Ask for More Than You Expect to Get by Roger Dawson

One of the cardinal rules of Power Negotiating is that you should ask the other side for more than you expect to get. Henry Kissinger went so far as to say, "Effecti eness at the conference ta!le depends upon o erstating one"s demands." #hink of some reasons why you should do this$ o %hy should you ask the store for a !igger discount than you think you ha e a chance of getting& o %hy should you ask your !oss for an executi e suite although you think you"ll !e lucky to get a pri ate office& o 'f you"re applying for a (o!, why should you ask for more money and !enefits than you think they"ll gi e you& o 'f you"re dissatisfied with a meal in a restaurant, why should you ask the captain to cancel the entire !ill, e en though you think they will take off only the charge for the offending item& 'f you"re a salesperson$ o %hy, if you are con inced that the !uyer wants to spread the !usiness around, should you still ask for it all& o %hy should you ask for full list price e en if you know it"s higher than the !uyer is paying now& o %hy should you ask the other person to in est in the top of the line e en when you"re con inced they"re so !udget conscious that they"ll ne er spend that much& o %hy should you assume that they"d want to !uy your extended ser ice warranty e en though you know they" e ne er done that in the past& 'f you thought a!out this, you pro!a!ly came up with a few good reasons to ask for more than you expect to get. #he o! ious answer is that it gi es you some negotiating room. 'f you"re selling, you can always come down, !ut you can ne er go up on price. 'f you"re !uying, you can always go up, !ut you can ne er come down. %hat you should !e asking for is your )PP*your maximum plausi!le position. #his is the most that you can ask for and still ha e the other side see some plausi!ility in your position. #he less you know a!out the other side, the higher your initial position should !e, for two reasons$ +. ,ou may !e off in your assumptions. 'f you don"t know the other person or his needs well, he may !e willing to pay more than you think. 'f he"s selling, he may !e willing to take far less than you think. -. 'f this is a new relationship, you will appear much more cooperati e if you"re a!le to make larger concessions. #he !etter you know the other person and his needs, the more you can modify your position. .on ersely, if the other side doesn"t know you, their initial demands may !e more outrageous.

'f you"re asking for far more than your maximum plausi!le position, imply some flexi!ility. 'f your initial position seems outrageous to the other person and your attitude is "take it or lea e it," you may not e en get the negotiations started. #he other person"s response may simply !e, "#hen we don"t ha e anything to talk a!out." ,ou can get away with an outrageous opening position if you imply some flexi!ility. 'f you"re !uying real estate directly from the seller, you might say, "' reali/e that you"re asking 0-11,111 for the property and !ased on e erything you know that may seem like a fair price to you. 2o perhaps you know something that ' don"t know, !ut !ased on all the research that '" e done, it seems to me that we should !e talking something closer to 0+31,111." 4t that the seller may !e thinking, "#hat"s ridiculous. '"ll ne er sell it for that, !ut he does seem to !e sincere, so what do ' ha e to lose if ' spend some time negotiating with him, (ust to see how high ' can get him to go&" 'f you"re a salesperson you might say to the !uyer, "%e may !e a!le to modify this position once we know your needs more precisely, !ut !ased on what we know so far a!out the 5uantities you"d !e ordering, the 5uality of the packaging and not needing (ust* in*time in entory, our !est price would !e in the region of 0-.-6 per widget." 4t that the other person will pro!a!ly !e thinking, "#hat"s outrageous, !ut there does seem to !e some flexi!ility there, so ' think '"ll in est some time negotiating with her and see how low ' can get her to go." 7nless you"re already an experienced negotiator, here"s the pro!lem you will ha e with this. ,our real )PP is pro!a!ly much higher than you think it is. %e all fear !eing ridiculed !y the other. 2o, we"re all reluctant to take a position that will cause the other person to laugh at us or put us down. 8ecause of this intimidation, you will pro!a!ly feel like modifying your )PP to the point where you"re asking for less than the maximum amount that the other person would think is plausi!le. 4nother reason for asking for more than you expect to get will !e o! ious to you if you"re a positi e thinker$ ,ou might (ust get it. ,ou don"t know how the uni erse is aligned that day. Perhaps your patron saint is leaning o er a cloud looking down at you and thinking, "%ow, look at that nice person. 2he"s !een working so hard for so long now, let"s (ust gi e her a !reak." 2o you might (ust get what you ask for and the only way you"ll find out is to ask for it. 'n addition, asking for more than you expect to get increases the percei ed alue of what you are offering. 'f you"re applying for a (o! and asking for more money than you expect to get, you implant in the personnel director"s mind the thought that you are worth that much. 'f you"re selling a car and asking for more than you expect to get, it positions the !uyer into !elie ing that the car is worth more. 4nother ad antage of asking for more than you expect to get is that it pre ents the negotiation from deadlocking. #ake a look at the Persian 9ulf %ar. %hat were we asking 2addam Hussein to do& :Perhaps asking is not exactly the right word.; President 9eorge 8ush, in his state of the 7nion address used a !eautiful piece of alliteration, pro!a!ly written !y Peggy Noonan, to descri!e our opening negotiating position. He said, "'"m not

!ragging, '"m not !luffing and '"m not !ullying. #here are three things this man has to do. He has to get out of Kuwait. He has to restore the legitimate go ernment of Kuwait :don"t do what the 2o iets did in 4fghanistan and install a puppet go ernment;. 4nd he has to make reparations for the damage that he"s done." #hat was a ery clear and precise opening negotiating position. #he pro!lem was that this was also our !ottom line. 't was also the least for which we were prepared to settle. No wonder the situation deadlocked. 't had to deadlock !ecause we didn"t gi e 2addam Hussein room to ha e a win. 'f we"d ha e said, "Okay. %e want you and all your cronies exiled. %e want a non*4ra! neutral go ernment installed in 8aghdad. %e want 7nited Nations super ision of the remo al of all military e5uipment. 'n addition, we want you out of Kuwait, the legitimate Kuwaiti go ernment restored and reparation for the damages that you did." #hen we could ha e gotten what we wanted and still gi en 2addam Hussein a win. ' know what you"re thinking. ,ou"re thinking, "<oger, 2addam Hussein was not on my .hristmas card list last year. He"s not the kind of guy ' want to gi e a win to." ' agree with that. Howe er, it creates a pro!lem in negotiation. 't creates deadlocks. =rom the Persian 9ulf scenario, you could draw one of two conclusions. #he first :and this is what <oss Perot might say; is that our 2tate >epartment negotiators are complete, !lithering idiots. %hat"s the second possi!ility& <ight. #hat this was a situation where we wanted to create a deadlock, !ecause it ser ed our purpose. %e had a!solutely no intention of settling for (ust the three things that 9eorge 8ush demanded in his state of the 7nion address. 9eneral 2chwar/kopf in his !iography It Doesn't Take a Hero said, "#he minute we got there, we understood that anything less than a military ictory was a defeat for the 7nited 2tates." %e couldn"t let 2addam Hussein pull 311,111 troops !ack across the !order, lea ing us wondering when he would choose to do it again. %e had to ha e a reason to go in and take care of him militarily. 2o, that was a situation where it ser ed our purpose to create a deadlock. %hat concerns me is that when you"re in ol ed in a negotiation, you are inad ertently creating deadlocks, !ecause you don"t ha e the courage to ask for more than you expect to get. 4 final reason*and it"s the reason Power Negotiators say that you should ask for more than you expect to get*is that it"s the only way you can create a climate where the other person feels that he or she won. 'f you go in with your !est offer up front, there"s no way that you can negotiate with the other side and lea e them feeling that they won. o #hese are the inexperienced negotiators always wanting to start with their !est offer. o #his is the (o! applicant who is thinking, "#his is a tight (o! market and if ' ask for too much money, they won"t e en consider me." o #his is the person who"s selling a house or a car and thinking, "'f ' ask too much, they"ll (ust laugh at me." o #his is the salesperson who is saying to her sales manager, "'"m going out on this !ig proposal today, and ' know that it"s going to !e competiti e. ' know that they"re getting !ids from people all o er town. ?et me cut the price up front or we won"t stand a chance of getting the order."

Power Negotiators know the alue of asking for more than you expect to get. 't"s the only way that you can create a climate in which the other side feels that he or she won. Let's recap the five reasons for asking for more than you expect to get: +. ,ou might (ust get it. -. 't gi es you some negotiating room. @. 't raises the percei ed alue of what you"re offering. A. 't pre ents the negotiation from deadlocking. 6. 't creates a climate in which the other side feels that he or she won. 'n highly pu!lici/ed negotiations, such as when the foot!all players or airline pilots go on strike, the initial demands that !oth sides make are a!solutely outlandish. ' remem!er !eing in ol ed in a union negotiation where the initial demands were un!elie a!ly outrageous. #he union"s demand was to triple the employees" wages. #he company"s opening was to make it an open shop*in other words, a oluntary union that would effecti ely destroy the union"s power at that location. Power Negotiators know that the initial demands in these types of negotiations are always extreme, howe er, so they don"t let it !other them. Power Negotiators know that as the negotiations progress, they will work their way toward the middle where they will find a solution that !oth sides can accept. #hen they can !oth call a press conference and announce that they won in the negotiations. 4n attorney friend of mine, Bohn 8roadfoot from 4marillo, #exas, tested this theory for me. He was representing a !uyer of a piece of real estate, and e en though he had a good deal worked out, he thought, "'"ll see how <oger"s rule of "4sking for )ore #han ,ou Expect to 9et," works." 2o, he dreamt up -@ paragraphs of re5uests to make of the seller. 2ome of them were a!solutely ridiculous. He felt sure that at least half of them would !e thrown out right away. #o his ama/ement, he found that the seller of the property took strong o!(ection to only one of the sentences in one of the paragraphs. E en then Bohn, as ' had taught him, didn"t gi e in right away. He held out for a couple of days !efore he finally and reluctantly conceded. 4lthough he had gi en away only one sentence in -@ paragraphs of re5uests, the seller still felt that he had won in the negotiation. 2o always lea e some room to let the other person ha e a win. Power Negotiators always ask for more than they expect to get. Roger Dawson is the author of two of Nightingale-Conant's best selling audiocassette programs, Secrets of Power Negotiating and Secrets of Power Negotiating for Salespeople. This article is e cerpted in part from Roger Dawson's new boo!-Secrets of Power Negotiating, published b" Career Press and on sale in boo!stores e#er"where for $%&.''.