in the present case does not show that her personality disorder is of the kind contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code as well as jurisprudence as to render her psychologically incapacitated or incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

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