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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Article III Bill of Rights I. Section 1 1. Purpose of the Bill of Rights 2. Three Great Powers of Government 3. Police Power 4. The Seat of Police Power MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, etc GR No. 135962, March 27, 2000


Respondent filed a case against petitioner enjoining them from opening the Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction. On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the MMDA possess police power.


NO. Not being a political subdivision but merely an executive authority, the MMDA has no police power. Police power in Metro Manila is exercised by the cities and municipalities hence; it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Hence, its proposed opening of Neptune Street which was not mandated by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City is illegal.

5. Life, Liberty, Property 6. Hierarchy of Rights Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc., 51 SCRA 189


This is a case involving petitioners claim of their civil & political rights as against respondents claim to property rights. The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union, composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union. Petitioners claim that they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers as well as those in the regular second and third shifts and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration. The petitioners and their members proceeded with the demonstration, ignoring the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration. Consequently, respondent Company filed on March with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout. Petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm.


Whether or not the life and property enjoy identical protection from the Constitution.


No. The primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized .In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupies a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions. The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is understood by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose-that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights.

Social Justice Society, et al v. Atienza, Jr., GR No. 156052, February 13, 2008


The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Respondent Mayor approved the said Ordinance, pursuant to police powers delegated to the Local Government Code, a principle prescribed as the power inherent in the government to enact laws within a constitutional rights to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the society. This is evident from Section 1 and 3 thereof, Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of the business disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their business within six months form the date of affectivity of the Ordinance. Among the business situated in the4 area are so called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies Caltex, Petron and shell.

The City of Manila and the DOE entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that the selling down of the Pandacan terminals was the most visible and practicable option. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, The Sangguniang directed that the MOU was effective only for a period of Six (6) months. Thereafter, on January 30, 2006. The Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 136 exercising the validity of Res 97 and authorize Mayor Atienza Jr to issue special business permits to the oil companies. Meanwhile, enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.


Whether or not Respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.


Yes, Supreme Court ruled that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a public rights and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as real parties in interest and they need not allow any specific interest in the experiment of the citys ordinance. Respondent never questioned the rights of the petitioners to institute the proceeding. On the other hand, the Local Government code imposes upon the respondent the duty as the City Mayor, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of this is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce ordinances as long as it has not been regarded or amended by the courts , and do not violate the rights of everyone.

7. Due Process: In General Tupas v. CA 193 SCARA 597


The record shows that the petitioners received a copy of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, 1989, and that the motion for reconsideration thereof was filed fourteen days later. The order denying the motion was received by the petitioners counsel on May 9, 1989. Instead of filing the petition for review with the Court of Appeals within the remainder of the 15-day reglementary period, that is the petitioner did so only on May 23, 1989, or 14 days later. The petition was therefore clearly tardy. The law requires that if motion for reconsideration is denied, petitioner should file petition for review with the Court of Appeals within the remaining period to file a petition for review. Hence, it may be necessary to file a motion with the Court of Appeals for extension of time to file such petition for review. Hence, it may be necessary to file a motion with the Court of Appeals for extension of time to file such petition for review.


Whether or not the petitioner can file a petition for certiorari because they were denied due process.


No. The petitioners counsel did not file the petition for review within the remaining period, which he should have known was only one day. Neither did he move for an extension that would have been granted as a matter of course. The petition for review being indisputably late, he could not thereafter ask that it be treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which can be filed

within a reasonable time. This remedy cannot be employed as a substitute for a lost appeal. It follows that for having themselves forfeited the right to appeal, the petitioners cannot now plaintively claim that they have been denied due process. Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give effect to both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive and procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court. The petitioners argument that they should not be prejudiced by the mistakes of their counsel because they are laymen and not familiar with the intricacies of the law is not acceptable. If clients could dis authorize their counsel on this ground, the administration of justice could be hopelessly encumbered. The petitioners have not shown that their counsel was exceptionally inept or motivated by bad faith or excusably misled by the facts. There is no reason why we should not apply the rule that clients should be bound by the acts of their counsel, including his mistakes.

8. Procedural Due Process In General Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca 37 P 921 FACTS: Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt. His debt amounted to P218, 294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owes. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracios property. Engracio however left for China and he never returned till he died. Since Engracio is a non-resident, El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court further ordered the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that itd be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Bancos petition to execute Engracios property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as hi s administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio ever received the summons.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed.

HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been met, to wit; 1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it. 2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings. 3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.

Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

Aspects of the Proceedings Villegas v. Hui Chiong FACTS:

This is a case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed or engages or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the enforcement of such ordinance as well as to declare the same null and void. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.


Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor who may withhold or refuse it at his will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

Galvez v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 685


Petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr..Before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Information of the original information. This motion was granted by Judge Villajuan and the cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new information against herein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms. Petitioners filed Motion to Quash the new information for lack of jurisdiction. At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the motion to quash. In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, an order was issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, ordering the reinstatement of the original informations, and setting the arraignment of the accused therein for February 8, 1994. On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24, 1994 issued by Judge Pornillos which denied petitioners motion to quash filed for the new information. As earlier stated, respondent court dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of February 18, 1994, hence this petition.


Whether or not the ex parte motion to withdraw the original information is null and void on the ground that there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

Held: No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners had not yet been placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted before they could be arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing thereof. In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original three information but the filing of four new information, three of which charge graver offenses and the fourth, an additional offense. Had this new information not been filed, there would obviously have been no cause for the instant petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed procedural lapses involved in the motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress us as a candid presentation of their real position. Petitioners contention that the dismissal of the original information and the consequent filing of the new ones substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous an argument. They would want to ignore the fact that had the original information been amended so as to charge the capital offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be deprived of their right to bail once it was shown that the evidence of guilt is strong. Petitioners could not be better off with amended information than with the subsequent ones. It really made no difference considering that where a capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion under either amended or new information. Contrary to petitioners submission, the absence of notice and hearing does not divest a trial court of authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held that The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint or to appeal from the dismissal and not certiorari.

State Prosecutors v. Muro, 236 SCRA 505


Respondent Judge Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Petitioners contend that the respondent judge gravely erred in dismissing eleven (11) cases for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions against Mrs. Imelda Marcos on the basis of a mere newspaper account that the President had announced the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions. That for the respondent judge to take judicial notice thereof even before it is officially released by the Central Bank and its full text published as required by law to be effective shows his impulsive action in utter disregard of the fundamental rule of due process which the People is also entitled to and exposes his gross ignorance of the law. This Court issued a resolution referring the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as revised, there being no factual issues involved. This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals, the appellate court found that the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judges dismissal of a case without the benefit of a hearing and without any notice to the prosecution violated due process.

HELD: Yes. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only an obvious denial of due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.

The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early as possible is no license for abuse of judicial power and discretion, nor does such professed objective, even if true, justify a deprivation of the prosecutions right to be heard and a violation of its right to due process of law. The lightning speed with which respondent judge resolved to dismiss the cases without the benefit of a hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution inevitably opened him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality for the accused. More importantly, notwithstanding the fact that respondent was not sure of the effects and implications of the Presidents announcement, as by his own admission he was in doubt whether or not he should dismiss the cases, he nonetheless deliberately refrained from requiring the prosecution to comment thereon.

Martinez v. CA, 237 SCRA 575


The focal issue lies on the petitioners claim to dismiss the appeal on the ground that no appeal lies from the dismissal of a criminal case, and certainly not by the private complainant, particularly where dismissal was at the instance of the City Prosecutor upon orders of the Department of Justice. If any remedy was available to private complainant, it was a petition for certiorari, not an appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not complainant is allowed to file an appeal.


YES. The right to appeal from a final judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to "any party, except when the accused is placed thereby in double jeopardy. Section 2, Rule 122 RCP Who may appeal. Any party may appeal from a final judgment or order, except if the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. Court ruled that the word "party" must be understood to mean not only the government and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal proceeding. Thus, the party injured by the crime has been held to have the right to appeal from a resolution of the court which is derogatory to his right to demand civil liability arising from the offense. Due Process; The complainant was deprived of his day in court when the judge granted the motion to dismiss without the prosecution having furnished him a copy of the motion.The fault of error tainting the order of dismissal of the lower court consists in its failure to observe procedural due process and to exercise its discretion properly and judiciously. The trial judge granted the motion to dismiss without the prosecution having furnished private complainant a copy of the motion despite having been ordered to do so, thereby effectively depriving private complainant of his day in court.

Espelita v. Avelino, 62 SCRA 396

FACTS: Shells counsel Bellaflor forwarded an oral motion for the revocation of appearance of Espletas witness Montano for cross-examination and the conclusion of her testimony. She was unable to appear in one of the trials due to her auditing job in the Department of Local Government at the day she was supposed to finish her testimony and crossexamination. Judge Avelino accepted this proposal and even allowed Shell to present its rebuttal witness for Espeletas testimony. The judge granted this request to the prejudice of Espeleta. The magistrate also did not consider Espeletas counsels letter for postponement. The judge told parties to submit documentary evidence afterwards but rejected the ones from Montanos testimony due to her being stricken from the records.


Whether the concept of fairness that is basic to procedural due process would be satisfied if the right to be heard of petitioner was revoked by the respondent Judge.


No. Petition for certiorari granted. Espeleta presented Montano as an accountant to testify for the reduced balance to Shell in the form of 14,000 from Shells p roposed amount of 22,000. The deductions included payment for damage due to gasoline leakages. Under the circumstances, the stress on the absence of procedural due process is understandable for as a result of the order of respondent Judge now sought to be set aside, there is more than just a probability that petitioner would be condemned to pay before he had been fully heard. The trial didnt satisfy the standard for a judicious inquiry, because there was a mockery of the requirement that the litigants should be given full opportunity to sustain their claims and have their evidence considered and weighted. The petitioner can assert due process.

By saying that the postponement of the counsel was a delay on the administration of justice was not in line with Justice Carsons saying that a sound discretion in this regard should be exercised by the trial judge, and the highly commendable desire for the dispatch of business should not be permitted to turn the scales of justice rather than accede to a reasonable request for a continuance. Due heed must be paid to procedural due process mandate. The discretion for denying motions are allowed but such must be exercised with a view to substantial justice. The judge in this case must have reconsidered the denial.

Rabino v. Cruz, 222 SCRA 493 FACTS:

This case rooted between David Palmenco, et al. and Adora Cruz, et al., where herein petitioners, Rabino, et al. where not impleaded as defendants in said civil cases although they are also occupants of land in dispute. MTC decision in said case on December 29, 1983 was for David Palmenco, et al. to vacate the premises in question and restore the possession thereof of the plaintiffs; also, to pay Php 6,000 as attorneys fees and costs. A writ of execution was issued by the MTC of Taytay Rizal but was resisted by the defendants (David Palmenco), and filed a complaint at the Bureau of Lands, which later on rendered a decision that the defendants should file within 60 days upon subdivision survey and approval. Palmenco, et al. filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction at the Court of Appeals, which was denied by said court. The defendants again filed the same at RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, which was also dismissed. Again for the second time, said case was brought to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration which was also denied. Herein petitioners Rabino filed an opposition to the writ of demolition and an action for damages. Palmenco, et al. also filed an action for injunction with damages at the RTC. On December 6, 1988, a temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court directing the respondents and other defendants to refrain implementing alias writ of demolition. For the third time, the case was brought to the Court of Appeals through the petition for certiorari filed by Adora Cruz, with prayer to prohibit the judge of RTC Antipolo from conducting further proceedings related to Civil Case Nos. 630 and 631. On August 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered the previous order on December 6 as null and void, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.


Whether or not the writ of execution issued in Civil Cases 630 and 631 may be forced against petitioners who were not impleaded as defendants but also occupants of the said land in dispute.

HELD: Judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action.

This is anchored on right of person to due process of law. In order to have due process, following conditions must be met: 1. Court or tribunal with judicial power to hear and determine the matter. 2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over person of defendant or property subject of the proceedings. 3. Defendant is given an opportunity to be heard. 4. Judgment is rendered upon lawful hearing. Due process of law was denied to the petitioners. Hence, judgment rendered in Civil Cases 630 and 631 cannot be enforced against them. Right to due process is one of the building blocks of the edifice of our democratic form of government; courts must be vigilant in safeguarding it.

Gonzales v. CSC, 226 SCRA 66 FACTS:

The herein petitioner is an employee for 36 years of the Agricultural Training Institute (ATI), an agency of the Department of Agriculture. The petitioner applied for and was granted leaves with pay and went to the United States from February 2 to July 16, 1990. Petitioner wrote to the Director of ATI requesting approval of a leave without pay to spend more time with his children in US and to avail of a physical check- up free of charge. The letter carried the petitioners address in US. However, the Direc tor of ATI did not act on the letter request; it was neither approved nor disapproved. ATIs OIC wrote to petitioner declaring him AWOL for more than 30 days and warned him that should he not report within 5 days from receipt of the letter, he would be dropped from the rolls. The letter was addressed to the petitioners house in Quezon City which was returned to sender (ATI). The ATI instead publish a notice in 3 different issues of a newspaper in general circulation. When the petitioner came back from US and reported for work on November 19, 1990, he found out that he was already dropped from the rolls and was replaced in his position. The petitioner protested to the CSC which referred the letter- protest to the Merit System Protection Board. The board ruled that the petitioner was duly notified before he was dropped from the roll which was also affirmed by the CSC. Thus, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari for grave abuse of discretion before the SC. The Solicitor General ordered to comment, conceded that petitioner was denied due process and hence, illegally dismissed.


Whether or not grave abuse of discretion was committed when the petitioner was summarily, hastily and inordinately dropped from the rolls and his replacement hurriedly appointed without the observance of the requisite due process.

HELD: The petition is impressed with merit. The petitioners argument where he invokes the protection of the due process clause of the constitution should be sustained.

The records do not show that the officials of ATI denied knowledge of petitioners correct address in US which was carried in his letter request for leave without pay. Despite knowledge, the letter written by the ATI OIC, directing the petitioner to return to work within 5 days, otherwise, he would be dropped from the rolls was inexplicably mailed to his house in Quezon City, which was not received by the petitioner. They are aware that petitioner was not momentarily staying in his address in Quezon City where he could receive said notice. The publication of the notice made by the respondent commission in the 3 issues of a newspaper in general circulation might have been proper only if the address of the petitioner were unknown. Since the officials all knew the whereabouts of petitioner, they have no legal warrant to notify him thru newspapers. The ATI officials did not accord fair treatment to the petitioner. ATI did not act immediately on the request and for reasons not divulged in records, they sat on the request. The ATI OIC declared the petitioner AWOL and ordered to return within 5 days due to the exigencies of service. However, the ATI OIC did not explain why all of a sudden the exigencies of service required the immediate return of the petitioner. Worse still, the order dropping petitioner from rolls was never sent to him. Petitioner did not also know he had been replaced till he returned to the a setting of scarcities, it is bad enough to lose a job: it is worse if it is taken away by government itself without due process of law. Our constitution abhors such arbitrariness.

Webb v. Hon. Raul De Leon, 247 SCRA 652


The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a lettercomplaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation. Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies. Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination. Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.


Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation.

HELD: NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard. Pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial.

Herein, however, nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Further, on the contention of the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation, records show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Webb, et. al. were given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against them. Still, the Supreme Court reminds a trial judge in high profile criminal cases of his/her duty to control publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice. The ability to dispense impartial justice is an issue in every trial and in every criminal prosecution; the judiciary always stands as a silent accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the promise that justice shall be done and is done, and that is the only way for the judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of public opinion.

People v. Teehankee, GR No. 111206, Oct. 6, 1995


Maureen Hultman, JussiLeino and Roland Chapman while walking was approached by the accused Teehankee Jr. and after a series of events, the accused fired his gun killing Chapman and mortally wounding Hultman and Leino, then left. Leino, though mortally wounded mustered all his strength and called for help and noticed at least 3 people looking on from outside their house namely Vicente Mangubat, Domingo Florece and Agripino Cadenas. Mangubat, after the gunman sped away, ran outside his house, helped the victims and reported the incident to the proper authorities. During their Investigation the NBI and the Makati police asked Jussi Leino twice regarding the person who shot them.The first instance was On July 15, 1991 while Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown (3) pictures of different men by the investigators. He identified Claudio Teehankee Jr. as the gunman from the pictures. In order to confirm the identification made by Leino and other witnesses Cadenas and Mangubat who also pointed the accused as the gunman thru a separate out-of-court identification procedures. Leino was brought out of the laws and placed in a car with slightly tinted windows. A group of five to six men (including the accused) then came out of the unoccupied house, into the street. From the group, Leino identified the accused as the gunman for the second time,3 separate criminal cases were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of confinement at the hospital and during the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER. The trial court convicted the accused Claudio Teehankee jr because the strength of the testimonies of 3 eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the gunman. However, in his appeal, he vigorously assailed the validity of the out-of-court identification by these eyewitnesses especially the identification of JussiLeino.


Whether or not the out-of-court identification in this case is a valid and licit way in the identification of the accused.


Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. Based on this statement given by the high court regarding the issue, we can say that out-of the court identification of the accused is valid and licit when it is in line with the rules that the Supreme Court have fashioned. In the case given, the authorities did not violate anything stated in the latter; otherwise it is stated in the decision that they violated one. Wherefore, the out-of-court identification in this case is valid and licit which makes the contention of the accused regarding the validity of the identification, groundless.

Ang Tibay v. CIR 69 PHIL 635


Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers. There was a shortage of leather soles, and it was necessary to temporarily lay off members of the National Labor Union. According to the Union however, this was merely a scheme to systematically terminate the employees from work, and that the shortage of soles is unsupported. It claims that AngTibay is guilty of ULP because the owner, Teodoro, is discriminating against the National Labor Union, and unjustly favoring the National Workers Brotherhood, which was allegedly sympathetic to the employer. The petitioner, AngTibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion for new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.


Whether or not special courts like Court of Industrial Relations should observe due process.


Yes. The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support

thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

Rural Bank of Buhi v. CA, 162 SCRA 288


Buhi Bank was a rural bank. Its books were examined by the Rural Banks division of the Central Bank. However, it refused to be examined. As a consequence, its financial assistance was suspended. Later, a general examination of the banks affairs and operations were again conducted. The rural banks division found out massive irregularities in the operations, giving out loans to unknown and fictitious borrowers, and sums amounting to millions past due to the Central Bank. There were also promissory notes rediscounted with the Central Bank for cash. As a result, the Buhi Bank became insolvent. The division chief, Odra, recommended that Buhi be placed under receivership. Thus, the Monetary Board adopted a Resolution # 583, placing the bank under receivership. Odra, the division chief, was made the receiver. Odra thus implemented the resolution, authorizing deputies to take control and possession of Buhis assets and liabilities. Del Rosario, the Buhi Bank Manager, filed an injunction against the receiver, arguing that the resolution violated the Rural Banks Act and constitutes gadalej. The bank claims that there was a violation of due process. They claim that the bank was not given the chance to deny and disprove the claim of insolvency or the other grounds and that it was hastily put under receivership. Later on, the Central Bank Monetary Board ordered the liquidation of the Bank. The judge ruled in favor of the Bank and issued a writ of execution. The CA however restrained the enforcement of execution, citing that the Judge did not follow the orders, and thus required the Bank to yield to the CB.


Whether or not due process was observed.


YES. Under Sec 29 of the RA 265, on proceedings regarding insolvency, there is NO REQUIREMENT that a hearing be first conducted before a bank may be placed under receivership. The law explicitly provides that the Monetary Board can IMMEDIATELY forbid a banking institution from doing business and IMMEDIATELY appoint a receiver when: a) there has been an examination by CB, b) a report to the CB, and c) prima facie showing that the bank is insolvent. As to the claim that the RA 265 violates due process, the claim is untenable. The law could not have intended to disregard the constitutional requirement of due process when it conferred power to place rural banks under receivership. The closure and liquidation of the bank is considered an exercise of POLICE POWER. It may be subject to judicial inquiry and could be set aside if found to be capricious, discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, etc. Due process does NOT necessarily require a PRIOR HEARING. A hearing or an OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD may be made SUBSEQUENT to the closure. One could just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would happen, resulting in panic and hysteria. In that way, fortunes will be wiped out, and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking industry.

ADMU v. Capulong 222 SCRA 644

FACTS: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean Del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered.

ISSUE: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students?


There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the Ateneo Law School notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing. Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University.

Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

Non v. Judge Dames, 185 SCRA 523


Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings. Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. They now petition the court to reverse its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case. The court said that petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89, which states that: The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and discipline.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the students right to freedom of speech and assembly was infringed.


Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly available to students and is well-settled in our jurisdiction. However there are limitations. The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights within the school presupposes that conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior should not materially disrupt classwork or must not involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.

Guzman v. NU, 142 SCRA 699 FACTS:

Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they alleged that they were denied due to the fact that they were active participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University. The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners failure to e nroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their constitutional and human rights. That as regards to Guzman, his academic showing was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts of classes. That Guzman is facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent University. The petitioners have failures in their records, and are not of good scholastic standing.


Whether or not the petitioners should be refused to enroll. HELD: No. Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of

theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing. There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) They shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) They shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

Alcuaz v. PSBA, 161 SCRA 7 FACTS:

Petitioners are all bona fide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City. The students of the respondent school and the respondent PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities within the school. On the exercise of students democratic rights, it has been agreed that protest actions can be conducted any day as long as they meet the following requirements: a) that they be held at the PSBA quadrangle from 12:30 pm to 1:00 pm only; b) that the protest action be removed to the PSBA parking lot if it will exceed the 1:00 time limit; c) that if the protest move exceeds 1:00 it will be limited only up to 2:30 pm; d) However, before any action is taken the organizers of the protest action should secure a permit 6 days before, or if on the same day, it still be under the first-come-first-served basis in the use of facilities, volume of sound system shall be adjusted so as not to disturb classes. It is the firm stand of the administration of PSBA that it will not allow the students to directly participate in the policy-making body of the school. In spite of the above-stated agreement, petitioners felt the need to hold dialogues and demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances. During the regular enrolment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of school year 1986 1987 which prompted the President of the Student Council to file a complaint with the Director of the MECS against the PSBA for barring the enrolment of the Student Council Officers and student leaders.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been deprivation of due process for petitioners-students who have been barred from re-enrollment and for intervenor-teachers whose services have been terminated as faculty members, on account of their participation in the demonstration or protest charged by respondents as anarchic rallies, and a violation of their constitutional rights of expression and assembly.

HELD: No. It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual that the written contracts required for college teachers are for one semester. It is thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers.

Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359


Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year.


Whether or not there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.


Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.

UP Board of Regents v. Telan, GR 110280, Oct. 21, 1996


The UP Board of Regents imposed on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one year, non-issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest per annum and non-issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled his financial obligations with the university. The disciplinary action is meted after finally rendering a guilty verdict on Nadals alleged willful withholding of the following information in his application for scholarship tantamount to acts of dishonesty, viz: (1) that he has and maintains a car and (2) the income of his mother in the USA in support of the studies of his brothers. Nadal complained that he was not afforded due process when, after the Board Meeting on his case on March 28, 1993 that resulted in a decision of NOT GUILTY in his favor, the Chairman of the UP Board of Regents, without notice to the petitioner, called another meeting the following day to deliberate on the Chairmans Motion for Reconsideration, which this time resulted in a decision of GUILTY. Upon petition, Nadal was granted his action for mandamus with preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nadal was denied due process.

HELD: No. It is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation.

This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. He would make an exception of the March 29, 1993 meeting for it was supposed to reconsider the decision made on March 28, 1993 exonerating respondent Nadal from all administrative charges against him.

Lao Gi Alias Chia, Jr. V. CA 180 SCRA 756

FACTS: Herein petitioner faces a charge for deportation when a judgment was rendered cancelling his citizenship (obtained from a prior judgment) on the ground that it was founded on fraud and misrepresentation. Petitioners were required to register as aliens but refused. They filed a motion for reconsideration of the order directing them to register as aliens and to oppose the motion for their arrest but were denied by Acting Commissioner Nituda. Petitioners filed for certiorari in the CFI of Manila which was dismissed for lack of legal basis. Petition for certiorari was also dismissed on appeal in the CA and a motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES: What kind of due process is required is required in deportation proceedings?


Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the consequences can be as serious as those of a criminal prosecution. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings.

PHILCOMSAT v. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218


Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications, charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordered of reducing the rates by 15% is valid.


Yes. Changing existing rates is quasi-judicial in nature. Hence, it must be preceded by a hearing. The fact of the order being merely interlocutory does not alter the situation because for all practical purposes it is final as to the period covered.

Radio Communicattions v. NTC 184 SCRA 517


This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order seeking to annul and set aside the order of the National Telecommunications Commission and to prohibit respondent Commission from taking cognizance of, and assuming jurisdiction over the Application for Approval of Rates fo r Digital Transmission Service Facilities of the Philippine Long Distance and Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity), private respondent herein, for lack of jurisdiction. Private respondent PLDT filed an application with respondent Commission for the Approval of Rates for Digital Transmission Service Facilities under NTC Case No. 84003. The respondent Commission provisionally approved and set the case for hearing within the prescribed 30-day period allowed by law. In the aforementioned notice of hearing, herein petitioners except Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation were not included in the list of affected parties. At the hearing, petitioner PT & T Co., along with other petitioners which came to know of the pending petition through the former, appeared and moved for some time within which to file an opposition or reply to said application. Petitioners alleged that neither respondent Commission nor private respondent PLDT informed them of the existence of this provisional authority.


Whether or not the NTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing a provisional authority in favor of PLDT without prior notice to the petitioners.

HELD: No, as it is impossible for the respondent Commission to give personal notice to all parties affected, not all of them being known to it.

More than that, there is no dispute that the notice of hearing was published and as admitted by petitioners, one of them received the notice which in turn informed the others. In fact, the petitioners have timely opposed the petition in question, so that lack of notice was deemed cured. Under the circumstances, the Commission may be deemed to have substantially complied with the requirements. In any event, the provisional nature of the authority and the fact that the primary application shall be given a full hearing are the safeguards against its abuse.

Maceda v. ERB 199 SCRA 454


Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August 1990, private respondent oil companies filed with the ERB their respective applications on oil price increases. ERB then issued an order granting a provisional increase of P1.42 per liter. Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to nullify said increase.


Whether or not the decisions of the Energy Regulatory Board should be subject to presidential review.


Pursuant to Section 8 of E.O. No. 172, while hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering a provisional increase subject to final disposition of whether or not to make it permanent or to reduce or increase it further or to deny the application. The provisional increase is akin to a temporary restraining order, which is given ex-parte. The Court further noted the Solicitor Generals comments that the ERB is not averse to the idea of a presidential review of its decision, except that there is no law at present authorizing the same. The Court suggested that it will be under the scope of the legislative to allow the presidential review of the decisions of the ERB since, despite its being a quasi-judicial body, it is still an administrative body under the Office of the President whose decisions should be appealed to the President under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, especially on a matter as transcendental as oil price increases which affect the lives of almost all Filipinos.

Abalos v. Civil Service Commission, 196 SCRA 81


Shortly after assuming office as Provincial Governor of Lanao Del Norte, the petitioner, by resolution of the provincial board, filed with the Tanodbayan a complaint for malversation against his predecessor, Arsenio A. Quibranza, for having used for personal purposes several bulldozers belonging to the province. The private respondents were informed in another memorandum that formal charges for "dishonesty and intentionally making false statements in material facts" had been filed against them which they should answer within 72 hours. Curiously, however, they were informed in a separate memorandum issued on that same date that their services as equipment operators had been terminated. The problem with this argument is that the private respondents have rejected their supposed confession as having been extracted from them without benefit of legal assistance. The results of the proceedings before the Ombudsman are, of course, not decisive of the administrative charges. Nevertheless, the private respondents should have been given a chance to prove in an investigation duly called that they did not execute the affidavits against former Governor Quibranza and that they were tricked into admitting the offense imputed to them. They were not accorded this opportunity. Instead they were simply informed that, in view of the charge and their supposed admission thereof, they were being summarily dismissed from the service. The petitioner also invokes Section 40 of P.D. No. 807 and argues that in view of the private respondents' admission of the charge against them, they could be summarily dismissed under this section which provides that No formal investigation is necessary and the respondent may be immediately removed or dismissed if any of the following circumstances is present. When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent was denied due process though the latter had initially admitted his guilt.

HELD: We do not have to rule at this time on the degree of the offense imputed to the private respondents. But we will say here that, in view of their rejection of the confessions supposedly made by them, the evidence of their guilt cannot by any standard be regarded as strong. Indeed, that guilt had yet to be established by preponderant evidence, especially against the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the perjury charge against them. Consequently, we cannot find that Item (a) of Section 40 could be validly applied against the private respondents to justify their summary dismissal. The Court had earlier entertained serious misgivings about the constitutionality of Section 40 as against strong protests that it was violative of due process in so far as it deprived the civil servant of the right to defend himself against the ex parte decision to dismiss him. While it is true that this section had been upheld in earlier decisions (albeit not very categorically), there was a growing sentiment that the law should be reexamined more closely in deference to the right to a hearing that it was foreclosing. The right to be heard is one of the brightest hallmarks of the free society. We should be proud that in this jurisdiction every person who may be involved in controversy is entitled to present his side, no less than his adversary, at a hearing duly called for that purpose.

GSIS v. CA, 201 SCRA 661


Respondent Evelyn Kintanar was summarily dismissed from service as Control Clerk at the Cebu City Branch office of the petitioner GSIS. The case started when in 1979, two (2) members of GSIS, in separate affidavits, complained that they had not received their policy loan checks. Several employees were investigated, including respondent Evelyn. Meanwhile, in a letter dated 16 October 1979 addressed to the Officer-inCharge of the Department of Investigation, GSIS, Manila, respondent Evelyn requested another and separate investigation. The Department of Investigation thereafter sent Atty. Elpidio Divina to Cebu City. Curiously enough, Evelyn Kintanar was never considered for investigation, although she had requested such re-investigation. Based on the affidavits of the five (5) other employees who were investigated, Atty. Divina had concluded that the loss of the two (2) checks occurred while they were in the custody of Evelyn Kintanar. Atty. Divina therefore did not try to secure Evelyn's statement, as he had intended to file formal charges against her, at which time Evelyn would have the opportunity to refute the charges against her. However, Atty. Divina's suggestion that charges be filed against Evelyn Kintanar was turned down by his superiors in Manila. And on 9 May 1980, petitioner GSIS, through Board Resolution No. 310 adopted by its Board of Trustees, resolved, upon recommendation of the Officer-In-Charge, Department of Investigation, summarily to dismiss respondent Evelyn from the service. On 3 June 1980, Evelyn Kintanar filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission, contending that her summary dismissal was a violation of her right to security of tenure and of the constitutional guarantee of due process The Civil Service Commission endorsed the appeal to GSIS President and General Manager Roman A. Cruz who in turn informed respondent Evelyn that she was "summarily dismissed from the service as mandated under [paragraph a] of Sec. 40 of Presidential Decree No. 807 or the Civil Service Decree.


Whether or not the Evelyn Kintanar was denied due process by GSIS.


Yes, the Court found that respondent Evelyn was denied due process by petitioner GSIS. In the case at bar, there is no question that no charges had been filed before respondent Evelyn Kintanar was dismissed from the service. She simply was not informed of any charges against her; she was not even interviewed by the lawyer sent by the GSIS to look into the matter. The Court held that that what the opening sentence of Section 40 of PD 807 is saying is that an employee may be removed or dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear t that an employee must be informed of the charges preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges made against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remains consistent with the constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the charges leveled against him and to present evidence in support of his defenses. The ordinary way by which a Civil Service employee is given this opportunity is by holding an investigation, in the course of which the employee may assert his defenses and present his supporting evidence.

Hellenic Philippine Shipping Inc v. Siete, 195 SCRA 179


Private respondent Epifanio Siete was employed as Master of M/V Houda G by Sultan Shipping Co. Ltd. Through its crewing agent, petitioner Hellenic Philippine Shipping. He boarded the vessel on May 24, 1985 at Cyprus. The vessel sailed to El Ferrol Spain where it loaded cargo that it subsequently discharged at Tripoli, Libya. Then proceeded back to Cyprus, arriving there on. Wilfredo Lim boarded the vessel and advised Siete that he had instructions from the owners to take over its command.

These instructions were later confirmed by a telex sent by Sultan Shipping to Siete. Neither Lim nor the telex indicated the reason for Sietes dismissal. Siete claims that this information was also withheld from him by petitioner Hellenic Shipping upon his repatriation to Manila. Siete filed with the POEA a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal and non-payment of his salary and other benefits under their employment contract. In its Answer, petitioner alleged that Siete had been dismissed because of his failure to erase the timber load line on the vessel, as instructed, and for his negligence in supervising the discharge of cargo at Tripoli that resulted in the replacement of certain damaged equipment. POEA Administrator Tomas Achacoso dismissed the complaint for lack of merit and held that there was valid cause for Sietes removal, based on the communication presented in evidence by Hellenic Shipping. The NLRC reversed the POEA Administrator, holding that the dismissal violated due process and that the documents submitted by petitioner were hearsay, self-serving and unverified. Petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari, contending that Siete had not been denied due process, considering the summary nature of the proceeding that had to be taken in view of the nature of his position. Moreover, petitioner avers that Siete is a managerial employee and may be dismissed on the basis of loss of confidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent was illegally dismissed.

HELD: YES. Substantial evidence has been established that the private respondent was indeed not notified of the charges against him and that no investigation was conducted to justify his dismissal. Moreover, the petitioner has failed to prove that Siete had been instructed to erase the timber load lines and that he had been negligent in the cargo unloading at Tripoli. The Court noted that the reports submitted by the petitioner to prove its charges were all prepared after the fact of Sietes dismissal and were signed by its own employees. Their motives are necessarily suspected. The excuse of the petitioner that it itself did not know why Siete was dismissed, being only a crewing agent of Sultan Shipping, deserves no comment The Labor Code provides that no work er shall be dismissed except for a just or authorized cause provided by law and after due process. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular act or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal. The employee may answer the allegation stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons. It is not correct to say that managerial employees may be arbitrarily dismissed at any time and without just cause as established in an appropriate investigation. Managerial employees, no less than rank-and-file laborers, are entitled to due process.

Salaw v. NLRC, 202 SCRA 7


Salaw, was employed by the private respondents as a credit investigator-appraiser. The CIS of the Philippine Constabulary extracted from Salaw without the assistance of counsel a Sworn Statement which made it appear that Salaw, in cahoots with a coemployee, Madrigal, a supervisor in charge of the acquired assets of respondent Associated Bank, sold twenty sewing machines and electric generators which had been foreclosed by the respondent bank from Worldwide Garment and L.P. Money Garment Salaw was requested by private respondent Tuazon, the bank manager, to appear before the bank's PDIC which would be meeting the following day. Salaw was terminated from his employment for alleged serious misconduct or willful disobedience and fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed on him by the private respondents. Salaw filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent Bank, Tengco, and Tuazon. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissal of complainant. private respondents appealed the labor arbiter's decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) who reversed and dismissed the case for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioner by the private respondents was legally justified though he was denied assistance of counsel during investigation.

HELD: Under the Labor Code, as amended, the requirements for the lawful dismissal of an employee by his employer are two-fold: the substantive and the procedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a valid or authorized cause as provided by law (Articles 279, 281, 282-284, New Labor Code), but the rudimentary requirements of due process notice and hearing must also be observed before an employee may be dismissed. One does not suffice; without their concurrence, the terminate would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal. The inviolability of notice and hearing for a valid dismissal an employee cannot be overemphasized. Those twin requirements constitute essential elements of due process in cases employee dismissal. The requirement of notice is intended inform the employee

concerned of the employer's intent dismiss him and the reason for the proposed dismissal; on other hand, the requirement of hearing affords the employ the opportunity to answer his employer's charges against him and accordingly to defend himself therefrom before dismissal effected. Neither one of these two requirements can be dispensed with without running afoul of the due process requirement of the Constitution. The investigation of petitioner Salaw by the respondent Bank' investigating committee violated his constitutional right to due process, in as much as he was not given a chance to defend himself, as provided in Rule XIV, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code governing the dismissal of employees. Section 5 of the said Rule requires that "the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires. Here petition was perfunctorily denied the assistance of counsel during investigation to be conducted by the PDIC. No reasons preferred which vitiated the denial with irregularity and unfairness.

Macayayong v. Ople 204 SCRA 372


Petitioner Macayayong had been detailed with the various offices in the Office of the President from 1968 up to the time he was dropped from the roster of the Department of Labor. The Chairman, Board of Liquidators, Office of the President, requested extension of petitioner's detail with said office until after the cases he was handling are terminated. Notwithstanding the request, the Secretary of Labor in a telegram manifested that the detail of Atty. Macayayong was not sanctioned by his Office, therefore, the recall order still stood with a warning that unless he reported to his home office within 72 hours from notice, he would be dropped from the rolls of personnel. In obedience thereto, Macayayong reported to the Bureau of Labor Standards and rendered service therein, when he applied for a leave of absence. The Secretary of Labor notified Macayayong that his services would be terminated effective January 31, 1976 by reason of his failure to report back to his Office which urgently needed his services. And on January 23, 1976, the Secretary issued an order dropping Macayayong from the roster of the Department of Labor for "Abandonment of Post." Petitioner appealed to the CSC but it affirmed the order of respondent Ople. The petitioner filed another appeal with the Office of the President from Resolution of CSC, but again it was denied. Petitioner contends that he was denied due process because he was not given enough time to obey said recall. He alleges that the January 5 and 19 letters sent to him were received together with the order of the Secretary of Labor on January 30, 1976 (Friday), which was the eve of the effectivity of his dismissal on January 31, 1976. Hence, he was not given the opportunity to be heard. On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was never denied due process. In fact, he was sent the necessary notifications and was given an ultimatum to report back to his home office which he disregarded. This may be considered as substantial compliance with the due process rule.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's summary dismissal is in violation of the due process of law.


The court ruled in favor of the respondent. The petition is without merit. Petitioner's contention is untenable. The records show that before petitioner was dropped from the roster of the Department of Labor, he was notified twice by his home office to report back to work, on January 5 and on January 19, 1976. And even assuming that petitioner's contentions as to his date of receipt of notices were true, it is well settled that due process contemplates freedom from arbitrariness and what is required is fairness or justice, the substance rather than the form being paramount. An allegation based solely on the lack of opportunity to be heard without notice does not per se merit unconditional approval.

Alonzo v. Capulong, 244 SCRA 80


Private respondent Juliet Fajardo is manager of the Administrative Services Department of the Home Development Mutual Fund, otherwise known as the Pag-ibig Fund Foundation. On December 17, 1992 Celeste G. Al-Jawazneh, lodged a complaint stating that Fajardo had took advantage of her position. After finding prima facie evidence, a formal charge was filed against private respondent for dishonesty, misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, contracting of loans of money or other property from persons with whom the office of the employee concerned had business relations, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Private respondent was required to answer the charges and indicate whether she desired to have a formal investigation. Meanwhile, she was placed under preventive suspension for 90 days. Private respondent complained that the order of preventive suspension was issued without giving her the right to be heard. The respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from executing and/or enforcing the order of preventive suspension. Petitioner contends that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his discretion in taking cognizance of the case and stopping the preventive suspension of private respondent whom he ordered to be allowed to continue in office. She contends that the investigation being conducted by her office was purely an administrative one and that private respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies by appealing to the Civil Service Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not the preventive suspension of a civil service employee or officer can be ordered even without a hearing.

HELD: Prior notice and hearing was not required. It is now settled that the preventive suspension of a civil service employee or officer can be ordered even without a hearing

because such suspension is not a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The movant/petitioner having shown that the invasion of the right to be protected is material and substantial; that her right is clear and unmistakable. As Chief Executive Officer of the Home Development Mutual Fund, petitioner is the proper disciplining authority. Indeed her power to order the preventive suspension of any employee under her is not denied by private respondent. What private respondent contends is that she was suspended on the basis of an unverified letter and without first giving her the right to be heard in her defense.

CHR v. CSC, 227 SCRA 42


Atty. Elias Pacete, a permanent appointee since February 1, 1988 to the position of Division Chief of Region IX of the Commission of Human Rights (CHR) based in Zamboanga City, filed an application for optional retirement. However, Pacete sent a notice of withdrawal of his application for retirement. Pacete was informed by the Chairman of the CHR through a telegram of the acceptance and approval of his application for optional retirement effective and the appointment of Atty. Rodrigo Roy as his successor. (GSIS) informed private respondent that his application for optional retirement cannot be favorably considered due to his failure to meet the condition provided for in Section 12 (c) of Rep. Act No. 1616 which provides requirement of three (3) years of continuous service preceding retirement. Consequently, the GSIS advised the CHR to allow Pacete to continue in the service to complete the said requirement. Accordingly, Pacete requested the CHR that he be reinstated to his former position with back wages and allowances and the recall of the appointment of his successor, Atty. Roy. The GSIS denied his request and instead formally charged him with incompetence, gross inefficiency in the performance of official duty and failure to account for public funds.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner justified in refusing to allow Pacete to continue rendering service to fulfill the requirements under Rep. Act No. 1616.

HELD: Petitioner cites paragraph (d) of Section 12 of Com. Act 186 as basis for its power of removal of its personnel on grounds of inefficiency and incompetence which provides that The employer concerned may request the retirement of any such employee described in the preceding subsection who, by reason of a disqualification, is unable to

perform satisfactorily and efficiently the duties of his position or some other position of the same grade or class as that occupied by the employee and to which he could be assigned, but such request shall be submitted to the Civil Service Board of Appeals only after the said employee had been notified in writing of the proposed retirement. No such employee, however, shall be so retired unless the Civil Service Board of Appeals has given him a hearing and found him after examination that he is so disqualified. The decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals as to whether or not the said employee shall be retired under this sub-section shall be final and conclusive. The above provision recognizes the discretion of the head of office in the approval of an employees optional retirement, but such discretion must be exercised without violating the tenets of administrative due process. We find that there was a glaring disregard of this procedure laid down in the law. In fact, the October 18, 1989 resolution of the CHR denying him reinstatement for failure to fulfill the three-year requirement of continuous service preceding retirement was reached without notice and hearing. Much less was there any request for optional retirement of private respondent from the CHR to the Civil Service Board of Appeals based on incompetence and inefficiency. Although he was furnished a copy of the resolution denying his application for reinstatement with the attendant charges against him, he was not afforded the opportunity to refute them prior to the promulgation of the said resolution.

People v. Nazario 165 SCRA 136

FACTS: Respondent Eusebio Nazario, an owner and operator of a fishpond situated in the barrio of Pinagbayanan, was charged in violation of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance 4, Series of 1995, as amended, for willful, unlawful, and felonious refusal to pay the municipal taxes in the total amount of P362.62 required of him inspite of repeated demands made upon him to pay the same. The years in question of failure to pay were for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did not pay because he was not sure if he was covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty, thus this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance said is null and void for being vague and hence violative of due process.

HELD: No. In no way may the ordinance at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It is unmistakable from its very provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term manager. To be declared null and void, the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction.

Estate of Francisco v. CA 199 SCRA 595


Basilan Municipal Mayor Benjamin Valencia summarily ordered the demolition of an antiquated and dilapidated quonset warehouse situated in Port Area, Strong Boulevard, IsabelA, Basilan, outside the zone for warehouses. The legal possessor of the Quonset sought the prohibition of the Order but was denied by the RTC. The CA originally overturned the RTC but subsequently reversed itself. In question in this case is the validity of such order by the Municipal Mayor, which was in effect an abatement of nuisance, without prior judicial authority.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily and extra-judicially order the demolition of petitioner's quonset building.

HELD: NO. Ordinance No. 147 relied upon by Respondents should not be interpreted as authorizing the summary removal of a non-conforming building by the municipal government. For if it does, it must be struck down for being in contravention of the requirements of due process, as originally held by the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the enforcement and administration of the provisions of the Ordinance resides with the Zoning Administrator. It is said official who may call upon the City Fiscal to institute the necessary legal proceedings to enforce the provisions of the Ordinance. And any person aggrieved by the decision of the Zoning Administrator regarding the enforcement of the Ordinance may appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals. Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail of extra-judicial remedies. On the contrary, the Local Government Code imposes upon him the duty "to cause to be instituted judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances".

Misamis Occidental Association V. DOF 238 SCARA 63


Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a domestic corporation whose members, individually or collectively, are engaged in the buying and selling of copra in Misamis Oriental. On the other hand, respondents represent departments of the executive branch of government charged with the generation of funds and the assessment, levy and collection of taxes and other imposts. It alleges that prior to the issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91 on June 11, 1991, which implemented Value Added Tax (VAT) Ruling 190-90, copra was classified as agricultural food product under Section 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and, therefore, exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution. Likewise, petitioner claims that RMC No. 47-91 is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because while coconut farmers and copra producers are exempt, traders and dealers are not, although both sell copra in its original state. Petitioners add that oil millers do not enjoy tax credit out of the VAT payment of traders and dealers.

ISSUE: Whether or not RMC No. 47-91 is violative of the equal protection clause.

HELD: The argument has no merit. There is a material or substantial difference between coconut farmers and copra producers, on the one hand, and copra traders and dealers, on the other. The former produce and sell copra, the latter merely sell copra. The Constitution does not forbid the differential treatment of persons so long as there is a reasonable basis for classifying them differently. It is not true that oil millers are exempt from VAT. Pursuant to 102 of the NIRC, they are subject to 10% VAT on the sale of service.

Medenilla v. Civil Service Commission 194 SCRA 278


Petitioner was a contractual employee at the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) as Public Relations Officer II (PRO II). Medenilla was promoted to the position of Technical Assistant in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Manpower Management. Petitioner Medenilla was appointed as supervising Human Resource Development Officer. Respondents Dellosa, et al. protested the appointment of the petitioner to the position through the DPWH Task Force. Their contention was that since they are the next-in-rank employees, they should be appointed and not the petitioner. However, the said protest was dismissed on August 2, 1989. The matter was then brought to the Civil Service Commission. The CSC decided that, Medenilla, being contractual and considering her eligibility is non-eligible for the said position. A motion for reconsideration by the petitioner was filed, which was later on denied by the CSC. Thus, the matter was brought to the Supreme Court.


Whether or not the petitioner was denied due process of law by the CSC not giving notice to the petitioner the existence of an appeal filed in the CSC.

HELD: Petitioners contention is without merit. She was not deprived of due process since she petitioned a motion for reconsideration. Due process abhors not lack of previous notice but the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. The presence of a party is not always the cornerstone of due process. In the case at bar, any defect was cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration.

Mendiola v. CSC, 221 SCRA 295


The petitioner, an employee of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau was terminated from service on the ground of E.O. 127 issued by Pres. Aquino mandating the reorganization of the Department of Finance. The petitioner appealed to the Chairman of Appeals Board alleging that he was not informed of the cause of his dismissal and denied due process of law. His appeal was denied, thus, he subsequently appealed to the Civil Service Commission. The Commission resolved the case in petitioners favor and ordered that the petitioner be appointed to his previous position or to position of comparable or equitable rank without loss of seniority and with payment of back salaries. The petitioner filed a motion for execution base on the Resolution of the Commission. However, the motion was left un acted upon. Petitioner then found out that the Bureau filed a motion for reconsideration on the resolution. The commission, giving due courses to the motion for reconsideration set aside its previous resolution. Petitioner filed his Omnibus Motion for reconsideration with the Commission praying that the motion for reconsideration of the Bureau be stricken off the records and the Commissions Resolution on the motion for reconsideration be set aside. The Commission however, denied the Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process when the commission heard the Bureaus motion for reconsideration without notice to him.


With respect to petitioners contention that he was denied due process when the commission heard the bureaus motion for reconsideration without notice to him, the highest tribunal agree with the respondent bureaus argument that the defect was cured

by the filing by the petitioner of his omnibus motion. Thus, in Medenilla v. CSC, lack of notice to petitioner regarding the pending appeal and the hearing of said appeal was cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.

Rodriguez v. Project 6 Market Service Coop., Inc et al, GR 79968


The instant petition stems from Civil Case No. Q-45781 filed in 1984 by the Cooperative against petitioner with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 39, Quezon City. The Cooperative sought to eject petitioner from his market stall and recover from him arrears in his monthly rent over the property. Judgment was rendered by the MTC on November 28, 1985 ordering petitioner to vacate the leased premises and pay rent in arrears and until such time as he vacates the leased property.


Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of procedural due process when an order was issued without hearing, and though petitioner had subsequently moved for reconsideration.


Petitioner contends that he was deprived of procedural due process when the trial court issued the order of August 31, 1987 without any hearing and without him having been furnished a copy of the Cooperative's opposition to his motion to quash. However, petitioner admits that when he moved for reconsideration of said order, he received his copy of the opposition and respondent judge conducted a hearing on his motion. 17 Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.

Lazo v. CSC, 236 SCRA 469 FACTS:

The Civil Service Commission received a letter from a certain Efren L. Pagurayan, reporting that petitioner Dennis C. Lazo had boasted to him that he had bought his career service (subprofessional) eligibility from the Civil Service Commission for a certain amount. Acting on the report, the CSC directed its Regional Office at Tuguegarao, Cagayan to investigate the matter. The Regional Office found that the complainant was a fictitious individual and there being no witnesses to support the allegation in the letter, the Regional Office recommended dismissal of the matter. Considering the seriousness of the allegation in the letter, however, the CSC ordered the examination answer sheets of petitioner retrieved and hand-checked by the Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement. Upon discovery in anomaly (he actually got a failing grade), the CSC charged petitioner with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service, and ordered the Regional Office to conduct anew a formal investigation of the case. The case was again dismissed for lack of evidence; they had dismissed the administrative charge against him but had also revoked his eligibility for being null and void as Resolution No. 92-837. Petitioner asked for reconsideration, alleging that Resolution No. 92-837 was issued in violation of his right to due process and that the CSC had found him to have failed the Civil Service Examinations without evidence being presented to support the finding.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion and denied petitioner's right to due process by unilaterally revoking petitioner's eligibility without a formal investigation or an opportunity given to him to examine and go over his answer sheet in the Civil Service Examination.

HELD: Under the Constitution, the Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil service. Its power to issue a certificate of eligibility carries with it the power to revoke a certificate for being null and void.

The argument is made, however, that the CSC cannot motu propio revoke a certificate of eligibility without notice and hearing to the examinees concerned. While this is true as a general proposition, in the context of this case, which simply involves the rechecking of examination papers and nothing more than a re-evaluation of documents already in the records of the CSC according to a standard answer key previously set by it, notice and hearing was not required. The question before the CSC did not require any evidentiary hearing. Instead, what applied was the rule of res ipsa loquitur. Petitioner could have examined the rechecking of his examination papers and, if he found anything wrong, he could have asked for reconsideration. But, while he filed one in this case, he did not show that his score was really 76.46%. He simply argued that he should not be made to answer for an irregularity in which he had no participation and, on this basis, asked the CSC for a formal investigation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration remedied whatever defect there might have been in rechecking the examination papers of petitioner without his presence. 3 Petitioner was given the right to be heard, but, as already said, he did not make good use of it by showing that his actual score was 76.46%, and not 34.48%. For that matter, even here petitioner does not allege that his grade in the civil service examination is 76.46% and not 34.48%. All he is alleging is that he should have ben given a chance to see the examination sheet himself.

Stronghold Insurance v. CA 205 SCRA 605 FACTS:

The petitioner invokes due process to escape liability on a surety bond executed for the protection of a Filipino seaman. Acting on behalf of its foreign principal, Qatar National Fishing Co., Pan Asian Logistics and Trading, a domestic recruiting and placement agency, hired Adriano Urtesuela as captain of the vessel M/V Oryx for the stipulated period of twelve months. The required surety bond, in the amount of P50,000.00, was submitted by Pan Asian and Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., the herein petitioner, to answer for the liabilities of the employer. Urtesuela assumed his duties on April 18, 1982, but three months later his services were terminated and he was repatriated to Manila. He thereupon filed a complaint against Pan Asian and his former employer with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration for breach of contract and damages. In due time, the POEA rendered a decision in his favor for the amount of P6,374.94, representing his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract and the cash value of his unused vacation leave, plus attorney s fees and costs, which the respondents were required to pay. The judgment eventually became final and executory, not having been appealed on time. Pursuant thereto, a writ of execution was issued against Pan Asian but could be enforced only against its cash bond of P10,000.00, the company having ceased to operate. Urtesuela then filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission against Stronghold on the basis of the aforementioned surety bond and prayed for the value thereof plus attorney's fees and litigation costs.


Whether or not there was lack of due process for Stronghold Insurance.

HELD: No. Stronghold agreed to answer for whatever decision might be rendered against the principal, whether or not the surety was impleaded in the complaint and had the opportunity to defend itself. Petitioner agreed to answer for all liabilities that may be adjudged or imposed by the POEA against the principal. The right to be head is as often waived as it is invoked, and validly as long as the party is given an opportunity to be heard on his behalf. Due process is not violated where a person is not heard because he has chosen, for whatever reason, not to be heard. It should be obvious that if he opts to be silent where he has a right to speak, he cannot later be heard to complain the he was unduly silenced.

Feeder International Line v. CA 197 SCRA 842


The M/T "ULU WAI" foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on May 6, 1986 carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines. On May 14, 1986, the vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo customs authorities. The presence of the vessel only came to the knowledge of the Iloilo authorities by information of the civilian informer in the area. Acting on said information, the Acting District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a Customs team on May 19, 1986 to verify the report. The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the required ship and shipping documents, except for a clearance from the port authorities of Singapore clearing the vessel for "Zamboanga." In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention over the same was issued after due investigation. The petitioner then filed its Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants of Seizure and Detention contending that the sworn statements of Deposa and Torres were taken without assistance of counsel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sworn statements of Deposa and Torres were taken without assistance of counsel in violation of their constitutional right thereto.


The fact that the testimonies of Deposa and Torres were given without the assistance of counsel may not be considered an outright violation of their constitutional right to be assisted by counsel. The right to the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or a law. Exception is made in the charter only during the custodial investigation of a person suspected of a crime, who may not waive his right to counsel except in writing and in the presence of counsel, and during the trial of the accused, who has the right "to be heard by himself and counsel," either retained by him or provided for him by the government at its expense.

These guarantees are embodied in the Constitution, along with the other rights of the person facing criminal prosecution, because of the odds he must contend with to defend his liberty (and before even his life) against the awesome authority of the State. In other proceedings, however, the need for the assistance of counsel is not as urgent nor is it deemed essential to their validity. There is nothing in the Constitution that says a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that without such representation he will not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side. Besides, if ever there was any doubt as to the veracity of the sworn statements of Deposa and Torres, they should have been presented during any appropriate stage of the proceedings to refute or deny the statements they made. This was not done by petitioner. Hence, the presumption that official duty was regularly performed stands. In addition, petitioner does not deny that Torres is himself a lawyer. Finally, petitioner simply contends that the sworn statements were taken without the assistance of counsel but, however, failed to allege or prove that the same were taken under anomalous circumstances which would render them inadmissible as evidence against petitioner. We thus find no compelling reason to doubt the validity or veracity of the said sworn statements.

Alba v. Hon. Deputy Ombudsman, GR 120223 March 13, 1996

FACTS: Private respondents were among the twenty five (25) graduating students of the Arriesgado Institute of Medical Sciences Foundation, Inc. (AIMSFI) in Tagum, Davao who sought the intervention of petitioner in settling a dispute with the said school arising from the implementation of certain school policies. On March 20, 1994, petitioner scheduled a meeting with the students which led the private respondents and the other complaining students travelled all the way from Tagum, Davao to the DECS Office in Davao City on the said date, However, instead of conferring with the aggrieved students, petitioner instead met with the Arriesgado spouses-owners of AIMSFI - who admittedly did not even have a previous appointment with petitioner with the result that the students were left waiting at the anteroom for several hours. Anent this apparent incident, the students contacted respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, Cesar E. Nitorreda who was impelled to proceed to the DECS Office to admonish petitioner for not conferring with both parties at the same time in order to hear both sides of the controversy. Therefore, petitioner presided over the conference between the Arriesgados and the aggrieved students. On March 29, 1994, petitioner submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao (Office of the Ombudsman), a report on the said conference wherein he claimed that he had succeeded in facilitating an amicable settlement between the parties After both parties failed to attend the preliminary conference scheduled by the Graft Investigating Officer assigned to the case, a resolution dated April 28, 1995 was rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman finding petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b), (c) and (e) of R.A. 6713. When petitioners motion for reconsideration of the foregoing resolution was denied, he filed an Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction (petition). In a Resolution dated June 27, 1995, the said petition was dismissed on the ground that it was moot and academic because the questioned suspension of petitioner which was effective from May 26, 1995 to June 24, 1995 had already expired or became functus oficio on June 28, 1995 when the petition was filed. Alleging,first and foremost, a misreading of the correct date of filing of the said petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the thirty (30)-day suspension of Petitioner, without pay is un appealable.


The motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated June 27, 1995 is hereby denied. The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The constitutional requirement of due process may be satisfied notwithstanding the denial of the right to appeal for the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of ones case.

Telan v. CA 202 SCRA 534


Pedro rented a 750 sq. m lot from Luciano Sia. He set up an eatery and vulcanizing shop. His cousins, Roberto, Vicente and Virginia followed suit by setting up their own businesses. His cousins executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with Sia over the lot shared by Pedro and wife. Pedro received a Notice to Vacate from DPB and a demand letter from his cousin ordering the same. Roberto was able to secure a TCT under his name. With this new TCT, they filed a complaint against Pedro. Pedro and wife hired an attorney to defend them Lower court awarded possession of property to cousins. Pedro and his wife wanted to appeal but lawyer did not agree so they asked another person to sign the appeal for them. Pedro and wife met a certain Ernesto Palma in the eatery who pretended to be a lawyer.CA dismissed case because Pedro and wife was not able to file an appeal within the period required. Pedro and wife found out about the dismissal. Pedro and wife couldnt find the fake lawyer and filed a case against him. The judge of lower court issued a WRIT of DEMOLITION, writ for certiorari filed by Pedro with Urgent Prayer for TRO.


Whether or not the representation of the petitioner by a fake lawyer amounts to a deprivation of his right to counsel and hence a lack of due process.


YES. They lost their right to appeal when they lost their counsel. In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable. There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be different in civil cases. The preeminent right to due process of law applies not only to life and liberty but also to property. There can be no fair hearing unless a party, who is in danger of losing his house in which he and his family live and in which he has established a modest means of livelihood, is given the right to be heard by himself and counsel.

The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all time. A client is generally bound by the action of his counsel in the management of a litigation even by the attorneys mistake or negligence in procedural technique. But how can be there negligence by the counsel in the case at bar when the lawyer, turned out to be a fake? The affidavit of the petitioner, the sworn Petition, the Certifications of the Bar Confidants Office and the IBP, and the submitted records of criminal case against fake lawyer more than sufficiently establishes the existence of the fake lawyer.

Aris (Phils) Inc. v. NLRC 200 SCRA 246


Private respondents, who were employees of petitioner, aggrieved by management's failure to attend to their complaints concerning their working surroundings which had become detrimental and hazardous, requested for a grievance conference. As none was arranged, and believing that their appeal would be fruitless, they grouped together after the end of their work that day with other employees and marched directly to the management's office to protest its long silence and inaction on their complaints. The management issued a memorandum to each of the private respondents, who were identified by the petitioner's supervisors as the most active participants in the "rally", requiring them to explain why they should not be terminated from the service for their conduct. Despite their explanation, private respondents were dismissed for violation of company rules and regulations, more specifically of the provisions on security and public order and on inciting or participating in illegal strikes or concerted actions. Private respondents lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner and Mr. Gavino Bayan with the regional office of the NLRC at the National Capital Region, Manila. After due trial the labor arbiter ordered Aris (Phils.), Inc. to reinstate Leodegario de Guzman and company to their former respective positions or any substantial equivalent positions if already filled up, without loss of seniority right and privile,de Guzman and company filed a Motion For Issuance of a Writ of Execution pursuant to Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 which provides that In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, in so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided therein." Petitioner filed its Appeal. On 26 July 1989, the complainants, except Flor Rayos Del Sol, filed a Partial Appeal. On 10 August 1989, complainant Flor Rayos Del Sol filed a Partial Appeal. On 29 August 1989, petitioner filed an Opposition to the motion for execution alleging that Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 on execution pending appeal cannot be applied retroactively to cases pending at the time of its effectivity. Petitioner submitted a Rejoinder to the Reply on 5 September 1989. On 5 October 1989, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order granting the motion for execution and the issuance of a partial writ of execution "as far as reinstatement of herein complainants is concerned in consonance with the provision of Section 2 of the rules particularly the last sentence thereof."


Whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it relied on the constitutionality of the amendment introduced by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715 to Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.


The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the NLRC and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The SC held that execution pending appeal is interlinked with the right to appeal. One cannot be divorced from the other. The latter may be availed of by the losing party or a party who is not satisfied with a judgment, while the former may be applied for by the prevailing party during the pendency of the appeal. The right to appeal, however, is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. The law may then validly provide limitations or qualifications thereto or relief to the prevailing party in the event an appeal is interposed by the losing party. Execution pending appeal is one such relief long recognized in this jurisdiction. The Revised Rules of Court allows execution pending appeal and the grant thereof is left to the discretion of the court upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. Before its amendment by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6716, Article 223 of the Labor Code already allowed execution of decisions of the NLRC pending their appeal to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. These provisions are the quintessence of the aspirations of the workingman for recognition of his role in the social and economic life of the nation, for the protection of his rights, and the promotion of his welfare. The charge then that the challenged law as well as the implementing rule is unconstitutional is absolutely baseless. Laws are presumed constitutional.

Rivera v. CSC, 240 SCRA 43


Petitioner George I. Rivera was the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of the Philippines ("LBP"). On the basis of the affidavits of William Lao and Jesus C. Perez, petitioner was charged, on 01 February 1988, by the LBP President with having committed dishonesty, receiving gifts in the course of official duties, committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft laws, violation of CSC rules and regulations, and violation of Res. 87-A, R.A. No. 337; resulting to misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Once the charges were filed, Rivera was placed under preventive suspension (effective 19 February 1988). After a formal investigation, the LBP held Rivera guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the bank and in thereby receiving salaries and allowances in violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, of the Revised Civil Service Rules. He was also found to have transgressed the prohibition in Section 3, paragraph (d), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended). The penalty of forced resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon imposed on Rivera. On appeal, the decision was modified by the MPSB. The LBP filed a motion for the reconsideration of MSPB's decision, of which the latter denied the motion. The Commission resolves to dismiss the appeal of Respondent George Rivera. Moreover, the Commission finds him guilty of Grave Misconduct for which he is meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service.

ISSUE: WON the CSC committed grave abuse or discretion in imposing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated finding and conclusions.


The Court resolved to dismiss the petition for petitioner's failure to sufficiently show that CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its questioned resolution. Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of the petition, now strongly

asserting that he was denied due process when Hon. Thelma P. Gaminde, who earlier participated in her capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken action on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CSC. The Court, in its resolution of 05 July 1994, resolved to grant the motion, to reinstate the petition and to require respondents to comment thereon. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, then reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. The argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990 is unacceptable. It is not denied that she did participate, indeed has concurred, in MSPB's resolution of 03 March 1994, denying the motion for reconsideration of MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990.

Central Bank v. CA, 220 SCRA 536


Based on examination reports submitted by the Supervision and Examination Sector (SES), Department II, of the Central Bank (CB) "that the financial condition of TSB is one of insolvency and its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors and creditors," the Monetary Board (MB) issued on 31 May 1985 Resolution No. 596 ordering the closure of TSB, forbidding it from doing business in the Philippines, placing it under receivership, and appointing Ramon V. Tiaoqui as receiver. On 1 July 1985, the trial court temporarily restrained petitioners from implementing MB Resolution No. 596 "until further orders", thus prompting them to move for the quashal of the restraining order (TRO) on the ground that it did not comply with said Sec. 29, i.e., that TSB failed to show convincing proof of arbitrariness and bad faith on the part of petitioners;' and, that TSB failed to post the requisite bond in favor of Central Bank.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner was denied substantive due process.


Contrary to the notion of private respondent, Sec. 29 does not contemplate prior notice and hearing before a bank may be directed to stop operations and placed under receivership. When par. 4 (now par. 5, as amended by E.O. 289) provides for the filing of a case within ten (10) days after the receiver takes charge of the assets of the bank, it is unmistakable that the assailed actions should precede the filing of the case. Plainly, the legislature could not have intended to authorize "no prior notice and hearing" in the closure of the bank and at the same time allow a suit to annul it on the basis of absence thereof. "The charge of lack of due process in the complaint may be taken as constitutive of allegations of arbitrariness and bad faith. This is not of course to be taken as meaning that there must be previous hearing before the Monetary Board may exercise its powers under Section 29 of its Charter. Rather, judicial review of such action not being

foreclosed, it would be best should private respondent be given the chance to show and prove arbitrariness and bad faith in the issuance of the questioned resolution, especially so in the light of the statement of private respondent that neither the bank itself nor its officials were even informed of any charge of violating banking laws. Respondent judge acted in plain disregard of the fourth paragraph of Section 29 of the Central Bank Act when he restrained the petitioners from closing and liquidating the Rural Bank of Libmanan, prevented them from performing their functions, and ordered them to return the management and control of the rural bank to its Board of Directors without receiving convincing proof that the action of the Central Bank was plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith

Philippine Merchant Marine School v. CA L 112844 June 2, 1995


DECS received reports that petitioner enrolled freshmen for its maritime programs which were ordered phased out effective SY 1989-1990 and was thus without prior government authorization and/or in violation of any of the terms and conditions of said permit or recognition; directed that in accordance with the phase-out order, petitioner's Manila campus is allowed to operate only the 2nd, 3rd and 4th years of the authorized maritime programs which shall be gradually phased out; and, required petitioner to comment on the reported unauthorized enrolment. Petitioner moved for reconsideration stating that the finding that it had not complied with the minimum requirements was that as early as 21 June 1989 it filed a letter requesting reconsideration and that since there was no reply it believed that the letter order was reconsidered sub-silencio and that petitioner was allowed to enrol 1st year students for SY 1989-1990; and, that it had undertaken improvements in all of its facilities in compliance with DECS requirements. In this regard, it requested another inspection of its premises. Petitioner failed another inspection made thus petitioner moved to reconsider the phase-out order in its letter of 21 May 1990, which request was denied by the DECS Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed the matter to respondent Office of the President which the latter opined Mere alleged efforts to improve the facilities and equipment do not warrant the reversal of our previous resolution. It bears stressing as the records may show that the phase-out order of DECS was based not only on PMMSI's failure to provide adequate equipment and facilities but also on PMMSI's failure to comply with the standard requirements prescribed for a school site. While said phase-out may not be final and executory, there was no reason for PMMSI to offer maritime courses without the requisite prior authority of the DECS. PMMSI possessed no valid permit prior to the issuance of the phase-out. Petitioner asseverates that the DECS denied its right to a hearing on the supposed deficiencies which allegedly justified denial of its request for issuance of a renewal permit. Likewise, the DECS denied petitioner the opportunity to correct such deficiencies. The Office of the President totally ignored supervening events properly brought to its attention in the letters of petitioner dated 2 and 3 October 1992.


WON petitioner was denied due process as it was not provided a chance to explain itself.


The assertion of petitioner that it was deprived of its right to a hearing and any opportunity whatsoever to correct the alleged deficiencies readily collapses. The earlier narration of facts clearly demonstrates that before the DECS issued the phase-out and closure orders, petitioner was duly notified, warned and given several opportunities to correct its deficiencies and to comply with pertinent orders and regulations. Petitioner has gone all the way up to the Office of the President to seek a reversal of the phase-out and closure orders. There is thus no reason to complain of lack of opportunity to explain its side as well as to comply with the alleged deficiencies. As long as the parties were given opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered, the demands of due process were sufficiently met.

Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502


MWSS conducted bidding for two projects concerning its water distribution system in Metro Manila. The Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturers Association (PLDPPMA) then questioned the award of the projects with the Office of the O m b u d s m a n ( V a s q u e z) , charging an apparent plan on the part of the MWSS to favor certain suppliers (those offering fiberglass pipes over those offering steel pipes) through the technical specifications, and urging the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation thereon and hold in abeyance the award of the contracts. The Ombudsman then issued the assailed order, directing the MWSS to: set aside the recommendation of a n MWSS committee to award the contact to a contractor offering fiberglass pipes, and award the subject contract to a complying and responsive bidder- the officials of MWSS filed the instant petition with the SC, contending that the ombudsman acted beyond the competence of his office when he assumed jurisdiction over the complaint, when the same is clearly among the excepted cases enumerated in the Ombudsman Act. Also, that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion by arbitrarily and capriciously interfering with the exercise of sound discretion of the MWSS.


WON the Ombudsman had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint filed by the PLDPPMA and correspondingly issue the challenged orders.


NO. Reasoning on the basis of all the provisions regarding the Office of the Ombudsman, Solicitor-General insists that the authority of the Ombudsman is sufficiently broad enough to cloth it with sufficient power to look into the alleged irregularities in the bidding conducted by the MWSS- The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasance committed by public officers.

It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses 'all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.- the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman have generally been categorized into: Investigatory Power; Prosecutory Power; Public Assistance Functions; Authority to Inquire and Obtain Information; and Function to Adopt, Institute and Implement. While the broad authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission which " appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient" may be yielded, it is difficult to equally concede, however, that the Constitution and the Law have intended to likewise confer upon it veto or revisory power over an exercise of judgment or discretion by an agency or officer upon whom that judgment or discretion is law fully vested. It seems that the Ombudsman, in issuing the challenged orders, has not only directly assumed jurisdiction over, but likewise pre-empted the exercise of discretion by, the Board of Trustees of MWSS. Indeed, there commendation of the MWSS Committee to award the contract appears to be yet pending consideration and action by the MWSS Board of Trustees. We can only view the assailed order to be more of an undue interference in the adjudicative responsibility of the MWSS Board of Trustees rather than a mere directive requiring the proper observance of and compliance with the law.

American Inter-Fashion Corp. v. Office of the President, 197 SCRA 409


This case arose from an April 24, 1984 ruling of the GTEB that respondent Glorious Sun was guilty of misdeclaration of imported raw materials resulting in dollar salting abroad and, therefore, its export quotas should be cancelled. Its quotas were given to two newly-formed corporations-De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation (De Soleil and the American Inter-Fashion Corporation (AIFC). These two corporations were joint ventures of the Hongkong investors and majority stockholders of Glorious Sun on one hand and, allegedly, a member of the family and a crony of President Marcos on the other. The Office of the President set aside the GTEB decision and remanded the case for genuine hearings where due process would be accorded both parties. The petitioner now alleges that the GTEB decision is res judicata and that Glorious Sun was given every opportunity to be heard by the Board.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Malacaang decision suffers from grave abuse of discretion.


The cancellation of the export quotas of the private respondent was a violation of its constitutional right to due process by GTEB. Before the cancellation in 1984, private respondent had been enjoying export quotas as early as 1977. In effect, the private respondent is export quota allocation which was initially a privilege evolved into some form of property right which should not be removed from it arbitrarily and without due process only to hurriedly confer it to another. While it is true that such allocations were mere privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, the privileges have been accorded to private respondent for so long that they have become impressed with property rights especially since not only do these privileges determine the continued existence of private respondent but also the livelihood of its workers

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148560 (Nov. 19, 2001)


Petitioner Joseph Estrada, prosecuted under An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens real in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, these terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.


W/N the assailed law is vague and therefor invalid.


It is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: it violates due process for failure of the conduct to avoid and it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provision and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The plunder Law under which Estrada is being prosecuted is not vague .The words series and combination of crimes can be understood in their ordinary meaning.

CIR v. CA 261 SCRA 236


A task force was created to investigate tax liabilities of manufacturers engaged in tax evasion schemes. The CIR issued Rev. Memo Circ. No. 37-93 which reclassified certain cigarette brands manufactured by private respondent Fortune Tobacco Corp. (Fortune) as foreign brands subject to a higher tax rate. On August 3, 1993, Fortune questioned the validity of said reclassification as being violative of the right to due process and equal protection of laws. The CTA, on September 8, 1993 resolved that said reclassification was of doubtful legality and enjoined its enforcement. Fortune was assessed deficiency income, ad valorem and VAT for 1992 with payment due within 30 days from receipt. Private respondent moved for reconsideration of said assessment. Meanwhile, the Commissioner filed a complaint with the DOJ against private respondent Fortune, its corporate officers and 9 other corporations and their respective corporate officers for alleged fraudulent tax evasion for non-payment of the correct income, ad valorem and VAT for 1992. The complaint was referred to the DOJ Task Force on revenue cases which found sufficient basis to further investigate the charges against Fortune.

ISSUE: Whether the basis of private respondents tax liability first be settled before any complaint for fraudulent tax evasion can be initiated.


Fraud cannot be presumed. If there was fraud on willful attempt to evade payment of ad valorem taxes by private respondent through the manipulation of the registered wholesale price of the cigarettes, it must have been with the connivance of cooperation of certain BIR officials and employees who supervised and monitored Fortunes production activities to see to it that the correct taxes were paid. But there is no allegation, much less evidence, of BIR personnels malfeasance at the very least, there is the presumption that BIR personnel performed their duties in the regular course in ensuring that the correct taxes were paid by Fortune. Before the tax liabilities of Fortune are finally determined, it cannot be correctly asserted that private respondents have willfully attempted to evade or defeat any tax under Sects. 254 and 256, 1997 NIRC, the fact that a tax is due must first be proved.

Conti v. NLRC 271 SCRA 114


Petitioners were employees of Corfarm Holdings Corp. who operates and manages the Manila Electric Company commissary. Petitioners contract was coterminous with the effectivity of the contract executed by and between Corfarm and MERALCO.The contract between Corfarm and MERALCO expired, however, Corfarm continued to operate the MERALCO commissary without renewing the contract. Petitioner s received a memorandum on January 13, 1993 dated January 12, 1993 terminating their services on the said date for 2 reasons: 1) the expiration of their employment contracts, these being coterminous with the management contract between Corfarm and MERALCO, and; 2) the on-going evaluation of their past performances, and investigation of the internal auditor of Corfarm of certain anomalous transactions involving the petitioners. The latter contend that they were denied with due process when they were dismissed without a written notice and a hearing as required by law.


Whether or not the petitioners were denied of due process.


The court consistently held that the twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute essential elements of due process in the dismissal of employees. As to the requirement of notice, it has been held that the employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (a) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and; (b) subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. With regard to the requirement of a hearing, this Court has held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, and not that an actual hearing should always and indispensably be held.

Joson v. Executive Secretary 290 SCRA 279


The case at bar involves the validity of the suspension from office of petitioner Eduardo Nonato Joson as Governor of the province of Nueva Ecija. On July 11, 1997, on recommendation of DILG Secretary Barbers, Executive Secretary Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the President, placing petitioner under preventive suspension for sixty (60) days pending investigation of the charges against him. On September 17, 1996, private respondents filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint dated September 13, 1996 charging petitioner with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. On June 24, 1997, petitioner, through counsel, filed a "Motion to Dismiss." Petitioner alleged that the letter-complaint was not verified on the day it was filed with the Office of the President; and that the DILG had no jurisdiction over the case and no authority to require him to answer the complaint. Likewise, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals challenging the order of preventive suspension and the order of default.

ISSUE: W/N the rules of procedure & evidence should be applied in the administrative disciplinary & clearly punitive proceeding? HELD:

Yes, the Court ruled that the rules of procedure and evidence should also be applied in administrative disciplinary & clearly punitive proceedings. Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local officials are governed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, and Administrative Order No. 23 entitled "Prescribing the Rules and Procedures on the Investigation of Administrative Disciplinary Cases Against Elective Local Officials of Provinces, Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities, and Cities and Municipalities in Metropolitan Manila." In all matters not provided in A.O. No. 23, the Rules of Court and the Administrative Code of 1987 apply in a suppletory character. In the instant case, petitioner Joson is an elective official of the province of Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint against him was therefore properly filed with the Office of the President. According to petitioner, however, the letter-complaint failed to conform with

the formal requirements set by the Code. He alleges that the complaint was not verified by private respondents and was not supported by the joint affidavit of the two witnesses named therein. But even assuming, that the letter-complaint was unverified when submitted to the Office of the President, the defect was not fatal. The requirement of verification was deemed waived by the President himself when he acted on the complaint.

Marcos v. Sandigabayan 12 LR 6 N98


The former first lady Imelda Marcos was found guilty by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan of violating 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After conviction she filed a "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and treatment by practitioners of oriental medicine in China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening medical condition" requiring facilities not available in the Philippines that was denied. Then she again filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel abroad" to undergo diagnosis and treatment in China. This was supported by several medical reports that were prepared by her doctor Roberto Anastacio. Again another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. Marcos to US and Europe for treatment of several Heart diseases alleging that the tests were not available here. The presiding justice, Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-inCharge of the Philippine Heart Center, and later wrote him a letter, asking for "expert opinion on coronary medicine". The court still found no merit to allow the petitioners motion to leave and denied all of the motions. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to Admit Clinical Summary and to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration." Attached was a recent medical report and letters of Vice President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of petitioner and those of twenty four members of the House of Representatives requesting the court to allow petitioner to travel abroad. This was also denied by the Court also stating their express disapproval of the involvement of the VP and the Cabinet members so as to influence the resolutions, decisions or orders or any judicial action of respondent court.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the Sandiganbayan erred in disallowing the Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad because it (1) disregarded the medical findings (2) it motu propio contacted a third party asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings (3) said that there was no necessity to get medical treatment abroad.

HELD: No. The contention of the petitioner that was invalid to contact a third party asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings was erroneous. Respondent court had to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her physician. The court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in resolving her request for permission to travel. What would be

objectionable would be if respondent court obtained information without disclosing its source to the parties and used it in deciding a case against them. In disregarding the medical reports, the petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad. It should be emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts in several cases, in two of which she was convicted although the decision is still pending reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country and the burden was on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek medical treatment in foreign countries. On the third issue, the Court ordered petitioner to undergo several tests which summarily states that the required medical treatment was available here in the Philippines and that the expertise and facilities here were more than adequate to cater to her medical treatment. The heart ailments of the petitioner were not as severe as that was reported by Dr. Anastacio.

Pafianco v. Moral, 322 SCRA 439


Former DECS Secretary filed an administrative complaint against respondent for dishonesty. She was dismissed. Respondent filed a petition for mandamus to compel petitioner to furnish her a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report. It was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not a respondent in an administrative case is entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of the investigating committee.


A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent had been accorded these rights.

Roxas v. CA 321 SCRA 106


Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Congress passed the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. Before the law's effectivity, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL. Petitioner applied with the DAR for conversion of Haciendas Palico and Banilad from agricultural to non-agricultural lands under the provisions of the CARL. Despite petitioner's application for conversion, respondent DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two Haciendas. The LBP trust accounts as compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by respondent DAR with cash and LBP bonds. On October 22, 1993, respondent DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award and they were distributed to farmer beneficiaries. Petitioner, sent a letter to the Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS (voluntary offer to sell) of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. Respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification of the land would not exempt it from agrarian reform, hence it denied the withdrawal. On August 24, 1993, petitioner instituted a Case with respondent DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying for the cancellation of the CLOAs issued by respondent DAR in the name of several persons. Petitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are located, had been declared a tourist zone, that the land is not suitable for agricultural production, and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the land to non-agricultural. On October 29, 1993, petitioner filed with the CA questioning the expropriation of its properties under the CARL and the denial of due process in the acquisition of its landholdings, but it was denied.


WON respondent DAR failed to comply the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings.


Yes. For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are required: (1) the Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. The procedure in the sending of these notices is important to comply with the requisites of due process especially when the owner, as in this case, is a juridical entity. Petitioner is a domestic corporation, and therefore, has a personality separate and distinct from its shareholders, officers and employees. The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage and the letter of invitation to the conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the States police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The CARL w as not intended to take away property without due process of law. The exercise of the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the taking of private property. In the entire acquisition proceedings, respondent DAR disregarded the basic requirements of administrative due process.

Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita 330 SCRA 153, GR 130442, April 6, 2000


Respondent was charged with 12 administrative complaints which were consolidated into one major complaint, which is, conduct unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board suspended respondent from service for 20 days, for simple irregularity in the performance of service. The Board later found respondent to have committed a breach of internal discipline by taking alcoholic drinks while on duty.


Whether or not the Simple Irregularity in the Performance of Duty of having alcohol in his breadth is proper.


NO. While the definition of the more serious offense is broad and almost all encompassing a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light for which one is not properly charge and tried cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentary requirements of due process.

Sec. of Justice v. Lantion, 343 SCRA 377, GR. 139465, Oct. 17, 2000


The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US Attempt to evade or defeat tax Fraud by wire, radio, or television False statement or entries Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request.

ISSUE: WON an extradite has a right of access to the evidence against him.


During the executive phase of an extradition proceeding, an extradite does not have the right to access the evidence in the hands of the government. But during the Judicial Phase, he has.

Government of the USA v. Purganan 389 SCRA 623 Sept. 24, 2002


Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty.

ISSUE: Whether or not extradite is entitled to notice and hearing before issuance of warrant of arrest.


It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extradite. In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions. That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondents demonstrated predisposition to flee.

Lazaro v. CA 330 SCRA 208 April 6, 2000


Herein petitioner Marlyn Lazaro received from complainant Rudy Chua the amount of Ninety Thousand (P90,000.00) Pesos as advance payment for deliveries of sugar, cigarettes and luncheon meat ordered by the latter from Lazaro who is a businesswoman. Petitioner made a partial delivery of the ordered goods worth Eighteen Thousand (Pl8, 000.00) Pesos. Petitioner was unable to deliver, the rest of goods ordered by Chua. Petitioner, as a refund of the amount of Seventy-Two Thousand (P72,000.00) Pesos, issued Prudential Bank Check No. 599175 dated 28 October 1989 for the aforementioned amount, complainant Chua deposited the check in his account. The check was dishonored by the bank and stamped "Account Closed." To make up for the dishonor, Lazaro indorsed Trader's Royal Bank Check No. 393173 by a certain Lolita Soriano and payable "to cash". The check which was dated 18 November 1989 was likewise dishonored and marked "Account Closed." Chua then sent, demand latter to Lazaro asking for the payment of the Seventy-Two Thousand (P72, 000.00) Pesos covered by the first check within five (5) days from receipt of the letter.For failure of the accused to pay the amount, Chua filed complaints for estafa and violation of B.P. 22 against Lazaro.of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 86, Quezon City rendered a joint decision finding the accused, MARLYN LAZARO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of B.P. 22. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in a decision ** dated 31 March 1992 affirmed the trial court decision in toto. A motion for reconsideration was denied on 15 May 1992.


Whether or not respondent committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to denying petitioner's due process of law in disregarding the fact that the amount which is covered by (the) check in question has already been paid by petitioner when she executed a deed of sale in favor of private complainant of her car.


Petitioner's argument is without merit. In prosecutions for violation of BP 22, prejudice or damage is not a pre-requisite for conviction. That the obligation of Marlyn Lazaro to complainant Chua has been extinguished by the conveyance by the former of her car to Chua does not also justify the cancellation of the indemnity awarded. It should be noted that BP 22 provides that a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the dishonored check may be imposed by the court. This is the only logical conclusion since the law does not require that there be damage or prejudice to the individual complainant by reason of the issuance of the worthless check.

Agabon v. NLRC 442 SCRA 573, GR 158693, Nov. 17, 2004


Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioner Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissal illegal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision because it found that the petitioners had abandoned their work and were not entitled to back wages and separation pay. The Court of Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was not illegal because they had abandoned their employment. The Agabons further appealed to the SC, disputing the finding of abandonment, and claiming that the company did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing.


Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.


The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employees last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.

When the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights. The petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 23, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 63017, finding that petitioners Jenny and Virgilio Agabon abandoned their work, and ordering private respondent to pay each of the petitioners holiday pay for four regular holidays from 1996 to 1998, in the amount of P6,520.00, service incentive leave pay for the same period in the amount of P3,255.00 and the balance of Virgilio Agabons thirteenth month pay for 1998 in the amount of P2,150.00 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is further ORDERED to pay each of the petitioners the amount of P30,000.00 as nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.

9. Substantive Due Process US v. Toribio 15 Phil. 85


Appellant slaughtered for human consumption a carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality where it was slaughtered, therefore violating sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an act regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle. It was found out that there is no municipal slaughterhouse in Carmen, Bohol, where the animal was slaughtered. Appellants contention was that since there was no slaughterhouse in said place, neither prohibition nor the penalty is applicable to cases of slaughter of large cattle without a permit in that municipality. The purpose Act 1147 is to prevent thieves to dispose the large cattle easily. Also, it is to prevent the slaughter for food of the carabaos fit for agricultural and draft purposes, and all animals unfit for human consumption. The appellant did apply for permit but was denied because the animal was not unfit for agricultural work or draft purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the laws which interfere with life, liberty, or property satisfy substantive due process.


To justify the State in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear that the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class require such interference, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon the individuals.

Churchill v. Rafferty 32 Phil. 580


The case arises from the fact that defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, would like to destroy or remove any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be offensive to the sight. The plaintiffs allege otherwise.


W/N there is a valid exercise of police power in this case.


Yes. Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the right of the State and of the public to self-protection.

People v. Fajardo 104 Phil. 443


Herein appellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.


No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

Ermita-Malate Hotel & Operator v. City of Manila 20 SCRA 849


The Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760 which has the following provisions: 1. It would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times.. 4. It prohibits a person less than 18 years old (minor) from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, and tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian. 5. It makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. With this, Petitioners who were operators of hotels and motels filed a petition against respondent assailing the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 4760.


Whether or not the police power is valid.


No. Police power has been characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers extending as it does to all the great public needs. Negatively it has been defined as that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare society.

Ynot v. Intermediate Court of Appeals 148 SCRA 659


Petitioner assails constitutionality of E.O. No. 626-A prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. E.O. No. 626-A was held unconstitutional for violating the due process clause. Petitioner Restituto Ynot had transmitted 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac for violating Executive Order No. 626-A- Executive Order No. 626-A prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. Carabao/carabeef transported in violation of E.O. 626-A shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions as Chairman of National Meat Inspection may see fit (carabeef) and to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit (carabao).This amended E.O. 626; the latter prohibiting only the slaughter of carabaos of age. Petitioner sued for recovery; RTC issued writ of replevin after petitioner filed supersedes bond of P 12,000.00. Trial Court confiscation of carabaos sustained; ordered confiscation of the bond; declined to rule on the constitutionality of the E.O. for lack of authority and its presumed validity.

Issue: Whether or not EO 626-A is constitutional. Held: The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional.

Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195


Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Letter of Instruction 229 and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner Romeo Edu. His car already had warning lights and did not want to use this. The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device installed on a vehicle to reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked cars. The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of the acquisition cost. The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street or highway for 30 minutes and it was mandatory.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Is the constitutional.


Yes on both. Petition dismissed. Police power is nothing more or less than the power of government inherent in every sovereignty. There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity. There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesnt violate any constitutional provision. LOI 229 doesnt force motor vehicle owners to pu rchase the reflector from the LTO. It only prescribes the requirement from any source. The objective is public safety.

Balacuit v. CFI 163 SCRA 182


Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit, Lamberto Tan, and Sergio YU caral, managers of Mayor and Dalisay theaters, the crown theater, and the Diamond theater, respectively, aggrieved by the effect ordinance No. 640, they filed a complaint before the court of First Instance of Agusan Del Norte and Butuan City, praying that the Ordinance No. 640 be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and uncomfortable.


Whether or not the ordinance is valid.


No. For the benefit of parents that the cost is passed on to cinema owners .There is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals, and the general welfare.

National Development Co. and New Agrix v. Phil. Vet. Bank 192 SCRA 257


The particular enactment in question is Pres. Decree No. 1717, which ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of Companies to be administered mainly by the National Development Company. The law outlined the procedure for filing claims against the Agrix companies and created a Claims Committee to process these claims. Especially relevant to this case, and noted at the outset, is Sec. 4(1) thereof providing that "all mortgages and other liens presently attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations are hereby extinguished." Earlier, the Agrix Marketing, Inc. (AGRIX) had executed in favor of private respondent Philippine Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978, over three (3) parcels of land situated in Los Baos, Laguna. During the existence of the mortgage, AGRIX went bankrupt. It was for the expressed purpose of salvaging this and the other Agrix companies that the aforementioned decree was issued by President Marcos.

ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1717 is a valid regulation.


The contention is that this inherent power of the state may be exercised at any time for this purpose so long as the taking of the property right, even if based on contract, is done with due process of law. The police power is not a panacea for all constitutional maladies. Neither does its mere invocation conjure an instant and automatic justification for every act of the government depriving a person of his life, liberty or property. A legislative act based on the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. In more familiar words, a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, should justify the interference of the state; and b) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Applying these criteria to the case at bar, the Court finds first of all that the interests of the public are not sufficiently involved to warrant the interference of the government with the private contracts of AGRIX.

Maranaw Hotel v. NLRC 238 SCRA 190


Eddie Damalerio, a room attendant of the Century Park Sheraton Hotel, operated by Maranaw Hotel and Resort Corporation, was seen by hotel guest Jamie Glaser with left hand inside the latters suitcase. Confronted with what he was doing, Damalerio explained that he was trying to tidy up the room. Not satisfied with the explanation of Damalerio, Glaser lodged a written complaint before William D. Despuig, shift-in-charge of security of the hotel. Damalerio was given a Disciplinary Action Notice (DAN). The next day, an administrative hearing was conducted on the matter. Taking the witness stand on his own behalf, Damalerio denied the accusation against him. Damalerio received a memorandum issued by the Floor Supervisor, bearing the approval of the Executive Housekeeper, stating that he (Damalerio) was found to have committed qualified theft in violation of House Rule No. 1, Section 3 of Hotel Rules and Regulations. The same memorandum served as a notice of termination of his employment. On May 19, 1992, Damalerio filed with the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner who ordered the respondents to reinstate him to his former or equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and with back wages from April 15, 1992 when he was preventively suspended up to actual reinstatement and other benefits. From the aforesaid Labor Arbiters disposition, the petitioner appealed to the NLRC, which modified the appealed decision by giving petitioner the option of paying Damalerio a separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, instead of reinstating him.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that petitioner failed to adduce conclusive evidence in support of its version of the incident.


The petition is barren of merit. Records disclose petitioners failure to substantiate such imputation against the private respondent. During the investigation presided over by the

Labor Arbiter, Damalerio narrated a plausible and satisfactory explanation for his behavior complained of. Although it was not completely proper for Damalerio to be touching the things of a hotel guest while cleaning the hotel rooms, the dismissal of Damalerio was unwarranted. To be sure, the investigation held by the hotel security people did not unearth enough evidence of culpability. It bears repeating that subject hotel guest lost nothing. Albeit petitioner may have reasons to doubt the honesty and trustworthiness of Damalerio, as a result of what happened, absent sufficient proof of guilt, he (Damalerio), who is a rank-and-file employee, cannot be legally dismissed. Unsubstantiated suspicions and baseless conclusions by employers are not legal justification for dismissing employees. The burden of proving the existence of a valid and authorized cause of termination is on the employer. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the employee, in keeping with the principle of social justice enshrined in the Constitution.

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties 234 SCRA 255


There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353 and on January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93. Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance by the Local Government. 3353 and 3375-93 are valid exercises of police power


No. Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policies announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

Bennis v. Michigan No. 94-8729 March 4, 1996

FACTS: Bennis husband was convicted of gross indecency following his sexual activity with a prostitute in the couple's jointly-owned car. The local county prosecutor filed a complaint alleging the car was a public nuisance subject to abatement (i.e., to eliminate or confiscate the car). The Circuit Court entered the abatement order, but the Appeals Court reversed. After granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the appellate court's decision and re-entered the abatement order. Bennis appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the abatement order entered against Bennis car constitute a taking of private property for public use in violation of the property clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. HELD: Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist held that the abatement order against Bennis's car did not violate the takings clause. Her innocence and lack of knowledge concerning her husband's illegal and indecent activity, in the couple's jointly owned car, could not serve as a defense against her vehicle's forfeiture. Furthermore, under the present circumstances, the vehicle's forfeiture did not violate Bennis's property rights without due process. Michigan's abatement policy, aimed at deterring criminal uses of property, lawfully transferred hes vehicle to the state. As such, Michigan is not required to compensate Bennis for the vehicle's forfeiture.

Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri No. 88-1503 June 25 1990


Petitioner was involved in a car accident, which left her in a persistent vegetative state. In order to feed her and to facilitate her recovery, surgeons implanted into her a gastronomy feeding and hydration tube. After it become apparent that Cruzan had virtually no chance for recovery, Petitioners, Cruzans parent s, asked hospital employees to terminate the life support procedures. The State hospital employees refused to honor this request without court approval. After trial, on appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court refused to order termination of the life-support, because clear and convincing evidence was not produced to show that Cruzan herself would have chosen to refuse treatment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cruzan have a right under the United States Constitution that would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment.


No and No. The Missouri Supreme Court is affirmed. Prior decisions support the principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing medical treatment under the Due Process Clause. But incompetent persons do not enjoy the same rights, because they cannot make voluntary and informed decisions. The right to terminate life-sustaining treatment of an incompetent, if it is to be exercised, must be done for such incompetent by a surrogate. Missouris interest in the preservation of life is unquestionably a valid State interest. The Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as a right to refuse life-saving treatment. Missouri may legitimately safeguard these personal decisions by imposing heightened evidentiary requirements. Moreover, even when available, family members will not always act in the best interests of a patient. The State is entitled to safeguard against such abuses.

JMM Promotion and Management Inc. v. CA 260 SCRA 319

FACTS: Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with the introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the Secretary of DOLE sought a 4-step plan (to realize the plan) which included an Artists Record Book which a performing artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of talent Managers of the Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.


The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police power. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to high risk destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.

Corona v. United Harbor 283 SCRA 31


The case arose when Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) General Manager issued an Administrative order No. 04-92, whose avowed policy was to instill effective discipline and thereby afford better protection to the ports users trough improvement of pilot age services. Where all existing regular appointments to harbor pilot positions shall remain valid only up to December 30 of the current year and that henceforth all appointments to harbor pilot positions shall be only a term for one year from date of effectivity, subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the PPA after conduct of rigid evaluation of performance. Pilotage as a profession may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals, who have to pass five government professional examinations. The Harbor Pilot Association challenged the validity of the said order arguing that it violated the harbor pilots right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law and that the said administrative order was issued without prior notice and hearing. But the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier on the ground that PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPA jurisdictional area. Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC Manila, and ruled that AO No. 04-92 is declared null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not (PPA AO 04-92) violated the due process of pilots.


The right of the pilots to due process was violated. The court held that pilotage as a profession is a property right protected by guarantee of due process. The pre-evaluation cancellation of the licenses of the harbor pilots every year is unreasonable and violated their right to substantive due process. The issuance of Administrative Order also violated procedural due process, since no prior public hearing was conducted.

Kelly v. Johnson 425 US 238


Kelley was a police officer who wanted to wear his hair in a length and style contrary to local police standards. Kelley brought an action to invalidate the local regulation. The lower courts sustained the attack, requiring the police department to establish a genuine public need for the regulation.

ISSUE: Whether the hair-grooming and hair-length regulations at issue violated Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by infringing upon liberty interests.


The Court upheld the grooming regulations for police officers, thereby limiting the scope of privacy concerns. The Courts holding established that there is no protected liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment when it comes to personal appearance, distinguishing the case from those that impact an individuals choice with respect to basic and fundamental matters of procreation, marriage, sexual relations, and family life.

Chavez v. Romulo 431 SCRA 534 (2004)


President Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She directed the then respondent PNP Chief, to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Fire arms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR), thus: Acting on President Arroyos directive, respondent issued the assailed guidelines in the implementation of the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence. Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition. He contends that the PNP Guidelines violate the due process clause of the Constitution because: 1. the right to own and carry firearm is necessarily intertwined with the peoples inherent right to life and to protect life: and 2. the ownership and carrying of firearms are constitutionally protected property rights which cannot be taken without due process of law and without just cause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the PNP Guidelines violate the due process clause of the constitution.

Held: Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights.

10. Equal Protection of the Law People v. Cayat 68 PHIL. 12, 18


The accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province was sentenced by the justice of the peace of court of Baguio for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3). At the trial, Cayat admitted all the facts alleged in the information that on or about the January 25, 1937, in the City of Baguio, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him.


Whether or not there is a prohibition classification.


No, but the classification must be reasonable, must rest on substantial distinctions, must be germane to the purpose of the law, must not be limited to existing conditions only, must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Ichong v. Hernandez 101 PHIL. 1155


Petitioner is questioning the validity and constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significant. The enactment poses questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. The legislation in question is RA 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate the Retail Business, which provides, among others, that (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending, among others, that: RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law. For their part, respondents argues that ) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival.

ISSUE: W/N RA 1180 violates the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.


No. The Court ruled that the Act is valid and does not violate the constitutional guaranty of equal protection of laws and of due process. According to the Court, the Act in question was approved in the exercise of the police power of the State. Police power and the constitutional guarantees to equal protection of laws and of due process are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.

There can be no absolute power, whoever exercises it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270


An ordinance of the City of Manila prohibited the employment of aliens in any occupation or business unless they first secured a permit from the Mayor of Manila and paid a fee of P500. Respondent, an alien, employed in Manila, brought suit and obtained judgment from the CFI declaring the ordinance null and void.


WON said ordinance is valid

HELD: No. The ordinance is a tax measure. In imposing a flat rate of P500, it failed to consider substantial differences in situations among aliens and for that reason violates the rule on uniformity of taxation. It also lays down no guide for granting/denying the permit and therefore permits the arbitrary exercise of discretion by the Mayor. The Court explained that the ordinance did not provide a standard for the classification of aliens between those who could avail of permits and those who could not. The Supreme Court further held that the equal protection act can be violated when a governmental act fails to classify. Finally, the ordinance denies aliens due process and the equal protection of the laws.

Dumlao v. COMELEC 96 SCRA 392

FACTS: Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits there from. He filed for re-election to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Batas Blg. 52 section 4 is valid.


The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees; aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumlao), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

Goesart v. Cleary - 335 US 464


A Michigan state law provided that no women could obtain a bartenders license unless she was the wife or daughter of the male owner. This law was challenged under equal protection.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law violates equal protection.

HELD: No. Michigan could ban all women from being bartenders if it wished. The Constitution does not require legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards. Since there may be a reasonable and valid desire in the legislature to protect female bartenders, the court cannot second-guess the legislature and decide that the real purpose here was for male bartenders to monopolize the industry.

Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City Feb. 7, 1968


Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid. HELD:

N0, should another sugar central arise in Ormoc City, the ordinance would be discriminatory against Ormoc Sugar Central which alone comes under the ordinance.

Sison, Jr. v. PAGCOR May 14, 1991


On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under Presidential Decree 1869, pursuant to the policy of the government, to regulate and centralize through an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. This was subsequently proven to be beneficial not just to the government but also to the society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash-strapped Government. Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and public order, among others.

ISSUES: Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because: 1.) It is contrary to morals, public policy and public order; 2.) It constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to improve taxes and legal fees; and that the exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of constitutional principle of Local Autonomy; 3.) it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution in that it legalizes gambling thru PAGCOR while most other forms are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices; and 4.) It is contrary to the avowed trend of the Cory Government, away from monopolistic and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization.

HELD: 1.) Gambling, in all its forms, is generally prohibited, unless allowed by law. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power, wherein the state has the authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. 2.) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Its charter was created by Congress, therefore subject to its control. Also, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.

3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law, provided it is not unreasonable or arbitrary. The clause does not prohibit the legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. 4.) The Judiciary does not settle policy issues which are within the domain of the political branches of government and the people themselves as the repository of all state power. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, thus, to be nullified; it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In this case, the grounds raised by petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. Therefore, petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan 230 SCRA 711


The PCGG issues a search and seizure order which have all the features of a search warrant.


Whether or not the seizure it is valid.


No, because only a judge may issue a search warrant.

Himagan v. People 237 SCRA 538


Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr. and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

ISSUE: Whether Sec 42 of Ra 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the constitution.

HELD: No. Members of the PNP are treated differently from other classes of men charged criminally or administratively in so far as the application of the preventive suspension is concerned because policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them. If a suspended policemen criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while the case is pending, his victims and witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the suspect is in uniformed and armed.

Almonte v. Vasquez 244 SCRA 286


This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988" and all evidence such as vouchers from enforcing his orders. Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished to several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman. In his comment on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied all the allegations written on the anonymous letter. Petitioner moves to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum but was denied. Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted with the claim of privilege of an agency of the government on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla will necessarily lead to knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB."


Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection of laws.


YES. .The Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled by fictitious persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to his investigation as the designated protectors of the people of the Constitution. Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals ,the aggrieved parties , can only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings.

Telebap v. COMELEC 289 SCRA 337


TELEBAP is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. GMA Network Inc., a broadcasting station, operates throughout the Philippines with a franchise granted by Congress.RA 6646 prohibits sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads, except to COMELEC. As cited in Osmea v COMELEC, part and parcel of a regulatory scheme designed to equalize the opportunity of candidates in an election in regard to the use of mass media for political campaigns. The law in question prohibits mass media from selling or donating print space or air time to the candidates and requires COMELEC instead to procure print space or air time for allocation to the candidates. The petitioners contention is that the said law denies the radio and TV companies the equal protection of laws because the said law is not applicable to print media; Therefore, the unequal treatment between print media and the radio & TV media.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 prevents radio and TV broadcast companies from exercising their right to due process and equal protection if the law. HELD: Petitioners contention is without merit. There are important differences in characteristics between two media, which justify differential treatment between the two. Government spends public funds for allocation of and regulation of broadcast industry, which it does not do in case of print media. To provide free air time for COMELEC time is a fair exchange for what the industry gets. Also, radio and TV broadcast has wider reach compared to print media, which is why it needs to be regulated during the election campaign period.

Tiu v. CA GR 127410 Jan. 20, 1999


On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227 which provides for the Conversion of Military Reservations into Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone. Under the said law, the president is granted the authority to issue a proclamation defining the metes and bounds of the zone.

On June 19, 1993, then President Ramos issued E.O. No. 97-A. According to the said Order, the grant of enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized under R.A. No. 7227 were limited to the business enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone.

The petitioner challenged the constitutionality of E.O No. 97-A contending that it violates the right to equal protection of the laws. However, the CA ruled in favour of the constitutionality of the said E.O.Thus, the petitioner filed a petition for review with the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7227 is valid.

HELD: The Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents. The real concern is to convert the lands formerly occupied by the US military bases into economic or industrial zone. In furtherance of such objective, Congress deemed it necessary to extend economic incentives to attract and encourage investors both local and foreign.

Aguinaldo v. COMELEC GR 132774 June 21, 1999


Petitioners, at the time of the filing of the petition, were incumbent provincial or municipal officials in Cagayan. Petitioner Rodolfo Aguinaldo was governor; Florencio L. Vargas, vice governor; Romeo I. Calubaquib, member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; Amado T. Gonzales, member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; Silverio C. Salvanera, member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; Alberta O. Quinto, mayor of the municipality of Pea Blanca; and Aurora V. Estabillo, mayor of the municipality of Sta. Praxedes. Petitioners seek to prevent the COMELEC from enforcing during the 1998 elections Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) in accordance with its own tenor or as modified by paragraph 3 of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436.


Whether or not the classification in Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

HELD: No, the court held that Section 67 is not violative of the Constitution as it does not unduly cut short the term of office of local officials. The situation that results with the application of Section 67 is covered by the term voluntary renunciation. According to the doctrine laid down in Cayat, for a classification to be valid, (1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.

De Guzman v. COMELEC 336 SCRA


This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order assails the June 15, 2007 Resolution of the First Division of COMELEC, disqualifying ROSELLER DE GUZMAN from running as vice-mayor in the May 14, 2007 elections. Petitioner was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under RA 9225. Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. Having reacquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As such,qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.


Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American Citizenship in accordance with RA 9225.

HELD: We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure to renounce his American citizenship. RA 9225 was enacted to allow reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1. Natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; 2. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after the effectivity of the law, becomes citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are not deemed to have reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.

Petitioners oath of allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not comply with section(5)2 of RA 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running for vice mayor.

People v. Mercado GR 116239, Nov. 29, 2000


The foregoing discussion and finding the guilt of both accused to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, while the undersigned Presiding Judge does not believe in the imposition of the law which is his duty to uphold, the Court hereby sentences both accused, ELPIDIO MERCADO y HERNANDO and AURELIO ACEBRON y ADORA, to death, to proportionately indemnify the heirs of the deceased Richard Buama in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00); to pay the sum of fifty two thousand six hundred eighty pesos (P52,680.00) as expenses incident to the burial; and the further sum of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) by way of moral and exemplary damage, all without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. Accusedappellants further argue that Republic Act. No. 7659 denies equality before the law. They cite studies here and abroad against the poor. This statement is too sweeping to merit further serious consideration. Anyone, regardless of how economic status in life, may commit a crime. While there may be perceived imbalances in the imposition of penalties, there are adequate safeguards in the Constitution, the law, and procedural rules to ensure due process and equal protection of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 7659 impugns the constitutional right to equality before international law.

HELD: The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City, finding accusedappellant Elpidio Mercado y Hernando and Aurelio Acebron y Adora guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping with murder and imposing upon each of them the DEATH PENALTY, is ARRIEMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the awards of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages are DELETED and accused-appellants are ORDERED to pay jointly and severally to Lourdes Vergara the amount of P3,510.00 as reimbursement for the expenses she incurred for the victims wake and funeral.

People v. Jalosjos 324 SCRA 689


The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented.


Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives


Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, in spite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

People v. Piedra 350 SCRA 163

FACTS: Maria Lourdes Modesto and Nancy Araneta together with her friends Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquino went to the house of Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is there to recruit job applicants for Singapore. Carol dela Piedra was already briefing some people when they arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomed and asked them to sit down. They listened to the recruiter who was then talking abou t the breakdown of the fees involved: P30, 000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing of the papers. The initial payment was P2, 000, while P30, 000 will be by salary deduction. The recruiter said that she was recruiting nurses for Singapore. Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. A surveillance team was then organized to confirm the report. After which, a raid was executed.

Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal recruitment. Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime.


Whether or not accused was denied equal protection and therefore should be exculpated.


For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause. Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness. The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination. In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, in charging her, there was a clear and intentional discrimination on the part of the prosecuting officials. Furthermore, the presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties, and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. As said earlier, accused has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that dela Piedra, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellants eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.

International School v. Quisumbing June 1, 2000


Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure.

ISSUE: WON the grants provided by the school to foreign hires and not to local hires discriminative of their constitutional right to the equal protection clause.


The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid

similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding. The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly. The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," "to afford labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and localhires.

Central Bank Employees Assn. v. BSP 446 SCRA 299

II. Section 2


A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentrals human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, that compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758." The Association alleges that the proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file(Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is a classic case of class legislation, allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnels position

ISSUE: Whether or not the rank-and-file employees of the BSP are unduly discriminated upon by exempting BSP officers (SG 20 and above) from the Salary Standardization Law.

HELD: Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. The exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSPs lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of

salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. However, while RA 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislatures power, the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other Government Financial Institutions (GFIs) leeched all validity out of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653. Even the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was granted the same blanket exemption from the SSL in 2000.The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there were substantial distinctions that made real differences between the two classes. The subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classification - albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws - between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class. The proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences. The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination - no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld

1. Requisites of a Valid Warrant People v. Veloso 48 Phil. 169

FACTS: The building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club. The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduo of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date above- mentioned. They found the doors to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door.-Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant and the arrest of Veloso were valid. HELD: Yes. It is provided, among other things, in the Philippine Code on Criminal Procedure that a search warrant shall not be issued except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person of thing to be seized. The name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant and where the name is unknown there must be such a description of the person accused as will enable the officer to identify him when found.

A warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," is void, without other and further descriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the best description personae possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he can be identified. In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the building to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched. As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.

Alvarez v. CFI 64 Phil. 33

FACTS: The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board presented to Judge David, presiding judge of CFI of Tayabas, alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner is keeping in his house in Infanta, Tayabas documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath the chief of the secret service did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his knowledge of the facts but the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon this questioned affidavit, the judge issued the search warrant, ordering the search of the petitioners house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents and the immediate delivery of such to him (judge). With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at 7 o'clock of the night and seized and took possession of various articles belonging to the petitioner. The petitioner asks that the warrant of issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at any time of the day or night, of certain accounting books, documents, and papers belonging to him in his residence situated in Infanta, Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned to him.

ISSUES: Whether or not the seizure of evidence to use in an investigation is constitutional. HELD: A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights or citizen, for the enforcement of no statue is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basis principles of government.

Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against which the constitutional guarantee affords full protection. The term "unreasonable search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in general language. All illegal searches and seizure are unreasonable while lawful ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence or probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We are of the opinion that there was no such waiver, first, because the petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of compromise and, second, because if there was a compromise it referred but to the institution of criminal proceedings fro violation of the Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles in question, but such was not the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest in writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents.

Stonehill v. Diokno June 19, 1967


Upon application of the officers of the govt (resp. prosecutors), several judges (resp. judges) issued a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners &/ or the corporations of w/c they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the perons named and/ or the premises of their offices, warehouses, and/ or residences, and to seize several personal prop. as the "subject of the offense; stolen or embezelled or the fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense" as violation of CB Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws (TCC), NIRC and the RPC." Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null & void, said petitioners filed w/ the SC this orig. action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus & injunction. The writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents, and things seized from the officers of the corporations; but the injunction was maintained as regards those found & seized in the residences of petitioners.

ISSUES: (1) With respect to those found & seized in the offices of the corporations, w/n petitioners have cause of action to assail the validity of the contested warrants. ( 2) In connection w/ those found & seized in the residences of petitioners, w/n the search warrants in question and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof are valid. (3) If the answer in no. 2 is no, w/n said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners.

HELD: (1) No. Petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and the seizure made in pursuance thereof because said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of petitioners. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by 3rd parties. a. Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to



avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the circumstances. Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different from that of the corporation.

Bache & Co. v Ruiz 37 SCRA 823

FACTS: Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leons application for search warrant and Logronios deposition. The searchwas subsequently conducted.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.


The SC ruled in favour of Bache on three grounds. 1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness. Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause. 2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled in Stonehill Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search Warrant.Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnar,
receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.

The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

Placer v. Villanueva 126 SCRA 463 FACTS:

Petitioners filed information in the city court and they certified that Preliminary Investigation and Examination had been conducted and that prima facie cases have been found. Upon receipt of said information, respondent judge set the hearing of the criminal cases to determine propriety of issuance of warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the information to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to compel respondent to issue warrants of arrest. They contended that the fiscals certification in the information of the existence of probable cause constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to issue warrants of arrest. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation.


Judge may rely upon the fiscals certification for the existence of probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of issuing magistrate. Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals certification and require submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at the conclusion as to existence of probable cause.

Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP 133 SCRA 800


Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Cruz-Pano of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum newspaper, were seized.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 2 search warrants were validly issued and executed. HELD:

The broad statements in the application and joint affidavit are mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Deficient of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question are too general.The closure of the premises subjected to search and seizure is contrary to the freedom of the press as guaranteed in our fundamental law. The search warrants are declared null and void.

Corro v. Lising 137 SCRA 541


Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of articles allegedly used by petitioner in committing the crime of Sedition. Seized were printed copies of the Philippine times, newspaper dummies, typewriters, mimeographing machines and tape recorders, video machines and tapes. The petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his motion was denied.


Whether or not the search warrant is valid.


Yes. The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of Law and do not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. The language used is all embracing as to include all conceivable words and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is objectionable. Probable cause means for a search warrant means such facts and circumstances which would have a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In the light of the 1987 Philippine Constitution Section 2 article 3 relays that search warrant n order to be valid there must be a probable cause and determined personally by the judge as one of the requisites. The affidavits executed by Col. Castillo and Lt. Ignacio only contains articles tending to incite distrust and hatred for the government which does not constitute the crime of Sedition but only a mere conclusions of law

Soliven v. Makasiar 167 SCRA 394


In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support. Petitioner contends that the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.

ISSUE: Whether or not the word personally requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.


What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Salazar v. Achacoso 183 SCRA 145


This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment. A complaint was filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against petitioner Hortencia Salazar. Having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent POEA Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205.Petitioner filed this instant petition with the SC which the high court considered as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.

ISSUE: W/N the POEA may validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?

HELD: No, the Court ruled that it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. The 1987 Constitution states that: no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The Court further reiterates that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

Board of Comm. (CID) v. De la Rosa 197 SCRA 853

FACTS: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, Willian, then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens. On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued an identification certificate to William. The boarf of commissioners waws directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such included the case of William. As a result of the decision of the board of special inquiry which recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board of Commissioners? Acting commissioner issued an order affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion ordered the arrest of William and was released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond. Thus on the 29thof the same month, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied.


Whether or not Commissioners on Immigration may issue warrant of arrest. HELD:

Since the Commissioner on Immigration is not a judge, he may not issue warrant of arrest in aid merely of his investigatory power. However, he may order the arrest of an alien for the purpose of carrying out a deportation order that has already become final.

Lim, Sr. v. Judge Felix Feb. 19, 1991


Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. An investigation of the incident then followed. Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor AntonioKho of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident. After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order dated July 31, 1989 stating therein that: . . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during the preliminary examination in searching questions and answers, concludes that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint, namely, Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez, Nonilon Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime Liwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy. Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations which in substance prayed that an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment regarding the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as the determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall be issued unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause.- In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really exists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary investigation.- It should also be noted that the Lims also presented to the respondent Judge documents of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case against them.-On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.

ISSUE: WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.


The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. A Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be necessary documents and a report supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. Usually, this depends on the circumstances of each case. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion; after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. However, to be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. As mentioned in the facts (stated above), the Lims presented documents of recantations of the witnesses. Although, the general rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the determination of a case and in the granting of a new trial the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have gone over the records of the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now presented by the concerned witnesses in view of the political undertones" prevailing in the cases. In making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest. Indubitably, the respondent Judge (Felix) committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutors certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5,1990 without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause.

Silva v. Pres. Judge of RTC of Negros Or. 203 SCRA 140


In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioners seek the nullification of Search Warrant 1 issued by respondent judge as well as the return of money in the amount of P1, 231.00 seized from petitioner Antonieta Silva. The respondent judge issued Search Warrant for the petitioner upon receiving an application along with the deposition of witness on June 13, 1986 for violation of Republic act 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. In the search warrant items to be search are cited such as marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, and joint. In the course of the search, the serving officers aside from the items listed also seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of Php 1,231.00. The latter then filed a motion for the return of the said amount on grounds that search warrant only authorized seizure of marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes and joint. The herein respondent issued an order holding in abeyance the disposition of said amount pending the filing of appropriate charges in connection with the search warrant. Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 1. However, their motion was denied due to lack of merit by respondent trial court through Judge Cruz who then replaced the retire Judge Ontal. Another motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner dated Sept. 1, 1987, but was likewise denied by Judge Cruz in an order dated Oct. 19, 1987. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not issuance of Search Warrant No. 1 was tainted with irregularity.


YES. The petition is granted. Search Warrant No. 1 is hereby declared null and void. Respondent judge of RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch XXXIII is directed to return to petitioner Antonieta Silva the amount of Php 1,231.00 which was earlier been seized from her by virtue of the Illegal Search Warrant. The decision is immediately executory at no costs.

In issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by personally examining the applicant and witnesses in form of searching questions and answer. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. This is highly irregular considering that she was not even named as one of the respondents and that the warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but only marijuana leave, cigarettes and joints.

Allado v. Diokno 232 SCRA 192

FACTS: Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, alumni of the College of Law, University of the Philippines, are partners of the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. In the practice of their profession, and on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial confession of a security guard, they have been accused of the heinous crime of kidnapping with murder by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested without bail by respondent judge. The petitioner Allado contends that the respondent Judge acted in excess of Jurisdiction in holding that there is probable cause against them without determining the admissibility of the evidence against them and without even stating the basis of his findings. Thus, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion against the respondent judge.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in holding that there is probable cause against petitioners without determining the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners and without even stating the basis of his findings.

HELD: Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, lays down the requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, i.e., a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is it believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.

Ortiz v. Palaypayon 234 SCRA 391


Judge Lucio Palaypayon of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur is administratively charged with gross ignorance of the law tainted with vindictiveness and oppression relative to a criminal case pending before respondent judge. The charge stemmed from a complaint for damage to property thru reckless imprudence filed before the respondent's sala on May 19, 1993 involving a collision between a Toyota Corolla owned by one Rosalinda Tanay and then driven by her husband, Roberto Tanay, and a mini-truck owned by one Juliana Lu which was entrusted to herein complainant, and then driven by one Rodrigo Vasquez. It appears that on May 19, 1993, respondent judge issued an order for the arrest of accused Juliana Lu, Rodrigo Vasquez and herein complainant, David Ortiz, on the basis of mere affidavits by the offended party and without conducting the preliminary investigation required by Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent judge is likewise charged with fixing and imposing a grossly excessive bond amounting to P30, 000.00 for the accused's provincial liberty in violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code and Department of Justice Circular No. 10 dated July 3, 1987 which provides that for crimes punishable only by fine, the amount of the bail shall be equal to three-eighths (3/8) of the amount of the fine but shall not exceed P6, 000.00. Furthermore, it is alleged in the administrative complaint that herein complainant was wrongfully included as one of the accused even if there existed no basis for his indictment of the criminal act as he was not among the nine (9) passengers nor was he the driver of the mini-truck. Respondent judge, instead of filing his comment on the complaint, filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of factual or legal basis. He contends that Section 3, Rule 112 of Revised Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, was substantially, if not entirely, complied with. He claims that pursuant to the said rule, he personally examined in writing and under oath the private complainant and his witnesses by asking the same questions propounded to them in their sworn statements and the same answers were given. At the same time, respondent judge maintains that it is customary for him to adopt the sworn statements of the complainant and the witnesses if he is satisfied of the existence of probable cause. This practice, he claims, will expedite the proceedings and save the party litigants' time and money.

ISSUE: WON the warrant of arrest issued to the petitioner is unconstitutional.


The respondent judge's action clearly violates constitutional provisions and established rules of procedure. From the foregoing factual and legal milieu, it is evident that there was no preliminary investigation conducted. Respondent judge did not personally examine the complainant and her witnesses by asking searching questions and answers to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause as mandated by law. He simply ignored the constitutional requirement of procedural due process. This Court cannot countenance such blatant practice of disregarding fairly elementary legal principles and substituting it with an unorthodox and highly irregular practice which appears convenient only to respondent judge. Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides: "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may procedure .In relation thereto, Rule 112, Section 6 (b) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides: (b) By the Municipal Trial Court. - If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after as an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest."

People v. Martinez 235 SCRA 171

FACTS: Accused-appellant Alexander Martinez, alias Abelardo Martinez y Montesor, was charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act and violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City. Appellant with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on the above charges. But eventually, the court rendered its decision finding the accusedappellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In his appeal, accused-appellant argues that he is not the person named in the search warrant issued in connection with the buy-bust operation, his name being Abelardo Martinez and not Alexander Martinez. That being the case, all things seized by virtue of the said warrant are inadmissible in evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant is invalid because of the discrepancy regarding the name of the accused and that stated in the search warrant. HELD: No. The discrepancy regarding the name of accused-appellant and that stated in the search warrant cannot militate against his positive identification by the poseur-buyer. It has been consistently held that greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than accuseds denial concern ing the commission of the crime. Granting arguendo that the search warrant issued against accused-appellant was invalid because his true name is Abelardo Martinez and not Alexander Martinez as stated in the search warrant, the same cannot render the articles seized inadmissible as evidence in court. As a matter of fact the information filed identifies him as Alexander Martinez alias Abelardo Martinez y Montesor, accused. The accused-appellant was arrested as a result of a buy-bust operation and the ensuing search of the premises was made as an incident to a lawful arrest. It is therefore clear that regardless of the alleged defect of the search warrant in erroneously designating his first name, the seized articles may still be used as evidence against accused-appellant, having been obtained from him and as such, fruits of a lawful search incidental to a valid arrest.

Webb v. De Leon 247 SCRA 652

FACTS: On June 19, 1994, the NBI filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitioner Webb et al with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrelita Nicolas-Vizconde, and sister Anne Marie Jennifer Vizconde in their house at #80 W Vinzons Street, BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991. DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst. Chief State Prosecutor, Jovericio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation. The focal point of the case lies on the contention of the petitioner that the respondent judges issued warrant of arrest against the former without conducting the required preliminary examination. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judges gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing the arrest warrant against the petitioner HELD: The court held that the respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretions. In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that there must be a crime committed and that the person sought to be arrested committed it. (The DOJ Panel found a probable cause in the case.) Sec 6 of Rule 112 provides that upon filling information, the RTC may issue a warrant to arrest the accused. Clearly, the law repudiates the submission of the petitioner that the respondent judges should have conducted searching examinations of the witnesses prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest.

People v. Woolcock 244 SCRA 235

FACTS: Accused-appellants Deborah Woolcock, George Williams, Jacqueline Ann Daughtry and Evans Asare were indicted for allegedly conspiring with each other in delivering, giving away, distributing, dispatching in transit or transporting approximately 3,328.58 grams* of heroin in Pasay City and other parts of Metro Manila. At the arraignment, appellants, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, hence trial on the merits proceeded. Subsequently, appellants filed a motion to quash the search warrants before Judge Antonio J. Fineza of the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 131, who had issued the same, contending that said warrants were issued without probable cause and only for the purpose of fishing for evidence. Judge Fineza denied the motion, holding that the same should be resolved by the Pasay court where the principal case was pending. Under date of March 26, 1993 appellants filed another motion to quash the warrants before the latter court on the same grounds. The court, through Judge Baltazar Dizon, without categorically ruling on said motion rendered a judgment of conviction and sentenced each of the appellants to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of P20, 000.00. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not resolving appellants' motion to quash the search warrants.

HELD: The remedy for questioning the validity of a search warrant can only be sought in the court that issued it, not in the sala of another judge of concurrent jurisdiction. What appellants would downgrade but could not suppress is the fact that such police mission proceeded with commendable precision and resulted in total success and that the police acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information. Besides, even if the search warrants ex concessis were disregarded, a warrantless search could be justified. The Court held that in light of such circumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability and facility to promptly accordingly, including searching without a warrant would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.

Tambasen v. People 246 SCRA 184


On August 31, 1988, P/Sgt. Natuel applied at the MTCC for issuance of search warrant for petitioner who allegedly holds in his possession some firearms with ammunitions, explosives, and subversive documents. The same day, the search warrant was granted.On September 9, 1899, the police team searched the house of the petitioner and seized the following items: Php 14,000 cash (in two envelops) AR 280 handset with antennae YAESU Transreceiver with antennae Academy Notebook and Assorted Papers 4 handset battery packs On September 19, 1988, the petitioners urgent motion for the return of seized articles and to make a return of search warrant was ordered by the MTCC. The petitioner later on filed a motion praying that the search and seizure be declared illegal. However, the Bacolod City Police earmarked the Php 14,000 as payment of allowance of Armed City Partisan (ACP) and other known NPA personalities. On December 23, 1988, MTCC issued an order to return the money seized to the petitioner. It opined that any seizure should be limited to the specific items covered by the warrant. It said that the money could not be considered as subversive documents.

ISSUE: Whether or not warrant issued was valid and seizure of said money (Php 14,000) was valid evidence kept in custodia legis. HELD: Issuance of search warrant for more than one specific offense is prohibited by the Revised Rules of Court, which in this case, Anti-Subversion Law and illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives. Therefore, the warrant was a scattershot warrant, and totally null and void. Also, things to be seized should be particularly described in the search warrant. Although public welfare is the foundation of the power to search and seize, such power must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizen.

Columbia Pictures v. CA 262 SCRA 219


Alfredo Ramos, an intelligence officer of the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB), applied for and was granted by the RTC Br. 168 of Pasig a Search Warrant against the respondent Jose Jinco for violation of Section 56 of PD No. 49 as amended. However, private respondent filed an urgent motion to lift the search warrant and for the return of the seized articles on the ground that the SW was issued without probable cause. The then new presiding judge of RTC Br. 168 granted the motion to quash and ordered the return of all articles seized to private respondent. The court used as its justification the fact that as the master copies were not presented to the court, there was no probable cause to issue the SW. Petitioners appealed to the CA, which affirmed the order of the trial court in toto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was issued without probable cause. HELD: The SC ruled that the SW was issued with probable cause. It is evidently incorrect to suggest that in copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of the copy right films is always necessary to meet the requirement of probable cause for the issuance of SW. It does not rule out the use of testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence tending to prove the factum probandum especially where the production in court of object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to its evidentiary rule. From the records, it is clear that the judge who issued the SW observed all the requirements necessary before the SW was issued: he heard the testimonies and studied the deposition of the witnesses for the petitioners on the existence of probable cause.

20th Century Fox Film v. CA 164 SCRA 655

FACTS: Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the NBI in conducting searches and seizures in connection with the NBIs anti -film piracy campaign. Petitioner alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law). The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the private respondents. The lower court issued the desired search warrants. The NBI, accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items described in the three warrants.Private respondents later filed a motion to lift the search warrants and release the seized properties, which was granted by the lower court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the lower court. The CA affirmed the trial court. ISSUE: Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier? HELD:

YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier.The lower court lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. NBI agents who acted as witnesses during the application for search warrant did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony, which was the alleged commission of the offense of piracy by the private respondents. Only the petitioners counsel who was also a witness during the application stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. The lower court lifted the warrants, declaring that the testim ony of petitioners counsel did not have much credence because the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the application.

The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films, from which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns. The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.

Ho vs. People 280 SCRA 365 FACTS: The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, represented by its chief prosecutor Atty. Reynaldo L. Bagatsing, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against Doris Teresa Ho, Rolando S. Narciso, Anthony Marden, Arsenio Benjamin Santos and Leonardo Odoo. The complaint was for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019 prohibiting a public officer from entering into any contract or transaction on behalf of the government if it is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. Such contract was entered into despite their full knowledge that the rate they have agreed upon was much higher than those offered by the Loadstar Shipping Company, Inc. (LSCI) and Premier Shipping Lines, Inc. (PSLI), in the public bidding, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to the National Marine Corporation. Ho and Narciso alleged that the Sandiganbayan, in determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant for their arrest, merely relied on the information and the resolution attached thereto, filed by the Ombudsman without other supporting evidence, in violation of the requirements of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, and settled jurisprudence.

ISSUE: May a judge determine probable cause and issue a warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the resolution of the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, without having before him any of the evidence which may have been submitted at the preliminary investigation?

HELD: NO. The word personally does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous Constitutions. This emphasis shows the present Constitutions intent to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under the previous Charters,the public respondent relied fully and completely upon the resolution of the graft investigation officer and the memorandum of the reviewing prosecutor, attached to the information filed before it, and its conjecture that the Ombudsman would not have approved their recommendation without supporting evidence. It had no other documents from either the complainant (the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines) or the People

from which to sustain its own conclusion that probable cause exists. Respondent Court palpably committed grave abuse of discretion in ipso factoissuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutors findings and recommendation, and without determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence other than such bare findings and recommendation.

Gozos v. Tac-an GR 123191, Dec. 17, 1998 FACTS: The officials, teachers, and students of the Concepcion Aguila Memorial College organized a school party. While the party was going on, the principal, Felizardo Aguila, was informed that several men, who appeared to be drunk, were trying to force their way through the main gate. One of the men seemed armed with a handgun. After calling the police, Aguila went to the main gate, where he asked the men what their business was. At this point, private respondents Blanco and Atienza arrived at the school. They were shortly joined by private respondents Pedro Castillo, Sulit, and Ildefonso Castillo, who were all members of the Philippine National Police of San Jose, Batangas. They demanded from the man armed with the handgun, who later turned out to be the victim Gilbert Dyogi, that he surrender his gun and go with them to the station. Gilbert Dyogi gave the handgun to the respondents, who then asked to see his license. He produced a sheet of paper from his wallet which he handed to private respondents. After allowing them to inspect the weapon and the alleged license, Gilbert Dyogi asked the private respondents to give them back to him. However, private respondent Blanco who had the handgun refused to do so. Before long the two were grappling for possession of the gun. Apparently, Blanco pulled out his sidearm and fired at Gilbert Dyogi twice. Subsequently respondent judge issued the questioned warrant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of warrant is valid.

HELD: Respondent Judge conducted an inquiry, not only for the purpose of determining whether there was probable cause to order the arrest of private respondents Blanco, Pedro Castillo, Sulit, Atienza, and Ildefonso Castillo, but for the purpose of determining whether there was sufficient evidence to prosecute them as well. The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

Hence, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the judge regarding the designation of the offense committed, for as long as he finds probable cause for the offense charged, he should issue a warrant of arrest against the accused for the crime charged in the information. The petition is hereby granted and the orders, dated October 18, 1995, November 22, 1995, and January 3, 1996, of respondent Judge Paterno Tac-an are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Flores v. Sumaljag 290 SCRA 568

FACTS: This is an administrative case against Judge Antonio C. Sumaljag, for gross ignorance of the law in connection with the preliminary investigation of three criminal cases and the arrest of complainants. Complainants were charged with three counts of falsification of public document. Respondent judge conducted a preliminary examination, during which the complainant, Gualberto Parmis, and his witness, Diego Cala, Jr., testified in each of the criminal cases. Thereafter, respondent judge ordered the arrest of herein complainants. By virtue of warrants of arrest, the herein complainants were arrested and detained. They were later released on bail. The complainants instituted this administrative case against respondent judge asserting that the testimonies during the preliminary examinations failed to establish probable cause; Complainants claim that, contrary to Rule 112, 6(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, respondent did not ask the complainant and the witnesses searching questions but mainly questions designed to make them merely affirm what they had previously stated in their affidavits. Deputy Court Administrator Abesamis notes that the questions asked by the respondent were leading and revealed the latters apparent knowledge of the case which the witness testifying had only to confirm with a Yes, Judge. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent complied with his duty under the Rules of Court. HELD: The transcript of the preliminary investigation shows that some of the questions asked by the respondent were indeed leading. It is evident, however, that he was dealing with witnesses who were reticent and had to be prodded if their examination was to be searching. Most of the time, complainant Gualberto Parmis and his witness Diego Cala, Jr. merely said Yes, Judge in answer to questions put to them. The only way to make them explain was to ask them leading questions. Deputy Court Administrator Abesamis contends that the respondent revealed his apparent knowledge of the facts of the case which the witness testifying before him only needed to confirm with a Yes, Judge. Obviously, this is because the judge based his questions on the allegations of the complaint and the affidavits of the complainant and the witnesses. In fact, the first questions he asked concerned the execution of affidavits. If the only way to make the witnesses give details was to ask questions based on their

complaints and affidavits, we see no reason why this should be considered improper. After all, the witnesses could deny what the judge asked them if it was not true. While some of the questions of the judge clearly suggested the answers, nonetheless it is clear that the answers were still those of the witnesses and not those of the judge. We are satisfied that as far as the duty to ask searching questions is concerned, respondent complied with his duty under the Rules of Court.

People v. CA 291 SCRA 400

FACTS: A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of Judge Casanova which quashed the search warrant issued by Judge Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant. An application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes against Mr. Azfar Hussain who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt 1207 Area F. Bagon Buhay Avenue, Sarang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. The following day Search Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was served not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of 4 Pakistani nationals and the seizure of a number of different explosives and firearms. ISSUE:

WON a search warrant was validly issued as regard to the apartment in which private respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly, WON that particular apartment had been specifically described in the warrant.

HELD: The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence.

What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.

Kho v. Makalintal GR 94902-06, April 21, 1999

FACTS: On May 15, 1990, NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the issuance of search warrants by the respondent Judge against Banjamin V. Kho (petitioner) at his residence at BF Homes, Paranaque. On the same day, Eduardo T. Arugay, another NBI agent, applied with the same court for the issuance of search warrants against the said petitioner in his house at 326 McDivitt St. Brgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque. The search warrants were applied for after teams of NBI agents had conducted a personal surveillance and investigation in the two houses referred to on the basis of confidential information they received that the said places were being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and chop-chop vehicles. On the same day, the respondent Judge conducted the necessary examination of the applicants and their witnesses, after which he issued Search Warrant Nos. 90-11, 90-12, 90-13, 90-14, and 90-15. NBI agents searched subject premises at BF Homes, Paranaque, and they recovered various highpowered firearms and at the house at No. 326 McDivitt St. Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque, yielded several high-powered firearms with explosives and more than a thousand rounds of ammunition. The petitioners presented a Motion to Quash the said Search Warrants, contending that: 1. The subject search warrants were issued without probable cause; 2. The same search warrants are prohibited by the Constitution for being general warrants; 3. The said search warrants were issued in violation of the procedural requirements set forth by the Constitution; 4. The search warrants aforesaid were served in violation of the Revised Rules of Court; and 5. The objects seized were all legally possessed and issued. They contend that the surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI agents within the premises involved, prior to the application for the search warrants under controversy, were not sufficient to vest in the applicants personal knowledge of facts and circumstances showing or indicating the commission of a crime by them (petitioners).

ISSUE WON the warrants were issued without probable cause.


Petitioners contention is untenable. Records show that the NBI agents who conducted the surveillance and investigation testified unequivocally that they saw guns being carried to and unloaded at the two houses searched, and motor vehicles and spare parts were stored therein. In a similar case, it was held that it held that the existence of a probable cause depends to a large extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge who conducted the required examination of the applicants and the witnesses. Respondent judge had the singular opportunity to assess their testimonies and to find out their personal knowledge of facts and circumstances enough to create a probable cause. The Judge was the one who personally examined the applicants and witnesses and who asked searching questions vis-a-vis the applications for search warrants. He was thus able to observe and determine whether subject applicants and their witnesses gave accurate accounts of the surveillance and investigation they conducted at the premises to be searched. In the absence of any showing that respondent judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the personal examination he so conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions.

Paper Industries v. Asuncion GR 122092, May 19, 1999 FACTS:

On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the RTC of Quezon City, stating: 1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises described; 2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring to the described properties.

After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized a number of firearms and explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash and a Motion to Suppress Evidence. On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners motions. On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.


Whether or not the search warrant was valid


The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to

them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with particularity.

Malalaon v. CA 232 SCRA 249 FACTS:

The crime alleged is a violation of PD 1866. The officers applied for a search warrant in Kalookan City. However, the place to be searched was in Quezon City. The officers executed the search and seized several firearms. After the search and seizure was conducted, the accused are now assailing the validity of the search warrant since they claim that it was void for lack of jurisdiction. The accused buttresses their claim arguing that the criminal case was filed in the Quezon City RTC, not in Kalookan City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was valid. HELD: Yes, the search warrant was valid. A warrant merely constitutes criminal process. It is not a criminal action. The requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action. Moreover, no law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest.


Particularity of Description

Yousef Al-Ghoul v. CA GR 126859, Sept. 4, 2001 FACTS:

Presiding judge of the RTC of Kalookan City, issued search warrants for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. The police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No. 2 were 2 M-16 rifles with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16ammunitions, among others. Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court information accusing them with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree No.1866. Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and detained. At the hearing for bail, the RTC denied petitioners' motion for bail earlier filed for the accused are being charged of two criminal offenses and both offenses under Presidential Decree1866, Sections 1 and 3 thereof prescribe the penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period to Reclusion Perpetua. Under Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-94, particularly Section 7 thereof, no person charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the place searched and articles seized were not described with particularity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that the search and seizure orders in question were valid and the objects seized admissible in evidence


The place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, we are constrained to declare that the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners. Now, in contrast, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly faulted. The search warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The search was done in the presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners allege lack of particularity in the description of objects to be seized pursuant to the warrants. That the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrant appears to be beyond cavil. The items seized from Apartment No. 2 were described with specify in the warrants in question. The nature of the items ordered to be seized did not require a technical description. Moreover, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or species would suffice.

Uy v. BIR 344 SCRA 36 FACTS: In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy Chin Ho aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling thousands of cartons of canned cartons without issuing a report. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. In Oct 1993, the BIR requested before RTC Cebu to issue a search warrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant on the same day. A second warrant was issued which contains the same substance but has only one page, the same was dated Oct 1st 2003. These warrants were issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A third warrant was issued on the same day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in relation to sec 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993, searched the premises of the UPC. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of UPC. A return of said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC filed a motion to quash the warrants which was denied by the RTC. They appealed before the CA via certiorari. The CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is not the proper remedy.


Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the return of the seized items but sustained the validity of the warrant. The SC ruled that the search warrant issued has not met some basic requisites of validity. A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are: (1) The warrant must be issued upon probable cause; (2) The probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and

(4) The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. The SC noted that there has been an inconsistency in the description of the place to be searched as indicated in the said warrants. Also the thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the judge. He used generic itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched. One warrant was directed only against Uy and the other was against Uy and UPC. The SC however noted that the inconsistencies were cured by the issuance of the latter warrant as it has revoked the two others.


Warrantless Searches and Seizures When is a search a search?

Valmonte v. General de Villa 178 SCRA 211 (Main) and 185 SCRA 655 (MR)

FACTS: The National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. ISSUE: WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures. HELD: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights.

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individuals right against a warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

Guazon v. De Villa 181 SCRA 623


The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to be search and that there is any search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely roused from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that their homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents of mauling, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical informations. The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contend that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event.


Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights.

HELD: It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities .

Based on the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as the rights of the squatters and low income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should not be brought by a taxpayer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator are properly charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent relief can be given. In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court temporary restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.

People v. Saycon 236 SCRA 329

FACTS: On or about 8 July 1992, at about 6:00 in the morning, the Coastguard personnel received information from NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that a suspected "shabu" courier by the name of Alvaro Saycon was on board the MV Doa Virginia, which was arriving at that moment in Dumaguete City. Upon receipt of the information, the Coastguard chief officer CPO Tolin, instructed them to intercept the suspect. A combined team of NARCOM agents and Philippine Coastguard personnel consisting of CPO Tolin, a certain Miagme, and Senior Police Officers Ruben Laddaran and Winifredo Noble of NARCOM posted themselves at the gate of Pier 1. The MV Doa Virginia docked at 6:00 a.m. that same morning at Pier 1 in Dumaguete City. Alvaro Saycon alighted from the boat carrying a black bag and went through the checkpoint manned by the Philippine Coastguard where he was identified by police officer Winifredo Noble of NARCOM. Saycon was then invited to the Coastguard Headquarters at the Pier area. He willingly went with them. At the headquarters, the coastguard asked Saycon to open his bag, and the latter willingly obliged. In it were personal belongings and a maong wallet. Inside that maong wallet, there was a Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu". When police officer Winifredo Noble asked Saycon whether the Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu" was his, Saycon merely bowed his head. Then Saycon, his bag and the suspected "shabu" were brought to the NARCOM office for booking. When Alvaro Saycon was arrested, the NARCOM agents did not have a warrant of arrest. The PNP's Forensic Analyst declared in court that she had conducted an examination of the specimens and found out that the specimens weighed 4.2 grams in total, consisted of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more widely known as "shabu."

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest was valid HELD: The warrantless search was valid, as the accused was a passenger of a motor vehicle. There was probable cause to believe that the accused was carrying prohibited drugs. Three weeks earlier, agents of the Narcotics Command bought methamine hydrochloride from him. An agent of the Narcotics Command reported that the accused would be arriving on board the vessel and carrying methamphetamine hydrochloride

with him. Drug couriers do not go about their trade with some external sign indicating that they are transporting prohibited drugs. This must be taken into account in determining probable cause.

People v. CFI 101 SCRA 86

FACTS: One week beforeFeb.9, 1974 the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC) was informed by a disclosed that a shipment of highly dutiable goods would be transported to Manila from Angeles City on a dodge car. Spurred by such lead, RASAC agents ARTHUR Manuel and Macario Sabado on said date and upon order of the chief of intelligence Operations branch RASAC-MBA Col. Antonio Abad Jr. stationed themselves in the vicinity of the tollgate of the North Divisoria Road at Balintawak, Quezon City. A light blue dodge car entered the toll gate driven by Sgt. Jessie Hope accompanied by Medina thats the RASAC agents gave a chase and overtook Sgt. Hopes car. Agent Sabado blew his whistle and signaled Sgt. Hope to stop but the latter instead of heeding made a U-turn back to North Divisoria Road, but he could not get o through because of the buses in front of his car. At this point the agents succeeded in blocking Sgt. Hope car and the latter stopped. Manuel and Sabado who were in civilian clothes showed their identification card to Hope and Medina and introduced themselves as RASAC agents. The agents saw 4 boxes on the back seat of the dodge and upon inquiry Sgt. Hope answered I do not know. Further, Hope and Medina were asked where they were bringing the boxes, Medina replied they will bring it to Tropical Hut at EDSA. Agent Sabado boarded the dodge car with Hope and Medina while agent Manuel took their own car and both cars drove towards Tropical Hut making a brief stop at the Boranza where agent Manuel called up Col. Abad by telephone driving at the tropical Hut, the party together with Col. Abad waited for the man who according to Medina was supposed to receive the boxes. As the man did not appear Col. Abad called off the mission and brought respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo. Upon inspection, 11 boxes revealed 4,441 wrist watches of assorted brands and 1,075 watch bracelets of assorted brands supposedly untaxed. RASAC Chairman Gen. Pelagio Cruz requested the Bureau of Customs to issue a warrant of seizure and detention against the articles. ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure was valid even after the collector of customs declared the seized articles not subject to forfeitures. HELD: It is not accurate to say that the collector of customs made no findings that the articles were smuggled .In fact what the collector stated was that the prosecution failed to present the quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant the forfeiture of subject articles .In

general sense, this does not necessarily exclude the possibility of smuggling .The decision of collector of customs as in other seizure proceedings concerns the res rather than the persons. In the light of the 1987 Philippine Constitution one of the valid reasons for warrants the search and seizure. Customs search or seizure of goods concealed availing these duties as in the case of Papa vs. Magno under Article 3 Section 2 Enforcement of Laws on Tariff and Customs Code to include searches inside a dwelling need not necessary for a search warrant.

Roan v. Gonzales 145 SCRA 687 FACTS:

A search warrant was issued by herein respondent Judge Gonzales on May 10, 1984. Two days later the house was searched but none of the articles listed in the search warrant was discovered. However, the officers found in the premises one (1) Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen (18) live bullets which they confiscated. The articles seized from him are sought to be used as evidence in his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. The petitioner claims that he was the victim of an illegal search and seizure conducted by the military authorities.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant made was illegal.


The instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. The respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is that these things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they were taken. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioner's pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by the exclusionary principle.

Nolasco v. Mago GR 27360

FACTS: This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction, filed by petitioners against private respondent Remegio Mago, praying for the annulment of the order issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila under date of March 7, 1967, which authorized the release under bond of certain goods which were seized and held by petitioners in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code. In the afternoon of November 4.1966, based on reliable information received the day prior, elements of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department headed by petitioner Martin Alagao, apprehended and seized two (2) truckloads of cargo which came from the customs zone in the port of Manila. The shipment which was labelled as containing personal effects, were allegedly misdeclared and undervalued. The police operation was conducted upon the orders of Manila Police Chief and Deputy agent of Bureau of Customs, petitioner Ricardo Papa. Among the arguments raised by respondent Mago is that the goods were seized by the Manila Police Department without a search warrant issued by a competent. ISSUE: W/N the seizure was valid. HELD:

Yes, the Court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure in the case at the bar is valid. The Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings.

The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases.

People v. Lo Ho Wing 193 SCRA 122


Peter Lo , together with co-accused Lim Cheng Huat alias Antonio Lim and Reynaldo Tia, were charged with a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, for the transport of metamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu". Upon arrival at NAIA` and after boarding a taxi, defendants vehicle was stopped by the PC after a tip from a deep penetration agent of the arrival of the defendants with shabu . Defendants allege that it is an illegal search as the PC knew two days in advance of her arrival and yet did not obtain a search warrant.


Whether or not the search and seizure was legal.


Yes, it is a legal search falling under the exception of search of a moving vehicle.

People v. Malmstedt 198 SCRA 401


Accused is a Swedish national arrested for carrying Hashish, a form of marijuana during a NARCOM inspection. He was tried and found guilty in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. He contends that the arrest was illegal without the search warrant.

ISSUE: WON the arrest made was illegal in the absence of a search warrant.

HELD: NARCOM operation was conducted with a probable cause for a warrantless search upon information that prohibited drugs are in the possession of the accused and he failed to immediately present his passport. A warrantless arrest may be lawfully made: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Posadas v. CA 188 SCRA 288

FACTS: Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While in the vicinity of Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the warrantless search is valid. HELD: Yes. In the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering that it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late. Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.

Bagalihog v. Fernandez 198 SCRA 614


On March 17, 1989, Rep. Moises Espinosa was shot to death shortly after disembarking at the Masbate Airport. Witnesses said one of the gunmen fled on a motorcycle. On the same day, the petitioner's house, which was near the airport, was searched with his consent to see if the killers had sought refuge there. The search proved fruitless. Two days later, Capt. Julito Roxas and his men from the Philippine Constabulary seized the petitioner's motorcycle and took it to the PC headquarters in Masbate. They had no search warrant. The motorcycle was impounded on the suspicion that it was one of the vehicles used by the killers. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction in holding that the motorcycle can be seized without a warrant

HELD: For all his strong conviction about the guilt of the petitioner, the private respondent must still abide by the Constitution and observe the requirements of the Bill of Rights. Article III, Section 2, provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty but are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The mere fact that in the private respondent's view the crime involved is "heinous" and the victim was "a man of consequence" did not authorize disregard of the constitutional guaranty. Neither did "superior orders" condone the omission for they could not in any case be superior to the Constitution.

People v. Cuachon 238 SCRA 540

FACTS: On 20 November 1988, a confidential informant reported to the police that was rampant selling of shabu in the residence of Romeo Cuachon. Forthwith, a team of police officers was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation against the accused. As planned, Pat. Uggadan and the informant proceeded to the residence of their quarry while Pat. Reyes and other members of the team posted themselves in strategic places. After a few minutes, Uggadan together with the informant reported to Reyes that he had succeeded in buying shabbu from the accused at the same time presenting the merchandise to the latter. After determining it was shabu, Reyes and his men immediately proceeded to the residence of Cuachon and found in one of the rooms several men seated around a table, engaged in pot session and several paraphernalia. Uggadan pointed Cuachon to Reyes as the person who earlier sold shabu to him. Thereupon, Reyes frisked Cuachon and found in his person the two P100 bills that he gave Uggadan as a buy-bust money. He also found a quantity of shabu contained in the plastic bag.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure justified. HELD:

The Court justified the warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrest and the obligation of the police to apprehend even without a warrant. Pat. Uggandan witnessed the illegal act of selling shabu on the occasion of the buy-bust operation in front of the room of the accused. He did not make the arrest right then and there because there were only himself and the informant as against the different male and female voices he heard from both rooms of Cuachons house. Considering that the operation took place inside the house of the appellant, understandably Pat. Uggadan and his informant had to get of the house and inform their backup that the sale had been consummated. Furthermore, weighty consideration is the fact that, as previously stated, Uggadan immediately gave the shabu to Reyes who was only a block away and after thelatter had determined that it was shabu, which only took a few minutes, they all immediately proceeded to the house of Cuachon and arrested him.

It was a continuing buy-bust operation which, as the phrase connotes, commenced with buying shabu and culminates in Cuachons arrest. Since his arrest was lawful, it follows that the incidental search was also valid.16.Peoplevs.Medel(One kilo of marijuana; accused carrying red travelling bag; acting suspiciously; arrest was based on suspicion; where there is urgency; compared to The answer of the Court is in the affirmative. The contention of the accused is devoid of merit. The judgment of conviction by the trial court is AFFIRMED.

People v. De Garcia 233 SCRA 540

FACTS: The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup detat staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the Government. At around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team led by F/Lt. Virgilio Babao raided the Eurocar Sales Office. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which is the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure. HELD: Yes. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is the Courts considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.

People v. De Lara 236 SCRA 291

FACTS: After surveillance conducted, a buy-bust operation was conducted by the police, and as a consequence of which, the accused was arrested in his residence. The accused admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his house. He even showed the arresting officers a blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs. During the investigation, when asked to write a statement, the accused refused to do so. He contended that his arrest and the seizure of the blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs were null and void, on the ground that there were no warrants of arrest and search presented during his arrest and the search.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the blue plastic bag were valid HELD: Yes. The accused was caught in flagrante s a result of the buy-bust operation. There was no need of an arrest warrant. The policemens entry to his house without an arrest warrant was in a hot-pursuit of a person caught committing an offense in flagrante. The arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was valid. The seizure of the blue plastic bag, on the other hand, was the result of the accuseds arrest in the house. A contemporary search may be conducted upon the person arrested and the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made.

Aniag v. COMELEC 237 SCRA 424

FACTS: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323, Gun Ban, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the Gun Ban, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioners house and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano was apprehended and detained. He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to show because why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car. HELD: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority. However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellanos waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these

circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not informed that he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.

People v. Barros 231 SCRA 557

FACTS: While on a bus from Bontoc, Mountain Province to Nacagang, Mountain Province, Barros was caught in possession of 4kgs of dried Marijuana which was intended for distribution and sale at Baguio City, knowing that said Marijuana is a prohibited drug. Petitioner was charged in violation of RA 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act. RTC sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Php 20,000.

ISSUE: Whether there was due process by the court a quo, ignoring manifest absence of mandatory warrant in arrest and search of the accused.

HELD: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the meaning of Section 2 of the Bill of Rights. The evidence secured will be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.The exception to this rule is when a search is done in moving vehicles, upon probable cause. In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to visual inspection. In the case at bar, peace officers did not receive any prior information or tip off. Also, they did not contend that they had detected the odor of Marijuana. There is no indication of probable cause for the search. The non-admissibility of evidence secured through a disregard of the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable searches and seizures is the sanction imposed by the Constitution for disregard of such right; the sanction is a powerful one, for it renders inutile the work done by police officers, by the prosecutor and by the trial court. It is a sanction which this Court has no other choice but to apply in the instant case. RTC decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. The evidence lawfully before trial courts no being sufficient to establish guilt thereof beyond reasonable doubt.

People v. Tabar 222 SCRA 144 FACTS: The appellant was convicted by the RTC Br. 15 of Cebu City for violation of R.A, 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) as amended. In the course of the trial, the facts revealed that the police operatives conducted a buy bust operation and successfully arrested the nephew of the appellant for selling sticks of marijuana. The appellant however, was also arrested when she hurriedly left her shanty after noticing the arrest of her nephew while holding pair of white pants. When the officers ask her to spread the rolled pants, they found other marijuana sticks which were confiscated. The appellant filed a petition for appeal contending that the arrest was a violation of her rights against unreasonable searches and seizure since it was effected without the virtue of a search warrant.

ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search and seizure made against the appellant valid.

HELD: The SC ruled in affirmative. When the appellant was asked by the police operatives to spread out the rolled pair of pants, which she voluntarily did, the package containing the packs of marijuana sticks were thus exposed in plain view to the members of the team. A crime was thus committed in the presence of the policemen. Pursuant to Sec. 15, rule 113 and sec. 12 Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, she could lawfully be arrested and searched for anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense without the corresponding arrest and search warrants. The appellant had effectively waived her constitutional right relative thereto by voluntarily submitting to the search and seizure. The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made expressly or impliedly.

Manlavi v. Gacott 244 SCRA 50


Complainant, a senior police officer, charged respondent with partiality, miscarriage of justice and knowingly rendering an unjust decision in connection with the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 9210 (Illegal Possession of Explosives Intended for Illegal Fishing) and 9211 (Illegal Possession of Illegally Caught Fish). The cases were consolidated for trial. The accused moved to quash Criminal Case No. 9210 on the ground that the evidence of the prosecution was the product of a warrantless and illegal search and seizure. Respondent granted the motion in the Order dated July 9, 1992, citing the admission of the prosecution that the search and seizure was not covered by a search warrant, and that the search warrant presented in court was issued after the fact. Complainant contended that the confiscation of the fish in the absence of a search warrant was allowed under Circular No. 130 (s. 1967) of the Office of the President. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge indeed acted with partiality resulting to miscarriage of justice and knowingly rendered an unjust decision HELD: In the case at bench, the accused moved for the quashal of the criminal cases after their arraignment. As a general rule, an accused can move for the quashal of the information on any ground before arraignment (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 117, and Sec. 1). However, the rule admits of some exceptions such as where there is no offense charged (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 117, Section 8; Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 145 [1991]), for what controls is not the designation of the offense charged in the information but the allegations of the constitutive elements of the offense. Any ambiguity in the information shall be resolved in favor of the accused. Well-settled is the rule that the acts of a judge which pertain to his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary power, unless when they are committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith (Abiera v. Maceda; 233 SCRA 520 [1994]).

People v. Leangsiri 252 SCRA 213

FACTS: Suchinda Leangsiri was arrested in the NAIA in the act of bringing into the country approximately more than kilo of heroin. In his arrest, he informed the arresting officers that the heroin is meant to deliver to three other people in Las Palmas Hotel in Manila. Immediately, the NARCOM formed a group for a follow up operation in the said Hotel. In the accuseds cooperation, he was allowed to check in to Room 504, where the others will meet him to give the drugs. Around 10 pm, Amidu two other co-appellants entered Room 504 and Leagsiri gave them the drugs, before the appellants leave the room, the NARCOM officers barged in and arrested the appellants. Amidu, told the officers that he is staying in Room 413 and that the two others are in Royal Palm Hotel. The officers then went to the room of Amidu, searching for evidence and subsequently confiscated a telephone address bearing the name of Leangsiri, other possessions and documents of Amidu were also confiscated. In the case of the two other, the police confiscated a suit case and masking tape and empty transparent bag, allegedly will be used in transporting the drugs. The appellants were charged and were convicted in conspiring to transport heroin violative of RA 6425. Hence this petition, alleging that the search is illegal being conducted not in the direct premises of the arrest. ISSUE: Whether the articles sought in the other room and hotel, outside the direct premises of the arrest admissible as evidence? HELD: No. those articles are inadmissible as evidence as it was obtained neither in plain view nor within the direct premises of the arrest. The plain view doctrine applies to OBJECTS OF THE PLAIN VIEW OF AN OFFICER WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO BE IN THE POSITION TO HAVE THAT VIEW ARE SUBJECT TO SEIZURE AND MAYBE PRESENTED AS EVIDENCE. Thus, what can be admitted are evidences seized within the direct premise where the accused has an immediate control which should only be Rm. 509. In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel. The piece of paper bearing Leangsiri's name was obtained through a warrantless search of Room 413 of the same hotel, and found tucked within the pages of appellant Amidu's telephone and address book. Clearly, the warrantless search is illegal and the piece of paper bearing Leangsiri's name cannot be admitted as evidence against

appellants. The in admissibility of this evidence will not, however, exculpate appellants. Its exclusion does not destroy the prosecution's case against appellants. The remaining evidence still established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Note: Plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not, searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine. What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came in advertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification.

United Laboratories v. Isip GR 163858 (June 28, 2005)

FACTS: Petitioner UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place reported to be manufacturing fake UNILAB products, especially revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where the marked manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant directing the police to seize finished or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly revicon multivitamins. No fake revicon was however found; instead, sealed boxes were seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine. HELD: It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine. However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine to apply are present, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on plain view. In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove the essential requirements for the application of the plain view doctrine.IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Malacat v. CA 283 SCRA 159

FACTS: On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Police officer Yu and company were on foot patrol (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with their eyes,moving very fast. "Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line. Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner "later voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store," concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest. HELD: Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search of petitioner were invalid. The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those affected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions.

People v. Encinada 280 SCRA 72

FACTS: In this case, Bolonia received at 4:00 p.m. on May 20, 1992 an intelligence report that appellant who was carrying marijuana would arrive the next morning aboard the M/V Sweet Pearl. Although such report could have been the basis of probable cause, Bolonia explained that he could not secure a warrant because the courts in Surigao City were already closed for the day. Thus, he and the other lawmen had no choice but to proceed the next morning to the port area. After appellant disembarked from the ship and rode a motorela, Bolonia stopped the motor vehicle and conducted the search. He rummaged through the two strapped plastic baby chairs which were held by appellant and found inserted between them a package of marijuana wrapped in a small plastic envelope. Appellant contended before the lower court that the warrantless search of his belongings was proscribed by the Constitution. But the trial judge rejected this contention, opining that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto at the time of his arrest. Hence, it concluded that the warrantless search conducted after his lawful arrest was valid and that the marijuana was admissible in evidence. ISSUE: Whether the arrest and search of the accused without a warrant would fall under the doctrine of warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest; and, (2) Whether the subject marijuana is admissible in evidence against the accused. HELD: Appellant claims that the prosecution failed to prove his possession and ownership of the plastic baby chairs. He contends that the testimonies of Bolonia and Iligan conflicted as to the number of passengers riding the motorela. Such alleged conflict is peripheral and irrelevant. Hence, it deserves scant consideration. Appellant adds that such testimonies also conflicted as to the place where appellant sat inside the motorela. This claim, aside from being flimsy, is also not supported by the transcript of stenographic notes. Based on the foregoing discussion, appellants conviction could have be en affirmed by this Court. However, the very evidence implicating him -- the prohibited drugs found in his possession -- cannot be used against him in this case or, for that matter, in any proceeding.

In acquitting the appellant, the Court reiterates the constitutional proscription that evidence (in this case, prohibited drug) seized without a valid search warrant is inadmissible in any proceeding. A yield of incriminating evidence will not legitimize an illegal search. Indeed, the end never justifies the means.

Mustang Lumber v. CA 257 SCRA 430 FACTS: On 1 April 1990, acting on information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner. The team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the RTC. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioners lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. The following day, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of remaining lumber because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin. The petitioner questioned therein the seizure on 1 April 1990, without any search and seizure order issued by a judge, of its truck. ISSUE: WON the search and seizure made during inspection of the moving vehicle without a search warrant was unconstitutional. HELD: No. The trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with large volumes of lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving vehicle.

People v. Gatward 267 SCRA 785

FACTS: At about 3:00 p.m. of 1 September 1994, Gatwards luggage was brought back to the NAIA from Bangkok through the Thai airways, pursuant to the request of Erece. Upon its retrieval, the law enforcers subjected the bag to x-ray examinations in the presence of Gatward and some Customs officials. It was observed to contain some powdery substance. Inside the bag were two improvised envelopes made of cardboard each containing the powdery substance, together with many clothes. The envelopes were hidden inside the bag, one at the side in between a double-wall, the other inside a partition in the middle. Upon its examination by Chemists Ayonon and Advincula pursuant to the request of Police Senior Inspector John Campos of the NARCOM, the powdery substance contained in the two cardboard envelopes, with a net weight of 5,237.70 grams, was found to be heroin. Nigel Richard Gatward was charged with violating Section 4 of Republic Act 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (transporting); while U Aung Win was charged for transgressing Section 3 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (importing). Gatward pleaded not guilty of the charge when arraigned, while U Aung Win pleaded guilty of the crime charged upon his arraignment. On 3March 1995, the trial court found both guilty of the crime charged. ISSUE: Whether Gatwards and U Aung Wins suitcases may be searched without warrant. HELD: While no search warrant had been obtained for that purpose, when Gatward checked in his bag as his personal luggage as a passenger of KLM Flight 806 he thereby agreed to the inspection thereof in accordance with customs rules and regulations, an international practice of strict observance, and waived any objection to a warrantless search. His subsequent arrest, although likewise without a warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of the heroin in his bag, or in flagrante delicto. The conviction of U Aung Win is likewise unassailable. His culpability was not based only upon his plea of guilty but also upon the evidence of the prosecution, the presentation of which was required by the lower court despite said plea. The evidence thus presented convincingly proved his having imported into this country the heroin found in his luggage which he presented for customs examination upon his arrival at the international airport. There was, of course, no showing that he was not authorized by law to import such dangerous drug, nor did he claim or present any authority to do so.

People v. Lacerna 278 SCRA 561

FACTS: On September 12, 1992, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Carlito P. Valenzuela, a member of the Mobile Patrol Division of the Western Police District (WPD), was assigned to man the checkpoint and patrol the area somewhere along the side streets of Radial Road near Moriones Street. Appellant was seated beside the taxi driver while co-accused was seated at the left back seat of the taxi. When PO3 Valenzuela looked at the occupants of said taxi, the latter bowed their heads and slouched, refusing to look at him. Feeling that something was amiss, PO3 Valenzuela and his companion stopped the vehicle, signaling the driver to park by the side of the road. PO3 Valenzuela and his co-police officer asked permission to search the vehicle. As the occupants readily agreed, the police officers went about searching the luggage in the vehicle which consisted of a knapsack and a dark blue plastic grocery bag. They asked appellant what the contents of the plastic bag were. Co-accused Noriel Lacerna immediately answered that the bag contained his vomit. Skeptical of what appellant and co-accused disclosed as regards the contents of the plastic bag, PO3 Valenzuela made a hole in the bag and peeped inside. He found several blocks wrapped in newspaper, with the distinct smell of marijuana emanating from it. PO3 Valenzuela opened one of the boxes and saw dried marijuana leaves. He told appellant and co-accused that the contents of the bag were marijuana, which co-accused readily affirmed. According to both Lacernas, the bag was a padala of their uncle. Specifically, they claimed that the bag was sent by their uncle, who happened to be in Baguio City, for shipment to Iloilo. After thorough investigation, the appellant was judged guilty for the crime of violation of Section 4 of RA 6425 as amended, and was sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20, 000.00. The appellant invoked his right against warrantless searches and seizures because when the vehicle was searched, and the marijuana was seized, there was no valid warrant presented to them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant can invoke his right against warrantless search and seizure.

HELD: No. The appellant and his baggage were validly searched because he freely consented to the search. True, appellant and his companion were stopped by PO3 Valenzuela on mere suspicion -- not probable cause -- that they were engaged in a felonious enterprise. But Valenzuela expressly sought appellants permission for the search. Only after appellant agreed to have his person and baggage checked did the actual search commence. It was his consent which validated the search, waiver being a generally recognized exception to the rule against warrantless search. But court a quo observed that appellant could not be convicted of delivering prohibited drugs because the Information did not allege that he knowingly delivered marijuana. Neither could he be convicted of transporting or dispatching in transit such prohibited drugs because these acts were not alleged in the Information. The trial court mused further that appellant could not be convicted of selling marijuana because the elements constituting this crime were not proven. However, the Information charged appellant with giving away to another prohibited drugs, a charge which was different from delivery defined under Section 2 (f) of R.A. 6245, as amended. The Court modified the assailed decision. Appellant is convicted of illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of R.A. 6425; sentenced, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to eight (8) years as minimum to twelve (12) years as maximum; and ordered to pay a fine of twelve thousand pesos (P12, 000.00).