RACISM AND SOCIAL

MARGINALISATION:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
THREE EU MEMBER STATES
Research Team in France:
Catherine Blaya (dir.)
Eric Debarbieux
Jean-Franois Bruneaud
Franoise Lorcerie
Research assisans :
Benjamin Denecheau
ristana !imor
"ur#lie Ber$uer
Inernai!na"
O#ser$a!r% !&
Vi!"ence in Sch!!"s
%ni&ersit %ni&ersit# # de Bordeaux de Bordeaux
F'("L )E!*) * +E E%)*!E"( %('*(
F%(D",E("L )'-+. "-E(C/0
DECE,BE) 1223
Research Team in S'ain:
Cristina )echea- "lberola
(dir.)
-loria Fern4nde5- !acheco
)a6uel Bartolom#
Research assisans :
Esther Fern4nde5- ,olina
Lourdes )ueda
"na L. Cuer&o
Research Team in U(:
.usan ,c7ie
.usan 8iltshire
Research assisans :
Eric Chen
"shley 7ar$hese
u9yal Choudhury
INDEX
Page
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER 2 - REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 4
CHAPTER 3 STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 35
CHAPTER 4 DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF MEMBER STATES 43
CHAPTER 5 SURVEY RESULTS FROM FRANCE 51
CHAPTER 6 SURVEY RESULTS FROM SPAIN 85
CHAPTER 7 SURVEY RESULTS FROM THE UK 118
CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS 148
CHAPTER 9 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 153
REFERENCES 155
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Background to the research
Since violent radicalisation has emerged as a European and global concern,
institutions such as the European Union are increasingly keen to identify and address
the factors and causes which may contribute towards peoples involvement in
extremist violence and violent radicalization. he European !ommission defines
violent radicalization as "people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could
lead to those acts of terrorism as they are defined in #rticle $ of the %ramework
&ecision on !ombating errorism'
$
. (n particular, the !ommission points out that
"although Europe has experienced different types of terrorism in its history, the main
threat currently comes from terrorism that is underlined by an abusive interpretation
of (slam'.
(slam is a world religion with around $.) billion followers* however, only a very small
proportion of +uslims are thought to be involved in radical movements that support
violence, either in a passive or an active way. herefore, current policies are
concerned with identifying the reasons why and how certain individuals develop
attitudes that support such activities and become involved themselves. he European
!ommission has acknowledged that "the reasons for becoming involved in groups
which use terrorism against others as a way of expressing their ideas often stem from
a combination of perceived or real in,ustice or exclusion'. Such feelings of in,ustice
or exclusion leave +uslim youths feeling discriminated against and alienated. # key
focus of interest, therefore, is the relationship between experiences of racism and
social -ehaviour-ed-n- and manifestations of violent -ehaviour-ed-n or terrorism.
.y addressing the root of such problems, more might be done by European agencies
to prevent radicalisation amongst +uslim youth.
(n an effort to become better informed about potential pathways to violent
radicalisation, the European !ommission, under the &irectorate /eneral for 0ustice,
1iberty and Security 2&/ 01S3, put out a call for research proposals to explore this
complex area. he European Union +onitoring !entre on 4acism and 5enophobia,
which has subse6uently become the European Union #gency for %undamental 4ights
2%4#3, had published two reports in 7889 highlighting the absence of high 6uality
data on young +uslims experiences of integration, victimisation and discrimination.
(n particular, these reports noted that the absence of evidence about the experience of
young +uslims in EU +ember States, particularly those with sizeable +uslim
populations, was hampering the efforts of policy makers to develop initiatives to
address issues around racism and social marginalisation or prevent violent
radicalisation. (n 788:, therefore, the %4# commissioned a piece of research aimed
at collecting much needed 6uantitative data racism and social marginalisation, by
looking at the experiences, attitudes and behaviours of +uslim and non;+uslim
youths in three EU member states which had been the target of (slamist inspired
violence< %rance, Spain and the U=.
he research team commissioned by the %4# to carry out this study was a
collaborative group of researchers based in University of !astilla de la +ancha in
$
.russels, 7$.>.788), !?+2788)3 -$- final, !?++U@(!#(?@ %4?+ AE !?++(SS(?@ ? AE
EU4?BE#@ B#41(#+E@ #@& AE !?U@!(1 concerning errorist recruitment< addressing the factors
contributing to violent radicalisation available at http<CCeur;lex.europa.euC1exUriServC1exUriServ.doD
uriE!?+<788)<8-$-<%(@<E@<A+1
-
Spain, the University of .ordeaux in %rance and the University of Edinburgh in the
U=. he team were asked to conduct a survey of $888 young people between the
ages of $7 and $F in each member state, ensuring that the sample represented both
males and females and +uslim and non;+uslim youths. he %4# stipulated that the
research should be informed by the following underlying hypothesis<
Discrimination and social marginalisation are major stumbling blocks to
integration and community cohesion. In particular, discrimination and racial
abuse can lead to social marginalisation and alienation that, in turn, might be
one set of factors leading some individuals to develop attitudes, and even
activities, supporting radicalised movements and their use of violence.
Aims of the research
he main aim of this research study was to explore the relationship between young
peoples experiences of discrimination and social marginalisation, including racism,
and the development of attitudes, and potential activities, that may be supportive of
violence and, particularly, extremist violence or terrorism. he intention of the %4#
was to explore these relationships with a view to identifying possible pathways to
violent radicalisation, which could be researched further by other means. (t was not
the intention of this research to identify any of the young people participating in the
study as potential future terrorists or to suggest that the communities from which
young people were sampled were areas that were at most risk of developing violent
radicalisation. E6ually, it was not the intention of the research to highlight specific
problems of violence or social marginalisation solely amongst young +uslims.
he study had two main aims<
o explore experiences of and attitudes towards racism, discrimination and social
marginalisation amongst young people aged $7 to $F from +uslim and @on;
+uslim backgrounds across - EU member states.
o explore the links between the experiences and attitudes of +uslim and non;
+uslim youths and their attitudes towards or activities in support of violent
radicalisation.
Structure of the report
his report presents the findings from the research conducted by the Universities of
!astilla la +ancha, .ordeaux and Edinburgh. !hapter 7 starts with a comprehensive
review of the literature looking at issues around (slamic culture, both globally and
within the context of the three member states covered by this research. !hapter -
presents details of the research design and methodology, and highlights the main
practical and ethical challenges presented by this research. (n !hapter G, a
demographic profile of the samples from each of the three member states is presented,
including details of their age, sex, religious and cultural background. he following
three chapters present the substantive findings from each of the three member states,
namely %rance, Spain and the U=. Each findings chapter is separated into two main
sections, the first of which focuses on experiences of and attitudes towards alienation,
G
discrimination, bullying and violence, while the second focuses on the lifestyles,
family backgrounds, friendship patterns, spare time activities and school experience
of the young people surveyed. he report ends with !hapter F, which draws together
the main conclusions from the research and presents a series of policy implications
and recommendations.
)
CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
ISLAM IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
hroughout history there have been cultural, ideological and territorial disputes
conducted in the name of religion. he twentieth and twenty first centuries have been
no different, except that with increasing technology and communications, weapons
are more potent and far reaching in impact. he relentless disputes between (srael
and Balestine, which sees 0ews pitted against +uslims is perhaps emblematic, as was
the drawn out .osnian crisis, with each side accusing the other of terrorist atrocities
and even genocide. .ut it was the catastrophic events of >C$$ that were to arouse and
awaken a modern global concern with (slam, centred primarily upon the radical and
violent group, al Haeda, and its acts of terrorism across the world.
State leaders responded to >C$$ with a variety of policies, both nationally and
internationally. %oreign policies culminated in wars against #fghanistan and later
(ra6, whilst internal policy, in the U= at least, was eventually criticised for being both
too harsh and too soft* on the one hand fuelling a wider (slamaphobia, and on the
other, for a policy of appeasement premised upon a philosophy of multiculturalism,
that actually permitted the more recent phenomenon of home grown terrorism to
flourish in its midst, culminating in the 1ondon bombings and later, the attempt to
destroy /lasgow airport. +eanwhile, %rance had been vigorously pursuing
integration into a singular %rench way of life in a bid to encourage national unity and
avoid segregationalism, whilst in Spain there has been little sign of any integrationist
politics until fairly recently.
Even before >C$$, but especially since, research clearly evidences a rise in racist and
discriminatory attitudes towards non; European immigrants and ethnic minorities, and
an increase in concern about immigration among public authorities across Europe
2+oreau, 7888* %unke, 788$3. %or example, a survey by the European +onitoring
!entre of 4acism and 5enophobia 2788$3 reported that half of the members of the
European Union believed that ethnic minorities were contributing to the employment
difficulties experienced in their country, and that ethnic minorities were abusing
social welfare services. #round half of the respondents believed that there are too
many children from ethnic minorities at schools and that this constitutes an
impediment to general school achievement. +oreover, that the feeling of insecurity
due to the presence of ethnic minorities had increased, a feeling reported by -7I of
U= respondents, )$I of %rench respondents, and -GI of the Spanish respondents.
#t the theoretical level, prior to >C$$ there had been little interest in Jterrorism among
sociologists. (t can be understood, like other phenomena, as a social construction,
where governments define the acts as Jterrorist, a labelling endeavour by powerful
state elites to define a particular group in threatening terms. .y contrast the
perpetrators maintain that they are struggling for freedom and martyrdom. Breviously
the #merican government had labelled the Soviets as the font of terrorism 2Sterling,
$>F7* urk, 788G3. his was set to change as +uslims became the new enemy within,
the Jother.
9
# growing body of literature now seeks to explain the complex motivations of
terrorism, or what has come to be known as violent radicalization and its association
with distorted interpretations of (slam promoted by (slamists. !onversely, there is a
broad range of literature which also explores the ways in which +uslims from various
backgrounds have experienced discrimination and racism in countries they have
chosen to settle in, which impacts on feelings of belonging and Jotherness 2Saeed,
788:3, and which might also go some way towards understanding motivations
towards violent :ehaviour:ed:n.
his report presents evidence of a range of discrimination indices and experiences
from across the three +ember States involved in the research. #ll of these clearly
show the extent of social marginalization, and evidence of feelings of alienation that
many +uslims are living with on a daily basis. he research hypothesis suggests that
discrimination and racism, of which many +uslims are sub,ected to across Europe,
may encourage young people to feel socially marginalised and alienated, which may
manifest as motivational factors in the adoption of positive attitudes towards
radicalisation and violence. his study is therefore crucial in mapping the attitudes
towards, and experiences of racism and social marginalisation amongst both +uslim
and non;+uslim youth in %rance, Spain and the U=.
ISLAM IN FRANCE
4elationships between %rance and the #rab;+uslim world are centuries old, a similar
relationship also having evolved over time with Spain. (n :$$, the anger governor,
ari6 ibn #iyad colonized Spain and some parts of %rance beyond the Byrenees.
+uslims initially settled in the #rab province of @arbonne 2South of %rance3 until
their fall in :)>. Some +uslim presence continued and during the $8
th
century some
#ndalus +uslims settled in Brovence for about one hundred years. he Sarasins were
also present in the area of +ontpellier during the twelth century.
he +iddle #ges witnessed a very tense period between the %rench and +uslims
which is most clearly evidenced in the !rusades. Aowever, some diplomatic
relationships were also established. %or instance, between BKpin le .ref and the
!alifon #bbasside al;+ansour 2:9);:9F3 or between !harlemagne and Aarun al;
4ashid 2:>:;F8:3. 1ater, the %rench colonial period beginning in $F-8 with the
overtaking of #lger prompted a new period of violent relationships with the +uslim
world. %rance showed a strong interest in +aghreb at the end of the $>
th
century.
unisia became a %rench protectorate in $FF$ through the treaty of =sar SaLd,
followed by the +arsa agreement that took any authority left to the .ey of unis.
+orocco became a protectorate of %rance in $>$7 with the reaty of %ez. +any
+oroccan soldiers 2/oumieres3 served in the %rench army in both Morld Mar ( and
Morld Mar ((. (n $>)9, #lgeria was liberated from the colonization of %rance, and
+orocco and unis gained their independence. Subse6uently immigration from these
countries was encouraged to fill labour shortages, many of the immigrants being
+uslim.
oday there are many +uslim organisations in %rance, the main ones detailed below.
hese have different origins and political ob,ectives. Mhen (slam was a religion of
:
isolated workers, before the family reunification process, +uslim worshippers would
gather on the basis of their origin and residence. hey did not have any claims
towards public policies, and consulates tightly controlled them. 1ittle by little, the
immigration of other family members has led to change. (n all the European countries
where +uslim people have settled they have tried to organize themselves with their
own religious organizations basing their demand for these in %rance on their claim to
%rench citizens rights to freedom of religion.
The Grand Mosque de Paris (GMP).
(n %rance, (slam has long been associated with the /+B, the most ancient +uslim
organization in +etropolitan %rance, inaugurated in $>79 to honour +uslims who had
participated in the %irst Morld Mar as allies to %rance. #lgeria is responsible for its
financing, and it is organized under a federation that controls various groups spread
across five different administrative areas lead by a +ufti. o the %rench authorities,
the /+B has thus represented a form of moderate (slam.
The Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF).
his federation, created in $>F-, was the first to compete with the /+B. ?riginally
led by unisians, it had been considered a +oroccan organization since its !hairman
and /eneral Secretary were +oroccan. he U?(% had long been perceived as
extremist, that is, until 788- when Sarkozy, +inister of the (nterior at that time,
accepted an invitation to their national congress, thus legitimating their status as a key
+uslim organization in %rance. #part from organizing an annual congress, the
federation also provides European seminars for young imams. Studies are offered to
both males and females to train them to lead prayers, and to manage +os6ues and
+uslim cultural centres. ?ther associated groups include the 0eunes +usulmans de
%rance N 0+% 2Ooung +uslims of %rance3, Etudiants +usulmans de %rance 2+uslim
Students of %rance3 and a Momens organization. Such groups and their involvement
in local neighbourhoods meant that the federation has remained close to youth and
their families throughout the $>>8s. Aowever, improvements in the social status of
regional and national leaders contributed towards distancing themselves from
"ordinary' +uslims. Oouth, in particular, perceive the federation as a conformist
organization for their parents.
The Fdration Nationale des Musulmans de France (FNMF)
his group was created in $>F) in opposition to the #lgerian leadership of the
+os6ue of Baris 2.oyer, $>>F3. o start with its members were from varied
backgrounds such as %rench, unisian, +oroccan and urkish. (t proved a challenge
to retain a united cohesion and eventually divisions emerged around the lines of
ethnicity. #ccording to 1aurent P QaLsse 2788:3, the federation was created not only
in opposition to the /+B but also to empower converted %rench +uslims. he
organization was eventually managed by hard;core +oroccan leaders and became a
representative entity of 4abat and its government, with which they maintain a steady
relationship. (n 7889 the federation was temporarily put under tutelage because of
financial and management difficulties. he same year various members seceded and
created a new group, the 4assemblement des +usulmans de %rance 24+%3.
F
The Salafis
he Salfis do not form part of the main organizations presented above. Salafis tend to
gather around a religious leader, with links and contacts made through &Q&s,
websites and books. hey are considered ultra;conservative. (n %rance, at least
officially, they do not operate any +os6ues since doing so would re6uire official
recognition from public, local or national authorities. hey form networks to support
the visit of a personality from the #rab world or visit them instead. hey tend to use
some already existing structures in which they gather to disseminate their message,
primarily to youth. hey target a +os6ue in which to proslytise until the +os6ues
leaders expel them, owing to the (slamist image they represent. hey tend to recruit
amongst "hittistes' in suburbs and socially deprived neighbourhoods 2Ait means hang
around in #rab3. Aowever, they are a heterogeneous group, their commonality being
their distance to the rest of +uslims and their re,ection of any political involvement in
the name of (slam 2#mghar, 788F3.
1ately, the very term of Salafism has become synonymous for fundamentalism and
terrorism. heir bearded male members and females wearing bur6a represent appear
to show evidence of the danger (slam can represent, in particular, their reflection in
the media and political discourse associates them with #l;HaLda. Aowever, there are
various groups among the Salafis and not all of them are extreme. Mhat they share in
common is the interpretation of (slam and Huran in compliance with the first three
generations of +uslims earliest Huran. he most extreme Salafi are from the akfir
of which translation of the Huran is anathema 2ernisien, 7887, p. $:G;$:)3. heir
main idea is that the whole +uslim community and its members should be
excommunicated since they do not comply with what they consider to be the genuine
and authentic (slam.
he %rench Salafi school of thought is Mahhabi or "Unitarian' orientated since it
follows the school of thought from Saudi #rabia. #ccording to =epel 2788G3, the
movement is divided into two branches< on one side the 0ihadists who consider it
normal to use violence to return to an authentic (slam* and on the other side the
"Sheikhists' who condemn terrorism as a whole, and are faithful to the Sheikhs who
lead Saudi #rabia. #ccording to =epel 2788G3, Mahhabism became influent amongst
+uslims following the increase of oil in the $>:8s which enabled Saudi #rabia to
spend large amounts of money to promote Mahhabism, or what some call "petro;
(slam'.
Other organizations
%oi et Brati6ue depend on the 0amaat al abligh group which originates from
Bakistan. his group is considered as rigorist and was created in %rance in $>:7. (t
runs various +os6ues in Baris, preaching 2=hro,3 by travelling under the supervision
of a leader called Emir. hey traverse neighbourhoods, cafes and apartment buildings
halls to remind +uslims of the fundamental principles of the +uslim faith and advise
them to respect these. he group is particularly active in socially deprived areas but
their role seems to be limited mainly to the one described above. # great number of
youth have returned to (slam as a result of this groups 2outreach3 work, without
becoming members. (slam in %rance remains strongly linked to the country of origin
>
of its members. #lthough the group is not considered a fundamentalist organization, it
is thought that association could be a step towards radicalisation for some youth.
urkish people also have their own groups, for example, the !omitK de !oordination
des +usulmans urcs de %rance 2the !oordination !ommittee for the urkish
+uslims in %rance3 and the &yanet &((. and +illR /SrTs. urkish +os6ues in
%rance are run by the &((.. (n Europe, from the $,$88 identified urkish +os6ues,
half are under the control of the &((. and the +os6ues are considered sovereign
urkish territories. ?ne of the critics addressed to the &((. by the +illL /SrTs is that
they represent an impediment to the integration of urks in Europe, since one of their
main ob,ectives is "love for your home nation, flag and religion 21aurent P QaLsse,
788:, p. $G73.
he #ssociation des Etudiants (slami6ues de %rance 2?rganization of (slamist
Students in %rance3 was created in $>9- and it is linked to the Syrian branch of the
+uslim .rothers. he %ederation %ranUaise des #ssociations (slami6ues d#fri6ue,
des !omores et des #ntilles 2%rench %ederation of the (slamist #ssociations from
#frica, !omoros and Mest (ndies3 was largely involved in the consultation process on
(slam in %rance organized by the +inistry of the (nterior in the $>>8s. #s far as youth
organizations are concerned there are also the Union des 0eunes +usulmans de %rance
2Union of Ooung +uslims in %rance3 with their head6uarters in 1yon, and 0eunes
+usulmans de %rance 2Ooung +uslims in %rance3 mentored by the U?(%.
Me can thus say that +uslims are well organized in %rance and are actively involved
in political debates. %or instance, in 788G Baris, thousands of people demonstrated in
the streets to protest against the law banning the (slamic veil from public schools. he
veil, which used to be worn by older women, had become a visible sign of male
domination and lack of integration in the minds of most people. Some +uslim women
wore the veil under real constraints of the family or their religious community
24obert, $>>F3, whereas some younger +uslim women deliberately chose to wear it
as a sign of belonging to the +uslim community, and often in opposition to their
parents wish of integration.
Demographics in France
(t is not possible to present an accurate picture of the number of +uslims in %rance,
nor to concisely map their ethnic identities. Mhilst surveys have attempted to define
the number of +uslims, a census of +uslims in %rance remains problematic due to
the %rench ban on holding data based on religious or ethnic characteristics of
individuals<
"(t is prohibited to collect or process personal data based directly or indirectly
on the racial, ethnic characteristics of individuals, their political, philosophical
or religious beliefs, their trade unions activities or their health and sexual life.'
21aw of the 9
th
of 0anuary $>:F, art. F3.
he issue continues to be debated between researchers and politicians regarding the
relevance of holding such data and the necessity to protect individuals. Aowever,
there are some existing estimates of figures and it is globally agreed that there are
around ) million +uslims in %rance 21aurent P QaLsse, 788:3. +oreover, compared
$8
to many other western European countries, %rance has the highest number of
+uslims.
hree 6uarters of +uslims in %rance have their origins in @orth #frica 2#lgeria,
+orocco, unisia3, and the remaining 7) per cent come from across $7- different
countries. heir ethnic background is thus extremely wide< +aghrebi, +iddle Eastern
#rabs, urks, Mestern and Eastern #fricans, people from the 4eunion (sland,
+alagasy, +auritians, #sians, Mest (ndians, and %rench converts as well as people
from the former Soviet countries. he number of converts is estimated to be around
F8,888 21e +onde des religions, +ay, 0une 788F. Bp. 9;$$3, though this figure
excludes children of converted couples or conversions from +os6ues.
here is a huge deficit in the provision of places of worship compared to the number
of +uslim adherents. he figures for %rance are outstanding in the sense that although
it hosts the largest number of +uslims in its overall population in western Europe, it
provides the lowest number of mos6ues. ?ne reason might be that the earlier laic
%rench 4epublican model had separated religion and state in $>8), culminating in
difficulties for any %rench authorities to accept the building of +os6ues.
Muslim Youth and Education
he creation of private +uslim schools has emerged as part of the claims of +uslims
as %rench citizens and their concomitant right to freedom of religion. here are three
+uslim private schools in %rance and the #verroes +uslim upper secondary school
which has existed in 1ille 2@orth of %rance3 for ) years. ?ne of the main arguments
for refusing the creation of +uslim schools has been the recent perception that they
would train activists and terrorists.
(nternational comparisons of school experience amongst youth from ethnic minorities
show great differences from one educational system to the other. Some school
systems provide pupils and students with a safe and caring environment, trusting in
their abilities regardless of ethnic background 2Mindle, 788F3. Aowever, comparative
studies show that the %rench education system is socially selective and that it tends to
concentrate the placement of pupils from ethnic minorities in a few schools 2%elouzis
et al., 788)3. School levels of achievement though do not seem to suggest
discrimination. Mhen comparing pupils from the same socio;economical
background, average academic results at national level are similar< a bit lower at the
primary school level and a bit higher at the secondary education level.
Mhat is significant for youth from ethnic minorities is the feeling of unfairness they
experience and express 2!aille, 788:3. Hualitative surveys show that they associate
such feelings to characteristics of the education system, specifically the dynamics
within the state schools network and the internal organization of the schools that can
be segregative on an ethnic basis 2Bayet, $>>F3* a violent school climate that this type
of organization can generate 2&ebarbieux, $>>9, $>>F3* little attention and caring
from the school staff to pupils from ethnic minorities 2VKphir, 788:* Mindle, 788F3,
and also to their parents 2Berroton, 7888* Boiret, $>>9, 78883.
Hualitaive research indicates that the position of school staff towards ethnic minority
pupils is ambiguous. Staff are concerned when pupils display cultural differences,
$$
especially those focused on religious beliefs. hey are e6ually concerned by the
tensions arising from cultural diversity within the schools or by the expression of
racism from some pupils, and do not feel trained to manage these situations 2&hume;
Sonzogni, 788:3.
Prejudice against Muslims in France
(t is argued that discrimination and pre,udice in %rance is mainly directed towards
+uslims 2.astenier, 788G* &e 4udder, Boiret, Qourch, 78883, accelerating in the
seventies with the unprecedented oil crisis which had widespread socio;economic
repercussions such as rising unemployment. (n response, the former %rench president
/iscard dEstaing terminated labour migration from abroad. Aowever, in order to
integrate those who had already settled, %rance focussed on family reunification, since
families were protected by law, despite their origins 20oppke, $>>F3. %rench national
unity was perceived as lost or endangered due to immigration from non Mestern
countries, which prompted a new public debate around integration to promote national
unity. (mmigrant ethnic minorities were considered different from earlier
communities such as the Spanish, (talian or Bortuguese. he gulf between %rench
culture and their ethno;cultural backgrounds was considered too wide. hey were
therefore encouraged to assimilate into %rench culture.
#lthough children of migrants consider themselves to be %rench citizens, the
acceptance of ethno;cultural differences remains a challenge, with some experiencing
discrimination based on ethnic, cultural and religious characteristics. +ore
specifically, (slam is one of the most widely debated issues since (slam appears to
6uestion several aspects of the %rench integration model.
(n $>F9, Spain and Bortugal became full members of the European community
ensuring a new status to migrants from these countries. he Bortuguese were the most
important ethnic minority followed by #lgerians. #s European citizens, this allowed
them to become almost invisible as immigrants. .y contrast, at around this time (slam
became the identity frontier of Europe and the issue of immigration became a political
one.
Social Issues: Crime, Unemployment, Segregation and Unrest
4esearch on the treatment of youth by the police and other authorities in the criminal
,ustice system seems inconclusive. ?ne study presented results that showed it was not
possible to explain so;called police "blunders' towards ethnic minority youth on the
basis of ethnic discriminatory practices, and that other factors were more important
20obard, 78873. #nother piece of research on ,udicial archives shows that young
immigrants from extra;European ethnic minorities suffer more sanctions than others
but identified no anti;immigrant discriminatory bias 20obard, @evanen, 788:3.
here has been a genuine increase in concern over the presence of extra;European
immigrants in %rance, a form of social collective pessimism, which has generated the
political exploitation of the immigration 6uestion. Several ethnographic surveys show
that within the working environment, due to unemployment and the growing
competition for ,obs, racism towards immigrant ethnic minorities and their children, is
stark 2.ataille, $>>:* .eaud, Bialoux, $>>>* 1amont, 78873. +ore broadly, research
$7
on urban and social issues 2accommodation, labour and unemployment, teenagers and
police activities3 show evidence of the existence of local segregation practices
2%itoussi et al., 788G3 within which the process of spatial distancing and lack of
service provision are accompanied by discriminatory attitudes from civil servants.
#s for suburbs or segregated neighbourhoods, women and youth in particular are the
recipients of dubious ethnic connotations. o talk about "sensitive neighbourhoods'
for instance, means in that context that you are talking about areas where immigrants
are highly concentrated, life is tougher, the need for care and prevention higher and
difficulties ever greater and it is supposed that resistance to improvement is the
conse6uence of the cultural background of the inhabitants 2&oytcheva, 788:* issot,
788:3. #s a result, in the discourse of public agents and some citizens, these social
issues cannot be addressed because of supposedly existing cultural differences.
(n Europe, recent decades have also seen the rise of right wing populist organizations
and parties as well as right wing extremist parties contributing to feelings of
resentment and insecurity towards +uslim communities. (n %rance, the rise of racist
right;wing extremist parties dates from the late 98s after the 1iberation Mar in
#lgeria which led to resentment amongst military staff and defeated colons and led to
the creation of the @ational %ront party by 0ean;+arie 1e Ben. hey spread their
influence in the $>>8s with the civil war in #lgeria, and then after >C$$ in @ew;Oork.
&iscrimination was then strengthened with counter suspicions of anti;Semitism from
some young +uslims 2aguieff, 7887* .erenner, 78873. 4ight wing supporters rely on
and propagate racism, xenophobia, pro,ecting the causes of unemployment or
economic recession onto immigrant populations as scapegoats.
Oouth from ethnic minorities, primarily +aghrebians are far more likely to be
unemployed, twice more numerous than their %rench counterparts 21aurence P
QaLsse, 788:, p.F)3. his group had begun to receive special attention from city
councils in the $>:8s following urban riots. Since then, the so called "city policy' has
increased to try and provide some positive discrimination to this part of the population
in areas such as housing, leisure and education. (n $>F-, a march for e6uality
between 1yon and Baris occurred under the initiative of a group of young +uslims
from 1yon. he ob,ective was to claim e6uality of treatment and respect. #t that time
+uslim youth had attempted to gain access to the political scene but had failed. (t is
only in the new $-ehaviour$- that these young people began to get some access to
public political life among political parties.
(n their neighbourhoods, youth who gain access to upper secondary education become
"invisible' and find ways to climb up the social scale 2Santelli, 788:3. he others,
who face academic achievement difficulties, or who have dropped out of school, hang
out and take control of the common areas in their neighbourhood, sometimes adopt
deviant behaviours 2.ordet, $>>F3. hey often express feelings of frustration and
unfairness 2+arliWre, 788F, Berrin, 788F3. (n @ovember 788), dramatic urban riots
started in several socially deprived areas in %rench cities following the death of two
teenagers from !lichy;sous;.ois 2socially deprived outskirts of Baris3. 4esearchers
collated evidence to show how those involved in the riots were feeling desperate with
the lack of prospects and future perspectives due to their background and how adults,
although not involved in the riots, sympathized with them 21agrange P ?berti, 7889*
1e /oaziou P +ucchielli, 78893.
$-
ISLAM IN SPAIN
Spain is the only Mestern European context in which the (slamic tradition developed
a cultural society and a political system over eight centuries 2from :$$ to $G>73. he
kingdom of #l;#ndalus ended with the expulsion of +uslims by the Spanish Hueen
(sabel and =ing %erdinand from the city of /ranada 2Vapata; .arrero, 78893
7
. Since
these events, the Spanish identity 2like the European one but with many more
historical points of reference3 has been built in opposition to the picture of the +uslim
in general and the J+oroccans in particular, considered in pe,orative terms as Jhe
+oors.
(n Spain there is also a naturalized form of (slam, owing to the presence of +oroccan
citizens who had become naturalized Spaniards in the middle of the $>F8s 2less than
F8,8883. here is also a converted Islam represented by small communities of
Spanish citizen converts who mainly live in #ndalusia. .ut is the immigrants from
(slamic countries who tend to be the ones identified by the host society as +uslims
2Aernando de 1arramendi, 788$3.
Under (slam, !hristians and 0ews had been recognised as "people of the book'
-
, and
were free to practice their religion, but also faced some mandatory discriminations
and penalties. !onversion to (slam proceeded at a steadily increasing pace. %ollowing
the mass conversions in the $8
th
and $$
th
centuries it is believed that +uslims
outnumbered !hristians in the remaining +uslim controlled areas that existed at those
times.
?ver time, large +oorish populations became established, especially in the
/uadal6uivir 4iver valley, the coastal plain of Qalencia, and in the mountainous
region of /ranada. !ordoba, the caliphates capital, was the largest, richest and most
sophisticated city of the medieval Mestern Europe. +editerranean trade and cultural
exchange flourished and +uslims imported a rich intellectual tradition from the
+iddle East and @orthern #frica. +uslim and 0ewish scholars played an important
part in reviving and expanding classical /reek learning in Mestern Europe. he
4omanized cultures of the (berian Beninsula interacted with +uslim and 0ewish
cultures in a complex way, thus giving the region a distinctive culture.
Aowever, by the $$
th
century, +uslim holdings had fractured into rival aifa
kingdoms, allowing the small !hristian states the opportunity to greatly enlarge their
territories and consolidate their positions. he arrival of the @orth #frican +uslim
ruling sects of the #lmoravids and the #lmohads restored unity upon +uslim
7
Bublic opinion polls reveal that the ma,ority of Spanish citizens link their opposition to immigrants in
general and to the +uslim community in particular, especially the most numerous one, the +oroccan
community 2BKrez;&iaz et al., 788G3. !ited in Vapata;.arrero, 4. 278893, Bp. $G-.
-
(n (slam, the Beople of the .ook are non;+uslim people who, according to the Huran, received
scriptures which were revealed to them by /od before the time of +uhammad 2especially !hristians
and 0ews3. (n (slam, the +uslim scripture, the Huran, is taken to represent the completion of these
scriptures, and to synthesize them as /ods true, final, and eternal message to humanity. Aowever,
because the Beople of the .ook recognize the /od of #braham as the one and only /od, as the
+uslims do, and they practice revealed faiths based on &ivine ordinances, tolerance and autonomy is
accorded to them in societies governed by sharia 2(slamic divine law3.
$G
holdings, with a stricter and less tolerant application of (slam, but ultimately, even
after some successes in invading the north, they proved unable to resist the increasing
military strength of the !hristians states.
he Reconquista 2"4econ6uest'3 is the centuries;long period of expansion of SpainXs
!hristian kingdoms, beginning with the battle of !ovadonga in :77, concurrent with
the period of +uslim rule on the (berian Beninsula. he !hristian armys victory over
the +uslim forces led to the creation of the !hristian =ingdom of #sturias along the
northern coastal mountains of Spain. +uslim armies had also moved north of the
Byrenees, but they were defeated at the .attle of Boitiers in %rance. Subse6uently,
they retreated to more secure positions in the south to the Byrenees with a frontier
marked by the Ebro and &uero rivers in Spain.
he breakup of AlAndalus
!
into the competing aifa kingdoms helped the expanding
!hristian kingdoms. he capture of the central city of oledo in $8F) largely
completed the recon6uest of the northern half of Spain. #fter a +uslim resurgence in
the $7
th
century, the great +oorish strongholds in the south fell to !hristian Spain in
the $-
th
century, leaving only the +uslim enclave of /ranada as a tributary state in the
south. (n $G9>, the crowns of the !hristian kingdoms of !astile and #ragon were
united by the marriage of (sabella and %erdinand. (n $G:F it began the final stage of
the con6uest of the !anary islands and in $G>7, these united kingdoms captured
/ranada, ending the last +uslim remnant finishing the presence of the (slamic rule in
(berian Beninsula. he reaty of /ranada guaranteed religious tolerance toward
+uslims. @evertheless the same year, Spains 0ews were ordered to convert to
!atholicism or face expulsion from Spanish territories during the Spanish (n6uisition.
@ot long after, +uslims were also expelled under the same conditions. he last of
them N the +oriscos N were summarily expelled in $98> from a Spain obsessed with
racial purity and the threat from the ?ttoman farmworkers and artisans were given
three days to leave.
he process of the negative construction of the image of the +oors intensified from
the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, when +uslim corsairs filled the ports of the
southern +editerranean with !hristian slaves 2+artYn !orrales, 788$3
)
. he unsolved
problems between Spain and +orocco 2piracy from the region of the 4if, attacks on
!euta and +elilla N still today Spanish enclaves in +orocco; and on the fishing boats
that operated along the Saharan coast, among others3 were the pretext for the Spain to
embark on the #frican Mar of $F98. he conference of #lgeciras in $>89 marked the
beginning of the Spanish protectorate phase. %rancos Spanish troops imposed their
dominion in +orocco. he participation of +oorish troops on the pro;%ranco side
against the 4epublic revived the stereotypes of +uslimsX brutality. he still vivid
memory of the war in the 4if and the part played by +oorish regular soldiers in the
!ivil Mar reinforced the negative perception of the +oroccans in the minds of the
losers.
Prejudice against Muslims in Spain
G
AlAndalus was the #rabic name given to those parts of the (berian Beninsula governed by +uslims
or "oors, in the time period of :$$ and $G>7.
)
!ited in< Vapata;.arrero, 4. 278893, pp. $G).
$)
he politics of the so;called !atholic =ings have many elements of what we would
refer today to as ethnic cleansing 2Vapata .arrero, 78893. .ehind this, there is also a
politically constructed idea of #ispanidad, developed at the beginning of the
twentieth century to counterweight the loss of the last colonies in #merica
2particularly !uba in $F>F3. his idea of #ispanidad was also used under the %ranco
regime 2$>->; $>:)3 to refer to a community of people linked together by linguistic
and religious criteria, which was used politically to build a culturally and ethnically
homogeneous society.
l.Since then discrimination against +uslims has been maintained within mainstream
society. %actors explaining this could be a historical hangover from the colonial
period and the permanent conflict between +orocco and Spain for Sahara control, and
the historical construction of the stereotype J+oor as somebody suspicious,
physically dirty and potentially criminal 2Vapata .arrero, 78893. Even since the racist
events in El E,ido 2#lmeria3 in %ebruary 7888 and also as a conse6uence of $$
September 788$ in @ew Oork, and $$ +arch in +adrid, and more recently, 1ondon
and /lasgow bombings 20uly 788) and 0uly 788: respectively3 there has been an
explicit policy favouring !entral and Eastern European immigrants and South
#mericans over +oroccans. Bublic opinion and public policies are therefore complicit
in promoting a stereotyped image of +uslims, the principal source of racist and
xenophobic attitudes 2Aernando de 1arramendi, 788$3.
o conclude, there is a historical Spanish tradition of (slamophobia, or "aurophobia
2Vapata .arrero, 78893 that is used to legitimate citizensX attitudes against +uslim
immigration in Spain. Spanish identity building is also nourished by the media which
constantly portrays the most negative news related to +uslim presence and practice.
(slam has historically been excluded from the formation of the 0udaeo;!hristian
Spanish identity in which the construction of !hristianity has been opposed to an
(slamic Jother 2+artYn +uZoz, $>>93.
(n 7887, the annual report of S?S 4acism drew attention for the first time to a new
and growing type of racism in Spain< (slamophobia. he ma,ority of conflict zones are
related to (slamic community facilities, such as mos6ues or oratories. /enerally, local
authorities adopt an Junderstanding position towards the local inhabitants, no doubt
because of the electoral cost of defending the +uslimsX claims. he S?S 4acism
reports problems around granting trading permits to +uslimsX shops or even, as was
the case in #licante, administrative inspectors being sent to +oroccan stores to close
them down. &uring the period 7887;788G, there have been at least four kinds of
conflicts< toward mos6ues, toward +uslim shops, toward cemeteries and racist
attacks. (n 788-, for instance, if only three xenophobic attacks against +uslim
facilities 2mos6ues3 were reported by S?S 4acism 2two in !atalonian and one in
+adrid3, twelve cases of opposition to the opening of a mos6ue were identified.
Demography in Spain
$9
(t is not possible to obtain !ensus data on religious groups, because official statistics
do not include this information. (t is therefore not possible to create a sampling
design with statistical representation when there is no detailed and reliable census to
inform this 2Spanish Aome ?ffice, 78893
9
. he only information available is the
nationality of foreigners. (mmigration is a very recent phenomenon in Spain, and it
has grown exponentially in the last few years, as shown in able $.$. he number of
legally resident foreigners increased from ,ust over 7G8.888 in $>F) to more than )
million in 788F 2+inisterio de raba,o y #suntos Sociales, #nuarios EstadYsticos de
Extran,erYa, http<CCextran,eros.mtas.es3. he 788F !ensus reveals that $$.-I 2).77
million of inhabitants3 of the nations population were classified as foreign, and all
ethnic minority groups have a younger age profile in comparison to the Spanish origin
group.
TABLE 1.1: Evolution of foreign population resident in Spain by origin
1998 Census 2001 Census 2007 Census
Africa $G:,F:9 -$:,7G$ F89,:>)
America $-7,$)9 GG7,FFF $.)>G,--F
Asia G7,:G- :G,G$G 7$>,FG-
Europe -$7,G>- )-G,$-8 $.F>),:7:
Oceania $,)9- $,G:7 7,7:$
Total 9-:,8F) $.-:8,9): G.)$>,))G
Source < (nstituto @acional de EstadYstica 2(@E3
he total population of the country stood at G9.89 million of in 0anuary 788F and the
increase in the foreign population until 788: amounted to :8$.87- inhabitants
2$).)I3. he foreign inhabitants living in Spain on the $
st
of 0anuary 788F were
).877.)::. he arrival of legal and undocumented immigrant workers has been given
a high visibility in the Spanish media 2See, for example, Berez &iaz et al, 788G3 and
has become a popular political debate.
he most representative population estimates from 788F derive from EU;7:, which
indicates that 7.$ million people are nationals of European countries 2around $.7
million of inhabitants come from the 7) European countries until 788:* FF7,9-$ come
from the new former European countries, 4omania and .ulgaria3. he most
representative nationalities in this group are 4omanians, with more than half a million
people 2they represent $$.:I from the total foreign population with around :7F,888
inhabitants3. %ollowed by .ritish nationals 2with more than -)8,888 inhabitants3,
/ermans 2more than $F8,888 inhabitants3 and (talians 2around $):,888 inhabitants3.
9
he same problems for sampling faced a research about public opinion related to +uslim population
carried out by +etroscopia for the Spanish Aome ?ffice< "1a comunidad musulmana en EspaZa'.
+adrid, @ovember 7889. pp. ). (n www.mir.es
$:
%rom non;European countries, +oroccan citizens are the most representative 2with
more than 9G8,888 inhabitants3* followed by citizens from Ecuador 2with more than
G78,888 inhabitants3* and around 7F8,888 from !olombia 27F8,:8) inhabitants3.
.olivians represent around 7G8,888 sub,ects in population statistics, and #rgentineans
$G),888
:
. %rom +uslim countries +oroccans are the most representative, in second
position in the total foreign population. !itizens from #lgeria, Bakistan or +ali are
also represented within population statistics. (n 788:, #lgerians were over )8,888*
Bakistanis represent almost the same number and citizens from +ali over $),888.
able $.7 shows the most representative nationalities in the Spanish population.
TABLE 1.2: Most representative foreign population in Spain by nationality,
change between 2007-2008
Country
of origin
1
st
1anuary 2008 1
st
1anuary 2007 Population
change

change
Amount of
Population
total
foreign
population
Amount of
Population
total
foreign
population
Romania :7F,>9: $G.8 )7:,8$> $$.: 78$,>GF -F.-
Morocco 9GG,9FF $7.- )F7,>7- $7.> 9$,:9) $8.9
Ecuador G78,$$8 F.8 G7:,8>> >.) ;9,>F> ;$.9
UK -)$,>$> 9.: -$G,>)$ :.8 -9,>9F $$.:
Colombia 7F8,:8) ).G 79$,)G7 ).F $>,$9- :,-
Bolivia 7->,>G7 G.9 788,G>9 G.G ->.GG9 $>,:
Germany $F8,9)8 -,) $9G,G8) -.9 $9.7G) >,>
Algeria ; ; )8,-F- ; ; -
Pakistan ; ; G7,>7> ; ; -
Mali ; ; $9,)9> ; ; -
TOTAL 5,220,577 100.0 4,519,554 100.0 701,023 15.5
Source< (nstituto @acional de EstadYstica 2(@E3
(n general the foreign population is younger than the Spanish one, a pattern which is
repeated across Europe. he largest groups of ethnic youth are from Ecuador,
+orocco, 4omania and !olombia, whilst the oldest are from the United =ingdom and
/ermany. he age profile of the foreign population in Spain is compared to that of
the Spanish native population in able $.-.
:
4eport from @ational (nstitute of Statistics $$th 0une 788:. www.ine.es
$F
TABLE 1.3: Foreign population in Spain by age, 2008
Age in years Spanish
total
Spanish
populat.
Foreigners
total
foreign
populat.
Total
total
populat.
Under 16 years 9,7F9,97: $).G :F$,F8- $).8 :,89F,G-8 $).-
16 to 44 years $9,F):,987 G$.- -,---,98- 9-,> 78,$>$,78) G-.F
45 to 64 years $8,-$>,9:9 7).- F)8,->- $9.- $$,$:8,89> 7G.7
More than 65 :,-:>,87> $F.$ 7)G,::F G.> :,9--,F8: $9.9
TOTAL 40,842,934 100.0 5,220,577 100.0 46,063,511 100.0
Source < (nstituto @acional de EstadYstica 2(@E3
he increase in immigration to the Spanish territory during the eighties and the
nineties coincided with the first initiatives to develop a common European policy of
immigration and asylum. Mhen Spain ,oined the European Union in $>F9
immigration flows were limited. here were no rules of intergovernmental
cooperation between European countries related to immigration apart from the
Schengen system of frontiers. %ifteen years later, Spain became the guardian of a
special part of the Schengenland frontiers, the frontier with #frica. (n this context, the
institutional framework developed in Spain to incorporate the first flow of migrant
workers, placed a particular emphasis on security and control of illegal immigration,
both priorities of immigration policies across the European Union. #lthough %rance
and the United =ingdom had established their legal frameworks in the integration of
ethnic minorities from the first arrivals of Jguest workers in the middle of the twenty
century, Spain built its immigration laws adapting them to the European directorates.
Mithin this framework, in Spain there is an apparent absence of integrationist politics,
and a lack of political will to include +uslims in the public sphere. ?nly in the last
few years the issue of immigrant integration, and more particularly the
accommodation of cultural and religious claims raised by +uslims, has ac6uired more
prominence as a legitimate and important ob,ective of national and regional
immigration policies.
Aowever, Spain is one of the few European countries to have reached an agreement
with religious communities for regulating their activities 2the three religious
communities concerned are the (slamic, the Evangelist and Brotestant, and the
0ewish3. he legal framework in con,unction with the +uslim community was drawn
up in $>>7 2coinciding with the )88
th
anniversary of the culmination of the
Reconquista3 and represents a normalization of the situation of +uslims, and a
political will to right the wrong regarding their expulsion from Spanish territory. (t
was the first legal norm since $G>7 which gives the (slamic religion a legal status.
his was approved by the Spanish Barliament in @ovember $>>7.
$>
?ne of the first difficulties encountered by the state was the lack of a uni6ue
interlocutor representing the whole +uslim community, as there are two main
federations, the %EE4( 2%ederaci[n EspaZola de Entidades 4eligiosas (sl\micas,
$>F>3 and the U!(&E 2Uni[n de !omunidades (sl\micas de EspaZa, $>>$3. (n spite of
discrepancies between them, they created the (slamic !ommission of Spain
2!omisi[n (sl\mica de EspaZa or !(E3 with the aim of negotiating with the state.
here were many disagreements during the negotiations and several situations of
deadlock, especially due to the undifferentiated treatment they were given and the
stateXs refusal to give special treatment to one religious community with regard to
others.
.eyond these initial difficulties, the agreement has been viewed as the basis of a
twofold primary recognition. %irst, this agreement is a first step toward a policy of
religion and as a policy of integration. Second, the agreement with the +uslim
community was the first official recognition in Spain in which (slam has a Jfirm
foundation on e6ual terms with other faiths, in what can be regarded as the beginning
of the recognition of the religious plurality of Spain, usually perceived as exclusively
!atholic.
he contents of the agreement deal with the recognition of traditional claims of
+uslims in Spain< provision of religious needs in public buildings and legal
protection of mos6ues* status for (slamic religious leaders and imams, with the
determination of specific rights derived from the exercise of their religious function,
personnel in key areas such as social security* authority to perform civil marriages in
accordance with (slamic ritual* tax relief for religious activities* regulation of
religious festivities in the workplace* prescription of halal food* rights to create an
area within existing cemeteries for +uslims, and even to create their own cemeteries*
the possibility of setting up +uslim schools at all educational levels and the
possibility for +uslim students for receiving religious education in public schools*
and a collaboration with the state for the conservation and promotion of the historical
and artistic heritage of (slam.
Muslim Organisations in Spain
oday there is a large gap between the reality and the contents of the agreement
mentioned, which is used in practice as the main ,ustification for claiming a
relationship between the +uslim community and the state. .etween the two
federations that make up the (slamic !ommission in Spain, there are no longer any
more discrepancies, but there is an outright hostility in the form of competition to
control the whole community. hus, there is a serious fragmentation of the +uslim
community, and competition between its factions to get pro,ects financed and to
extend their control beyond the local and regional scale.
he organizations created in Spain to claim religious rights have had limited visibility
in the public sphere. Aowever, the terrorist attacks in +adrid in 788G have revived the
interest of the Spanish governments to regulate the +os6ues already settled. hus the
(slamic !ommission will be the institution responsible for the expedition of the
certificate to recognize an association as a religious one. (ts conformity will be
necessarily to admit as +os6ues the premises used for worship, training and religious
attendance, and to authorize new imams* conferring them a specific legal protection.
78
@evertheless, the disparity of criteria between the members of the +uslim community
in Spain suggests a specific idea about the lack of information related to the practices
developed around +os6ues and holy places in Spain 2Berez; &i\z, 788G3. here are
several associations which have grown around +os6ues, offering not only a place for
worship, to carry out the tasks of (slam, but also social activities and social
attendance. he ma,ority of +uslim organizations are situated in !atalonia, +adrid
and #ndalusia. +ost of them have a place of worship. here are almost G)8 +uslim
oratories in Spain, but not all of them are registered with the (slamic !ommission. (f,
after the signing of the !o;operation #greement the (slamic !ommission of Spain
was the only body recognized by the state to regulate and manage the various aspects
of +uslim practices in public and private life, such as the control of holy places, the
training and selection of imams, negotiations with employers about work timetables
or the main +uslim festivities, this is now considered problematic since most +uslim
practices are performed outside the (slamic !ommission.
Spanish Discourse on the Muslim Community after the Terrorist Attacks
#fter the terrorist attacks in +adrid on $$ +arch 788G the Spanish government tried
to regulate imams. here was evidence of the existence of uncontrolled imams with
fundamentalist discourses directed to the +uslim immigrant community, together
with a solid and clandestine (slamic network. wo ways of regulating the Jmos6ue
circuit and the figure of the imam are currently under discussion in Spain. ?ne
originates from the +uslim community, and proposes (slamic schools and universities
as a way to manage the (slamic educational curriculum and even as a way to control
the training of imams in Spain, thus incorporating Spanish contextual elements within
the curriculum 2at the moment the ma,ority of imams are Jimported3. he other
proposal is to reach some sort of formula for financing the +uslim community
through associations and supporting their mobilization, with the aim of supervising
them. ?ne of the measures is the inclusion within the Spanish tax system of the
possibility of choosing the religious confession for which a percentage of income tax
is to be earmarked.
?n the other hand, there is a social fear regarding an unknown community amongst
mainstream society. he arguments citizens are currently finding in the public arena
come mainly from the media, tradition and political discourse. he argument to be
defended is not that (slam is a source of social and political instability, but it is the
perception that citizens have of (slam that is a source of instability. %or instance, it is
not the presence of a mos6ue in a city that provokes instability, but the perception that
citizens have of a mos6ue which transforms this previous contact zone into a conflict
zone. he media tends to consolidate the perception of +uslims as different to us and
as people whose practices can endanger our values and the Spanish 6uality of life. (n
addition, Spanish discourse has constructed a long tradition that draws a negative
picture 2even dangerousness3 of the +uslim, specifically of the +oroccans 2Vapata;
.arrero, 78893.
ISLAM IN THE UK
he histories of race and of crime show the idea of the Jracial other as central to
7$
European thinking in the modern period and that certain groups have always been
portrayed as having a specific set of physiological and characterological attributes
which attach to their skin colour, and in more recent times, attaching to both religion
and ethnicity.
Breviously, .lacks had been perceived as the original folk devil in the minds of the
.ritish 2though the racialisation of the (rish has been severe3, with each subse6uent
permutation ac6uiring greater power 2/ilroy, $>F:<$G)3. #frican;!aribbeans had
begun to arrive in .ritain in great numbers after MM((. ?n arrival during the $>)8s
and $>98s they were sub,ected to racist abuse on a regular basis at work and in the
street. (n sociological terms, images of .lack criminality were constructed against this
backdrop, as something fixed in the definition of .lackness, and fuelled by media
perceptions of .lackness as disorderly.
Beople from South #sia, and certainly +uslims had been arriving in .ritain
periodically throughout history, especially during the nineteenth century where there
is evidence of a mos6ue in Males and of a +uslim association in 1ondon 2(slamic
Huarterly, $>FG3 .ut en masse migration was especially marked during the $>)8s and
$>98s, with migrants encouraged to fill post;war labour shortages, alongside #fro;
!aribbeans.
he $>9$ !ommonwealth (mmigration #ct and (mmigration #ct $>:$ placed the first
limits on immigration into .ritain. 4ace and nationality were to dominate .ritish
politics for the next twenty years as the labour shortage came to an end and the post;
war boom gave way to economic crisis, but amongst all immigrants it was .lacks
who suffered from the most trenchant forms of racism and discrimination.
Until $>:7 the official view on crime and immigrants had been that,
!oloured immigrants are no more involved in crime than others* nor are they
generally more concerned in violence, prostitution and drugs. he west (ndian
crime rate is much the same as that of the indigenous population. he #sian
crime rate is very much lower 2Aouse of !ommons, $>:7<:$3.
.y the late $>:8s this position shifted dramatically, with growing evidence of conflict,
often violent, between police and .lack communities, culminating in the urban riots
of the $>F8s.
Berceptions of #sian criminality on the other hand, had until that time, assumed a
different character. !rimes were perceived as minor or intra;racial, suggesting a
cultural theory based on an analysis of South #sian family strength, characterised by
cohesiveness and strong informal community controls.
Until the $>F8s, +uslims had been generally depicted as 6uiet, peaceful, law;abiding,
and also introspective. he crucial catalyst emerged with the 4ushdie #ffair of $>F>
2+odood, $>>73, raising critical issues around religious minorities, cultural tolerance,
blasphemy laws and incitement to religious hatred. he fatwa issued against the
author was constructed as linked to (slamic militancy elsewhere, spurning a new
discourse of #sian criminality, the racialisation of +uslim communities, their
reinvention as an underclass, and the latest incarnation of the .lack folk devil. he
77
threat had shifted and with it emerged a new fear of +uslim radicalisation.
he collapse of the Soviet Empire, also beginning in $>F>, signalled a shift in geo;
politics towards what came to be termed as a Jclash of civilisations, encapsulated in
Auntingtons argument about the Jnew cold war based on culture. (slam was
henceforth presented as a serious threat, as a religion with an innate propensity to
violence.
Subse6uent global events spurned similar ways of imagining the dangerousness of
(slam. &uring the $>>8s, events in .osnia brought al Haeda to Europe, and after the
subse6uent atrocities of >C$$ there emerged a global Jwar on terror and the
subse6uent invasion of (ra6. +ore recently, +adrid became the target of (slamist
violence in 788G, whilst %rance experienced youth urban riots, ostensibly associated
with (slam in 788). he U= suffered the attacks of :C: in 1ondon 788), which saw
the first ever suicide;bombing on European soil, followed by the attempted explosion
at /lasgow airport, Scotland, in 788:.
Such events, not withstanding their atrocity, have accelerated a process of acute
economic, social, cultural and political marginalisation of +uslims across Europe,
allied to an ideological construction of (slam which depicts a dichotomy of East
versus Mest.
UK Demographics
Unlike %rance and Spain, the U= is able to collect a wealth of statistics on
demographic indicators, including religion and ethnicity. he U= comprises England,
Scotland, Males, and @orthern (reland, nations which are home to +uslims from a
variety of backgrounds. he ma,ority of Bakistani, .angladeshi and (ndian +uslims
in the U= are Sunni +uslims. here are also Shia +uslims, branches of ShiJism, and
minority groups not necessarily recognised by other +uslims, but including the
#hmadis of South #sia, the &ruze of 1ebanon and the #lawis from Syria, and there
are around $,988 mos6ues across .ritain. 2+asood, 78893.
(t is estimated that +uslims comprise around -I of the .ritish population. (n 788:,
the total population of the U= stood at 98,>:),888. Mhilst (ndia had been the most
common post;war citizenship of all immigrants arriving in the U=, recent indices of
population movement, put the net migration level in 7889 at $>$,888, with Bolish
immigrants overtaking (ndia. 2(nternational +igration, 78893. @ewer +uslim citizens
have also arrived from #fghanistan, #lgeria, .osnia, (ra6, =osovo and Somalia,
countries which have all been characterised by relatively recent conflict 2+asood,
78893.
+easuring population demographics is problematic, whether the markers are
religious, ethnic or classified according to nationality. Ethnicity is particularly
difficult, and it is often conflated with national identity. Ethnic classification relies on
self reporting, with respondents selecting from either an extensive or a limited range
of constructs predefined by researchers or official agencies. +oreover, in surveys and
data gathering exercises, some people also choose to define their primary identity in
terms of religion. Ethnicity is distinct from religion, so it should not be assumed that
both can be measured in responses to 6uestions on either ethnicity or religion. (n the
7-
.ritish context, Bakistanis and .angladeshis are generally connoted as specific ethnic
groups, as sub;categories of #sian or #sian .ritish. #ccording to the 788$ !ensus
the ma,ority of those who self identified as Bakistanis and .angladeshis also
identified as +uslim< >7 per cent and >7.) per cent respectively. Me can legitimately
assume therefore that in any discussion about +uslims in .ritain the focus lies
primarily around Bakistanis and .angladeshis comprising the largest groups of
+uslims.
he 788$ !ensus reported on respondent religious affiliation that after !hristianity,
the largest religious group in .ritain are Bakistani +uslims 2!ensus, 788$3. Mhilst
being amongst the smallest population group in Scotland, the +uslim religion is the
second largest, and also boasts the youngest age group of followers, with many
younger than sixteen. he ?ffice for @ational Statistics estimate the +uslim
population of England P Males to be around $.)G million 2788$3, the /eneral
4egister for Scotland puts the +uslim population at around G8,888, 2788$3, whilst the
+uslim population in @orthern (reland is considerably less, at around G888. he total
population then is around $.9 million. (t is interesting to note that :.9I of the
population in .ritain, according to self reported identification, belong to an ethnic
minority group 2Mhite, 78873.
+uslims tend to be concentrated in particular geographical areas, notably large cities
like 1ondon, cities in the +idlands and the north of England. #mongst these cities,
+anchester, 1iverpool, /lasgow, 1ondon and .irmingham, feature the worst rates of
child poverty in the country, a finding which is not exclusive to +uslim children, but
is repeated across every ethnic grouping. Save the !hildren estimate that $ in $8
children in the U= live in severe poverty, and whilst :GI of these are from Mhite
backgrounds, the likelihood of children living in severe poverty increases for those
from an ethnic minority background 2Save the !hildren, 788:3. he +uslim
population of 1ondon is around $ million, speaking around )8 languages between
them, amongst a total of :.7 million others. (ndeed, 1ondon is home to around GFI
of all ethnic minorities in .ritain 2Mhite, 78873. (n .irmingham, +uslims comprise
around $)8,888 of a total of $ million people, and in Scotland most +uslims live in
/lasgow, almost $F,888 of a total of )::,F9> /laswegians 2!ensus of Scotland,
788$3.
(n .ritain, --I per cent of +uslims are aged 8;$) years 2the national average is 78.7
per cent3* $F.7 per cent are aged $9;7G 2the national average is $8.> per cent3. (ndeed,
the age structure across all ethnic minorities in .ritain evinces a greater volume of
younger age groups, which is indicative of past immigration and fertility patterns
2Mhite, 78873. +any +uslims in the U= are U= born< )8 per cent of +uslims were
born in the U=, a figure which includes )G.) per cent of Bakistanis and G9.9 per cent
of .angladeshis 2?ffice of @ational Statistics, 788-3.
National Identity
Huestions on national identity are often considered a useful barometer with which to
tap into individuals feelings of belonging and loyality towards a particular country.
?ne response from the government in the wake of violent radicalisation and also
immigration to .ritain, has been to encourage +uslims specifically, and immigrants
more generally, to do more to fit in with being .ritish and the .ritish way life, despite
7G
the fact that such terms are utterly problematic, as a recent +?4( poll demonstrates.
he +?4( survey sought to explore young peoples 2aged $9;7$3 attitudes to
J.ritishness, and reported a tension between the experiences of being young,
regardless of ethnic group, and perceptions of .ritishness as traditional, hierarchical
and outmoded. .y contrast, being Melsh, Scottish or (rish evidenced a far greater
resonance. Understandings of .ritishness were not considered relevant to the daily
lives of youth, though some sense of .ritishness N or otherness N became important
when holidaying abroad, and acknowledging the advantages to living in .ritain,
though there was concern about career prospects and e6uality issues. Mhilst Mhite
youth in England claimed to find it hard to distinguish between being English and
.ritish, ethnic minorities were far more likely to disagree with the statement Jbeing
.ritish is more important to my sense of identity than my familys country of origin.
Ethnic minorities living in England said that they find it difficult to adopt an English
identity, whereas Scottishness, for those in Scotland, did not appear to be seen in the
same way. (ndeed, youth of Bakistani origin felt comfortable saying they were
JScottish #sian.
?n the whole young people reported that the singular nature of a .ritish identity is
imposed on them, favouring local identities, such as being a /laswegian, and national
identities, like being Scottish, and any ethnic identity as more important and relevant
than the Jsupra .ritish identity. hey were unable to see how .ritishness as a shared
social identity could work, taking into consideration multiple identities characterised
by ethnic, religious, social and cultural differences between communities 2+?4(,
788:3. hus there appears to be a contradiction between the supra;identity of an
outmoded sense of .ritishness promoted by government, and the lived reality of
multiculturalism for youth.
# further study on +uslim youth and identity also highlighted difficulties in the
construction of identity formation at the micro level of local institutions. JOoung
+uslims Speak suggested that the sense of identity for many young +uslims is
actually formed from a mixture of experiences within the community, educational
institutions, religion and family. (n addition, many felt that they did not have an
ade6uate grasp of their own heritage and history, against which to balance the other
influences in their lives 2Ooung+uslimsSpeak. 78893.
he content of discussions between young people on a +uslim Oouth Aelpline also
draws attention to identity dilemmas faced by young +uslims in .ritain. Bopular
discussion topics amongst youth included the difficulties of integrating when people
have the dual identity of being .ritish and +uslim, ineffective local services for
young +uslims, and discontent over foreign policy. 2http<CCwww.myh.org.ukC3
Youth in the UK: Housing, Education, Employment and Health
here are a range of indicators that show the extent of social exclusion experienced by
youth in the U=. he unemployment rate is high< $)I rate for $9; to 7G;year;olds,
which has risen since 788G, and is now four times the rate for older workers. (t is also
higher for males than for females. (n addition, one in eight $9; to $>;year;olds is not
in education, employment or training, which is slightly higher than a decade ago. he
7)
proportion of Mhite $9;year;olds who do not continue in full time education is higher
than that for any ethnic minority, though many are undertaking some form of training
2Bolicy (nstitute, 788F3.
+uslim youth tend to suffer, on the whole, disproportionately across a broad spectrum
of socio;economic indices, including education, housing, unemployment and health,
factors which may have some bearing on feelings of grievance towards local and
national government, alienation and social marginalisation.
#t school age, (ndian pupils gain more 6ualifications than any other ethnic group,
whilst Bakistani and .angladeshi boys achieve the lowest, with girls doing slightly
better, though not as well as the other groups, apart from .lack boys 2Mhite 78873.
here is also a clear link between the educational under;attainment of children with
eligibility for free school meals N a marker of low family income N including Mhite
children 2+?4(, 788:3.
Aowever, differences in achievement between $$;year old pupils by eligibility for
free school meals are greatest amongst Mhite pupils, and one third of Mhite .ritish
boys eligible for free school meals do not obtain ) or more Standard /rade
6ualifications. his is a much higher proportion than that for any other combination
of gender, ethnic group and eligibility for free school meals 2@ew Boverty (nstitute,
788F3.
here is evidence of bias for +uslims in further education. #ccording to the 1abour
%orce Survey there is strong evidence of bias against ethnic minority candidates
within older universities 2@ational Statistics, 78883. Aowever, in 788$C7, some ethnic
groups, including (ndians and ?ther #sians, were more likely to have obtained
degrees than the Mhite population, a notable exception being Bakistanis and
.angladeshis, who were most likely to be un6ualified 2Ooung, 78873.
(n employment, .angladeshis and Bakistanis are two and a half times more likely than
the Mhite population to be unemployed, and three times more likely to be in low paid
employment 2+odood and Shiner, 78873. Bakistanis and .angladeshis are more likely
to live in low income households than any other group in .ritain 2Mhite, 78873, and
almost half of .angladeshis live in social housing accommodation, which is greater
than the national average 2Beach, $>>$3. -) I of +uslim households have no adults
in employment, 2more than double the national average3* ,ust under three;6uarters of
.angladeshi and Bakistani children 2:-I3 are living in households below the poverty
line 298I of median income3. his compares with under a third 2-$I3 for children in
all households. 2&epartment for Mork and Bensions, 788$3 +uslim households are
also the most likely to experience overcrowding. %or example, one third of +uslim
households 2-7I3 live in overcrowded accommodation, which compares with ,ust 9I
of !hristian households who experience overcrowding. (n addition, +uslim
households are the most likely to lack central heating 2$7I3.
?n health, #sians score worse across a range of self reported indices 2Mhite, 78873,
particularly Bakistani and .angladeshi groups, the latter also exhibiting the highest
smoking rates amongst the general population. Aealth ine6ualities can also be seen in
specific illnesses such as diabetes, which for .angladeshis is six times higher than
among the general population 2Aealth Survey, $>>>3. (n 788$, $-I of +uslim men
79
and $9I of +uslim women reported Jnot good health. hese rates, which take
account of the difference in age structures between religious groups, were higher than
those of 0ewish and !hristian people, who were the least likely to rate their health as
Jnot good.
Youth Victimisation and Crime in the UK
1ittle research has been conducted on youth and interpersonal violence, but extant
research suggests that such occurrences, for many, are a routine aspect of their lives,
particularly specific groups, and that much of this goes unreported 2.ritish crime
Survey, 78883.
he $>>- Scottish !rime Survey 2S!S3 reported that $ in G young people had been
sub,ected to violence, of which half felt it was something that J,ust happened. #lmost
half of these incidents occurred at or near school. (n 98I of these incidents there was
only one assailant, but in :8I there was at least one other person present. he $>>-
.!S looked at victimisation of young people away from home and found that< around
one third of $7;$) year olds claimed to have been assaulted in the last 9;F months,
which compares with >I of $9;$> year olds. 1ike the Scottish data most of the
assaults happened at or near school and the victim was usually with another person at
the time.
# .ritish !rime Survey reported found that half of the $7;$) year olds included in the
survey had been a victim of at least one unpleasant incident or crime since the
beginning of the previous summer holidays. he most common offence experienced
was harassment, followed by bullying, assault and theft of personal property 2$)I3.
%ive per cent of respondents said they had had something stolen that they were
carrying or had been victims of sexual harassment 2.!S, 78883.
# government sponsored study looking at physical abuse amongst a sample of 7,G78
children and young people found that ,ust over half had at some point been a victim of
physical abuse outside their home, including being kicked, struck with an implement,
or slapped. Stranger;perpetrated physically andCor sexually abusive incidents were
estimated to comprise $$I of the total incidents of this type of harm, making these
the least fre6uent form that young people were likely to encounter. #t the same time,
$ in F young people had been victims of a theft or attempted theft, and $ in - had been
harassed by a stranger 2Scottish Executive, 788$3.
?n weapon carrying, a 7887 survey reported that almost $ in G boys and $ in $- girls
aged $G carried a weapon to school or in their neighbourhood. #lmost $ in ) boys and
$ in $$ girls the same age, attacked someone intending to harm them 2.einart et al,
78873. (t is clear then, that interpersonal violence is a periodic feature in the lives of
many young people.
Oouth crime itself is positioned as a perennial problem that appears to be getting
worse, despite statistics to the contrary. (ndeed, statistics indicate that the number of
$F; to 78;year;olds found guilty of an indictable offence has been falling steadily and
is now a 6uarter lower than in $>>>. GG,888 people aged $F to 78 were found guilty of
an indictable offence in 7889, around 7I of this age group. he overwhelming
ma,ority of those found guilty are young males. (n addition, young .lack adults are
7:
three times as likely as Mhite young adults to be in prison and five times as likely as
#sians 2@ew Bolicy (nstitute, 788F3.
Youth Victimisation, Crime and Minority Ethnic Groups in the UK
(n explaining crime, victimisation and imprisonment, criminology has tended to focus
on race and ethnicity rather than faith when looking at diversity issues 2Spalek and El;
Aassan, 788:3. Aowever, a clear picture has emerged of the distribution of +uslims in
,ail. (n 788-, +uslims accounted for eight per cent of the prison population 2@ational
?ffender +anagement Service, 788G3, two;thirds of whom were young men aged $F;
-8 2Brison Service Statistics, 788G3, a significant over;representation considering that
+uslims make up only approximately three per cent of the U= population. Even in
Scotland where the +uslim population is much smaller than in England, the largest
incarcerated minority ethnic group is Bakistani 28.9$I3.
(n terms of contact with the police, the contentious practice of Jstop and search has
generated much debate implying racist practices. .etween 788$ and 788- there was
a -87I increase in Jstop and search incidents among #sian people, compared with
$$FI among Mhite people. 2Aome ?ffice, 788G3. &uring 7889C:, the police
recorded an increase of nearly >I on 788)C9, the highest figure since $>>FC>. ?f
these searches, $).>I were of .lack people, F.$I of #sian people and $.)I of
people of ?ther ethnic origin. #sian people were twice as likely to be stopped and
searched than Mhite people, but less likely than .lack people 2Statistics on 4ace
and the !riminal 0ustice System, 788F3.
Bakistanis and .angladeshis are the most likely group to have been victims of racist
crime across .ritain. he latest .ritish !rime Survey 2.!S3 estimates that there
were around $FG,888 racially motivated incidents in England and Males 7889C:, of
which many were not reported to the police. Bakistanis, .angladeshis and (ndians
are also more likely to have been victims of household crime 2.!S, 788-3. (n
addition, the %ederation of Student (slamic Societies reported that almost half of
+uslim students in further and higher education that they surveyed had experienced
what they understood as (slamophobia. 2%?S(S, 788)3, further experience of
victimisation.
Prejudice against Muslims
(slamaphobia represents the emergence of a new form of Jracism based more on
religion than skin colour, and can be defined as Junfounded hostility towards
(slam . . . unfair discrimination against +uslims individuals and
communities.2Meedon, 788G3. he term itself is a relatively recent construct, unlike
the more well;established tradition of +uslims as intolerant religious zealots or
Jterrorists. +edia language used to describe +uslims is often violent, inferring that
+uslims are violent too. #rabic words such as 0ihad have been appropriated into
,ournalistic vocabulary signifying an ongoing military war by (slamists against the
Mest. Mords such as Jfundamentalist, Jextremist and Jradical are regularly used in
headlines across all sectors of the .ritish press. +uslims are presented as separatist,
insular and unwilling to integrate. Mhat the media does not focus on are the social
problems faced by many +uslims, preferring instead to focus on conflict and fear.
7F
he 4unnymede rust, an independent research and social policy agency established
the !ommission on .ritish +uslims and (slamophobia in $>>9 to challenge
(slamaphobia and the idea that there is only one form of (slam, highlighting that
understanding was important for the well being of not only +uslims but of wider
society, focussing on the twin themes of social inclusion and cultural pluralism in
.ritain.
4egardless of attempts such as these to counter (slamaphobia and promote tolerance
and understanding a more recent report from the E6ualities 4eview suggests limited
success. he 4eview 7>ehaviour7>ed that around a 6uarter of .ritish people
surveyed were unconcerned about whether or not they were personally pre,udiced.
Beople appeared to be least concerned about expressing pre,udice against +uslims,
and gay men and lesbians, and most concerned about being seen to be pre,udiced
against older or disabled people 2+?4(, 7889C8:3
Evidence of discriminatory attitudes are also apparent amongst younger people.
J(ntolerance is a report about a range of attitudes towards certain groups of minorities
by young people at school in Sweden, and includes (slamaphobia. he survey also
examined forms of crime and antisocial behaviour associated with intolerance. he
research found that school students from a completely Swedish background were
more intolerant of +uslims, as were those who described themselves as non;religious.
.oys were more intolerant than girls, but on the whole the group most intolerant
towards +uslims was small. (ntolerance towards all groups covered in the study did
not appear to be randomly distributed among young people. he highest levels of
intolerance were associated with such factors as low levels of educational
achievement and parental social class, feelings of social alienation, and a high
fre6uency of associating with friends in the evenings, in groups and also having older
friends N in other words, lower parental control 24ing and +orgentau, 788)3.
he %ederation of Student (slamic Societies 2%?S(S3 788) survey of young +uslims
in higher education across .ritain, although it had limitations, reported that most felt
uncomfortable about being a +uslim after the 788) 1ondon attacks. F)I said they
condemned the attacks, whilst GI did not. ?n suspecting someone they knew of
planning a terrorist attack, almost three 6uarters said they would immediately go to
the police, and of the remainder, almost half said they would do so after trying to first
talk the person out of it. >I of those who would not inform the police, said that this
was because they did not trust them or feared them, a sentiment replicated in a recent
Scottish survey which found that young ethnic minorities aged $9;7) perceive the
police as racist and culturally insensitive.
wo issues that +uslims in higher education were most concerned about were
practicing religion, and (slamaphobiaCpre,udiceCracism. here were geographical
differences in the reported incidence of (slamophobia, which was greater in 1ondon,
followed by the +idlands and the @orth of England. %emales reported a slightly
higher incidence of (slamophobia, with prevalence on campus also higher for females.
?ver half had experienced what they regarded as direct (slamaphobia, which was
mostly verbal, and around a third felt isolated from other students due to being
+uslim.
7>
Aowever, around two thirds said that they did not see a conflict between loyalty to the
ummah, the global +uslim community, and loyalty to the U=, believing that the
respective values were not conflictual. # similar level perceived the future for
+uslims was challenging.
(nterestingly, a broader study indicated that 97I of +uslim young people aged $9 to
7G feel they have as much in common with non;+uslims as +uslims, compared to
:$I of ))] year olds. -:I of $9;7G;year;olds prefer to live under Sharia law
compared to :$I of ))] year olds. :GI of $9;7G;year;olds would prefer +uslim
women to choose to wear the veil, compared to 7FI of ))] year olds. F9I of
+uslims feel that Jmy religion is the most important thing in my life. 2Bolicy
Exchange, 788:3.
Mhat we see from the literature above is an entrenched picture of disadvantage across
a range of indicators for Bakistani and .angladeshi groups in particular, compounded
by racism. he ma,ority of Bakistanis and .angladeshis are also +uslims living in an
age of (slamaphobia.
Ethnic Minorities and Political Power in the UK
Mhilst minority ethnic groups are overrepresented as victims of poverty and social
disadvantage, crime and imprisonment, they are under;represented across all domains
of public life, and especially women in all of these groups. #ll parties have selected
+uslims as potential candidates since $>>7. #ccording to a report in $he
Independent, $:I of ethnic minority candidates were fielded by the three main
political parties across U= in the 788) general election 28FC$7C8) @igel +orris3. #t
Mestminster, only three per cent of +Bs are .lack or #sian, though recent debates are
seeking ways to remedy this. his e6uates to fifteen ethnic minority +BS, which
includes two women. here are currently no ethnic minorities as +embers of the
Scottish Barliament 2+SBs3. (n 788F, a +uslim +B was appointed as the U=
governments ,ustice minister.
%igures from he /overnment E6ualities ?ffice indicate further under;representation
of ethnic minority groups in public life 2788:3. he @ational !ensus of 1ocal
#uthority !ouncillors in England evidences vastly une6ual representation as local
councillors for people of ethnic minority status. #gain, this is more marked for
women, and the proportion of young councillors across all classifications is low, with
most councillors aged G8 and over 278893. he ma,ority of councillors described
themselves as Mhite 2>9.9 per cent3. # total of 7.7 per cent described themselves as
of #sian ethnicity. he greatest proportion of #sian councillors were among the
1ondon boroughs 2$8.F per cent3. Beople from .lack and +inority Ethnic 2.+E3
groups were significantly less likely to be a councillor where they were a member of
either the !onservative, 1iberal &emocrat parties, or an (ndependent councillor
2/olden, 788F3.
he governments recent attempt to incorporate the views of youth into the
development of policy allowed a range of youth to consult on a /overnment /reen
Baper Oouth +atters 2788)3, which reported that in general, young people wanted
more places to go and were concerned about the governments emphasis on their
behaviour. Ooung +uslims specifically were concerned about several issues including
-8
dissatisfaction about the lack of information about what was available in their local
areas, and three 6uarters felt that the delivery of youth services should reflect the
religious and cultural sensitivities of the users. %or example, nearly all called for
different sports sessions for young men and young women, as well as certain arts and
drama activities, like dance.
# significant ma,ority of the young +uslims considered their local mos6ue an
important focus for community participation and support, where they go to play sport,
volunteer, learn and engage in spiritual activities. he ma,ority also said they were
actively involved in voluntary work in their communities 2Oouth +atters, 788)3.
Support for government
Since the invasion of #fghanistan and (ra6, +uslim support for 1abour has declined,
owing to the states role in the Jwar against terror 2+asood, 78893, a finding to which
+uslim youth surveys also attest.
4ecent newspaper headlines have served to alienate +uslims further as it was
revealed that +ohammad Sarwar, the +B for /lasgow !entral, had had his
conversations illegally recorded by anti;terrorist police, because of his association
with a constituent he had visited in ,ail facing extradition for terror;related offences.
Mhilst the police have periodically been accused of misusing terrorism laws against
+uslims, this came to a head in 788F when the +etropolitan Bolice !ommissioner
was accused of racism within the police force. he #ssistant !ommissioner, ari6ue
/haffur, the most senior +uslim policeman, lodged a race discrimination
employment case against the +etropolitan police, after allegedly being told to keep
6uiet about his reservations about extending pre;charge detentions to suspected
terrorists to G7 days. Ae had earlier criticised (slamaphobia within the police and also
an independent ,udicial in6uiry into the radicalization of young +uslims following
the 788) 0uly : attacks in 1ondon 2+uslim @ews ?nline3. Ae has argued that he has
been victimised over his comments and that this has led to a refusal to renew his
contract. he episode threatened to evoke similar concerns around institutional
racism as the +acBherson report had in $>>F.
#dding to a sense of in,ustice felt by many +uslims, new guidelines under the U=
governments Brevent strategy have been issued to school teachers re6uesting that
exercise vigilance for extremist views held amongst pupils and that they report these
to the authorities. hese have been described by the "uslim %e&s as putting +uslims
under suspicion from the cradle to the grave 2788F3. he +uslim !ouncil of .ritain
re,ected terrorism openly at the !onference to !ombat errorism hreats on the :
th
0uly 788:. +eanwhile, .ritish security services claim that they are currently tracking
around 7,888 terrorist suspects, which notwithstanding the existence of very real
threats, should perhaps be considered within the context of the 0ean !harles de
+enezes shooting which raised issues of uncoordinated intelligence and racist
assumptions, if not attitudes, amongst .ritish police.
RADICALISED VIOLENCE
-$
Since September $$, (slamist extremism and terrorism have become one of the main
global concerns, including Europe. he %rench domestic intelligence service
24enseignements /KnKraux3 calculated that in a given +uslim population, there
would be an average )I of fundamentalists, out of which -I could be considered as
dangerous, though it is not at all clear how these figures were arrived at. #ccording to
the &irector /eneral of the European Strategic (ntelligence and Security !enter
2+oni6uet, 788)3, the most exposed countries to terrorism are %rance, .elgium, the
@etherlands, (taly, Spain, /reat .ritain, and /ermany, countries where the number of
+uslim residents is highest. #ccording to 1aurent P QaLsse 2788:, p. 7>:3, it is in
%rance that the efforts of recruitment for extremist groups have been most visible for
two main reasons. %irstly, there is clear link to discrimination and integration
difficulties, and secondly as a result of the relationship between %rance and #lgeria.
# growing body of literature now seeks to explain terrorism, or what has come to be
known as violent radicalization and its association with distorted interpretations of
(slam N the (slamist. !onversely, there is a broad range of literature which also
explores the ways in which +uslims from various backgrounds have experienced
discrimination and racism in countries they have chosen to settle in, which impacts on
feelings of belonging and Jotherness 2Saeed, 788:3.
(slamist radicalisation is often assimilated to fundamentalist ideology and to violence.
Aowever, for .ouzar 2788:3 and &yevre 2788F3, radicalism does not systematically
lead to violence. Mhat can be problematic is the relationship that the person has with
their worship, and not their religious belonging as such. %undamentalism can be built
through a religious discourse that leads individuals to a double social exclusion< on
one hand they exclude themselves from mainstream society and on the other hand
they exclude themselves from their own community and religious friends. .ouzar
stresses 2788:, p.-)3 that those with a lack of geographical andCor cultural references
are likely to become fundamentalist. # lack of cultural and values transmission and
the absence of family support are considered risk factors since they generate a search
for cultural and religious identity 21aurent P QaLsse, 788:, p. -8>3. %undamentalism
can offer a community life within which individual identities are not important
anymore and where individuals become agents of a system against 'ouffars 2non
+uslims3 and also mounafikins 2the bad +uslims, the hypocritical ones3. ?nly their
community is considered as guardians of the truth, and group cohesion presents a
negative myth of 0ahiliya. (n other words, that the world is decadent and is to be
fought, the end of the world is near and it crucial to strictly follow the Brophet
directives on (slam to avoid Aell. Such logic enables the rupture between the
fundamentalists from the sectarian group and the mainstream +uslim community,
society and their country of origin 2&yevre, 788F3.
urk argues that exposure to ideologies ,ustifying terrorism are crucial in terms of
leading to a commitment to terrorism. (slamist fundamentalism, in particular, seems to
depend on radicalisation through formal education consisting mostly of religious
indoctrination 2urk, 788G3. errorist acts are political he maintains and often
associated with relative affluence and social advantage rather than with a range of
social deprivation indicators 2urk, 78873. JSuicide bombers, for instance, appear
increasingly likely to be respected individuals form advantaged classes, with stable
family and community ties 2urk, 788G<7:-3.
-7
echnological advances and corporate globalisation facilitate more flexible and
intricate ways to organise terrorism. he classic model suggested that terrorist
organisations were small, hierarchical and isolated cells disciplined and socially
isolated from others. his appears to be outdated now, with larger, more complex and
pan national networks. o urk 2788G3, the latter are most likely to appear in
democratic societies where individualism is highly valued, such as the US.
4oy 2788-3 explains that what is called the re;islamisation of segregated
neighbourhoods and +uslim youth as a whole does not necessarily lead to political
radicalisation and violence. #lthough it represents an unavoidable condition to enable
the emergence of these two processes, it is not sufficient as a sole factor. #s a matter
of fact, re;islamisation can be achieved in a humanist, even liberal way. (t can also
lead to radicalisation and a feeling of insecurity amongst other members of the
population. #ccording to the %rench ntelligence service, the threat is real and at the
time of the writing of this report, %rance has received threats of a terrorist assault if it
does not withdraw military troops from #fghanistan.
#ccording to the %rench +inister of the (nterior, since the beginning of 788F, ))
(slamist activists have been arrested. Some are part of the #H+( 2al;Haida in (slam
+aghreb3* whilst others have provided financial or material support for 0ihad or
supported para;military trainings. %rench prisons are considered by radicals as a
primary site of recruitment, as well as among socially deprived neighbourhoods. %or
1aurence P QaLsse 2788:, p. 7>F3 the number of Salafis is estimated by the former
Aead of (ntelligence Services 24enseignements /KnKraux3 to be ),888, of which $8I
are considered potentially dangerous. he number of people incarcerated because of
terrorism was -9$ in &ecember 788G, including $)- from the .as6ue terrorist group,
:> !orsican nationalists and $8- were (slamists.
Youth Recruitment and Conversion
!oncern is increasingly more focused on %undamentalism amongst young people.
here are $) million +uslims in Europe, and the fact that so many of these are young
is of significant relevance to the &irectors /eneral within the EU. Mith youth as a
cross;cutting issue there are concerns about issues of racism and social
marginalisation across EU member states.
#ccording to the European Strategic (ntelligence and Security !entre, %rench
0ihadists killed or arrested in (ra6 are from $F to 78 years old. ?nce recruited, youth
are sent to Bakistan, Oemen or Egypt to attend religious training. Aowever,
individuals who become radicals to the point of becoming violent terrorists do not
constitute a homogenous group. hey are often the result of a complex con,unction of
factors amongst which religion is only one of them. he #merican intervention in
(ra6 would have favoured the recruitment of a few young +uslims ready to fight
against Mestern (mperialism.
he best known network is the "5(5th arrondissement
F
group' that has recruited and
sent several young boys from the Barisian neighbourhood of .uttes;!haumont fight in
(ra6. he Aead of this group is incarcerated, his court case in progress. (t is now
acknowledged that (slam had nothing to do with the 788) urban riots in %rance. he
F
"#rrondissement' refers to administrative areas or neighbourhoods in Baris.
--
rioters were typically school disaffected and socially deprived youngsters in a
precarious situation but not known as fundamentalists or sympathetic to radicalism.
he earlier explanation of the riots being supported by underground activities from
+uslim groups has since been set aside by the police intelligence services. he few
young %rench from +uslim ethnic backgrounds that were identified as having
becoming involved with radicalised violence did not start with delin6uent careers
before turning to ideology and terrorism, but had disrupted biographies. =haled
=elkal, who lived in 1yon and from #lgeria, had returned to #lgeria before acting as
a terrorist for the /(# 2(slamic #rmed /roup3. Vaccarias +oussaoui, whose origin is
+oroccon, had studied in England and was involved in >C$$. .oth were well educated
and successful students. (n %rance, unable to climb up the social scale, they left the
country and encountered terrorist recruiters.
Such isolated cases cannot lead to the conclusion that there is a direct relationship
between discriminations, racism and (slamist violence. he media contribute to the
idea that all +uslims are terrorists or activists of a religion hostile to democracy.
#ccording to =hosrokhavar 27887, 78893, amongst radical youth there is the common
feeling of humiliation and alienation as well as the deep rooted impression of being
victims of "Mestern arrogance'. (slam is then seen as a means to re;gain dignity. his
logic of victimisation enables individuals to enter a new worldwide community, their
personal situation being similar to that of other +uslims in the world. #s a
conse6uence their identity becomes constructed entirely around (slam through the
notion of oumma 2the community of the worshippers3. his adhesion to this
community takes place through membership of a local group under the authority of a
!heikh. (f the !heikh does not have any sympathy for violence, the group members
will tend to adopt attitudes and behaviours of shutting themselves off from the outside
world and the first foe will not be Mesterners but +uslims who do not comply with
what they consider as being proper adherents of (slam 2.ouzar, 788:3.
0ihadists usually go through a stage of (slamisation or re;islamisation through the
intermediary of an extreme conservative group 2abligh3 and then they will ,oin a
Salafi group 2=epel, 7888* 4oy, 788-3. hey usually drift towards radicalism when
meeting local recruiters from terrorist networks who point out the humiliation, racism
and alienation they are submitted to, leading them to a greater political commitment
and offering them military training 2=hosrokhavar, 78893. Ooung radicals are usually
recruited amongst young people who are socially marginalised, have dropped out of
school early and are delin6uents but there are also some from lower middle class
background with an average level of education. he ones who are delin6uent ,ustify
their delin6uent activity as being political action, their victims granted the status of
political foe 2&yevre, 788F3. hose who are more successful in education and ,oin
radical groups usually suffer from of a lack of cultural and historical feelings of
belonging in the host country and feel it as a threat to the +uslim identity and
community. +ost of these are youth from the so; called third generation, who
discover or re;discover (slam, as well as Europeans who have been converted
21aurence P QaLsse, 788:, pp. $>>;-883.
# study for the !hange (nstitute for the European !ommission on beliefs, ideologies
and narratives that lead to violent radicalisation underpinned by an abusive
interpretation of (slam, was recently conducted across four EU +ember States<
&enmark, %rance, /ermany and the U=. !ase studies of terrorist movements
-G
indicated 6uite clearly that grievances inform the employment of violence. he
research also examined the role of the internet and the way violent ideologies were
relayed. (n this sense, the web appeared to act as a distribution mechanism,
promoting violence against perceived enemies, spreading propaganda and the
glorification of martyrs. Mhilst few interviewees in the research appeared to
subscribe to or act upon violent radical views, many expressed clear oppositional
views towards violence. he research produced several key narratives including
Jliving in a Jhostile society, disenfranchisement and heightened political
consciousness, anti; imperialism and social ,ustice, revivalism, emancipation and the
personal search to be a good +uslim and the headscarf as liberation, bringing together
a constellation of narratives 2!hange (nstitute, 788F< G3. (n contrast, a core ideology
of violent radicals was identified and included 0ihadism, akfir, the world as an abode
of war, the principle of non;discrimination between civilian and military targets*
attacking the far enemy* suicide bombing* the killing of other +uslims, and the return
of the caliphate. he authors suggest that what we are seeing is something akin to a
social movement across +uslim fields, united by a sense of common grievances, and
propose practical and research based recommendations as a means to counter these.
4ecent research commissioned by the &irectorate /eneral for 0ustice, %reedom and
Security of the European !ommission, sought to uncover the methods through which
(slamist militants in Europe mobilise their supporters and find new recruits. his no
longer occurs in settings such as mos6ues and has been driven underground, focusing
instead on places of vulnerability such as prisons. Spalek has also expressed concern
about the potential for +uslim conversion during imprisonment 2788:3
#ctivists were clearly involved in recruitment, exploiting young +uslims identity
conflicts between Mestern ideals on the one hand, and those of their parents on the
other. he web has assumed an increasingly important role, evidencing new forms of
(slamist militant online activism with Jvirtual self;recruitment. !rucially however,
there were differences between countries in Southern Europe, with recent +uslim
immigration, against those in which second and third generations of European
+uslims are reaching adolescence. (n the former, conflicts of identity are less
problematic between Mestern society and traditional culture, which makes (slamist
extremists less attractive. !onversely, the Jradical imam, tends to appeal more to
converts and second or third generation European +uslims. he authors suggest that
open recruitment has become more difficult since the attacks in +adrid and 1ondon,
with +uslim communities and authorities adopting a more vigilant approach. he
research therefore warns that the trend towards Jseekers and Jhome;grown self;
starter groups will continue, especially in countries with a large second and third
generation +uslim population 2@eumann and 4ogers, 788:3.
here are various explanations for violent radicalisation, such as a response to
feelings of humiliation and dissatisfaction in hostile political environments 2=rueger
and +aleckova, 788-3, to more psychological and individualised accounts. Aowever,
.none seems entirely satisfactory, since there appears to be no clear profile of who is
likely to engage in such acts 2&E+?S, 78893. Smelser and +itchell warn that it may
be misleading to focus on psychological explanations regarding the individual who
commit the acts, as it is to focus on material disadvantage. he crucial site of analysis
is the political contexts in which such acts occur. &espite different approaches to
understanding these acts, what has been generally observed is an underlying tension
-)
allied to past historical colonialist exploitation 2Smelser and +itchell, 78873. (ndeed,
the U=, %rench and Spanish literature on +uslim youth, all draw attention to the
reality of social marginalisation, feelings of alienation, concerns about foreign policy
against +uslims elsewhere, and in particular a clear sense of identity confusion which
oscillates around religious and cultural heritage, the influence of parents, and the
adoption of a national identity within their own host country. Such identity
confusion, grievances and social marginalisation mean that +uslim youth present a
fertile hotbed of recruitment to (slamist radicals. (n order to counter this, research
suggests focussing on specific areas, which include the development of co;operation
between relevant national and local authorities and +uslim civil society< !ommunity
engagement engagement with mos6ues* understanding the concerns of youth*
responding to local and national grievances* developing strategies of social inclusion,
and addressing perceptions of global grievances through dialogue
(t is paradoxical that the feeling of insecurity about (slam and its
representativesCmembers develops whilst research is being published showing
evidence that +uslim immigrants and a fortiori their children do not differ from
others in many aspects of their personal lives 2ribalat, $>>)* $>>9* .rouard, iber,,
788)3 but the fact they are +uslims. #lthough they are suspected of being part of
strong communities, they do not form communities geared towards worship. hey
form part of groups which are increasingly diversified as far as their social
background and status are concerned and their religious organization too 2!ouvreur,
$>>F* &assetto, $>>93. here has been an evolution since the $>:8s and it is possible
to clearly state that there is a social and cultural evolution amongst +uslims from
Europe 24oy, 788)* 1orcerie, 788)3. # European (slam has been emerging and not
only (slam in Europe. ?nly a small part of the +uslims who live in this part of the
world are resisting these changes and stick to a very puritan practice of (slam. &espite
this difficult context where threats should not be minimized, many researchers
2.ouzar 788:, .oyer, $>>F, 1aurence et QaLsse, 788:, ernisien, 78873 maintain that
the phenomenon of violent radicalisation remains marginal and involves about $)
people per year out of ) million +uslims. Qiolence and terrorism are clearly
denounced by leading +uslim organisations. Qarious +uslim authorities met in
(stanbul in 0uly 7889 and signed up to the opkapi statement that "errorism
whatever its forms of expression is an insult to Aumanity. (n no circumstance (slam
can admit terrorism and the murder of civilians'.
-9
CHAPTER 3 STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Introduction
he broad aims of this research study were two;fold< to explore experiences of and
attitudes towards racism, discrimination and social marginalisation amongst young
people aged between $7 and $F from +uslim and non;+uslim backgrounds across -
EU member states* and to explore the links between these experiences and attitudes
with attitudes or activities that were supportive of violent radicalisation. his section
of the report outlines the research design that was adopted to achieve these aims and
includes details of the sampling strategies adopted, 6uestionnaire development and
piloting, ethical and access re6uirements, fieldwork procedures, practical challenges
and shows the achieved samples in each of the three EU member states.
Research design
he %4# stipulated that a 6uantitative research design be developed to address the
aims of this study, using a self;completion 6uestionnaire administered to young
people in schools, and colleges where necessary. he aim was to survey a minimum
of $888 young people within each EU member state, sampling approximately e6ual
numbers of young people between the ages of $7 and $F, males and females and
+uslims and non;+uslims. (t was not possible to conduct a survey that was
representative of the total population within this age bracket, for two main reasons.
%irstly, +uslim households make up a relatively low proportion of the population in
each of the three countries, so a representative sample would not have yielded
sufficient numbers of +uslim respondents. Secondly, there is a strong tendency for
+uslim households to live in close geographical clusters, which makes representative
sampling problematic. herefore, two specific locations known to have higher than
average populations of +uslim families were selected within each member state to
administer the survey. wo locations rather than one were selected< firstly, because
there was concern that there would not be sufficient numbers of +uslim youths in any
one location to achieve the re6uired number of respondents* and, secondly, the high
level of geographical clustering meant that it was desirable to take samples from
different locations so as to minimise any skewing of the results by the inclusion of
respondents from one Jatypical location. he locations selected for inclusion were
.ordeaux and Baris in %rance, +adrid and /ranada in Spain and /lasgow and
1ondon in the U=
>
.
Sampling strategies
(t was necessary to use slightly different sampling designs in the three member states
due to the differential availability of data on ethnicity which was re6uired to target
geographical areas high in +uslim households. (n the U=, data from the 788$ !ensus
could be used to identify administrative areas with the highest concentrations of
households with dependent children that had a Bakistani or South #sian head of
household. Aowever, in Spain and %rance it was not possible to use !ensus data to
identify localities with high levels of minority ethnic groups because the Spanish and
>
&ue to difficulties accessing sufficient numbers of +uslim youths in /lasgow, an additional sample
was taken from Edinburgh to represent the Scottish picture.
-:
%rench !ensus do not collect information on ethnicity. herefore, sampling
strategies in Spain and %rance relied much more on Jlocal knowledge and
intelligence gathered from local literature and experts.
(rance
(n %rance, local knowledge based on previous research was used to select cities with
higher concentrations of minority ethnic residents. .ordeaux was selected because it
had particular neighbourhoods with a high concentration of +uslim households.
Mithin .ordeaux, two specific areas were selected< one of which was a socially
deprived neighbourhood with high concentration of ethnic minorities* the other was a
satellite city with a vocational school where there were known to have been problems
with racism during the last academic year. he suburbs of Baris were chosen partly
because of the high level of interest in the high profile clashes between minority
ethnic groups and the police in recent years* however, the authorities have also
become concerned there by the growing recruitment of young people into traditional
fundamentalist +uslim groups. ?ne particular area was selected because if its
reputation for having social and educational challenges and a high concentration of
minority ethnic youths. he vocational and upper secondary schools were selected on
the basis of the social and ethnic composition of their intake.
)pain
(n Spain, demographic information about the nationality of foreign residents in
+adrid and /ranada was drawn from three sources< a /ranada !ouncil study of
ethnic minorities perceptions* from official immigrant advisors in /ranada and
+adrid* and from E(+ at the #utonomous University of +adrid
$8
. @eighbourhoods
with high rates of minority ethnic groups from +uslim countries were identified and
then schools located in these areas. ?riginally, it was intended to survey around G
schools in each location. Aowever, this figure had to be revised because the
proportion of children from +uslim backgrounds attending schools was severely
limited. his was partly due to the small numbers of +uslim households with school
children of the relevant ages living in the communities, but also due to legislation
introduced by the Spanish government to limit the intake of minority ethnic youths in
Spanish schools to 78I. #s a conse6uence, a much larger number of schools had to
be sampled 2around 78 in total3 and fieldwork was widened out to include other
organizations, such as centres for immigrant children, mos6ues and immigrant
schools.
$he *'
he first stage of sampling was to identify those wards in the selected U= locations
with the largest concentrations of +uslim households. (t is not possible from the
788$ !ensus to determine this exactly, as information on religion affiliation is not
published. Aowever, it is possible approximate this by identifying the administrative
Mards with the highest concentration of households with dependent children that have
a head of household 2or household reference person3 belonging to Bakistani or South
#sian origin. Aaving identified the most important Mards, the next stage was to
identify the school catchment areas overlapping these !ensus Mards in order to
sample from schools within these areas. he aim was to sample a total of around
eight schools and four colleges from in and around these areas, selecting those schools
$8
E(+ is a research group about social development and intervention in the +editerranean land, and
specifically about #rabic issues. (t is an organization dependent on the &epartment of #rabic and
(slamic studies of the #utonomous University of +adrid.
-F
and colleges that were known to have a good mix of both +uslim and @on;+uslim
young people attending.
(t was not possible simply to select those schools from within the identified wards, as
these did not always reflect the population density of the local area. his was due to
issues of parental choice, school admission policies and the proximity of schools
within and across wards. (n many areas of the U=, pupils do not attend their closest
school but travel to other neighbouring areas for their education. (n the selected
location in England, this had led to significant problems of school segregation,
making it very difficult to find schools with an Jeven balance of +uslim and @on;
+uslim youths. (n Scotland, there were also some issues with parental choice 2i.e.
parents deciding to send their children to non;catchment schools3. Aowever, because
the concentration of +uslim households is not nearly so great in Scottish cities, a
bigger problem for sampling was finding schools with a high enough density of
+uslim pupils. %or this reason, advice was sought from the local education
authorities in both England and Scotland as to the most appropriate schools to sample
2the aim being purposive rather than random sampling3.
Mithin each school, one class from each year group that covered the ages $7 to $F
was randomly sampled. (n Scotland, this was first to sixth year of secondary school*
whereas, in England this was years seven to twelve. (n order to ensure a large enough
sample of $F year olds 2who were severely under;represented in the school samples3 7
colleges in Scotland and 7 sixth form colleges in England were visited and young
people were randomly selected to participate.
Questionnaire development
he 6uestionnaire for this study was developed over a four month period. Some
6uestions were adopted from a range of existing and verified research instruments.
he sources of these 6uestions included the following well known studies<
he (nternational Self;4eport &elin6uency Study N a comparative self;report
study of youth offending and anti;social behaviour across approximately -8
countries.
he Edinburgh Study of Oouth ransitions and !rime N a prospective
longitudinal study of youth offending in a cohort of G888 young people in
Scotland.
he Ooung Beoples Social #ttitudes Survey N a repeated cross;sectional study
first carried out in $>>G to explore the attitudes and values of children and young
people.
he Eurogang instrument N a standardised bank of 6uestions used to establish
whether group activities fall into the definition of a criminal youth Jgang.
he /allop Boll of the +uslim Morld N a large in;depth study of +uslim opinion,
covering more than >8I of the worlds +uslim population.
he European Social Survey N an academically;driven social survey which
explores the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of populations from over -8
nations in the face of changing European institutions.
->
Mhile these surveys were useful in developing components of the 6uestionnaire, it
soon became evident that there was a real lack of standardised 6uantitative measures
in this area, as the bulk of the research in this field has been 6ualitative in its
methodology. herefore, it was necessary to develop many new measures by drawing
on broader sources of literature on the topics of youth violence, social
marginalisation, radicalisation, political and religious affiliation and youth culture.
# number of key issues were identified as being key to the design of the 6uestionnaire
and, therefore, efforts were made to find or design 6uestions that would tap into these
key issues. Some aspects of the 6uestionnaire had to be very carefully drafted in
order not to contravene ethical guidelines in the EU member states, particularly
%rance which has very stringent rules prohibiting 6uestions that may be indicative of
any form of cultural discrimination. he eight main issues that were identified were<
.ackground characteristicsN age, sex, cultural background and religious
affiliation, including strength of religious beliefs and perceptions of religious
truth.
Experiences of discrimination N being picked on unfairly, discriminated against
by adults, bullied or victims of violence, and exploring whether these experiences
may be caused by racism.
%eelings of social marginalisation N experiences of isolation, feelings of
alienation and general unhappiness.
#ttitudes towards violence N perceptions of when it is ,ustifiable to use violence,
and whether war and terrorism are acceptable means of solving problems.
Berceptions of global problems N key social issues affecting the world 2including
terrorism3, interest in politics, trust in people and institutions in positions of
power and civic participation.
%amily characteristics N family size and structure, parental origin, socio;economic
status and Jconflict within the family, particularly around religious or cultural
issues.
Environmental influences N satisfaction with the local community and school.
Beer relationships and lifestyle choices N friendship patterns, peer groups, gang
involvement, hanging around, spare time activities and internet usage.
he draft 6uestionnaire was developed predominantly in English, but translated into
%rench and Spanish before being extensively piloted in each of the three member
states. Biloting involved work in some schools, but also targeted young +uslim
youths who were located in +os6ues in order to ensure that the 6uestions were not in
any distressing or offensive to these youths. he final 6uestionnaire was almost
completely comparable across the three member states, with the exception of a small
number of 6uestions that had to be designed in a way that was culturally specific.

he
final 6uestionnaire consisted of eleven sections, each containing 6uestions on a
different theme. he sections and themes are summarised below<
$3 About you and &here you live< demographic 6uestions on age, sex, nationality,
languages spoken* having a personal confident* description of neighbourhood and
time spent hanging around.
G8
73 +our family< family structure* parental nationality* parental working status* 6uality
time spent with parents* parental conflict.
-3 +our identity< nature and strength of cultural identity* experience of
discrimination* perception of cultural integration.
G3 +our friends< number, sex and cultural background of friends* parental approval of
friends* gang membership bank of 6uestions* experience of adult discrimination.
)3 $hings that have happened to you< experiences of bullying and violence and
whether these are discriminatory.
93 $hings you might have done< instances of involvement in bullying and violence to
others that may be discriminatory.
:3 Religious beliefs< nature and strength of religious beliefs* source of religious
teaching* and perception of religion and truth.
F3 Attitudes and opinions< general satisfaction with life* perceptions of alienation*
priorities in life* ,ustification of violence* degree of trust in individuals and
institutions.
>3 $he &orld today< concern about the state of the world and social issues* whether
war or terrorism is ,ustified* interest in local politics* civic involvement and
commitment.
$83 About your free time< time spent on the internet* nature of internet sites visited*
key influences in life* amount and nature of 6uality time spent with friends.
$$3 About school,college< attitudes to school* perceptions of achievement* school meal
entitlement 2proxy for individual deprivation3* experience of exclusion*
experience of discrimination at school.
Research access and ethics
#ccess re6uirements varied between the member states and, therefore, it was easier
for researchers in some locations to start fieldwork 6uickly, while others had to await
permissions. (n %rance and Spain, the local educational authorities in each location
were informed about the research in advance* however, formal permissions were not
re6uired before the schools were approached. herefore, school head teachers were
approached directly for permission to conduct the survey. (n the U=, formal consent
was re6uired by the local authorities before any schools could be approached. (n
addition, each member of the U= research team had to apply for an Jenhanced
disclosure from the criminal records office in order to prove they had no convictions
before being allowed access to school children. his was not necessary in %rance or
Spain due to the status of the researchers as civil servants. ?nce local authority
permission was granted, schools and colleges were contacted individually and
permission was sought from the Aead eacher or Brincipal for the study to go ahead.
(n all three member states it was necessary to provide letters to the parents of school
children informing them about the study and seeking their informed consent for the
child to participate. %or data protection reasons these letters were issued by the
individual schools. ?ver;sampling was carried out in all areas to ensure that the
minimum achieved number of 6uestionnaires remained at around $888 in each
member state. %or those young people who were sampled in colleges in the U=
G$
parental permission was not re6uired because these young people were all over the
age of $9.
#ny research involving young people is sub,ect to stringent ethical considerations. (n
each of the three member states, therefore, the University authorities had to be
satisfied that the research was being carried out to the highest ethical standards.
&uring 6uestionnaire design, it was essential to ensure that none of the measures
included could be construed as being discriminatory. (n %rance, there were additional
ethical re6uirements because the %rench constitution states that "all citizens are e6ual
with no distinction of origin, race or religion', and therefore it is "forbidden to collect
or process any personal data that provide indications, directly or indirectly, on the
ethnic origin, religious, philosophical or religious beliefs, the union affiliation of
individuals or data about their health or sexual life' 2-a& of .,/0,0123 art. 34.
!onse6uently, all of the data collected for this study were anonymous and treated with
the highest confidentiality, and none of the individual children or participating schools
are identifiable in this report. (n addition, all of the data collected have been stored on
computers sub,ect to the highest levels of security, no names of individuals or schools
being recorded.
Fieldwork procedures
?nce access had been agreed and permissions secured, the survey was administered in
classrooms in schools and colleges within the three member states. Each school or
college arranged for the researchers to administer the 6uestionnaires at times that were
convenient for the organisation, but one hour was re6uested for the survey to be
administered. he 6uestionnaires were administered by members of the research team
or their assistants, rather than by teachers which would have breached the guidelines
on confidentiality. (n Spain and the U=, school staff were often in attendance during
fieldwork* however, they were not permitted to assist the young people or observe
what they were writing in their 6uestionnaires. (n %rance, teachers were not present at
all during fieldwork visits to schools. # minimum of two researchers were present
during 6uestionnaire administration at all times. (n all three member states, research
assistants were employed to assist the core researchers with completing the fieldwork.
he administration procedures started with a comprehensive introduction to the
survey. he young people were informed about the nature, aims, background and
confidentiality of the study, and some time was spent explaining how to complete the
6uestionnaire 2reading instructions, following routing, etc3. Barticipants were
reassured that they would be completely anonymous, but given the opportunity to
withdraw if they wished, even though their parents had consented. hereafter, the
survey was administered and the young people completed the 6uestionnaires. he
average length of time for completion varied depending on the age, educational level
and first language of the respondents, but response time ranged from $) to ))
minutes. 4esearchers were available at all times to answer 6uestions or assist
respondents and, for those who had more difficulty completing the survey, one to one
assistance was offered.
?nce 6uestionnaires were completed, they were checked briefly 2to ensure the
minimum possible amount of missing data3 and then gathered in by the researchers.
Ooung people who completed the survey were given additional, fun tasks to complete
during the course of fieldwork in order not to disturb or distract those who were still
G7
filling in their 6uestionnaire. (mmediately following fieldwork, the 6uestionnaires
were coded 2to identify the location, schoolCcollege type and year group3 and then the
data were input into computer software for analysis.
Challenges of fieldwork
he research team faced a number of challenges in conducting this research. he
nature of the research design is such that the findings cannot be said to be generalisable
to the whole population of the specific member states, far less other member states.
Aowever, it is hoped that the findings are reflective of the experiences, attitudes and
behaviours of young people from +uslim and non;+uslim backgrounds living in areas
of high ethnic diversity. &uring the course of the study, the research team faced some
fairly difficult challenges which may have impacted in some ways on the findings
presented in this report. he main challenges are summarised below<
(n each of the three member states, schools were sometimes reluctant to participate
in the research because of the high demand for such research and the great burden
placed on school staff and pupils by researchers.
he access and ethical re6uirements for this study are outlined above* however, it
is worth restating here the importance to schools, parents and students of
guaranteeing anonymity and confidentiality as this was raised many times during
this survey.
?ne hour was re6uested to administer our survey, although it was not always
possible to provide this amount of time. herefore, there were problems with
getting some young people to complete the 6uestionnaire.
he concentration of +uslim youths within member states is variable and it is
often hard to pinpoint households with young people of the relevant ages, so
finding schools with a high enough number of respondents was problematic.
Educational policies that limit numbers of minority ethnic pupils compounds the
problem.
he fieldwork for this study coincided with two periods of Eid, so it was necessary
to make return visits to schools or colleges to ensure a high enough sample of
+uslim youths was achieved.
Achieved samples
&espite all the challenges faced by the research team, the minimum achieved number
of $888 respondents was met in all three member states. able -.$, below, presents a
summary of the number of schools and other institutions that were visited for this
study, and the number of young people that were achieved during fieldwork. he
smallest number of schools was visited in %rance, where fieldwork was concentrated
within four schools and no additional surveys in colleges or other institutions was
re6uired. (n Spain, around three 6uarters of the fieldwork was conducted in schools,
with the remaining work taking place in various centres, mos6ues and community
G-
groups in order to boost the number of +uslim respondents. (n the U=, F)I of the
fieldwork took place in schools, but colleges and sixth form colleges were necessary
to boost the number of $F year olds.
Table 3.1: Achieved samples in each member state
%rance Spain U=
@umber of schools surveyed G 7$ F
@umber of colleges or other
institutions surveyed
8 ) G
@umber of students surveyed
in schools
$889 :9- >)8
@umber of students surveyed
in colleges or other institutions
8 7)7 $:G
otal number of pupils
surveyed
$889 $8$) $$7G
GG
CHAPTER 4 DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF MEMBER STATES
Introduction
his chapter of the report outlines the demographic profile of the samples of young
people surveyed in %rance, Spain and the U=. his chapter includes< a breakdown of
the age and sex of the young people who were surveyed* some information about their
socio;economic background based on parental employment status and their
entitlement to educational privileges due to low income* their cultural background,
including country of birth and languages spoken* and their religious affiliation,
strength of religious beliefs and opinions about truth and religion. he information
on religious affiliation is important because it forms the basis for the structure of the
following three chapters, presenting results separately for +uslims and @on;+uslims
in the three member states.
Demographic profile
he remit of the study was to survey approximately e6ual samples of males and
females aged between $7 and $F. able G.$ shows that the %rench and Spanish
samples contained slightly more female students than males* whereas the U= sample
includes more males than females. Mhile these do not represent an e6ual division,
they do broadly reflect the populations of the schools and colleges sampled. he age
profile of school classes meant it was not always possible to ensure that the young
people surveyed fell exactly between age $7 and $F, as sometimes young people start
school at a younger age while others are re6uired to repeat years. (n the colleges and
vocational schools, the age range of students tended to be wider and it was not always
possible to get the re6uired number of respondents within the age ranges specified.
Aowever, the ma,ority of respondents 2FGI in %rance, >7I in the U= and $88I in
Spain3 fell within the $7;$F year age range. %or the purposes of analysis, those who
were aged under $7 are merged with the $7 year olds and those aged over $F are
merged with the $F year olds.
Table 4.1: Age and Sex profile of the samples in each member state
France Spain UK
N N N
Sex
male G:G G: G9: G9 9G7 ):
female )7F )- )G: )G GF7 G-
#ge in years
Up to $7 $8: $$ $G7 $G $>$ $:
$- $8> $$ $:> $F $:9 $9
$G >F $8 $)7 $) $G8 $-
$) >$ > $F) $F $7F $$
$9 $G7 $G $:- $: $F- $9
$: $F- $F $G- $G $G9 $-
$F or over 79> 7: G$ G $98 $G
#verage age $).> $G.: $G.>
G)
(deally, each year of age should have been represented by $GI of the sample within
each member state. able G.$ shows that the %rench sample under;represents the
younger respondents and over;represents the older respondents, which has resulted in
a higher average age amongst the respondents 2approximately $).> years3. he
Spanish sample is largely representative for most of the age groups, although they
slightly over;represent $-, $) and $9 year olds, and they seriously under;represent $F
year olds. his was due to problems in accessing young people who had left
secondary education. his resulted in an average age of $G.: years within the Spanish
sample, which is far lower than that of the %rench sample. he U= sample is broadly
representative for most age groups, although there is some slight over;representation
of $7, $- and $9 year olds and a slightly under;representation of $) year olds. his
was caused by examinations occurring at the time of fieldwork which prevented some
young people in their final compulsory year of education from participating in the
survey. he average age of the U= sample is $G.> years, higher than that for Spain
but a year lower than that for %rance.
Socio-economic background
(t was not possible within the scope of this survey to collect detailed information on
the socio;economic status of the children in the study based on the detailed
occupational or educational background of the parents, as such information is almost
impossible to collect accurately amongst children. herefore, we rely here on a
general 6uestion about the employment status of the young peoples parents and on
information about whether the child was eligible for special educational privileges
which are indicative of low income. able G.7 shows the percentage of the sample in
each member state who reported having a working father and mother. he rate of
employment amongst the fathers is very similar for all three member states* however,
the rate of employment amongst the mothers is highest for %rance and lowest for the
U=. (n the U=, far more of the mothers were caring full time for the family than was
the case in %rance. his may indicate that the sample in the U= was more socially
deprived than that in %rance, since employment rates tend to be higher for those
women in more affluent socio;economic classes.
Table 4.2: Employment status of father and mother by member state ()
Employment status France Spain UK
Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother
Employed :F :$ :F ): :9 G:
Unemployed 9 F $- $8 ) F
4etiredCtoo ill to work > - G 7 : -
!ares for the family ^ $: $ 79 7 ->
&o not live with parent : 7 - : $8 -
Bercentages are rounded so may not total $88I. ^ denotes less than 8.)I.
(n %rance, )9I of respondents to the survey stated that they had both a mother and a
father in employment, which was considerably higher than the figures for Spain
2G:I3 and the U= 2->I3. he second most common scenario was to have a working
father and a mother who stayed at home to care for the family, which was the case for
$$I of %rench, 78I of Spanish and -8I of U= respondents. herefore, there was
some income coming into the household in the vast ma,ority of cases. Unfortunately,
it was not possible to determine what that level of income was.
G9
1ooking at the proportion of young people who receive some form of educational
assistance gives further indication of socio;economic status. (n %rance and Spain,
young people from poor backgrounds get bursaries to help with their school expenses.
(n Spain, the proportion who reported getting an educational bursary was 7-I, only
7I lower than the national average 2Spanish +inistry of Education, 788F3. (n %rance,
G8I of respondents who answered this 6uestion reported receiving an educational
bursary in %rance, which is significantly higher than the national average of 7GI
2@ational +inistry for Education, 788:3. (n the U=, the e6uivalent measure is
entitlement to free school meals, which 7GI of respondents said they were or had
been entitled to. his is greater than the national average which stands at $9I in
Scotland 2Scottish /overnment 788:3 and 7$I in England 2&!%S 788F3, although
the difference is not as great as in %rance. hese findings could indicate that the
%rench sample is less affluent than the Spanish and U= samples* however, it would be
necessary to know more about the circumstances of these families to confirm this.
Cultural profile
his section of the report describes the cultural profile of the respondents to the
survey, according to self;reports about their ethnic background and information about
their country of origin and spoken languages. Me also look here at how strongly they
associated with their ethnic background. #s can be seen from able G.-, the cultural
profiles of the samples in each of the three member states were very wide ranging and
this reflects the fact that many schools and colleges within the sampled cities
contained young people from many minority backgrounds. #s can be seen, many
respondents described themselves as coming from more than one cultural background,
especially in Spain 27)I3 and the U= 2)GI3.
Table 4.3: Cultural background of respondents in the 3 member states ()
France Spain UK
%rench GG Spanish :$ Scottish G8
?ther European $- +orrocan -8 English G8
#rab $7 1atin #merican $8 .ritish -8
#frican $8 ?ther European G Bakistani -8
@orth #frican G #sianC+iddle Eastern - #frican :
#sian 7 ?ther #frican 7 (rish G
urkish 7 Bakistani $ !hinese -
1atin;#merican $ (ndian 7
Eastern
European
$ Melsh $
?ther $$ ?ther G ?ther $F
+ore than one response permitted so columns do not total $88I.
%or each description of their cultural background, the young people were asked how
Jstrongly they felt they belonged to this group. he responses to this 6uestion are
summarised in %igure G.$. his indicates that there was very little difference between
%rench, Spanish and U= respondents in terms of how strongly they felt they belonged
to their cultural background. #round two thirds felt very strongly associated with
their stated background, while around one 6uarter felt fairly strongly associated. 1ess
G:
than $ in $8 in each member state said they did not feel attached to the cultural
background they had used to describe themselves.
Figure 4.1: Strength of association with cultural background by member state
()
)
*)
+)
,)
-)
.)
/)
0)
1)
Ver% sr!n2"% Fair"% sr!n2"% N! sr!n2"%
France
S'ain
U(
# fairly sizeable proportion of the samples in each member state said that they spoke
a language other than the native mother tongue at home. (n both %rance and the U=,
)GI of respondents stated that they spoke languages other than %rench and English,
respectively, at home. (n %rance, around half 2))I3 of the multilingual respondents
said that they spoke predominantly %rench at home while -:I said they spoke %rench
and another language e6ually. (n the U=, G$I said they spoke predominantly
English at home, while a further G$I said they spoke English and another language
e6ually. #mongst the Spanish respondents, only G)I of respondents said they spoke
a language other than Spanish at home. ?f these, only -8I said they spoke Spanish
all the time, and G>I claimed to speak Spanish and another language e6ually.
Religious affiliation
%ature of religious beliefs
he young people in the survey were asked some 6uestions about their religious
beliefs, starting with a general 6uestion about the religion they belonged to. able G.)
shows the responses to this 6uestion from each of the three member states. he
results indicate that around one in four of the samples from Spain and the U= were of
+uslim origin, compared to -GI of the %rench sample. ?f the remaining
respondents, the bulk of those in %rance said they were either 4oman !atholic 27-I3
or did not belong to any religion 279I3. (n the U=, a third of respondents said they
did not belong to any religion, with the second most prevalent religion being
protestant at only $8I. (n Spain, the bulk of non;+uslim respondents were 4oman
!atholic, while $9I did not belong to any religion. hese distinctions are important,
because they form the basis of the analysis contained in chapters ), 9 and :,
presenting results from each of the three member states.
GF
Table 4.5: Religion of respondents in each member state ()
France Spain UK
4oman !atholic 7- -> 9
Brotestant - $ $8
?ther !hristian 9 7 :
.uddhism $ ^ $
0ewish ^ 8 ^
(slam -G G8 G$
Sikh ^ 8 $
Aindu ^ 8 ^
?thers ^ 7 7
&ont belong to any religion 79 $9 -7
CHAPTER 9 &enotes less than 8.)I.
)trength of religious beliefs
4espondents were also asked to indicate how Jstrong their religious beliefs were.
%igure G.7 compares the responses from the three member states. hose who
responded to this 6uestion in %rance were the most likely to say they had very strong
religious beliefs, while the Spanish were most likely to say that their religious beliefs
were not very strong. #mongst the respondents in the U=, they were around e6ually
likely to say that they had fairly strong religious beliefs or that they had no religious
beliefs. his chart indicates that there were some 6uite dramatic differences in the
religious affiliation of young people in different member states, which may be due to
differing cultural mixes or due to other unknown factors.
Figure 4.2: Strength of religious beliefs by member state ()
)
.
*)
*.
+)
+.
,)
,.
-)
-.
Ver%
sr!n2"%
Fair"%
sr!n2"%
N! $er%
sr!n2
N!
re"i2i!3s
#e"ie&s
France
S'ain
U(
(requency of &orship
&espite their apparent strong religious beliefs, the young people in the %rench sample
were not likely to regularly attend a place of worship. (n fact, around F8I of the
%rench respondents who answered this 6uestion stated that they attended a place of
worship either less than one day per week or never. # high proportion 2:8I3 of the
G>
Spanish respondents also stated that they rarely or never attended a place of worship.
#mongst the U= respondents, the most common response was to say that they never
attended a place of worship 2)$I3. (n %rance and Spain, respondents were far more
likely to attend a place of worship occasionally compared to the U=. (ronically,
respondents in the U= were also more likely to say that they attended a place of
worship more than G days per week.
Figure 4.3: Frequency of attendance at place of worship by member state ()
) *) +) ,) -) .) /)
-4 5a%s67ee8
*4 5a%s67ee8
9* 5a%67ee8
Ne$er
U(
S'ain
France
Religious teaching
he source of young peoples learning about religion varied between the member
states. (n %rance, young people do not receive any religious education in schools*
therefore, the most common source of teaching about religion reported by the %rench
youths was family members 2)GI3. Aowever, 7-I stated that no;one taught them
anything about religion. (n Spain, religious education is taught in schools* however,
only $8I of respondents stated that they learned most about religion from teachers.
1ike the %rench sample, most 2)8I3 stated that they learned about religion from their
family, while a further $:I said nobody taught them any religion. (n the U=, a lower
proportion 2-:I3 stated that they were taught by family members, while a higher
proportion 27:I3 said they were taught by teachers. #gain, $9I said that nobody
taught them religion. (nterestingly, religious leaders were responsible for around the
same proportion of religious teaching in each of the three member states 2$-I in
%rance and the U=, and $GI in Spain3.
5pinion about religion and truth
(n the (slamic faith it is generally believed that there is only one religion that tells the
truth. he respondents to this survey were, therefore, asked whether they believed
this to be true or, alternatively, whether they though the truth could be found in many
religions, or that no religion tells the truth. able G.9 presents the responses to this
6uestion. he table indicates that respondents in Spain and the U= were more likely
to state that the truth was found in only one religion, which is perhaps not surprising
)8
since the samples in these member states contained higher proportions of +uslims. (n
fact, looking at the responses of +uslim respondents only, 9$I of those in Spain and
)FI of those in the U= agreed that only one religion told the truth. ?nly around $ in
$8 respondents in each member state felt that no religion told the truth* however, a
large minority of those in each member state was uncertain how to answer this
6uestion.
able G.9< ?pinion about truth and religion in each member state 2I3
France Spain UK
?ne religion tells the truth 78 -) 7F
ruth is found in many religions -- 7G -$
@o religion tells the truth $$ $8 >
&ont know -9 -8 -7
Summary of Chapter 4
he sample populations for %rance and Spain have slightly more females than
males, while the U= has a higher sample of males. Aowever, these
proportions are representative of the populations underlying them.
he age profile is oldest for the %rench sample and youngest for the Spanish
sample. he U= sample largely meets the criteria for the sample 6uotas.
Similar proportions of all three EU samples had a father in employment,
although %rance had the highest rates of mothers in employment, while the
U= had the lowest rates of working mothers. his may be reflective of
cultural differences but it is difficult to tell without further analysis.
#ccording to school;based measures, the %rench sample is the most deprived
while the Spanish sample is similar to the national average. he U= sample
was slightly more deprived than the national average, but less so than %rance.
he three member states presented very different cultural profiles, which may
explain many of the differences found later in this report. he Spanish sample
reported feeling predominantly Spanish and the .ritish sample were
predominantly either .ritish, English or Scottish. he %rench sample was
least likely to associate with the predominant nationality. +any young people
said they belonged to more than one cultural background, especially in Spain
and the U=.
+uslims accounted for about G8I of the Spanish and U= samples, and -GI
of the %rench sample. 4oman !atholics accounted for a large proportion of
both the %rench and Spanish samples. he next largest group was those who
stated they did not belong to any religion, which was highest in the U= and
lowest in Spain.
)$
he %rench respondents claimed to have the strongest religious beliefs, while
the U= respondents had the weakest beliefs. he Spanish sample varied
widely in terms of strength of beliefs.
!onse6uently, the U= respondents were least likely to attend a place of
worship. #lthough the %rench respondents claimed to have strong religious
beliefs, they mostly claimed to attend a place of worship either rarely or never.
he Spanish were most likely to attend at least weekly. (nterestingly, the U=
sample had the largest number who attended a place of worship G or more
days per week.
4eligious teaching varies from country to country, which was reflected in the
findings here. (n %rance, there is no religious teaching in schools, therefore
most religion is taught by the family. (n Spain also, most religion was said to
be taught by the family. (n the U=, teachers were more likely to teach
religion. 4eligious leaders were said to teach respondents about religion in
about $ in F cases in each member state.
%ew respondents felt that no religion told the truth* however, views were
varied about whether the truth was found in only one or many religions. #
third of respondents in all member states were unsure. Aowever, Spanish
respondents were most likely to believe the truth was found in only one
religion.
)7
CHAPTER 5 SURVEY RESULTS FROM FRANCE
Introduction
his chapter of the report outlines the key findings from the %rench sample, which
involved fieldwork in .ordeaux and Baris. he sample size for this component of the
study is $889 cases, of which -GI are from +uslim backgrounds. (n the %rench
sample, four main religious groups were identified< +uslims, 4oman !atholics, other
religious groups and those that did not follow any religion. #nalysis for this section
is separated into these four groups. he chapter looks at the following issues<
experience of alienation, social isolation and anxiety* experience of discrimination*
experience of bullying 2as victim and perpetrator3* attitudes to violence* experience of
violence 2as victim and perpetrator3* family background and dynamics* friends,
friendship patterns and group activities 2including gang membership3* school
experience* and spare time activities 2including civic participation3. he chapter ends
with a summary of the main findings from each section.
Experience of alienation, social isolation and anxiety
6eneral happiness &ith life
+ost respondents when asked how happy they currently were said that they were
happy. (ndeed, the level of +uslim youth who reported being Jvery happy was
slightly higher than the other groups. ?f those who reported being unhappy, +uslim
youth and those with no religion were unhappier than the other groups, though not
markedly so.
Table 5.1: feeling of happiness
Religious background categories/ Feeling
unhappy with life
Very
happy
Quite
happy
Neither happy nor
unhappy
Quite
unhappy
Very
unhappy
+uslims G:.FI -7.:I $-.>I -.7I 7.GI
no religion ->.$I ->.FI $G.9I -.GI -.$I
!atholics -).)I GG.9I $G.:I G.-I 8.>I
others minorities G8.>I -).)I $F.7I 7.:I 7.:I
?#1 G$.9I -:.>I $G.FI -.)I 7.7I
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E $).F8, df E $7, $;p E :>.>7I.
>G$ 6uotations.
7ersonal isolation
Table 5.2: personal matters
Religious background
categories/Confident(s)
No
A
teacher
A
friend
A religious
leader
My parents
or adult carer
Brother/sister
Someone
else
+uslims :.)I $.FI GG.9I -.GI $:.:I 77.$I 7.>I
no religion ).7I 7.8I G7.8I 8.9I 79.$I $>.)I G.9I
!atholics G.9I -.8I G-.-I 7.9I 77.FI $F.)I ).7I
others minorities :.>I 7.-I -F.$I G.:I $>.)I $>.)I :.>I
)-
?#1 9.$I 7.7I G7.:I 7.)I 7$.:I 78.$I G.9I
he dependence is highly significant, however the !hi7 value is weak< chi7 E G7.-G, df E $F, $;p E
>>.>8I.
$:-: 6uotations.
?n the 6uestion of whom respondents confide in this table illustrates that the ma,ority
of respondents, including +uslims, elect to confide with their peers, followed by their
family. .y contrast, school, institutions or religious representatives are rarely
approached. he close environment is approved of by a large ma,ority of the
youngsters who seem to be 6uite happy whatever their origin 2see table $F3.
Table 5.3: who do you spend most of your free time with out of school
Religious
background
categories/free
time
On
my
own
My
parents
or
adult
carer
Borthers/sisters
My parents
and
brothers/sisters
A
boyfriend/girlfriend
Friends
Religious
leader
Someone
else
TOTAL
+uslims ).)I F.9I $F.7I 78.-I $8.8I -$.9I 8.8I ).FI $88I
no religion :.:I ).7I 9.>I >.-I 78.7I G-.$I 8.8I :.:I $88I
!atholics :.GI G.$I >.7I $-.GI $>.FI -F.7I 8.)I :.GI $88I
others
minorities
$8.)I G.:I $7.FI $$.9I 79.:I 79.:I 8.8I :.8I $88I
?#1 :.$I 9.$I $7.8I $G.GI $:.7I -9.7I 8.$I 9.>I $88I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E 97.G-, df E 7$, $;p E _>>,>>I. FG7 6uotations.
Mhen asked who respondents spent most time with, +uslim respondents spent
significantly more time with their family and less time with friends. he importance
of spending time with brothers and sisters is also high.
(eelings of alienation
Table 5.4: social exclusion
Religious background categories/ social
exclusion
Agree
Neither agree nor
disagree
Disagree
+uslims -.>I 7$.FI :G.-I
no religion G.9I --.$I 97.-I
!atholics G.FI 7:.7I 9F.8I
others minorities ).:I 79.GI 9:.>I
?#1 G.)I 79.FI 9F.:I
he dependence is little significant. !hi7 E $8.:9, df E 9, $;p E >8.-FI. >7> 6uotations.
his table confirms that very few respondents stated that they felt isolated or socially
excluded, and +uslims seem to be less affected by social isolation than the others.
)G
$rust in others
Me combined here all the 6uestions on the trust granted to political and national or
international organizations 26uestions F.)a ` F.) k3 and created from the mean
obtained from the answers to each item, an index of trust of (nstitutions 2(&!3. he
!ronbach alpha for these items is .>$. Me can then compare the means 2%isher test3
with a .8) for significance. he difference in answers from part of the +uslim
respondents is not significant.
Table 5.5: religion/mean
Religious background categories IDC (trust in institutions)
+uslims 7.GG
no religion 7.)9
!atholics 7.GG
others minorities 7.-9
?#1 7.G:
he values in this table are the means calculated without the a non answers b. he %isher test results<
(&! 2trust in institutions3< Qcinter E $.-$, Qcintra E 8.7$, % E 9.-:, $;p E >>.>9I.
!omparison of the means for J+uslims et J?#1< J(&! 2trust in institutions3< 7,GG
C 7,G:. he difference is not significant 2t E 8.:F, $;p E )).9I3. ?nly the agnostics are
noticeable with a greater mistrust.
his e6ual allocation shows the general mistrust of young people to public institutions
2 for instance, one in two participants do not trust the police, 98,9I do not trust
Barliament and even more of them state that they do not trust the Bresident of the
4epublic 2:7,9I3.
Table 5.6: Religious background / Trust President of the Republic
Religious background categories/Trust President A lot A bit Do not trust ?#1
+uslims G.:I $F.)I :9.FI $88I
no religion -.>I 77.8I :G.$I $88I
!atholics ).$I 79.GI 9F.)I $88I
others minorities >.9I 7G.)I 99.8I $88I
?#1 ).$I 77.$I :7.>I $88I
he dependence is little significant. !hi7 E $8.-7, df E 9, $;p E FF.F-I.
FFG 6uotations.
he difference between J+uslims and the overall sample is not significant 2chi7E
$,>F, $;p E 97,::I3.
))
6lobal concerns
Table 5.7: level of worry about the state of the world today
Religious background
categories/worried
Very
worried
Quite
worried
Not
worried
Total
+uslims -7.8I )8.9I $:.GI $88I
no religion -7.8I )-.-I $G.:I $88I
!atholics 7G.>I 98.8I $).$I $88I
others minorities -).7I G9.:I $F.$I $88I
?#1 -8.9I )-.7I $9.$I $88I
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E :.:>, df E 9, $;p E :G.)FI.
>$: 6uotations
Table 5.8: social issues/worry
Religious
background
categories/cause
inquiet
Global
warming
Poverty Racism inequality
Lack of
respect
wars
(Irak)
Terrorism Diseases
Nuclear
weapons
immigration others
+uslims $7.>I 78.-I $F.-I 9.7I 9.FI $7.GI :.>I -.)I $.>I F.>I 8.FI
no religion $F.9I $9.:I $G.$I :.9I $8.$I $8.>I 9.-I G.:I 7.-I :.FI 8.>I
!atholics $G.9I $F.9I $).-I :.>I >.7I >.:I F.>I ).$I 7.9I :.9I 8.)I
others minorities $7.:I $).:I $G.7I F.7I F.7I $7.GI F.7I G.>I G.)I F.9I 7.7I
?#1 $).8I $F.-I $).>I :.-I F.)I $$.-I :.:I G.GI 7.)I F.7I 8.>I
he dependence is significant. !hi7 E G9.7G, dfE -8, $;p E >:.8)I.
7->$ 6uotations.

Table 5.9: world safety
Religious background
categories/world safety
Safer
About the
same
More
dangerous
I do not
know
TOTAL
+uslims ).9I 7G.FI G9.$I 7-.)I $88I
no religion -.$I 7F.)I G>.7I $>.$I $88I
!atholics ).GI 7:.7I G>.$I $F.-I $88I
others minorities 7.8I 7F.8I )-.8I $:.8I $88I
?#1 G.GI 79.FI GF.)I 78.-I $88I
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E F.78, df E >, $;p E GF.)9I.
>8- 6uotations.
#lthough respondents appeared to be happy, table $F, they are rather worried about
the state of the world. here is no real difference between the different categories of
respondents and when these differences exist, the !hi7 values are weak. he shared
worrying issues are poverty and wars.
)9
Experience of discrimination
Table 5.10: victims of racism
Religion REGROUP/racism victims Yes No Total
+uslims 7>.)I :8.)I $88I
!atholics 79.9I :-.GI $88I
?ther minorities $).GI FG.9I $88I
Brotestants $>.GI F8.9I $88I
@o religion 79.$I :-.>I $88I
?#1 7G.$I :).>I $88I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E $9.>8, df E G, $;p E >>.F8I.
he difference between +uslims and !atholics is not significant. 2chi7E 8.)), $;p E
)G.-7I3
Table 5.11: reasons for racism
Religious
background
categories/reason
for racism
Coulour
of skin
Religion
My cultural
background
Other
language
Disabled
and other
reasons
Gender Age TOTAL
+uslims >.8I $$.8I $).GI ).7I :.FI 7.8I $.:I $88I
no religion G.9I 8.FI G.7I 8.GI F.GI $.>I 8.GI $88I
!atholics $8.-I 7.$I $$.7I $.:I F.9I 8.>I 8.>I $88I
others minorities F.FI -.)I >.:I $.FI F.8I 7.:I 8.>I $88I
?#1 F.8I ).-I $8.GI 7.FI F.-I $.:I $.$I $88I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E G-.$9, df E $F, $;p E >>.>7I. F 27F.9I3 cells are under )*
the chi7 test is not applicable. $889 observations.
+uslims feel more strongly that they are victims of racism than the other participants.
he whole sample of victims of racism state it is due to their religion. he +uslim
respondents feel they are victims of anti;+uslim racism. %or 6uestion -.), only :
answers out of 98 are linked to racism or xenophobia. he others mention physical
problems 2overweight, too much hair3 or homophobia.
Table 5.12: unfairly treated when in group in the street
Religious background categories/group
street discrimination
Yes, much of
the time
Some of the
time
Never Total
+uslims $G.:I -9.-I GF.>I $88I
no religion :.:I G8.>I )$.GI $88I
!atholics $7.GI G$.$I G9.)I $88I
others minorities $8.FI -F.9I )8.9I $88I
?#1 $$.:I ->.$I G>.7I $88I
):
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E 9.:9, df E 9, $;p E 9).9)I.
:F- 6uotations.
Table 5.13: unfairly treated when group in shops
Religious background categories/group
shops discrimination
Yes, much of
the time
Some of the
time
Never Total
+uslims 78.>I -7.8I G:.$I $88I
no religion $8.>I -7.-I )9.FI $88I
!atholics $9.-I 7F.$I )).:I $88I
others minorities $9.>I -:.-I G).FI $88I
?#1 $9.)I -$.9I )$.>I $88I
he dependence is little significant. !hi7 E $7.)7, df E 9, $;p E >G.F9I.
:FG 6uotations.
Table 5.14: unfairly treated by teachers
Religious background categories/teachers
discrimination
Better
The
same
Worse otal
+uslims :.FI F8.)I $$.9I $88I
no religion G.GI F).>I >.:I $88I
!atholics ).:I FG.GI $8.8I $88I
others minorities :.FI :F.>I $-.-I $88I
?#1 9.-I F7.>I $8.FI $88I
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E G.:9, df E 9, $;p E G7.G9I.
FG7 6uotations.
Table 5.15: unfairly treated by teachers because of nationality
Religious background categories/teachers
discrimination-nationality
Most of
them
Some of
them
None Total
+uslims $G.-I $G.-I :$.GI $88I
no religion >.:I >.:I F8.9I $88I
!atholics ).>I F.FI F).-I $88I
others minorities $).FI $).FI 9F.GI $88I
?#1 $$.GI $7.$I :9.GI $88I
)F
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E -.-9, df E 9, $;p E 7-.:FI.
$G8 6uotations. he difference between the +uslims and non +uslims is not significant.
2chi7E 8.)G, $;p E 7-.F$I3
Table 5.16: Number of times excluded
Religious background
categories/Exclusions
Never Once Twice
3
times
4
times
5 times
and more
Total
+uslims F:.9I :.:I $.7I $.7I 8.9I $.FI $88I
no religion F$.9I :.:I G.7I $.)I $.)I -.GI $88I
!atholics F$.FI 9.)I 9.)I $.:I 8.GI -.8I $88I
others minorities F7.:I >.$I -.9I $.FI 8.>I $.FI $88I
?#1 F-.>I :.9I -.9I $.)I 8.>I 7.9I $88I
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E $:.7G, dfE $), $;p E 9>.)$I.
>G8 6uotations.
he young +uslim people who answered the 6uestionnaire do not feel more excluded
from school than the others. his does not mean that they are not excluded but that all
are excluded in the same way or that according to the definition of symbolical
violence from .ourdieu and Basseron 2$>:83 they are not conscious of the domination
process they are submitted to and that leads them to believe that what they experience
is "normal'.
Experience of bullying
As a victim
Table 5.17: ostracism
Religious background
categories/exclusion by peers
Never Once Twice
3
times
4
times
5 times
and more
Total
+uslims F:.9I :.:I $.7I $.7I 8.9I $.FI $88I
no religion F$.9I :.:I G.7I $.)I $.)I -.GI $88I
!atholics F$.FI 9.)I 9.)I $.:I 8.GI -.8I $88I
others minorities F7.:I >.$I -.9I $.FI 8.>I $.FI $88I
?#1 F-.>I :.9I -.9I $.)I 8.>I 7.9I $88I
)>
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E $:.7G, df E $), $;p E 9>.)$I.
> 2-:.)I3 cells show a theoretical enrolment inferior to ), the chi7 test is not really applicable. >G8
6uotations.
Table 5.18: called names teased made fun of.
Religious background
categories/calling names
Never Once Twice
3
times
4
times
5 times
and more
Total
+uslims )7.:I F.FI 9.GI G.7I 8.9I 7:.-I $88I
no religion ->.9I $G.9I F.$I ).GI $.7I -$.7I $88I
!atholics G8.-I $7.GI 9.7I F.GI $.FI -$.8I $88I
others minorities )7.FI 9.9I F.)I G.:I $.>I 7).)I $88I
?#1 G9.8I $$.$I :.8I ).9I $.7I 7>.$I $88I
he dependence is little significant. !hi7 E 7G.$8, dfE $), $;p E >-.99I. >77 6uotations.
Table 5.19: Threatened to be hurt
Religious background
categories/threat hurt
Never Once Twice
3
times
4
times
5 times
and more
Total
+uslims 9F.7I $8.$I ).$I $.FI 7.GI $7.)I $88I
no religion ):.:I $).GI ).8I ).GI 7.-I $G.7I $88I
!atholics )>.$I $9.)I :.8I -.8I $.-I $-.8I $88I
others minorities :8.8I $-.9I >.$I 8.>I 8.8I 9.GI $88I
?#1 9-.7I $-.9I 9.8I -.8I $.FI $7.GI $88I
he dependence is significant. !hi7 E 7:.)G, df E $), $;p E >:.)GI. >-9 6uotations.
he difference between J+uslims and non +uslims is not significant 2chi7E ).-9, $;p E 97.9:I3.
As a perpetrator
Table 5.20: rejection of others
Religious background
categories/Nber of excluding
others
Never Once Twice
3
times
4
times
5 times
and more
Total
+uslims F8.)I >.9I -.>I 7.$I 8.>I -.8I $88I
no religion :).FI $G.7I -.FI 7.-I 8.FI -.$I $88I
!atholics ::.-I >.7I :.>I 7.7I $.:I $.:I $88I
others minorities :G.-I $$.8I >.7I $.FI 8.>I 7.FI $88I
?#1 ::.:I $$.8I ).)I 7.$I $.$I 7.:I $88I
98
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E $G.9:, dfE $), $;p E )7.G7I.
: 27>.7I3 cells have a theoretical enrolment inferior to )* the chi7 test is not really applicable. >-$
6uotations.
9$
Table 5.21: Insulting others
Religious background
categories/author of insults
Never Once Twice
3
times
4
times
5 times
and more
Total
+uslims G:.>I $7.7I :.$I 7.:I 8.9I 7>.)I $88I
no religion GG.7I $7.:I 9.)I ).GI 8.FI -8.GI $88I
!atholics G-.:I F.:I F.-I G.GI -.$I -$.>I $88I
others minorities G-.$I $7.FI F.-I G.9I 8.>I -8.-I $88I
?#1 G).-I $$.9I :.GI G.$I $.-I -8.GI $88I
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E $G.78, df E $), $;p E GF.>-I.
) 278.FI3 cells have a theoretical enrolment inferior to )* the chi7 test is not really applicable. >-G
6uotations.
Table 5.22: Threats to others
Religious background
categories/author of threat
Never Once Twice
3
times
4
times
5 times
and more
Total
+uslims 99.GI 9.-I 7.:I G.7I 8.>I $>.9I $88I
no religion 9-.:I $8.:I :.9I ).8I 8.8I $-.8I $88I
!atholics 9F.>I :.>I 9.9I G.GI 8.>I $$.GI $88I
others minorities 9:.>I :.-I $8.$I G.9I 8.8I $8.$I $88I
?#1 99.GI F.8I ).>I G.)I 8.)I $G.:I $88I
he dependence is significant chi7 E 7:.F-, df E $), $;p E >:.:GI.
) 278.FI3 cells have a theoretical enrolment inferior to )* the chi7 test is not really applicable. >-)
6uotations.
he differences in perpetrating violence or being the victim are minimal according to
the religious background 2the !hi 7 is either not significant or of little significance3.
#s a conse6uence the risk of being exposed to violence is not greater for +uslims.
97
Attitudes towards violence
Table 5.23: violence acceptance is specific situations
Religious background
categories/justification
violence
It is ok to
use
violence to
stop being
physically
hurt
It is ok
to use
violence
my
friends
or family
being
insulted
It is ok
to use
violence
just for
fun
It is ok to
use
violence
because
someone
has
insulted
my
religion
It is ok
to use
violence
to
protect
my
country
Total
+uslims 7>.7I 7$.9I 7.:I 7F.7I $F.7I $88I
no religion )8.)I $9.9I $.FI $-.FI $:.7I $88I
!atholics G-.GI $:.7I $.:I $9.7I 7$.)I $88I
others minorities G9.)I $F.FI 7.$I $9.8I $9.:I $88I
?#1 ->.-I $>.$I 7.7I 78.FI $F.9I $88I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E 9-.)7, df E $7, $;p E _>>.>>I.
$-9- 6uotations.
Qery clearly, +uslim respondents are more numerous in thinking it is alright to use
violence if their religion is insulted.
Table 5.24: use of war to solve problems in the world
Religious background
categories/Lgitimisatviolence
Agree
Neither
agree nor
disagree
Disagree
I do not
know
Total
+uslims $F.8I 77.8I G>.7I $8.FI $88I
no religion $).-I 7>.FI G).$I >.FI $88I
!atholics $).$I 7F.8I G:.9I >.-I $88I
others minorities 7$.8I 77.8I GF.8I >.8I $88I
?#1 $9.FI 7).:I G:.)I $8.8I $88I
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E :.->, df E >, $;p E G8.--I.
>8- 6uotations.
9-
Table 5.25: use of terrorism
Religious background
categories/Lgitimisatterrorism
Agree
Neither
agree nor
disagree
Disagree
I do not
know
Total
+uslims >.8I $8.7I 9F.-I $7.GI $88I
no religion 9.-I >.8I ::.-I :.GI $88I
!atholics 7.:I >.>I ::.>I >.)I $88I
others minorities 9.$I >.7I :).)I >.7I $88I
?#1 9.-I >.:I :G.$I >.>I $88I
he dependence is little significant. !hi7 E $G.)G, df E >, $;p E F>.):I.
F>F 6uotations. he difference between +uslims and non +uslims is not significant.
2chi7E G.>G, $;p E F7.-:I3
Even if insulting religion is considered as a reason to use violence 2table G83 for
nearly one third of the +uslim respondents, the use of war or terrorism to solve
conflict is far less acceptable.
Experience of violence
As a victim
Table 5.26: victims of physical violence
Religious background
categories/physical violence
Never Once Twice
3
times
4
times
5 times
and more
Total
+uslims 98.:I F.$I 9.-I 7.$I 8.9I 77.7I $88I
no religion 9).>I $-.9I G.:I -.>I 8.8I $7.8I $88I
!atholics 9).7I $-.:I G.:I -.>I 8.>I $$.9I $88I
others minorities 98.9I $8.$I F.-I G.9I 8.>I $).9I $88I
?#1 9-.7I $$.-I ).:I -.-I 8.)I $9.8I $88I
he dependence is significant. !hi7 E 79.>-, df E $), $;p E >:.8:I.
) 278.FI3 cells have a theoretical enrolment inferior to )* the chi7 test is not really applicable.
Aowever it is the +uslims who have been most victimised 2) times and more3 and
show the highest contribution to the !hi 7 test 2-8I3. >-- 6uotations.
9G
Table 5.27: victims of assault with weapon
Religious background
categories/assault with weapons
(victims)
Never Once Twice
3
times
4
times
5 times
and
more
Total
+uslims FG.$I -.FI -.7I $.)I 8.8I :.GI $88I
no religion >8.GI -.FI $.)I 8.8I 8.FI -.)I $88I
!atholics >8.)I -.GI 7.7I 8.GI 8.8I -.GI $88I
others minorities FG.GI F.-I 8.>I -.:I 8.8I 7.FI $88I
?#1 F:.GI G.-I 7.7I $.$I 8.7I G.FI $88I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E -7.98, df E $), $;p E >>.G:I.
$8 2G$.:I3 cells have a theoretical enrolment inferior to )* the chi7 test is not really applicable.
(t is the +uslims who have been most victimised 2) times and more3 who show the
highest contribution to the !hi 7 test 2$GI3. >G8 6uotations.
Table 5.28: victims of extortion
Religious background
categories/extortion (victims)
Never Once Twice
3
times
4
times
5 times and
more
+uslims >-.FI -.)I $.)I 8.-I 8.>I $88I
no religion >-.)I ).8I $.7I 8.8I 8.GI $88I
!atholics >7.:I ).9I 8.>I 8.GI 8.GI $88I
others minorities >8.>I 9.GI 7.:I 8.8I 8.8I $88I
?#1 >-.$I G.FI $.GI 8.7I 8.)I $88I
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E :.89, df E $7, $;p E $G.9GI.
$7 298.8I3 cells have a theoretical enrolment inferior to )* the chi7 test is not really applicable. >G7
6uotations.
Me find here similar results 2about 9I3, to the ones from our victimization in schools
surveys in %rance for the percentages of students who report having been victims of
extortion 2&ebarbieux, 78893. @evertheless, even if the +uslim students seem to be
slightly more numerous in being physically assaulted and victimized with weapons,
their experience does not differ from the mean results for students from the types of
schools which are in socially deprived areas.
9)
As a perpetrator
Table 5.29: authors of physical violence
Religious background
categories/physical violence
Never Once Twice
3
times
4
times
5 times
and more
Total
+uslims 98.:I F.$I 9.-I 7.$I 8.9I 77.7I $88I
no religion 9).>I $-.9I G.:I -.>I 8.8I $7.8I $88I
!atholics 9).7I $-.:I G.:I -.>I 8.>I $$.9I $88I
others minorities 98.9I $8.$I F.-I G.9I 8.>I $).9I $88I
?#1 9-.7I $$.-I ).:I -.-I 8.)I $9.8I $88I
he dependence is significant. !hi7 E 79.>-, df E $), $;p E >:.8:I.
) 278.FI3 cells have a theoretical enrolment inferior to )* the chi7 test is not really applicable. >--
6uotations.
Table 5.30: Assault with weapon
Religious background
categories/physical violence &
weapon
Never Once Twice
3
times
4
times
5 times
and
more
Total
+uslims FG.$I -.FI -.7I $.)I 8.8I :.GI $88I
no religion >8.GI -.FI $.)I 8.8I 8.FI -.)I $88I
!atholics >8.)I -.GI 7.7I 8.GI 8.8I -.GI $88I
others minorities FG.GI F.-I 8.>I -.:I 8.8I 7.FI $88I
?#1 F:.GI G.-I 7.7I $.$I 8.7I G.FI $88I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E -7.98, df E $), $;p E >>.G:I.
$8 2G$.:I3 cells have a theoretical enrolment inferior to )* the chi7 test is not really applicable. >G8
6uotations.
Table 5.31: perpetrators of extortion
Religious background
categories/extortion
Never Once Twice
3
times
4
times
5 times and
more
+uslims >-.FI -.)I $.)I 8.-I 8.>I $88I
no religion >-.)I ).8I $.7I 8.8I 8.GI $88I
!atholics >7.:I ).9I 8.>I 8.GI 8.GI $88I
others minorities >8.>I 9.GI 7.:I 8.8I 8.8I $88I
?#1 >-.$I G.FI $.GI 8.7I 8.)I $88I
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E :.89, df E $7, $;p E $G.9GI.
$7 298.8I3 cells have a theoretical enrolment inferior to )* the chi7 test is not really applicable. >G7
6uotations.
99
#s for perpetrators of violence, the difference is obvious for a small group of
respondents who are significantly more violent than the others 2) times and more3
@evertheless the small number of students involved makes it impossible to draw
conclusions on the +uslim belonging as a risk factor for more violence.
Family background and dynamics
(amily structure
Table 5.32: family structure
Religious
background
categories/family
Mother
Step-
mother
Mother`s
partner
Father
Step-
father
Father`s
partner
Brothers
Step
brothers
Sisters
Step
sisters
Others
Lives
on
one`s
own
+uslims >-.8I 7.8I 8.9I ::.$I 7.9I 8.8I :9.7I :.FI :7.)I :.7I :.7I 7.8I
no religion F>.GI -.GI -.FI 9).GI 9.)I 8.FI G9.FI F.8I G).9I >.$I $8.9I 7.:I
!atholics >7.-I G.-I 7.9I 9>.$I ).9I 8.GI GF.>I >.8I )G.$I >.>I G.:I $.:I
others minorities >-.FI 8.8I 7.:I 9G.9I >.:I 8.>I )).FI F.8I )>.-I >.:I F.FI -.)I
?#1 >7.$I -.8I 7.-I :8.9I ).7I 8.GI )F.FI F.-I )>.9I F.FI :.:I 7.GI
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E 9F.F-, df E --, $;p E >>.>:I..
he difference between +uslims and non +uslims is significant 2chi7E 77.>), $;p E >F.7$I3. $889
observations.
7arental origin of birth
Table 5.33: mother`s country of birth
Religious background
categories/Country of birth
mother
In
France
Other
country
Other
country
unknown
I do not
know
Total
+uslims $>.$I :-.8I 7.8I $.7I $88I
no religion :>.$I $:.$I 8.GI $.)I $88I
!atholics )$.$I G).$I 8.8I 8.>I $88I
others minorities 7>.7I 9$.$I G.GI $.FI $88I
?#1 G).8I GF.:I $.GI $.-I $88I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E 7G8.F7, df E >, $;p E _>>.>>I. F 2)8.8I3 cells have a
theoretical enrolment inferior to )* the chi7 test is not really applicable. $889 observations.
9:
Table 5.34: father`s country of birth
Religious background
categories/Country of birth of
father
In
France
Other
country
Other
country
unknown
I do not
know
Total
+uslims $-.-I :F.FI 7.-I 7.>I $88I
no religion :).:I 78.)I 8.8I 7.:I $88I
!atholics )7.GI G).)I 8.GI $.-I $88I
others minorities 79.)I 97.FI ).-I G.GI $88I
?#1 G$.:I )$.>I $.FI 7.:I $88I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E 7:G.87, df E >, $;p E _>>.>>I. G 27).8I3 cells have a
theoretical enrolment inferior to )* the chi7 test is not really applicable. $889 observations.
(f +uslims respondents have parents who were born abroad as table )8 and )$ show,
the same is shown for half of the !atholics who participated. hese latter mainly
come from sub;Saharian #frica. (t is also the case for other minorities 2#sia, Eastern
Europe for instance3.
7arental employment
Table 5.35: father`s employment
Religious background
categories/father`s
employment
Yes
He has
no job
He is retired
or too unwell
to work
He looks
after the
family
I do not live with
my father, step-
father or mother`s
partner
total
+uslims 9-.7I :.8I $).GI 8.9I :.FI $88I
no religion F8.7I -.8I -.8I 8.8I :.9I $88I
!atholics F$.$I -.>I ).9I 8.>I ).7I $88I
others minorities :9.$I >.:I ).-I 8.8I ).-I $88I
?#1 :-.:I ).GI F.-I 8.GI 9.:I $88I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E )).89, df E $7, $;p E _>>.>>I. $889 observations.
Table 5.36: mother`s employment
Religious background
categories/Emploi mre
Yes
She has
no job
She is
retired or
too unwell to
work
She looks
after the
family
I do not live with
my mother, step-
mother or father`s
partner
total
+uslims )7.FI $8.:I -.FI 7F.GI $.GI $88I
no religion :9.8I 9.$I -.8I $8.-I 7.-I $88I
!atholics F$.$I ).7I 7.$I F.7I 8.>I $88I
9F
others minorities :>.9I F.8I 8.>I F.FI $.FI $88I
?#1 9F.>I F.$I 7.:I $9.7I $.)I $88I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E FG.7$, df E $7, $;p E _>>.>>I. $889 observations.
he employment rate of the fathers of the +uslim respondents is clearly lower. %ewer
mothers have paid employment and tend to be at home to look after the family.
7arental conflict
Me have created a conflict scale from the 9 scale 6uestions 2- steps3 on conflict with
parents 2H7;Fa to H7cFf3 2!ronbach alpha< .>-3. his scale is compared with a %isher
test 2mean test3
Table 5.37: Scale of conflict with parents
Religious background categories Conflict with parents
+uslims 7.)7
no religion 7.)>
!atholics 7.)-
others minorities 7.GG
?#1 7.)-
he values in the cells are the mean results without the non answers. he highlighted results are the
means which are most significantly different 2t test3 from the overall sample 2risk< >)I3. %isher test
results< conflict with parents< Qcinter E 898, Qcintra E 8.$G, % E G.7-, $;p E >>,G-I
#lthough it is significant, the variance 2distance variance inter; variance intra3 is
extremely weak. he young people who participated in the survey have few conflicts
with their parents, except for schooling which is most often 6uoted as a source of
conflict. his leads us to think that parents are involved in their childrens
performance at school.
Friends, friendship patterns and activities with friends
(riends8 characteristics
Table 5.38: number of friends at school
Religious background
categories/Number of friends at
school
None 1 to 5
6 to
10
10 to
20
More
than 20
Total
+uslims $.GI $).GI $-.-I 78.9I GF.:I $88I
no religion $.)I $G.$I 77.FI 7$.:I -F.FI $88I
!atholics 8.GI >.GI 7).FI 7$.8I G$.7I $88I
others minorities 8.>I $F.9I $G.7I -8.$I --.9I $88I
?#1 $.$I $-.)I $>.-I 7$.:I G7.)I $88I
9>
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E -7.8F, df E $7, $;p E >>.F:I. $889 observations.
:8
Table 5.39: number of friends in neighbourhood
Religious background
categories/Nber of friends in
neighbourhood
None 1 to 5
6 to
10
10 to
20
More
than 20
Total
+uslims ).7I $-.9I $-.9I $-.9I )$.-I $88I
no religion $8.9I 7-.9I $9.8I $9.8I -$.9I $88I
!atholics $8.-I 78.9I $G.7I $G.9I -9.)I $88I
others minorities F.8I $>.)I :.$I $).8I GG.7I $88I
?#1 F.7I $F.>I $-.GI $G.GI G$.GI $88I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E -9.7>, df E $7, $;p E >>.>:I. $889 observations.
Table 5.40: gender of friends
Religious background categories/friends`
gender
Most
boys
Most
girls
Balanced Total
+uslims 7$.GI )9.)I 78.>I $88I
no religion 7$.:I 97.GI $).7I $88I
!atholics $F.)I 97.7I $F.8I $88I
others minorities $G.7I 9).)I $9.FI $88I
?#1 $>.)I 9$.8I $:.)I $88I
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E :.-7, df E 9, $;p E :8.::I.
$889 observations.
Table 5.41: religious belonging of friends
Religious background categories/Friends
from other religion
All or most of
them
Some of
them
None Total
+uslims 77.>I 9F.$I :.7I $88I
no religion $F.9I 99.)I $7.>I $88I
!atholics 78.7I :$.:I :.:I $88I
others minorities 7-.>I 9:.-I :.$I $88I
?#1 78.>I 9:.FI >.8I $88I
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E F.>-, df E 9, $;p E F7.7:I.
$889 observations.
:$
Table 5.42: friends from other origin
Religious background categories/friends
from other country of origin
All or most
of them
Some of
them
None Total
+uslims -:.:I )).GI G.9I $88I
no religion 7F.>I 97.GI :.7I $88I
!atholics -G.-I )>.:I G.-I $88I
others minorities G$.9I )G.8I $.FI $88I
?#1 -G.7I )F.$I G.>I $88I
he dependence is little significant chi7 E $$.>F, df E 9, $;p E >-.:)I.
$889 observations.
Table 5.43: friends with different skin colour
Religious background categories/friends
different skin colour
All or most of
them
Some of
them
None Total
+uslims 78.8I :7.)I G.-I $88I
no religion $7.7I :F.-I F.GI $88I
!atholics 78.9I :8.GI :.-I $88I
others minorities 7).:I 97.FI >.:I $88I
?#1 $F.$I :7.GI 9.9I $88I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E $:.>7, df E 9, $;p E >>.-9I.
$889 observations.
Table 5.44: friends with different language
Religious background categories/Friends
other language
All or most of
them
Some of
them
None Total
+uslims 7G.9I )G.)I $:.:I $88I
no religion $8.9I )9.:I -$.7I $88I
!atholics 78.9I )).FI 77.-I $88I
others minorities 77.$I )-.$I 7-.>I $88I
?#1 $>.7I )G.7I 7-.FI $88I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E 7:.:F, df E 9, $;p E >>.>>I.
$889 observations.
:7
hese results show evidence that the +uslim participants have a larger number of
friends, and that these friends are of mixed gender which contradicts collective social
representations in %rance. +any of these groups of friends are also ethnically mixed
although a common cultural background is stronger.
7arental kno&ledge and acceptance of friends
he following 6uestions concern the parental knowledge of their childrens friends
and their tolerance of possible ethnic, cultural and religious differences.

Table 5.45: parents know about of friends
Religious background
categories/Parents/friends
All or most of
them
Some of
them
None Total
+uslims 78.8I :8.$I >.8I $88I
no religion 7:.GI 99.>I ).:I $88I
!atholics 7F.-I 9G.FI ).9I $88I
others minorities -$.8I )9.9I F.8I $88I
?#1 7).7I 99.$I 9.>I $88I
he dependence is little significant. !hi7 E $7.77, df E 9, $;p E >G.7:I.
$889 observations.
Table 5.46: parents` approval of friends from different religion
Religious background
categories/Parents/religion friends
Yes, they
approve
No, they do
not approve
I do not
know
Total
+uslims F).)I ).FI :.7I $88I
no religion F).9I -.8I $8.-I $88I
!atholics F:.$I -.8I >.8I $88I
others minorities :>.9I ).-I $$.)I $88I
?#1 FG.>I G.$I >.8I $88I
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E 9.F), df E 9, $;p E 99.)-I.
$889 observations.
Table 5.47: parents` approval of friends from different cultural background
Religious background
categories/Parents/cultural background
friends
Yes, they
approve
No, they do
not approve
I do not
know
Total
+uslims F>.8I G.-I -.FI $88I
:-
no religion >$.-I 7.:I G.>I $88I
!atholics >7.-I $.:I G.:I $88I
others minorities FF.)I ).-I 7.:I $88I
?#1 >8.8I -.7I G.7I $88I
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E 9.88, df E 9, $;p E ):.99I. $889 observations.
Table 5.48: parents` approval of friends from different skin colour
Religious background
categories/Parents/skin colour
friends
Yes, they
approve
No, they do
not approve
I do not
know
Total
+uslims F:.FI -.7I 9.GI $88I
no religion F>.8I G.7I ).:I $88I
!atholics F>.:I -.>I G.:I $88I
others minorities F:.9I ).-I G.GI $88I
?#1 FF.-I -.:I ).)I $88I
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E 7.$$, df E 9, $;p E >.8GI. $889 observations.
Table 5.49: parents` approval of friends with different language
Religious background
categories/Parents/Other
language friends
he
dependence is
not significant
he
dependence is
not significant
he
dependence is
not significant
TOTAL
+uslims FF.GI G.$I G.>I $88I
no religion F).7I -.GI $8.-I $88I
!atholics F:.9I -.GI :.-I $88I
others minorities F9.:I 9.7I G.GI $88I
?#1 F9.-I -.FI :.GI $88I
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E >.7$, df E 9, $;p E F-.F$I. $889 observations.
(riendship groups and gang membership
#ccording to the definition of the Eurogang of which we are members 2&ebarbieux P
.laya, 788F3 N we used the gang variable combining HG;> 2street oriented3, HG;$8
2group existing _- months3, HG;$) et HG;$9 2group tolerates delin6uency and is
delin6uent3 et HG;$: 2admitting that group is a gang3. his definition involves $$:
respondents, $$I of the sample which confirms some previous results from the (S4&
and Eurogang %rench survey 2.laya, 788F3.
Table 5.50: Ethnic origin of gang members
Religious background categories/Gang members no members Total
:G
@o answer >8.GI >.9I $88I
+uslims F>.-I $8.:I $88I
no religion FF.7I $$.FI $88I
!atholics F:.$I $7.>I $88I
others minorities >8.-I >.:I $88I
?#1 FF.:I $$.-I $88I
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E $.$:, df E G, $;p E $$.:)I. $889 observations.
Table 5.51: Percentage of French members in gangs
Religious background
categories/Group members
French
No
answer
All of
them
Most of
them
Some of
them
None total
@o answer -8.FI $:.-I 7-.$I 7).8I -.FI $88I
+uslims 77.8I :.)I $9.)I G-.7I $8.:I $88I
no religion 78.>I $>.GI --.)I 7).)I 8.FI $88I
!atholics $-.-I $F.)I --.8I -$.-I -.>I $88I
others minorities 7G.FI $).>I 77.$I -7.:I G.GI $88I
?#1 78.)I $G.9I 7).:I --.:I ).)I $88I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E >:.G), df E $9, $;p E _>>.>>I.
$889 observations.
Table 5.52: Percentage of members from Maghreb
Religious background
categories/Origines bande
maghreb
No
answer
All of
them
Most of
them
Some of
them
None total
@o answer )$.>I -.FI $-.)I 7).8I ).FI $88I
+uslims 7-.FI 78.>I -).>I $9.)I 7.>I $88I
no religion --.)I $.)I $).9I --.$I $9.-I $88I
!atholics 7-.9I -.8I $9.:I -F.7I $F.)I $88I
others minorities G7.)I -.)I $:.:I 7).:I $8.9I $88I
?#1 7>.FI F.FI 7-.8I 7:.-I $$.8I $88I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E 7$9.F9, df E $9, $;p E _>>.>>I.
$889 observations.
+uslims seem to be more grouping with other +uslims although they are not with
+uslims only since there are only :.)I of +uslims who state there are no %rench in
:)
their gangs. ?f course this needs to be analysed more in depth with gender, age and
multivariate analyses.
School experience
o create a satisfaction scale about school from 6uestion $$.7 it has to be taken into
account that all 6uestions do not have the same meaning< some are positive 2( agree
with the fact ( like school3 and others for the same scale are negative 2( agree with the
fact ( truant3. #s a conse6uence, we have created a scale of "school trust' giving the
value - to all the positive attitudes towards school statements 2( agree that ( like
school or ( do not agree with saying ( am a truant3. Me gave the value 7 for the "(
neither agree nor disagree' and the value $ for the negative attitudes towards school
statements 2i.e. ( agree to say there are a lot of problems in my school* ( do not agree
to say ( like school3. Me have then re;combined the variables assessing the school
satisfaction scale 2variable labels $$;$ ` $$;- P $$;93 and a mean value that enables
the comparison of the school satisfaction scale 2SSS3 with the different analysis
categories
Table 5.53: Religious background and school satisfaction
Religious background categories SSS School satisfaction scale
+uslims 7.77
no religion 7.7$
!atholics 7.7$
others minorities 7.$G
?#1 7.7$
he cell values are the means calculated without the I of non answers. @o criterion permits to
discriminate the different categories. %isher test results< SSS< Qcinter E 8.$9, Qcintra E 8.$$, % E $.G>,
$;p E :F.)FI
he only slightly discriminating criterion is the one concerning their trust of the
future< the +uslim respondents are more numerous in thinking that achieving well at
school will not help them to get a ,ob 2Mith a weak chi 73.
Table 5.54: no trust in school helping for job
Religious background categories/
school-job
Agree
Neither agree nor
disagree
Disagree total
+uslims 77.-I 77.8I GG.$I $88I
no religion $:.>I 77.GI )9.:I $88I
!atholics $7.>I 7>.7I )-.7I $88I
others minorities $>.)I 77.$I G8.:I $88I
?#1 $:.>I 7-.GI GF.GI $88I
he dependence is significant. !hi7 E $G.>G, df E 9, $;p E >:.>-I. $889 observations.
:9
@one of the religious groups feel different from the others as far as their school
achievement is concerned.
Table 5.55: religious background /school achievement
religious background categories/rsultats
scolaires
Better The same Worse total
+uslims 77.-I )G.)I $8.GI $88I
no religion 7).$I 9$.9I >.>I $88I
!atholics 7G.8I ):.>I $7.GI $88I
others minorities 7-.8I GF.:I $8.9I $88I
?#1 77.>I )).-I $8.FI $88I
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E $.G-, df E 9, $;p E -.)FI. $889 observations.
Table 5.56: religious background /exclusion
religious background categories/exclusion No Yes total
+uslims 7G.>I 97.>I $88I
no religion $F.9I :>.FI $88I
!atholics 77.-I :7.)I $88I
others minorities $$.)I :7.9I $88I
?#1 78.7I 9>.FI $88I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E $7.$G, df E -, $;p E >>.-$I.
$889 observations.
Bost coding of the answers to the numeric open 6uestion on the number of exclusions
from school
Table 5.57: religious background /school exclusions
4eligious background categories
Cnumber of school exclusions
G and more - times twice once ?#1
+uslims 7.-I 2 F3 $.:I 2 93 -.)I 2 $73 ).7I 2 $F3 $88I 2 GG3
no religion 8.GI 2 $3 $.)I 2 G3 -.8I 2 F3 9.)I 2 $:3 $88I 2 -83
!atholics 8.>I 2 73 $.:I 2 G3 7.$I 2 )3 F.9I 2 783 $88I 2 -$3
others minorities 7.:I 2 -3 8.8I 2 83 $.FI 2 73 G.GI 2 )3 $88I 2 $83
?#1 $.GI 2 $G3 $.GI 2 $G3 7.FI 2 7:3 9.$I 2 983 $88I 2 $$)3
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E $$.7F, df E >, $;p E :G.-8I. : 2G-.FI3 cells have a
theoretical enrolment inferior to ), the chi7 test is not really applicable. $889 observations.
he +uslim respondents do not think they are more excluded from school than the
others. @one of the 6uestions 2label $$;:a ` $$;:z3 on the reasons for being excluded
is significantly correlated with the ethnic, religious or cultural background. he
results show that the +uslim students are aware of a possible discrimination process
within the school environment, except for F of them who are more fre6uently
::
excluded. Aowever, due to the small number of this group, it is impossible to
complete any sound statistical calculation.
Spare time activities
#anging around the neighbourhood
Table 5.58: religious background/hang around in neighbourhood
religious background categories/hang around Most days Some days Rarely Total
+uslims -7.)I 2 $$73 7:.FI 2 >93 -$.8I 2 $8:3 $88I 2 -$)3
no religion 77.GI 2 )>3 -7.-I 2 F)3 -$.>I 2 FG3 $88I 2 77F3
!atholics 7-.9I 2 ))3 7G.>I 2 )F3 -:.FI 2 FF3 $88I 2 78$3
others minorities 77.$I 2 7)3 -$.8I 2 -)3 --.9I 2 -F3 $88I 2 >F3
?#1 79.8I 2 7)$3 7F.>I 2 7:G3 --.8I 2 -$:3 $88I 2 FG73
he dependence is little significant. !hi7 E $7.8-, df E 9, $;p E >-.F9I. $889 observations.
he difference between +uslim respondents and non +uslim is not significant 2chi7E -.):, $;p E
F-.$FI3
Table 5.59: religious background/hang around in other places
religious background categories/other places Most days Some days Rarely Total
+uslims 7-.)I 2 F$3 7G.>I 2 F93 $F.9I 2 9G3 $88I 2 7-$3
no religion -8.FI 2 F$3 --.FI 2 F>3 $G.FI 2 ->3 $88I 2 78>3
!atholics 7F.-I 2 993 -G.-I 2 F83 $).)I 2 -93 $88I 2 $F73
others minorities 7$.7I 2 7G3 7G.FI 2 7F3 $-.-I 2 $)3 $88I 2 9:3
?#1 79.-I 2 7)73 7>.-I 2 7F-3 $).:I 2 $)G3 $88I 2 9F>3
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E 9.)-, df E 9, $;p E 9-.-)I.
$889 observations.
#s for the 6uestions about the perception of the neighbourhood they live in, +uslim
respondents have a greater feeling of insecurity compared to others as exposed in
table :: and table :F below.
Table 5.60: religious background/safety in neighbourhood
religious background categories/ safety
neighbourhood
Agree
Neither agree nor
disagree
Disagree total
+uslims -8.:I 2 $893 -7.7I 2 $$$3 -7.7I 2 $$$3 $88I 2 -7F3
no religion )$.:I 2 $-93 79.9I 2 :83 $F.-I 2 GF3 $88I 2 7)G3
!atholics GF.$I 2 $$73 -7.7I 2 :)3 $9.:I 2 ->3 $88I 2 7793
others minorities G:.FI 2 )G3 7-.8I 2 793 7-.>I 2 7:3 $88I 2 $8:3
?#1 G7.)I 2 G8F3 7>.GI 2 7F73 7-.)I 2 77)3 $88I 2 >$)3
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E G$.$F, df E 9, $;p E _>>.>>I.
$889 observations.
:F
Aowever as shown in table ).9$, +uslim respondents think that people are willing to
help each other.
Table 5.61: religious background/help each other in neighbourhood
religious background categories/ help each
other
Agree
Neither agree nor
disagree
Disagree total
+uslims )7.)I 2 $F$3 79.:I 2 >73 $G.FI 2 )$3 $88I 2 -7G3
no religion -G.9I 2 >$3 GG.>I 2 $$F3 $:.>I 2 G:3 $88I 2 7)93
!atholics -).9I 2 F-3 G-.-I 2 $8$3 $:.9I 2 G$3 $88I 2 77)3
others minorities G$.9I 2 G:3 7F.-I 2 -73 77.$I 2 7)3 $88I 2 $8G3
?#1 G7.7I 2 G873 -).9I 2 -G-3
$9.>I
2 $9G3
$88I 2 >8>3
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E -9.:$, df E 9, $;p E _>>.>>I.
:>
Table 5.62: religious background/gangs in neighbourhood
religious background categories/bandes
dans quartier
Agree
Neither agree nor
disagree
Disagree total
+uslims G:.FI 2 $9)3 7$.GI 2 :G3 7).)I 2 FF3 $88I 2 -7:3
no religion -8.GI 2 F83 77.FI 2 983 GG.)I 2 $$:3 $88I 2 7):3
!atholics -8.>I 2 :73 7:.8I 2 9-3 ->.>I 2 >-3 $88I 2 77F3
others minorities G8.:I 2 G93 78.GI 2 7-3 -$.8I 2 -)3 $88I 2 $8G3
?#1 -F.8I 2 -9-3 7-.$I 2 7783 -G.-I 2 ---3 $88I 2 >$93
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E -).:9, df E 9, $;p E _>>.>>I.
Aowever, the +uslim respondents do not think there are more problems.
Table 5.63: religious background/problems in neighbourhood.
Religious background categories/pbs in
neighbourhood
Agree
Neither agree nor
disagree
Disagree total
+uslims -$.9I 2 $8>3 -$.>I 2 $$83 -$.9I 2 $8>3 $88I 2 -7F3
no religion 7G.:I 2 9)3 -$.7I 2 F73 G7.7I 2 $$$3 $88I 2 7)F3
!atholics 79.7I 2 9$3 -7.9I 2 :93 -:.FI 2 FF3 $88I 2 77)3
others minorities -7.:I 2 -:3 79.)I 2 -83 -7.:I 2 -:3 $88I 2 $8G3
?#1 7F.GI 2 7:73 -$.GI 2 7>F3 -).-I 2 -G)3 $88I 2 >$)3
he dependence is little significant. !hi7 E >.G9, df E 9, $;p E F).8:I. $889 observations.
)pending time &ith parents
Table 5.64: religious background/ time with adults per week
religious background
categories/time adults per
week
never
Up to 1
hour
Up to 2
hours
Up to 4
hours
+ than 4
hours
total
+uslims $-.-I $F.9I 77.>I $:.$I 7-.)I $88I
no religion $7.>I $9.-I 7).)I $:.>I 79.7I $88I
!atholics :.-I $>.:I 7$.>I $9.-I -7.7I $88I
others minorities $8.9I 7$.7I 7-.>I $9.FI $>.)I $88I
?#1 $$.GI $F.FI 7-.9I $9.FI 7).7I $88I
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E $-.$$, df E $7, $;p E 9-. >$I.
F8
Table 5.65: religious background/time with adults at weekends
religious background
categories/time adults
weekend
never
Up to 1
hour
Up to 2
hours
Up to 4
hours
+ than 4
hours
total
+uslims >.-I $$.-I $F.8I $).$I G8.>I $88I
no religion :.7I $9.:I $:.)I 7G.-I --.$I $88I
!atholics ).7I $G.7I 7$.8I $:.9I ->.)I $88I
others minorities F.8I $7.GI $9.FI $).8I ->.FI $88I
?#1 :.9I $-.)I $F.)I $F.7I -:.FI $88I
he dependence is little significant. !hi7 E $:.9G, df E $7, $;p E F:.-$I.
$889 observations.
he young +uslim people spend slightly more time with their parents or other adults
than the other respondents.
)pending time &ith friends
Table 5.66: religious background/time with friends during the week
religious background
categories/friends during
week
never
Up to 1
hour
Up to 2
hours
Up to 4
hours
+ than 4
hours
total
+uslims F.:I $-.8I 79.GI $G.FI 7).FI $88I
no religion F.8I $7.7I 78.)I $9.-I G8.-I $88I
!atholics ).7I $).)I 77.-I $>.:I -$.FI $88I
others minorities $8.9I >.:I 7$.7I $).8I 7:.GI $88I
?#1 :.9I $7.:I 77.9I $9.9I -8.)I $88I
he dependence is little significant. !hi7 E $F.>:, df E $7, $;p E >$.8FI.
$889 observations.
Table 5.67: religious background/time spent with friends during weekends
religious background
categories/friends weekend
never
Up to 1
hour
Up to 2
hours
Up to 4
hours
+ than 4
hours
total
+uslims F.GI :.)I $).>I $-.9I G$.GI $88I
no religion 9.)I :.9I $:.)I >.$I )).)I $88I
!atholics :.-I >.8I $G.9I $).)I G:.7I $88I
others minorities 9.7I >.:I $G.7I $9.FI -G.)I $88I
?#1 :.8I F.8I $).)I $-.-I GG.FI $88I
F$
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E $).G7, df E $7, $;p E :F.8)I.
$889 observations.
Table 5.68: religious background/activities with friends
religious background
categories/activities
with friends
TV
movies
shops
restaurant
public
places
Play or
watch
sports
games
Do illegal
things
together
Go to
place of
worship
Walks
or bike
rides
Chat
about
parents
or school
Chat
about
the news
or world
events
Computer
Games or
internet
Do
homework
Others
+uslims -F.FI )).:I G$.7I G8.-I $7.FI $:.$I -G.FI 7:.FI 7$.7I -).$I $9.)I F.$I
no religion )$.-I 9$.9I )-.9I G7.9I 77.$I $.>I G7.7I -8.FI 7:.FI )).)I $7.)I $$.FI
!atholics GG.7I 97.:I )7.FI G$.7I $).)I $.-I G$.7I -8.8I 7-.9I G8.-I $9.-I $-.-I
others minorities -F.>I G9.>I -F.>I -F.$I $7.GI ).-I ->.FI $7.GI $).8I -G.)I $-.-I G.GI
?#1 G7.)I )9.>I G9.7I G8.:I $).9I :.GI -F.)I 79.:I 77.9I G$.7I $G.>I >.9I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E $8:.F9, df E --, $;p E _>>.>>I.
$889 observations.
G-I of the contribution to the !hi 7 is for a go to place of worship b C +uslims. his
shows a greater concern for worshipping amongst the +uslim respondents 2$) times
more than the !atholic respondents for instance3.
)pending time on the internet
Table 5.69: religious background/internet weekly
religious background
categories/internet per week
never
Up to 1
hour
Up to 2
hours
Up to 4
hours
+ than 4
hours
total
+uslims $$.>I $>.GI 7G.9I $$.>I 7G.-I $88I
no religion $8.-I 78.)I 7$.-I $G.GI -$.9I $88I
!atholics :.:I $>.-I $).>I $F.8I -).9I $88I
others minorities $7.GI 78.GI $9.FI $G.7I 77.$I $88I
?#1 $8.7I 78.$I $>.>I $G.8I 7F.$I $88I
he dependence is little significant. !hi7 E $>.:-, df E $7, $;p E >7.::I.
$889 observations.
Table 5.70: religious background/internet weekends
religious background
categories/tps internet we
never
Up to 1
hour
Up to 2
hours
Up to 4
hours
+ than 4
hours
total
+uslims >.8I $-.8I $:.:I $).GI -).>I $88I
no religion :.9I $).9I 7$.:I $G.FI -:.9I $88I
!atholics >.8I $7.8I 77.:I $7.GI G8.FI $88I
others minorities F.FI $-.-I $7.GI $$.)I -:.7I $88I
?#1 F.)I $-.9I $>.$I $-.9I -9.FI $88I
F7
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E :.G8, df E $7, $;p E $9.>>I.
F-
Table 5.71: religious background/ visited websites
religious
background
categories/websites
Online
games
email
Download
sites
1ob
adverts
News/weather
Religious
sites
Sport
Education/
homework
bebo
myspace
facebook
others total
+uslims )7.:I >.-I $8.GI 7.:I -.GI -.>I :.FI 7.9I -.:I -.-I $88I
no religion )8.>I >.7I $7.FI $.:I -.7I 8.-I :.)I 7.8I 9.)I 9.8I $88I
!atholics )G.8I >.)I $$.)I 7.$I -.$I 8.7I :.7I 7.7I ).FI G.GI $88I
others minorities )8.7I $8.8I $7.>I 7.9I G.-I $.8I 9.:I $.:I G.-I 9.GI $88I
?#1 )7.7I >.GI $$.9I 7.-I -.GI $.9I :.GI 7.-I ).$I G.:I $88I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E $8F.)>, df E 7:, $;p E _>>.>>I.
->GG 6uotations. G9I contribution !hi 7 2absolute contribution3 for the religious sites cellC+uslims 2))
individuals3
Table 5.72: religious background/blog
religious
background
categories/blog
Your
Family
Age Friends
Your
interests
Your
country
of
origin
The
area
you
live
in
Your
religion
Your
gender
The
country
where
you live
Your
school
Our
cultural
background
What
you
look
like
Language
+uslims $).)I F.)I $G.FI F.FI $7.:I 9.>I F.GI F.GI ).$I $.FI $.:I -.FI -.9I
no religion $7.GI $-.:I $F.GI $G.-I G.>I 9.)I 8.7I $7.-I G.:I 7.GI 8.)I :.GI 7.-I
!atholics $G.-I $8.:I $F.:I $-.9I >.:I 9.8I 8.:I >.>I -.FI 7.8I $.7I ).FI -.:I
others
minorities
$9.GI $8.GI $9.:I $7.GI $8.GI G.8I 7.9I >.FI 7.8I $.:I 7.9I 9.>I G.8I
?#1 $G.GI $8.FI $:.$I $7.8I >.GI 9.-I -.GI $8.8I G.-I 7.8I $.-I ).:I -.-I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E 7)-.:$. df E -9, $;p E _>>.>>I. 2items about family were
grouped3. --7G 6uotations. he most important contribution to the !hi7 test is the cell +uslims x
religion 2-7I3 which involves >9 young people.
Interest in politics and global issues
Table 5.73: religious background/interest in politics in France
religious background
categories/interest in politics
Very
interested
Quite
interested
Not
interested
total
+uslims F.GI -:.:I G:.7I $88I
no religion >.$I -$.9I ):.FI $88I
!atholics 9.GI G$.7I G>.GI $88I
others minorities >.:I -$.>I G9.8I $88I
?#1 F.8I -G.>I G>.>I $88I
he dependence is not significant. !hi7 E F.$G. df E 9, $;p E ::.7$I.
$889 observations.
FG
Table 5.74: religious background/life affected by what is going on in the world today
religious background
categories/influence world on
personal life
Very
interested
Quite
interested
Not
interested
total
+uslims $-.9I GG.-I --.8I $88I
no religion $$.GI G7.7I G).7I $88I
!atholics $G.9I GG.9I -:.FI $88I
others minorities :.$I -F.$I G7.)I $88I
?#1 $7.8I G$.FI -:.9I $88I
he dependence is little significant. !hi7 E >.:>. df E 9, $;p E F9.9GI. $889 observations.
Degree of civic participation and citizenship
Table 5.75: religious background/level of trust to institutions and
representatives-citizenship
religious
background
categories/level
civic
participation
Writer a
letter of
complaint
to the
Council
Ask my
parents to
write a
letter of
complaint
Contact my
head
teacher/other
staff
Start or
sign a
petition
Contact
radio. TV
or a
newspaper
Contact
a
Ministry
Contact
a
religious
leader
Go on a
protest or
demonstration
None
of all
these
I do
not
know
Sth
else
+uslims 79.$I $-.9I 9.:I 7).7I 9.$I 9.:I -.)I $:.:I 7:.8I 7:.7I G.-I
no religion -$.9I $$.FI -.GI -).8I >.)I 9.$I $.$I 7G.:I 78.>I 79.7I -.8I
!atholics -G.-I 7$.8I :.:I ->.)I F.7I G.:I -.GI 7G.)I $:.7I 7G.8I 7.$I
others
minorities
-).GI $:.:I ).-I 7G.FI $8.9I :.$I 7.:I 7-.8I $).>I 7-.8I 7.:I
?#1 -8.7I $G.>I ).:I -8.7I :.:I ).>I 7.9I 7$.7I 7$.8I 7).$I -.7I
he dependence is significant. !hi7 E GF.->. df E -8, $;p E >F.$>I.
$889 observations.
Table 5.76: religious background/extra-curricular activities
religious background
categories/extra-
curricular activities
Sports
club
Music.
Dancing.
Youth
club
Young politics
group
After-
school club
Religious
or faith
group
Community
group
None
of
these
total
+uslims -9.)I $-.>I :.FI $.7I G.9I 9.GI $G.)I 7).FI $88I
no religion G7.7I $:.)I -.8I $.>I $.>I $.$I F.:I --.FI $88I
!atholics G:.9I 79.7I ).7I $.:I ).9I G.:I >.>I 7$.8I $88I
others minorities G7.)I $:.:I F.FI 7.:I 7.:I 9.7I $7.GI $F.9I $88I
?#1 G8.>I $:.9I ).>I $.9I -.:I G.-I $$.$I 7).GI $88I
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E )G.$8, df E 7$. $;p E >>.>>I. $889 observations.
F)
%rom these results we can say that the religious belonging to (slam does contribute to
a strong identity building process. (n the table below 2table >)3 we can see that being
a young +uslim means some stronger belief.

Table 5.77: religious background/strength of religious beliefs
religious background
categories/strength in belief
Very strong Quite strong
Not very
strong
I have no
religious beliefs
total
+uslims 9>.-I 2 7->3 77.8I 2 :93 :.)I 2 793 8.>I 2 -3 $88I 2 -GG3
no religion -.FI 2 $83 7.:I 2 :3 G.>I 2 $-3 78.)I 2 )G3 $88I 2 FG3
!atholics $G.9I 2 -G3 --.)I 2 :F3 -F.9I 2 >83 $$.9I 2 7:3 $88I 2 77>3
others minorities 7>.7I 2 --3 -9.-I 2 G$3 79.)I 2 -83 ).-I 2 93 $88I 2 $$83
?#1 -$.GI 2 -$93 78.$I 2 7873 $9.8I 2 $)>3 >.9I 2 >83 $88I 2 :9:3
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E G)).-), df E >. $;p E _>>.>>I. $889 observations.
his strong identification to religion does not seem to generate a global radicalisation,
sympathy to violence nor deviant behaviour. Aowever, gender differences are very
important and we might need to investigate this aspect of the results deeper. #s a
matter of fact, +uslim boys are more numerous than +uslim girls in stating that
terrorism is okay even though the ma,ority are opposed to violence and terrorism.
Table 5.78: religious background/terrorism
gender/lgitimisatterrorism Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree I do not know total
+ales $).9I 2 773 $G.7I 2 783 )7.)I 2 :G3 $7.$I 2 $:3 $88I 2$--3
%emales -.GI 2 :3 9.GI 2 $-3 :$.9I 2$G93 $$.-I 2 7-3 $88I 2$F>3
?#1 F.GI 2 7>3 >.9I 2 --3 9-.FI 27783 $$.9I 2 G83 $88I 2-773
he dependence is highly significant. !hi7 E 7G.:7, df E -. $;p E _>>.>>I.
-G) observations.
he numbers of +uslim females who run a blog are much more numerous than boys
in putting forward their religion 2-$I vs 7-I males3 as well as their family 29-I vs
-)I3. ?n the +uslim males side, $FI of them declare they are part of gang
2Eurogang definition3 vs 9I females. Some further multivariate analysis will be
needed there since gender seems to have some great differences.
Summary of Chapter 5
9:perience of alienation, social isolation and an:iety
+ost of the %rench respondents, regardless of religion said that they were happy
with their lives. he level of +uslim youth who reported being Jvery happy
exceeded that of the others. #t the other end of the spectrum, a small proportion
of +uslim youth, as well as those with no religion, reported being unhappy at a
slightly greater level than the others.
F9
+ost %rench respondents said that they had someone they could confide in,
mainly their peers and their family.
+uslim respondents spend significantly more time with their family and siblings
and less time with friends, compared to the other groups.
%ew %rench respondents stated that they felt isolated or socially excluded, with
+uslims even less affected by social isolation than the others.
#ll young people in the %rench sample reported a high level of mistrust in public
institutions, regardless of religion.
he ma,ority of respondents were worried about the state of the world, regardless
of religion, though a significant minority 2less than one fifth3 were not worried at
all.
Boverty, racism and global warming presented as issues most worried about
across all %rench respondents. (ssues least worried about were disease and
nuclear weapons* though lack of respect, immigration, terrorism and ine6uality
were, in ascending order, issues eliciting least concern amongst all groups. he
two issues concerning +uslims most were poverty followed by racism, whereas
for non +uslims the leading issues were poverty followed by global warming.
#round half of all respondents thought the world more dangerous than it used to
be, a pattern consistent across all groups.
9:perience of discrimination
he ma,ority of the %rench respondents said that they had not suffered from
racism, though slightly more +uslims suffered from this compared to other
groups. he main reasons for being picked on, according to +uslim youth, were
cultural background, religion and skin colour. %or those with no religion the
primary reason was identified as disability or some other reason, whereas for
!atholics it was, as with +uslims, skin colour and cultural background.
#round half of all respondents did not consider they were unfairly treated by
adults. ?f those who thought they were unfairly treated +uslims and other
minorities reported the highest levels of unfair treatment. he vast ma,ority
however, thought that teachers treated them the same as other pupils, though
around $)I of +uslims and other minorities thought teachers treated them
unfairly because of their nationality, and to a slightly lesser extent, their religion.
+uslims were the least likely to have been excluded from school, compared to
those with no religion and other minorities.
9:perience of bullying
(n terms of bullying the vast ma,ority of %rench respondents said that this had
never happened to them. ?f those who had been bullied up to five times,
+uslims were the least likely to have been victims. he levels were fairly
consistent across the other groups.
+uslims and other minorities were least likely to have been called names and
made fun of. Up to one third of respondents in all categories had suffered from
such taunts five or more times.
+uslims and other minorities were least likely to have been threatened to the
extent of inflicting pain. he highest levels of those who had suffered this type of
F:
threat were likely to have suffered five times or more, a finding repeated across
the groups.
+ost respondents from %rance said they had not re,ected friends, though a small
minority across the groups had done so at least once.
0ust under half of respondents across the groups said they had not insulted others,
and most of those who said they had, had done so on five or more occasions. he
pattern was similar in terms of threats to others.
here was no conclusive evidence that +uslims experienced more bullying than
@on;+uslims as either victims or perpetrators.
Attitudes to&ards violence
+uslims in %rance were the least less likely to report that it is ?= to use violence
to stop themselves being physically hurt, but the most likely to say it was ?= to
stop someone else being physically hurt. here was little difference between the
small number of respondents across the groups who thought it ?= to use violence
for fun, though almost a third of +uslims considered it acceptable to use if their
religion had been insulted, a greater level than any other group, whilst less than
one 6uarter across all groups considered it acceptable as a means to protect their
country, suggesting strong feelings of pacifism amongst youth.
?n attitudes to using war as a means to solve the problems of the world up to half
of respondents across the groups disagreed, whilst up to one third in each group
were unable to take a clear stance. ?f those who agreed, other minorities led
followed by +uslims, though all groups conferred some level of agreement.
Qiews on use of terrorism were stronger than those on war, with around three
6uarters of all respondents disagreeing, regardless of group. ?f those who
conferred agreement the +uslim level was greater, particularly compared to
!atholicism with the lowest level of consent.
9:perience of violence
+ost %rench respondents said they had not been victims of physical violence,
though those with no religion and also !atholics elicited the greatest numbers
reporting violence against them at least once within their groups. #ll groups had
rather high levels of having been the victim of repeat violence five times or more,
especially +uslims, and other minorities.
# similar pattern emerged with weapons used against them, but to a markedly
lesser extent. ?ne difference was that other minorities were more likely to have
been assaulted only once rather than repeat victims.
?n extortion the vast ma,ority of all respondents had no experience of this crime.
?f the few that had, across all groups this was most likely to have occurred only
once as opposed to revealing a pattern of repeat victimisation.
Berpetrators of violence presented at similar levels to that of victimisation, across
all groups, with +uslims more likely to suffer from repeat victimisation five
times or more. # similar pattern, though to a lesser extent, was revealed in
weapons used against the person.
# small minority of %rench respondents had forcibly stolen something from
someone else, this being least prevalent amongst the +uslims respondents.
FF
(amily background
?n family structure, most %rench respondents said they lived with their mother
and father, with +uslims more likely to live with brothers and sisters also.
+others of most +uslim respondents were the most likely amongst all groups to
have been born outwith %rance. !onversely, most of the mothers of the non
religious respondents had been born in %rance. # similar picture is evidenced in
the fathers country of birth.
Aalf of the !atholic group report having parents born outside %rance.
+ost respondents fathers were in employment, though fathers without a ,ob were
most likely to be in the other minorities group. +uslims had the greatest level of
fathers retired or too unwell too work.
#t least half of all groups reported a mother in employment, though +uslims had
the lowest level, and highest level of mothers reported as looking after the family.
%ew respondents reported conflict with parents and of those who did the
differences were not stark, with school reported as the leading source of conflict.
(riends, friendship patterns and activities &ith friends
Qery few of the %rench respondents reported having not having any friends, the
ma,ority having more than twenty. +uslims reported the greatest number of
friends in their neighbourhood, which is also the greatest volume within and
between groups.
+ost said their friends were girls, with those reporting either both or boys at less
than a third of that level.
+ost respondents reported that some of their friends were from different religious
backgrounds, around one fifth reporting that all or most of them belonged to this
group. hose expressing no religion were most likely to report that none of their
friends were from different religious backgrounds.
+ost said that all or some of their friends were from different countries of origin,
and few reported none in this category, though those with no religion reported the
greatest volume compared to the others. he pattern of friends with different skin
colour varied only slightly from that presented on different religious
backgrounds, though other minorities were the most likely to have no friends in
this category.
+uslims were the most likely to have friends who spoke another language, and
the least likely not to have any friends in this category.
+ost respondents parents had some knowledge of their friends, though +uslims
and other minorities were more likely to report the opposite, albeit at relatively
low levels. Qery few said their parents would not approve of friends with a
different religion. he same applied with having friends of a different skin colour
and language.
#round one tenth of respondents across the groups claimed gang membership.
%or all groups most or some of the members were described as %rench. +uslims
also had many more +aghreb members than the other groups, though other
groups were very likely to contain at least some +aghreb members.
)chool e:perience
+uslim respondents were more likely to agree that doing well at school would
not get them a good ,ob.
F>
#ll groups expressed similar views regarding their perception of their progress at
school, with most reporting that they are achieving the same as others.
+uslims were least likely to have been excluded form school with those of no
religion ,ust about more likely than respondents from the other groups.
)pare time activities
(n terms of time spent hanging around their neighbourhood there was little
variation in responses between the groups, though +uslims expressed a greater
sense of insecurity regarding perceptions of safety within their neighbourhood.
+uslims though were more likely to agree that people in their neighbourhood
were willing to help each other.
+uslim respondents were more likely to agree that there are gangs in their
neighbourhood, and at least one third of other respondents concurred.
+ost %rench respondents reported spending varying amounts of time with their
parents or adult carers, most reporting either up to two hours a week, or more
than four, though +uslims spent considerably more time with parents than the
other groups during the weekends.
Similarly most respondents spent up to either two hours or more than four hours a
week with friends.
+uslim respondents evidenced a greater proportion of time worshipping
compared to the other groups and visited the most religious sites on the internet,
though the latter was a very small proportion of all +uslim respondents. hey
were also more likely to mention their religious background if setting up a
webpage.
+any respondents from %rance said their lives were not affected by what is going
on in the world today, though a large minority said their lives were affected a bit
and a similar proportion that their lives were affected a lot by what is going on in
the world. Mhen asked a more concrete 6uestion about what they would do if a
favourite park was being closed down, most indicated that they would do
something, although around a third were not sure what they would do.
+uslim respondents were most likely to be involved in a community group and a
religious or faith group.
?ver two thirds of +uslim respondents reported that feelings for their religion
were very strong. Mhen this figure is combined to those who reported feelings as
J6uite strong this accounts for almost all of the +uslims in the sample.
+uslim boys were five times more likely than +uslim girls to express the view
that it would sometimes be ,ustified to use terrorism to solve the worlds
problems, and three times more likely to declare gang membership
>8
CHAPTER 6 SURVEY RESULTS FROM SPAIN
Introduction
his chapter of the report outlines the key findings from the Spanish sample, which
involved fieldwork in +adrid and /ranada. he sample size for this component of
the study is $8$) cases, of which G8I are from +uslim backgrounds. (n the Spanish
sample there were three main religious groups that emerged< the +uslims, the 4oman
!atholics and the other respondents 2who are made up of many different religious
backgrounds3. herefore, the analysis for this section is separated into these three
groups. he chapter consists of the following sections< experience of alienation,
social isolation and anxiety* experience of discrimination* experience of bullying 2as
victim and perpetrator3* attitudes to violence* experience of violence 2as victim and
perpetrator3* family background and dynamics* friends, friendship patterns and group
activities 2including gang membership3* school experience* and spare time activities
2including civic participation3.
Experience of alienation, social isolation and anxiety
General happiness with life
Table 6.1: Feeling unhappy with life
:1;*: Are %!3 sais&ie5 7ih
%!3r "i&e<
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
7ery much satis9ied
:2;
<=>3?
@A
<2>;?
B;
BA>:?
1:=
<1><?
Cuite satis9ied
;:
B3>1?
@=
B;>@?
<@
<B>3?
121
B;>3?
(o satis9ied nor unsatis9ied
B<
:<>B?
1<
:<>@?
:=
:<>B?
AB
:<><?
Cuite unsatis9ied
B
:>B?
=
B>2?
B
1>;?
::
1>1?
otally unsatis9ied
:
><?
B
:>3?
1
:>;?
@
:>1?
*"L
1B3
:22>2?
:@<
:22>2?
:2=
:22>2?
=2A
:22>2?
d
7
E ),>-9* g.l. E F* ns
here are no significant differences among the three groups 2!atholics, +uslims and
?ther3 regarding their own life satisfaction.
>$
7ersonal isolation
Table 6.2: Having someone to talk to
:*;/: D! %!3 ha$e an%#!5% !
7h!m ! s'ea8 a#!3 %!3r
hin2s<
RELIGION
Si2ni&icance "e$e"
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher *"L
(obody
:< 13 @ <3
D
1
E :=>@@BF $.l. E 1F G H .222
=>;? :@>3? =>3? ;><?
BrotherIsister
;2 =@ <1 :33
D
1
E :>B2<F $.l. E 1F n.s.
BA>A? BB>=? <2>2? B@>3?
BoyI$irl 9riend
<1 ; :; A2
D
1
E :<>=2=F $.l. E 1F G H .22:
:A>@? =><? :3>:? :B>A?
.Giritual leader
B 1 < ;
D
1
E B>12@F $.l. E 1F n.s.
:>B? :>1? B>3? :>3?
!arentsItutorsJ
:12 AA =2 1<A
D
1
E >@3;F $.l. E 1F n.s.
=2>1? <@>:? <A>@? <3>B?
eachers
Friend
A A < :3
D
1
E .<;BF $.l. E 1F n.s.
1>;? <>1? B>3? B>=?
Friend
:@B =; 3B B2=
D
1
E @<>AB=F $.l. E 1F G H .222
@3>1? B=>B? A;>2? =;>A?
*ther
:< 12 = B;
D
1
E @>A@=F $.l. E 1F G H .2B<
=>;? :1>2? <>3? A>@?
here are significant differences between +uslims and the two other groups with
respect "to have somebody to tell about your things' 2a $9.FI of +uslims do not
have anybody to speak to against a ).FI of the other two groups, in particular, friends
and boyCgirlfriend3.
Table 6.3: Spend most time outside school
:*);.: =ih 7h!m 5! %!3
s'en5 m!s !& %!3r
"eis3re ime<
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
By ,ysel9
:; 1B :; @:
=>:? @>1? ;>1? @><?
8ith my brothers and sisters
<= =1 1; :1@
:1>1? :<>2? :<>2? :B>B?
8ith my boyI$irl 9riend
<A := 11 3<
:1>A? <>2? :2>@? 3>;?
8ith a sGiritual leader
: 2 : 1
>B? >2? >=? >1?
8ith !arents
<: <B :@ :22
::>:? ::>@? A>A? :2>=?
8ith Garents and brothersIsisters
32 :13 <= 1=B
1:>A? B<><? 1:>A? 1@>A?
8ith a 9riend
::3 ;: @3 1AA
B1>2? 1<>=? B1>;? 1;>1?
*ther
:3 12 A <=
<>;? =><? B><? <>A?
*"L
B@; BA1 12A ;<3
B3>;? B;>1? 1:>3? :22>2?
d
7
E G-,>77* g.l. E $G* p e .888
he larger difference between +uslims and the two other groups regarding those with
who they spend their time off with, is found in two cases, when they spend their
leisure time with their boyCgirlfriend 2GI compared to a mean $$.9I in the other
groups3 and when this happens with their parents and brotherCsisters 2-G.GI compared
to a mean 7$.:I in the two other groups3.
>7
(eelings of alienation
o analyse the variable HFc7 a new one was constructed J?pinion on yourself
summing up the six answers to this 6uestion. he results of this transformation
produced a scale ranging from 9 to $F points, and was recoded to a three categories
variable with the following values< $ E low opinion* 7 E media opinion* - E high
opinion* >F E missing 2for young people that did not answer all the options3
Table 6.4: Scale of feeling of alienation`
:1;+: Y!3r !'ini!n !n
%!3rse"&
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
LoK *Ginion
:B B2 A =2
B><? A>@? B>B? =>2?
,edian *Ginion
:12 ::@ @2 1;@
B:>2? 1;><? 13>B? 1;>3?
+i$h *Ginion
1=< 1<3 :<= @<A
@=>@? @1>;? @3><? @=>1?
*"L
B3A B;< 1:1 ;;B
B;>2? B;>A? 1:>B? :22>2?
D
1
E ;>@<=F $.l. E <F GH.2=
@o significant differences were found among the three groups, although +uslims
show a lower percentage than the rest on Jlow opinion.
$rust in others
Table 6.5: Trust in people and institutions
:1;.: D!
%!3 r3s
>
Re"i2i!n
Si2ni&icance
Le$e"
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
A "! A #i N!ne A "! A #i N!ne A "! A #i N!ne
,y 9amily
B23 @A :: B12 @1 :1 :=@ == B D
1
E :2>A<BF
$.l. E <F G H .2B2
A;>3? :A.<? 1.3? 3:.1? :=.A? B? A1.;? 1=.A? :.<?
,y 9riends
:;= :A; :2 :=A :;; B@ :1= A; :2 D
1
E B:>@=AF
$.l. E <F G H .222
=2.3? <@.@? 1.@? <2.:? =2.3? ;.1? =3.<? B@.;? <.A?
City Council
:2 ::: 1@2 <2 :11 1:A 3 =2 :=1 D
1
E B:>11@F
$.l. E <F G H .222 1.@? 1;.:? @3.1? :2.@? B1.1 =A.B? B.3? 1B.3? A1.<?
.Giritual
leader
B= :11 11= :AB :B: 31 :B 1@ :A2 D
1
E 1AA>B11F
$.l. E <F G H .222
;.1? B:.;? =3.;? <<.3? BB.;? 1:.1? @.1? :1.<? 3:.B?
!olice
@1 :3A :B: =; :@A :@1 :; ;; ;B
D
1
E ::>2;AF
$.l. E ><F G H.21= :@.B? <;.1? B<.=? :=.1? <B? <:.3? ;? <@.; <<.:
Jud$es and
Courts
<< :;3 :B; <3 :@: :A: 1: :2= 3=
D
1
E ::>2;AF
$.l. E <F ns ::.=? =1? B@.=? :1.@? <1.<? <=? :2? <;.3? <2.B?
!oliticians
:2 31 13; :; ::2 1=B ; <@ :=@
D
1
E :2>B<B
$.l. E <F G H.2B=.
1.@? 1:.=? A=.;? =? 13.3? @@.1? <.B? 1:.3? AB.;?
he
!resident
1: :23 1=: B; :B< 12A :: A: :1;
D
1
E :<>@:@F
$.l. E <F G H .2:
=.=? 13.<? @@.: :2.B? B=.B? =<.=? =.1? BB.@? @:.:?
he Lin$
;2 :<3 :<< @; :<; :@B BB @; :2;
D
1
E :B.2=@F
$.l. E <F G H .2::
1B.@? B3.A? BA.A? :3.:? B;.:? <1.3? :=.@? B1.A? =:.A?
EuroGean
%nion
A2 :A= :B@ =3 :<B :A3 B@ :22 A=
D
1
E :1.@:1F
$.l. E <F G H .2:B
:3.<? <=.;? B=.A? :=.B? BA.A? <A? :A.: <A.<? B=.=?
*(%
31 :3A ::B =; :<A :A: <: :2: @;
D
1
E 11>1:;F
$.l. E <F G H .222 1:.=? <;? 1;.@? :=.@? B;? <=.<? :;.<? <A.;? B1.A?
+uslims and !atholics present a similar confidence level in the family 2an F8I in
both groups are very close to their family3. he larger difference is found on the group
of J?thers with a clear higher percentage in Ja bit option. (n exchange, +uslims
show less confidence towards their friends 298I trust a little or nothing on them3.
>-
Mith respect of (nstitutions, +uslims trust the !ity !ouncil, the Bresident and, above
all, spiritual leaders more than any other option. # 7$.7I of +uslims do not trust
their spiritual leaders facing higher percentages than GGI in the other two groups.
here are no differences among the three groups in their trust or not trust towards
Bolice, 0udges and !ourts, Boliticians, the =ing or the EU.
Summing up, +uslims characterise themselves by a lower confidence on their friends
2that agree with that pointed above< they do not have friends with whom to speak3. ?n
the contrary, they show a larger tendency than the rest of the groups in trusting their
spiritual leaders.
6lobal concerns
Table 6.6: Level of anxiety about the state of the world today
:?;*: An@ie% a#!3 he
7!r"5 !5a%
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
7ery Korried
A2 :1= =2 1<=
:3>2? B:>B? 1B>=? 1<>=?
Cuite Korried
1AB 1:3 :1@ @:A
A2><? =<>@? =;>1? @:>A?
(ot Korried
<= =@ BA :B3
::>@? :<>2? :A><? :B>3?
*"L
B33 B;; 1:B :222
B3>3? B;>;? 1:>B? :22>2?
D
1
E 1=>32@F $.l. E <F G H .22.
+uslims show more concern about the world 2-$.-I are very worried3 than !atholics
that show themselves as 6uite worried only 2:8.GI3, and the J?thers who show more
homogeneity in the distribution of their opinion.
Table 6.7: Social issues worry about
:?;+: =!rrie5 #% >
Re"i2i!n
Si2ni&icance "e$e"
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
-lobal Karmin$
:;; :13 :B:
D
1
E =1>@<AF $.l. E 1F G H .222
=:>1? B1>@? @:>1?
!o&erty
12< 11= :2B
D
1
E > <>3A<F $.l. E 1F n.s.
=1><? =A>B? <3>:?
)acism
::3 123 @=
D
1
E =2>3@<F $.l. E 1F G H .222
B2>B? =1>;? B2><?
.ocial ine6uality
@2 =A B3
D
1
E :>:1=F $.l. E 1F n.s.
:=><? :<>=? :A>3?
LacM o9 resGectItolerance
AA 3@ <1
D
1
E >@A<F $.l. E 1F n.s.
:;>3? 1:>;? :;>@?
errorism
1B2 :@B ;< D
1
E 1>;@1F $.l. E 1F
ns =;>:? <:>=? <B>;?
'llnessesIeGidemics
:B2 ::2 @1 D
1
E 1>;@1F $.l. E 1F
ns BB><? 13>2? 1;>2?
(uclear KeaGons
A@ @3 B1
D
1
E 1>2=<F $.l. E 1F n.s.
:;>=? :A>B? :=>2?
,i$ration
<A =2 1=
D
1
>:=@F $.l. E 1F n.s.
:1>:? :1>A? ::>A?
Cultural con9lict
<; :<B <B
D
1
E @B>1B2F $.l. E 1F G H .222.
:1>@? B@><? 12>:?
*ther
B2 13 1<
D
1
E B>1;AF$.l. E1F ns
A>A? A>:? ::>1?
/lobal warming does not worry +uslims 2-7.9I3 as much as the members of the
other two groups 2)$.7>I !atholics, and 9$.7I ?thers3.
>G
here are no differences among the three groups with respect to their concern with
poverty, although there are many students worried by this problem 2)7.9I3* social
ine6uality, lack of respect or tolerance, terrorism, illnessesCepidemics, nuclear
weapons and migration 2which are seeing as a problem for ,ust the F,- I of our
sample3.
?n the other hand, more than half of +uslins are concerned about racism 2a )7.>I3
with a significant higher percentage than the one found in the other two groups 2with
a -8.GI3. (n the same way, conflicts between cultures worry +uslins in a higher rate
than in the two other groups 2-9.:I against $9.-I3. Sub,ects less concerned about
this matter are ,ust !atholics.
0ust an F.-I of the sample points out another problem that is of their concern, overall
the economical crisis.
Table 6.8: World safety
:?;,: Is he 7!r"5 m!re
5an2er!3sA eB3a"A !r sa&er
han a"7a%s
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
.a9er
:A :; @ <1
<><? <>A? 1>3? <>1?
,ore or less the same
:13 ::= A1 B:=
B1>;? 13>@? BB>@? B:>B?
,ore dan$erous
12A :;1 :2A =2@
=B>1? <A>3? =2>2? =2>B?
DonNt MnoK
BA A@ 1; :<1
;>=? :3>;? :B>@? :<>:?
*"L
B3; <21 1:< :22=
B3>A? <2>2? 1:>B? :22>2?
D
1
E :B>B32F $.l. E @F G H .2BA.
Security perception is similar on the three groups. )8.-I of the sample considers the
world as more dangerous, with a slightly higher percentage among !atholics. (t is
important to point out that on the +uslim group* there is an $F.>I that answer "donXt
know', a higher percentage than the one found in the other groups.
>)
Experience of discrimination
Table 6.9: Experience of being pick on` and reasons
:,;,C :,;-: Bein2
'ic8e5 #eca3se >
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL Si2ni&icance Le$e"
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
:,;,: Bein2 'ic8e5
an%ime
B@ :== 13 1:; D
1
E ::B>=:=F $.l. E 1F G H .222
;>B? B3>3? :B>2? 1:>3?
Skin colour 3 11 = B= D
1
E 1>=1=F $.l. E 1F ns
1<>1? :B>=? :A>;? :=>@?
Religion
1 :21 1 :2@ D
1
E ==>@1BF $.l. E 1F G H .222.
@>B? @B>2? A>:? <A>A?
Country of origin
:: @@ :B ;2 D
1
E >;:2F $.l. E 1F n.s.
B<><? <2>A? <@><? <2>=?
To speak another
language
A << A =3
D
1
E ><23F $.l. E 1F n.s.
1:>;? 1A>1? 1=>2? 1@>:?
Handicap
2 B 2 B D
1
E :>::;F $.l. E 1F n.s.
>2? :>3? >2? :>B?
Sex
1 = : 3 D
1
E >A3BF $.l. E 1F n.s.
@>B? B>:? B>@? B>@?
Age
B :2 1 := D
1
E ><<1F $.l. E 1F n.s.
;><? @>1? A>:? @>3?
Other
:2 1: ; <2
D
1
E :2>BAAF $.l. E 1F G H .22@
B:>B? :B>2? B1>:? :3>2?
+uslims are the group in which significantly more sub,ects have been picked 2-F,FI
against a mean of $$,$I3 and they are also the ones that have been more attacked
because of their religion and less because of "other reasons' different than the ones
shown on the 6uestion.
Table 6.10: Unfairly treated in the street
:-;*?: Un&air"% reae5 #%
a53"s in he sree
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
,any times
:2 := @ B:
1>;? =>2? B>:? B>A?
.ometimes
A3 ;< @< 1B@
11>=? B:>1? BB>2? 13>:?
(e&er
1=3 :;1 :1< =A<
A<>@? @B>3? @B>;? @3>B?
*"L
B<@ B2: :;< 3<:
<:>:? B=>3? 1B>:? :22>2?
D
1
E :1>2;3F $.l. E <F G H .2:A
he ma,ority of youngsters have not been mistreated by adults on the streets, but this
is especially true in the case of !atholics 2:G.9I no mistreated3. ?n the other hand,
more +uslims consider that have been mistreated many times 2).8I3. 4esults
regarding mistreatment by adults in shops are very similar, although the percentage of
never mistreated sub,ects gets higher in the three groups, especially in the group of
"others'.
>9
Table 6.11: Unfairly treated in shops
:-;+): Un&air"% reae5 #%
a53"s in sh!'s
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
,any times
:1 := @ BB
B><? =>2? B>:? B>;?
.ometimes
A: A3 =2 :;;
12><? 1@>2? 1=>3? 1B>@?
(e&er
1@= 12A :B3 @:2
A@>:? @;>2? A:>:? A1><?
*"L
B<3 B22 :;< 3<1
<:>B? B=>@? 1B>2? :22>2?
D
1
E =>1=2F $.l. E <F ns
Table 6.12: Unfairly treated by teachers
:**;/: H!7 are %!3 reae5
a sch!!"<
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
Better than to the others
1B A@ :1 :::
@>:? :;>1? =>A? ::>B?
,ore or less the same
B<2 1;< :;: 31=
;2><? A<>1? ;:><? 3<>:?
8orse than to the others
:B 1@ @ <=
B>=? @>@? 1>;? <>@?
*"L
BA@ B;@ 12; ;3:
B3>B? <2><? 1:>B? :22>2?
D
1
E <;>33BF $.l. E <F G H .222
>8I of !atholic students and from the ?ther group feel e6ually treated, but this
percentage is lower in +uslims 2:G.7I3. (nterestingly, they present higher
percentages either on feeling better treated than the others 2a $>.7I over an average
of ).>I of the other two groups3 and feeling worse treated 29.9I vs. -.:I3. #lso,
there are more +uslims who have felt excluded 2$).)I vs. $8.FI3 although this
difference is not significant.
Table 6.13: Number of times excluded from school
:**;.: Ha$e %!3 #een
e@c"35e5 &r!m sch!!"<
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
YesD
BB @: 1A :1:
3>A? :=>=? :1>;? :1>B?
*nce
:< 1< :: <;
<3>B? <3? <A>3? <3?
Kice
3 :A @ B:
1A>@? B<? 1@>:? B2><?
hree or 9our times
B @ < :B
:2>B? :1? :A><? :1>A?
Fi&e times or more
< B 1 ;
:B>3? @? 3>A? 3>3?
*"L
1; =2 1B :21
13><? <;? 11>=? :22>2?
CHAPTER 9 D
1
E 1>1B@F $.l. E @F ns
>:
Experience of bullying
As a victim
Table 6.14: Exclusion by peers
:.;*: H!7 man% imes ha$e
%!3 #een e@c"35e5 &r!m a
%!3h 2r!3'<
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(e&er
BB2 B<: :A= 3<@
3<>3? 3=>2? 31>;? 3<>=?
*nce
<2 1; :3 3A
:2>B? A>1? 3>=? 3>A?
Kice
3 :< :2 B1
1>:? B>=? <>A? B>1?
hree times
B < A :<
>3? :>2? B>B? :><?
Four times
1 < 2 @
>=? :>2? >2? >@?
Fi&e times
@ ; : :@
:>=? 1>1? >=? :>@?
*"L
B3; <2: 1:: :22:
B3>;? <2>:? 1:>:? :22>2?
D
1
E :A>@A:F $.l. E :2F ns
Brevalence is higher for !atholics, but incidence is higher for +uslims
Table 6.15: Number of times called names, teased or made fun of
:.;+: H!7 man% imes ha$e
%!3 #een ca""e5 namesA
ease5A ma5e &3n !&<
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(e&er
13< 1=3 :<B @3=
AB>2? @<>B? @A>3? @3><?
*nce
B< <= 13 :2A
3>A? ::>1? :B>B? :2>A?
Kice
1B 1; A =;
=>;? A>1? B>B? =>;?
hree times
:2 :A ; B@
1>@? <>1? <>B? B>@?
Four times
B < B :2
>3? :>2? :><? :>2?
Fi&e times
B= <3 1: :2<
;>2? :1>2? :2>2? :2><?
*"L
B3; <2: 1:: :22:
B3>;? <2>:? 1:>:? :22>2?
D
1
E :1>A=BF $.l. E :2F ns
he ones who have been less called names, teased or made fun of are !atholics, and
those who have suffered all this the most have been the +uslims, but this difference is
not statistically significant. (t occurs the same on "been threatened or hurt'.
>F
Table 6.16: Threatened to be hurt
:.;,: H!7 man% imes ha$e
%!3 #een hreaene5 ! #e
h3r<
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(e&er
B1@ B1A :@@ 3:;
3B>3? 3:>=? A3>A? 3:>3?
*nce
B1 BA 13 ;A
3>1? ;>1? :B>B? ;>A?
Kice
:: :@ @ BB
1>3? <>2? 1>3? B>B?
hree times
A 3 < :;
:>3? 1>2? :>;? :>;?
Four times
: B : =
>B? >A? >=? >=?
Fi&e times
:1 :2 @ 13
:>1? :>2? >@? 1>3?
*"L
B3; <2: 1:: :22:
B3>;? <2>:? 1:>:? :22>2?
D
1
@><2AF $.l. E :2F n.s.
As a perpetrator
Table 6.17: Rejection to others
:/;*: H!7 man% imes ha$e
%!3 e@c"35e5 s!me#!5%<
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(e&er
BB2 B=2 :A= 3==
3<>3? 3@>3? 31>1? 3=>:?
*nce
<: B: 13 :22
:2>=? A>A? :B>:? :2>2?
Kice
; :A B 1;
1>B? <>1? :><? 1>;?
hree times
= : B ;
:>B? >1? :><? >;?
Four times
2 : : 1
>2? >1? >=? >1?
Fi&e times
< B B :2
:>2? >A? :><? :>2?
*"L
B3; <2B 1:B :22=
B3>A? <2>:? 1:>1? :22>2?
D
1
E :;>;<1F $.l. E :2F ns
Table 6.18: Insulting others
:/;+: H!7 man% imes ha$e
%!3 ca""e5 namesA ease5A
ma5e &3n !& s!me#!5%<
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(e&er
1@; B:< :<< A1A
@;>1? A3>:? @A>@? A1><?
*nce
<< B2 1@ :22
::>B? A>=? :1>1? :2>2?
Kice
1@ :3 :2 =<
@>A? <>=? <>A? =><?
hree times
:< :B :: B3
B>@? B>1? =>1? B>3?
Four times
B 1 < ;
>3? >=? :>;? >;?
Fi&e times
BB 1= :3 A@
3>=? @>1? 3>=? A>@?
*"L
B3; <21 1:B :22<
B3>A? <2>2? 1:>1? :22>2?
D
1
E :@>@1;F $.l. E :2F n.s.
>>
Table 6.19: Threats to others
:/;,: H!7 man% imes ha$e
%!3 hreaene5 ! h3r
s!me#!5%<
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(e&er
B<= B<: :33 3A<
33>A? 3<>3? 33>A? 3A>:?
*nce
1; BB :1 A<
A>=? 3>1? =>A? A><?
Kice
B :: < :3
>3? 1>A? :>;? :>3?
hree times
= A B :=
:>B? :>A? :><? :>=?
Four times
: 1 2 B
>B? >=? >2? >B?
Fi&e times
@ 3 = :;
:>=? 1>2? 1><? :>;?
*"L
B3; <21 1:1 :22B
B3>3? <2>:? 1:>:? :22>2?
D
1
E A>3;BF $.l. E :2F n.s.
here are no significant differences between the three groups regarding the
prevalence of perpetrators, and the percentages are especially similar on the case of
"trying to hit someone'.
Attitudes towards violence
Table 6.20: Violence acceptance in specific situations
:1;-:
Vi!"ence
acce'ance
>
Re"i2i!n
Si2ni&icance
Le$e"
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
A2ree Neiher N! A2ree Neiher N! A2ree Neiher N!
o Gre&ent
somebody
bein$ hurt
:<@ :=2 ;2 :B< :1; :B: ;= @; <3
D
1
E :=>;:<F
$.l. E <F G H .
22B
BA>3? B3>;? 1B>B? B<? B1>A? B;>A <<>3? B1>=? 11>@?
o de9end
somebody
11= ::: =2 12; ;; 33 :BA <3 13
D
1
E :A>@A1F
$.l. E <F G H .
22:
=3>B? 13>3? :B? =1>3? 1=? 11>1? @<>B? 11>=? :B>:?
o de9end
somebody
a$ainst insults
<< :@A :A: @B :<3 :3: 1A 3< :21
D
1
E =>:A3F
$.l. E <F n.s.
::>=? <B>A? <<>3? :@>:? BA>3? <@>1? :1>A? B;><? <A>;?
For 9un
A :3 B=3 11 13 B<2 = :1 :;=
D
1
E :1>2:<F
$.l. E <F G H .
2:A
:>3? <>A? ;B>=? =>@? A>1? 3A>1? 1><? =>A? ;1?
.omebody
has insulted
my reli$ion
B3 ::2 1B= ;3 :B< :@: :2 @3 :B<
D
1
E @;>=::F
$.l. E <F G H .
222
;>;? 13>A? @:><? 1<>;? B<>:? <:? <>A? B1>:? @B>1?
o Grotect my
country
=@ :23 1:; ::< ::2 :A2 1= @@ :1:
D
1
E B3>BB2F
$.l. E <F G H .
222
:<>@? 13>1? =A>1? 13>;? 1A>;? <B>:? ::>3? B:>:? =A>:?
$88
Table 6.21: Use of war to solve problems in the world
:?;-: Is i E3si&ie5 ! 3se 7ar !
s!"$e 7!r"5 'r!#"ems<
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
"$ree
:1 :1 = 1;
B>:? B>2? 1>B? 1>;?
(either a$ree> nor disa$ree
=A @B B1 :=1
:<>A? :=>A? :=>2? :=>1?
Disa$ree
1@3 1<< :=: @@B
@;>:? @2>3? A2>@? @@>:?
DonNt MnoK
=: 31 1@ :=;
:B>:? 12><? :1>:? :=>;?
*"L
B33 <2: 1:< :22B
B3>A? <2>2? 1:>B? :22>2?
D
1
E :1>1@@F $.l. E @F n.s.
here are no differences between the three groups regarding the belief that war is
,ustified to solve problems in the Morld, although among +uslims there is a higher
percentage who answers "( donXt know'.
Table 6.22: Use of terrorism to solve problems in the world
:?;.: Is i E3si&ie5 ! 3se
err!rism ! s!"$e 7!r"5
'r!#"ems<
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
"$ree
< :A B 1<
:>2? <>B? :><? 1><?
(either a$ree> nor disa$ree
1< B= :1 A:
@>1? 3>3? =>@? A>:?
Disa$ree
B:A 1@: :A; A=A
3:>=? @=>B? 3B>@? A=>=?
DonNt MnoK
<< 3A 12 :=:
::>B? 1:>3? ;>B? :=>:?
*"L
B3; <22 1:< :22B
B3>3? B;>;? 1:>B? :22>2?
D
1
E <:>31:F $.l. E @F G H .222
#bout terrorism, F7I of !atholics and from other religions disagree with it, against a
9).-I of +uslims. ?nce again, +uslims present a higher percentage of undecided,
27$.F vs. $8.-I3
Experience of violence
As a victim
Table 6.23: Victim of physical violence
:.;.: H!7 man% imes ha$e
%!3 s3&&er 'h%sica"
$i!"ence<
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(e&er
B@B B=2 :;< ;2A
;B>B? 3A>=? ;:>=? ;2>@?
*nce
:B B2 :1 ==
B>B? A>=? =>A? =>=?
Kice
= :1 : :3
:>B? B>2? >=? :>3?
hree times
B 1 2 =
>3? >=? >2? >=?
$8$
Four times
2 1 B =
>2? >=? :><? >=?
Fi&e times
= < 1 ::
:>B? :>2? >;? :>:?
*"L
B3; <22 1:1 :22:
B3>;? <2>2? 1:>1? :22>2?
D
1
E 12>:A@:F $.l. E :2F G H .213
Table 6.24: Victim of assault with a weapon
:.;/: H!7 man% imes ha$e
%!3 #een h3r 7ih a
7ea'!n<
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(e&er
B3A B3< 1:2 ;3:
;;>=? ;=>=? ;;>:? ;A>3?
*nce
1 :< : :A
>=? B>=? >=? :>A?
Kice
2 B : <
>2? >A? >=? ><?
Fi&e times
2 : 2 :
>2? >1? >2? >:?
*"L
B3; <21 1:1 :22B
B3>3? <2>:? 1:>:? :22>2?
D
1
E :A>B2BF $.l. E @F G H .223
Table 6.25: Victim of extortion
:.;0: H!7 man% imes ha$e
%!3 #een hreae5<
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(e&er
B@; BA= :;@ ;<2
;<>;? ;B>=? ;1>=? ;B>3?
*nce
:B := :2 B3
B>B? B>A? <>A? B>3?
Kice
B A < :<
>3? :>A? :>;? :><?
hree times
B 1 : @
>3? >=? >=? >@?
Four times
2 : : 1
>2? >1? >=? >1?
Fi&e times
: : 2 1
>B? >1? >2? >1?
*"L
B3; <2: 1:1 :221
B3>3? <2>2? 1:>1? :22>2?
D
1
E =>2=2F $.l. E :2F n.s.
%ortunately, the ma,ority of youngsters has not been victims or not suffered from
physical violence 2>8.9I3, nor been wounded by a weapon 2>:.FI3 nor been
threatened 2>-.FI3. Statistical tests show that +uslims have been more physically
victimized than non +uslims. Specifically, a $7.)I has suffered from violence and a
G.)I has been hurt 2against a 8.FI3. here are no significant differences between the
groups regarding being threatened.
$87
As a perpetrator
Table 6.26: Author of physical violence
:/;.: H!7 man% imes ha$e
%!3 #een he a3h!r !&
'h%sica" $i!"ence<
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(e&er
-)) --: $FF FF8
>$,-I F-,GI FF,-I F:,)I
*nce
$F -$ $$ 98
G,9I :,:I ),7I 9,8I
Kice
9 $G ) 7)
$,)I -,)I 7,-I 7,)I
hree times
9 : - $9
$,)I $,:I $,GI $,9I
Four times
8 $ - G
,8I ,7I $,GI ,GI
Fi&e times
G $G - 7$
$,8I -,)I $,GI 7,$I
*"L
-F> G8G 7$- $889
-F,:I G8,7I 7$,7I $88,8I
D
1
E 1:>B<:F $.l. E :2F GH .2:;
Table 6.27: Author of assault with a weapon
:/;/: H!7 man% imes ha$e
%!3 h3r s!me#!5% 7ih a
7ea'!n<
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(e&er
B32 B;1 12; ;3:
;A>A? ;@>3? ;3>:? ;A><?
*nce
@ ; B :3
:>=? 1>1? :><? :>3?
Kice
1 1 : =
>=? >=? >=? >=?
hree times
: 1 2 B
>B? >=? >2? >B?
*"L
B3; <2= 1:B :22A
B3>@? <2>1? 1:>1? :22>2?
D
1
E :>;<<F $.l. E @F n.s.
Table 6.28: Author of extortion
:/;0: H!7 man% imes ha$e
%!3 hreaen s!me#!5%<
Re"i2i!n TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(e&er
BA; B;2 12@ ;A=
;A><? ;@>=? ;@>A? ;@>;?
*nce
< = B :1
:>2? :>1? :><? :>1?
Kice
= B 1 :2
:>B? >A? >;? :>2?
hree times
: B : =
>B? >A? >=? >=?
Four times
2 : 2 :
>2? >1? >2? >:?
Fi&e times
2 1 : B
$8-
>2? >=? >=? >B?
*"L
B3; <2< 1:B :22@
B3>A? <2>1? 1:>1? :22>2?
D
1
E =>:12F $.l. E :2F n.s.
#s it happened with victimization results, the ma,ority of youngsters have not been a
bully and the >:I have not hurt or threaten anyone* about the most prevalent
behaviour, to have used physical violence, the percentage of bullies is of $7I.
Brecisely it is this behaviour, physical violence, the one that shows some significant
differences proving that among +uslims the ones who used physical violence are
more 2$9.9I against a media of $8I on the other groups3.
Family background and dynamics
(amily structure
Table 6.29: Family structure
:+;*: I "i$e 7ih >
Re"i2i!n
Si2ni&icance "e$e"
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
,y mother
B@< B@< :;=
D
1
E B>@;2F $.l. E 1F n.s.
;B>@? 3;>;? ;2>A?
,y steG-mother
B < <
D
1
E :>=;AF $.l. E 1F n.s.
>3? :>2? :>;?
,y motherNs Gartner
A : :1
D
1
E 12>A2BF $.l. E 1F G H .222
:>3? >1? =>@?
,y 9ather
13; B21 :@2
D
1
E 2>1BF $.l. E 1F n.s.
A<>:? A<>@? A<><?
,y steG-9ather
:; @ A
D
1
E A><=2F $.l. E 1F G H .2=.
<>;? :>=? B>B?
,y 9atherNs Gartner
B < A
D
1
E A>2==F $.l. E 1F G H .2=
>3? :>2? B>B?
Brothers
121 1=3 :22
D
1
E 12>1B:F $.l. E 1F G H .222
=:>3? @B>A? <@>=?
,E"( (um. Brothers
:.1< :.A; :.B2 D
1
E =A>3:BF $.l. E :2F G H .222
.teG-brothers
< :1 ;
D
1
E @><2:F $.l. E 1F G H .2=
:>2? B>2? <>1?
,E"( (um. .teG-
brothers
: :.@A :.@A D
1
E @>BB:F $.l. E 3F n.s.
.isters
:@3 1<B 3B
D
1
E B<>B3:F $.l. E 1F G H .222
<B>:? @2>2? B3>@?
,E"( (um. .isters
:.1@ :.AA :.B2 D
1
E <B>B2;F $.l. E :1F G H .222
.teG-sisters
@ A B
D
1
E >:23F $.l. E 1F n.s.
:>=? :>A? :><?
,E"( (um. .teG-sisters
:.<2 :.A: : D
1
E 1>1@AF $.l. E @F n.s.
*therO
<3 =: 1=
D
1
E >:11F $.l. E 1F n.s.
:1>B? :1>@? ::>@?
CHAPTER 9 E&ery youn$ GeoGle li&in$ KithP otherP> li&es Kith one or more relati&es> exceGt 3
,uslims Kho li&e in a Centre 9or unaccomGanied minors
>8I of the youth live with their mother and a :G.-I do it with their father without
any difference between groups. he difference found is that to live with a mothers
partner or a fathers partner is something more usual on the group of "other religions'.
$8G
#mong +uslims is less fre6uent to live with a step;father and on the other hand is
more common also to live with brothers and sisters.
$8)
Table 6.30: Mother`s country of birth
:+;,: Y!3r m!her 7as #!rn
in >
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
.Gain
B22 <@ :== =2:
A@>;? ::><? A1>:? <;>@?
'n another country
33 B=A =; =2<
11>@? 33>:? 1A><? <;>;?
'n another country but ' donNt MnoK
Khich one
1 1 2 <
>1? >=? >2? ><?
' donNt MnoK
2 2 : :
>2? >2? >=? >:?
*"L
B;2 <2= 1:= :2:2
B3>@? <2>:? 1:>B? :22>2?
D
1
E <2B>@A<F $.l. E @F G H .222
Table 6.31: Father`s country of birth
:+;-: Y!3r &aher 7as #!rn
in >
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
.Gain
B2< B@ :<1 <31
A3>:? 3>;? <A>;? <A>;?
'n another country
32 B@1 A2 =:1
12>@? 3;>3? B1>A? =2>;?
'n another country but ' donNt MnoK
Khich one
B 1 2 =
>3? >=? >2? >=?
' donNt MnoK
1 B 1 A
>=? >A? >;? >A?
*"L
B3; <2B 1:< :22@
B3>A? <2>:? 1:>B? :22>2?
D
1
E <1B><A:F $.l. E @F G H .222
he ma,ority of parents of !atholics were born in Spain 2::I3. ?n the other hand,
,ust an $$.GI of +uslims mothers and an F.>I of +uslims parents were born in
this country. #mong those from "other religions' there are almost as many mothers
born in Spain as on the !atholics group, but the percentage of fathers goes down to a
G:.>I.
7arental employment
Table 6.32: Father`s employment
:+;,: Y!3r &aher has a
E!#>
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
/es> he has a job
B1< 1@A :3B
AA<
3B>A? @A>B? 3=>;?
AA>@?
(o> he does not ha&e a job just noK
:@ A1 :2
;3
<>:? :3>:? <>A?
;>3?
(o> he is retired or too unKell to KorM :@ 12 A
<B
<>:? =>2? B>B?
<>B?
(o> he looMs a9ter the 9amily
: A 1
:2
>B? :>3? >;
:>2?
' donNt li&e Kith my 9ather> steG-
9atherQ
B2 B: ::
A1
A>3? A>3? =>1?
A>1?
*"L
B3A B;A 1:B
;;A
B3>3? B;>3? 1:><?
:22>2?
D
1
E @1>@<=F $.l. E 3F G H .222
$89
Table 6.33: Mother`s employment
:+;-: Y!3r m!her has a
E!#>
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
/es> she has a job
1A< :BA :@2 =A:
A2>3? B<>@? A<><? =A>1?
(o> she does not ha&e a job just noK
1= AA 1B :1=
@>=? :;><? :2>A? :1>=?
(o> she is retired or too unKell to
KorM
@ ; = 12
:>@? 1>B? 1>B? 1>2?
(o> she looMs a9ter the 9amily
A@ :=3 1B 1=A
:;>@? B;>;? :2>A 1=>3?
' donNt li&e Kith my mother>Q
@ := < 1=
:>@? B>3? :>;? 1>=?
*"L
B3A B;@ 1:= ;;3
B3>3? B;>A? 1:>=? :22>2?
D
1
E :<@><1AF $.l. E 3F G H .222
he lower percentage of parents without a ,ob appears on the +uslims group 29:,-I
vs. FG,FI 3 and the lower percentage of mothers who work outside the home belongs
to this group too, which in this case goes down to a -G,9I against a :7,9I on the
other groups. he rate of unemployment among +uslims is very high 2$F.$I for
fathers and $>.GI for mothers3 compared to that of the other groups.
7arental conflict
Table 6.34: Issues of conflict with parents
:+;1:
Disc3ss
7ih
'arens
a#!3 >
Re"i2i!n
Si2ni&icance
Le$e"
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
A "!
A
"i"e
N! A "!
A
"i"e
N! A "!
A
"i"e
N!
,y 9riends
B< :B@ 1:A <3 :@2 :;2 :A 33 :23 D
1
E A>A21F
$.l. E <F n.s.
3>3? B=>:? =@>:? :1>:? <2>1? <A>A? 3>2? <:>B? =2>A?
8here ' $o
R Khat ' do
Khen $oin$
out
<; :=@ :3: =B :=A :3B 1; 3@ ;3
D
1
E >:@1F
$.l. E <F n.s.
:1>A? <2><? <@>;? :B>=? B;>;? <@>@? :B>@? <2><? <@>2?
he music '
listen R
clothes '
Kear
12 A1 1;B B2 ;< 1@3 :B <@ :==
D
1
E @>211F
$.l. E <F n.s.
=>1? :3>A? A@>:? A>A? 1<>2? @3><? @>:? 1:>=? A1><?
)eli$ion and
customs
= :; B@: =: =: 1;2 @ 1= :3: D
1
E A:>12=F
$.l. E <F G H .222 :>B? <>;? ;B>3? :B>2? :B>2? A<>2? 1>3? ::>3? 3=><?
!olitical
ideas
3 <3 B1A 1< =; B2= = B: :AA D
1
E :1>:3BF
$.l. E <F G H .2B@ 1>:? :1>=? 3=><? @>1? :=>1? A3>@? 1>B? :<>@? 3B>:?
+ome KorM
B3 :;@ :=B @2 :1; 12B B: 32 :2B
D
1
E 1A>B:AF
$.l. E <F G H .222 ;>3? =2>@? B;>=? :=>B? B1>;? =:>3? :<>=? BA><? <3>:?
(t is interesting also to verify which the points where parents and children disagree
are. he fact that the differences among the three groups of young people appeared
with respect their parents religious and political ideas is important. (t is important
also the fact that scholar home work is a point of disagreement significant different
among the three groups of young people* this could be explained by a higher interest
of some of the parents, or a lower interest in the part of young people.
Huestion 7.F is a measure of parents;children conflict. # new variable was
constructed calculating the mean value of the six options of conflict situation. he
results are seen in able -.:.
$8:
Table 6.35: Scale of conflict with parents
:+;1: C!n&"ic 7ih
'arens sca"e
Re"i2i!n
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher TOTAL
( B3; <21 1:= :22@
,ean 1.=; 1.=2 1.=@ 1.==
.D .BB1 .<=B .B@: .B;B
#n #@?Q# was run to verify if there were significant differences among the three
groups. 4esults showed that there were significant differences among them 2S+
inter
E .
):8* S+
intra
E .$)9* % E 9.-$$* pe .8793. o check among which groups the difference
was found the ukey post;hoc test was applied to data and the result showed that the
difference appeared between the groups of !atholics and +uslims 2mean dif. E .8>:*
p e .8)3. @o differences were found between the J?ther group and !atholics or
+uslims.
Friends, friendship patterns and activities with friends
(riends8 characteristics
Table 6.36: Number of friends at school
:-;*a: H!7 man% &rien5s 5!
%!3 ha$e a sch!!"<
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(one
1 ; = :@
>=? 1>1? 1>B? :>@?
: to =
<= 32 1A :=1
::>=? 12>2? :1>@? :=>:?
@ to :2
@< <= <B :=1
:@><? ::>1? 12>:? :=>:?
:2 to 12
:2B 32 =2 1BB
1@><? 12>2? 1B><? 1B>1?
,ore than 12
:A@ :3A 3; <=1
1=>:? <@>@? <:>@? <=>2?
*"L
B;2 <2: 1:< :22=
B3>3? B;>;? 1:>B? :22>2?
D
1
E 1A>B@BF $.l. E 3F G H .22:
# >F.GI of people polled have friends and the only remarkable difference appears on
!atholics, who show a lower percentage on the category of "more than 78' 27).$I
vs. GG.$I3.
$8F
Table 6.37: Number of friends in the neighbourhood
:-;*#: H!7 man% &rien5s 5!
%!3 ha$e a %!3r
nei2h#!3rh!!5<
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(one
B; @2 11 :1:
:2>B? :=>B? :2>A? :1><?
: to =
A: ;: =: 1:B
:3>3? 1B>1? 1<>;? 1:>3?
@ to :2
@1 =1 B2 :<<
:@><? :B>1? :<>@? :<>3?
:2 to 12
@; =< B: :=<
:3>B? :B>A? :=>:? :=>3?
,ore than 12
:BA :B@ A: B<<
B@>1? B<>@? B<>@? B=>1?
*"L
BA3 B;B 12= ;A@
B3>A? <2>B? 1:>2? :22>2?
D
1
E ::>1B<F $.l. E 3F n.s.
his able shows that the youth have fewer friends in the neighbourhood than in the
school, although an F:.9I do have friends in the neighbourhood. (n this case there are
no differences by group.
Table 6.38: Gender of friends
:-;+: Y!3r &rien5sA
are he% #!%s !r
2ir"s<
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
B!%s Gir"s B!%s Gir"s B!%s Gir"s B!%s Gir"s
,ostly boys
@2 :1 @; :2 1= :< :=< B@
B<>:? =>A? B@>;? <>@? 1=>B? :1>1? BB>B? @>@?
+al9 and hal9
:2@ :@2 ::2 ;@ A2 A2 13@ B1@
@2>1? A=>=? =3>3? <<><? A2>A? @2>;? @:>;? @2>2?
,ostly -irls
:2 <2 3 ::2 < B: 11 :3:
=>A? :3>;? <>B? =2>;? <>2? 1A>2? <>3? BB>B?
*"L
:A@ 1:1 :3A 1:@ ;; ::= <@1 =<B
B3>:? B;>2? <2>=? B;>3? 1:><? 1:>1? :22>2? :22>2?
For Boys S D
1
E <>321F $.l. E <F n.s.
For -irls S D
1
E =3>3A=F $.l. E <F G H .222
+ore or less, the 98I of boys and girls have mixed groups of friends. hese groups
are formed by a similar number of boys and girls. #lso, it can be seen that is more
usual that boys and girls have friends formed by members of the same sex than of the
opposite sex. he most remarkable result is that girls are part of mixed groups, overall
!atholics 2F$.7I3, this percentage gets lower to a :-.$I on the other religions and
even more among +uslims females< G>I. his means that +uslim girls are the ones
with groups of friends formed mostly by females.
$8>
Table 6.39: Friends from different cultural backgrounds
:-;,:
H!7
man% !&
%!3r
&rien5s
are
5i&&eren
#eca3se
!& >
Re"i2i!n
Si2ni&icance
Le$e"
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
A"" S!me N!ne A"" S!me N!ne A"" S!me N!ne
)eli$ion
< 1<= :B; :<3 11= 1@ 1@ :B= =: D
1
E 11;>2B1F
$.l. E <F G H .222
:>2? @B>:? B=>3? BA>:? =@><? @>=? :1>=? @B>A? 1<>:?
Country o9
ori$in
1; 1@1 ;3 ;B 1<; =< 1@ :<3 <2 D
1
E =2>2BBF
$.l. E <F G H .222
A>=? @A><? 1=>1? 1B>=? @1>;? :B>@? :1>:? @;>1? :3>A?
.Min colour
:< 1B@ :B3 B; 1<B ::< :2 :<3 == D
1
E 12>:3;F
$.l. E <F G H .222
B>@? @2>3? B=>@? ;>3? @:><? 13>3? <>A? @;>=? 1=>3?
Lan$ua$e
A :3= :;@ @B 11@ :23 :2 :22 :21 D
1
E 3=>;;BF
$.l. E <F G H .222 :>3? <A>A? =2>=? :=>;? =@>;? 1A>1? <>A? <A>1? <3>:?
(t is evident that youngsters are related on percentages higher than the 98I with
different friends by religion, country of origin or skin colour. 1anguage seems to
create more frontiers, among !atholics overall, as ,ust the G>.)I have friends who
speak on a different language.
he biggest differences on this matter are seen on the +uslim, with a higher
percentage of youth with friends from other religions, other countries and who speak
other languages. he group of "others' are the ones who have friends from other
religions 2they are a minority3 and the ones with the lower percentage are !atholics
2-).9I have no friends at all from a different religion, and also race3.
7arental kno&ledge and acceptance of friends
Table 6.40: Parents knowledge about friends
:-;-: H!7 man% !& %!3r
&rien5s 5! %!3r 'arens
8n!7<
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
"ll or nearly e&erybody
:23 31 <= 1B=
1A>3? 12>=? 1:>2? 1B><?
.ome o9 them
1@: 1A; :== @;=
@A>:? @;>3? A1><? @;>B?
(one
12 B; :< AB
=>:? ;>3? @>=? A>B?
*"L
B3; <22 1:< :22B
B3>3? B;>;? 1:>B? :22>2?
D
1
E ::>@==F $.l. E <F G H .212
# 9>.-I of the sub,ects affirm that their parents know at least some of their friends.
#mong !atholics it appears the biggest percentage of boys and girls who say their
parents know all of their friends 27:.FI vs. 78.:I3 and among +uslims the biggest
one of those whose parents do not know any of their friends 2>.FI vs.).)I3
$$8
Table 6.41: Parents approval of friends
:-;.: D!
%!3r
'arens
a''r!$e
%!3r
&rien5s
&r!m a
5i&&eren
>
Re"i2i!n
Si2ni&icance
Le$e"
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
Yes N!
D!nF
8n!7
Yes N!
D!nF
8n!7
Yes N!
D!nF
8n!7
)eli$ion
B=; :: 12 B=B :A BB 12: < ; D
1
E 3>:B1F
$.l. E <F n.s.
;1>:? 1>3? =>:? 3A>@? <>1? 3>1? ;B>;? :>;? <>1?
Country o9
ori$in
BA: A :1 B@= :@ :3 12<: B 3 D
1
E @>@<@F
$.l. E <F n.s.
;=>:? :>3? B>:? ;:>=? <>2? <>=? ;<>;? B? B>A?
.Min colour
B@A ; :< B@: :@ 1B 12B B 3 D
1
E @>A<=F
$.l. E <F n.s.
;<>:? 1>B? B>@? ;2>B? <>2? =>3? ;<>;? :><? B>A?
Lan$ua$e
B@2 :B :A B@: :@ 1B 12: < ; D
1
E B>:3AF
$.l. E <F n.s. ;1>B? B>B? <><? ;2>B? <>2? =>3? ;B>;? :>;? <>1?
he great ma,ority of parents approve of their children having friends from a different
religion, country of origin, skin colour or language and there are no significant
differences between the different groups, even though the percentages of acceptance
is slightly lower among +uslims.
(riendship group and gang membership
%ollowing the definition of gang membership given by the Eurogang, a new variable
was created taking into account 6uestions like<HGc>< &oes your group of friends
spend a lot of time together in public places, fD
HGc$8< %or how long has this group existedD
HGc$)< (s doing illegal things accepted by or ?= for your groupD
HGc$9< &o people in your group actually do illegal things togetherD
HGc$:< &o you consider your special group of friends to be a gangD
#ccording to the previous definition, only a 7.>I of young people sampled could be
considered as members of a Jgang 2$) young people3. ?f these $- were !atholics and
7 belonged to another religion or were agnostics. @o +uslim young people were
engaged in a Jgang. hese results agree with another ones obtained in 7889 applying
the (S4& (( to a national wide sample of school young people of $7 to $F years old
24echea, 788:3. .ecause the comparison between +uslims and others is the reason of
this report, we are not going to take into account this classification. Me are then going
to analyse the characteristics of ,uvenile groups of friends.
Table 6.42: Having a group of friends
:-;/: D! %!3 ha$e a 2r!3'
!& &rien5s<
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
/es
B<= 1;1 :;B 3B2
33>A? AB>2? 3;>3? 31>A?
(o
<B :23 11 :AB
::>:? 1A>2? :2>1? :A>1?
*"L
B3; <22 1:= :22<
B3>A? B;>3? 1:><? :22>2?
D
1
E <=>;;;F $.l. E <F G H .222
$$$
#mong !atholics, 78> 2F:.FI3 have a group of friends* this figure amounts to $88
298.9I3 for +uslims and to >: 2>7.GI3 for others, of a total of )8F respondents. (t is
interesting to learn that nearly a 78I of young people 2$8$3 consider they do not have
a group of friends.
Table 6.43: Age of group members
:-;0: A2e !&
mem#ers !& 2r!3'
Re"i2i!n
Si2ni&icance "e$e"
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
/oun$er than :1
:1 :B B
D
1
E 1>A;BF $.l. E 1F n.s.
B>=? <>B? :>=?
BetKeen :1 and :=
:3< :A3 ;B
D
1
E =>=@<F $.l. E 1F n.s.
=1>;? =3>@? <A>;?
BetKeen :@ and :3
:AB :=A :2<
D
1
E >A@AF $.l. E 1F n.s.
<;>A? =:>=? =B>@?
BetKeen :; and 1=
B2 B: 1<
D
1
E :>;<;F $.l. E 1F ns
3>@? :2>1? :1><?
1@ or more
; :: <
D
1
E :>:A@F $.l. E 1F n.s.
1>@? B>@? 1>:?
#s seems logic, most of young people have friends with ages between $7 to $F years*
around a $7I has older friends and very few have friends younger than them. here
are not significant differences among groups.
?f all options explaining the reasons to ,oin a group the only significant ones are that
shown in the following table.
Table 6.44: Reason to joint a group
:-;*+: Reas!ns !
E!in a 2r!3'
Re"i2i!n
Si2ni&icance "e$e"
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
o maMe 9riends
B:2 1<A :A:
D
1
E ;>31AF $.l. E 1F G H .22A
3;>:? 3:>2? 33>:?
o maMe 9orbidden thin$s
1: 11 1<
D
1
E A>:3<F $.l. E 1F G H .22:
@>2? A>1? :1><?
o MnoK the other sex
GeoGle
::B @: =3
D
1
E :B>=2@F $.l. E 1F G H .22:
B1>=? 12>2? 1;>;?
+uslims are the ones that less marks the option Jto make friends andCor Jto know the
other sex people. hese belonging to the groups of ?thers are the ones that mark in a
higher percentage the option Jo make forbidden things.
Table 6.45: Characteristics of the group of friends
:-;*.G*/G*0: Y!3r
2r!3' >
Re"i2i!n
Si2ni&icance "e$e"
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
"cceGted to do ille$al
thin$s
;; =< @3
D
1
E :;>11AF $.l. E 1F G H .222
13>B? :A>;? B<>;?
"ctually doin$ ille$al
thin$s
@A BA <3
D
1
E :1.33:F $.l. E 1F GH.221
:;.:? :1.B? 1<.@?
's it a $an$
=; @< 1:
D
1
E ;.2:@F $.l. E 1F G H .2::
:@.;? 1:.:? :2.3?
# 6uite large percentage of young people marks that their group of friends accept to
do illegal things, and even that they actually doing illegal things. he highest
percentage is found among the group of ?ther 2-G.>I y 7G.9I for both situations3,
and the lowest percentage is found among +uslims 2$:.>I y $7.-I3. .ut, the 7$.7I
$$7
of +uslims identify his group to a gang, faced to a $9.>I of !atholics and a $8.FI
from other religions or agnostics. Mith respect to H$.$F about what they feel by being
a member of a /roup of friends, the young people of the three groups have the same
opinion* there are no significant differences among them. his should be analysed in a
deeper way later.
School experience
o learn about the students experience at school we create a new variable with the
eight options of H$$c7. Me first inverted the negative items and then calculate the
mean value of positive and negative 2inverted3 items to create a School Satisfaction
Scale.
Table 6.46: Scale of school satisfaction
:**;+: Sch!!"
Sais&aci!n Sca"e
Re"i2i!n
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
*"L
( BAA B;< 1:: ;31
,ean 1.=2 1.<A 1.<1 1.<A
.D .B<1 .BA2 .B=B .B=@
o verify if there were differences among the three groups in SSS we performed an
#@?Q# 2one way3 and a uckey Bost;hoc test. he #@?Q# did detect a significant
difference among the three groups 2S+
enter
E .):8* S+
intra
E .$)9* % E -.98* p e .8793.
#nd the ukey test show that this difference was between !atholics and the J?ther
group 2mead dif. E .8:>* p e .8)3. +uslims do not differ from the two other groups.
Table 6.47: School achievement
:**;,: A sch!!" %!3 5! >
han he res
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
Better
== 3= BA :AA
:<>=? 1:>;? :A>@? :3>:?
,ore or less the same
1;@ 13= :=A AB3
AA>;? AB>B? A<>3? A=><?
8orse
1; :; :@ @<
A>@? <>;? A>@? @>=?
*"L
B32 B3; 1:2 ;A;
B3>3? B;>A? 1:>=? :22>2?
D
1
E ;>2A@F $.l. E <F ns
he three groups of young people have similar levels of self steam with respect their
scholar capacities* a >-I think that they do better or the same as others at school.
+uslims are the ones with a higher percentage in doing better 27$.>I3, and are the
ones also with the lowest percentage in doing worse at school 2G.>I3.
$$-
Table 6.48: Unfairly treated by adults at school
:**;/: A sch!!"A a53"s
rea %!3 > han he res
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
Better
1B A@ :1 :::
@>:? :;>1? =>A? ::>B?
,ore or less the same
B<2 1;< :;: 31=
;2><? A<>1? ;:><? 3<>:?
8orse
:B 1@ @ <=
B>=? @>@? 1>;? <>@?
*"L
BA@ B;@ 12; ;3:
B3>B? <2><? 1:>B? :22>2?
D
1
E <;>33BF $.l. E <F G H .222
he opinion about the treatment the young people receive at school is not
discriminative +ost of them think feel that adults at school treat them the same or
better than to the rest of students 2more than a >)I3. (n this case the significant
differences point to +uslims* they have the highest percentages in being best treated
2$>.7I vs. a mean of ).)I for the other groups3, as well as in being treated worse
29.9I vs. a mean of -.-I for the other groups3. hese last results will have to be
investigated besides the SSS.
Table 6.49: Experience of school exclusion
:**;.: Ha$e %!3 #een
e@c"35e5 &r!m sch!!"<
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
/es
BB @: 1A :1:
3>A? :=>=? :1>;? :1>B?
(o
B<A BBB :3B 3@B
;:>B? 3<>=? 3A>:? 3A>A?
*"L
B32 B;< 1:2 ;3<
B3>@? <2>2? 1:>B? :22>2?
D
1
E 3>B@AF $.l. E 1F G H .2:=
Brevalence is significantly higher for +uslims in the case of being excluded from
school. here are a $).)I of +uslims excluded compared to a mean of a $8.FI of
the other groups.
here were no significant differences among groups using H$$.)x 2times being
excluded from school3. So we decided to recode the variable in five categories to
better present the data.
Table 6.50: Number of times excluded from school
:**;.@: H!7 man% imes
ha$e %!3 #een e@c"35e5
&r!m sch!!"<
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
*nce
:< 1< :: <;
<3>B? <3>2? <A>3? <3>2?
Kice
3 :A @ B:
1A>@? B<>2? 1@>:? B2><?
hree or 9our times
B @ < :B
:2>B? :1>2? :A><? :1>A?
Fi&e o more times
< B 1 ;
:B>3? @>2? 3>A? 3>3?
*"L
1; =2 1B :21
13><? <;>2? 11>=? :22>2?
D
1
E 1>1B@F $.l. E @F n.s.
$$G
Spare time activities
#anging around the neighbourhood
Table 6.51: Time spent hanging around the neighbourhood
:*;0a: Time s'en !3 in
nei2h#!3rh!!5
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
)e$ularly
:B@ ;1 @; 1;A
B@>3? 1<>B? B<>2? B:>1?
.ome days
:<2 :B: @@ BBA
BA>3? B<>A? B1>=? B=><?
)arely
;< :== @3 B:A
1=><? <:>2? BB>=? BB>B?
*"L
BA2 BA3 12B ;=:
B3>;? B;>A? 1:>B? :22>2?
D
1
E 1<>@A1F $.l. E <F G H .222
+uslims spend less time in streets than the members of the other groups.
Table 6.52: Time spent hanging around other places
:*;0#: Time s'en !3 in
!her '"aces
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
)e$ularly
@A A< =@ :;A
:;>:? 1:>3? 1A>;? 11>:?
.ome days
:;2 :@< ;B <<A
=<>B? <3><? <@>B? =2>1?
)arely
;B :2: =1 1<@
1@>@? 1;>3? 1=>;? 1A>@?
*"L
B=2 BB; 12: 3;2
B;>B? B3>:? 11>@? :22>2?
D
1
E A>B=<F $.l. E<F ns
.ut there are no differences among the three groups when young people spend their
time in other places than their neighbourhood.
#s done for School Satisfaction, we create a @eighbourhood Satisfaction scale with
the different possibilities of H$.F.
Table 6.53: Neighbourhood Satisfaction Scale
:*;1:
Nei2h#!3rh!!5
Sais&aci!n Sca"e
Re"i2i!n
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher TOTAL
( B3; <2@ 1:= :2:2
,ean 1.:AA 1.123 1.:BB 1.:32
.D .B3= .B3: .BAA .B31
he #@?Q# test did not show any significant differences.
)pending time &ith parents
$$)
Table 6.54: Time spent with parents during week days
:+;0a: Time 7ih %!3r
'arens 53rin2 7ee8 5a%s
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(one
3 12 :B <:
1>:? =>2? @>:? <>:?
%G to one hour
1A 1= :@ @3
A>2? @>B? A>=? @>3?
%G to tKo hours
A1 <A <1 :@:
:3>@? ::>3? :;>@? :@>:?
%G to 9our hours
3; A2 =1 1::
1B>2? :A>=? 1<>B? 1:>:?
,ore than 9our hours
:;: 1BA ;: =:;
<;><? =;><? <1>=? =:>;?
*"L
B3A B;; 1:< :222
B3>A? B;>;? 1:><? :22>2?
D
1
E 1A>B3<F $.l. E 3F G H .22:
Table 6.55: Time spent with parents during weekends
:+;0#: Time 7ih %!3r
'arens 53rin2 7ee8en5
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(one
:: 1< ; <<
1>3? @>1? <>1? <>=?
%G to one hour
11 11 11 @@
=>A? =>A? :2>1? @>A?
%G to tKo hours
=A <2 B1 :1;
:<>3? :2>B? :<>;? :B>:?
%G to 9our hours
3B A2 B= :33
1:>=? :3>:? :@>B? :;>2?
,ore than 9our hours
1:B 1B: ::A =@:
==>1? =;>A? =<><? =@>3?
*"L
B3@ B3A 1:= ;33
B;>:? B;>1? 1:>3? :22>2?
D
1
E :@>;=AF $.l. E 3F G H .2B:
+uslims are the students that pass more time with their parents during the week days,
and the weekend.
)pending time &ith friends
Table 6.56: Time spent with friends during week days
:*);/a: Time 7ih %!3r
&rien5s 53rin2 7ee8 5a%s
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(one
B< <1 B3 ::<
;>2? :2>A? :3>:? ::>@?
%G to one hour
AA 3< B1 :;B
12><? 1:>B? :=>1? :;>A?
%G to tKo hours
:2A ;B =; 1=;
13>B? 1B>@? 13>:? 1@><?
%G to 9our hours
=3 AB 1A :=3
:=>B? :3>=? :1>;? :@>:?
,ore than 9our hours
:21 :21 =< 1=3
1A>2? 1=>;? 1=>A? 1@>B?
*"L
BA3 B;< 1:2 ;31
B3>=? <2>:? 1:><? :22>2?
D
1
E :A>3@3F $.l. E 3F GH.211
Table 6.57: Time spent with friends during weekends
$$9
:*);/#: Time 7ih %!3r
&rien5s 53rin2 7ee8en5
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(one
1< B3 1< 3@
@>=? :2>2? ::>=? ;>2?
%G to one hour
1= =: :@ ;1
@>3? :B><? A>A? ;>@?
%G to tKo hours
=B 3B 1A :@B
:<><? 1:>3? :B>2? :A>2?
%G to 9our hours
:2@ 33 <; 1<B
13>3? 1B>:? 1B>@? 1=><?
,ore than 9our hours
:@2 :1: ;1 BAB
<B>=? B:>3? <<>1? B;>2?
*"L
B@3 B3: 123 ;=A
B3>=? B;>3? 1:>A? :22>2?
D
1
E BB>@A@F $.l. E 3F G H .222
he difference among the three groups in time out with friends is better seen with
respect to the weekend. +uslims pass less time out with friends that the two other
groups.
Table 6.58: Activities with friends
:*);0: =ha 5! %!3
5! 7ih %!3r &rien5s
Re"i2i!n
Si2ni&icance "e$e"
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
.Gend time at streets
1== :@1 :<=
D
1
E @3>:=2F $.l. E 1F G H .222
@A>B? <:>1? @3>A?
!lay or Katch
sGortsI$ames
:@; :=A ;1
D
1
E :>31;F $.l. E 1F G H .<2:
<<>@? B;>;? <B>@?
Do ille$al thin$s to$ether
@A 1; <@
D
1
E 13>B12F $.l. E 1F G H .222
:A>A? A><? 1:>3?
-o to a Glace o9 KorshiG
1= ;2 :B
D
1
E =@><=2F $.l. E 1F G H .222
@>@? 11>;? @>1?
.Gend " lot o9 time at your
home or a 9riendNs home
:;< :=2 :B1
D
1
E B<>=;:F $.l. E 1F G H .222
=:>1? B3>1? @1>@?
Do homeKorM
3< :B3 B3
D
1
E 1@><ABF $.l. E 1F G H .222
11>1? B=>:? :3>2?
!lay comGuter $ames or
$o on the internet
:B; ::< 3A
D
1
E :2>1=@F $.l. E 1F G H .22@
B@>A? 1;>2? <:>1?
here are not significant differences among the three groups in< watching Q, going
shopping or having lunch outside, talking about parents or school, talking about the
news or what is happening in the world, going for a walk or cycling, doing
homework.
he only case in which +uslims have a higher percentage is in going to a place of
worship.
$$:
)pending time on the internet
Table 6.59: Time spent on the internet during week days
:*);*a: Time !n he inerne
53rin2 7ee8 5a%s
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(one
A2 ;2 1; :3;
:3>:? 11>A? :B>3? :;>2?
%G to one hour
;< :13 <; 1A:
1<><? B1>1? 1B>B? 1A>B?
%G to tKo hours
::: 3B @< 1=3
13>3? 12>;? B2>=? 1@>2?
%G to 9our hours
=1 <3 11 :11
:B>=? :1>:? :2>=? :1>B?
,ore than 9our hours
=; <3 <@ :=B
:=>B? :1>:? 1:>;? :=><?
*"L
B3@ B;A 1:2 ;;B
B3>;? <2>2? 1:>:? :22>2?
D
1
E 13>1<BF $.l. E 3F GH.222
Table 6.60: Time spent on the internet during weekends
:*);*#: Time in inerne
53rin2 7ee8 en5
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
(one
=2 A= B: :=@
:B>:? :3>;? :<>3? :=>3?
%G to one hour
=@ ;< B1 :31
:<>@? 1B>A? :=>B? :3><?
%G to tKo hours
3= ::@ <@ 1<A
11>1? 1;>B? 11>2? 1=>2?
%G to 9our hours
;: @< =1 12A
1B>3? :@>1? 1<>;? 1:>2?
,ore than 9our hours
:2: <A <3 :;@
1@><? ::>;? 1B>2? :;>3?
*"L
B3B B;@ 12; ;33
B3>3? <2>:? 1:>1? :22>2?
D
1
E <3>AB3F $.l. E 3F G H .222
(n general, young people pass more time with internet during weekdays than during
the weekend. Brevalence is higher for +uslims in the band of no time with internet at
all.
Table 6.61: Most visited web pages
:*);+: =e# 'a2es
%!3 $isi
Re"i2i!n
Si2ni&icance "e$e"
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
Chat
:@; 12@ 33
D
1
E :2>B1AF $.l. E 1F G H .22@
<<>A? =<>=? <1>A?
.Gorts
;3 ::1 <:
D
1
E @>==2F $.l. E 1F G H .2B3
1=>;? 1;>@? :;>;?
E-mail
11: :@; ::B
D
1
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=3>=? <<>A? =<>;?
DoKnload music> 9ilms> Q
:@: ::< 3<
D
1
E :B>3B1F $.l. E 1F G H .22:
<1>@? B2>1? <2>3?
Job ad&ertisement
3 1B ; D
1
E A><;3F $.l. E 1F G H .21<
$$F
1>:? @>:? <><?
)eli$ious Keb
= @= 1
D
1
E 3<>3BBF $.l. E 1F G H .222
:>B? :A>1? :>2?
,y sGace> Face booM
::2 @2 =<
D
1
E :;>AA:F $.l. E 1F G H .222
1;>:? :=>;? 1@>1?
*ther Kebs
A= BA <2
D
1
E :@>;B=F $.l. E 1F G H .222
:;>3? ;>3? :;><?
here are not significant differences among the three groups in visiting webs of<
+usic, %ilms, @ewsCMeather, Sports, ?n;line games, looking for help for homework,
patience games, and Bolitical.
+uslim prevalence is higher than the rest of the groups in chats, 0ob advertisement,
but especially religious webs.
Me need to have more time to classify the answers to J?thers
Table 6.62: Aspect of themselves express on a web page
:*);-: =ha 7!3"5
%!3 sa% a#!3
%!3rse"& !n a 7e#
'a2e<
Re"i2i!n
Si2ni&icance "e$e"
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
,y Garents
=A :2; 1@
D
1
E B2>=1@F $.l. E 1F G H .222
:=>1? 13>3? :1>A?
,y a$e
1A2 :;< :BA
D
1
E 1@>;;@F $.l. E 1F G H .222
A1>1? =:>B? @@>3?
,y interests and liMin$s
1@A 12B :B3
D
1
E :2>31AF $.l. E 1F G H .22<
A:><? =B>A? @A>B?
,y country o9 ori$in
;B :B= <1
D
1
E :3>@::F $.l. E 1F G H .222
1<>;? B=>A? 12>=?
,y nei$hbourhood
:2= ;@ =3
D
1
E 2>33BF $.l. E 1F n.s.
13>:? 1=><? 13>B?
,y reli$ion
13 :=; ;
D
1
E :A;>2;=F $.l. E 1F G H .222
A>=? <1>:? <><?
,y sex
1:1 :1B :2@
D
1
E <A>@=:F $.l. E 1F G H .222
=@>A? B1>=? =1>2?
,y looMs
::@ @= @2
D
1
E 1:><A<F $.l. E 1F G H .222
B:>2? :A>1? 1;><?
he lan$ua$es ' sGeaM
@: :B2 B1
D
1
E <1>31;F $.l. E 1F G H .222
:@>B? B<><? :=>A?
he differences shown in table -.-G make a big difference between +uslims and the
rest of the groups. +uslims will define themselves through their parents, their country
of origin, their religion and the language they speak. Mhile the two other groups, are
more identified with their age, their interests and likings, their sex and their looks.
$$>
Interest in politics and global issues
Table 6.63: Interest in political matters
:?;/: Are %!3 inerese5 in
'!"iics<
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
,uch
:B BA 12
A2
B>B? ;>B? ;><?
A>2?
Cuite a lot
A3 :2@ <3
1B1
12>:? 1@>=? 11>@?
1B>1?
(othin$
1;3 1=A :<<
@;;
A@>@? @<>B? @A>;?
@;>3?
*"L
B3; <22 1:1
:22:
B3>;? <2>2? 1:>1?
:22>2?
D
1
E 12>:=;F $.l. E <F G H .222
Table 6.64: Interest in worldly matters
:?;0: Is %!3r "i&e a&&ece5 #%
7ha is 2!in2 !n ar!3n5 he
7!r"5<
Re"i2i!n
TOTAL
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
,uch
@< 3; =2
12B
:@>=? 11>B? 1B>@?
12>B?
Cuite a lot
1;2 1B= :B3
@@B
A<>A? =3>3? @=>:?
@@>B?
(othin$
B< A@ 1<
:B<
3>3? :;>2? ::>B?
:B><?
*"L
B33 <22 1:1
:222
B3>3? <2>2? 1:>1?
:22>2?
D
1
E 13>=A:F $.l. E <F G H .222
!atholics is the group less interested in politics, maybe because they dont feel they
are not affected by what is going on around the world. +uslims are more similar to
the group of other religions and agnostics.
Civic participation and citizenship
Table 6.65: Action face to public interference
:?;1: Aci!n &ace !
'3#"ic iner&erence
Re"i2i!n
Si2ni&icance "e$e"
Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
8rite a letter to oKn +all
12= :@B ;B
D
1
E ::>:3:F $.l. E 1F G H .22<
=B>2? <:><? <<>:?
ell "cademic authorities
B1 @; 12
D
1
E :A>BBAF $.l. E 1F G H .222
3>B? :A>=? ;>=?
Collect si$natures
:@@ :B< 3B
D
1
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<B>2? B<>2? B;>B?
!articiGate in a
demonstration
:<B ;; 3=
D
1
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BA>2? 1=>:? <2>B?
(one
=2 AA B<
D
1
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:1>;? :;>=? :@>:?
' donNt MnoK
3: :B: <@
D
1
E :A>A1=F $.l. E 1F G H .222
1:>2? BB>1? 1:>3?
Contact a reli$ious leader :: B: =
D
1
E :<>1:2F $.l. E 1F G H .22:
1>3? A>;? 1><?
$78
here are not significant differences among the three groups in<
a3 o ask for help to parents for writing a complaint letter
b3 o give some information through radio, Q, or newspapers
c3 o get in touch with competent national politics
d3 o get in touch with a religious leader.
+uslims are more prevalent in J( dont know and in J!ontact a religious leader. (n
this last case although prevalence is not high 2:.>I3, it differs largely from that of the
other groups 2a mean of 7.9I3.
Table 6.66: Degree of participation in religious or civil organizations
:?;?: D! %!3 #e"!n2
! an% !& hese
!r2aniHai!ns<
Re"i2i!n
Si2ni&icance "e$e" Cah!"ic M3s"im Oher
" reli$ious $rouG
:; @A ;
D
1
E <:>121F $.l. E 1F G H .222
<>;? :A>:? <><?
" ju&enile association
B: @@ :=
D
1
E :;>:A<F $.l. E 1F G H .222
3>:? :@>;? A>B?
Extra-scholar acti&ities
=: A@ :3
D
1
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:B>B? :;><? 3>3?
" social Centre
= :3 =
D
1
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:>B? <>@? 1><?
(one
:@2 :B< ;2
D
1
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<:>A? B<>B? <B>;?
here are no significant differences in< a Sporting club, a music or dance group, and a
political party.
$7$
Summary of Chapter 6
Referred to the e:perience of alienation, social isolation and an:iety
(n general, these Spanish youths are very or fairly satisfied with their life
regardless of the religion they belong to.
he ma,ority of respondents said they had someone to talk to, especially family
and friends. +uslims are more likely to be isolated and less likely to report having
friends andCor partners to talk to. +uslims spend more of their time with family
and are conse6uently more likely to confide in relatives, but less likely to confide
in friends than non;+uslims.
Berceptions of global social issues and world security is similar between groups,
but +uslims in Spain appear to be more worried about the world today, racism
and cultural conflicts and less worried about environmental issues than non;
+uslims. !atholics are far less worried about cultural confict.
9:periences of discrimination
he ma,ority of Spanish youths surveyed had not had experience of discrimination
andCor mistreatment by adults.
@evertheless, the percentage of +uslims who have been picked on is significant
higher than for the others. hey perceive this to be largely because of their
religion.
%ew Spanish respondents felt as if they were treated worse than others at school.
+uslims were actually more likely to feel better treated than others. here are no
differences between groups on exclusions from school.
9:periences of bullying
here was no significant difference in the prevalence of bullying, either as a
victim or a perpetrator, between the three Spanish groups.
Attitudes to&ards violence
Qiolence is more commonly ,ustified for defending self or another person than for
defending ideals or concepts like country or religion. Aowever, +uslims were
more likely to ,ustify violence to protect ones country or if ones religion is
insulted than the other groups.
%ew youngsters agreed that war was ,usfified, although +uslims were more likely
to be undecided on this issue.
0ustification for the use of terrorism was also very low for all - groups, although
+uslims were again more likely to be undecided than the rest.
9:periences of violence
# minority of the Spanish respondents had been victims of violence in the last
year and few had been violent to others. @evertheless, +uslim youths were more
likely to have suffered from physical violence and to have perpetrated it.
(amily background
he ma,ority of young people in the Spanish sample were living with their
mother, and a high proportion were also living with their natural father.
?nly around $ in $8 of the +uslim youths had parents who were born in Spain.
$77
+uslims were more likely to be living in poorer socio;economic situations, with
unemployed and non;economically active parents.
!onflict between parents and children was common in all three groups, but young
+uslims were more likely to argue with their parents about religion, cultural and
political ideas, and less about homework.
(riends, friendship patterns and activities &ith friends
Aaving many friends was characteristic of all three groups of young people,
especially at school, which suggests that young people are highly integrated at a
general level.
+ost young people have a mixed group of friends 2boys and girls3 who are of a
similar age. +uslims girls are more likely to have mostly friends of the same sex.
#t least three 6uarters of young people in the Spanish sample reported having
friends that were different to them in terms of their religion, country of origin,
skin colour or language. 1anguage seems to be the characteristic that makes
relationships more difficult. he respondents most likely to have different kind of
friends are the +uslims, while !atholics are least likely.
+ost children said their parents approved of their having friends who were
different. +ost parents also appear to know their friends, which supported the
finding that friends were not a source of family conflict
Qery few Spanish respondents belonged to a gang as defined by the Eurogang
@etwork, even though many did identify their group of friends as a "gang'.
Oouths who have groups of friends do it mainly to make friends or to meet people
from the other sex. #round a 6uarter of the youths confessed their group of friends
found it acceptable to do illegal things and most of those confirmed that they
actually do illegal things. his was far less likely amongst +uslim youths,
however.
)chool e:perience
School experience is seen, in general, as positive by the Spanish youths
independently of their religion. herefore school satisfaction and self esteem are
high, and treatment by adults is not perceived to be discriminatory.
@evertheless, more +uslims had been expelled from school.
)pare time activities
Ooung people, when going out, spend most of their time hanging about on the
streets and in the neighbourhood than going to other places or doing other kinds of
things. +uslims are less likely to spend time hanging around their
neighbourhoods, although there are no differences in neighbourhood satisfaction.
+uslims spend more time with their parents on week days and more time with
their friends at the weekend.
?ther fre6uent activities with friends are being at home playing or watching
sportsCgames. +uslims are generally less likely to report doing this, or doing
illegal acts or playing with computer games. hey were, however, more likely to
go to a place of worship or doing homework.
$7-
+uslims also spend less time surfing the internet and they use it more for such
things as chatting or looking for ,obs. hey were also more likely to go to
religious sites. hey use e;mail, download music and visit social networking sites
less fre6uently.
+uslims define themselves more in terms of their parents, their country of origin,
their religion and the language they speak. Mhile the two other groups, define
themselves by their age, their interests, their sex and their looks.
+uslims also show a bigger interest on politics and they feel more affected by
what is happening in the world than !atholics.
%inally, +uslims engage in more civic participation, ,oining more groups than
non;+uslims, especially religious organizations.
$7G
CHAPTER 7 SURVEY RESULTS FROM THE UK
Introduction
his chapter of the report outlines the key findings from the U= sample, which
involved fieldwork in both Scotland and England. he sample size for this
component of the study is $$7G cases, of which G$I were from +uslim backgrounds.
he analysis in this chapter, like the preceding two chapters, compares the responses
and characteristics of the +uslim and non;+uslim groups across a range of measures.
he chapter consists of a number of sections that are comparable with those in the
previous two chapters< experience of alienation, social isolation and anxiety*
experience of discrimination* experience of bullying 2as victim and perpetrator3*
attitudes to violence* experience of violence 2as victim and perpetrator3* family
background and dynamics* friends, friendship patterns and group activities 2including
gang membership3* school experience* and spare time activities 2including civic
participation3.
Experience of alienation, social isolation and anxiety
6eneral happiness &ith life
4espondents to this survey were asked a range of different 6uestions in an attempt to
get at their feelings of social isolation and anxiety. his included a very general
6uestion about how happy they were with their lives at the moment. ?verall, the vast
ma,ority of the young people in this survey said they were either very 2G-I3 or 6uite
2G7I3 happy with their lives on the whole. %igure :.$ shows the +uslim respondents
were slightly more likely than the non;+uslims to say they were very happy while the
non;+uslim youths were more likely to say that they were 6uite happy. Qery few of
either group were either 6uite or very unhappy, however.
Figure 7.1: How happy are you with life as a whole at the moment?
2 :2 12 B2 <2 =2
7ery haGGy
Cuite haGGy
(either haGGy
nor unhaGGy
Cuite
unhaGGy
7ery unhaGGy
(on-muslim
,uslim
$7)
7ersonal isolation
#nother way of determining whether the respondents felt socially isolated was to ask
them whether they had someone they could talk to about personal matters. Qery few
29I overall3 of the young people sampled said they no;one that they could talk to
about personal matters. (n fact, the ma,ority of respondents indicated that they had
more than one type of person with whom they could share things. 1ooking at able
:.$, it is clear that most young people felt they could tell personal things to a parent,
friend or sibling. (t was far less common for respondents to say they could talk to a
boy or girlfriend, a teacher or a religious leader. ?verall, those in the non;+uslim
group were more likely than the +uslim group to say that they could talk to others in
almost every category, with the exception of siblings. he most notable difference in
able :.$ is that +uslim youths were less likely than non;+uslims to say they could
discuss personal matters with a friend.
Table 7.1: Who can you discuss personal matters with? ()
Muslim Non-Muslim All
BarentsCcarer 98 9) 9-
%riend G9 9-. )9
Siblings G- G8. G$
.oyfriendCgirlfriend $7 $F $)
eacher : $G $$
4eligious leader ) 9 9
@o;one G 9 9
?ther person 9 $8 F
+ore than one response permitted so columns do not total $88I.
he findings in able :.$ may partly be explained by looking who they spend their
spare time with outside school, which is shown in able :.7. Six in ten respondents
said they spent most of their spare time with friends outside of school, although this
was lower for the +uslim youths 2)8I3 than for the non;+uslim youths 29:I3. #
relatively small proportion of the sample said that they would spend most of their time
with parentsCadult carers 2)I3 or with their siblings 2)I3. Aowever, young +uslims
were much more likely to say that they spent most of their time with parents and
siblings 27-I3 compared to the non;+uslim group 2$8I3. here was no difference
between the groups as to spending time with boyCgirlfriends or with religious leaders*
although the +uslim youths were slightly more likely to spend time alone.
Table 7.2: Who do you spend your spare time outside school with? ()
Muslim Non-Muslim All
%riends )8 9: 98
Barents and siblings 7- $8 $)
.oy or girlfriend > F F
.rothers, sisters : G )
Barents or adult carer G ) )
?n my own 9 - G
4eligious leader $ $ $
Someone else 7 7 7
+ore than one response permitted so columns do not total $88I.
$79
(eelings of alienation
# measure that has commonly been used in research to tap into feelings of negative
emotionality is the alienation scale of the +ultidimensionality Bersonality
Huestionnaire 2ellegen $>F73. # shortened version of the alienation scale has been
used in other research with young people and has been shown to be strongly related to
victimisation and anxiety 2Smith et al 788$3. his scale consists of six 6uestions,
each of which tap into a separate aspect of alienation, social isolation and feelings of
persecution. he resulting scale ranged from a score of 8, meaning no feelings of
alienation, to a score of $7, suggesting that the individual felt highly alienated. he
mean score across the whole sample was -.:G* however, +uslim youngsters were
significantly more likely to report feeling alienated, with an average score of G.->
compared to an average of -.-$ for non;+uslims 2pe.88$3.
$rust in others
#nother measure of social isolation is the extent to which young people feel they have
trust in a variety of people and organisations who represent power and authority in
their lives. ?verall, young people had most trust in those people who were closest to
them, namely their parents 2>8I trust a lot3 and their friends 29GI trust a lot3. hey
expressed a moderate degree of trust in religious leaders 2-7I trust a lot3 and police
officers 27:I trust a lot3. hey were far less trusting of other criminal ,ustice,
political or international people or institutions. %igure :.7 shows that youths from
non;+uslim backgrounds were more trusting overall, especially when it came to
friends, heads of state and the international institutions. Aowever, +uslims were
significantly more likely to place their trust in religious leaders than non;+uslims.
his is not surprising given that the +uslim youths were far more likely to have
strong religious beliefs and to attend a place of worship on a regular basis, compared
to non;+uslim youth.
Figure 7.2: Proportion of young people who trust a lot`
2? 12? <2? @2? 32? :22?
!arents
Friends
)eli$ious leaders
!olice o99icers
Courts R jud$es
%nited (ations
he Cueen
EuroGean %nion
!rime ,inister
Local councillors
!oliticians
(on-muslim
,uslim
6lobal concerns
$7:
%eelings of anxiety can be related to both personal concerns and more global worries
about the world* therefore, the respondents were asked how worried they were about
the state of the world today. ?verall, around F in $8 young people reported feeling
either very 277I3 or 6uite 2):I3 worried about the state of the world today. +uslim
youths were significantly more likely to report feeling worried, with 7FI of them
saying they were very worried compared to only $FI of non;+uslim youths. he
respondents were also asked whether they felt the world was safer, more dangerous or
about the same as it used to be. #lmost half of the young people 2GFI3 said they
thought it was more dangerous, although around a 6uarter 27FI3 said they thought it
was about the same. ?nce again, however, +uslim youths were significantly more
likely to say they felt the world was more dangerous than non;+uslim youths 2)>I
compared to G$I3. (nterestingly, non;+uslim youth were more likely to say they
were not sure than the +uslim youth 27$I compared with $7I, respectively3.
(n order to gauge what worried them the most about the state of the world today, the
respondents were asked to identify the three social issues that they were most worried
about. Some young people gave more than - answers, so they are excluded from this
analysis. ?verall, the two most concerning issues for young people were terrorism
and climate change 2G9I of young people chose these two issues3. his illustrates
that young people are very aware of the current political issues affecting the world
today. Aowever, there were some 6uite significant differences between the two
groups in responding to this 6uestion. %igure :.-, below, shows that the +uslim
youths were significantly more concerned about terrorist attacks 2)8I3, racism 2G:I3
and conflict between cultures 2G8I3 than the non;+uslim youths 2G-I, 7GI and
7)I, respectively3. ?n the other hand, the non;+uslim youths were more concerned
about climate change G>I3, nuclear weapons 27FI3 and Jother things 2$)I3
compared to the +uslim youths 2G$I, $7I and $I respectively3. here was only a
marginal difference between the groups in terms of other social issues, such as
poverty, disease and illness and ine6uality between people. he biggest difference,
however, was in the proportions who identified racism as a ma,or social problem, as
this was the second highest global concern amongst +uslim youths, but featured only
seventh for non;+uslims. #mongst the Jother responses given by young people, the
most common was the current economic situation, which had only ,ust become a
ma,or political issue at the time of starting the fieldwork for the study.
$7F
Figure 7.3: Social issues that young people worry about the most
2? :2? 12? B2? <2? =2? @2?
errorist attacMs
-lobal Karmin$Iclimate chan$e
!o&erty
)acism
Con9lict betKeen cultures
Disease and 'llness
(uclear KeaGons
LacM o9 resGect betKeen GeoGle
'ne6uality betKeen GeoGle
'mmi$ration
*ther thin$s
(on-muslim
,uslim
Experience of discrimination
?verall, one 6uarter of the respondents said that they had ever been Jpicked on for
some reason. he young people from +uslim backgrounds were significantly more
likely to have been picked on 2--I3 than those from non;+uslim backgrounds 27$I3.
able :.- shows that +uslim youths who had been picked on were most likely to say
this was because of their religion, skin colour and cultural background, clearly
indicating that experiences of discrimination were felt to be racist. @on;+uslim
youths were less likely than +uslims to say that they were discriminated against on
the basis of their skin colour and cultural background, although this did affect around
$ in ) of non;+uslims who were picked on. he most striking difference between the
two groups was in terms of religion, which was given as the reason for discrimination
by )>I of +uslims compared to only :I of non;+uslims. @on;+uslims were more
likely to report being discriminated against on the basis of language, however. here
were many other reasons that young people gave for being discriminated against,
particularly those from non;+uslim backgrounds. he main other reason given was
that they were Jdifferent, because of their physical appearance, clothing, lifestyle,
behaviour or sexuality.
Table 7.3: The reasons young people feel they are picked on
Muslim Non-Muslim All
Skin colour G: 7$ -)
4eligion )> : -G
!ultural background -) 79 -$
Speaking a different language $7 77 $:
&isability 8 G 7
/ender - : )
#ge - 9 )
?ther reasons $9 )9 -)
+ore than one response permitted so columns do not total $88I.
$7>
Ooung people were asked whether they thought Jnon;.ritish people needed to do
more to fit in with the culture in the country, or whether they thought non;.ritish
people already did enough to fit in. #round a 6uarter 2-)I3 of all respondents were
not really sure, although most of the remainder 2-:I3 already felt that non;.ritish
people already did enough to fit in, leaving 7FI who thought that more could be
done. here was a significant difference between +uslim and non;+uslim
youngsters to this 6uestion, however. Surprisingly, +uslim youths were far more
likely 2-:I3 to say that non;.ritish people should do more to try to fit in with the
dominant culture in the U= compared to non;+uslim youths 277I3.
(n order to find out more about young peoples experiences of discrimination, they
were asked whether they had ever been unfairly treated or picked on by adults when
they were with a group of friends. wo scenarios were suggested< the first involved
them walking past adults in the street with their group of friends, while the second
involved being unfairly treated by adult employees when they were inside shops.
#mongst those youths who said they often hung about with a group of friends, most
of them said they had never experienced discrimination from adults in the street
298I3 or in shops 2)9I3. !omparing +uslim and non;+uslim youths responses, we
found that non;+uslim youths were more likely than +uslims to say that they had
been discriminated against by adults in the street 2GGI had3 compared with +uslim
youths 2-)I3 2pe.88$3. he same was true for discrimination in shops, which -:I of
+uslims in groups said they had experienced compared to GFI of non;+uslims
2pe.8$3.
Ooung people were asked whether they felt they were treated better, the same or
worse by adults in their school or college compared to other students. ?verall, most
school pupils 29>I3 and college students 2)-I3 felt they were treated around the
same by adults. Aowever, the experiences of those in schools compared to college
were somewhat different. #mongst pupils still at school, +uslims were significantly
more likely than non;+uslims to say that they were treated better by teachers than
other 278I compared to $7I, respectively, pe.8$3. (n colleges, students felt they
were treated better by adult teachers overall compared to in schools. Aowever, the
+uslim students were slightly less likely 2-GI3 to say they were treated better by
teachers compared to the non;+uslim students 2G$I3, although the difference was not
statistically significant.
(n total, $:I of pupils in schools and $$I of college students said they were treated
worse by adult teachers than other people. he reasons they gave are summarised in
the table below 2the numbers were too small to disaggregate them by school and
college, therefore they are presented together3. #s can be seen from able :.G, around
half of all those who felt ill;treated by teachers said this was for no good reason.
Aowever, GGI of the sample also conceded that they were picked on because of their
behaviour. (nterestingly, this was slightly more common amongst the +uslim than
the non;+uslim respondents. #round G in $8 of the non;+uslim students said they
were picked on because of their young age, twice as many as the +uslim youth.
+uslim respondents were, however, far more likely to state that they were picked on
by teachers because of their cultural background, skin colour or religion than non;
+uslim youths. ?ther reasons for being picked on at school or college included
teacher favouritism and talking in class.
$-8
Table 7.4: Reasons given for being picked on by adult teachers/lecturers ()
Muslim Non-Muslim All
@o good reason )$ GF G>
.ehaviour G> G$ GG
#ge $> G$ -G
!ultural background -8 $$ $:
Skin colour -7 9 $)
4eligion 79 F $G
#ssociation with a
sibling
$> $8 $-
&isability 8 $G >
/ender G F 9
1anguage spoken 9 9 9
?ther reason F 7- $F
+ore than one response permitted so columns do not total $88I.
Experience of bullying
As a victim
he young people in this study were asked how often they had experienced three
common types of bullying< being excluded or left out by a group of friends* being
called names, made fun of or teased* and being threatened with violence. he
prevalence of bullying was fairly high in this sample, with 9$I of respondents saying
that they had experienced one or more of these types of behaviour towards them
within the previous year. here was no difference between +uslim and non;+uslim
respondents in terms of the percentage who had experienced at least one incident of
bullying. he responses to the three bullying 6uestions were collated together into a
scale of Jbeing bullied ranging from a score of 8, for those who had never been
bullied, to $), for those who had experienced bullying on $) or more occasions in the
last year. he average score for being bullied across the entire sample was -.8*
however, the average score for bullying was higher 2pe.88$3 amongst the non;+uslim
population 2-.-3 compared to the +uslim youths 27.)3.
he respondents who had experienced bullying were asked why they thought they had
been made fun of, excluded or threatened. able :.) below summarises the results.
#s you can see, amongst the +uslim youths, the reasons for being bullied were very
much perceived to be because of their cultural background, skin colour and religion,
whereas this was significantly less likely to be the case for non;+uslims. o a lesser
extent, the language they spoke was also a reason for bullying amongst +uslims,
although again this was far less common for non;+uslims. here is not much
difference between the +uslim and non;+uslim youths in the other factors noted in
the table below, although many other reasons were given for bullying. he most
common other reasons given by non;+uslim youths was because of their appearance,
their sense of dress, their sexuality or having a disability 2G-I3* whereas, amongst
+uslim youths, the main other reason stated was that the bullies were ,ust nasty
people who wanted to mark them out as a different group 2-)I3. 1ess fre6uently
mentioned reasons were having a fall out with friends, being part of a rival gang and
being teased Jfor fun.
$-$
Table 7.5: Reasons given for being bullied by others ()
Muslim Non-Muslim All
!ultural background G- 7) -7
Skin colour G> $: -8
4eligion G7 $$ 7G
1anguage spoken 7) $) $>
#ge $F $) $9
/ender > $$ $8
&isability - - -
?ther reason G> 9) )F
+ore than one response permitted.
As a perpetrator
he survey also asked the young respondents whether they themselves had bullied
someone else during the previous year by excluding them from a group of friends,
calling them names or making fun of them and threatening to hurt them. Brevalence
for bullying another person was lower that for being a victim of bullying, but G-I of
the U= sample said they had done one of these things to someone in the last year.
Brevalence of being a bully was higher 2pe.88$3 amongst the +uslim group 2))I3
compared to the non;+uslim group 2G7I3. # scale similar to that for being a victim
of bullying was created, ranging from 8, for those who had not bullied anyone in the
last year, to $), for those who said they had done this on $) or more occasions. he
average number of times young people said they had bullied someone else was 7.7*
and there was no significant difference between the +uslim youths 27.G3 and the non;
+uslim youths 27.$3.
able :.9 shows the reasons why they said they had made fun of someone, excluded
them from the group or threatened them in the preceding year. +uslin youths were
three times more likely to say that they had bullied someone else on the basis of the
language the other person was speaking. ?therwise, there is no great difference
between two groups on any of the other reasons listed in the table. (n fact, most
respondents gave some other reason for their bullying behaviour. he main reasons
given were that they had had an argument with someone else or found another person
annoying 2--I3 and that the other person had started it or that they were saying things
in retaliation or self defence 2-7I3.
Table 7.6: Reasons given for bullying others ()
Muslim Non-Muslim All
!ultural background $G $: $9
1anguage spoken 7G F $)
4eligion $G $7 $-
/ender $$ 9 F
Skin colour $$ F >
#ge > : F
&isability > : F
?ther reason :$ F) :>
+ore than one response permitted so columns do not total $88I.
$-7
he young people from a +uslim background were more likely to give both of these
responses 2->I and -:I respectively3 than those from a non;+uslim background
2-8I and 7FI respectively3. Mhereas, non;+uslim youths were more likely to say
that their bullying behaviour was ,ust for fun or not intended seriously 27)I3
compared to the +uslim youths 2$$I3.
Attitudes towards violence
he survey included a series of 6uestions on when it would be ,ustifiable for someone
2not necessarily them3 to use violence, ranging from being violent in self;defence
through to using violence to protect ones country. he results for the sample as a
whole indicated that most young people found it ,ustifiable to use violence, either all
or some of the time, in situations where it is perceived to be needed in self;defence
2FFI3 or where another individual is being assaulted 2F:I3. %ar fewer respondents
felt it was ever ,ustifiable to use violence ,ust for fun 2$9I3. # sizeable number did,
however, agree that violence could ,ustifiably be used if someone was sub,ected to
insults 2GFI3 and, particularly, if someone insulted a persons religion 2))I3. # high
proportion 2:8I3 of the respondents also felt that it was ,ustifiable to use violence to
protect ones country either all or some of the time.
1ooking at the responses to these 6uestions by religious background, there were
significant differences between the two groups on all 6uestions 2pe.8)3, although in
some cases the difference was very slight, as shown in able :.:. he +uslim
respondents were slightly less likely to say that it was acceptable to use violence in
self defence or to defend another person in comparison to the non;+uslim
respondents. Aowever, young +uslims were more likely to support the use of
violence in other circumstances. %or instance, they were a little more likely to say it
was ?= to use violence, at least sometimes, for fun compared to the non;+uslims. (n
the remaining three 6uestions, however, the young people from +uslim backgrounds
were far more likely to ,ustify the use of violence than non;+uslims. So $-I of
young +uslims said it was always ,ustifiable to use violence if a person was insulted,
-GI said it was always ,ustifiable to use violence if someones religion was insulted
and -)I said it was always acceptable to use violence to protect ones country,
compared with :I, >I and 77I of the non;+uslim respondents, respectively.
Table 7.7: How justifiable is the use of violence in these circumstances? ()
Muslim Non-Muslim
Always Some-
times
Never Always Some-
times
Never
o stop themselves
being physically hurt
G: -F $) GF G7 $8
o stop someone else
being physically hurt
-9 GF $: -- ): $8
Someone insulted them $- G8 GF : -F ))
0ust for fun : $G :> G $8 F:
Someone insulted their
religion
-G -- 7) > -- )F
o protect their country -9 -> 79 77 G) --
$--
he responses to these 6uestions were used to create a scale of J,ustifiability of
violence, which ranged from a value of 8 for those who thought violence was never
acceptable in any of these circumstances, to a value of $F for those who thought
violence in these circumstances was always acceptable. he average ,ustifiability of
violence score for the sample as a whole was ).8* however, this was significantly
higher for the +uslim youths 2).93 as compared to the non;+uslims 2G.:3.
he respondents were also asked whether they thought it was sometimes ,ustified for
people to use war or terrorism to solve the problems of the world. ?verall, only $)I
of the sample agreed that it was ,ustifiable to use war to solve the worlds problems,
whereas around half 2GFI3 of the respondents disagreed. #n even lower proportion
2:I3 agreed that it was ,ustifiable to use terrorism for this purpose, while the vast
ma,ority 2:7I3 disagreed with this statement. #gain, the responses differed
somewhat by religious background. # higher proportion of the +uslim youths agreed
that it was sometimes ,ustifiable to use war 2$FI3 or terrorism 2$8I3 to solve the
worlds problems compared to the non;+uslims 2$-I and )I respectively3* however,
it is worth emphasising here that the proportions of those who disagreed with these
statements was considerable, and not significantly different, for both groups.
Experience of violence
As a victim
(n order to gauge their experiences of violent victimisation, the respondents were
asked how often they had experienced three different forms of violence< being hurt on
purpose by someone hitting, kicking or punching them* being hurt on purpose by
someone using a weapon* and using force or threats to steal or try to steal something
from them. he prevalence of violent victimisation was much lower than for
bullying, with -7I of respondents saying that they had experienced one or more of
these types of violence towards them within the previous year. (n the case of
violence, +uslim respondents were slightly more likely 2-)I3 to have experienced at
least one incident of violence compared to the non;+uslim respondents 27>I3. he
responses to the three violence 6uestions were collated together into a scale of
Jviolent victimisation ranging from a score of 8, for those who had not experienced
violence in the last year, to $), for those who had experienced $) or more incidents of
violence in the last year. he average number of incidents of violent victimisation
across the entire sample was $.-, but this was not significantly different between the
+uslim 2$.G3 and the non;+uslim youths 2$.73.
he respondents who had been victims of violence were asked why they thought these
things had happened to them. able :.F, below, summarises their responses. 1ike the
responses to the 6uestions on bullying, the +uslim youths were far more likely to
perceive that their experiences of violence were due to discrimination on the basis of
cultural background, religion, skin colour and language than the non;+uslim
respondents. here was little difference between the two groups in terms of the other
reasons listed, whereas the ma,ority of non;+uslim respondents cited some other
reason for being the victim of violence. he most common other reasons given by
non;+uslim youths was that they were attacked for being different, such as
appearance, sexuality or dress sense 2-$I3 or that they were the victims of rival gangs
2-8I3. #mongst the other reasons given by +uslim youths, many also reported being
$-G
victims of rival gangs 2G$I3 although many also said they were picked on by people
who ,ust took a disliking to them for no reason 2-FI3. 1ess than $I of those who
experienced violence said that they thought it was ,ust Jfor fun.
Table 7.8: Reasons given for being victims of violence ()
Muslim Non-Muslim All
!ultural background -) 7> -7
4eligion G8 $) 7:
Skin colour -: $) 79
#ge 7- 77 77
1anguage spoken 7G $G $>
/ender $- $G $-
&isability F G 9
?ther reason -F 9: )-
+ore than one response permitted so columns do not total $88I.
As a perpetrator
he young respondents were also asked whether they had been violent towards
someone else during the last year, either by hitting, kicking or punching them, using a
weapon against them or stealing money or something else from them by force.
#round one 6uarter 27:I3 of the sample said that they had done at least one of these
things to someone in the last year. 1ike bullying, prevalence of using violence against
others was higher 2pe.88$3 amongst the +uslim group 2-:I3 compared to the non;
+uslim group 278I3. # scale of violence was created, ranging from 8, for those who
had not been violent at all in the last year, to $), for those who said they had been
violent on $) or more occasions. he average number of times young people said
they had been violent to someone was $.7, which is very low overall* however, this
was higher for the +uslim youths 2$.:3 compared to the non;+uslim youths 28.:3.
able :.> shows that the most common reason for being violent towards someone else
was their age. +uslim youths were more likely to assault someone because of their
age than among non;+uslim youths, although it is not clear whether victims were
younger or older. !ultural background and religion were also given as reasons for
initiating violence, although there was little difference between +uslim and non;
+uslim youths in choosing these options. ?nce again, the ma,ority of respondents
opted for some other reason for getting involved in violence. .y far the most
common other reason 2)7I3 given by the +uslim respondents was that they acted in
self;defence or retaliation when someone else attacked them or threatened to assault
them. his reason was also given by 78I of non;+uslim youths, however, they were
more likely than the +uslim respondents to say they were violent because they were
involved in a fight with a rival gang 27$I3, that someone had annoyed them or started
an argument 2$:I3 or that it was ,ust for fun 2$>I3.
$-)
Table 7.9: Reasons given for using violence towards someone else ()
Muslim Non-Muslim All
#ge 7- $$ $F
!ultural background $9 $: $:
4eligion $7 $$ $7
1anguage spoken F $7 $8
Skin colour : F :
&isability > - 9
/ender 7 > )
?ther reason 9> FF ::
+ore than one response permitted so columns do not total $88I.
Family background and dynamics
(amily structure
he young people in the study were asked to indicate who they lived with Jmost of the
time 2i.e. for those who were living in more than one household, they were asked to
tell us about the house where they lived most often3. able :.$8, below, shows the
profile of the most common family structures, focusing particularly on the adults
living within the household. ?verall, 97I of the children in our sample were found
to be living with both birth parents* however, the +uslim youths were significantly
more likely to be living in households with both birth parents present compared to
non;+uslim youths. #mongst the non;+uslim youths, a far greater proportion were
living either with their birth mother only 27-I3 or with a birth mother and step;father
or mothers partner 2$-I3 compared to the +uslim youngsters.
Table 7.10: Profile of family structure ()
Muslim Non-Muslim Overall
.oth .irth Barents :: )7 97
.irth +other and Step %atherC Bartner 8 $- F
.irth %ather and Step +otherCBartner $ - -
.irth +other ?nly $) 7- 78
.irth %ather ?nly $ G -
?ther 2including unknown3 ) ) )
7arental origin of birth
able :.$8 sheds some light on the stability of the family unit* however, we were also
interested in whether their parents had been born in the U=, or whether they had
migrated here from another country. he findings shown in able :.$$ very clearly
illustrate that the ma,ority of +uslim children taking part in our study were first
generation, since FGI of them said their father had been born in a different country
and F)I stated that their mother had been born in a different country. his compares
to only -$I of fathers and -)I of mothers born in another country for the non;
+uslim youths.
$-9
Table 7.11: Country of birth of parents ()
Father Mother
Muslim Non-
Muslim
Overall Muslim Non-
Muslim
Overall
his !ountry $7 9: G) $G 9- G-
?ther !ountry FG -$ )- F) -) ))
&ont =now G 7 - 7 7 7
7arental employment
1ooking at parental employment patterns between the two groups, able :.$7 shows
there was no difference in terms of the percentage who had a working father 2:9I for
both groups3. +uslim youths were slightly more likely to say that they had a father
who was either retired or unable to work, whereas non;+uslim youths were more
likely to say that their father had no ,ob, looked after the family or was not living with
the family. here was a much greater difference between the groups, however, in
terms of their mothers working patterns. wo thirds 29FI3 of the non;+uslim
youths said that their mother was working compared to only $FI of +uslim youths.
?n the contrary, :8I of the +uslim youths said their mothers looked after the family
full;time, compared to only $FI of the non;+uslim youths. his is not surprising,
given the expected gender roles in +uslim families.
Table 7.12: Employment status of parents ()
Father Mother
Muslim Non-
Muslim
Overall Muslim Non-
Muslim
Overall
Employed :9 :9 :9 $F 9F G:
Unemployed - 9 ) $8 : F
Unable to work $7 G : 7 - -
!ares for family $ - 7 :8 $F ->
@ot living with
this parent
F $$ $8 8 G -
7arental conflict
#s well as looking at family structure and employment patterns, we were interested in
the extent to which there may be conflict within the family, since this may relate to
other wider experiences of social isolation and violence. herefore, the young people
were asked whether they argued with their parents about a range of issues, including
their parents political or religious and cultural beliefs. he percentage of those young
people who said they argued either Ja lot or Ja bit about each of the six items in this
6uestion is shown in %igure :.G. @on;+uslim youths were more likely to argue with
their parents about homework or school work, and slightly more likely to argue about
where they went or what they did in their spare time. Aowever, +uslim youths were
more likely to argue with their parents on all of the other measures, in particular their
parents religious or cultural beliefs. hese items were combined together to create a
Jscale of conflict, ranging from 8 for those who did not argue at all to $7 for those
$-:
who argued a lot about all of these things. he average score over all was 7.:, but this
did not differ significantly for +uslim 27.F3 and non;+uslim 27.93 youths.
Figure 7.4: Whether young people argue a lot or a bit about these issues ()
2 :2 12 B2 <2 =2 @2 A2
+omeKorM or school KorM
Friends or GeoGle you han$ Kith
8hat you doIKhere $o in sGare time
Clothes or music
!arents reli$iousIcultural belie9s
!arents Golitical belie9s
(on-muslim
,uslim
Friends, friendship patterns and group activities
(riends8 characteristics
%riends and peer groups represent a very significant aspect of young peoples lives,
and the findings already presented in this chapter indicate that most young people
spend most of their spare time outside school with friends. Mhen they were asked
how many friends they had, the ma,ority of the young people indicated that they had
more friends in school than in their local neighbourhood. (n fact, G)I overall said
they had more than 78 friends within school compared to 7FI who said they had
more than 78 friends in their local neighbourhood. +ost young people 2G>I3 had
between $ and $8 friends in their local neighbourhood, but more than $8 friends at
school 2:GI3. ?nly a small proportion said they had no friends at school 2$I3,
although $GI claimed to have no friends in their local neighbourhood. his pattern
of having more friends at school than in the neighbourhood was broadly similar for
+uslim and non;+uslim youths, as shown in able :.$-. here were some
differences, however, as +uslim youths were more likely to report having more than
78 friends at both school 2G:I3 and in their neighbourhoods 2-)I3 than the non;
+uslim youths 2GGI and 7-I, respectively3. he difference is especially significant
for the neighbourhood friends, which may indicate extended social networks for this
group.
Table 7.13: How many friends do you have? ()
Muslim Non-Muslim
School Neighbourhood School Neighbourhood
@one $ $) $ $
$;) $7 7G 9 -)
9;$8 $G 7$ $F $
$-F
$$;78 79 ) -7 $-
+ore than 78 G: -) GG 7-
1ooking at the sex of their friends, it was rare for males 2)I3 or females 2:I3 to say
that they were friends predominantly with people of the opposite sex. +ales were
most likely 2)7I3 to have mostly male friends, whereas females were most likely
2)8I3 to say they had approximately e6ual numbers of male and female friends.
1ooking at the two groups separately, however, there were some distinct gender
patterns. able :.$G shows that non;+uslim males were as likely to say that they
were friends with all or mostly boys as they were with e6ual numbers of both boys
and girls. +uslim males, however, were far more likely to have predominantly male
friendship groups. @on;+uslim females mainly reported being friends with other
girls, whereas non;+uslim girls were more likely to say they were friends with about
e6ual numbers of boys and girls. #gain, these patterns probably reflect distinct
cultural differences between the two groups.
Table 7.14: What sex are your friends? ()
Muslim Non-Muslim
.oys /irls .oys /irls
+ostly same sex )F )F GF --
E6ual mix of both sexes -: G$ GF )9
+ostly opposite sex 9 $ G $$
+ost U= respondents claimed to be friends with other people who were different to
them in terms of culture and background. able :.$ shows that this was true for both
+uslim and non;+uslim youths. (n fact, there was no difference between the two
groups in terms of the proportions that said all, most or some of their friends were
from different cultural backgrounds to them. ?n the other measures included in this
table, there were some slight differences however. he overall picture was that
+uslim youths were more likely to say that all or most of their friends were from
different religious backgrounds, had different skin colours and spoke other languages*
whereas non;+uslim youths were more likely than +uslim youths to say that none of
their friends were different to them. he overall pattern, however, was one of
extreme diversity in the friendship patterns of both +uslim and non;+uslim youths.
Table 7.15: How many friends are different from you? ()
Muslim Non-Muslim
All or
most
Some None All or
most
Some None
&ifferent religion $9 :8 $G > :- $>
&ifferent cultural background $) 99 $> $G 9> $F
&ifferent skin colour $F 9> $G > :9 $)
Speak another language $: 98 7- : 9> 7)
7arental kno&ledge and acceptance of friends
he ma,ority of the respondents to this survey 2>$I3 stated that their parents knew at
least some of their friends well, with 7$I stating that their parents knew all or most
of their friends well. his differed considerably for the two groups, as +uslim youths
$->
were far less likely 2:I3 to say that their parents knew all or most of their friends
compared to the non;+uslim youths 2-8I3. @evertheless, they were more likely to
say that their parents knew some of their friends well 2F$I of +uslim youths
compared to 9-I of non;+uslims3. herefore, there was little difference in the
proportion who said their parents did not know any of their friends well 2$7I +uslim
youths compared with FI non;+uslim youths3. his 6uestion was followed by a
6uestion about whether they thought their parents would approve of their having
friends who were different to them. he response was overwhelmingly positive, with
around :)I of all respondents saying that their parents would approve of friends from
different religions, cultural backgrounds, skin colours and those speaking different
languages. hese figures were more or less identical for the +uslim and the non;
+uslim respondents, so there was no real difference to report.
(riendship group and gang membership
+uch research has been done in recent years into gang membership in European
countries 2see &ecker and Meerman 788)3. +uch of the contemporary research on
gangs emanates from the Eurogang @etwork which uses the following definition< "a
youth gang, or troublesome youth group, is a durable, street oriented youth group
whose involvement in illegal activity is part of their group identity'
$$
. he @etwork
has devised a series of standard 6uestions to identify whether young people fall into
the definition of a Jgang. able :.$9 shows that, although many young people report
to be part of youth groups, a relatively small proportion were in groups that would be
formally defined as a gang according to the Eurogang definition.
+ost young people from both +uslim 2F$I3 and non;+uslim 2FFI3 backgrounds
had a certain group of friends that they spent time doing things with or ,ust hanging
out together, although this was more common among the non;+uslim respondents.
#lmost all of those who reported having a group of friends reported that these friends
fell between the age brackets of $7 and 7) years, as defined by the Eurogang
@etwork. he non;+uslim respondents were more likely to report spending time
hanging around in public places with a group of friends, although this was also fairly
common for the +uslim youths. he gap between the two groups widens slightly
when we take the length of time the group has been into existence into account, as
only )7I of +uslims fall into this definition of a Jdurable street;oriented group
compared to 9-I of the non;+uslim youths. Aowever, the difference narrows again
when we examine the proportion of these two groups who admitted to both accepting
and participating in illegal behaviour. Under the Eurogang definition, $-I of non;
+uslims were part of a street gang compared with $8I of +uslims.
Table 7.16: Characteristics of friendship groups ()
Muslim Non-Muslim
Aave a group of friends F$ FF
/roup aged $7;7) :> F)
Spend time in public place ): 9F
.een in existence for a least - months )7 9-
#ccept and Barticipate in (llegal $8 $-
$$
See Eurogang website page< http<CCwww.umsl.eduCgcc,CpdfsC8)I78OouthI78Survey.pdf. !orrect as
at 9.$7.8F.
$G8
.ehaviour N /ang
!onsider the group a gang : )
(nterestingly, the proportion of +uslims 2:I3 who considered themselves to be part
of a Jgang was slightly higher than amongst the non;+uslim youths 2)I3. Mhen the
respondents who said they were part of a Jgang were asked more about it, the +uslim
respondents were more likely to state that the gang had a discernable name 27$I3 and
that the group promoted or supported a particular political or religious issue 2:I3,
compared to the non;+uslim respondents 2$)I and 7I, respectively3.
(riendship group characteristics
#dditional 6uestions provided by the Eurogang @etwork allow us to explore in more
detail the characteristics of friendship groups. %igure :.), below, shows some of these
characteristics separately for +uslim and non;+uslim youths. he chart reflects all
of those who said they were part of a group of friends, not ,ust those who fell into the
definition of a gang. he +uslim youths were more likely than the non;+uslims to
say that their group had distinct sex roles, recognised leaders, special values or codes,
a dress code and particular re6uirements for ,oining the group. (n other words, the
+uslim friendship groups appeared to be far more structured than for the non;+uslim
youths, who were only more likely to say that their group had regular meetings.
Figure 7.5: Characteristics of the friendship group

2 = :2 := 12 1= B2 B=
Boys and $irls do
di99erent thin$s
)e$ular meetin$s
-rouG symbol or
si$n
)eco$nised
leaders
.Gecial &alues or
codes
.Gecial joinin$
re6uirments
8ear sGecial
clothes
attoos
(on-,uslim
,uslim
Mhen they were asked why they had ,oined the group, a wide range of responses were
given* however, the most common reasons related principally to issues of friendship
and companionship. he three most common reasons for being in a group were that
they ,ust wanted to hang out, make friends and have company 2these reasons were
slightly more common amongst the non;+uslim youths3. he +uslim respondents
were more likely than the non;+uslim youths to say that they had ,oined the group in
$G$
order to keep out of trouble, for their own protection, to feel important and to have a
particular Jterritory. hese findings are summarised in %igure :.9, below. his
suggests that +uslim youths may be more likely to perceive ,oining a group or gang
as being a means of ensuring their well;being and of giving them status in their
communities.
Figure 7.6: Reasons for being part of a friendship group

2 12 <2 @2 32 :22
Just to han$ out
,aMe 9 riends
For comGany
!articiGate in $rouG acti&ities
Friend Kas in $rouG
Feel liMe ' belon$
o share secrets
*ther
,eet the oGGosite sex
LeeG out o9 trouble
For Grotection
!reGare 9or the 9 uture
Feel imGortant
$et money or other thin$d
-et aKay Kith ille$al acti&ities
+a&e a territory
$et my Garents resGect
.iblin$ Kas in $rouG
Family member Kas in $rouG
(on-,uslim
,uslim
hese findings about the reasons for ,oining a group were further supported by a
series of 6uestions which asked the respondents about what being in the group meant
to them. he most important thing about being in the group for around F8I of both
+uslim and non;+uslim respondents was that they simply en,oyed being with their
group of friends. +uslim youths were, however, more likely to state that being in the
group provided a means of support and loyalty to each other 2G>I3 and made them
feel respected 2G>I3, compared to non;+uslim youths 2-9I and -:I respectively3.
.eing part of a group also made +uslim youths feel useful 2->I3 and important
2-GI3, compared with non;+uslims 2--I and 7GI respectively3. Qirtually none of
the respondents stated that their group did not like people with different cultural
backgrounds, religions, skin colour or languages.
School experience
he ma,ority of the respondents to this survey 2F)I3 were attending schools in the
U=, while the remaining $)I were attending either sixth form colleges 2in England3
$G7
or %urther Education !olleges 2in Scotland3. Since slightly different 6uestions were
asked of those attending school and college about their educational experience, the
findings in this section are presented according to whether the young person was a
school or a college student.
he students were asked a series of eight 6uestions about their attitudes to school and
how important it was to do well at school. hese 6uestions were used to construct a
scale of school commitment, ranging from a score of 8 for those who showed no
demonstrable commitment to school to a score of $9 for those who were highly
committed to their education. %or those who were attending college, they were asked
to respond about the school they had attended most recently. he results showed
indicated that those who were attending school had a slightly higher average score
2$$.F3 on commitment to school committed than those who were attending college
2$8.$3* however, there was no difference in the scores between +uslim and non;
+uslim respondents.
?n the whole, those who were attending college perceived themselves to be doing
better 2G-I3 than other students in comparison to those at school 2-9I3, although
only around $ in $8 students from both school and college said they were doing worse
than others. 1ooking at the +uslim and non;+uslim populations, there were no
differences amongst those attending college* however, +uslim school students were
slightly more likely 2$-I3 to perceive themselves as performing worse than non;
+uslim students 2>I3
here was no difference overall in the proportion of young people at school or college
who said they had been excluded from school on at least one occasion 2$:I for both3.
Aowever, +uslims were significantly more likely to say that they had been excluded,
whether they were t school 277I3 or were attending college 27GI3, compared to the
non;+uslim students 2$)I and -I, respectively3. #mongst those who had been
excluded from school, rates of exclusion were also far higher amongst the +uslim
youths. he average number of times young +uslims had been excluded from school
was 7.F times for school students and G.8 times for college students, compared with
only 7.$ and $.: times, respectively for non;+uslim students. he difference in these
average rates was significant 2pe.8)3. (n other words, it appears that +uslim students
tend, on the whole, to have a less positive experience of school attendance than non;
+uslims.
Spare time activities
#anging around the neighbourhood
# common aspect of contemporary youth lifestyle is spending time, usually with a
group of friends, ,ust hanging around the streets in the neighbourhood they live in or
other local places. he respondents to this survey were no exception, although only
around $ in ) overall said they spent Jmost days hanging around either in their local
area or some other place. able :.$: shows that a large proportion said they would
hang about the streets Jsome days, although they were more likely to say they hung
about areas away from where they lived 2G9I3 rather than in their own
neighbourhoods 2-9I3. +uslim youths were less likely than non;+uslims to hang
about the streets Jmost days, either in their local area or other places. Aowever, they
$G-
were more likely to say they would hang about both types of area Jsome days.
#nother interesting difference between the groups, however, was that while +uslim
youths were as likely to say they would rarely hang about other places away from
where they lived, they were less likely to say they rarely hung about their own local
areas. herefore, it appears that +uslim youths hang about less fre6uently than non;
+uslim youths, and when they do they are more likely to prefer the safety of their
own local neighbourhoods to those further afield.
Table 7.17: How often do you hang around your local area or other places? ()
Muslim Non-Muslim Overall
Local
area
Other
Places
Local
area
Other
Places
Local
area
Other
Places
+ost days $F $) 77 7$ 78 $F
Some days G7 )$ - G- -9 G9
4arely G$ -G G9 -9 GG -)
Some further clues about the extent to which young people hang about their own
neighbourhoods emerge when we consider how they responded to eight statements
describing their local areas. %igure :.: shows how the respondents from +uslim and
non;+uslim backgrounds perceived their neighbourhood across a range of
dimensions. ?verall, most young people were more likely to agree with the positive
statements about their neighbourhood, such as it was nice and 6uiet, and that people
got along and helped each other, than the negative statements that safety was a
problem or that there were many gangs in the neighbourhood. Aowever, the young
people from +uslim backgrounds were more likely to agree with these positive
statements about their neighbourhoods than the non;+uslim youths. Mhereas, the
non;+uslim youths were much more likely than the +uslims to agree that there were
some problems in their neighbourhood. he +uslim youths were more likely to say
that safety was a problem in their area, however.
he 6uestions on neighbourhood were combined together to make a scale of
Jneighbourhood satisfaction, ranging from a score of 8, for those who were very
dissatisfied with their area on these measures, to $9, for those who were highly
satisfied. he average score was $$.8 which indicates that most people were satisfied
rather than not. Aowever, non;+uslims gave a lower average satisfaction rating
2$8.:3 overall compared to +uslims 2$$.)3.
$GG
Figure 7.7: Agreement with statements about the local neighbourhood ()
2 :2 12 B2 <2 =2 @2 A2
,y nei$hbourhood is nice
!eoGle $enerally $et alon$
!eoGle are Killin$ to helG each
other
,y nei$hbourhood is &ery 6uiet
.ome Groblems in
nei$hbourhood
!eoGle can be trusted
,any $an$s in nei$hbourhood
.a9ety is a Groblem
(on-muslim
,uslim
)pending time &ith parents
he respondents were asked to estimate the number of hours they spent doing things
with their parents in their spare time, such as talking, eating, playing sports,
worshipping or going out, both on weekdays and at weekends. ?nly around $ in $8
young people said that they spent no time at all doing things with their parents, either
on weekdays or at weekends. &uring the week they indicated that they were most
likely to spend between one and two hours with parents 2)8I3, whereas at weekends
they were most likely to spend more than two or four hours 2))I3. able :.$F shows
that there was a distinct cultural difference, however. Ooung people from +uslim
backgrounds were far less likely to say that they spent no time doing things with
parents, particularly at the weekends. hey were not significantly more likely than
non;+uslim youths to spend more than G hours doing things with parents, either at the
weekends or on weekdays, but they did tend to spend more hours doing things with
parents on average than young people from non;+uslim backgrounds.
Table 7.18: How much spare time do you spend doing things with parents? ()
Muslim Non-Muslim Overall
Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend Weekdays Weekend
@one $8 9 $7 $- $$ $8
8; $ hour $9 $7 7- $9 78 $)
$;7 hours -G 7G 7F $F -8 7$
7;G hours $> 77- $- 78 $) 7$
G] hours 77 -) 7) -7 7G -G
$G)
)pending time &ith friends
he same 6uestion was asked about the number of hours spent doing things with
friends during their spare time on weekdays and at weekends. #gain, it was rare for
young people to say they spent no time doing things with friends. Aowever, young
people indicated that they spent far more time doing things with friends than they did
doing things with their parents. # comparison between able :.$F, above, and able
:.$> below indicates that the proportion overall who said they spent more than G
hours with friends is higher on both weekdays and at weekends. his is certainly true
for the non;+uslim respondents, who were around twice as likely to spend more than
four hours doing things with friends at the weekend. Aowever, the amount of time
spent with friends by +uslim youths is actually lower than it was for time spent with
parents, especially on weekdays. (n other words, both +uslims and non;+uslims
spend more time with friends and parents at the weekends compared to weekdays*
however, young +uslims are more likely to spend free time with parents rather than
friends, where the reverse is true for non;+uslim youths.
Table 7.19: How much spare time do you spend doing things with friends? ()
Muslim Non-Muslim Overall
Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend Weekdays Weekend
@one $8 $8 ) G : 9
8; $ hour 7- $7 $$ ) $9 F
$;7 hours 7) 7> 7> $$ 7: $F
7;G hours 77 $G 77 $> 77 $:
G] hours 7$ -) -- 9$ 7> )$
his picture of cultural difference is reflected in the proportion of young people who
reported doing different sorts of activities with their friends. %igure :.F shows that
both +uslim and non;+uslim youths tended to participate in the same types of
activities, so the things that were common for one group were common for the other.
Aowever, young people from non;+uslim backgrounds were significantly more likely
than +uslim youths to report doing all types of activity with their friends, with the
exception of going to a place of worship, which was higher for +uslim youths. hese
findings tie in with the previous table, on the extent of time spent with friends.
$G9
Figure 7.8: Nature of activities with friends ()
2 12 <2 @2 32
8atch 7 or 9ilm
.Gend time at home or 9riends house
-o shoGGin$> eat out
!lay or Katch sGort
+an$ about in Glubic Glaces
!lay comGuter $ames or use internet
Chat about Garents or school
-o 9or KalMs or biMe rides
Chat about neKs or Korld e&ents
Do homeKorM
*ther
Do ille$al thin$s to$ether
-o to Glaces o9 KorshiG
(on-,uslim
,uslim
)pending time on the internet
(n addition to spending time with parents and friends, the young people in this survey
were asked how much time they spent on the internet on weekdays and at the
weekend. able :.78 indicates that the bulk of young people spent between $ and 7
hours on the internet on weekdays 2):I3, whereas they were likely to spend longer on
the internet at weekends. ?nly around $ in $8 said that they spent no time on the
internet, either at weekends or on weekdays. his pattern of spending more time on
the internet at weekends compared to weekdays was the same for both +uslim and
non;+uslim youths. here was no ma,or difference between these groups as to the
amount of time spent on the internet, although +uslim youths were a little less likely
to say that they spent no time doing this compared to the non;+uslim youths. @on;
+uslim youths were also a little more likely to spend more time on the internet during
weekdays compared to +uslim youths, but there was far less difference between the
groups at the weekend.
Table 7.20: How much spare time do you spend on the internet? ()
Muslim Non-Muslim Overall
Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend Weekdays Weekend
@one $$ $8 $- $- $7 $7
8; $ hour -9 $G 7F $F -$ $:
$;7 hours 79 -7 7: 7: 79 7>
7;G hours $- 7$ $> 78 $: 78
$G:
G] hours $9 7- $- 77 $G 77
#s with the pattern of activities with friends, %igure :.> shows that young people from
both +uslim and non;+uslim backgrounds were likely to look at the same types of
sites overall. he most common activities on the internet included visiting social
networking sites, reading and sending emails, online games and music, film and Q
sites. Ooung people were far less likely to visit more Jadult oriented sites, such as
employment, political or religious sites. @on;+uslim youths were more likely to
participate in social networking sites, which is consistent with their greater likelihood
of socialising with friends compared to the +uslim youths. Aowever, +uslim youths
were more likely to say they used email sites and visited chatrooms, which indicates
that they may prefer different ways of communicating online. +uslim youths were
also more likely to say that they visited religious sites compared to non;+uslim
youths, but this was uncommon amongst both groups.
Figure 7.9: Nature of websites visited on internet ()
2
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Interest in politics and global issues
%igure :.>, above, indicates that young people rarely visit political websites and this
appears to reflect their general level of interest in contemporary U= politics. Mhen
asked how interested they were in what was going on in politics in their country,
around two thirds 29-I3 said they were not interested at all. #round $ in $8 2>I3
said they were very interested, while 7FI said they were 6uite interested. hese
figures did not differ significantly for +uslim and non;+uslim youths. &espite this
general lack of interest in politics, young people were aware that the things going on
$GF
in the world today did affect their lives. ?verall, $FI of young people thought that
things going on in the world today affected their lives in many ways, while )>I said
they thought their lives were affected in some ways. #round a 6uarter 27-I3 of
young people did not believe their lives were affected at all, however. #gain, there
were no differences between the +uslim and non;+uslim youths in their responses to
this 6uestion.
Civic participation and citizenship
(n order to get some gauge on how civically minded these young people were, they
were asked what they would do in the event that a favourite part or place that they
hung around with their friends was being closed so that houses could be built on the
land. ?verall, )FI of the young people said that they would take some form of
positive action in the event that this was to happen in their local area. %igure :.$8,
shows that the most common forms of action would be to write to the local authority,
start or sign a petition and to ask parents to write a letter on their behalf. #
significant minority also indicated that they would be prepared to attend a protest,
contact a politician or report the matter to the media. +uslim youths were ,ust as
likely as non;+uslims to say they would write a letter to the !ouncil and they were
also ,ust as likely to say they would do none of these things. Aowever, non;+uslim
youths were more likely to say that they would do most of the other things than
+uslim youths, with the exception of contacting a religious leader which was more
commonly reported by +uslim youths. +uslim youths were also slightly more likely
to say they did not know what they would do.
Figure 7.10: Expected action if a favourite park was closed to build housing ()
2
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#nother aspect of civic participation is getting involved in different organised
activities, so young people were asked about their involvement in a range of different
types of clubs or groups. ?verall, 98I of young people said they were involved in at
least one type of club or group. %igure :.$$ shows that the most common type of
civic participation was to be involved in a sports club, which around 7 in ) of all
young people reported. # far lower proportion said they were involved in after;
school clubs, recreational groups or youth clubs, and few said they were members of a
religious, community or youth politics group. Ooung people from +uslim
backgrounds were more likely to say they were part of a youth club or religiousCfaith
group, while non;+uslim youths were more likely to be part of an after;school or
recreational group. Aowever, around a third of young people said they were not
involved in any of these types of groups, and this did not differ significantly for
+uslim and non;+uslim youths.
Figure 7.11: Which of the following groups or clubs are you involved in? ()
2 :2 12 B2 <2 =2
.Gorts club
"9ter school club
)ecreational $rouG
/outh club
)eli$ious or 9aith $rouG
Community $rouG
/oun$ !olitics -rouG
(one o9 these
(on-,uslim
,uslim
Summary of Chapter 7
9:perience of alienation, social isolation and an:iety
he vast ma,ority of young people in the U= sample said they were very or 6uite
happy with their lives at the moment, and there was little difference between
+uslim and non;+uslim groups, although +uslims were a bit more likely to be
indecisive.
+ost respondents did have someone they could talk to about personal matters,
although +uslims gave a fewer number of responses to this 6uestion. Barents,
friends and siblings were the most common sources of support for both groups,
although +uslims were less likely than non;+uslims to confide in a friend. %ew
stated that they would confide in a religious leader.
+ost reported spending time with friends outside of school, although it was more
common for +uslims to spend time with their parents and siblings than it was for
$)8
non;+uslims. (t was rare for any young people to spend a lot of time with
religious leaders.
%eelings of alienation were low amongst the U= sample as a whole, although
+uslims were more likely to report feelings of isolation and alienation.
+ost young people placed their trust in their parents and friends. +uslim youths
also placed a high degree of trust in religious leaders, although non;+uslims were
far less likely to do so 2which is not surprising as a large proportion of these had
no religious beliefs3. U= youths were least likely to trust politicians.
+any young people expressed anxiety about the state of the world today. +uslim
youths were most worried about the state of the world and felt that it was a more
dangerous place now than it used to be.
he issues that were of significantly more concern to +uslim youths in the U=
than non;+uslim youths were terrorism, racism and conflict between cultures.
@on;+uslim youths were more worried than +uslims about climate change,
nuclear weapons and the economy. 4acism was an issue that was particularly
high on the agenda for +uslims, but very low down for non;+uslims.
9:periences of discrimination
+ost young people did not feel discriminated against or Jpicked on, although this
was higher for +uslim youths than non;+uslims in the U=. he reasons for
being picked on were mainly perceived to be racist N skin colour, religion and
cultural background. (n fact, +uslims were F times more likely to cite religion as
a reason than non;+uslims for being picked on. @on;+uslims said they were
picked on mainly because they looked or acted differently to others.
(nterestingly, +uslim youths were more likely than non;+uslims to say that they
thought non;.ritish people should do more to fit into the predominant U= culture.
+ost had not experienced discrimination by adults while they were with a group
of friends, but +uslims were more likely than non;+uslims to report this.
+ost young people also reported being treated well by teachers, and this was
especially true for +uslims. his finding suggests that strangers are more
suspicious of +uslim youths, but adults they are familiar with are far less
discriminatory.
#mongst those who felt they had been treated worse than other students by
teachers, most said they felt it was for Jno good reason or admitted that their
behaviour was at fault. here was some racist element in around a third of cases
where +uslims reported discrimination, although this was rare.
9:periences of bullying
+ost young people in the U= sample stated that they had experienced some form
of bullying in the last year, and there was no difference in prevalence between
+uslim and non;+uslim youths. he fre6uency of bullying was slightly higher
for non;+uslims.
+uch of the bullying against +uslims was described in racist terms, with most
citing religion, skin colour and culture as the predominant reasons for the acts.
%or non;+uslims, reasons for bullying mainly revolved around their appearance.
Some +uslims indicated that their bullies had specifically marked them out for ill
treatment.
$)$
Brevalence of involvement in bullying as a perpetrator was less common than
victimisation, although +uslim youths were more likely to say that they had
bullied another person in the last year.
(n some instances this bullying was reported to be racist, mostly against someone
who spoke a different language. Aowever, the main reasons given by +uslim
youths for bullying others was because it was part of an ongoing dispute or
argument, or because they had acted in retaliation or self;defence.
Attitudes to&ards violence
Qiolence was mostly considered ,ustified in cases where it was used in self;
defence or to protect another person from harm. (t was far more rarely considered
,ustified if the violence was J,ust for fun or because someone had been sub,ect to
insults. (nterestingly, however, young people from +uslim backgrounds were far
more likely to support the use of violence Jalways in cases where someone had
insulted a persons religion or if it was needed to protect ones country.
?n the whole, +uslims in the U= sample were more likely to consider violence as
an acceptable response in certain situations than non;+uslims were. (n addition,
+uslims were more likely to agree that it was acceptable to use either war or
terrorism to solve the problems of the world N although it should be emphasised
that most respondents disagreed with these statements.
9:periences of violence
.eing a victim of violence was rarer than being a victim of bullying, but +uslims
were more likely to have experienced violence than non;+uslims.
#gain, +uslims who had experienced violence said the reasons were mainly racist
in nature, especially because of their skin colour and religion. #nother main
reason that they gave was that it was part of a Jgang fight or rivalry between
groups.
+uslim youths were also more likely to report being perpetrators of violence than
non;+uslim youths in the U=, although rates of violence overall were very low.
+ainly, they argued that the violence had been used in self;defence or to retaliate
against someone else.
(amily background and dynamics
he ma,ority of the U= sample were living with both birth parents, although this
proportion was higher for the +uslim respondents. ?therwise, the most common
arrangement was to be living only with a mother, although this was far higher for
the non;+uslims than the +uslims.
+ore than F in $8 young people from +uslim backgrounds said their parents had
been born in a different country, suggesting that they were mainly first generation.
his compared to only a third of the non;+uslims.
+ost of the respondents had fathers who were in employment. he non;+uslim
youths mainly had mothers in employment also, but this was far rarer for the
+uslim youths, most of whom said that their mother cared for the family full;
time. his indicates that the +uslim youths were from 6uite traditional cultural
backgrounds, as evidenced by their first generation status.
+ost young people said they argued with their parents about some things, the
most common being homework, friends, social activities and appearance.
$)7
Aowever, +uslim youths were more likely to argue with parents about their
religious or cultural beliefs and political issues.
(riends, friendship patterns and group activities
+ost young people in the U= sample had a wide social circle with many friends,
particularly at school, but also in their local neighbourhood. +uslims reported
having larger friendship groups overall, suggesting they were more likely to have
extended social networks.
.oth +uslim and non;+uslim youths mainly reported being friendly with same
sex friends, although this was most common for the +uslims.
he ma,ority of young people said that they had at least some friends who were
different to them in terms of cultural background, religion, skin colour and
language. Aowever, +uslims were twice as likely as non;+uslims to say that all
or most of their friends were from different backgrounds.
Barents were largely knowledgeable about friends, and accepting of friends from
different backgrounds, and there were no differences between +uslims and non;
+uslims on this measure.
+ost young people said that they had a certain group of friends that they
socialised with, although only around $ in $8 of these groups fell into the
definition of a Jgang, regardless of religious background.
+uslims were, however, more likely to regard their group as a Jgang, and to
indicate that the group had a gang name and was supportive of particular political
or religious issues.
he strength of the gangs identity was evidenced by the characteristics that
+uslims attributed to it N they were more likely to say that boys and girls had
different ascribed roles, that the group had recognised leaders, special codes or
values, ,oining re6uirements or code of dress.
he most common reasons for being in a group of friends were ,ust to hang out, to
make friends or for company. +uslims were more likely than non;+uslims,
however, to say that they ,oined the group for protection, to keep out of trouble, to
feel important and to belong to a Jterritory.
?verall, +uslims were more likely to report that being in their group provided
support, loyalty and protection and gave them, personally, a feeling of importance,
respect and status.
)chool e:perience
+ost of the U= sample showed a high degree of commitment and attachment to
school, and a belief that it was important to do well.
his degree of commitment was e6ual for +uslims and non;+uslims, despite the
fact that +uslims were more likely to have been excluded from school and to have
had more fre6uent periods of exclusion.
)pare time activities
# high proportion of young people in the U= sample said they would hang around
the streets, either in their local area or in other areas. +uslims were as likely to do
so as non;+uslims, although they tended to do so less fre6uently. +uslims also
expressed a preference for hanging about in their local area rather than other areas,
further away, suggesting some degree of territoriality.
$)-
+ostly young people gave positive views on their neighbourhoods, and this was
especially true for the +uslim respondents, although they were more likely to say
that safety was a problem in their areas.
Ooung people tended to spend a large amount of time doing things with their
parents, especially at the weekends. #s reflects earlier findings in this section,
however, +uslims spent more time on average with parents than non;+uslims,
especially at the weekends.
here was also a tendency for young people to spend considerable amounts of
spare time with friends, again more commonly at the weekends. ?verall,
however, +uslims reported spending more time with parents, whereas non;
+uslims reported spending far more time with friends.
he only activity that +uslims reported being more likely to do with friends than
non;+uslims was going to a place of worship together.
+ost young people reported spending at least some time on the internet in their
spare time. 4ates of internet use were higher for non;+uslim youths during the
week, but the gap closed at the weekend.
(nternet usage suggested some differences in preferred modes of communication
between +uslims and non;+uslims. @on;+uslims preferred social networking
sites, whereas +uslims were more likely to use email and chatrooms. hey were
also more likely to visit religious sites, although this was fairly rare.
Oouths in the U= sample expressed a general lack of interest in national political
matters, although most did believe that world events did affect their lives to some
degree.
;ivic participation and citizenship
@on;muslims were more likely to indicate that they would be likely to take action
if a favourite park was going to be sacrificed for the building of new homes, while
+uslims were more likely to be unsure of whether the would take action or not.
+ost young people were involved in some kind of extracurricular activity. (n the
case of non;+uslims, this was mainly recreational groups and after;school clubs*
whereas, +uslims were more likely to be involved in youth club or a religious or
faith group.
$)G
CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS
his report has presented the findings from a cross;national study of experiences of
and attitudes to racism and social marginalisation amongst young people aged $7 to
$F from three EU member states. # key aim of the report was to represent the views
of both +uslim and non;+uslim respondents in order to start to investigate possible
reasons why some young people are more likely to get involved in violence, and
whether such involvement might potentially indicate support for the use of extremist
or radicalised violence amongst +uslim youths in particular. his concluding chapter
draws together the results of the four substantive chapters in this report that describe
the demographic characteristics of the samples and present the main findings from the
surveys carried out in %rance, Spain and the U=.
?n the whole the demographic characteristics of the samples are somewhat different,
most probably due to the different sampling schemes that were re6uired and the
differential nature of the schools and colleges included in the survey. %or example,
the %rench sample was slightly older than the other two and the U= sample had more
males than females. o a large extent this was unavoidable, and can be rectified
using corrective weighting, which is recommended before further analysis is
conducted. Employment patterns amongst the respondents parents indicate some
level of difference between the samples, which may be cultural or may be indicative
of differential levels of affluence. his re6uires further investigation. School;based
measures indicate that the %rench sample was substantially more deprived than the
other two, however.
@ot surprisingly, the three member states presented very different cultural profiles and
different levels of strength of association to their country of residence. +any people
indicated that they felt part of more than one cultural background, however, which
may be reflective of a wider trend of Europeanisation. &espite attempts to ensure that
the sample had e6ual proportions of +uslim and non;+uslim respondents, this was
not possible due to the highly geographically dispersed nature of +uslim households
in the three member states and the relatively low levels compared to other cultural
backgrounds. Aowever, this again can be rectified using corrective weighting.
(nterestingly, the non;+uslim component of each sample N especially %rance and the
U= N comprised young people who had not religious affiliation. #t some later date,
this re6uires much further investigation. Strength of religious belief varied
enormously and is clearly culturally centred. Sources of religious teaching also
varied, but religious leaders were said to be the primary source of information for
only around $ in F respondents. Strength of support for the (slamic premise that truth
is found only in one religion was greatest in Spain, which may indicate that this
member state contains the highest concentration of devout +uslims, but again this
re6uires further investigation.
# key aim of this investigation was to determine whether +uslim youths may
experience greater levels of alienation, social marginalisation and anxiety than those
from non;+uslim backgrounds. ?verall, young people from all three member states
reported feeling either very or fairly happy with their lives at the moment. here were
some differences in the samples* for example, the %rench +uslim respondents were
more likely than non;+uslims to report being very happy, while the U= +uslim
respondents were more likely to be undecided. Aowever, on the whole, the picture
$))
was one of general happiness. !orrespondingly, almost all respondents reported
having someone that they could confide in if they had personal matters to discuss.
#cross all three member states, young people most commonly confided in friends or
parents, with +uslim youths being more likely to confide in parents than friends
compared to non;+uslims. his reflected a general tendency for +uslim youth to
spend more of their spare time socialising with their parents and siblings than non;
+uslims, although they also spent considerable time with friends and peers. ?verall,
feelings of alienation or social re,ection were low amongst these three samples*
however, there were some cultural differences. %rench +uslims reported feeling less
alienated than non;+uslims, but the reverse was true for the U= +uslims.
Ooung people across all three member states expressed a high level of concern about
current global issues and world security. (n almost all cases, the +uslim youths were
more likely to express concern about terrorism, racism and cultural conflict, whereas
non;+uslim youths were more likely to say they were worried about environmental
matters and the state of the economy. Mhen it came to matters of trust, young people
tended to feel most secure in trusting those closest to them, including friends and
parents* whereas they expressed the highest levels of distrust in public institutions,
and politicians in particular. ?n the whole, young people in all three member states
felt the world was a less safe place than it used to be, indicating a general level of
ontological insecurity permeating young peoples lives. he degree to which it
affected them personally was low, however, ,udging by the relatively low levels of
marginalisation expressed by respondents.
+ost of those included in this survey indicated that they had not been discriminated
against or picked on directly. Aowever, in all three member states +uslim youths
were more likely to say they had experienced discrimination than non;+uslims.
Mhat is more, this was largely perceived to be due to their cultural background,
religion or skin colour in all three ,urisdictions. @on;+uslims tended to give other
reasons for being picked on, including their appearance, a disability or their
behaviour. Brevalence of direct discrimination by adults against groups of youths
were also relatively uncommon* although, again +uslims reported higher levels of
unfair treatment than non;+uslims. Qery few of the respondents indicated that they
had been unfairly treated by adults, and this was especially true for +uslims. hose
who did feel they had been treated worse by teachers did indicate some degree of
racism, although this was less common than some other reasons. 4ates of exclusion
differed markedly across the member states. (n Spain there was no difference
between +uslims and non;+uslims, whereas in %rance rates for +uslims were lower
and in the U= exclusion rates for +uslims were higher compared to non;+uslims.
4ates of victimisation by bullying in Spain and %rance were fairly low, although
around two thirds of the U= sample said they had experienced some form of bullying
in the previous year. here was no difference between +uslims and non;+uslims in
rates of bullying in the U= or Spain, although the %rench +uslims were less likely to
be victimised than other groups. +uch of this bullying in the U= was attributed to
racist reasons amongst +uslims, while for non;+uslims it appeared to be largely
related to appearance and being seen as Jdifferent. 4ates of bullying others were also
low in Spain and %rance, and were higher in the U=, although lower than rates of
victimisation. #gain, no difference emerged between +uslim and other respondents
in %rance and Spain. (n the U=, however, +uslims were more likely to report that
$)9
they had bullied someone else. he main reasons give were that the bullying was
part of an ongoing dispute or argument, or because they had acted in retaliation or
self;defence.
4esponses to the survey in all three member states indicated that young people felt it
was at least sometimes ,ustifiable to use violence in the event that a person was
defending either themselves or another person, while it was far less ,ustifiable to use
violence ,ust for fun. hese responses did not create too much disparity between the
+uslim and non;+uslim respondents. Aowever, there was some considerable
difference when they were asked whether violence was acceptable in order to protect
ones country or if someone insulted a persons religion. hese two positions were far
more vehemently accepted as ,ustifiable by the +uslim respondents in Spain and the
U=, although less so in %rance. here was a general level of pacifism amongst the
samples, however, as very few respondents in any of the member states agreed that it
was ,ustifiable to use either war or terrorism to solve the problems of the world. (n
Spain, +uslims were not more likely to agree with this, but did tend to be more
undecided. (n %rance, +uslim youths were more likely to agree with the statement
about terrorism, but not about war more generally. Mhile in the U=, +uslim youths
were more likely than non;+uslims to agree with both statements.
1ike bullying, very few of the respondents in %rance or Spain reported experiencing
an incident of physical violence in the last year. (n %rance, +uslim youths were less
likely to report being victims than other groups* whereas, in Spain and the U=
+uslim youths were more likely to say they had been a victim of violence than non;
+uslims. he same was true for perpetrating physical violence. ?nce again, the
most common reasons for victimisation were due to racism, although another
common reason was that the individual had been caught up in a gang fight or rivalry
between neighbouring groups. Mhereas, violence against others perpetrated by
+uslims was largely said to have been done in self;defence or in retaliation.
hese findings start to indicate some clear differences between the samples in Spain,
%rance and the U= which deserve further investigation. his report goes some ways
towards doing that by exploring the background, relationships, and activities of the
youths included in the survey. Starting with family background, we found that most
of the respondents in all three member states were living with their birth mother and
father, especially those from +uslim backgrounds. # fairly low proportion of the
young people from +uslim backgrounds in Spain, %rance and the U= said their
parents had been born in that member state* whereas, non;+uslim youths were most
likely to have parents born in their country of residence. +ost young people reported
that their fathers were in employment, although unemployment was higher amongst
males from minority ethnic groups. +uslims tended also to have mothers who were
not working but were instead looking after the family. his pattern was reflected in
all three member states, suggesting that the same very traditional gender roles are
common across European states. Ooung people did report a relatively high degree of
conflict with their parents, but this tended to be over rather ordinary, mundane matters
such as homework, friends, leisure activities and appearance. +uslim youths were
more likely to argue with parents about their religious or cultural beliefs and political
issues, however.
$):
%riendship patterns showed remarkable similarity across the three samples. Ooung
people were largely sociable and had large friendship groups, both at school and in
their local neighbourhoods. +uslims were more likely than non;+uslims to report
having greater numbers of friends in the local neighbourhood, particularly in %rance
and the U=. +uslims were also more likely to have same sex friends, whereas non;
+uslims had a bigger mixture of male and female friends. #cross all three member
states, the ma,ority of the respondents indicated that at least some of their friends
were from different religious or cultural backgrounds to them* although, +uslim
youths appeared to have the most culturally diverse groups of friends, as they were
most likely to say that all or some of their friends were different from them. +ost
young people reported that their parents knew all or some of their friends, and that
they were largely approving of friends from diverse cultural backgrounds. #round $
in $8 young people from %rance and the U= were found to have groups of friends that
conformed to the Eurogang definition of a Jgang, while the proportion was less in
Spain. (nterestingly, the U= sample indicated that perceived membership of a gang
had particular significance for +uslim youths as they were more likely than non;
+uslims to indicate that being part of a structured, organised gang gave them the
reassurance of having friends who would offer support, loyalty and protection and
gave them a sense of importance, respect and status. (t is not clear whether this was
also true in %rance and Spain.
School experience was generally similar across all three member states. he ma,ority
of young people agreed that doing well at school was important and that they
were highly committed to school, regardless of religious background. #s
indicated above, few perceived themselves to be treated worse than other
students by teachers. 1evels of exclusion from school were not extensively
high* however, +uslim respondents in both Spain and the U= were more likely
to report being excluded from school than non;+uslim groups* although the
reverse was true for the %rench sample.
?ne of the most common leisure activities reported by young people in studies of
youth is hanging around the streets or other public places. his survey was no
exception. # high proportion in all three member states said that they would hang
about the streets, either in their own local area or in another place, at least some days
a week. here was no difference between groups in the %rench sample, although the
Spanish and U= surveys indicated that +uslims tended to hang about the streets less
fre6uently than non;+uslims. # series of 6uestions about the characteristics of their
local neighbourhoods found some interesting differences in the samples, which may
underpin some other findings reported here. he %rench sample expressed
conflicting reports about their neighbourhoods, as places where people were willing to
help each other but also places where there were gangs and low levels of safety. he
Spanish survey found no differences between +uslims and other groups in terms of
their perceptions of the neighbourhood* whereas, the U= sample found that +uslim
respondents were more satisfied in general with their areas than non;+uslims,
although they did agree that safety was a problem.
(n terms of the way in which young people reported spending their time, most young
people reported spending a moderate number of hours doing positive things with their
parents during the week, with the amount of time increasing at the weekends.
/enerally speaking, most of the respondents reported spending a greater number of
$)F
hours doing things with friends, however, especially at weekends. #cross the three
member states, the +uslim respondents spent a greater degree of time with parents
than friends compared to the non;+uslim respondents. %or this reason, non;+uslim
respondents were more likely to report engaging in almost every type of activity with
friends compared to +uslim youths, with the exception of going to a place of
worship. +uslims were also more likely to visit religious sites on the internet,
although this was one of the least fre6uently mentioned sites visited. +ostly, young
people targeted social networking and communications sites, games, music, videos
and other forms of entertainment. (nterestingly, the U= sample showed that +uslims
used email and chatrooms to communicate, whereas non;+uslims preferred social
networking spaces.
he impact of global issues on young peoples lives is not something that has
attracted a great deal of research, and yet it could be crucial to understanding how
they make decisions about their future. +any respondents across the three member
states indicated that their lives were not directly affected by the social issues affecting
the world today and few expressed a strong interest in national politics. @evertheless,
when asked what action they would take if a favourite park was to close, most
indicated that they would be motivated to take some for of action or register their
protest in some manner. # very large proportion, especially amongst the +uslim
respondent, indicated that they were unsure what they would do, however. #t a more
personal level, young people did indicate their involvement in civic participation and
citizenship to some degree as the ma,ority were involved in some kind of extra;
curricular club or group activity. (n %rance, Spain and the U=, +uslim respondents
were more likely to be involved in a religious or faith group* whereas, non;+uslims
were more likely to be involved in sports clubs.
?verall, these findings have shown remarkable consistency across the three member
states, but also some intriguing differences which merit further study and exploration.
(n particular, the next step of analysis should be to determine whether some of the
most interesting findings, in terms of attitudes to and experiences of violence, are
explicable by some of the underlying factors measured in this survey or whether they
are due to other reasons. his will re6uire multivariate analysis to assess the potential
explanatory relationship between issues such as feelings of alienation, experience of
discrimination, perceptions of racism and attitudes towards violence. %urther
bivariate analysis should also rely on weighted samples, in order to redress the
imbalance that was caused by differential sampling and variation in the underlying
populations.
$)>
CHAPTER 9 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
his report ends with some tentative policy recommendations based on the findings
presented here. his list of recommendations is not exhaustive, but it does indicate
the range of areas in which policies might be targeted and present some practical
measures for change to impact on young peoples lives. Me recognise that further
work needs to be done to identify links between experiences of racism and social
marginalisation on the one hand and attitudes that may be supportive of extremist
violence on the other. Aowever, these policy recommendations represent a place to
start, which can be built on with further research.
Islamaphobia
o address perceptions of discrimination 2including racism and (slamaphobia3
ensure that policies exist at the school and community level to reassure young
+uslims that such practices should not be tolerated and invest in local, national
and voluntary organisations already involved in this type of work.
Criminal 1ustice
Oouth activities such as hanging around are often seen as policing problems,
particularly when they affect local communities. Aowever, national police forces
should re;appraise the way they deal with minority ethnic groups, particularly
those young people who congregate within local communities in large groups.
Brevious research has indicated that such behaviour is largely due to fears about
personal safety. his study suggests that such concerns may be even more
strongly elevated amongst groups of +uslim youths, who may be more likely to
be both victims and perpetrators of violence, and who use the group identity not
only for status but for protection.
Political Inclusion
his study suggests that young people are disengaged from politics at both the
global and the national level. #t the local level, young people may attempt to
register their feelings or participate in activities for the benefit of the community*
however, many young people are uncertain of how to do this. hese feelings of
impotence are particularly strong amongst +uslim youths, who may feel
dissociated from communities more generally. herefore, there is a need to
encourage minority ethnic groups, particularly youth groups, to participate in
local and national politics in order to develop a sense of political and civic
belonging.
Education
o secure feelings of belonging and to promote participation, ensure that
+uslims are not discriminated against at the specific level of social institutions,
particularly in terms of school exclusion policies, and attempt to understand the
reasons behind differential behaviour on the part of +uslim youth.
$98
4e;evaluate school violence policies, particularly related to bullying and
expressive violence, and take into consideration the much greater experiences of
racially motivated violence amongst young people from +uslim and other
minority ethnic backgrounds.
&evelop teacher training and professional development to incorporate exploration
of the extent and effects of discriminatory attitudes held and applied by teachers,
parents and pupils. he material used should be routinely reviewed by an
independent body comprising +uslim, other faith and non religious
representatives to ensure it is up to date and fit for purpose.
eachers, or appointed schools person, should act as facilitators to develop
sensitivity and understanding towards +uslim needs within the school, such as
the timing and strains of +uslim celebrations, and their impact on pupils.
Mork towards a programme of education that includes a wider variation in global
issues and develop policies that ensure discrimination on the basis of race and
culture is considered alongside other factors, such as gender and age, as a
fundamental aspect of such studies.
Poverty and social exclusion
he +uslim respondents in %rance and the U=, in particular, appear to be above
the national average in terms of socio;economic disadvantage. /iven the high
degree of geographical clustering of such communities, this suggests a wider
social problem that needs to be addressed by governments. Aigher levels of
poverty are likely to compound issues around social exclusion and
marginalisation amongst youth +uslims, and therefore need to be addressed as a
matter of urgency.
Citizenship and Integration
EU +ember States should debate and develop a coordinated approach to
regenerating debates and understanding about integration, national identity, and
citizenship. ?ne step towards this might be to establish an EU symposium with
experts from a range of countries to discuss what has been learned from existing
practice and research, and where the most promising routes for the future lie for
EU states.
$9$
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and 5enophobia in the +ember States of the EU. %4#, Qienne 2#ustria3. $9) Bp.
%alaize .enoRt, 788:, 9nseigner l8histoire de l8immigration > l8<cole, 4apport
den6ukte. Baris, (@4B.
%assin &idier, 7887, a 1hinvention franUaise de la discrimination b, Revue franGaise
de science politique 2)7;G3, p. G8-;G7-.
%elouzis /eorges, Berroton 0ollle, 1iot %ranUoise, 788), -8Apartheid scolaire.
9nqu@te sur la s<gr<gation ethnique dans les coll?ges. Baris, Seuil.
%ern\ndez 4ios, 1. 2788:3< 1as raices del terrorismo< de la psicologYa de la
multicausalidad a la psicologYa de la ignorancia. 7sicologLa conductual, Qol. $)
@o $. Bp. $$-;$7F.
%itoussi 0ean;Baul, 1aurent Eloi, +aurice 0oll, 788G, )<gr<gation urbaine et
int<gration sociale, 4apport 2G)3 du !onseil dhanalyse Kconomi6ue, Baris, 1a
documentation franUaise
%?S(S 2788:3 Attitudes and perceptions of Mritish "uslim students follo&ing the
-ondon attacks on =uly 2th A//N he +uslim Student Survey< he voice of
+uslim students
$9-
%ranchi Qi,K, 788G, a Brati6ues de discrimination et vKcu de la violence des
professionnels en contexte ethnicisK b, Jille 9cole Int<gration Diversit< 2$-:3, p.
77;-$.
%raser @ancy, 788), OuIestce que la justice sociale C Reconnaissance et
redistribution. Baris, 1a &Kcouverte.
/alembert, !laire de, 7889, a Une action publi6ue en 6ukte de normes < la gestion
publi6ue de lhislam b, in 1ionel #rnaud, !hristian 1e .art, 4omain Bas6uier, dirs.,
Id<ologies et action publique territoriale. 4ennes, BU4, p. 77>;7G9.
/E1& 2/roupe dhKtude et de lutte contre les discriminations3, 788$, -es
Discriminations raciales et ethniques dans lIacc?s au logement social, non publiK.
/eneral 4egister for Scotland 2788$3
/olden, S 2788F3 @ational !ensus of 1ocal #uthority !ouncillors
/uiraudon Q., 788G, a !onstruire une politi6ue europKenne de lutte contre les
discriminations < lhhistoire de la directive mracem b, )oci<t<s contemporaines 2)-3,
p. $$;-7.
/utiKrrez, 0. #.* 0ord\n, 0. and ru,illo, A. 2788F3< Brevenci[n de la radicalizaci[n
yihadista en las prisiones espaZolas. Situaci[n actual, retos y disfunciones del
sistema penitenciario. Athena Intelligence. Qol. -, @o. $. Bp. $7. !onsulted 278
+ay 8F3 in www.athenaintelligence.org
Aaenni Batrick, 7889, -a (rance face > ses musulmansF Pmeutes, jihadisme et
d<politisation. (nternational !risis /roup, ME..
Aernando de 1arramendi, +. 2788$3< "(m\genes del (slam en la EspaZa de hoy'. (n<
+artY 0.+ P !atal\ S. 2eds.3< El (slam en EspaZa. Aistoria, pensamiento, religi[n y
derecho. !olecci[n Estudios, Universidad de !astilla; 1a +ancha, !uenca. Bp. 9-;
:).
Aome ?ffice 2788G3 !rime in England and Males 788-C788G &odd, * @icholas, S.
Bovey, &, Malker , # Statistical .ulletin, @ational Statistics 788G
Aome ?ffice, Statistics on 4ace and the !riminal 0ustice System, 788G
(nternational +igration 278893 Series +@ no. --
0enkins 4ichard, 7888, "!ategorization< (dentity, Social process and epistemology',
;urrent )ociology 2GF;-3, p. :;7).
0obard %abien, 7887, Mavures polici?res C -a force publique et ses usages. Baris, 1a
&Kcouverte.
0obard %abien, @evanen Sophie, 788:, a 1a couleur du ,ugement. &iscriminations
dans les dKcisions ,udiciaires en matiWre dhinfractions ` agents de la force
publi6ue b, Revue franGaise de sociologie 2GF;73, p. 7G-;7:7.
0ord\n, 0. 2788G3< Bosibles consecuencias de los atentados de +adrid. Real Instituto
9lcano, @o. G8C788G. Bp. ) .!onsulted 2$8 0une 788F3 at
www.realinstitutoelcano.org
0ord\n, 0. and +aZas, %. +. 2788:3< External Signs of 4adicalization and 0ihadist
+ilitancy. =ihad "onitor 5ccasional 7aper @o. G. > pp. !onsulted 2- 0une 788F3
at http<CCwww.,ihadmonitor.org
=akpo @athalie, 788:, -Iislam, un recours pour les jeunes. Baris, Bresses de
Sciences po.
=epel, /., 7888, =ihad F e:pansion et d<clin de l8islamisme, Baris, /allimard.
=epel, /., 788G, (itna F 6uerre au cQur de l8islam, Baris, %lamarion.
=hedimallah +oussa, 788$, a 0eunes prKdicateurs de mouvement abligh. 1a
dignitK identitaire retrouvKe par le puritanisme religieux b, )ocioAnthropologie
2$83, en ligne.
$9G
=hosrokhavar %arhad, $>>:, -Iislam des jeunes. Baris, %lammarion.
=hosrokhavar, %., 7887, -es nouveau: martyrs d8Allah, Baris, %lammarion.
=hosrokhavar, %., 7889, Ouand Al Oaeda parle R $<moignages derri?re les
bareau:, Baris, /rasset.
1agrange Augues, ?berti +arco, dirs., 7889, 9meutes urbaines et protestations.
*ne singularit< franGaise. Baris, Bresses de Sciences po.
1aurence 0onathan, QaLsse 0ustin, 788), Integrating IslamF 7olitical And Religious
;hallenges in ;ontemporary (rance. .rookings (nstitution Bress.
1e /oaziou QKroni6ue, +ucchielli 1aurent, dirs., 7889, Ouand les banlieues
brSlent... Retour sur les <meutes de novembre A//N. Baris, 1a &Kcouverte.
-iving apart togetherF Mritish "uslims and the parado: of multiculturalism, Bolicy
Exchange, 788:
1orcerie %ranUoise, 7888, a 1a lutte contre les discriminations ou lhintKgration
re6ualifiKe b, J9I 9njeu: 2$7$3, p. 9>;F$.
1orcerie %ranUoise, 788), a Huand lislam revendi6ue la laLcitK b, Jille 9cole
Int<gration R Diversit< 2$G73, p. ):;9F.
1orcerie %ranUoise, 788:, a 1e primordialisme franUais, ses voies, ses fiWvres b, in
+arie;!laude Smouts, dir. -a )ituation postcoloniale, Baris, Bresses de Science
po, p. 7>F;-G-.
1orcerie %ranUoise, dir., 788-, -89cole et le d<fi ethnique. Immigration et
int<gration. Baris ES% et (@4B 27
Wme
et -
Wme
parties3.
1orcerie %ranUoise, dir., 788), -a 7olitisation du voile R en (rance, en 9urope et
dans le monde arabe. Baris, 1Aarmattan.
1orcerie %ranUoise, 4nmhild .enkaaba =atrine, ietze @icola, 788:, a Bolitisation
autour de lislam et lKgitimation des ordres politi6ues nationaux en Europe. Une
comparaison %rance, &anemark, #llemagne b, in %ranUois %oret, dir., -89space
public europ<en > l8<preuve du religieu:. .ruxelles, Editions de lUniversitK de
.ruxelles, p. $:>;789.
1ozano, #. and Etxebarria, (. 2788:3< 1a tolerancia a la diversidad en los
adolescentes y su relaci[n con la autoestima, la empatYa y el concepto del ser
humano. Infancia y Aprendizaje, -8 2$3. Bp.$8>;$7>
1uengo, +. #. 2788:3< !uestionario autoinformado sobre percepciones adolescentes.
Bp.$-.
+anUo, #. 2788)3< /ood cities, good practices< systematization of a theoretical and
methodological framework for local actions designed to combat religious
discrimination. "igration -etters, Qol. 7 @o.-, &ecember 788). Bp. $F>;7$-.
+asood 278893 .ritish +uslims< +edia /uide, .ritish council
+artYn +uZoz, /. 2788-3< "arroquies en 9spaTa. 9studio sobre su integraciUn.
%undaci[n 4epsol. $>F pp.
+cBherson Milliam 21ord3, $>>>, $he )tephen -a&rence Inquiry, Report of an
Inquiry by )ir Billiam "acpherson of ;luny, 7resented to 7arliament by the
#ome )ecretary
+inistry of (nterior affairs, +inistry of 0ustice and +inistry of 1abor +arket and
social affairs 2788:3< 1a comunidad musulmana de origen inmigrante en EspaZa
788:. )7pp. !onsulted 2- 0une 788F3 at www.mir.es
+inistry of 0ustice 2788F3 Statistics on 4ace and the !riminal 0ustice System N
7889C: +inistry of 0ustice A +inistry of 0ustice Bublication under Section >) of
the !riminal 0ustice #ct $>>$, 0uly 788F
+odood, and Shiner, + Aigher education and the route to ethnic e6uality Mritish
$9)
=ournal of )ociology of 9ducation, 7887
+odood, . 2788-3 J+uslims and the politics of difference, 7olitical Ouarterly,
:G2$3, $88N$).
+ontero /[mez, #. 2788-3< Una Aip[tesis psicol[gica sobre los correlatos
neurocognitivos de la violencia sistem\tica del terrorismo. In ,ournal<
BsicopatologYa !lYnica 1egal y %orense. Qol.-, no. $. Bp. F:;>>.
+?4( 27889C788:3 Bublic #ttitudes towards !ohesion and (ntegration< +?4(
polling for the !ommission 2788:3
+?4( 2788:3 +oung 7eople and Mritish Identity 4esearch !onducted for the
!amelot foundation by (psos +ori 2788:3
h+uslim Aousing Experienceh, ?xford !entre for (slamic Studies
@ational Statistics 278883 1abour %orce Survey
@avas, +.* /arcYa, !.* S\nchez, 0., Bumares, B. et al 2788)3< 4elative #cculturation
Extended +odel 24#E+3< @ew contributions with regard to the study of
acculturation. International =ournal of Intercultural Relations, 7>. Bp. 7$;-:.
!onsulted 2$: +ay 788F3 at www.sciencedirect.com
@ew Boverty (nstitute 2788F3. he Boverty site with the 0oseph 4owntree
%oundation accessed 78C$$C8F at http<CCwww.poverty.org.ukCindex.htm
?bin 0ean;Bierre, 788G, -es signes et manifestations dIappartenance religieuse dans
les <tablissements scolaires. 4apport non publiK par le ministWre de lEducation
nationale * repris dans !ol., -I9cole face > lIobscurantisme religieu:. +ax +ilo,
7889
?ffice for @ational Statistics 2788$3 @ational !ensus 4eligion in .ritain, 1ondon<.
?ffice for @ational Statistics 278873 Social %ocus in .rief< Ethnicity 7887 edited by
Mhite, #
?ffice of @ational Statistics 2788-3.
Bayet 0ean;Baul, $>>F, a 1a sKgrKgation scolaire < une perspective sociologi6ue sur
la violence ` lhKcole b, Revue franGaise de 7<dagogie 2$7-3, p. 7$;-G.
Bayet, 0.B., 7887, a 1ethnicitK, cest les autres b, Jille, Pcole, Int<gration, Aors;
sKrie ni9, &Kcembre 7887, p. ));9G.
Beach, ! 2$>>$3 Ethnicity in the $>>$ !ensus Qol 7 A+S?
BKrez;&iaz, Q.* #lvarez; +iranda, .. and !huli\, E. 2788G3< 1a inmigraci[n
musulmana en Europa. urcos en #lemania, argelinos en %rancia y marro6uYes en
EspaZa. %undaci[n mla !aixam. Bp. 7$$;7:$.
Berroton 0ollle, 7888, a 1es ambiguLtKs de lhethnicisation des relations scolaires <
lhexemple des relations Kcole;familles ` travers la mise en place dhun dispositif de
mKdiation b, J9I 9njeu: 2$7$3, dossier a 1hUniversel rKpublicain ` lhKpreuve.
&iscrimination, ethnicisation, sKgrKgation b, p. $-8;$G:.
Beter 4. @eumann and .rooke 4ogers 2788:3 Recruitment and "obilisation for the
Islamist "ilitant "ovement in 9urope # study carried out by =ings !ollege
1ondon for the European !ommission 2&irectorate /eneral 0ustice, %reedom and
Security3.
Boiret !hristian, $>>9, (amilles africaines en (rance. 9thnisation, s<gr<gation et
communalisation. Baris, !(E+(;1Aarmattan.
Boiret !hristian, 7888, a 1a construction de lhaltKritK ` lhKcole de la 4Kpubli6ue b,
J9I 9njeu: 2$7$3, dossier a 1hUniversel rKpublicain ` lhKpreuve. &iscrimination,
ethnicisation, sKgrKgation b, p. $GF;$::.
4einares, %. 278893<o!oinciden el gobierno y los ciudadanos en 6uK medidas
adoptar contra el terrorismo internacionalD. Revista Real Instituto 9lcano, :F. Bp.
$99
). !onsulted 2- 0une 8F3 at www.realinstitutoelcano.org
4enan Ernest, $>G:, Kd. or. $FF7, Huest;ce 6uune nation D, Vuvres compl?tes, vol.
$, Baris, !almann;1Kvy, p. FF:;>89.
4ing, 0 and +orgentau, S 2788)3 IntoleranceF Antisemitic, homophobic,
islamaphobic and antiimmigration tendencies among young people 1iving
Aistory %orum Stockholm.
4oy ?livier, 788), -a -aWcit< face > l8islam. Baris, Stock.
4oy, ?., 788-, "Euro(slam < he ,ihad Mithin', $he %ational Interest, Spring 788-,
p.9-;:-.
4ushdie, S. 2$>F>3 $he )atanic Jerses, 1ondon< Qintage.
Saeed, #., .lain, @. and %orbes, &. 2$>>>3 J@ew ethnic and national 6uestions in
Scotland< post;.ritish identities among /lasgow Bakistani teenagers, 9thnic and
Racial )tudies, 772)3, F7$NGG.
Save the !hildren 2788:3 J1iving below the radar* severe child poverty in the U=
.riefing.
Scottish !rime Survey O?U@/ BE?B1E #@& !4(+E (@ S!?1#@&<
%(@&(@/S %4?+ AE 7888 S!?(SA !4(+E SU4QEO
Scottish Executive 2788$3 &epartment of Aealth !hildren 1ooked #fter in England
7888C8$ .ulletin 788$C79* Scottish Executive, !hild Brotection Statistics year
ending -$
st
+arch 7888* &epartment of Aealth and Social Services, !ommunity
Statistics, 7888C788$
Seddon, +., Aussain, &. and +alik, @. 2788G3 .ritish +uslims .etween
#ssimilation and Segregation, +arkfield< he (slamic %oundation.
Silke, #. 2788F3< Aoly Marriors. Exploring the Bsychological Brocesses of 0ihadi
4adicalization. In European 0ournal of !riminology, Qol. ). Bp. >>;$7-.
Slootman +. P illie, 0. 278893< Brocesses of 4adicalization. Mhy some #msterdam
+uslims became radicals. (nstitute for +igration and Ethnic Studies, Univ.
#msterdam, #msterdam. $7> Bp.
Smith, &.0., +cQie, S., Moodward, 4., Shute, 0., %lint, 0. and +c#ra, 1. 2788$3 $he
9dinburgh )tudy of +outh $ransitions and ;rimeF 'ey (indings at Ages 0A and 0X.
ES4! 4eport, published on the study website 2www.law.ed.ac.ukCclsCesytc3.
Spalek and El;Aassan, Aoward 0ournal of !riminal 0ustice, Qol. G9, @o. 7, pp. >>;
$$G, +ay 788:
Spalek, .. 2Ed.3 278873< (slam, !rime and !riminal 0ustice. 1ondon. Milliam
Bublishing. $GF pp.
Spalek, ..* +uncie, 0. P Milson, &. 2Eds.3 2788:3< (slam and !riminal 0ustice. In
Student Aandbook of !riminal 0ustice and !riminology. !avendish. Bp. $7-; $-$.
Stasi .ernard 2prKs.3, 788G, Rapport de la ;ommission de r<fle:ion sur l8application
du principe de laWcit< dans la R<publique, Baris, 1a &ocumentation franUaise
ellegen, #. 2$>F73. Mrief "anual for the "ultidimensional 7ersonality
Ouestionnaire. +inneapolis< University of +inesota.
ernisien, 5., 7887, -a (rance des mosqu<es, #lbin +ichel, Baris
he !hange (nstitute 2788F3 )tudies into violent radicalisationY -ot A $he beliefs
ideologies and narratives, A study carried out by the ;hange Institute for the
9uropean ;ommission 2&irectorate /eneral 0ustice, %reedom and Security3.
%ebruary 788F, he !hange (nstitute, 1ondon.
he /overnment E6ualities ?ffice %actsheet 2788:3 Ethic +inority Momen in the
U=
$9:
he (slamic Huarterly, 1ondon. Qolumes 55Q(((, @o. -, hird Huarter $>FG, hhe
#rabic contribution to Englishh b 4obert &evereux
$he "uslim %e&s JUnder Suspicion from !radle to /rave (ssue 7-G, %riday -$
?ctober 788F at http<CCwww.+uslimnews.co.ukCpaperCindex.phpDarticleE-:->
he Bew global #ttitudes pro,ect 278893< +uslims in Europe< Economic Morries
op !oncerns about 4eligious and !ulture (dentity. %ew Signs of .acklash from
Mestern Europeans. -: pp.
ietze @icola, 7887, =eunes musulmans de (rance et dIAllemagne F les
constructions subjectives de lIidentit<. Baris, 1Aarmattan.
odd, E., $>>G, -e destin des immigr<s, Assimilation et s<gr<gation dans les
d<mocraties occidentales, Seuil, Boints essais, Baris.
ribalat +ichWle et col., $>>9, De l8int<gration > l8assimilation. Baris (@E&C1a
&Kcouverte..astenier #lbert, 788G, Ou8estce qu8une soci<t< ethnique C 9thnicit<
et racisme dans les soci<t<s europ<ennes d8immigration. Baris, BU%.
ribalat +ichWle, $>>), (aire (rance. Baris, 1a &Kcouverte.
ribalat, +., $>>9, De l8immigration > l8assimilation, 9nqu@te sur les populations
d8origine <trang?res en (rance, 1a dKcouverteC(@E&, Baris.
ru,illo, A.* /onzalez; !abrera, 0.* 1e[n, !.* Qalenzuela, !. and +oyano, +.
278893< &e la agresividad a la violencia terrorista. Aistoria de una patologYa
piscosocial previsible. 7sicologLa conductual. Qol. $G @o. 7. Bp. 7:-;7FF.
!onsulted 2$: +ay 788F3 at www.athenaintelligence.org
urk, #. 2$>F73 7olitical ;riminalityF $he Defiance and defense of authority.
1ondon< Sage.
urk, #. 2788G3 Sociology of terrorism. Annual Revie& of )ociology -82$3< 7:$;7F9.
Ursano, 4. 0.* %ullerton, !. S. y @orwood, #. E.2Eds.3 2788-3< errorism and
&isaster. (ndividual and !ommunity mental Aealth (nterventions. !ambridge
University Bress. -G> pp.
Q.Q. #.#. 278893< !onocernos me,or para saber c[mo caminar. Estudio de
percepci[n de la poblaci[n inmigrante en la ciudad de /ranada. /ranadaXs council
ed., /ranada. >7 pp.
Qictoroff, 0. 2788)3< &raft of 6uestionnaire< (ntroduction to the ?ppression
Huestionnaire. Bolitical Bsychology 4esearch, (nc. $- pp.
Mindle 0oel, 788F, 9thnicity and 9ducational InequalityF An Investigation of )chool
9:perience in Australia and (rance. &octorate hesis, BhilosophyC Education,
University of +elbourne.
Ooung+uslimsSpeakBeace &irect, 7889
Oouth +atters< a report from +uslim Oouth Aelpline and the @ational !ouncil for
Qoluntary Oouth Services, 788) a response to the green paper
Vapata;.arrero, 4. 278893< "he +uslim community and Spanish tradition.
+aurophobia as a fact, and impartiality as a desideratum'. (n +odood, .,
riandafyllidou, #. and Vapata;.arrero, 4. +ulticulturalim, +uslims and
!itizenship. # European #pproach. 1ondon. 4outledge. Bp. $G-.
VKphir StKphane, 788:, Diff<rentes modalit<s de l8e:p<rience minoritaire dans
l8espace urbain d8une zone d8<ducation prioritaire F -es effets parado:au: d8une
action positive. hWse de sociologie, UniversitK de @ice.
$9F