Riw 3.0

AUSTRALIA | BRAZIL | CANADA | THE NETHERLANDS | SINGAPORE | USA | UNITED KINGDOM
Rig Inspection Workshop

Course book
Land rigs - Jack-up rigs - Platform rigs

Authors: Dave Anderson and Jaap Peetsold

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2

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Rig Inspection Workshop Course book 3.0
Table of contents

3

Table of contents

Table of contents ............................................................................ 3
Chapter 01 Drilling equipment....................................................... 5
Chapter 02 Mud processing equipment ........................................177
Chapter 03 Engine room and power plant ....................................219
Chapter 04 Electrical equipment .................................................267
Chapter 05 Safety equipment ....................................................327
Chapter 06 Marine equipment ....................................................361
Chapter 07 Well control equipment .............................................389
Chapter 08 Appendices .............................................................483

Table of contents

4

01 Drilling equipment

5

Chapter 01
Drilling equipment
1 Drawworks introduction.............................................................. 6
2 Rotary table ........................................................................... 44
3 Top drive introduction.............................................................. 53
4 Top drive ............................................................................... 79
5 Swivel ................................................................................... 93
6 Crown and travelling block introduction .................................... 101
7 Crown and travelling block...................................................... 107
8 Driller's console..................................................................... 117
9 Derrick ................................................................................ 124
10 Air winches introduction ......................................................... 143
11 Air winches........................................................................... 152
12 Lifting and handling equipment ............................................... 161


6

1 Drawworks introduction

Figure 1 - Overall picture of the layout of the drill floor, derrick,
travelling block and crown block.


7

Figure 2 - Layout with the drawworks components.
The drawworks is one of the most important items on the entire rig. The
drawworks is (together with the mud pumps and the BOP) the most costly
component of the rig. The correct operation of the drawworks components is
often not fully understood by the rig crews.
We will explain the main operational issues in this introduction.


8

Figure 3 - The wear spots of the drill line.
We find the following wear on the drawworks:
fastline wear
fleet angle side wear
sheave wear
drum wear
line wear


9

Figure 4 - Vibration wear on the drill line.
Whip and vibration can cause wire fatigue due to the very small movement
between the wires and the stands of the drill line (see Figure 4 for the wire
specifications). When the lines are 'banging' together in the derrick, this can
cause abrasive wear. Vibration may also cause lateral movement of the
sheaves, thus causing abrasive wear.

10

Figure 5 - Wire rope unwrapped, showing its different components.
For example, the drill line in use is 1" x 5,000' 6x19 S PRF IPS IWRC. What
does that mean?
1" = diameter of the line (in inches)
5,000' = length of the line (in feet)
6 = amount of strands per line
19 = amount of wires per strand
S = seal pattern
PRF = preformed strands
RRL = Right Regular Lay
IPS = Improved Plow Steel
IWRC = Independent Wire Rope Core


11

Figure 6 - Sheaves do not all move at the same speed.
The maximum recommended drum speed is approximately 4,000 feet per
minute. The travelling block is lowered in approximately 12 seconds for one
stand (93 feet) when the rig is using a six-line system.
If the line is paid off the drawworks drum, the speed will be 6 x 93 feet =
558 feet in just 12 seconds. Consequently, the drum speed will be
558 x 12 : 60 = 2,790 feet per minute.
If the line is later strung to 8 lines, the drum speed per stand at 12 seconds
becomes: 93 x 8 lines = 744, therefore 744 x 60 : 12 = 3,720 feet per
minute

Drum speed in feet per minute:
60 seconds
Block speed seconds/stand
x stand length (feet) x number of lines

12

Figure 7 - The maximum number of lines 'strung' depends on the
number of sheaves in the crown and travelling block.
Question: There are six sheaves reeved on the crown-block. How many
'lines' are strung?
Answer: Twelve lines.
Question: What is the mechanical advantage rate of this set-up?
Answer: 12:1
Question: When the load on the block is 400,000 lbs, what is the load on
the fastline?
Answer: 33,333 lbs (ignoring the friction)
Question: When the load is lifted 100 feet into the derrick, how much
wire is taken from the drawworks drum?
Answer: 1,200 feet


13

Figure 8 - Single sheave.
The single sheave means there is no
mechanical advantage. The effort it
takes to pull the load is equal to the
weight of the load itself.
Figure 9 - More than one sheave.
The mechanical advantage is equal to
the number of lines connected to the
two pulleys. The advantage of the two
pulleys means that we only have to
pull half the load to lift it entirely.

Fleet angles
Rate A:B Fleet angle
degrees
0.009 0.50
0.013 0.75
0.017 1.00
0.022 1.50
0.026 1.50
0.031 1.50
0.035 2.00
Figure 10 - The drawworks fleet angle and the table showing how to
calculate the fleet angle.
The fastline should line up with the centre of the drawworks drum. The angle
of the wire in relation to the centre line is called the fleet angle. An
excessively large fleet angle will cause wear on the side of the drill line.

14

Question: How do we calculate the fleet angle (see the right-hand picture of
Figure 10)?
Let's assume that the distance B = 150 feet and distance A = 3 feet. This
means that the ratio between A and B is A:B = 3 : 150 = 0.02. As this is
closest to 0.022, it means a fleet angle of 1.5 degrees.
The maximum fleet angle for smooth drums is 1.5 degrees.
The maximum fleet angle for grooved drums is 2.0 degrees.
The mathematical calculation for the fleet angle is tan W = A:B


15

1.1 Sheave wear
The main causes of sheave wear are as follows:
a) extremely heavy loads
b) very quick stopping or starting of the drawworks
c) vibrations and whipping
d) incorrect fleet angle
e) differences in the rope and sheave diameters
f) worn sheave bearings

Causes a, b and c are due to the incorrect operation standards. Causes d, e
and f are due to the incorrect design and maintenance standards. An
excessive fleet angle will create abrasive wear to both the sheave and the
drill line, resulting in the excessive and uneven wear of the groove radius.
We will discuss how to measure the sheaves in the chapter on the crown
block.

Figure 11 - Sheave cluster of the crown block made by NOV.

16

1.2 Drum wear

Figure 12 - Drawworks without a drill line installed (clearly visible
are the Lebus grooves).
Inspection criteria for the drum:
a) Inspect the condition and the adjustment of the kickback rollers.
b) Check the wear pads at the side of the drum.
c) Check the Lebus groove with a gauge.

Figure 13 - The Lebus groove with the drill line installed in the
recommended way.


17

1.3 Line wear
Line wear cannot be eliminated - it can only be monitored and controlled. A
good way to manage line wear is using a proven tonne-mile programme. The
most likely causes of line wear are the following:
a) excessive weight
b) raising and lowering too fast
c) stopping too quickly
d) poor spooling on the drum
e) contamination by extreme degreasers like acid or heavy brine

Figure 14
Good spooling shows
the outer layer resting
in the grooves of the
lower layer.

Figure 15
Poor spooling caused
by a slack line can
leave a gap that the
next wrap falls into.
This could be covered
by the same wrap, thus
causing another
crossover point.

Figure 16
A worn drill line left on
the drum after a slip-
and-cut operation may
have a smaller
diameter (the dark
colour in the drawing).
A newer drill line laid
over the top may not
fit the grooves, thus
causing uneven
spooling.
Cutting the line allows worn sections to be removed from the system. Simply
slipping is not recommended, as it does not move the crossover points on
the drum. As the drill line diameter reduces with wear, any worn drill line
(i.e. with a smaller diameter) kept on the drum may result in spooling
problems and further damage.

18

1.4 Summary
The most likely effects of wear are the following:
1. Crossover and pick-up points are most critical.
2. The fastline speed/whip/vibration needs to be controlled.
3. The need to carry out a rig-up to verify the fleet angle is correct.
4. Increased maintenance to ensure that the sheave and drum grooves are
in good condition.
5. Increased checks on the drill line diameter.
6. Increases in the cut-and-slip programme to move the critical wear
points.

Proper procedures and maintenance routines:
a) Proper care will extend the life of the drill line.
b) Prevent contact with sharp objects.
c) Keep the drill line clean from mud, sand and corrosive chemicals.
d) Do not use the drill line near an arc welding circuit.
e) Protect the drill line when welding is carried out in the vicinity.
f) Do not clean the drill line with solvents.
g) Lubricate as necessary.

Figure 17 - Conventional drawworks with main components.


19

1.5 Modern drawworks
The conventional drawworks (see Figure 17) was constructed with the
following components:
a low and a high clutch
two brake bands connected with an equalizing bar
a coupling at the end to be connected to the eddy current brake
two or three 1,000-horsepower DC motors driving the drawworks
two catheads to be used with the rig tongs
Modern drawworks are not DC-driven but AC-driven and have disk brakes
installed. The following schematic shows one of the new drawworks designs
by NOV.

Figure 18 - The NOV ADS-10 drawworks.

20

1.6 The NOV ADS- 10 drawworks
Description
The NOV ADS-10D Automated Drawworks System (ADS) is used for hoisting
the travelling equipment of a drilling rig to remove and insert tubulars into
the wellbore. The ADS is a gear-driven drawworks with VFD-controlled AC
motors and multi-plate friction brakes. Optional-resistive (regenerative)
braking via the main motors can be applied to augment the friction brakes.
The drawworks components are mounted on a unitized skid. The driller, at
an operator control station, uses a dedicated joystick and switches in order
to remotely operate the ADS through a Varco Integrated Control Instrument
System
(V-ICIS).
Wire rope drum
The wire rope drum is supported by two bearing carriers mounted to a
structural steel skid. The drum is fitted with Lebus grooving for customer-
specified wire. A crown saver toggle valve is located above the drum. The
valve is located where it can be activated by the wire rope, just short of the
point at which a crown collision would occur. When the valve is activated, it
sends a signal to a crown saver pressure switch that disengages the clutches
and activates the brakes and stops the drum rotating.
Gearboxes (dry sump)
The 1500-horsepower, single-speed, double-reduction gearboxes transfer
power between the AC motors and the wire rope drum. Mounted on the
clutch shaft is a pneumatically released, spring-operated multi-disc clutch
that transmits torque between the first and second gear reduction. The
clutch must be engaged for velocity control by the motors during hoisting
and lowering. Lubricating oil for the gears and bearings is supplied by an
external electrical pump system with a frame-mounted reservoir.
Gearboxes (wet sump)
The wet-sump gearbox is similar to the dry-sump gearbox, apart from the
fact that the lubricating oil for the gears is supplied by the sump inside the
gearbox. Lubricating oil for the bearings is supplied by an external lube
system.
Clutch
The clutch provides the opportunity to disengage the drive motors from the
drum shaft. It is used in ESD situations to reduce the (motor) inertia that
the plate disc brakes must retard. It is also used when electrical repairs or
maintenance tasks are being performed, and when it is necessary to tune
the VFDs by running motors or the change of motors.
AC motors
The ADS uses 1,150-horsepower (continuous rating), variable-speed AC
motors to drive the wire rope drum through the gearboxes. The motors are
coupled to the gearboxes with double-spherical gear drive couplings. The
wide range of motor speed allows the ADS to achieve a broad range of
hoisting speeds. The use of multiple motors increases the hoisting capability.
Motor blowers
The motor blowers provide open-loop, forced-air cooling to the AC motors.


21

Friction brakes
The brake is a combined spring-/air-operated, multi-plate disc brake. It
applies braking to the drum during operations, as well as parking braking.
Two braking methods are available to the operator: dynamic breaking using
the friction brakes, and regenerative braking through the AC motors. One
brake is mounted at each end of the drum shaft. The rotating brake discs
are spline-coupled to the drum shaft, and the brake housing is attached to
the skid. Each brake has three water-cooled discs for dynamic braking
control and a single, air-cooled brake disc for extra static parking and
emergency stopping capacity.
Rotary encoders
Rotary encoders provide speed and block position information. Encoders are
directly coupled to each motor and coupled to the clutch shaft by means of a
drive belt.
Sensing and feedback devices
Sensing devices are used to monitor the equipment functions. Sensor device
outputs are sent to the control system, where they are processed to provide
feedback for closed-loop control and to display status information to the
Driller. Several types of sensing devices are used.
ADS control system
The ADS control system processes all the data from the operator controls to
the drawworks, and all the feedback from the drawworks to the operator.
The processed data is used to control all the drawworks functions, and to
inform the operator of the drawworks operations and status. The control
system also provides the following safety features:
drill line protection
collision protection
equipment protection
Optional desert kit
An optional desert kit includes sand filters on the blowers and 55C ambient-
temperature-rated ancillary motors (blower motors and lubricating-oil pump
motor) and main AC motors.

22

Figure 19 - NOV ADS-10D water-cooled disc brakes.


23

Figure 20 - Connections of the disc brake onto the drawworks main
shaft.

Figure 21 - Details of the disc brake assembly.

24

Figure 22 - NOV ADS-10DT gearbox.


25

Figure 23 - Clear indications on computer screens (the presently
selected format is Autodrill).

26

Figure 24 - Actual information on the drawworks components
from the DWCS system.


27

Figure 25 - Drawworks status of the AC motors and encoders.

28

1.7 Specifications NOV type ADS- 10D
Component specifications
Size
Height (max.): 101 inches
Width (max.): 120 inches
Length (max.): 296 inches
Weight (max.): 100,000 lbs
AC motor
Power rating (max.): 1,400 horsepower (intermittent)
1,150 horsepower (continuous)
Speed (max.): 3,000 rpm
Cooling (each motor): 3,000 square cubic feet per minute of air
Gearbox
Type single-speed double-reduction parallel shaft
Ratios: 10.71:1 overall (dry sump)
10.69:1 overall (wet sump)
2.90:1 first stage (input) (dry sump)
2.77:1 first stage (input) (wet sump)
3.69:1 second stage (dry sump)
3.86:1 second stage (wet sump)
Torque rating: 11,000 ft-lbs input shaft (dry sump)
13,500 ft-lbs input shaft (wet sump)
Weight: 13,000 lbs (dry sump)
14,250 lbs (wet sump)
Brake
Brake size: 4-plate, 36-inch diameter
Dynamic braking type: 3-disc, water-cooled, pressure-applied
brake system
Emergency parking brake type: spring-applied, air-cooled, pneumatically
released multi-disc brake (engages three
dynamic discs and the single air-cooled disc)
Min. rig air pressure required: 135 psi
Max. dynamic braking torque at: 120 psi / 183,750 ft-lbs
Max. particle size: 5 microns (air quality as per ISA Standard
S7.3-1981)
Dew point: 10C below minimum ambient temperature,
not to exceed 2C in any case.


29

Brake cooling
Flow rate to each brake: 195 GPM
Brake cooling system: 6.0 M BTU/hr (total continuous) with heat
dissipation capacity required
Power rating: 1,950 horsepower each (150F max. outlet water
[continuous] temperature and 50F max.
temperature rise)
Water inlet pressure: 40 psi max.
Wire rope drum
Wire rope diameter: as per customer specification
Drum core diameter: as per customer specification
Drum length: as per customer specification
Grooving: Lebus
Wire rope
Type: 6x19 Extra Improved Plow Steel (EIPS)
Specification: API Spec 9A (Wire Rope)
Power requirements (electric and pneumatic)
Control system: 120 V AC / 60 Hz / 15 A
Pressure: 135 psi

30

1.8 Drawworks checklist
Record the date of the last drawworks overhaul (API RP 7L section 4.2).
Check the NDT inspection reports for the brake bands, linkage and
equalizer bar.
Review wear reports for the brake bands, brake pads and brake rims
(IADC Drilling manual, Chapter F).
Check for wear on the brake linkage; look for instances of kicking
brakes.
Test the wear on the drill line/Lebus groove wear.
Ensure that at least twelve wraps are on the brake drum (with the
travelling block in the lowest position).
Check the drill line clamp on the dead end of the wire behind the brake
rim flange.
Is there enough spare drill line for the contract?
Verify the kickback roller setting (- to -inch play).
Carry out a cathead pull test: minimum make-up 7,000 lbs and break-
out cathead 14,000 lbs (3,175 kg and 6,350 kg respectively).
Confirm the make-up chain condition (max. link wear 10%).
Check the break-out line condition.
Ensure the lube oil pressure is within the OEM required range (20 to 50
psi and 1 to 3 bars for National drawworks).
Review the oil samples analysis reports.
Check that the oil sprayer nozzles are not blocked.
Check if silicone sealant is being used as gasket material on the covers.
Review inspections records of the chain stretch: maximum allowed
stretch 3% as measured over five links (API Spec 7F section A.3.5).
Check for wear on the sprockets (API Spec 7F sections A.3.4 and A.3.5).
Carry out a function test of the Crown-O-Matic or equivalent system.
Check the disc brakes for wear and cracks; check the OEM manual for
wear rates.
Check over the disc brake hydraulic system; check the OEM manual for
the correct operating pressures.
Verify the condition of the brake pads on the emergency brake, parking
brake and main brake.
Confirm that any DC motors used inside the hazardous area are fitted
with spark arrestors and EX space heaters.
Confirm that the electric cables and junction boxes have an EX rating
(API RP 14F section 12.1.2).
Ensure there is sufficient cooling-water capacity for the brake band and
eddy current brake (150 US gallons per minute = 570 litres per minute
when using a Baylor 7838 unit).
Ensure there is sufficient cooling water for the disc brakes (i.e. 195
gallons per minute = 740 litres per minute). (*)


31

Figure 26
Critical load path.

Figure 27
Typical drawworks with
band brakes.

32

Figure 28
There should be no
unauthorized welding on
lifting equipment,
including the balance bar.
Perform a wobble test to
check the clearance.
Note: The maximum
clearance for a National
drawworks is 0.020 inch
(= 0.5 mm).

Figure 29
Cracks are often found
during NDT inspections.
Some NOV balance bars
are cast steel and tend to
reveal more cracks than
forged or fabricated
balance bars.

Figure 30
Small surface cracks can
be removed by means of
a pencil grinder.


33

Figure 31
Inspection of the brake
linkage system. The
toggle valve and the
pneumatic actuator are
clearly visible.

Figure 32
Poorly stored brake
bands could become
deformed and will not
correctly fit.

Figure 33
New brake bands are
formed to be a perfect fit
on the rims. They need
to be stored in a perfect
circle.

34

Figure 34
Partial NDT of the
drawworks brake bands.
If the bands have been
removed it would make
more sense to remove
the pads and carry out a
complete inspection.

Figure 35
Brake bands which came
apart, justifying the
regular NDT inspections.

Figure 36
Badly cracked brake
band still being used.


35

Figure 37
Brake bands are spring
steel, the rig welder
cannot repair the. This
repair could fail at any
moment.

Figure 38
Kick back rollers support
the weight of relaxed
brake bands to ensure
brake bands do not
overheat by rubbing
against the rotating
brake rims.

Figure 39
Lack of cooling water to
brake rim resulting in
small cracks and
discolouring. The bronze
colouring is an early
indication of problems.


36

Figure 40
When the rim surface
turns blue it is an
indication of serious
cooling-water problems.
This is caused more than
likely by heavy scale
build-up in the cooling
pipes and passages.

Figure 41
Typical brake cooling
system sowing the brake
rim and eddy current
brake cooling lines. Two
pumps would be
preferred.

Figure 42
The bent Crown-O-Matic
toggle valve spindle could
lead to a collision. It is an
easy repair that has been
ignored.


37

Figure 43
Drawworks should be
fitted with Lebus drums
to make sure the drilling
ling spools correctly,
reducing wear and tear
on the wires.

Figure 44
Even with a Lebus
groove expensive wires
can still get damaged, if
not enough care and
attention is taken.

Figure 45
Poor condition of the
Lebus grooves on the
drum.

38

Figure 46
Another example of worn
Lebus grooves. You do not
need tools to notice how
bad the wear is.

Figure 47
Modern wires are self-
lubricating. This one
should have been
changed a long time ago.
Who is looking at such
things?

Figure 48
Inspection of the power
end of the drawworks with
all the chains removed.


39

Figure 49
Nozzles inside the power
end provide lubrication for
the sprockets, chains and
bearings. A blockage of
the nozzles will rapidly
increase the wear on the
chain and sprocket.

Figure 50
The smaller chain drives
the oil pump from the
drawworks shaft. The
chains should be checked
for their condition and
tension to maintain the
correct oil pressure.

Figure 51
Older drawworks have
chain driven lubricating
pumps which means there
is no pre-lubrication.
Later drawworks have
externally mounted
electric driven pumps that
start as soon as the driller
selects the drawworks
and give good pre-
lubrication. This system
requires an alarm.

40

Figure 52
When there are no
gaskets available crews
tend to use silicon sealant
as a gasket material. This
has lead to many major
breakdowns on drilling
machinery.

Figure 53
Any drawworks inspection
must pay particular
attention to the sprockets
and chains. Badly worn
chains and sprockets
need to be replaced. It is
not cost effective to fit a
new chain on a worn
sprocket.

Figure 54
Chain links severely
damaged. An increase of
steel particles should
show up in the oil sample
analysis.


41

Figure 55
Severe wear and tear on
the teeth of the coupling
between the Elmagco
brake and drawworks.

Figure 56
Damaged, homemade
spliced wires should not
be used for the break-out
line.

Figure 57
Make-up chain from the
cathead showing severely
worn chain links. The
maximum wear level is
10% of the original
thickness. A new make-up
chain must be installed.

42

Figure 58
Break-out wires are
heavily loaded and should
be in perfect condition.

Figure 59
Rotating equipment should
be fully guarded to protect
personnel. Poor
housekeeping and
maintenance will almost
always result in low safety
standards. This should put
an inspector on high alert.

Figure 60
Typical disc brake
arrangement. The brake
pads and disc should be
checked on a disc brake.
Drawworks and the wear
rates should be within the
OEM's recommendations.


43

Figure 61
Typical example of what
happens when the drill
line fails.

Figure 62
Drill line failures are
expensive to repair and
could result in the loss of
the well and the contract.

Figure 63
Example of a drawworks
on a rig with low
operating standards.


44

2 Rotary table
Rotary table checklist
Take out a permit-to-work (PTW) and isolate.
Check the condition of the brake housing.
Check the condition of the chain and sprockets (maximum chain stretch
3% as per API RP 7F).
Ensure that the electrical cables and junction boxes have an EX rating.
Check the condition and operation of the gearbox.
Review any oil analysis reports, record the frequency.
Review backlash measurement records.
Function-test at 120 rpm for 30 minutes in a clockwise rotation.
Function-test in an anticlockwise rotation at slow speed.
When function testing allow time for the unit to warm through. Then
check the noise and vibration levels. Do not run in reverse for prolonged
periods.
Check the condition of the main bearing.
Ensure that the DC motors draw cooling air from outside the hazardous
areas and that spark arrestors are fitted on the discharge side.
Ensure that there is safety matting fitted around the rotary table.
Check and record any wear on the master bushings and inserts, and note
down the position of the drill pipe in the slips.
Check the manual locking system. (*)

Figure 64
Rotary table newly
installed.


45

Figure 65
Gearbox rotary table with
severely damaged teeth.

Figure 66
Pinion from the gearbox
severely damaged.

Figure 67
Complete the NDT as per
API RP 7L.

46

Figure 68
Cracks found in the rotary
master bushing inserts.

Figure 69
Cracks found on the outer
side of the master
bushings.

Figure 70
Crack found in the rotary
inserts.


47

Figure 71
Cracks in the lugs of the
split-type master
bushings.

Figure 72
The pin and the slots of
the master bushings need
to be measured to ensure
that they are within the
OEM maximum wear
limits.

Figure 73
Rotary table with clearly
worn master bushings and
inserts.

48

Figure 74
Measuring the neck of the
master bushing inserts to
ensure they are still within
the OEM maximum wear
limits.

Figure 75
Clear indications of
excessive wear on the
tapered inserts and master
bushings; the slips are
also going in too deep.

Figure 76
Disassembled bearing of
the rotary table. Note the
lack of lubrication and the
condition of the balls and
race.


49

Figure 77
The bearings and race are
totally destroyed on this
rotary table.

Figure 78
Damaged pinion gear and
shaft for the rotary table.

Figure 79
Damaged race and balls in
the rotary table bearing.

50

Figure 80
Air-operated brake of the
rotary table with a new
housing installed. Due to
its location, corrosion
levels on these brake
housings are often very
high and they need regular
replacement.

Figure 81
Brake housings are often
found badly corroded.

Figure 82
Rotary table DC motor
equipped with spark
arrestors.


51

Figure 83
Most rotary tables are
driven by DC motors,
these all need spark
arrestors fitting to the
cooling-air outlets.

Figure 84
It is becoming more
common to find hydraulic
drives for rotary tables.

Figure 85
New hydraulically driven
rotary table installed.

52

Figure 86
Bushing pullers crack and
need to be included in the
lifting-gear register. They
also require NDT.

Figure 87
Many rigs use auto slips,
the operation needs to be
check as long as the
mechanical condition and
NDT reports.

Figure 88
Bowl locks need to be in
good working order.


53

3 Top drive introduction

Figure 89 - Overall picture of the NOV top drive.
We will 'build up' this top drive and show all its major components: the top
drive assembly, the pipe handler, the retractable dolly and the hydraulic
system.

54

Figure 90 - Different configurations are possible.


55

Figure 91 - Upper part of the NOV top drive.
The upper part of the top drive contains the following elements:
1. gearbox
2. gear oil pump
3. gear oil cooler
4. motor coupling
5. drilling motor
6. parking brake
7. blower
8. motor bracket
9. lantern
10. wash pipe
11. S-pipe
12. suspension bail


56

Figure 92 - Gearbox type 2PV40.
Gear Ratio: 8.5:1
Maximum static torque: 122,500 ft-lbs
Load rating: 750 short tonnes

Figure 93 - Gear oil pump.
The oil circuit ensures cooling and filtering
and provides spray lubrication of the
bearing above the oil level.

Figure 94 - Air cooler.
The air cooler connected to the gear oil
circulation protects the oil from
overheating.


57

Figure 95 - AC drilling motor.
The AC drilling motor allows full torque at zero
speed for an unlimited period.
Make: Baylor CM628TUT
Output AC motor: 1,230 horsepower
Enclosure class: IP44

Figure 96 - Air brake.
The air brake (parking brake) is mounted to the
non-drive end of the drilling motor.

Figure 97 - Drilling motor.
The drilling motor is cooled by a blower driven
by an AC motor.

58

Figure 98
The support frame for the drilling motor.
Notice the attachment points for the retractable
dolly.

Figure 99 - The lantern.
The support bracket for the gooseneck and wash
pipe is called the lantern.

Figure 100
The wash pipe with a 3-inch ID.


59

Figure 101
S-pipe ID is 3 inches, pressure rating 7,500
psi.

Figure 102
Suspending compensating system.
Hoisting capacity: adjustable from 10 to 40 tons.
Uncompensated weight: adjustable minus
recommended setting (approximately 1 ton).


60

The pipe handler contains the
following elements:
1. main shaft
2. control valves
3. rotating head
4. hydraulic swivel
5. link hanger
6. split collar
7. crossover sub
8. remote IBOP
9. manual IBOP
10. saver sub
11. hydra lock
12. torque column
13. IBOP actuator
14. back-up grabber
15. links
16. link tilt
17. BX elevator
Figure 103 - Pipe handler.
The pipe handler has a 360-degree continuous-rotation facility. All ranges
from 4-inch up to 9-inch pipe can be torqued up by means of the same
pipe handler kit. The pipe handler has the capacity of 'kicking out' the
elevator 7 feet (provided that 132-inch links are installed [link tilt]).


61

Figure 104 - Main shaft.

Figure 105 - Support bracket.
The support bracket includes pneumatic and
hydraulic control valve blocks, instrument
junction boxes, pressure switches, etc.

Figure 106 - Rotation of pipe handler.
The rotation of the pipe handler is provided by a
dedicated hydraulic motor fixed to a gearwheel
driving the slew ring bearing on the rotating
head.

Figure 107 - Hydraulic swivel.
The hydraulic swivel provides hydraulic flow via
13 individual lines to the functions, while
allowing a 360-degree continuous rotation of
the pipe handler.

62

Figure 108 - Link hanger.
The link hanger is a cast-steel body
surrounding the main shaft. Tripping loads are
transferred via the link hanger block resting on
the split collar on the main shaft and then
further onto the main shaft thrust bearing.

Figure 109 - Split thrust collar.
The split thrust collar is located at the lower
end of the main shaft. The split collar is used
to transfer heavier pipe handler loads (loads
above 10 tons) to the drill stem.

Figure 110 - Crossover sub.
The crossover sub acts as crossover between
the threads of the upper IBOP and the main
shaft.

Figure 111 - Upper IBOP.
The upper IBOP is remotely operated (opened
and closed) from the driller's cabin by a yoke-
and-sleeve mechanism operated by a
hydraulic cylinder.


63

Figure 112 - Lower IBOP.
The lower IBOP can be manually opened by using a
supplied 22-mm Allan key used directly on the valve
stem.

Figure 113 - Hydra lock.
The Hydra lock locking rings provide a simple, reliable
and safe locking method of the drill stem subs
throughout the break-out operation.

Figure 114 - Torque column.
The torque column is fixed to the lugs at the rear side
of the link hanger. It acts as a torque arrestor when
breaking out connections by means of the drilling
motors and grabber.

Figure 115 - IBOP actuator.
The IBOP actuator consists of a hydraulic cylinder, a
lever arm and an actuating sleeve.


64

Figure 116 - Grabber body.
The grabber body is 'floating' on the column
sleeve. The grabber grips tubulars with an OD of
4 to 9 inches without replacing the die holders
or dies.

Figure 117 - Elevator links.


65

Figure 118 - Link tilt system.
The link tilt system consists of a set of hydraulic
cylinders and clamps to be fixed to the elevator
links.

Figure 119 - HPS (Hydralift Power Swivel).
The HPS is prepared for the operation with a
pneumatically or hydraulically operated elevator.

66

Figure 120 -
Retractable dolly.
The retractable dolly is
a rectangular and
vertical steel frame with
an upper and lower pair
of hinged and parallel
arms. The corners of the
frame have bogies
running in and between
the two vertical derrick
guide rails. Both arms
are connected to the
HPS support frame.

Figure 121


67

Figure 122
Gearbox type 2PV40.
The 2PV40 gearbox
provides the following
features:
helical-cut gearwheels
dual top and bottom lip
seal system
spring for preloading
both the main thrust
bearing and the axial
upward thrust bearing

Figure 123
Gearbox type 2PV40.

Figure 124 - Gearbox.
The gearbox is lubricated
by a combination of an
oil bath and forced
lubrication. The circuit
includes an oil filter, a
pressure gauge, a
pressure switch, a
temperature transmitter
and an oil cooler.

68

Figure 125
Baylor CM628TUT AC
drilling motor.
The Baylor CM628TUT AC
drilling motor allows full
torque at zero speed for
an unlimited time.

Figure 126
AC drilling motor.
The AC drilling motor is
cooled by a fan driven by
a dedicated AC motor.


69

Figure 127 - Performance curve of drilling motor type CM625TUT.

Figure 128 - Air brake.
The air brake (parking brake) is
mounted to the non-drive end of
the drilling motor. A 1024-pulse
tachometer provides an accurate
speed feedback to the AC drive
resulting in a safe operation and
precise speed readout.

70

Figure 129 - Suspension system.
The suspension system is fixed to the
gearbox with two bail pins. The weight-
compensating system is fixed to the bail
with two brackets. The aim of the weight-
compensating system is protecting the pipe
threads from damage when the HPS is
(dis)connected from the drill string.

Figure 130 - Wash pipe assembly.
A wash pipe assembly with a 3-inch bore
is used for transferring the drilling mud
from the stationary S-pipe to the rotating
main shaft.

Figure 131 - Lock rings.
As a system, the lock rings provide a
simple, reliable and safe locking method of
the drill stem subs throughout the break-
out operations.


71

Figures 132 and 133 - Pipe handler with its components.

Figure 134 - Rotating head.
The rotating head provides a
hydraulic flow via thirteen individual
lines to the consumers, while
allowing a 360-degree continuous
rotation. The rotation is provided by
a hydraulic motor fixed to a
gearwheel driving the slew ring
bearing.


72

Figure 135
Link hanger.
The link hanger is a cast-
steel body surrounding the
main shaft. API-designed
and API-rated ears allow
the installation of any
standard 350-, 500- or
750-ton elevating links.

Figure 136
Spring disc package.
In drilling operations the
weight of the link hangers,
link tilt, links and elevator
is supported by four spring
disc packages.


73

Figure 137
Locking cylinder.
A locking cylinder fixed by
the upper flange of the
rotating head is used for
preventing the rotation of
the pipe handler
throughout the breakout
operations.

Figure 138
The back-up grabber.
The horseshoe-like die
retainers combined with
long reach clamp cylinders
ensure a one-size-fits-all
feature. The grabber grips
4- to 9-inch OD without
replacing the die holders
or dies.

Figure 139 - Split collar.
The split collar is located
just above the crossover
subs and is used to
transfer heavy pipe
handler loads (above 10
tonnes) to the drill stem.

74

Figure 140 - Split
collar.
The split collar is
composed of two solid
halves with an inner
profile that fits the
recesses in the drill
stem.

Figure 141 - Link tilt system.
The link tilt system consists of a set
of hydraulic cylinders and clamps to
be fixed to the elevator links. The
total forward/ backward motion is
limited to approximate 90 degrees.
Figure 142 - Torque
tube column.
The torque column acts
as a torque arrestor
when breaking out
connections with the
drilling motors and
grabber. Both the link tilt
cylinders and IBOP
actuator interface points
are integrated parts of
the column.


75

Figure 143

Figure 144 - Yoke.
A yoke that can be connected
to the link tilt cylinders after
disconnecting the link clamps
assists the exact positioning
of the grabber for the make-
up and break-out of the
various drill stem subs.

76

Figure 145 - IBOP actuator.
The IBOP actuator consists of a
hydraulic cylinder, a lever arm
and an actuating sleeve.

Figure 146 - Service loops.
There are two service loops
installed: one power umbilical
and one signal umbilical.


77

Figure 147 - Hydraulic control valve unit.
A support bracket includes the hydraulic and pneumatic control valve blocks,
instrument junction boxes, pressure switches, etc.

78

Figure 148
Keypad joystick
vertical axis (speed
throttle).
Increase the drill mode
speed set point (and
speed) by pushing the
joystick in the 'Speed
Inc.' direction (along
the vertical axis).
Observe the speed set
point indicator and the
actual speed indicator
at the screen display
during the adjustment.
When the joystick is
returned to neutral, the
speed set point remains
where it was set.
Note: You can only
increase, not decrease,
the set point in this
direction.
Figure 149
Keypad joystick
horizontal axis.

Tilt the knuckle links
(with the elevator links
and elevator) forward
and backward by
moving the joystick in
the 'Link Tilt Backward'
and 'Link Tilt Forward'
direction.
Figure 150
Keypad IBOP close
button.

Select (push and
confirm) the button to
close the remote-
operated IBOP (kelly
cock) in the drill stem.
Repeat the command
to open the IBOP.
Note: The button is
also included in other
keypads.


79

4 Top drive
4.1 Top drive checklist
When was the last overhaul (as per API RP 7L section 4.2) performed
and when were the OEM's safety recommendations carried out? Equally
important, when is the next major overhaul due?
Inspect the condition of the service loop in the derrick.
Is there a spare service loop available?
Is the protection frame well secured?
Check for oil leakages.
Review and record the sampling/analysis frequency.
Are there swivel clearance records and is there a spare wash pipe?
Is a high-torque DC motor fitted and is it in good condition?
If it is DC drive, is there a spare DC motor with a special hub and
bearings?
Are there spare AC motors for the top drives with a VFD system?
Check the condition of the torque arrestor pins.
Verify the NDT inspection reports for:
o the pipe handler
o the main shaft/load collar
o the IBOP
o the elevator links
Check the link tilt operation condition and condition.
Confirm that the electric cables and junction boxes have an EX rating.
Are there dolly wheel catchers installed?
Have the latest Varco or other (OEM) upgrades been implemented?
Check the records of the swivel bearing clearances and verify if the
swivel is integrated with the top drive.
Are dropped-objects and post spud procedures in place?
Are the safety clamps correctly installed on the mud hoses (API Spec 7K
section 9.10.4 Table 8/Figure 10 and IADC Safety Alert 00-24)?
Are the inspection intervals on the mud hoses as per the OEM
recommendations?
Check for any exposed wire banding under the outer rubber of the hose
(ISS-059 Inspection Guidelines for high-pressure hoses).
Is the spare mud hose installed in the derrick? (*)


80

Figure 151
Notice that there are no
dolly wheel catchers
installed: a dropped-
object hazard.

Figure 152
Seized dolly wheel, which
could lead to a dropped-
object hazard.

Figure 153
Dolly wheel catcher
installed, plus an extra
safety chain.


81

Figure 154
Clear misalignment
between the top drive and
the centre of the rotary
table. This can be
adjusted on the top drive.

Figure 155
Alignment cylinder to
enable the adjustment of
the top drive in relation to
the well centre.

82

Figure 156
Rusty nail used as safety
pin. How about the
weekly dropped-object
inspections?

Figure 157
Things to look for during
the dropped-object
inspections.


83

Figure 158
Crushed blower hose for
motor cooling restricts air
flow and the motor
overheats. Crews should
be aware and fix this
before we find it!

Figure 159
View of the landing collar.

84

Figure 160
Commutator of a standard
DC motor.

Figure 161
Commutator of a high-
torque DC motor. Square
section cooling passage,
or perhaps a pineapple?
Easiest way to tell is by
looking here. It also
shows a good quality EX
space heater.


85

Figure 162
Measuring the clearance
of the integrated swivel of
a TDS 4.

Figure 163
Pipe-handling and link tilt
operation of a Tesco top
drive.

86

Figure 164
Pipe handler for Varco
TDS, which was removed
for an NDT inspection of
the load-bearing areas.

Figure 165
Home-made weld repairs
applied to the lifting
cylinder of the pipe
handler.


87

Figure 166
The IBOPs are to be
inspected regularly.

Figure 167
Unauthorized weld repairs
on the IBOPs of this top
drive. The top and bottom
of the IBOP were welded.

Figure 168
After-effects of a top drive
gearbox failure.
Lubrication oil analysis
may have pointed to a
potential failure before it
got to this.


88

Figure 169
An expensive failure lubrication
oil analysis might appear cost-
effective now!

Figure 170
Air-operated link tilt system.
Check intermediate stops for
correct operation.


89

Figure 171
Main components of the PH 85 pipe
handler system with air-operated
link tilt.

Figure 172
Typical service loop. Some are
unique to one rig, so you must
have a spare in the country.


90

Figure 173
Not all service pipes and
cables are in a combined
loop

Figure 174
Hydraulic link tilt that is
superseding the
pneumatic design of the
Varco TDS.

Figure 175
There used to be a top
drive on this rig.


91

Figure 176
Older mild-steel wash pipe
assembly on top drive (to
be checked every 600 to
800 hours). Better is a
chrome pipe, which is to
be checked every 1,200 to
1,500 hours, if fitted
correctly.

Figure 177
Schematic drawing
showing seal arrangement
in wash pipe assembly.

92

Figure 178
2,000 hours at 5,000 psi / 150
rpm Nova Plus mud (includes
1,000 hours with 0.006-inch
intentional perpendicular
misalignment)
4 hours at 7,500 psi/150 rpm
(test was stopped after no
failures)
4 hours at 7,500 psi/225 rpm
(test was stopped after no
failures)
200+ hours at 5,000 psi/150
rpm with Aqua Gel mud (test
was stopped after no failures)


93

5 Swivel
Checklist (independent) swivel:
Review the oil analysis records and frequency.
Review the grease sampling and analysis records.
Check for oil leaks from the lower seal.
Record the thrust bearing clearance records and use a dial indicator (API
RP 8B section 6.2 and ISO 13534).
Check that NDT inspections are carried out on all load-bearing areas as
per API RP 8B and ISO 13534.
Ensure that the NDT inspection records of the drill pipe connection are as
per API RP 7G section 13.2.
Review the wall thickness inspection records for the gooseneck (see API
RP 574 Table 1 for original pipe wall thickness).
Ensure a connection for the wire line operations installed on the
gooseneck.
Ensure that at least one spare wash pipe fully dressed with the correct
seals is available.
Has an upgraded wash pipe been installed?
Ensure that unused or swivels in long time storage are stored in a
vertical position.
Ensure wash pipes have high-temperature (HT) seals fitted if they are to
be used for HT operations. (*)

Figure 179
Swivel after an NDT
inspection. Notice that the
drill pipe connection was
not carried out. What other
section has been
forgotten?

94

Figure 180
Swivel components NDT-
inspected as per the API
RP 8B Category IV
inspection standards.

Figure 181
Swivel pins severely worn;
they need to be renewed.

Figure 182
Corroded threads of the
wash pipe connection.


95

Figure 183
Wrongly measuring the
clearance of the main swivel
bearing. By lowering the drill
pipe into the slips the shaft
moves up, and the clearance
can be measured with the dial
indicator, but only if the wash
pipe has been removed.

Figure 184
An alternative procedure is to
place a hydraulic jack under
the shaft. Note that the wash
pipe has been removed.
Alternatively, suspend the
swivel on a chain hoist, land it
on a flat surface, and then
carefully raise it.

96

Figure 185
Main bearing of the swivel with
shims to adjust excessive
clearance.

Figure 186
Swivel disassembled for major
overhaul.


97

Figure 187
Schematic showing the
seal arrangement in the
wash pipe assembly.

Figure 188
Wash pipe assembly: at
least one completely
dressed spare wash pipe
should be available.

Figure 189
Home-welded plug on top
of the gooseneck U-pipe.

98

Figure 190
No plug available in the U-
pipe means that no wire
line operations are possible
through this swivel. Notice
the improper storing
conditions here.

Figure 191
Hammer unions used
instead of threaded
fittings.


99

Figure 192
What is wrong here?

Figure 193
Correct long-term storage of
the swivel: in vertical
position.

100

Figure 194
New-generation wash
pipe assembly.

Figure 195
Specifications for the commissioning test of the newly designed wash pipe
assembly:
2,000 hours at 5,000 psi/150 rpm with Nova Plus mud (including 1,000
hours with 0.006-inch intentional perpendicular misalignment)
4 hours at 7,500 psi/150 rpm (test stopped after no failures)
4 hours at 7,500 psi/225 rpm (test stopped after no failures)
200+ hours at 5,000 psi/150 rpm with Aqua Gel mud (test stopped after
no failures)


101

6 Crown and travelling block introduction

Figure 196 - New NOV crown block fitted with
automatic grease cartridges.

Figure 197 - Modern NOV sheave cluster (most
rigs have seven sheaves installed).

102

Figure 198 - Example of the specifications of a modern crown block
cluster made by NOV.

Figure 199 - Sheave-bearing inspection by wobble test with a
crowbar.
Note: There must be no tension on the drill line and the travelling blocks
need to be hung off.


103

Figure 200 and Figure 201 - Groove radius and sheave gauges.
The radiuses of the sheaves are measured with sheave gauges. For each type
of sheave the maximum wear is already incorporated in these gauges; for
instance, the 1" sheave has a "+ factor" of 1/32 inch, expressing the
maximum wear.

Figure 202 Figure 203 Figure 204
Sheave measurements using the sheave gauges.
Note: Be aware that the loss of the upper layer of the hardened sheave
profile can rapidly increase the wear of the sheave profiles, so that frequent
inspections are required.

104

Figure 205 - Single sheave.
Some rigs use a single sheave
for the fastline, as these wear
faster than all the other sheaves.
Also, changing the bearings on a
single sheave is much easier
than on a cluster of sheaves.
Figure 206 - Sheave cluster.
Depicted here is a sheave cluster with a
set of automatic grease cartridges
installed, which reduces the number of
visits to the crown block platform for
greasing purposes.

Figure 207 - Grease plug.
Grease plugs need to be removed
to energize the grease cartridges.
Figure 208 - Grease cartridge.
After energizing the grease cartridges, a
chemical reaction inside the cartridges
is slowly pushing the grease out.


105

Figure 209 - Travelling-block general layout.

Figure 210 - Grease points of the travelling block.


106

6.1 Travelling Block Maintenance
Two-weekly maintenance routine
Although only being used intermittently, the travelling block must be
lubricated, using the OEM recommended programme specified in the
lubrication chart.
Six-monthly maintenance routine
Gauge the sheaves of the travelling block.
The sheaves should be reworked or replaced if the throat bottom radius
falls below the recommendation in section 3 of API RP 9B 'Application,
Care and Use of Wire Rope for Oil Field Service'.
Yearly maintenance routine
Wash down all the dirty parts of the equipment, and allow them to dry.
Have the (lifting-appliance) equipment inspected by a competent
enterprise to verify that it is suitable for another year of operation.
A signed copy of the inspection report must be filed in the maintenance
log, and the remarks must be followed up.
The yearly inspection must include a complete visual inspection and MPI
by means of the wet fluorescent method (see API Spec 8C) of the
following load bearing components: critical areas of cheek plate, sheave
shafts and critical areas of the sheaves.
Touch up all the paint damages, but wait until the inspection by the
competent enterprise has been carried out.
Six-monthly inspections
Visual inspection of the wire sheaves with respect to wear, deformation
and cracks.
If there is any visible evidence of damage, carry out an MPI by means of
the wet fluorescent method of the damaged/suspected areas.
The sheave wear measurement and acceptance criteria must be
according to the recommended practice described in the API RP 9B
standard.
Inspections after jarring/top hole drilling
When the travelling block has been subject to impact loads (for instance
during jarring or rough top-hole drilling), it must be inspected with re-
spect to cracks, loose bolts and parts, signs of overload and deformation.
Listed below is a guideline for inspections after jarring/top-hole drilling.
Based on the actual operation carried out, those responsible for the
operation must determine the required extent of inspection according to
the amount of abuse, and the level of impact loads to which the
travelling block has been subjected.
Inspect the sheave pin retainer plates (one retainer plate on each end of
each sheave shaft) with respect to the loose bolts and parts.
Damaged parts must be removed and taken out of service.
After the equipment has been returned to service, it must be observed
during its operation to verify an adequate performance.


107

7 Crown and travelling block
7.1 Crown block checklist
Take out a permit to work (PTW).
Hang off the blocks prior to inspection, and isolate the drawworks SCRs/
VFDs.
Use sheave gauges to check the sheave profile.
Ensure that the five-yearly NDT inspection and disassembly are as per
API RP 8B and ISO 13534 (or an acceptable alternative).
Carry out a wobble test with a small crowbar to check the wear on the
sheave boss and bearings.
Check the NDT inspection reports for the support frame.
Confirm that the grease lines and nipples are in good condition.
Check the condition of the omnidirectional aircraft-warning light.
Ensure that the crown platform entrance is fitted with a self-closing door
or barrier.
Verify that three jumper bars are installed over the sheave cluster.
Check that excess grease/tar build-up is being removed from under the
sheaves.
Ensure wooden bumper blocks if fitted are covered with heavy-duty wire
mesh and that the mesh has a safety wire as recommended by API RP
54. (*)
7.2 Travelling block checklist
Take out a PTW.
Hang off the travelling block prior to the inspection and isolate the SCRs/
VFDs for the drawworks.
Check that the NDT inspection and five-yearly disassembly are as per
API RP 8B and ISO 13534 (or an acceptable alternative).
Carry out a wobble test on the sheaves using a small crow bar or 12-inch
screwdriver.
Review the records and/or measure the sheaves with a sheave gauge.
Confirm that the grease nipples are in good working condition.
Ensure that a certified hang-off line, pad eye and shackles are used (API
RP 9A and API RP 9B).
Check for damage on the sheave covers due to twisted drill line or too
high a fleet angle on drill line. If the travelling block is not hanging true
the drill line might be fitted wrong.
Ensure that blocks in long-term storage are stored in a vertical position.
(*)

108

Figure 211
Overly designed jumper
bars over the sheave
cluster.

Figure 212
The standard 3 tubes
fitted over the sheaves is
more than enough to
prevent the drilling line
jumping off the sheave.

Figure 213
This rig had a new crown
cluster fitted without
jumper bars.


109

Figure 214
Performing a wobble
test: checking for
poor/worn sheave
bearings or cracked
sheaves. The bar is a
little too long.

Figure 215
Performing a wobble
test; checking for worn
bearings or sheave
bosses loose on the outer
race and the inner race
slack on the pin. One bar
is a little long, the other
simply ridiculous.

Figure 216
One sheave just on the
edge of the bearing.
Total failure is looming.
Taken the day after
raising the BOP.


110

Figure 217
Wear rate above the
maximum allowable wear
on the fastline sheave.

Figure 218
Sheave gauge and
checking sheave groves.

Figure 219
Checking the sheaves
with a sheave gauge.
This so-called new
sheave already shows
too much wear on one
side. This was a good
paint job over a worn
sheave, which then
returned like this from
the workshop.


111

Figure 220
This sheave shows less
indication of excessive
wear.

Figure 221
Cracked sheave on the
crown cluster.

Figure 222
You don't need gauges
to see these are worn.
Both failures could have
been avoided by regular
inspections. This one
lost the well.


112

Figure 223
No lock wire installed on
the bolts into the shaft
of the crown block
cluster. The bolts and
plate are potential
dropped objects.

Figure 224
Approximately 90% of
the sheaves are
condemned after five
years. The sheave profile
is excessively worn or
too soft, or cracks are
present as on this
sheave (parallel to the
sheave profile).

Figure 225
Install self-closing gates/
barriers at the crown
block platform entrance.


113

Figure 226
A very simple design for
a self-closing gate.

Figure 227
Bumper blocks protected
by heavy-duty wire
mesh. Note: This must
be fitted with safety
slings.

Figure 228
Distinct wear pattern on
the travelling-block
sheave covers a clear
indication of a twisted
drill line, or an excessive
fleet angle of the drill
line coming from the
drawworks drum.

114

Figure 229
Long-term storage of
the travelling block in a
vertical position. The
unauthorized welding
used here to secure the
block in the vertical
position can actually
cause severe damage on
the bearings.

Figure 230
Excessive play for the
main shaft of the
travelling block. It is no
longer possible to
grease, as the grease
nipple is broken off (a
so-called 'Dutchman').


115

Figure 231
Measuring the sheaves
and bearing condition by
performing a wobble
test on the travelling
block, which is not an
easy task.

Figure 232
What is wrong in this
yard?

Figure 233 - NDT inspection as per API RP 8B and ISO 13534.

116

Figure 234 - NDT inspection according to API RP 8B and ISO 13534.


117

8 Driller's console
8.1 Driller's console checklist
Check that all the gauges are working. Record the last calibration date.
They should be tested every three years to 1% full scale (API RP 53
section 12.5.3.g)
Is the purge air system working? (API RP 14F sections 3.2.3 and 4.3.1.2)
When was the last recorded purge air alarm test conducted (visual and
audible)?
Does the driller have a clear view of the monkeyboard and the crew
working it?
Does the driller have a clear view of the casing stabbing board and the
crew working it?
Does the load limiter or load management system for the generators
work?
Are there proper communications with the monkeyboard and casing
stabbing board?
Check the condition of the compliant electrical cables and junction boxes
and verify their EX feature.
Is safety glass used on the windows?
Is the lamp test system operational?
Are there any non-resettable alarm lights showing? Are the labels on the
control panels engraved (no graffiti)?
What is the condition of the mud pit level indicators (API RP 53 section
15.7)? (*)

Figure 235
Purge air-protected
control box fitted with
a load management
system.

118

Figure 236
The purge air supply is
disconnected, the
pressure switch is
disconnected and the
alarm has been
'shorted out'. There
should be an audible
and a visible low-
pressure purge air
alarm installed at all
times.

Figure 237
Junction box at the
driller's doghouse: most
of the studs were
missing. The enclosure is
no longer EXd-rated with
so many bolts missing.

Figure 238
Purge air supply with a
'temporary' hook-up.


119

Figure 239
Pressure gauge smashed
on the driller's console.

Figure 240
Poor electrical safety on
top of the driller's
doghouse. Which cable is
live and which one is
obsolete? Which one is
the EXi cable?

Figure 241
Driller's console with
various 'purge-air-
protected' cabinets.

120

Figure 242
Driller's console with an
EXi mud totalizing
system.

Figure 243
Star Wars-like driller's
console; the brake is now
operated using a
joystick. Be aware that
the joystick operation
requires training, to
ensure the load
fluctuations are kept to a
minimal level. Jumper
bars must be installed
over the crown block
sheaves when using a
joystick.

Figure 244
Another advanced
driller's console installed
on a jack-up rig.


121

Figure 245
Modern driller's console
on a new land rig.

Figure 246
Home-made temperature
thermostat fitted in the
Driller's house. This thing
is not really EX rated!

Figure 247
Driller's control house
(doghouse) on a new-
built rig in Australia. This
doghouse offers a good
view all around.

122

Figure 248
It is sometimes hard for
the driller to see the
rotary table and operate
the equipment at the
same time.

Figure 249
Poor location of the
torque gauges of the Iron
Roughneck connected to
the drawworks cover.

Figure 250
Digital gauges are not
always an advantage, as
they respond slower than
gauges with an analogue
readout.


123

Figure 251
Condition of a driller's
console found on a rig
operating in areas with
poor standards.

Figure 252
The origin of the name
'doghouse'. Every land
rig had a dog that slept
at the driller's feet.


124

9 Derrick
9.1 Derrick checklist
When was the last Category IV derrick inspection performed as per API
RP 4G section 5.1?
What is the load rating of the derrick (API RP 4G section 15.7)?
Is there an inspection programme in place?
Check for bent or damaged beams and cross members (API RP 4G
section 3).
Inspect the NDT inspection reports for the fingerboard.
Verify that the fingers are fitted with acceptable safety chains, wire
slings or wire rope.
Ensure that air hoist cables are not rubbing against any beams or
fingers.
Make sure load carrying wires are fitted using shackles and pad eyes not
slung across beams.
Confirm that the illumination in the derrick leaves no dark spots.
Ensure that all light fittings have secondary retention.
Is there a dropped-objects procedure in place?
Is there an inspection programme for the raising lines (land rigs)? How
many raising/lowering cycles are performed between changes (API RP
4G section 4)?
Is the derrickman correctly secured against falling when working on the
monkeyboard?
Check the mechanical condition of the Geronimo escape and escape line.
Check the condition of the derrick ladders and platforms, self-closing
barriers, handrails and back-scratchers (API RP 54 section 9.3.17).
Are suitable toe boards installed? (API RP 54 section 9.3.19).
Check the condition of the omnidirectional aircraft-warning lights.
Review the certification and check the condition of the travelling-block
hang-off lines and shackles (API RP 9B).
Are wooden bumper blocks covered with a heavy-duty wire mesh (API
RP 54 section 9.2.16)?
Are all hinged platforms in the derrick secured with safety chains?
Ensure that snatch block safety wires have a SWL which is at least twice
the SWL of the hoist wires (dynamic impact). (*)


125

Figure 253
Typical land rig derrick.

Figure 254
Damage to any of the
main members of the
derrick could affect the
actual load rating of the
derrick.

126

Figure 255
Derrick inspections would
have revealed the extent
of corrosion and it could
have been cleaned and
painted before it got too
bad.

Figure 256
Derrick inspections would
have revealed that some
bolts were loose and they
could have been
tightened.

Figure 257
Check for any corrosion
that may affect the load
rating in the long run.


127

Figure 258
Corrosion can be found
throughout the derrick,
here on one of the
fingers.

Figure 259
If you do not make sure
water drains from the
beams. You might end up
with an expensive repair.

Figure 260
Unblock the drain holes
or you end up with this.
Unplugging drain holes
costs nothing. Replacing
beams costs a lot more.


128

Figure 261
Wire sling installed over
the sharp edges of the
derrick beams.

Figure 262
Note how the wire rope is
becoming damaged when
it is wrapped around the
sharp corners of the
derrick beam.

Figure 263
Bent and deformed cross
member in the derrick.


129

Figure 264
Fingerboard at the
monkeyboard level. None
of these fingers were
secured with an
additional safety sling or
chain. Each of these
unsecured fingers
represents a serious
dropped-object hazard.

Figure 265
Fingerboard cracked and
insufficiently secured
with a safety chain.

Figure 266
During one of our
surveys the NDT
inspector found no less
than eighteen cracks on
this fingerboard!

130

Figure 267
More secure method of
fitting safety chains to
fingers. Note: The chains
must not be welded.

Figure 268
Smashed wooden
bumper blocks. No
heavy-duty wire mesh
installed: once again a
serious dropped-object
hazard.

Figure 269
Severely damaged
wooden bumper blocks,
but thanks to the heavy-
duty wire mesh the
wooden splinters did not
fall onto the drill floor.


131

Figure 270
Rubber crash blocks
which seldom splinter
and do not require
heavy-duty wire mesh
protection. However,
they can become hard in
extremely cold weather
areas and are vulnerable
to desert conditions,
where excessive heat
and extreme sunlight
exposure can cause the
rubber to crack as well.

Figure 271
Cracked handrail at the
crown platform. It is a
long way down.

Figure 272
Missing safety hoops
could cause a fatal
accident.

132

Figure 273
Self-closing gates
installed at the
monkeyboard level.

Figure 274
We make sure this type
of access have a hinged
plate preferably with a
counterweight to assist
open/close.


133

Figure 275
Safety chains, wire rope
or wire slings can be
used as barriers, but it
requires personnel to put
them back in place after
entry.

Figure 276
Pipe-handling equipment
is becoming more
common on many rigs.
No matter what it does
many of the components
will be the same as other
drilling equipment: pipes,
hoses, pistons, seals,
bearings, chains rollers,
sprocket and wires.


134

Figure 277
The maintenance for this
equipment is the same
as all others. They
should be lubricated and
maintained as per the
OEM requirements.

Figure 278
Cabins need safety glass
and controls must
function correctly.


135

Figure 279
Monkeyboard layout with
poor safety levels and
difficult entry. There is
no safety system for the
ladder-climbing
activities.

Figure 280
The arrow denotes a
handrail missing at the
end of the platform.

Figure 281
Unsafe solution for
the monkeyboard
winch brake. Poor
housekeeping level
causes potential
dropped objects.

136

Figure 282
Inertia reels to protect
the derrickman.
Preferably two inertia
reels must be installed in
case the derrickman
requires assistance. The
safety line needs to be
as near vertical as
possible to minimize the
drop of the derrickman
should he fall.

Figure 283
Potential dropped object.
This chair is not
supported at all.

Figure 284
If you have to leave
something on a derrick
platform for a short
period make sure it is
correctly secured. Rope
is not an option.


137

Figure 285
Rig crews should remove
potential dropped
objects; if the rig
inspector finds them they
are not doing their
derrick inspections
properly.

Figure 286
Weekly derrick
inspections should find
and remove these items.

138

Figure 287
Anything that is mounted
in the derrick has the
potential to fall.

Figure 288
We look for loose
equipment and bad
housekeeping. Even
flakes of rust are
dangerous. These look
like a Stanley knife.

Figure 289
We look for loose
equipment and poor
housekeeping. Even
flakes of rust are
dangerous. These look
like a Stanley knife.


139

If you take it up, bring it down again.
Keep a record in the doghouse.
Secure tools while you are working.
Do not rush.
If you think you see something
unsafe, discuss it with your
colleagues.
Be open and accept advice from
others.
This sling only captures the
light body.
This sling NOW captures
everything light body,
U-bracket and support bracket;
and it is taut.

140

Figure 290
This lump of grease
weighed just 650 grams
(23 ounces) and fell just
46 metres (144 feet)
from the crown to the
doghouse roof. When it
hit the deck, it had 2.4
times the momentum
energy of a fastball
thrown by the fastest
known baseball pitcher in
the Major League.

Figure 291
Gas-cut and home-made
repairs on the derrick
beams.


141

Figure 292
Pad eyes can only be
fitted by specialist
welders.

Figure 293
Grating is missing, which
is a clear tripping hazard.

Figure 294
Loose nuts can cause an
incident when dropping
out of the derrick. Notice
which nuts are
adequately secured and
which ones lack the
much-needed safety pin.

142

Figure 295
The winch wire is routed
away from the fingers but
they have no safety
chains, wires or slings.

Figure 296
Rope is not sufficient;
API requires a heavy-
duty wire mesh or
heavy-duty screen.

Carry out visual inspections.
Check items if you are not sure
they are secured properly.
Do not leave it for the next guy to
do.
Make it your habit to look around
every time you are in the derrick.
Practice good housekeeping.


143

10 Air winches: introduction

Figure 297 - Modern man-riding winch made by NOV.

Figure 298 - Modern man-riding winch layout (notice the accumulator
bottle).


144

Figure 299 - Man-riding winch specifications.

Figure 300
Man-riding winch: general
items.
Figure 301 - Man-riding winch: schematic.


145

Figure 302 - Hydraulic layout of the man-riding winch.

Figure 303
The winch is protected from overload
by a flexible coupling of the slip hub
type.
Figure 304 - Special tool:
ratchet wrench.
A ratchet wrench is supplied for
tightening the drum's flexible
coupling. This wrench is to be
located inside the door of the
valve cabinet.

146

Figure 305 - Recommended lubrication schematic NOV.

Figure 306
Spooling device for the
man rider.


147

Figure 307
Control console for the man
rider.

Figure 308
Grease points for the man
rider.

Figure 309
Remote-control console with
emergency stop.

148

10.1 Man- riding winch
(Source: NOV document T366-Z-MA-001 revision 0)
The Hydralift man-riding winch type HL-MR-150-110M is designed for safe
and reliable personnel-handling operations on fixed or floating drilling
platforms/vessels in a heavy-duty and critical onshore and offshore working
environment. The winch is designed to meet the latest NPD and EU rules for
machine directive requirements for such equipment and is type-approved by
DNV and ABS.
The winch unit consists of the following main components:
Drum
Drum foundation
Mechanical driven spooling device
Motor drive unit with brake
Slip hub
Disc brake units
Valve equipment and wire rope
The winch is also equipped with hook stop (up and down) and a slack-wire
detection system. In addition, a separate handheld remote control with 6-
metre hoses is available. The winch is prepared for a connection to an
external hydraulic power unit (ring line hydraulic system) of a constant
pressure type. Pressure regulation, flow limitation valves and filters are
integrated into the winch system. The winch is fitted with an accumulator for
emergency operation in case of hydraulic power loss from the rig's ring line
system.
Standard operation mode
In standard operation mode for man-riding the winch up/down movement is
accurate and directly controlled by the winch handle. The winch handle is
spring-centred to neutral position. In this mode the winch is also secured for
working with moving equipment. The winch pull force is limited to 150 kg,
and the winch will pay out wire if the load gets heavier than 230 kg.
Emergency operation mode
This mode is used when the hydraulic power supply fails during winch
operation. If a person is hanging in the winch under such circumstances, it is
possible to lower or hoist the person to bring him down into a safe location.
The hydraulic pressure is in this mode maintained by an accumulator. The
accumulator is automatically recharged when the winch is back in standard
operation mode.


149

10.2 Main Design
Drum and drum foundation steel structure
The drum is made of stainless-steel plates bolted together. The winch
structure is built of plate elements. All welding is performed in accordance
with the approved procedures. One of the drum flanges is equipped with a
split opening to allow wire end termination on the outside of the flange.
Three bolted clamps secure the wire end.
The winch is equipped with the mechanical spooling system to ensure an op-
timal build-up of wire rope on the drum. The system ensures excellent
spooling and a long wire lifetime. The winch drum is well protected from
personnel contact by a stainless-steel metal cover fitted to the winch
foundation with bolts. The cover is equipped with a hinged hatch for the
simple inspection of the drum/wire. The cover also protects the drum from
oil spillage, mud and water.
Mechanical spooling device
The spooling device consists of a wire guide, a double-grooved driveshaft, a
sprocket wheel on the drive shaft and drum shaft, and a chain between the
driveshaft and the drum shaft. When the drum rotates, the drum shaft
drives the double-grooved drive shaft on the spooling device, which moves
the wire guide that guides the wire on to the drum.
Hydraulic drive system
The winch drum is driven by an OMT motor connected to one side of the
winch drums, transferring the output torque to the drum. The motor has
high total efficiency and runs smoothly, even at an extremely low speed.
Drum brake units
In addition to the hydraulic brake integrated in the motor, there are two
extra brakes of a disc type working directly on the drum. One is hydraulic-
operated and the other is manual-operated. There is also a counterbalance
valve mounted on the motor.
Brake 1
The hydraulic brake in the motor is designed for fail-safe operation, which
means that the brake actuates when pressure supply is lost, for instance due
to a ruptured hose or pipe. The hydraulic brake is a dual-load control valve.
The motor brake consists basically of a set of plate springs. When pressure
is lost, the piston is forced to move backwards by the plate springs, and at
the same time the piston moves the brake disk together, until the required
brake torque is achieved.
Brake 2
The hydraulic disc brake needs hydraulic pressure from the emergency stop
valve on the remote control. The disc brake operates directly on the drum
flange.
Brake 3
The manual disc brake is manually operated on the winch. The disc brake
operates directly on the drum flange.
Brake 4
This brake is connected to a load control valve. When the operating handle is
in hoisting position, pressure will release the mechanical brake on the motor,
and open the load control valve and the hoisting will proceed. If the
operating handle is in neutral position, the winch will hold its position by
means of the load control valve, and the motor brake will be activated.

150

Valve cabinet
The valve cabinet houses all the main valves and critical components for the
winch. The valve cabinet is totally enclosed for long-term operation in a
corrosive environment.
Hydraulic valves
All the valves for the winch are installed inside the motor side cabinet, to
protect them from any external mechanical and/or chemical damage.
Control panel
The winch can be operated locally from the winch control panel or from the
pendant hydraulic remote control. Both control panels have the following
control functions:
Emergency stop
Brake for stopping the winch
Winch up/down control lever for stepless speed/direction control of the
winch
The control panel is located on the winch. A local main control valve is fitted
into the control panel for the winch system. The valve is equipped with a
winch-hoisting/ pressure-limiting valve and flow-limiting valve for easy
connection to the rig's ring-line system with overcapacity. The control panel
is also equipped with clear operating instructions.
To achieve a better view and communication between the operator and the
man-rider, an extra pendant hydraulic remote-control device is installed. The
pendant remote is fitted with a control valve and an emergency brake valve,
and is hydraulically connected to the main panel by means of a 6-metre-long
multi-hose. Upon request, a cordless radio-operated control system is also
available.
Wire
The winch is equipped with 110 metres of 10-mm rotation-resistant wire.
The wire is fastened to the drum by three bolted clamps. The outer end of
the wire is equipped with a closed spelter socket of an offshore type.


151

10.3 Safety Functions
In order to achieve the safe operation of the winch, and a commitment to
the regulation requirements from both the proving authority and the client,
extra hydraulic/mechanical systems (i.e. in addition to the ordinary winch
system) have been incorporated in the winch.
Moving equipment
This system eliminates the risk of overload to personnel from an external
force, caused by moving equipment by using a slip/hub adjusted to circa 230
kg. If any external force is applied to a person hanging in the winch, the
winch will pay out wire and avoid any overload to the person. The payout
function will always be active, except when the manual or hydraulic disc
brakes are active.
Slack-wire stop system
This system is applied to the winch to avoid slack wire during lowering. The
system consists of a wire sheave connected to a rotating bracket. When load
is applied to the wire, the wire sheave and bracket are rotated upwards until
a valve handle is moved to its ON position. This sequence gives a pressure
permit to the winch-down operation.
If for some reason the person becomes attached to an object during a
lowering sequence, and is not able to continue to descend, the wire sheave
on the rotating bracket will rotate down, and it will move the valve handle to
the off position. This will cut off the oil pressure to the winch-down side of
the motor and stop the descent, thereby preventing slack wire.
Pressure roller on the drum
The roller consists of a spring-applied roller pressed against the wire on the
drum, to keep it from unwinding if slack wire should occur.
Wire end stop system
The wire end stop system is installed to avoid winch-hoisting/lowering
movements after the person has reached its maximum/minimum
destination. Always leave a minimum of 5 turns of wire on the drum.
Emergency system
This system is installed on the winch to achieve safe lowering or hoisting of a
person to a safe location, due to the absence of pressure from the ring line
system. After choosing the emergency operation on the three-way ball
valve, the accumulator pressure is selected and it is ready for selecting the
winch direction on the control desk. It is important to reset the emergency
valves to their normal position after a return of pressure.
Emergency stop/brake
An emergency stop button is installed on the winch control panel. An
emergency brake button is also installed on the hydraulic remote-control
panel.

152

11 Air winches
11.1 Air winches checklist
Check the condition of the brake lining (no oil contamination is allowed).
Ensure that the brake linkage system and adjustment is correct.
Make sure that a ball valve is used on the air supply line and that the
handle is within easy reach of the operator.
Ensure that the free-fall handles on hoist winches have been disabled or
removed.
Check for oil and air leaks.
Check the condition of the wire-end termination.
Check that the winch control handle returns back to neutral when
released.
Ensure that permanent safe working load (SWL) signs are clearly
displayed.
Ensure a protective cage is fitted.
Make certain a spooling device is fitted.
Confirm the controls correctly indicate "Up" and "Down" functions and
are the same on all winches.
Check the condition of the winch foundation and foundation bolts, as well
as any NDT inspection records.
Verify that an exhaust noise suppressor is fitted.
Check the condition of the snatch blocks and review their inspection
reports.
Ensure the sheave snatch block is at least eighteen times the diameter of
the wire in use.
Check the condition of the wire (API RP 9B).
Confirm that the man-riding winches are fitted with automatic and
manual brakes.
Confirm that the man-riding winches have non-rotating wire installed.
Ensure that no rubber hoses are fitted in the man-riding winch air supply
line.
Check the maximum pull/speed adjustment on the man-riding winches is
correct.
Ensure that dedicated man-riding winches are installed in their area of
operation.
Confirm that there is an accumulator system for the man-riding winches,
if applicable. (*)


153

Figure 310
Drill floor with utility and
man-riding tugger.

Figure 311
New man-riding winch
being installed.

Figure 312
Man-riding winch: adjustment
block with adjustment screws to
adjust the speed and load-limiting
device.

154

Figure 313
Oil-contaminated brake:
the brake lining should be
replaced first.

Figure 314
Putting a plastic bag
inside the brake assembly
is not a professional way
for cleaning or adjusting
the brake.

Figure 315
Brake 'adjusted' with a
heavy 1502 coupling.


155

Figure 316
Free-fall handles must
either be secured on, or
removed altogether from
all the winches.

Figure 317
Locking system to isolate
and prevent the use of the
free-fall mechanism.

Figure 318
Foundation bolt missing
and bent stud on the
brake assembly.

156

Figure 319
Overstressed foundation
bolt with a very low-
quality safety pin.

Figure 320
Poor maintenance of this
tugger; the wire requires
replacement as soon as
possible. Can you mention
five obvious deficiencies
here?

Figure 321
Sharp spikes sticking out
of the damaged tugger
wire.


157

Figure 322
Rig worker using his hand
as a spooling device.

Figure 323
Home-made spooling
device, perfectly suitable
for this application. Notice
the silencer on the air
exhaust.

158

Figure 324
This air winch is installed
the wrong way round. The
spooling device is located
on the wrong side, so the
operator has to stand in
front of the winch to spool
the wire rope.

Figure 325
Home-made spooling
device that operates
satisfactorily.

Figure 326
Automatic line-spooling
device and line-tensioning
system installed. The
drum guard was removed
for this inspection.


159

Figure 327
No spooling device fitted,
so the wire ends up
tangled on the drum.

Figure 328
A designated man-riding
winch?

Figure 329
Snatch-locks under the
crown block platform
secured with safety slings.
The preferred shackles in
the derrick are of the
four-part type (like the
ones painted orange). The
upper shackles need to be
replaced, as these are the
two-part shackles.

What else do you see?

160

Figure 330
The typical four-part
shackle or safety shackle
required by major
operators.

Figure 331
Schematic showing how to
secure the snatch-blocks
and wires with a safety
sling. Ensure that the
safety sling's safe working
load (SWL) rating is at
least twice the SWL rating
of the tugger wire. The
distance between the
snatch-block bottom and
the safety wire loop must
be as short as reasonably
possible, in order to
reduce the dynamic
impact, should the tugger
line fail.

Figure 332
No guard over the drum,
no line spooling device, no
silencer, no hold-down
bolts, no SWL sign and no
isolation valve installed.
Nice colour, though.


161

12 Lifting and handling equipment
12.1 Lifting and handling equipment checklist
Check that all drilling lifting equipment is inspected, as per API RP 8B
Category I and II, visually inspected before use.
Ensure that all drilling lifting equipment is NDT-inspected, as per API RP
8B Category III every six months.
Confirm that all chain hoists are inspected on a six-monthly basis and
before use.
Check that sheaves are being removed from the derrick and inspected on
a regular basis.
Authenticate that all the elevator IDs are measured every six months.
Verify that the elevator links/bails are measured every six months.
Check that the slips, master bushings and safety clamps are inspected
every six working months.
Record the date of the last inspection date of all drilling tubulars, as well
as the inspection criteria (minimum as per API RP 7G).
Record the date of the last inspection date of drilling subs and fishing
tools.
Are the preferred four-part shackles in use in the derrick?
Verify that all shackles and slings are inspected every six months.
If the rig uses a colour code that is changed on a six-monthly rotation, is
it correctly enforced?
Check that the pad eyes are inspected as part of the six-monthly
inspection programme.
Confirm that no homemade spliced slings are used on the rig.
Ensure that no homemade lifting eyes or drill pipe lifting subs are in use.
(*)

162

Figure 333
No pins to back up the
tong inserts. If the tong
die fell inside the well, it
could cause prolonged
downtime.

Figure 334
Inspection of the rig tongs
is very important to the
safety of personnel.

Figure 335
NDT inspection on the
tongs, but what about
inspecting the hanging
arm as well?


163

Figure 336
Unauthorized welding of an
extension to the tong arm.

Figure 337
Using a tong die as a
spacer is not
recommended.

Figure 338
Completely destroyed tong
section.

164

Figure 339
Unauthorized welding to
connect the tong dies on
the casing tong. This
element can shatter into a
thousand pieces under
load!

Figure 340
Home-made arm and non-
OEM stud in the new tong
on a brand new rig.

Figure 341
Dramatic failure of the
elevator links, which shows
the importance of an NDT
inspection.


165

Figure 342
Wear on the eye of the
elevator link. Downrating
by means of the OEM
instructions is required.

Figure 343
Table for downrating the
elevator links.

Figure 344
Replace the non-OEM hinge
pin.

166

Figure 345
Drill pipe elevator NDT
inspection.

Figure 346
Unauthorized welding of
the rig number onto the
elevators. This elevator
must be scrapped
immediately.

Figure 347
Drill pipe slips in a very
poor state.


167

Figure 348
Drill pipe slips cracked,
most likely due to worn
master bushings or the use
of the wrong angle drill
pipe inserts.

Figure 349
Unauthorized welding on
the safety clamps.

Figure 350
Clear wear is noticeable;
the slips are going down
too far.


168

Figure 351
In this picture, again, the
slips are sitting low, but
the gap between the bowl
segments show no wear.
Varco SDS, SDML and
SDXL slips usually sit low
in the bowls.

Figure 352
Measuring the neck of the
drilling bowls.

Figure 353
Where to measure the
bushing and typical sizes.


169

Figure 354
Rig-made handling
equipment must not be
used.

Figure 355
Pipe spinner should have a safety sling
attached from the hanging line to the
lifting point on the spinner. If the
lifting cylinder or its component fails,
the spinner cannot fall down onto the
operating crew.

Figure 356
Bent and overstressed
bracket for the back-up
tong. Consult the derrick
drawings for the correct
type of bracket to be used.

170

Figure 357
Severely corroded and
damaged back-up sling. A
certified sling with a
moulded eye must be
installed here.

Figure 358
This is what happens when
the top drive collides with
the crown block sheave
cluster and the drill line
breaks.

Figure 359
One of the crown block
sheaves ending up inside
the driller's doghouse.


171

Figure 360 - NDT inspection of side door elevator
as per API RP 8B and ISO 13534.

Figure 361 - Elevator link inspection as per
API RP 8B and ISO 13534.

172

Figure 362 - NDT inspection of the centre latch elevator

Figure 363 - NDT inspection of the slip-type elevator as
per API RP 8B and ISO 13534.


173

Figure 364 - Swivel NDT inspection as per

Figure 365 - NDT inspection of the deadline anchor


174

Figure 366 - NDT inspection of the rotary slips

Figure 367 - NDT inspection of the hook as per


175

Figure 368 - NDT inspection of the link adapter as per

Figure 369 - NDT inspection of the block-to-hook adapter

176

Figure 370 - NDT inspection of the link adapter

02 Mud processing equipment

177

Chapter 02
Mud-processing equipment
1 Mud pumps .......................................................................... 178
2 Mud systems ........................................................................ 205


178

1 Mud pumps
1.1 Mud pumps checklist
Check the condition of the drive chains and sprockets, or belts and
pulleys.
Confirm the operation of the VFD AC driven pumps.
Test and record the main and pinion shaft bearing clearances (maximum
clearance is 0.016 inch/0.40 mm).
Visually inspect the bronze covers on the main shaft eccentric bearings
for cracks or loose pins.
Verify and record the crosshead slide clearances (National pumps: top
clearance between 0.015 inch/0.38 mm and 0.025 inch/0.63 mm).
Examine the oil analysis frequency and records.
Ensure that the pressure relief valves exhaust lines slope downwards at
least 2 degrees or inch per foot (API RP 54 section 9.13.7).
Check the location of the relief valve on the discharge manifold.
Ensure the discharge pulsation dampener installed is correctly charged.
Ascertain the condition of the discharge strainer.
Inspect the suction and discharge valves and seats.
Ensure that with 3M (200-bar) systems there are no NPT-threaded
fittings (for connections of 2 inches or more) (API RP 53 sections 8.2.b
and 10.2.1b)
Examine the suction pulsation dampener (pressure and gas).
Confirm the condition of the suction strainer.
Verify that the pony rods are NDT-inspected in between wells.
Are the discharge manifold studs inspected (NDT/stretch) as per 10%
cycle every year?
Check the condition of the manifold high-pressure valves.
Confirm the wall thickness inspection records for high-pressure lines
(minimum 87.5% of the original wall thickness left).
Verify the condition of the DC motors and AC motors and the last
overhaul records.
Ascertain the condition of the electrical cables and junction boxes.
Make sure the crew do not use silicone sealant as gasket material on the
main covers.
Test the condition of the pony rods and seals for wear and pitting. (*)


179

Figure 1
The inspection of the mud
pump is only possible after
the main cover is removed.
Simply removing the
inspection covers on the
main cover does not
provide the access needed
to measure the bearings.

Figure 2
The Surveyor or Rig
Mechanic needs to get
inside the pump to perform
measurements and visual
inspections. Electrical
isolation is critical.
Figure 3
Severe corrosion on the bull
gear teeth.

180

Figure 4
Bull gears in as-new
condition.
Figure 5
Damaged teeth cannot be
repaired on the rig. These
teeth must be chemically
hardened in the OEM
machine shops.
Figure 6
An NDT inspection revealed
cracked teeth on this bull
gear.


181

Figure 7
The main shaft and pinion
shaft have roller bearings
whose clearances regularly
need to be measured and
the values should be
recorded in the history files.

Figure 8
Measuring the clearance of
the main bearing.

Figure 9
Debris found in the oil. Not too hard
to find its origin.

182

Figure 10
Covers removed to allow
measuring of the main
bearings and crosshead
slide clearances (Gardner
Denver pump).

Figure 11
Connecting-rod eccentric
bearings. It is difficult to
measure their clearances, as
the rollers are normally
enclosed with a bronze
cage, so feeler gauges
cannot be used.

Figure 12
Visual inspection of the
bronze cage of the excentric
bearings, looking for cracks
and loose or missing pins.
This inspection requires that
the mud pump be rotated
several times to check all
the bearings from both
sides.


183

Figure 13
Cracks in the bronze cages
are a good indication that
the bearing rollers are
worn.

Figure 14
Checking the eccentric
bearing clearances using a
dial indicator and hydraulic
jack. This requires
removing the oil from the
sump. Difficult to do as the
crank can easily rotate
when lifted.

Figure 15
Very dirty oil inside the
crankcase. Notice the bull
gear-driven lubricating-oil
pump, which limits the slow
oil pump speed. This pump
cannot be pre-lubricated, so
the Driller should start the
pumps slowly to prevent
damage due to lubricating-
oil starvation on the
bearings and crossheads.
Modern practice is to fit
external motor-driven
pumps (complete with
alarm systems) that start
when the mud pump is
selected.

184

Figure 16
Water contamination results
in emulsified lubricating oil,
which will cause corrosion in
the power end.
Figure 17
High water content in oil
from condensation or water
ingress due to poor pony
rod seals will result in rapid
corrosion of the bull gear
and all the bearings.
Figure 18
Poor pony rod seals or
scored pony rod shafts will
allow water ingress,
resulting in high corrosion
levels.


185

Figure 19
Crosshead slides severely
scored due to oil starvation
and contamination.
Figure 20
Crosshead slide in as-new
condition.
Figure 21
Excentric connection rods
with crossheads, bearings
and pins installed.

186

Figure 22
A view of the new
crosshead slides being
installed.
Figure 23
View of the power end of
the mud pump with the
crankshaft removed.
Figure 24
Measuring the clearance of
the crosshead bearings.


187

Figure 25
Severely worn crosshead
bearing pin.

Figure 26
Crosshead being fitted with
new bearing.

Figure 27
New cross-head bearing pin.

188

Figure 28
An NDT inspection
revealed a large crack on
the main crankshaft.

Figure 29
Far too much slack in the
drive chain.

Figure 30
Severely worn sprocket
teeth.


189

Figure 31
New sprocket and chain;
sprocket teeth in as-new
condition.


190

Figure 32
These modern mud pumps have gearbox drives and are using VFD AC
motors instead of DC motors.


191

Figure 33
Regular NDT inspection of the pony rod
hubs and clamps can reduce a lot of
downtime.

Figure 34
All three pony rods were cracked in this
pump, which is not an exception. Can
you state at least three more very
dangerous situations from this scene?

Figure 35
Intermediate shafts: a large number of
these showed cracks during the NDT
inspection.

192

Figure 36
Excessive use of silicone
sealant on the covers of
this mud pump, i.e. a bad
practice. The silicone can
easily plug up the
lubricating-oil trough,
resulting in bearing
failure due to the lack of
lubrication.

Figure 37
The trough that guides
the lubricating oil to the
bearings; one line is
plugged by a lump of
silicone. The bearing will
fail at short notice if no
corrective action is
undertaken. Note: The
square headed plug is a
magnet that will attract
any ferrous material in
the oil.


193

Figure 38
This can happen if the
relief valve exhaust
piping is not adequately
anchored to the mud
tanks.

Figure 39
This fluid end has two
cracks. The suction
modules of the fluid ends
often crack due to the
poor condition or low
precharge levels/ volume
of the suction pulsation
dampeners.

194

Figure 40
Inspection of the suction
and discharge valves.

Figure 41
Discharge strainer still in
very good condition.

Figure 42
Rigid piping welded into
both sides of the mud
cross-block.
Consequently, the high-
pressure strainer could
not be removed!


195

Figure 43
Damaged discharge
strainer.

Figure 44
Completely deteriorated
discharge strainer.

Figure 45
Badly blocked high-
pressure strainer with
countless tie-wraps
having been caught.

196

Figure 46
Schematic showing the
preferred NOV position for
the high-pressure strainer.
Some OEMs prefer the
other side.

Figure 47
Threaded relief valve with
the correctly designed
safety clamps installed.
The NPT relief valves
should be replaced by
flanged type relief valves.


197

Figure 48
The generally preferred flange-
mounted relief valve.

Figure 49
Relief valve installed on
the wrong side of the
discharge manifold and
the vent line is running
uphill. When the relief
valve lifts, the vent line
will fill with mud, which
could solidify and block
the vent, rendering the
relief valve ineffective.

Figure 50
Unauthorized welding on
the high-pressure piping
and home-made pad eye
for the safety sling for
the relief valve.

198

Figure 51
Discharge of the relief
valve is not secured with
clamps and sloping
upwards, i.e. not self-
draining. Again, the relief
valve is connected to the
wrong side of the
discharge manifold.

Figure 52
NPT threaded relief valve
and the relief line with no
safety chains installed.

Figure 53
Poor routing of the
discharge line of the
relief valve. Again, the
relief valve is located on
the wrong side of the
discharge manifold.


199

Figure 54
Retsco relief valves: the
old-style and the new-
style models.

Figure 55
Desperate measures:
welding the fluid ends to
the main body of the
mud pumps. This is not a
long-term solution.

Figure 56
Sheared studs of the
discharge manifold.
Regular NDT inspections
are required to detect
these potential failures.

200

Figure 57
Unequal stud lengths for
the threaded studs on the
fluid end caps. Are the
long studs too long or are
they not fully screwed
into the female threads of
the housing?

Figure 58
The use of 4-inch NPT
plugs as a kind of fluid
target should not be used
in the high-pressure mud
systems.

Figure 59
Forces on a 2-inch plug
at 3,000 psi. If the plug
had a 3-inch diameter
the force would be
around 21,200 lbs.


201

Figure 60
All NPT fittings larger
than 2 inch OD should be
replaced by welded or
flanged connections. Here
all the 4-inch fittings are
NDT!

Figure 61
Modification of above
relief valve position
meant that the strainer
could not be removed.

Figure 62
Flanged-type gauge, threads have no
contact with the mud due to a
diaphragm fitted inside the flange.


202

Figure 63
Precharge of the pulsation
dampener should be
adjusted when other liners
are installed. Please inform
the MWD engineers that the
precharge is altered, so they
can readjust their
instrumentation, which
relies on pulses inside the
drill string to ascertain the
angle of the string.

Figure 64
Are the studs not correctly
installed, or are they the
wrong studs? The paint
reveals the answer.

Figure 65
Incident
While bringing mud pump
No. 1 on line after making a
connection the pulsation
dampener bladder ruptured
blowing off the pulsation
dampener cap.
The pulsation dampener was
sheared from the discharge
manifold and the mud pump
sustained significant
damage. Nobody was
injured.
The pulsation dampener cap
was found in the sand
approximately 240 metres
from the mud pump/rig site.


203

Figure 66
Initial findings and
lessons
On 22 April 2010 the
pulsation dampener was
recharged to 800 psi after
a small leak was repaired.
The possible cause was
nitrogen bottle
contaminated with oxygen
or an incorrect marking on
the oxygen bottle.
Check the bottle for O
2

with an oxygen meter
before filling dampener.

Figure 67
New mud pump installation
on a land rig. Notice that
all the relief lines are
installed opposite the
pulsation dampener and
strainer housing.
Somebody finally read the
book!

Figure 68
New generation of pulsation
dampener. No gas only a mud
cushion. This allows the relief valve to
be mounted on top.


204

Figure 69
Expensive mud leaking
from a pump seal. A slow
drip will assist in cooling
and lubricating packing.
Mechanical seals should be
for oil-based mud.

Figure 70
Worn impeller. We tested the
flow through the system with
the electrician's help.
Circulate the system with no
obstructions and record the
motor amperage.
Now close the discharge valve.
The current should drop when
the valve is closed more than
10% (acceptable). The drop on
a new pump could be as much
as 25%.

Figure 71
The condition of the mud
pumps on a platform rig in
an area with low
standards. The relief valve
exhaust is connected to
the suction side. This is a
dangerous practice, as the
pressure rating of the
suction lines is much lower
than the rating of the
discharge lines.


205

2 Mud systems
2.1 Mud- mixing system checklist
Is the ventilation adequate (for the indoor mixing systems)?
Is the lighting adequate?
Are the electrical cables and junction boxes suitable?
Test the pressurized alarms.
Check the housekeeping standards.
Inspect the handrails and stairs for damage.
Examine the condition of the dump valves for leaks.
Test the condition of the mud agitators for noise and vibration.
Check the condition of the mud guns.
Confirm the condition of any butterfly valves.
Inspect the operation of the pit level indicators.
Ensure there are no damaged/unsecured gratings and other tripping
hazards.
Is the trip tank design acceptable (i.e. no more than one barrel per one-
inch height)?
Test the condition of the desilter, desander and mud cleaners.
Check the condition and operation of the vacuum degasser.
Confirm the condition of the mud pits.
Inspect the suction height of the mud pits.
Verify that the mud pits are suitable for HP/HT applications.
Ensure that all the AC motors are EX and certified (API RP 14F section
4).
Confirm that any fixed fire-fighting system is operational.
Check the personal protective equipment (PPE), i.e.:
o long-sleeved rubber gloves
o rubber apron
o set of goggles and/or face mask
o eyewash station
o shower
o first-aid safety sheet of chemicals in use
o set of earplugs
Verify that a high-quality PPE box is available?
Test the corrosion levels of the hopper funnel and piping.
Confirm the operation of the hopper venturi arrangement and the
eductors in the vacuum mixing system.
Check the condition of the surge tanks for cement and barite.

206

Verify that there is a working mud-weighing system present.
Examine if communication between the hoppers and the driller's
doghouse is possible.
Confirm that a first-aid treatment sheet (MSDS) detailing the particular
types of chemicals is in use.
Ensure there are no NPT threaded fittings greater than 2 inches used in
the construction of the standpipe.
Check that if connected to the choke manifold a high-pressure isolation
valve equal to the ram BOP pressure is fitted at either manifold.
Check the general condition of the centrifugal pumps. Ensure they are
secure and vibration-free, and that coupling guards are fitted.
Check that the centrifugal pumps flow rating is good. (*)

Figure 72
Severely worn outer
cover of the mud jumper
hose.

Figure 73
Hose damage; note the
area where the bend
restrictor ends.


207

Figure 74
Worn sections on the
mud jumper hose. This
'safety chain' is far too
long and welded to a
home-made clamp that
cannot guarantee
security.

Figure 75
Hose failure at 40 psi
(less than 3 bars).
Imagine if it was 3,000
psi, which is 200 bars!

Figure 76
No safety clamps installed on the
jumper hose in the derrick.

208

Figure 77
Gap "b":
For rotary hoses this
dimension shall be
between 6 (152.4 mm)
and 18 inches (457.2
mm) from the inboard
end of the coupling.
For vibrator hoses,
this dimension shall be
6 (152.4 mm) to 10
inches (254.0 mm)
from the inboard end of
the coupling.

Figure 78
Hose manufacturers shall
mark the hose with the
notation "Attach Safety
Clamp Here".

Figure 79
Complete standpipe
manifold constructed
using NPT threaded
fittings, some of which
have been welded around
the threads. This
manifold does not comply
with the API standards. If
there is a connection with
the choke manifold high-
pressure isolation gate
valves should be fitted,
and never check valves.


209

Figure 80
Standpipe complying with
API and oil major
requirements, i.e. only
welded or flanged
fittings.

Figure 81
NPT threaded fittings and
very sharp bends are not
allowed on the standpipe.

Figure 82
Weld repairs made to the
high-pressure mud line. A
very dangerous and
unauthorised practice!

210

Figure 83
The worn gate valve of
the standpipe manifold.
Possible problems with
holding the low pressure.

Figure 84
Washed seat of the
standpipe manifold gate
valve.

Figure 85
This vent line from the
vacuum degasser is too
short. It needs to be
routed to a safe area.


211

Figure 86
This float assembly of the
vacuum degasser is
corroded and therefore
did not operate.

Figure 87
Expensive mud leaking
from a pump seal. A
slow drip will assist in
cooling and lubricating
packing. Mechanical seals
are used for oil-based
mud.

Figure 88
Worn impeller. We test
flow through system with
the electricians help.
Circulate the system with
water and record the
amperage. Close the
discharge valve. If the
current drops when the
valve is closed more than
10% this is acceptable.


212

Figure 89
Proper housekeeping and
good condition of the
mud tanks.

Figure 90
This relief line from the
mud pumps is not
properly secured. The
way it is fitted means it is
also a potential trip
hazard.

Figure 91
And here is the reason why it is
important to clamp the end of the
pipe. The force created by 3,000 psi
(200 bars) blasting through an
unsecured open pipe bent it
backwards.


213

Figure 92
Poor condition of the mud
pit walls and stiffeners.
What if the rig has to
ensure that the mud
tanks are spotless (!) to
accommodate the brine
for production testing?
What if the hydrostatic
pressure of the mud
splits the tank wall?

Figure 93
All clients would prefer
the tanks to be in this
condition.

Figure 94
All the blades are broken
on this agitator. Notice
the sharp edges and
corners on this mud pit,
where mud solids can
easily accumulate.
Agitator paddles must be
designed so they can
circulate the mud and not
just stir it.

214

Figure 95
Home-made blades will
rapidly wear the bearings
of the agitator motor and
gearbox.

Figure 96
Blocked and frozen mud
guns. Normally the mud
guns must be able to
rotate approximately 90
degrees.

Figure 97
Unprotected rotating
shafts on the mud pit
agitators.


215

Figure 98
Leaking gate valve
(dump valve) on the mud
pit causing pollution and
loss of valuable fluids.
Lockable butterfly valves
are the preferred option.

Figure 99
Surge tanks: a blockage
of the vent lines might
shatter the sight-glasses.

Figure 100
Relief valve installed on
the bulk silo. The vents
must be routed to vent
into a safe area away
from the rig personnel
working in the vicinity.

216

Figure 101
Safety signs must be
properly installed in mud-
mixing area.

Figure 102
PPE box with neglected
equipment.


217

Figure 103
The pit room door is left
open and under-
pressurization is lost in
the pit room.
Pressure in the pit room
must be slightly less than
that in adjacent non-
hazardous areas.
Doors must be closed,
alarms must be working.
An air lock entry is
preferred.

Figure 104
Example of poor
housekeeping around the
mud pits, resulting in
unnecessary health and
trip hazards.

218

Figure 105
Poor housekeeping in the
mixing area.

Figure 106
Very poor housekeeping
in this sack room. The
piled sacks could fall over
on floating rigs.

03 Engine room and power plant

219

Chapter 03
Engine room and power plant
1 Diesel engines ...................................................................... 220
2 Emergency generators ........................................................... 240
3 Air compressors .................................................................... 244
4 Cranes................................................................................. 251


220

1 Diesel engines
1.1 Diesel engines checklist
Ensure there are sufficient engines and power available for the drilling
programme.
Look for oil, air, gas and water leaks.
Verify the date of the last major overhaul (e.g. last 20,000-rhr service).
Check the OEM service hours. More importantly, when are the next
overhauls due?
Validate the date of the next planned major overhaul.
Check whether the oil consumption is as per the OEM specifications?
Confirm that the engine safety devices are tested as per API RP 7C11F
and API RP 14F section 5.2.5.1? Typical safety devices are the following:
o Low-lubrication-oil pressure
o High-cooling-water temperature
o Overspeed
o Crankcase pressure
Verify that the overspeed tests are recorded (110% rpm).
Inspect the condition of the insulation on all engine exhaust lines.
Exhaust insulation is mandatory for marine engines.
Confirm whether fixed fire protection is available (mandatory on offshore
rigs).
Validate that crankcase overpressure safety devices are installed on the
crankcase doors (on engines with bores larger than 200 mm).
Inspect the fitting of and test the operation of the combustion air inlet
safety devices (rig saver valves).
Verify if suitable a cooling-water treatment is performed (API RP 7C-11F
section 2.8).
Check the electrical cables and junction boxes.
Confirm the exhaust gas colour indication (API RP 7C-11F section 9).
Review the oil-sampling/analysis reports and record the frequency.
Inspect the condition of the pressure gauges and temperature sensors.
Check the operation of turbochargers and verify that a spare
turbocharger is available.
Verify that suitable spark arrestors are installed. All engines within 100
feet of the well head (API RP 7C-11F sections A.3e and A.1).
Validate the condition of all the starting motors and confirm that a spare
motor is available (API RP 7C-11F section 6.3.4). (*)


221

Figure 1
Spotless engine room;
most exhaust gas lines
are adequately insulated,
but there is no insulation
present at the
turbocharger bodies. This
is a requirement for
marine engines.

Figure 2
Caterpillar engine with
multiple oil leaks. This
will create a fire hazard
and cause unnecessary
pollution.

Figure 3
Scale build-up in cooling
passages destroys
engines. Look at the
scale in the waterways on
this cylinder head. It
does not look much but it
is more than sufficient to
cause the head to
overheat.


222

Figure 4
The scale builds up on
the cylinder liner walls
reducing heat transfer
and causing the pistons
to seize. Using cooling
water treatment is
essential. Water leaks on
the engine must be
stopped otherwise this
expensive treatment will
just need constant
replacement.

Figure 5
When was the last major
overhaul performed on
these engines? This
uncertainty could mean
that this engine will not
be available for
approximately 10 to 14
days! More importantly
for the client, when are
the next engine
overhauls due?

Figure 6
EMD two-stroke
engine.
The clearance of the top
piston spring indicates
whether a power pack
must be renewed. The
power pack consists of
the connection rod
including the bearings,
the piston, the liner and
the cylinder head. Power
packs are fitted as a
single and the removed
unit is usually sent to a
workshop for repair and
return.


223

Figure 7
Lubricating oil leaking
from a crankcase relief
valve seal. The most
common reason for this is
due to gases blowing past
the piston rings over
pressurizing the
crankcase causing the
relief valve to flutter. This
is very dangerous and
must not be ignored.

Figure 8
Marine engines of 200-
mm+ cylinder diameter
must be fitted with
crankcase relief valves.
They consist of a large
diameter plate with a
light spring.

Figure 9
Large surface area.
Large but lightweight
spring. Why? The opening
pressure is 0.2 bars.
Explosive forces in
crankcase normally range
from 1 to 2 bars, but 7
bars have been known.
Explosive speed is 0.3
metres per second but
can reach 300 metres per
second on long engines.

224

Figure 10
Is there pressure from
the sump? Is the sump
level increasing for no
obvious reason? Is the oil
getting dirty?
Look at the dipstick. Is
there noticeable fuel in
the oil? Look at and smell
the dipstick.

Figure 11
Large bore engine with no
crankcase relief valves.
This is compulsory on
offshore rigs.

Figure 12
An engine-monitoring
panel is a good way of
measure the performance
and conditions of the
engine. The temperature
and pressure read-outs
are to be checked several
times per day.


225

Figure 13
It is important that all
pressure and temperature
indicators be working
properly, as they provide
vital information on the
condition of the engine
and its components. On
this rig it is impossible.

Figure 14
Over-eager painters?
Neither the temperature
nor the pressure can be
read from these illegible
gauges.

Figure 15
Modern rigs tend to have
computerized touch
screen panels that record
everything going on in
the engine and associated
auxiliary equipment. With
a little luck the crew will
not paint it over.

226

Figure 16
The fuel injector's seal on
a brass seal ring. In due
time this ring will become
too hard and cause fuel
leaks. Leaking fuel
creates a fire hazard and
can destroy the
lubricating-oil viscosity
and the right lubricating
abilities, thus causing
premature engine failure.

Figure 17
Trying to solve a high-
pressure fuel leak with a
rag is not a good idea.
Inside the fuel-
contaminated rag a
spontaneous heat source
can develop and a fire
can break out.

Figure 18
There was no protection
on this exhaust gas pipe.
This is the result of a
small oil leak onto the
exhaust line.


227

Figure 19
Showing the results of
heat on an unprotected
engine exhaust. Switch
off the lights when the
engine is loaded and you
will have these "glowing"
red hot.

Figure 20
On modern engines fuel
pipes tend to be double
skinned which has helped
reduce but not totally
eliminate fuel oil spraying
onto exhausts. The main
cause of fires on large
engines is leaking lube
oil. Pipes and fittings
need to be well secured.


228

Figure 21
Two pictures of lubricating-oil
pipes from similar engines.
Which rig has the better
Mechanic?

Figure 22
Insulation material will
protect the personnel from
the heat and retard the start
of a fire. When a leak of
lubricating oil or fuel occurs,
there will be a rapid
development of smoke that
will warn the crew or that will
be detected by smoke
sensors.


229

Figure 23
Purpose-built heat shields
have been installed.
Notice that the exhaust
gas turbochargers also
have a shield installed.

Figure 24
An unprotected exhaust
line with turbochargers
and the expansion piece.
Note that the
temperatures of the
exhaust gasses range
from 500 to 700 degrees
Celsius!

Figure 25
Insulation material and a
heat shield providing
some protection, but all
hot surfaces should be
covered.

230

Figure 26
Modern engine with a
water-cooled shield fitted
around the turbochargers.

Figure 27
All hot surfaces are
adequately protected
from fuel or oil leakage.

Figure 28
Marine engines have no
rig saver valve fitted. You
have to ask for them to
be fitted when used on oil
rigs.


231

Figure 29
A similar model of a
diesel engine as in the
previous picture, but this
time with the correct rig
saver valve installed.
Some Caterpillar engines
have two air inlet
manifolds and, as a
result, two rig saver
valves installed: one in
each air inlet manifold.

Figure 30
Same valve installed but
this one has been vibrating
closed and isolated
preventing it from working.
It shows a near criminal
level of ignorance.


232

Figure 31
This single rig saver valve
is not connected to the
governor, and it would not
operate if the engine over-
speeds.

Figure 32
Different type of valve,
same old story.
Everyone's life on the rig
put at risk due to
ignorance.


233

Figure 33
Black smoke from engine,
what can we determine
here? Poor combustion, lack
of air, poor injectors, poor
turbines?

Figure 34
Blue smoke: the engine is
burning oil from worn liners,
piston rings or leaking valve
guides.

Figure 35
White smoke indicating a
cooling-water leak
somewhere inside the
engine. The nightmare
scenario could be cooling
water leaking because of
cracked cylinder heads. If
the cylinder heads are on
one block as often found
with smaller engines it
could indicate a leaking
cylinder head gasket.

234

Figure 36
The silencer and spark
arrestor are missing on the
exhaust gas discharge pipe.
There is no insulation
material present either. The
noise levels will be beyond
belief!

Figure 37
Also third-party-owned
engines must have spark
arrestors, rig saver valves
and insulation material
installed on their engines.

Figure 38
There are water spray spark
arrestors installed on these
rig engines. With this
design it is possible to flood
the engine when it is not
running. Severe damage
can occur when the engine
is started afterwards. Not
normally found on land rigs.


235

Figure 39
Water-cooled spark arrestor
on an offshore rig. Good
set-up; there is plenty of it
(NORSOK Z-015 4.3.1.1).

Figure 40
Standard land rig spark
arrestor with soot collector.
Engines are located within
50 feet of wellhead (API RP
section 54 7C-11F A3E).

Figure 41
Unprotected rotating
equipment on the engines.
This is a very unsafe
practice that has caused
serious accidents and
fatalities on other rigs! The
guards on rotating
equipment are nowadays an
accepted worldwide
standard.

236

Figure 42
If you are going to fit a
guard make sure it is
suitable for purpose.

Figure 43
Missing guard on a cooling
fan causes a fatal accident.


237

A container holding a generator system was placed on the platform to provide
power for testing some winches. The engine was fluctuating, so a Mechanical
Assistant and two Motormen went into the container to investigate.
It was decided that the engine needed to be shut down to change the filters.
The Motorman stayed by the filters, while the Mechanical Assistant returned to
the panel to ask the other Motorman to fetch new filters.
While the Mechanical Assistant left the control panel and went outside to tell
the winch crew to stabilize the winches, the Motorman who stayed in the
generator container decided to remove his jacket. As soon as the Deck
Electrician heard a noise in the container he went to investigate and found the
injured man sitting against the fan guard.
His jacket had wound into the unguarded balance wheel pulley assembly. The
Motorman had his left hand amputated and suffered a skull fracture. He
passed away after 15 days in the hospital.

Figure 44
Completely frozen
turbocharger on a
Caterpillar engine. This rig
apparently has an optimistic
mechanic with a can of WD-
40!

Figure 45
Radiator severely blocked
by millions of bugs in a rig
engine located in the desert.
Care must be taken not to
damage the cooling fins
when cleaning the radiator.

238

Figure 46
Leaking radiator found
during daily maintenance,
i.e. the mother of all
maintenance.

Figure 47
Corroded heat exchanger on
an offshore rig. If it is this
bad outside how bad is it
inside?

Figure 48
Governor 'permanently'
adjusted with a pair of
gripping pliers.


239

Figure 49
Offshore rigs require a
means of extinguishing
engine room fires from
outside the machinery
space. CO
2
is the most
common method. This
equipment is covered by
Class, SOLAS and MODU
Code.


240

2 Emergency generators
2.1 Emergency generator checklist
Verify that the switchboard shows the power available (in kW).
Ensure the engine is designed to start during a total black-out.
Test for fuel, oil, air and water leaks.
Check the condition of the fan, belt and radiator.
Examine all the gauges and the calibration.
Ascertain that the emergency generator is tested every week (including
an automatic start).
Ensure there is no dirt and oil underneath the engine (fire hazard).
Confirm that there are two independent ways of starting the engine.
Check the layout of the emergency switchboard.
Make sure that on MODUs the room is located above the waterline.
Test the electrical cables and junction boxes.
Inspect to see if a spark arrestor is installed.
Examine if a rig saver valve is fitted.
Verify if there is a pre-heating system for the engine.
Carry out a test run at maximum load for at least 30 minutes.
Validate that there is adequate ventilation.
Confirm that the fuel tank sight-glasses are protected.
Test the remote operation of the fuel tank valve.
Check the condition of any starting batteries and battery chargers. (*)

Figure 50
The inspection of
emergency generators
is more or less the
same as ordinary diesel
generators with
additions for Class and
MODU Code.


241

Figure 51
The main difference is they
must have two
independent means of
starting.

Figure 52
Battery box for starting the
emergency generator with
insufficient warning signs
and no ventilation routed
to the outside of the
emergency generator area.

Figure 53
Starting batteries of the
emergency generator.
There are no safety signs
and there is no venting to
a safe area. The H
2

exhaust gasses coming
from the batteries can
cause an explosion!

242

Figure 54
Battery system cupboard
inside the emergency
generator room: poor
housekeeping levels and
no adequate venting
available.

Figure 55
Fuel leaks are particularly
dangerous in the
emergency generator
rooms, especially when no
daily watchkeeping is
performed.


243

Figure 56
Two different sources of
starting the engine of the
emergency generator: one
source is electrical; the
other is by means of a
pneumatic starter.

Figure 57
Handles missing from the
breakers of the emergency
switchboard. If you read
the signs you will notice
that these are vital
functions, such as the fire
pump!

244

3 Air compressors
3.1 Air compressors checklist
Record the number of the air compressors and the capacity of rig
air/bulk air.
Verify that there is a separate bulk air compressor present.
If there is no independent bulk compressor, verify if there are two
reducing valves fitted to supply bulk air.
Confirm that there are at least three rig air compressors if there is no
bulk air compressor available (on MODUs).
Check the air dryer capacity is 4C above the outlet air temperature.
Test the EX integrity of the electrical cables and junction boxes.
Examine the condition of the emergency air compressor (diesel-driven
cold-start compressor).
Verify that all the relief valve vents are routed towards a safe area by
means of rigid piping.
Confirm that the air receivers are purpose-built and certified.
Validate that the air receivers are hydrostatically tested every ten years
(API 510 Chapter 6).
Check that the relief valves are recertified every two years.
Inspect the relief valve sizes to see if they are compatible with the size
of the pressure vessels.
Test the oil-sampling and analysis frequency.
Validate that the rig carries out wall thickness measurements on the bulk
silos and piping (as a standard, 87.5% of original wall thickness must be
left).
Verify if the crew tests the high-temperature air shutdown on all the
screw-type compressors. (*)

Figure 58
Well maintained
compressors and air
systems. Offshore, if
there are only two
compressors then a
separate bulk compressor
should be available. Air
supply shall be taken
from a safe area.


245

Figure 59
Emulsified lubricating oil
coming from the
compressor, indicating a
leaking oil cooler.

Figure 60
Air pressure vessel
carrying all the relevant
safety markings, but
where is the relief valve?

Figure 61
Air pressure vessel in
highly corroded condition
located underneath the
drill floor. It has no relief
valve, and no gauges and
safety signs are present.

246

Figure 62
All air receivers should
have maximum working
pressure indicated. They
need relief valve
exhausts to be routed to
a safe area.

Figure 63
Relief valve vent installed on the
APV plugged off with a common
stud that prevents the valve from
operating.
If relief valves are installed on a
90-degree screwed elbow, the
rapid venting forces can create a
torque strong enough to unscrew
the fitting, thereby allowing the
valve to fly off and the air receiver
to empty.

Figure 64
Too-small-sized relief valve placed
on top of the large air pressure
vessel. If a fire breaks out in the
room, the gas- pressurized air will
expand and could burst the
receiver. With such a small valve it
will not be possible to vent the air
fast enough from this large
pressure vessel. There must be a
suitable relief valve or bursting
disc.


247

Figure 65
Remove the isolation valve of
the relief valve. To hard-pipe the
exhaust line and to vent into a
safe area is an excellent and
very safe practice.

Figure 66
A cold-start air
compressor but with an
exposed battery. But
even worse it has no air
filter.

Figure 67
Running reciprocating
compressors without an
air filter is the main
cause of air receiver
explosions.


248

Figure 68
Imagine the results if it
was this one that
exploded.

Figure 69
Dirt in the air, mud,
smoke, sand, fibres, etc.
With a missing or poor
filter, the dirt mixes with
cylinder oil.
It then forms a sticky
paste. Like grinding
paste, it wears pistons;
metal enters paste and
passes from the cylinder.
It sticks to valves. This
is not carburization, it
burns. We have fuel, air
pressure and a source of
combustion.

Figure 70
BOOM!


249

Figure 71
This compressor, which
reduces the rig air
pressure to bulk air
pressure, contains only
one regulator. A single-
point failure during a
critical cement job is
looming.

Figure 72
Well-maintained rig air
compressors and
systems.

Figure 73
An exposed rotating shaft
on this cold-start
compressor at knee
height!

250

Figure 74
Fit locking pins and whip
lines.


251

4 Cranes

Figure 75
Unauthorized welding
performed on this boom
pin to 'solve' the excessive
play.

Figure 76
Boom pin with severe
corrosion and excessive
play. The safety pin is also
missing.

Figure 77
Severely damaged crane
boom. The OEM needs to
be contacted and the load
capacity of the crane boom
must be confirmed or
downrated.

252

Figure 78
Collapsed crane boom
member. What would be
the SWL rating of this
crane boom?

Figure 79
We often find corrosion.
There is no need for this,
crews should find it as
soon as it starts and clean
away the rust, and repaint
the steel. They should
have done it after the NDT
inspection.

Figure 80
Paint is easy and cheap.
Steel replacement is costly
and difficult.


253

Figure 81
This crane boom fell
because of failing boom
wires.

Figure 82
Another dropped crane
boom. On average, about
six to ten crane booms fall
over the side every year!

Figure 83
The rig crew had decided
to use a non-OEM pin.

254

Figure 84
Result of using non-OEM
equipment: a dropped
crane boom.

Figure 85
Severe corrosion caused
the complete tip of the
boom to shear off. Again,
catch it early and this
wont happen.

Figure 86
Keep them in as-new
condition.


255

Figure 87
Load charts must be
present in each crane
cabin.

Figure 88
Load cell management
systems should indicate
when the crane is reaching
its maximum boom
angle/load capacity.

Figure 89
The load cell is one of the
crane safety devices. It
requires regular
recalibration and must be
used. The load cell test
unit would require to have
had a recent
recertification.

256

Figure 90
Load charts must also be
in the crane cabin and a
boom angle indicator in
clear line of sight in case
the weight indicator fails
and the driver has to take
over to make safe.

Figure 91
Crane controls must return
to neutral when released.
Just like a train driver's
dead-man's handle. Tying
them back is not a
solution.

Figure 92
Crane windows must be
fitted with safety glass.
Cranes in this condition
bring danger to both the
driver and the rest of the
crew.


257

Figure 93
PA speakers and
floodlights. These are all
additional safety items but
here not one has a safety
sling fitted.

Figure 94
Light fittings require safety
slings.

Figure 95
All equipment mounted on
cranes require safety
slings.


258

Figure 96
The correct way to install a
wedge-type socket. Never
connect the load-carrying
line to the deadline it could
damage the load carrying
wire and nullifies the effect
of the wedge.

Figure 97
An incorrect way to install
a wedge-type socket. The
bull clamp nullifies the
action of the wedge and
puts a stress raiser: a
weak point in the load
carrying wire.


259

Figure 98
Modern method of securing
the wedge.

Figure 99
Another incorrectly fitted
wedge. These days most
barge engineers
understand the correct
method. Where then do
we find incorrectly fitted
wires on hydraulic cathead
wires? Drill crews have not
yet started reading the
books.

260

Figure 100
This wedge-type socket
has been wrongly installed.
It was damaging the lead
end of the wire and had
nullified the operation of
the wedge.

Figure 101
Standard thimble.
Here the lead and the dead
end must be connected.
This is not a wedge-type
socket.


261

Figure 102
Wedge socket.
Notice the safety pin
missing.

Figure 103
Limit switches are part of
the safety system. They
must be OEM-supplied
equipment.

Figure 104
We often find badly worn
hooks.


262

Figure 105
Who in their right mind thinks it is
a good idea to weld on a load-
carrying hook?

Figure 106
Slew bearing studs are to
be NDT-inspected every
four years, or 25% of all
studs each year. Be
aware that there are
inside and outside studs
on the slew bearing. If
you have four cranes you
will have hundreds that
need to be checked. Note
the time period is a
recommendation and
owners can alter it to
suit.

Figure 107
The crane block had not
recently (possibly never),
been stripped and NDT-
inspected.


263

Figure 108
Main block of the crane.
The speed and strength
depends on how many
wires are reeved. If fewer
wires are used, the main
block will move faster.
However, the load rating
will reduce and the load
cell management system
will have to be readjusted.

Figure 109
Different rig different crew
same lack of knowledge
about lifting equipment.
On this one the pin-and-
nut assembly was very
loose, could cause much
more than a simple
headache.

264

Figure 110
Frequent visits to the top
of the A-frame are
required to grease and
measure the sheaves. On
this rig you would need a
set of wings to reach the
A-frame.

Figure 111
Inspection of the sheaves
using a sheave gauge. The
minimum size of the
sheave diameter must be
18 times the outer
diameter of the wire.

Figure 112
If the crane has engines
they must be kept in top
condition.


265

Figure 113
Typical engine driven
hydraulic system.

Figure 114
Hydraulic clutches on a
link belt crane are prone to
seal a leak on a central
hydraulic cylinder spraying
hydraulic oil over the
clutch shoes.

266

Figure 115
Oops!

04 Electrical equipment

267

Chapter 04
Electrical equipment
1 Introduction to the eddy current brake ..................................... 268
2 Eddy current brake................................................................ 277
3 A basic introduction to hazardous-area equipment ..................... 286
4 Electrical safety equipment ..................................................... 302


268

1 Introduction to the eddy current brake

Figure 1 - General view of the Baylor 7838 eddy current brake with
low-temperature shaft and reverse junction box.
In Figure 1 there are four field coils installed, which are installed in a static
frame with bearings. The rotor is connected fixed to the shaft which is
connected to the drawworks shaft. The water level inside the eddy current
brake must remain below the bearings, which are sealed and protected from
the 'water spray', but the bearings must not be flooded.
The vent and overflow outlets prevent this flooding. On this drawing there
are three air gap inspection holes, which allow the rig's crew to measure the
clearances between the rotor and the coils on a monthly routine. The air gap
measurements can be used to calculate the eddy current brake's efficiency.


269

Figure 2 - Specification Baylor 7838 eddy current brake.
General explanation
When the steel rotor rotates through the stationary magnetic field, currents
are induced in the rotor. These currents, commonly called 'eddy currents',
produce a magnetic field which interacts with the stationary field.
This field interaction produces a force, which opposes rotor rotation, and
provides the braking torque for the Baylor brake. The braking torque of the
eddy current brake is dependent on the strength of the stationary magnetic
field, rotor speed and rotor temperature.
The torque increases with the magnetic field strength and with the rotor
speed. Torque decreases as the rotor temperature rises and the rotor
expands, which widens the air gap. The strength of the stationary magnetic
field is controlled by the field coil in proportion to the braking requirements.
The eddy currents induced in the rotor produce heat. This rotor heat must be
kept within acceptable limits or the braking torque will be reduced. To
maintain rotor temperature within acceptable limits, a cooling system is
required.
A steady flow of water is directed into the area containing the rotor. The
movement of the rotor through this water as it turns provides the uniform
cooling of the rotor surface. If the flow of cooling water fails while the brake
is in operation, the rotor will become overheated. In this state, the rotor will
be damaged if a safe cooling procedure is not followed.

270

Figure 3 - Funnel-type drain.
The water outlet(s) at the bottom of the brake should not be hardpiped or
otherwise restricted. This should be a free-flowing gravity drain. A funnel-
type drain as illustrated in Figure 3 is preferred. Do not plug, pipe, connect
hoses to, or otherwise obstruct the water overflow outlets, located on the
brake just below the shaft centerline. These overflow outlets provide a
warning of improper water flow conditions.
The eddy current brake allows cooling water to flow over the lower sections
of the magnets and rotor before it exits at the bottom. If the cooling water
outlets are restricted, the water level inside the brake will increase to a level
which could damage the bearing grease seals, and permit water to enter the
bearing cavity with ultimate damage resulting to the bearing.
CAUTION!
The eddy current brake is not designed to operate with the cooling water
internal of the brake at other than atmospheric pressure. For proper brake
operation ensure that brake cooling water flows unrestricted through the
brake with gravity discharge and unrestricted flow back to the cooling water
reservoir.
Radial bearing clearance
Measuring radial bearing clearance upon receipt of a new or factory rebuilt
brake is a method that will allow the prediction or verification of bearing
failures.
Note: In order to carry out this measurement, the brake must be uncoupled
from the drawworks.


271

A dial indicator is placed at the top dead center of the shaft's vertical
centerline, and the shaft is lifted. Care must be taken not to apply more
force than one half the combined weights of the rotor and shaft. Care must
also be taken to insure the dial indicator is perfectly vertical and properly
zeroed.
As with any lifting operation, all lifting apparatus must be properly sized, and
qualified personnel must perform the lift. The radial clearance data should be
recorded for future use. This information can be used later to predict bearing
failure.
The bearing manufacturer will indicate that a bearing that is in the process
of failing will undergo microscope surface failures prior to a complete failure.
When this begins to happen it is impossible to observe these surface failures
with a radial clearance measurement, but a large deviation from the original
measurement will indicate the failure process is well underway and a bearing
replacement should be planned.
Shaft alignment
Angular misalignment and offset misalignment between directly-connected
shafts often cause increased bearing loads and vibration, even when the
connection is made by means of flexible coupling. Shaft alignment is
especially critical if the coupling is to be operated at high speed

Figure 4 - Angular misalignment.
Angular misalignment should not
exceed 0.010 inch (0.0025 mm) total
indicator reading.
Figure 5 - Offset alignment.
The total indicator run-out of the
offset misalignment should not
exceed 0.010 inch (0.0025 mm).


272

Figure 6 - Recommended cooling-water flow curves.
Cooling-water quality
In order to function properly, the cooling water used in eddy current brakes
must meet four basic requirements:
1. It must adequately transfer heat energy from the rotor to the heat
exchanger used for cooling.
2. It must not form scale or sludge deposits in the brake or in the cooling
system.
3. It must not cause corrosion in the Brake or cooling system.
4. It must not deteriorate any of the seals or gaskets used in the brake or
cooling systems.
These requirements are normally met by combining suitably de-mineralized
water with a reliable corrosion inhibitor. Under extreme operating conditions
it may be necessary to use an antifreeze coolant. In this case the cooling
liquid should be a mixture of the ethylene glycol type antifreeze, de-
mineralized water, and an adequate corrosion inhibitor.


273

Water quality standards
The water used in eddy current brakes should meet the following
requirements:
1. no un-dissolved particles such as sand, grit or silt
2. a pH level between 7.0 and 7.5
3. a maximum dissolved chlorides content of 40 parts per million
4. a maximum dissolved sulfates content of 100 parts per million
5. a total dissolved solids content of 340 parts per million
6. a total hardness of 170 parts per million
Water that does not meet these standards should be treated by softening,
de-mineralization or de-ionization before being used to cool the brake.
Brake Operation on Rig
When a Baylor eddy current brake is installed on a rig its response may
vary, depending upon the following items:
1. Brake torque capacities may vary between +5% and -5% for individual
units.
2. When the brake becomes overheated it will lose some of its torque
capacity.
3. The normal reaction time for the brake to reach maximum braking
torque is circa 2 seconds. This may vary depending upon the brake
control system employed.
4. The Normal reaction time for the brake to decay to zero braking torque
is circa 1 to 2 seconds. This may vary depending upon the brake control
system employed.
5. As the brake ages, the air gap between the rotor and the magnets may
increase due to rust or erosion, which will cause a decrease in brake
output torque.
Drill assist operation
If the brake is used for 'drill assist' where the rotor speed is very limited, it
is recommended that no more than half of full rated DC voltage be applied
to the field coils continuously. The brake's primary purpose as an auxiliary
brake is to dissipate the energy of drill pipe or casing being lowered into the
bore hole. For this specific purpose, the field coils are designed to
accommodate a duty cycle of full DC voltage 'on time' of 20 seconds out of
every 60 seconds.
Increasing the duty cycle to 100%, or an 'on time' of 60 seconds out of 60
seconds, will create excessive heat buildup within the individual conductors
of the field coils. As the electrical insulation system of the field coil has
excellent dielectric characteristics, it also is an excellent thermal insulator.
Note: The heat produced internal of the field coil due to the DC current
passing through each conductor will continue to rise until, within a short
period of time, the insulation system will de-grade and turn-to-turn shorting
will occur with ultimate failure of the field coil.
It is also interesting to note that the torque curves for Baylor eddy current
brakes all have a similar characteristic. The torque produced at very low
drum shaft speeds (0 to 20 rpm) is approximately the same for various
excitation values. In other words, the brake torque produced at 15 rpm is
about the same, at full applied excitation, as the torque with 50% applied
excitation.
Therefore, the brake, utilized for 'drill assist', will perform at the low speed
drum requirements of feed off at half of excitation, as well as performance at

274

full excitation. This can reduce the excitation to the larger capacity brakes
from 21 kW to 7 kW with the reduction of thermal load of field coils.
Operation of the brake at very low speeds during drill assist, with full
excitation, will also contribute to excessive wear to the ID of the rotor and
the OD of the magnets. At very low rotor speeds, with full excitation to the
field coils, the magnetic attraction between magnets and rotor is greater
than the collapse strength of the rotor material.
Pull over will occur where the outer circumference of the rotor drum will pull
down and contact the OD of the magnet. The resultant contact, at slow
speed, will gall and gouge the surfaces of rotor and magnets. This
mechanical contact will increase the air gap between the rotor ID and the
magnet OD such that maximum torque of the brake will be reduced.
In conclusion it should be said that utilizing the Baylor eddy current brake in
the drill assist mode requires specific attention regarding the level of
excitation applied to the field coils.
Note: Continuous operation at full excitation can significantly shorten the
life of the field coils and increase the air gap dimension such that reduced
torque output will result.
National Oilwell Varco manufactures several different types of control systems
for use with the Baylor eddy current brakes. Each control system design
incorporates a different method of supplying reduced voltage to the brake
during drill assist operations.
Cooling-water alarm
A cooling water alarm system is available to monitor flow and temperature
of the coolant to the brake. This system warns the operator whenever
cooling to the brake has been impaired. It can prevent the need for
expensive repairs. Note: This is also required to maintain the hazardous-
area certification on the brake.
Cooling water treatment
The silicate nitrate inhibitor is basically non-polluting. Be sure to follow the
manufacturer's recommendations for applying the inhibitor. Both for new
untreated water and for maintenance of already treated water, the
recommended inhibitor is Nalcool 2000.
Warning! If glycol antifreeze is used, Nalcool 3000 is recommended due to
possible interaction with the glycol, which causes sludge.
Water quality standards with Nalcool
1. Ensure that the water quality meets the water quality standards.
2. Coolant has a pH level of 8.3 after corrosion inhibitor has been added
(the coolant solution turns pink)
3. The recommended nitrite level is 1,500 parts per million.
For long-term storage a 50% solution of Nalcool with clean water is
recommended.


275

1.1 Maintenance and service
Lubrication
To maintain the lubricant volume, add approximately 2 ounces of grease to
each bearing cavity each 24-hour period, or before each trip into the hole
with pipe. There is a grease type fitting for each of the two bearings, and
each must be independently lubricated. The recommended grease is NLGI
No. 2 water-resistant (lithium-based) grease. A good grade of lithium base
ball and roller bearing grease may be used.
The bearings and seals will not be harmed by excess grease. It will simply
enter the cooling water stream by momentarily lifting the seal lip to relieve
pressure. Drawworks manufacturers and users may connect the grease inlet
holes in the bearing caps to lubrication header blocks with tubing to facilitate
lubrication from a remote point. This is satisfactory if the tubing is regularly
inspected, and it is determined that the required amount of grease is
actually reaching the bearing.
Breather
A breather is installed on the upper and/or lower exterior face of each
magnet assembly. These breathers should be inspected periodically to
ensure that they are clean and have free access to air to minimize
condensation and to prevent any accumulation of moisture in the coil cavity.
They should be removed and cleaned with kerosene at least once a month.
Note: The accumulation of moisture in the coil cavities caused by plugged
breathers will result in early deterioration of the coils. These breathers
should be cleaned as outlined above and must always be pointed downward
for proper drain.

Figure 7 - Location overflow. Figure 8 - Location drains.
Air gaps
If there is erosion/corrosion in the air gap between the rotor ID and the
magnet OD due to the use of poor quality cooling water, this gap distance
may gradually increase to a point where rated torque will be reduced. In
making any field check of this air gap, it is necessary to allow for any pitting
and for any scale build-up to determine the effective gap distance.
Any scale present does not provide an effective magnetic path so it must be
deducted from the gap distance measurement. This air gap should be
checked monthly. The effective air gap is the average of all measurements
taken. Measurements should be taken at each air gap inspection hole (both
inboard and outboard) and recorded. Then rotate the rotor assembly 90
degrees clockwise and record the measurements. Do this three times.

276

Finally, rotate rotor assembly another 90 degrees clockwise. This will bring
you back to the original position and readings should agree with first position
readings. Normally, a 50% increase in the air gap will produce a 70%
decrease in rated torque. For the Baylor 7838 eddy current brake, the air
gaps should vary between 0.055 and 0.065".
Coil-readings
During the monthly routine maintenance the individual coils need to be
measured. The values are listed in the table in Figure 9. Note that these
values might differ if the temperature is not close to 20 degrees Celsius.
There is no difference between the inboard and the outboard magnets.
The leads are numbered for convenience in wiring and to assist in proper coil
lead connection to ensure a proper coil polarity. The outboard magnet leads
are F1, F2, F3 and F4. The inboard magnet leads are F5, F6, F7 and F8. If
there is a need to convert an inboard magnet to an outboard one or vice
versa, the following table should be used:
F1 = F8
F3 = F6
F2 = F7
F4 = F5
Therefore, the inboard and outboard magnets are mechanically and
electrically interchangeable.

Figure 9 - Coil readings of all Baylor eddy current brake models.
Insulation to ground
With the power removed, use a 500 VDC megger to check for grounds.
Wiring and interconnect cables should be at least 1 Mohm to ground.
Individual magnet coils should be at least 5 Mohm to ground. An insulation
resistance meter should be used to check the coils for open or short circuits.
Source of this introduction: NOV Document No. 165-60800


277

2 Eddy current brake
2.1 Eddy current brake checklist
Check the date of the last disassembly and bearing replacement.
Test the condition of the spline coupling and its alignment.
Inspect to see that it discharges through a cooling-water funnel.
Verify that the control handle spring is off when released.
Confirm the EX integrity of the electrical cables and junction boxes.
Record the air gap measurements. For instance, for a Baylor 7838 brake
this is 0.055 inch (1.4 mm) when new; maximum allowed wear 0.080
inch (2 mm) leaves only 50% efficiency.
Document the last reading of the individual coil resistance (11 to 14
ohms at 20C) and insulation values (minimum 5 Mohm for the coils).
Verify that the breathers are not plugged, and that the gauze and float
are still present (these are EX fittings that must have the gauze).
Confirm that the flow and temperature alarms are fitted (audible and
visible).
Record the date of the last battery back-up system drain test.
Validate that cooling-water treatment is used to prevent scale from
blocking the lines and to preserve adequate heat transfer.
Check that a fault-monitoring system is installed.
Confirm that the spline coupling release handle is adequately secured.
(*)

278

Figure 10
Schematic showing a
typical Baylor Elmagco
brake and clearances. For
the purpose of this course
we use the Baylor 7838
pressures, temperatures
and clearances.

Figure 11
Lining up the eddy current
brake to the drawworks is
a time-consuming
process, which can take
many hours to do it
properly.


279

Figure 12
The picture shows heavy
wear on the coupling
splines. This can only get
worse as the drawworks
direction is frequently
changing. True alignment
and greasing is of utmost
importance.

Figure 13
Measuring the clearance
between the rotor and the
coils. We check for
bearing wear and
corrosion. Heavy corrosion
has a detrimental effect of
the magnetic flux. Bearing
wear shows as a smaller
top clearance than bottom
clearance and could be a
sign of imminent shaft
bearing failure.

Figure 14
Scale build-up results in
overheating and possible
expansion and distortion
of the rotor. An expanded
rotor means the air gaps
increase and efficiency
drops. A distorted rotor
could make contact with
and damage the coils.

280

Figure 15
The overflow vent is to
prevent the casing filling
with water which could
wash away bearing
grease. It must not be
plugged. The internal
cooling water pressure
should be maintained
atmospheric.

Figure 16
Elmagco breathers should
have a flame trap (gauze)
to prevent hot burning
gases escaping after an
explosion and a ball valve
to block external air from
returning after the initial
explosion. Do not take
them apart wash them
frequently using kerosene.
Make sure that the ball
rattles.

Figure 17
Breathers are an EX
safety device and must be
maintained as such. They
allow hot humid air to
vent from the coil cavities
during normal operations
and when stopped.


281

Figure 18
Close-up of the air gap
between the coils and the
rotor. But what is the plug
beneath it doing?

Figure 19
This breather is
completely corroded. It is
meant to be a safety
device.

Figure 20
Here the cooling system
has been modified, and is
not according to OEM
design? The rotor is
designed to scoop water
and splash cool the inside,
the internal water
pressure should be 1
atmosphere.


282

Figure 21
Same unit as above.
Water coming out of
inspection point. Cooling
water needs corrosion and
salt scale inhibitor or
repairs become very
expensive (more than 1
million US dollars).

Figure 22
The water needs to be
cool (30
o
C) going in and
hot (74
o
C) coming out.
The flow rate is 150 US
gallons per minute. It
must have a flow alarm
fitted.

Figure 23
Low-flow and high-
temperature alarm bell for
the eddy current brake
fitted in the doghouse.


283

Figure 24
Flow and temperature
alarms installed in the
eddy current brake
cooling-water system. A
flow alarm is a must for
the EX rating.

Figure 25

Figure 26
Nameplate indicating the
necessity of a flow alarm
for the eddy current
brake.

284

Figure 27
An air-cooled eddy current
brake. We have our
doubts that this is a good
design for use in a
hazardous area, as it is
certainly not explosion-
proof. New air-cooled
units have a closed-loop
system.

Figure 28
The eddy current brake
should be connected to
the drawworks at all times
during the drilling
operation. The handle to
disconnect the eddy
current brake from the
drawworks should be
secured with a padlock
and covered by a work
permit.

Figure 29
Measuring the individual
coil resistance and the coil
resistance to ground must
be done at least every
month. Also ensure that
the polarity of the coils is
correct. All fittings are EX,
this one EXd.


285

Figure 30
The mini SCR that converts
240V AC into 240V DC.

Figure 31
Battery back-up system
testing: use the descend
method or this safer way
shown below.
Procedure:
Chain the blocks.
Switch off the system power and battery charger.
Hit the emergency stop (it will apply full brake from the batteries).
Record amperage, voltage and time.
Verify that the system disconnects the battery after three minutes or
when the battery voltage reaches a dangerous level.
What is a pass of the batteries?
Give full current for three minutes and not below the danger point
(200V).

286

3 A basic introduction to hazardous-area
equipment

Figure 32 - For a rig to burn there must be a source of ignition.
The purpose of this section is to:
to introduce the group to the concept of EX equipment
to give a basic explanation of what EX means
to explain why flame path maintenance is important


287

Figure 33 - Gas air explosive range.
methane up to 5% concentration by volume of air (= Lower Explosive
Limit at 20
o
C)
methane 15% concentration by volume of air (= Upper Explosive Limit at
20
o
C)
first alarm set at 10% of LEL; second alarm set at 20% of LEL.

Hazardous areas are classified in three different zones:
Zone 0: These areas are normally only found on production platforms, not
on drilling rigs.
Zone 1: An area in which an air gas mixture is likely to occur during normal
operations.
Zone 2: An area in which an air/gas mixture is not likely to occur during
normal operations, or an area in which such a mixture, if it does occur, will
only exist for a short time.
For the purpose of this course we will concentrate on Zones 1 and 2.


288

Figure 34 - EX ratings explained.

Figure 35
A typical EXd box. It has a
cover with a large surface
area, lots of bolts and no
gasket.

Figure 36
Schematic of an EXd box.
The cover makes a face to
face seal with no gasket
material.
Preferably there should be
no gap between the faces.
We can accept gaps of less
than 0.004 inches in spots
as long as they are not
excessive.
If an explosion occurs the
force created pushes on the
cover, stretching the bolts
and creating a gap over
which the gases can escape
expanding and cooling as
they flow. It is vital that all
bolts are in place and
secured.


289

Figure 37
Schematic showing how a
bolted EXd enclosure
operates.

Figure 38
Schematic showing how a
screwed EXd enclosure
operates.

290

Figure 39
A really badly fitted EXd
enclosure. If an explosion
occurs there will not be
enough bolts to prevent the
cover blowing off.

Figure 40
A correctly fitted EXd
enclosure. Remember that
one missing bolt negates its
rating. Hot gases will take
the shortest route, which
could mean up the missing
bolt hole and result in hot
gases escaping into
atmosphere.


291

Figure 41
Using silicon sealant as a
gasket for EXd enclosures is
very dangerous.

Figure 42
Schematic of an EXe
enclosure.


292

Figure 43
E0058e is used in many
fittings but mainly where
the connections are
mechanically connected.

Figure 44
Schematic of an EXp set-up.


293

Figure 45
EXp enclosure with a
go/no-go gauge.

294

Figure 46
The big drawback is they
were not tamperproof,
here mechanically or the
alarm could be shorted
electrically.

Figure 47
New driller's shacks are
pressurized while the
control panels are EXi.


295

Figure 48
Intrinsically safe gas
detector. Never mind
which way the wind is
blowing, just follow the
dog.

Figure 49
Typical EXi enclosure as
fitted on many oil rigs.

296

Figure 50
Other EX equipment that
once sealed requires no
maintenance. This could be
sand, quartz or resin filled
(EXq).

Figure 51


297

Figure 52
Schematic showing how
these items are fitted.


298

Class / MODU Code section 6.6.2 / IEC 61892-3 section 4.16 /
IEC 61892-7 section 6.2
Hazardous areas, electrical equipment. Check if any equipment, which is
or will be located in hazardous or potentially hazardous areas, complies
with a recognized standard for electrical apparatus for installation in
potentially explosive atmospheres. Look for certificates/labels of the
Underwriters Laboratory.
API RP 500 section 11.5.1.3 / ATEX 137
Australia and New Zealand: AS.NZ 2381.1:2005 section 3.8.16
Ventilation inlets should be located in unclassified (non-hazardous)
locations.
IEC 61892 - 7 sect 9.2.2 / ATEX 95
Check that all the junction boxes, control stations, starters, etc. are
closed with the proper type and amount of bolts, in order to ensure the
gastight integrity.
API RP 500 section 11.5.2.1
Enclosed hazardous (classified) locations are to be provided with
ventilation as required to maintain them at a pressure lower than
adjacent less hazardous locations by a minimum differential of 25 Pa
(0.1 in H2O).

Figure 53
Schematic of a DC motor
showing the requirements
for use in a hazardous
area.


299

Figure 54
Typical DC motor as used
to power drawworks and
mud pumps.

Figure 55
The easiest way to tell if a
DC motor is high torque
just by looking. The mica
lines are square section.
Note the EX space heater.


300

Figure 56
Typical of the type of
space heater we often
find. These are of a type
used in washing machines.
Submerged in water they
cannot glow red hot.
Inside a DC motor they
are a hot spot source of
ignition.

Figure 57
High standard air inlet
complete with gas
detector and spark
arrestors.

Figure 58
A basic spark arrestor,
cheap and easy to fit.


301

Figure 59
An alternative inlet and
exhaust vent to and from
a safe area.

Figure 60
A good reason to be safe.

302

4 Electrical safety equipment
Electrical safety equipment checklist
Check that the hazardous areas on the rig are clearly defined.
Validate that hazardous-area drawings are available.
Confirm that there are proper signs indicating the hazardous areas on
the rig.
Verify that the electricians have attended an EX equipment course.
Inspect to see if certified cables and EX cable fittings are fitted.
Test that all AC and DC motors are properly grounded with external
ground wire.
Check that monthly ground measurements of the AC and DC motors are
performed.
Ensure that the maximum resistance of the ground wires is 1 ohm.
Ascertain that only correctly sized copper ground wires are used.
Confirm that the vibrating equipment (shale shakers) uses a braided-
style ground wire and ground matting.
In case of a looped system, ensure it is double-looped to prevent single-
point failures.
Ensure that flame-path maintenance is carried out on all the EXd boxes.
Verify that all the EXd boxes are fitted with securing bolts.
Confirm that silicone sealant is not used as gasket material on the EXd
boxes.
Check the resistance of all the DC motors (must be at least 2 Mohm).
Make sure that spark arrestors are installed on the DC motors used in
the hazardous areas.
Verify that the DC motors used in a hazardous area draw their cooling air
from outside the hazardous area.
Check that the DC motor space heaters have an EX rating.
Test any loss-of-purge-air alarms installed on the rig.
Ensure that the electrical safety in the accommodation is adequate.
Make certain that the electric cables are adequately supported inside
dedicated cable trays.
Confirm that the electrical cables in the derrick are secured with rubber-
coated, steel tie-wraps.
Validate that the AC motors in the hazardous areas have an EX
certification.
Record the date of the last infra-red survey performed on the electrical
busbars.
Make sure rubber safety matting is present in front of all the motor
control centers (MCCs).
Verify that there is an insulated grab hook in the MCCs and in the main
switchgear room.


303

Figure 61
All equipment must be
grounded. Never use a
single loop to connect one
section to the other;
always use a double-loop
system to prevent single-
point failures.

Figure 62
Completely corroded steel
ground cable. This cable
will burn through the
moment any significant
current is passing through
it. This ground wire
provides no protection
whatsoever and only offers
a false sense of security.

Figure 63
Damaged ground cable.
Taped connections are not
recommended.

304

Figure 64
Badly corroded ground
cables. The individual
wires are too thin so that
their resistance will be too
strong in order to operate
as ground wire. The
maximum allowable
resistance is only 1 ohm.
These wires could act like
fuses and burn out when a
current flows. This is a fire
risk. The electrician should
fit the correct-diameter
cable for the loads
expected.

Figure 65
These ground cables do
not have a proper, solid
connection.


305

Figure 66
Using an accommodation
socket outside in a ground
wire power system is not
acceptable.

Figure 67
Cables should be routed
inside designated cable
trays; this set-up creates
a serious safety hazard.

Figure 68
Messy cables on top of the
driller's doghouse. Which
cable is live and which one
is obsolete? Do you
recognise any EXi cable in
this mountain of
spaghetti?

306

Figure 69
Too many cables installed
on a corroded cable
support system.

Figure 70
Incorrectly installed and
poorly supported electrical
cables.

Figure 71
All cables should be
mechanically supported to
comply with API. Note that
all these cables are in a
hazardous area!


307

Figure 72
An example of a well
designed electric-cable
support system.

Figure 73
It is dangerous to repair a
440-volt wire like this.

308

Figure 74
A 'high-voltage' rag is
used to cover a 440-volt
generator.

Figure 75
This air exhaust, which
could contain sparks from
the DC motor of the
drawworks, is venting
straight into a hazardous
area. Adequate spark
arrestors must be installed
here.

Figure 76
Air outlet from the DC
motors passing through an
OEM spark arrestor.


309

Figure 77
An example of a proper
spark arrestor system on
the rotary DC motor.
Notice that the air inlet
has been connected with
steel ducting, so that the
cooling air is coming from
outside the hazardous
area.

Figure 78
Duct tape is not EX and
should not be used on the
air supply inlet to the DC
motors on the drill floor.

Figure 79
Another example on non-
EX duct tape going to the
DC motors on the rig floor.

310

Figure 80
A new blower installed but
the air inlet is within the
hazardous area.

Figure 81
Non-EX space heater for
the drawworks DC motor.
When the DC motor is not
running, the purge air
protection is lost. For this
reason, the space heaters
installed to prevent
condensation inside the
DC motors must have an
EX rating.

Figure 82
Another example of a non-
EX space heater.


311

Figure 83
A certified and acceptable
EX aluminium space
heater.

Figure 84
Gas- and watertight
pencil.

Figure 85
Hole in the wall in the
shaker room, a Zone 1
hazardous area. The sharp
edges will damage the
wires. Cables should be
secured using transition
pieces.

312

Figure 86
No proper separation
between the mud pit room
and the mud pump room.

Figure 87
A 'watertight' plug socket.
Unfortunately, the water
was present inside the
socket!

Figure 88
Cover missing from the
plug socket.


313

Figure 89
Domestic plugs and
sockets placed on a
homemade, wooden
'junction box', in use
outside next to the mud
pumps. This is not
acceptable.

Figure 90
An example of a 'high-
tech' electrical support
system: rope!

314

Figure 91
Tape repairs will ruin the
seal and therefore the EX
rating of the cables going
to the junction box.

Figure 92
Cable glands are designed
to secure on the main
cable sheath only. In this
example it should be the
outer diameter that is
secured.

Figure 93
Junction box. The EX cable
gland is completely
missing.


315

Figure 94
Enough tape was used.
This tape may be
waterproof, but it is
absolutely not explosion-
proof.

Figure 95
Very dangerous
installation and with poor
termination of electrical
wires.

Figure 96
440-volt termination of
wires in a Zone 1 area,
next to the shakers. This
is very dangerous.

316

Figure 97
This new, supposedly EX
hot-water kettle does not
need a plug. It was
installed on top of mud
tanks, which is a Zone 1
hazardous area.

Figure 98
Electrical enclosure which
was held together with
rope.

Figure 99
Junction box cable entry of
a very low standard.


317

Figure 100
Instead of a rubber mat,
there is water on the steel
floor in front of the MCC.

Figure 101
Example of poor electrical
isolation; no physical barrier
is present. Anyone could
actually move the switch,
assuming the job has been
completed.

318

Figure 102
Example of correct electrical
isolation with a numbered
padlock, a physical barrier
and a padlock number,
which is mentioned and
covered by an electrical-
isolation work permit.

Figure 103
A well-maintained electrical-
isolation board.


319

Figure 104
Incorrectly terminated
ground wire connections.

Figure 105
Homemade MCC panel.

320

Figure 106
Are we totally crazy or just
plain stupid? The drill bit
has superseded the position
of the fuse!

Figure 107
Poor electrical safety in a
third-party container. Note
that third-party electrical
equipment is also the
responsibility of the rig
electrician.


321

Figure 108
Poor repair and a complete lack of
support for this high-voltage electrical
cable. Note that the wet conditions
greatly increase the danger.

Figure 109
Batteries in a box. There is
no ventilation outlet to vent
outside the area and there
are no safety signs
installed.

Figure 110
This battery is not even
placed inside a box. Clear
indication of leaking acid
and corrosion, and no
safety signs are installed.

322

Figure 111
Battery box with the
appropriate safety signs.

Figure 112
All start/stop stations
should be in proper
condition and indicating
what they are meant for.

Figure 113
A supposedly watertight
fluorescent light with water
inside!


323

Figure 114
Badly connected electrical
cable. These poor
connections will create heat
or powerful sparks when
high-voltage electrical
power is transferred.

Figure 115
Unsafe breaker panel inside
the accommodation area.

Figure 116
The famous 'tooth-pick
plug'.

324

Figure 117
'No plug is needed here, as
we have a safety line
installed on the 220-volt
electrical cable.'

Figure 118
What currency are we
converting to? Do we
assume it means current?
If so, what current? This
highlights the need to
ensure that all electrical
equipment is correctly
labelled.


325

Figure 119
Again, we must be precise
with labels. It is connected
to some piece of electrical
equipment, but exactly
what piece?

Figure 120
The KFC ultramodern gas
detection system. Well, not
very modern, but better
than having no warning
system at all. It is not so
long ago that western
coalmines used canaries to
warn of gas.

326

Figure 121
If the chicken dies we have
gas and must make the well
safe and muster in a safe
area. If not, we'll have
chicken for dinner.

05 Safety equipment

327

Chapter 05
Safety equipment
1 Drilling and safety equipment.................................................. 328
2 Pollution control .................................................................... 356

05 Safety equipment

328

1 Drilling and safety equipment
1.1 Safety equipment checklist
Check the condition of all the fire-fighting equipment (pumps, hoses,
suits and stations).
Confirm the condition of all the portable fire extinguishers and the
results of the last hydrostatic testing (API RP 54 section 7.2).
Test the condition of all the fixed fire systems (CO
2
).
Inspect all the lifeboats and life-rafts; check the frequency of the lifeboat
drills.
Examine all the helicopter facilities and rescue boxes.
Check the emergency procedures.
Verify the presence of lifting-/handling-equipment inspection records
(six-monthly).
Confirm that the crew colour-codes the lifting equipment.
Inspect the accommodation facilities and hygiene level.
Check the hospital and medical facilities.
Verify the condition and number of breathing-apparatus sets.
Examine the records for the gas detection equipment and the test
records (HC and H
2
S) in LEL (lower explosive limit) and PPM.
Ensure that there adequate and sufficient PPE for the crews.
Confirm that the permit-to-work system is enforced (API RP 54 section
20.1.1)
Drilling safety:
o Check the handrails and toe boards for damage (API RP 54 section
9.3.18)
o Examine all the grating and escape routes for damage and blockages.
o Inspect all the muster points, emergency showers and eyewash
stations.
o Verify that the grinders and welding equipment are fit for purpose
(API RP 54 section 20.4)
o Ensure that the V-door has secure protection when it is not in use.
(*)

05 Safety equipment

329

Figure 1
Two fire pumps located in
the same area: this is not
recommended.
Furthermore, these fire
pumps were installed next
to the fuel purifier!

Figure 2
The fire main piping has been 'repaired'
on the outside with a patch.

Figure 3
Sprinkler deluge system
was isolated because of
the leaks in the
accommodation. The leaks
must be fixed and the
system returned to
operation.
05 Safety equipment

330

Figure 4
The foam and fire pump
could not even reach the
middle of the helideck.

Figure 5
This is the pump output
that's required!

Figure 6
Ultraviolet fire sensor has
been covered with a rig
glove. A critical safety
system has been
disarmed.

05 Safety equipment

331

Figure 7
Portable fire extinguisher
in poor condition: a danger
to the crew. As soon as a
portable fire extinguisher
is 'energized' it becomes a
pressure vessel!

Figure 8
Leaving a portable fire
extinguisher standing on
the steel deck will not only
cause corrosion on the
deck, but corrosion will
also set in on the bottom
of the fire extinguisher.
This fire extinguisher
might explode when it is
energized.

Figure 9
A brand new fire
extinguisher still wrapped
in plastic, but the pressure
inside is already below the
set limit.
05 Safety equipment

332

Figure 10
Portable fire extinguishers
in very poor condition:
corrosion has taken hold
and the hoses have
deteriorated.

05 Safety equipment

333

Figure 11
The use of non-transparent
covers will help to preserve the
portable fire extinguishers in a
hostile environment.

Figure 12
The best solution: stainless-
steel or fibreglass cabinets in
which to store the portable fire
extinguishers. There is also a
clear sign indicating the correct
way to use this portable
extinguisher.
05 Safety equipment

334

Figure 13
What part of this did we
not understand? Why not
make a professional job of
this and place the
extinguisher in the original
storage bracket.

Figure 14
Fire station in highly
corroded condition. The
hand wheel is no longer
connected to the valve
stem.

Figure 15
Fire hose station in poor
condition.

05 Safety equipment

335

Figure 16
Fire-fighting station very poorly
maintained.

Figure 17
Broken smoke detector.

Figure 18
Fire-fighting equipment
storage lockers on a land
rig: a good design and well
maintained.
05 Safety equipment

336

Figure 19
Fire-fighting equipment on a jack-up
MODU: stored in a neat and tidy way.

Figure 20
A CO
2
system, but the
markings on the gauge can
no longer be read.

05 Safety equipment

337

Figure 21
A portable CO
2
cylinder. In
the event of fire the
frangible bulb will break
and release CO
2
. This is
not very safe for personnel
working in the vicinity.

Figure 22
A portable foam fire-
fighting system for use on
a land rig.
05 Safety equipment

338

Figure 23
A windsock (or what is left of
it) on the helideck.

Figure 24
An unacceptable method of
end-termination: wire knotted
through a chain! Only
approved hook terminations
are acceptable.

05 Safety equipment

339

Figure 25
Another very dangerous
practice is to weld a chain
to create an 'eye'.

Figure 26
These rig-made slings are
in very poor condition.

Figure 27
Old drill line has been
spliced and used as a
hang-off line for the
travelling block. The large
nut has been illegally
welded onto the derrick
member.
05 Safety equipment

340

Figure 28
Braided slings of very poor
quality and still in use!

Figure 29
Rig-made lifting eyes of a
very poor standard. Only
certified lifting devices are
acceptable.

Figure 30
A rig-made lifting tool to
lift the ram blocks.

05 Safety equipment

341

Figure 31
Old-fashioned hooks in use
for lifting casing. These
hooks should be banned;
only slings must be used.

Figure 32
Rig-made 'work platforms'
like these should not be
used.
05 Safety equipment

342

Figure 33
Chain hoist with a severely
deformed hook (the hook
has probably been over-
stressed). Furthermore,
the safety latch is missing.

Figure 34
A home-made lifting sub
for the drill pipe. The use
of this 'lifting sub' could
easily cause a fatality on
the drill floor.

Figure 35
A collection of rig-made
lifting caps.

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Figure 36
These flame-cut pad eyes
were still in use, despite
having been painted red to
indicate that they had
been condemned.

Figure 37
Flame-modified pad eye.
Due to the lack of material
this pad eye has been
weakened sixteen-fold.
The green paint indicating
that this is a 'safe' pad-eye
is still fresh though.

Figure 38
The missing section will
reduce the strength of this
pad eye. The pad eye must
be removed immediately.
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Figure 39
It is not acceptable to weld
a roller onto the high-
pressure mud standpipe
going into the derrick.

Figure 40
The fuel transfer pump on
this land rig did not have
any covers. A ground lead
must be present next to
the diesel tanks for
connection to the fuel
delivery truck.

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Figure 41
A well-worn grinding wheel
with too big a gap between
the wheel and the rest. A
grinding wheel as severely
worn as this one can
shatter into a thousand
pieces.

Figure 42
A near miss! Luckily the
operator was wearing
gloves; otherwise it could
have been his fingers.

Figure 43
Welding equipment in very
poor condition.
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Figure 44
Neither Jubilee clips nor
locking wire should be
used to secure the hoses
onto the cutting torch.

Figure 45
There was no flame
arrester fitted on this
oxygen bottle.

Figure 46
Flame arresters correctly installed on
the acetylene and oxygen bottles.
However, clips of the correct type
have not been used to secure the
hoses.

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Figure 47
The acetylene bottles
should be stored at least
10 feet away from the
oxygen bottles, or be
separated by an A-60 wall.
An A-60 wall is considered
to be fire-resistant for
sixty minutes.

Figure 48
A three-rail gate (either
hinged or sliding) must be
installed across the V-door
to prevent personnel from
falling through according
to API RP 54.

Figure 49
A garden hose in use as a sight-glass
for a fuel tank is a potential fire and
environmental hazard.
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Figure 50
A self-closing valve
installed on the fuel tank
for the emergency
generator. However, this
valve remains in the OPEN
position thanks to the
unauthorized tie-wrap.

Figure 51
Fork-lift truck with home-
made stretched forks.

Figure 52
Stairways are escape routes and
should be kept in good condition. Can
you see the twist in the steps halfway
down?

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Figure 53
It is easy to trip and fall
over loose grating on top of
the mud tanks. Openings in
the grating are tripping
hazards too. There was a
real-life incident where a rig
worker stepped onto an
unsecured grating, fell into
the mud pit and drowned.

Figure 54
Electrical conduit running
inside the mud tanks. The
electrical conduit must be
removed and routed outside
the mud tanks.

Figure 55
The floor in this kitchen does not
satisfy the required hygiene
standards.
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Figure 56
Fresh water? The hot
water turned red.

Figure 57
Fresh water? The cold
water turned green.

Figure 58
Bugs swimming in the
eyewash station.

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Figure 59
Eyewash station. Would
you rinse your eyes with
this filthy water?

Figure 60
Good, clean accommodation facilities
raise crew morale.

Figure 61
No, tank you!
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Figure 62
Good housekeeping in the
rig workshops.

Figure 63
The electrical control room
(SCR room) is not a
storage space.

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Figure 64
This is what the SCR and
switchgear rooms should
look like.

Figure 65
Harness? What harness? I
am a supervisor (look at
my very clean coverall) so
I don't need a harness!

Figure 66
Rig evacuation equipment
must be maintained to the
highest standards. Make
sure that the lifeboat
embarkation areas are well
lit.
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Figure 67
Poor organisation of
painting materials. Paint
must be stored in
designated paint stores,
which are normally
protected with a fixed CO
2

fire-fighting system.

Figure 68
Poor lifting practices.
Special lifting frames must
be available for lifting the
acetylene and oxygen
bottles.

Figure 69
Remove it from the food
store!

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Figure 70
If I do the drilling, will you
hold on to the bucket?

Figure 71
H
2
S? What is that? How
can we train people to be
safe if we ignore safety
ourselves?

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2 Pollution control
2.1 Pollution control checklist
Verify the presence of a valid International Oil Pollution Prevention
certificate (IOPP) (applicable to MODUs only).
Test the operation of the oil/water separator and the contents of the oil
discharge (max. 30 to 40 ppm).
Confirm that the rig has a zero-discharge policy.
Validate that the shale shaker dump valves are isolated.
Check if the mud pit dump valves are isolated.
Verify that there is an oil spill plan in place.
Confirm that sufficient equipment is available to handle small oil spills.
Test the sewage unit to see if it is operational.
Make certain a waste separation plan is available.
Ensure that no CFCs are used in the refrigerating plants.
Confirm that Halon is not used as a fire-fighting agent.
Verify that there are adequate facilities to store waste oil.
Ensure there is no direct-overboard dumping of sludge, bilge, dirty oil
and bilge water from the colleting tanks.
Ascertain that there is a cuttings disposal system in place.
Make sure the mousehole drains are connected to a collection tank.
Verify that all the mud pump room drains are connected to a collection
tank.
Confirm that there is no asbestos material present in the accommodation
or work areas. If yes, post warning notices.
Inspect the housekeeping and hydraulic-oil spills around the rig.
Check the garbage management plan (as per MARPOL). (*)

Figure 72
A drip pan underneath the
rotary table is a must
when taking pollution
control seriously.

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Figure 73
Poor pollution control:
chemicals are coming into
contact with the water and
polluting the soil. This is
called a waste pit!

Figure 74
Poor housekeeping also
has a dire effect on
pollution control. Engine oil
leaking onto the ground
and penetrating the soil.
One litre of oil or fuel can
contaminate one million
litres of fresh ground
water.

Figure 75
Poor housekeeping. There
was oil-based mud all over
this rig site.
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Figure 76
Leaking engine. There was
no drip pan installed
underneath.

Figure 77
There should be an alarm
and auto shut-off installed
on the outlet from the
purifier should it lose its
'seal'.

Figure 78
This drain in the mud
pump room went straight
into the ocean.

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Figure 79
Poor pollution control in
the cellar of this land rig.

Figure 80
This fuel tank overflow
should have a copper
gauze fitted, and a save-all
to contain small fuel spills.

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Chapter 06
Marine equipment
1 Jacking systems.................................................................... 362
2 Associated systems for jacking................................................ 366
3 The jack-up operation............................................................ 368
4 Jacking points to consider....................................................... 369
5 General equipment ................................................................ 383

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1 Jacking systems

Figure 1
1.1 I ntroduction
The principle means of jacking a rig include the following:
rack and pinion drive
hydraulic continuous recycling
The jacking system on the majority of drilling jackups is usually the rack-
and-pinion type. This system comprises of a number of electrically driven
rack-and-pinion-type jacking assemblies. For example, the rig may support
six jacking units per chord per leg which are housed inside each of the
jackhouse structures.
Each of the jacking pinions is independently driven by an electric motor via a
reduction gearbox which engages with the leg tooth racks of each leg. An
example of this is shown in Figure 2. This illustration indicates two
assemblies. Operationally each of the three chords has three on each side of
the rack-and-pinion tooth rack (total per chord six) with a further six on
each of the chords.
The jacking system is designed to operate in tandem capable of lifting or
lowering the hull. The jacking movement is guided by the upper and lower
guides, which form part of the jackhouse and hull structure.

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Figure 2 - Jackhouse indicating the electric drive motors and
gearbox assemblies on one chord.
1.2 System description
The jack-up operates with a rack and pinion type system, having saw tooth-
type racks, which are engaged by a number of synchronized, slow-turning
pinions. The pinions are driven through a system of reduction gears by
electric motors.
The motors are provided with a fail-safe spring-loaded brake system which
engages automatically when the power is cut. The brake is only released
when the motor is operational. When elevated, the hull can be supported by
the brake system, but it is usual to employ a ratchet chock-type assembly to
lock each rack-and-pinion chord to the structure, thereby reducing the
braking load.
The electrically driven rack-and-pinion jacking assemblies comprise the
following components:
main pinion shaft and drive pinion and reduction gearbox
electric brake motor
leg gear rack
1.2.1 Pinion shaft and drive pinion and reduction gearbox
A typical reduction gearbox usually consists of a three-stage planetary gear
train integrated with a three-stage spur gear. The reduction gearbox is fully
enclosed, splash-lubricated and cooled by natural convection.
The gearboxes are fitted as right- or left-hand units, depending on their
application on the leg rack and jackhouse. The main drive pinion which
engages with the leg racks is made of heat-treated, forged alloy steel. The
pinion drive is coupled via splines into the reduction gearbox and supported
on bearings at both ends of the pinion.
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Figure 3 - Jacking gearbox and motor.
1.2.2 Jacking electric brake/motor and jacking control
On most rigs each of the drive induction motors are designed for direct on
line starting. The motors are totally enclosed with exhaust fan cooling
installed on the shaft between the motor and the brake.
The brake motors drives their respective reduction gearbox through a
flexible coupling. An electro-magnetic disc brake of fail-safe design at the
non-drive end of the motor provides the brake holding force.
The jacking brake is integral to the motor. It is a spring-applied failsafe
brake with a self-adjusting mechanism for the disc wear. Modern jacking
control system can comprise of individual variable-speed drive (VSD)
controlled motors with the motors controlled from a VSD panel.
1.2.3 Leg racks
The jack-up has a trussed leg structure defined as a triangularly-shaped leg.
Cross-bracing extends between adjacent column members and includes
horizontal brace members with diagonal brace members extending between
adjacent pairs of horizontal brace members. The leg structure has an
elongated rack carried on the column members to provide jacking of the leg.
The rack comprises of a set of rack teeth extending along each edge for
meshed engagement with pinions on their respective jacking unit.
1.2.4 The central control cabinet and console
On modern jackups the central control cabinet the PLC system controls all
logical operations, except the closed loop controls for the motors. The PLC is
designed for the communication hardware to accommodate remote I/O and
the HMI system.
1.2.5 The central control console
The system is controlled at the central control console by the rig mover/
operator with all main functions controlled and monitored by push-buttons,
and indication lamps. In the event of an alarm or a warning, a message will
appear on one of the screens.

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1.2.6 Brake operation
Each jacking unit is equipped with a fail-safe brake. The brakes are spring-
applied and electromagnetically released.
1.2.7 Fixation system
Drilling rigs are equipped with fixation systems. The purpose of these
systems is to establish a rigid connection between the platform hull and the
platform legs. The fixation systems are used during towing and dry transport
and when the platform is elevated at its working height. The fixation
systems are capable of accepting the leg loading due to axial leg load and
leg bending moment.
Important criteria required for an efficient locking device should include:
The positive restraint of leg for both movement and moment transfer.
Adjustability to engage the leg in any position at elevations which may
vary from leg to leg and chord to chord.
The engaging mechanism should be capable of positioning the locking
element in positive engagement with the rack and holding it in position
for a period of time during adverse conditions without relying on outside
power sources.

Figure 4 - Fixation disengaged. Figure 5 - Fixation engaged.

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2 Associated systems for jacking
2.1 Seawater System
The rig is provided with a predetermined number of submersible, multi-stage
seawater pumps, with the pumps located on one of the legs. However, the
positioning of the submersible pumps is dependant on the rig design. When
in service, the raw-water pumps provide seawater at a sufficient capacity to
supply all users when the rig is jacked up and operational.
During the jacking-transition stage a lower capacity multi-stage seawater
submersible pump is utilized. The pump is often deployed from a deck
mounted winch with the seawater discharged to a buffer tank. The buffer
tank is capable of supplying the jack-up utilities. When the rig is jacked
down with the hull floating in the sea (transit), the seawater is taken from
the sea chests to supply the jack-up utilities.
Seawater system: points to identify
The port and starboard manifold seawater system strainers condition
should be inspected.
The buffer tank must be periodically checked for any indication of marine
growth.

Figure 6 Seawater system (PFD).
2.2 Leg j etting operation
Use of the jetting system is not invariably necessary to free the legs which
do not immediately come clear of the seabed. The use of the jack-up's
reserve buoyancy, particularly when a low swell is present, may be effective.
Therefore, it may be necessary to use the reserve buoyancy to attempt to
free the legs before resorting to jetting.
If the decision is to utilize the jetting system, the jack-up should be lowered
until there is a significant uplift on all the footings. The leg jetting system is

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connected to the seawater system and should be connected to all legs
simultaneously.
If the jack-up has been on location for an extended period of time it maybe
found that mud has blocked the jets. It may become necessary to clear
them with a higher pressure than the seawater pumps can deliver.
Indication of a spud can freeing itself from the seabed is indicated by
bubbles appearing on the surface. Jetting must be stopped when the leg
starts moving.

Figure 7 - Typical spud can geometry and skirting arrangement.

Figure 8 - Typical spud can arrangement.
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3 The jack-up operation
Prior to any jacking approach a number of factors are considered they can
include the sea conditions, weather window for jacking and a Site-Specific
Assessment (SSA), for instance soil analysis, to ensure the leg footings will
be maintained in a secure position.
Preloading
The aim of preloading/predriving is to proof-load the soils so that when
subjected to the design storm conditions, the load envelope remains within
the failure surface, and that settlements are minimal and acceptable. While
the preloading operation is a controlled soil failure which provides a test and
measure of the capacity of the soil under vertical loading conditions, the
foundations will be subjected to combined loading during storm conditions.
On establishing the footings the rig is elevated to a safe air gap above the
maximum wave height. Preloading takes place by filling the pre-load tanks
with seawater. This weight enables a simulation of the working load of the
rig and to ensure the leg settlement is maximised.
During the predetermined period of preload careful monitoring of the rig's
orientation is observed. Any sudden movements the preload is immediately
removed and the jacking preloading stopped until a full appraisal has been
carried out.
3.1 Foundation failure while predriving
Punch-through and its effects
After an initial set-down of the legs on the seabed and the loading of the
legs, unless founded on very hard clay or sand, the spud cans penetrate the
surface soil. Penetration will continue whilst the preloading operation is
ongoing until equilibrium is reached between the capacity of the soil and the
forcing load.
For example, penetration depths in sand are small, but those in soft clays
(such as the Mississippi delta) penetration depths as much as 55 metres
have been recorded.
A punch-through within soft soils will continue until the required resistance is
developed at a greater depth. If the distance through which the spud can/leg
travel is significant, then damage may be caused to the leg. Foundation
failure under any one leg while pre-driving will immediately result in the
loads being taken up by all the remaining legs.
The effects of an unexpected punch-through, which will occur if two of the
legs punch through, may be very severe, resulting in the tilting of the jack-
up and the possible damage to the legs. Since the tilt will cause additional
out-of-balance moments, this will lead to an increase in spud can loading
and hence further punch-through deformation. Punch-through may arise due
to any of the following conditions:
presence of a hard-clay crust over softer soils which may stay uniformly
soft or decrease with depth
existence of sand over soft clay strata
founding in a clay stratum which decreases in strength with depth
firm clay with sand or silt pockets
very soft clay where capacity increase rate does not match the loading
rate

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4 Jacking points to consider
4.1 Rack phase difference
To ensure unnecessary stresses are not induced into the leg bracings and
the possibility of stress fatigue, the rack phase difference (RPD) is to be
considered.
RPD is the difference in elevations between the rack teeth of the chords of
any one leg with the underlying causes of RPD related to moments and
shear forces passing through the leg/hull connection, such forces being
induced by environmental loads or foundation loads. Shear and moment
loads applied to the spud can are resisted at the leg/hull connection and may
give rise to significant RPD.
RPD may be used as a measure of the inclination of the leg relative to the
jack-up hull and, in turn, maybe used to estimate the leg loads (shear and
bending). The primary reason for measuring RPD is to ensure that the leg
braces are operating within their design limits. Monitoring the RPD during
jacking operations can give an early indication of possible leg overstress.
4.1.1 Causes of RPD
The scenarios that may lead to such spud can loads include:
Eccentricity of leg vertical reaction caused by the uneven ground
conditions e.g. sloping seabed, previous footprints, and scour. The
amount of eccentricity can be affected by hard soil conditions and the
shape of the spud can. It is recommended if a non level seabed is
identified by the site survey, the jack-up should, if possible, be relocated
to avoid a sloping seabed profile.
Sliding of leg (relative to the others), especially into footprints.
The following aspects should be noted:
A difference in rack phase between adjacent chords causes the bracing
members in that leg face to become stressed
The RPV measurements contains valuable information on the direction of
leg bending, and the RPD calculation on the hardware screen on the
jacking display should also be capable of showing this.
During jacking operations, it is useful to monitor the direction of leg
inclination, particularly if the RPD is approaching a safe limiting value
and corrective action is contemplated.

Figure 9
Manual measuring of the RPV.
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Figure 10 - Measurement of RPD (and plane of leg bending).
4.2 Scouring
Scouring is defined as the removal of seabed soils by currents and waves.
This can be caused by a natural geological process or by structural
components interrupting the natural flow above the seafloor. Scouring is
described as follows:
overall scouring which would occur even if no jack-up were there
global scouring representing a general scouring caused by the water flow
through the base of the jack-up
local scouring representing the local cone of depression formed by the
increased local flow around an obstruction (such as a pile or spud can)
4.2.1 Effects on foundations
Scouring may:
partially remove the soil from below the footings which will result in the
reduction of bearing capacity and any seabed fixity
cause a rapid movement of the leg downward during the storm and
affect the foundation severely, especially when there is a potential of
punch-through at the location

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4.2.2 Reducing the scouring effect
Once investigations have been carried out and appropriate studies have
predicted scour as being a potential problem, the following measures could
be implemented:
gravel dumping prior to jack-up installation
installation of artificial seaweed and the use of stone/gravel dumping,
gravel bags or grout mattresses after jack-up installation to reduce the
current velocity
regular monitoring the actual condition of the spud can
validity of the preloading operation should be reappraised if significant
scouring (say more than 1 metre) is encountered
deeper spud can initial penetration using jetting method if needed
using spud can with relatively flat profile in susceptible area
removing the spud can and cleaning the seabed if necessary
4.3 Motor torques and removal of chocks
A considerable number of rack and pinion jacking systems require that the
motor torque on each jacking motor be checked and equalized prior to using
the system. At the same time it should be ensured that each brake is in
good condition and releases properly. This should be done after the drilling
package has been skidded in and the platform's variables have been moved
or consolidated in preparation for the move. Torque results should be logged
in the move report.
If rack chocks, wedges or shims have to be removed, this may be done at
the same time. Full instructions will be found in the unit's operations manual
and jacking system manual.
If a long delay, such as waiting on weather, occurs after this has been
carried out, it will be necessary to ensure that torques remain equalised.
This may be done as described above, by operating the jacking system at
regular intervals.
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4.4 J acking systems checklist
Record the maximum and minimum water depth.
Check the condition of the jacking motors.
Are spare jacking motors available?
Look for leaking seals on the jacking gear housings.
Examine the condition of the jacking sprockets.
Record the type of legs used: K-type, inverted-K-type or X-type legs.
Verify the condition of the legs bracings and cross members.
Confirm the condition of the leg shock absorbers (dry tow!).
Check the leg zinc anode condition.
Inspect the condition of the spud cans and record the last inspection
date.
Is it possible to check the spud cans on location or is a dry dock needed?
Check the dump valves, injection system and spud cans.
Examine the condition of the pre-load tanks (anodes).
Inspect the condition of the pre-load tank dump valves.
Verify the condition of the seawater system.
Test the condition of the water tower for the deep-well pumps.
Record the number of deep-well pumps available and their capacity.
Check the condition of the leg load monitoring systems.
Examine the condition of inclination instrumentation and alarms.
Inspect the condition of any resistor banks, which absorb energy when
jacking down.
Verify the condition of the skidding system(s). (*)

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Figure 11
This was a relatively new
rig, but look at the severe
damage on the teeth. This
was a result of using
substandard steel.

Figure 12
Teeth worn as a result of
age.

Figure 13
Another worn drive
sprocket.
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Figure 14
Welding repairs in progress
on the sprocket.

Figure 15
Jacking system gearbox:
the case was leaking.

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Figure 16
The round-leg type of
jacking system.

Figure 17
Untidy arrangement of the
hydraulic hoses for the
cantilever skidding
system.
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Figure 18
Severe corrosion on the
hydraulic system for the
cantilever control unit.

Figure 19
Electric-powered skidding
system for the cantilever.

Figure 20
Deep scoring on the
beams of the skidding
system.

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Figure 21
A good way to protect the
skidding beams on a jack-
up from everyday damage
while the cantilever is
extended. This will also
prevent the grease from the
beams being spread all over
the rig.

Figure 22
legs.
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Figure 23
Deep corrosion on the cross
member of the leg.

Figure 24
More deep corrosion on the
leg. The zinc anode did not
prevent this.

Figure 25
cross member of the leg.

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Figure 26
New zinc anodes installed
on the legs.

Figure 27
Spud can inspection; some
rigs can do this on location
and do not need to be dry
docked.
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Figure 28
Inspection of the interior
of the spud can. Notice the
worn zinc anodes.

Figure 29
The eductor system for the
spud cans.

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Figure 30
The three spud can-jetting
lines connected to the mud
pump system. The relief
valve prevents
overpressuring the system.

Figure 31
The remote-operated pre-
load valve for the spud can.
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Figure 32 - Different bracing systems for the legs.

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5 General equipment

Figure 33
The major feature of an
offshore rig: helidecks made
of steel, aluminium or other
non-combustible materials
are to be constructed to the
satisfaction of the
administration and should be
at least the A-0 Class, as
identified in MODU Code. The
administration may accept an
air gap of maximally 1 metre
between the deckhouse top
and the underside of the
helicopter deck as an
alternative to the A-0
requirement. Deck house
tops directly below helicopter
should have no openings
(MODU Code section 1.3.18).

Figure 34
Check the fixed fire
protection system installed
for the helifuel tanks (MODU
Code section 9.11.9). Is it
possible to terminate fuel
transfer from a position on
the helideck in close
proximity to the helideck or
its access?
Further, No Smoking signs
should be displayed at
appropriate locations.
Check the minimum amount
of fuel available at any time,
check fuel records (should be
at least for one flight
ashore).
The fuel storage area should
be provided with
arrangements whereby fuel
spillage may be collected and
drained to a safe location.
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Figure 35
Check that all fire-fighting
equipment requirements are
in accordance with the
regulations.
Check the low-expansion
foam system which should be
capable of delivering water
and foam solution at 6 litres
per minute for each square
meter of the area contained
within a circle of diameter D.

Figure 36
Fire equipment rescue
box.
Check that there is a fully
equipped helicopter rescue
box readily available
comprising at least of an
aircraft-type axe, a large
axe, a heavy-duty hacksaw
with blade, two spare
hacksaw blades, a grab hook,
a quick-release knife, a
crowbar, and a pair of 24-
inch bolt croppers (see CAP
437 section 5.6).

Figure 37 - Bilge system.
Check the layout of the bilge
system for potentially
dangerous situations. Are all
hull compartments fitted with
bilge wells? Test the pumps
and/or the bilge ejector on
good working conditions.

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Figure 38 - OWS.
Pollution control is of the
utmost priority.

Figure 39
Fixed fire- fighting
system.
All spaces containing internal
combustion machinery above
750 kW should be provided
with either: a gas
extinguishing system, a fixed
foam-extinguishing system or
a water-spraying
extinguishing system. Check
if every space containing an
internal combustion engine is
equipped with such a system
(SOLAS II-2 reg. 7.2.1,
1974, 1997 and 2001
editions).

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Figure 40 - Fire fighting.
Check that the fire pumps
fitted in remote unmanned
areas are fitted with local
and remote start/stop and
that the valves are remote-
and local-controllable
Check that both pumps are
installed in separate
compartments so any fire in
one of the areas does not
disable the other pump
Check that both pumps are
installed in separate
compartments so any fire in
one of the areas does not
disable the other pump

Figure 41 - Tank vents.
Verify that ball is free to
move, is intact, and free of
cracks (Class and Load Line
reg. 20). Height and
construction of vents and
ventilators to be verified.
Pay attention to
unauthorized modifications
(Load Line Reg. 19
Ventilators and 20 Air
Pipes).

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Figure 42
Watertight doors.
The hatches and other
watertight closing devices
should be fitted with a sign
stating Keep Closed When
Afloat. All openings in the
watertight compartments
must be fitted with
watertight hatches and
positive-securing devices.

Figure 43
Fireman's suits.
Check that fireman's outfits
are stored in suitable
containers with instructions
on the lid. The boxes will be
located in pairs with one
pair readily accessible from
the helideck (MODU Code
section 9.9.1). Contents:
a protective outfit
including gloves, boots, a
face mask or hood and a
helmet
a self-contained BA set
a portable battery-
operated safety lamp
capable of functioning
efficiently for a period of
not less than three hours
a fireman's axe which
should have a blade and a
spike on the reverse side
(SOLAS Reg 17.1.1)
06 Marine Equipment

388

07 Well control equipment

389

Chapter 07
Well control equipment
1 Introduction to ram-type preventers ........................................ 390
2 Ram preventers .................................................................... 398
3 Introduction to annular preventers........................................... 413
4 Annular preventers................................................................ 421
5 Gate valves .......................................................................... 428
6 Introduction to the choke and kill manifold................................ 432
7 Choke and kill manifold .......................................................... 440
8 Introduction to the BOP HPU................................................... 455
9 BOP HPU.............................................................................. 469


390

1 Introduction to ram-type preventers

Figure 1 - The Cameron type U ram preventer is the ram BOP most
used for surface BOPs.
Ram-type preventers close the annular space outside a string of pipe in a
well, by moving rams from a retracted position clear of the bore, into a
position where they close around the pipe.
Rams operate in pairs and seal the space below and beside them when they
are closed. Pipe rams have semicircular openings that match the diameter of
the pipe for which they are designed.
Note: Pipe rams can only hold pressure from the bottom, not from the top!
It is absolutely vital that the pipe rams in a preventer fit the OD of the drill
pipe, casing or tubing that is in use. If more than one size of pipe is in use,
ram-type preventers of different sizes are required in the BOP stack in order
to have all the sizes of rams available for immediate use.
When a tapered string is used, the installation of variable-bore rams (VBRs)
or flexible packers (Cameron FlexPacker only) is carried out by most opera-
tors.

Figure 2 - Cameron rams for different applications.


391

1.1 The operation of the rams
Blocks of steel push into the well bore around the drill pipe, forced by
hydraulic cylinders. Elastomer seals installed in the ram blocks are made of
nitrile, and form a seal between the ram blocks, the drill pipe and the
preventer body to isolate the annulus of the well. The principle behind this
method is that the elastomers made of nitrile (rubber) cannot be
compressed, and will extrude into voids when (mechanical) compression
forces are applied. The internal pressures inside the rubber exceed the
working pressures of the rams.

Figure 3
Cameron 350 Packer lip-plated
design showing the upper and lower
extrusion plates.
Figure 4
Extrusion plates control the rubber
extrusion and apply forces to the
packing rubber to extrude it into any
gaps in the cavities and around the
drill pipes. Rams seal in cavities,
around pipes and against themselves
(Cameron rams).
1.2 Hydraulic operators
Hydraulic operators normally use 1,500 psi of operating pressure to close
and open the preventers. The operating chambers are rated to 3,000 psi.
Cameron rams must be closed with a minimum of 1,500 psi to get a good
seal around the drill pipe.
After the rams are fully closed and the 1,500-psi closing pressure is reached,
the rams can be locked by the manual locking devices located on the aft side
of the bonnets. The rams are only locked before shearing operations, when
the drill pipe needs to be hung off. Shearing operations do not happen often
with surface BOPs.

Figure 5
Cameron blind-shear ram in the OPEN
position.
Figure 6
Cameron blind-shear ram in the
CLOSE position.

392

Cameron bonnets have a very complicated system, which allows the bonnets
to be opened and closed hydraulically.

Figure 7
Close pressure will start to
move the main piston as
well as the ram-change
piston; the bonnet will
open.
Figure 8
The ram piston and the
bonnet are moving
simultaneously.
Figure 9
The ram piston is in the CLOSE
position and the bonnet is fully
open.

Figure 10
Opening pressure will start to
move the main piston as well
as the ram-change piston; the
bonnet will close.
Figure 11
The ram piston and the
bonnet are moving
simultaneously.
Figure 12
The ram piston is in the
OPEN position and the
bonnet is closed; the
opening pressure will press
the bonnet tightly against
the ram body.
All the ram preventers are wellbore assist. The wellbore pressure will
support the closed ram blocks. The rams are not sealing at the bottom of
the cavity. Allow wellbore pressure to get behind the ram blocks providing
significant support. As a result of this, the wellbore pressure should always
be bled off completely after a pressure test before the rams are opened.
A good practice is to first open the gate valves located in the choke and kill
lines. The total pressurized area of the bore of the rams is much larger,
more than twenty times larger (for 13-inch ram BOPs), than the
pressurized area of the gate valves.
Opening the ram blocks even with 'low pressure' underneath them can
create cracks on the piston hubs, and can deform the aft side of the ram
blocks. Opening the rams with wellbore pressure using 1,500 psi of opening
pressure might blow the ram rubbers from the ram block. Opening the rams
with wellbore pressure of 3,000 psi might shear the ram shaft attachment
(hub) with the ram blocks.
Calculate the force on the ram blocks of a 13-inch BOP when there is just
500 psi left, and see how much force there is still left on the ram blocks.
Next, calculate the force on the 13-inch BOP when the rams are pressure
tested to 10,000 psi. If you check your calculator, you will now realise how
important it is to STAY AWAY from the BOPs during pressure testing.


393

1.3 Types of rams
The following different ram-type preventers are available:
Ram block types: Closing on:
Fixed pipe and casing rams Pipe of one specific size
Blind rams Open hole, no pipe in the hole
Shear-blind rams Close, open hole or cut drill pipe
Shear rams - Casing shear or Super
shear
Can only shear pipe - do not seal
open hole
Variable-bore rams Seal on any pipe size within its range
Flexible-bore rams Seal on a range of pipe sizes (two to
four specific pipe sizes only)

Figure 13 - Cameron VBRs.

Figure 14 - Cameron FlexPacker.
1.4 Variable- bore packers
Advantage:
1. The VBR will seal on any size of pipe within its range.
Disadvantages:
1. Limited hang-off capacity in the lower range of the VBRs.
2. Expensive packers.
3. Special ram blocks are required.
4. Not suitable for use with high-temperature mud.
1.5 FlexPackers
Advantages:
1. FlexPackers will seal on three of four pipe sizes.
2. FlexPackers fit into a standard set of fixed pipe ram blocks.
3. Slightly better hang-off capacity than VBRs.
Disadvantages:

394

1. Limited hang-off capacity compared to fixed pipe rams.
2. The FlexPackers does not seal any size of pipe within its range.
3. Expensive packers.
4. Not suitable for use with high-temperature mud.
1.6 Shear blind rams
The shear blind rams are designed to cut drill pipe and leave a seal after the
pipe has been cut. The shear rams can only shear drill pipe, not tool joints,
heavy-weight drill pipe or drill collars. The blade seal should seal the annulus
after the pipe has been sheared.
The side packers are especially designed for LEFT and RIGHT, and should be
installed accordingly. The side packers will be clearly marked as to whether
they are for the left or the right side.
However, on the new Cameron DS shear blind rams, the blade seals
necessary to seal off the annulus, are comprised of two blades which CAN be
installed wrongly. The blades should slide in easily when installed the right
way up, but can be forced in with a sledgehammer (!) when they are the
wrong way up. The result of this will be that the DS shear blind rams will
only hold pressure for two or three tests!

Figure 15
Different types
of Cameron
shear blind
rams.
To improve the shear force, either large bore bonnets or booster cylinders
can be installed.
Figure 16
Modern
Cameron TL
with different
styles of
locking
systems and
bonnets.


395

1.7 Shearing procedure:
To successfully shear a drill pipe, hang-off the drill string first. The reasons
for doing so are as follows:
1. To be absolutely sure where the tool joint is located.
2. To be absolutely sure that there is no movement of the drill string.
3. So that the drill string does not drop into the well.
4. To centralize the drill string.
5. To allow a pull of up to approximately 10,000 lbs on the drill string. This
tension on the drill string will considerably improve the shearing
capacity.
Note: The shear rams can only shear drill pipe, not tool joints, heavy-weight
drill pipe or drill collars! Frequently, it will be difficult enough to shear the
newer and stronger drill pipes.
1.7.1 Procedure for hanging-off/shearing pipe:
1. Check the space out. Make sure the middle of the drill pipe is located in
the hang-off rams. (Try to avoid using VBRs for the hanging-off rams.)
2. Close the rams with low pressure (300-500 psi maximum).
3. As soon as the rams are closed, lower the drill pipe until a small weight
loss is noted. Check out your space again!
4. Increase the ram closing pressure to 1,500 psi minimum.
5. Lock the rams either manually or remotely (if the BOP is equipped with
a remote-operated locking system).
6. Open up the by-pass valve or use the high-pressure shear function -
both systems will apply 3,000 psi to the bonnets of the shear blind
rams.
7. Pull on the drill string with approximately 10,000 lbs.
8. Close the shear rams and keep your fingers crossed.
Note: There should be sufficient distance between the stick-up tool joint and
the bottom of the shear rams, so as to not try and cut the tool joint. On
most rigs the LPR (lower pipe ram) will be the hang-off ram.

Figure 17 - Cameron DS shear blind rams.
Take note that you have to turn the ram blocks upside down prior to
installing the blade seals, which have Left and Right stamped on them.

396

Figure 18 - Clearance ram block cavity.
Clearances between the top of the cavity and the ram blocks must be
measured frequently, as too much clearance might result in the loss of low-
pressure sealing.

Figure 19 - Schematic of a Shaffer ram-type BOP.
In this schematic of a Shaffer ram BOP it is obvious how the rubber is
pushed forward if the rams are closed. As the ram blocks do not seal at the
bottom of the cavity can, the wellbore pressure assists the rams after they
are closed, both in the upward position against the top of the cavity with the
top-seals, as well as from behind the ram blocks; pushing the ram blocks
firmly against the drill pipe. The forces also act on the bonnet seals, which
must be the same rating as the rams.


397

Figure 20 - Shaffer ram-type preventer.
Modern Shaffer BOPs of the NXT type are now commonly used as surface
BOPs.

Figure 21 - Hydril ram-type preventer.
The other major manufacturer of ram BOPs is Hydril. Hydril BOPs are
predominantly subsea BOPs.

398

2 Ram preventers
2.1 Ram preventers checklist
Record the date of the last five-yearly major service (API RP 53 section
17.10.3).
Verify that the ram BOP is suitable for H
2
S operations (NACE 0175).
Check the API certification package (API RP 53 section 17.13.2).
Test the condition of the control hoses and verify that they are fire-
resistant (API RP 53 section 12.5.2).
Inspect the NDT records for the piston hubs and bonnet bolts.
Examine the NDT records for the ram blocks and shear ram blades.
Record the cavity and ram block clearance measurements.
Verify that the rig crew understands how best to store spare parts and
increase shelve life (API RP 53 sections 6.4 and 6.5).
Ensure the BOP is suitable for HT/HP applications.
Confirm that the correct variable-bore rams are fitted.
Ascertain that the capacity of the blind/shear ram is sufficient.
Verify that there sufficient space to hang off on pipe rams and shear in a
safe manner.
Check that the condition of the elastomers is as new (API RP 53 section
19.5).
Record the date of the last test of the hydraulic circuits at 300 psi/20
bars and 3,000 psi/200 bars in order to check the integrity of the circuit
seals (API RP 53 section 18.3.2.5).
Test the condition of the (blind) flanges and their studs (API RP 53
section 17.11).
Inspect the condition of bore (key seating).
Record the date of the last pressure test to full working pressure (API RP
53 section 17.3.2).
Confirm the condition of all the hydraulic torque tools (API RP 53 section
17.11.4).
Check the ram configuration.
Verify that the ram-locking system is operational and check the date of
the last function test (API RP 53 section 17.5.8). (*)


399

Figure 22
Cameron ram-type BOPs with
bonnets open for inspection.
Ensure that the stack is
secured and all the hydraulic
lines are disconnected before
the actual maintenance can
start.

Figure 23
View through the ram cavity at
the opposite ram cavity with
the ram block still installed. A
visual inspection of ram
cavities is recommended. The
scoring at the top of the cavity
may cause problems with the
low bore pressure sealing.

Figure 24
Severely pitted BX sealing
area on the bonnet flange.

400

Figure 25
Non-Cameron-
authorized repairs.
After the bonnet bolt
threads were damaged,
a sleeve was fitted.
There is no guarantee
that this repair will
handle the bolt torque
or well bore pressures.
A new bonnet is the
only solution.

Figure 26
Typical damage found
on the ram blocks,
when the rams are
accidentally closed on a
tool joint instead of the
drill pipe.

Figure 27
Scouring at the top of
the cavity caused by
damaged ram blocks.
Like in the previous
picture, this can result
in poor sealing
capacities at low bore
pressures.


401

Figure 28
Scouring at the bottom
of the cavities is a
normal event and does
not affect the sealing
capacities of the rams
unless it increases the
upper clearance too
much.

Figure 29
The driller should be
careful when passing
the BOPs with drill bits
to prevent marks like
these in the cavities.

Figure 30
Manual locking systems
are to be properly
maintained. This lock is
corroded and bent, and
it was not possible to
lock the rams with
these locks.

402

Figure 31
Note the heat marks
around the housing for
the mechanical locking
screw. No heat or
welding must be
applied to ram BOPs.

Figure 32
Ensure that the studs
on the flanges are long
enough to pass
through the nuts.
Tremendous forces are
working on these
flanges during pressure
testing or high-
pressure kicks. The
BOP pressure rating is
only guaranteed when
all the studs, nuts and
bolts are fully fitted
and torqued.

Figure 33
Top seals 'nipped' on a
Cameron BOP, most
likely because
someone installed the
top seals with grease
underneath the top
seals.


403

Figure 34
Cracked seals must be
replaced. Sunlight and
ozone are the greatest
threats to the rubber.

Figure 35
Storing ram blocks like
this with the rubber
seals exposed to the
sunlight will cause
rapid cracking of the
rubber packers.

Figure 36
Spare ram blocks and
seals should not be
stored and covered in
petroleum-based
grease (Cameron
information sheet No.
96-002; Hydril EB 94-
001).

404

Figure 37
Shaffer ram blocks with
too little protrusion for
the top seals.

Figure 38
New variable-bore rams
from Hydril with a
hardened,
interchangeable hang-
off ring.

Figure 39
Bonnet bolts showing
excessive corrosion
during an NDT
inspection.


405

Figure 40
NDT inspection of the
ram piston hub. Cracks
are observed, most
likely caused by
opening the rams with
some bore pressure
still acting on the rams.

Figure 41
More cracked hubs.
Regular NDT
inspections should be
performed and drilling
personnel must be
advised of the damage
that can be caused if
the bore pressure is not
completely vented.

Figure 42
Piston hub with a large
section sheared off.

406

Figure 43
The same piston after
disassembly. An entire
section was sheared off
due to opening the
rams with the bore
pressure still present.

Figure 44
Worn piston hub area.
Instead of replacing
the parts, new chrome
was installed over the
corrosion. We have no
idea how much the
corrosion has reduced
the load-carrying
ability. This should
have been replaced.

Figure 45
Measuring the
clearance between the
ram block and the top
of the ram cavity, after
the ram rubbers had
been removed.


407

Figure 46
An NDT inspector checking the drill pipe
guides of the ram blocks for cracks.

Figure 47
Be careful while installing and removing the
ram blocks so as not to damage the piston
shaft or the chrome layer on the ram
change pistons. Be aware of the risk of
hand injuries. Use wood to protect these
sections and always use approved lifting
equipment.

Figure 48
Checking the ram body for flatness.

408

Figure 49
Hydril shear-blind rams
upper blade prior to
use.

Figure 50
Shear-blind rams lower
blade. Failure after
attempting to shear a
6-inch drill pipe that
was still in motion.

Figure 51
Another view of the
broken lower blade of
the shear blind ram.


409

Figure 52
Bonnet bolts not
correctly tightened on
this BOP. The rig was
just drilling away!

Figure 53
Testing Cameron BOP
hydraulic circuits can be
done with the bonnets in
the OPEN position or
CLOSE position. Ensure
the bonnets are opened
and closed with a low
operating pressure.
Verify that the test
pump certification is in
date. Be aware that the
stack can topple if the
test stump is not
designed to support the
stack with the bonnets
open.

Figure 54
Testing the ram BOPs
with a closed drill pipe is
a very dangerous
practice. The force on a
5-inch closed drill pipe
when testing a 10,000-
psi BOP is almost
200,000 lbs!

410

Figure 55
Ensure that the test
pipes for the rams are
heavy-walled and can
cope with the excessive
forces. This 3-inch
drill pipe was clearly
not strong enough.

Figure 56
The correct bolt torque
should be applied with
the correct grease and
the correct friction
coefficient. Be aware of
the risk of hand injuries
when using these tools.

Figure 57
No regulator used with
the impact gun. Bolt
torques will most likely
be much higher than
needed, resulting in
stretched and
weakened bolts. Under
pressure, the flange
could blow off.


411

Figure 58
No HCR valves were
installed on this BOP.
The outer valves must
be remotely operated
as per the API
recommendations.

Figure 59
Shaffer single-ram BOP
completely split!

Figure 60
BOP stored in the snow
in subzero conditions.

412

Figure 61
This is what can
happen if the well
'comes in' back to the
rig. Anyone has a
shovel?

Figure 62
How do we abandon
the rig now?

Figure 63
BOP in subzero
operations. Steam-
heated, but escaping
steam turns into ice.


413

3 Introduction to annular preventers
In the drilling industry, most rig crews call any annular preventer a 'Hydril'.
However, as not all cars are Toyotas we will always refer to this equipment
as 'annular preventers'. There are three major manufacturers:
Shaffer: spherical annular preventers
Hydril: annular preventers, types GK, GL, GX and MSP
Cameron: annular preventers, types D and DL.

Figure 64
Cameron DL.
Figure 65
Hydril GX.
Figure 66
Shaffer Spherical.
Annular preventers employ a ring of reinforced synthetic rubber that
functions as a packing unit, and surrounds the wellbore to create a shut-off.
In the full-open position, the inner diameter of the packing unit initially
equals the diameter of the blow out preventer bore.
A system for squeezing or packing the ring permits the operator to reduce
the diameter until it engages the pipe, tool joint, drill collar, kelly or wire line
that might be inside the preventer. Annular preventers have the ability to
create a pressure shut-off on any shape or diameter present in the hole.
Ram preventers must be equipped with rams to fit the OD of the drill pipe
inside the BOP. Annular preventers are closed by means of hydraulic
pressure, but cannot be locked mechanically like the ram preventers. In the
event of a kick, it is necessary to rapidly close in the well.
Since the annular preventer can close on any size of pipe, tool joint, etc.,
the annular preventers are normally the first blow-out preventers that are
closed. After the well has been closed in, and the exact location of the tool
joint has been determined, the correct pipe ram can then be closed.
If required, the string will be moved slightly, while the annular preventer
remains closed in order to close a pipe ram on the pipe, and not on the tool
joint. Normally, pipe rams remain closed during the remainder of the well
control operations.


414

3.1 Principle of annular preventers
Basically, all annular preventers operate in the same way. The hydraulic
closing pressure drives a piston upwards, which forces the sealing element
upwards and inwards, so as to form a seal around the pipe in the hole.

Figure 67
The annular preventer
(Hydril GL) in the OPEN
position.
Figure 68
Applying closing
pressure, the piston is
moving upwards, the
large rubber element is
in motion.
Figure 69
Completely closed, the
higher the piston can
travel the less rubber is
left on the element.
The sealing element is largely composed of a thick elastomer ring enforced
with steel fingers, to supply the elastomer with adequate strength when
closing on the wellbore pressure.

Figure 70 - Hydril annular preventer element.
Both the inner vertical section and the other section are important for the
proper sealing operations. It is normal to have small pieces of rubber
missing from the tapered inner section, and this does not affect the sealing
of the annular BOP.


415

Stripping through a closed annular BOP

Figure 71
Stripping down back to
the bottom, the tool joint
located just above the
closed annular BOP
element.
Figure 72
Tool joint inside the
element. Notice that the
extra volume (of the tool
joint) of closing fluid has
now shifted into the
stripping bottle. The N
2

bottle crimped due to the
higher pressure inside the
accumulator bottle.
Figure 73
Tool joint passed the closed
element The fluid volume of
the stripping bottle has
reached normal levels
again, the fluid shifts back
to the CLOSE chamber of
the annular BOP.
Every time a tool joint passes through the closed annular BOP element a
surge occurs, as the element is compressed by the tool joint. The annular
BOP regulator is located at least 100 feet away from the BOP. Consequently,
the annular regulator response is too slow to protect the element from
excessive wear. To solve this problem most rigs (even land-rigs!) nowadays
have installed a surge bottle.
When we install a stripping bottle we have to ensure it is installed as close
as possible to the annular preventer. Every time a tool joint passes through
the closed annular preventer, the stripping bottle will compensate for the
fluid increase to prevent too high pressure surges, which can cause rapid
wear of the annular elements
To perform stripping operations with minimum wear we should use the fol-
lowing procedure:
1. Install a 10-US-gallon surge bottle as close as possible to the annular
BOP.
2. Ensure the stripping bottle is precharged to approximate 400 psi.
3. Reduce the annular BOP closing pressure as low as possible until the
element starts to leak slightly, in order to lubricate and cool the element.
4. File off the tong marks from the tool joints.
5. Apply grease (no pipe dope as this will damage the element) onto the
tool joints.
6. Reduce the lowering of the drill pipe to approximately 1 foot per second.

416

An annular preventer can also perform a CSO (complete shut-off). This is
not a standard operation, but can be used in an emergency. The older
elements will normally suffer severely from this operation. When a CSO is
required, the maximum closing pressure must be applied. This means
3,000 psi for the Cameron annular BOPs and 1,500 psi for the Hydril and
Shaffer annular BOPs.

Figure 74 - A Shaffer annular preventer performing a CSO.


417

3.2 Hydril annular BOPs

Figure 75 - Hydril GK annular BOP in the OPEN position and
closing on the drill pipe.

Figure 76 - Hydril annular BOP closing on a square kelly and
performing a CSO.


418

Difference between Hydril GK and Hydril GL annular preventers
Most surface BOPs are equipped with a Hydril GK annular which have a
simple OPEN and CLOSE circuit.

Figure 77
Cutaway view Hydril GK preventer.
Figure 78
Hydril GK control circuit with
surge bottle.
Sometimes a Hydril GL annular is present, which has three circuits: OPEN,
CLOSE and a SECONDARY circuit. For surface BOPs the secondary chamber
is connected to the OPEN side the so-called standard hook-up. Only for
subsea applications is the secondary chamber connected to the CLOSE side,
the so-called optional hook-up.
Warning! Never leave a bull plug in the secondary chamber as this will
completely destroy the annular preventer!

Figure 79- Cutaway view Hydril GL preventer. Figure 80 - Hydril GL control
circuit with surge bottle.


419

Differences between different rubber annular preventer elements
For different applications we can choose out of three different types of
elements. In the figures below you will find the Hydril colour code and
temperature ranges for the three different types of elements. Note that
Shaffer uses different colour codes!

Figure 81
Natural rubber is
compounded for drilling
with water-based drilling
fluids at operating
temperatures between
minus 30F to plus 225F
(serial number with suffix
'NR').
Figure 82
Nitrile rubber is used with
oil-based or oil additive
drilling fluids at operating
temperatures between
minus 20F to 190F (serial
number with suffix 'NBR').
Figure 83
Neoprene rubber is used
with oil-based drilling
fluids at very low
operating temperatures
between minus 35F and
plus 170F (serial
number with suffix 'CR').
Storage conditions rubber goods on the rig:
1. Preferably in the dark away from any light source, like sunlight or
fluorescent lights.
2. Away from electrical equipment, which can produce ozone-like colour
copiers, laser printers or AC motors.
3. Away from large air flow streams coming out from powerful ventilators.
4. Stored in a relaxed and horizontal position without heavy items on top.
5. Away from aggressive solvents and chemicals, the rubbers should not be
covered with petroleum products.
6. The rubber hardness of the rubber should not increase more than 15
Shore from the original hardness.


420

3.3 Cameron annular BOPs

Figure 84 - Cameron BOPs - a donut and an element are used to be
changed out as a set.
Cameron annular BOPs differ from the Hydril and Shaffer BOPs as
follows:
Cameron Shaffer and Hydril
Not wellbore-assisted. Both are kind of wellbore-assisted.
Minimum closing pressure 1,500
psi up to 3,000 psi is allowed.
Hydril GK closing pressures 800-1,500
psi.
Shaffer closing pressures 1,200-1,500
psi
Uses a donut and an element
which need to be replaced as a
set.
Only one element is used.
Uses less fluid. Closing faster.
Less accumulator capacity
required.
Uses more fluid, closing slower.
More accumulator capacity required.
No pressure reduction required
closing on a larger casing string.
The Shaffer annular preventer must
reduce the closing pressure closing in a
large casing string to prevent indents by
the fingers of the element.

Figure 85
Shaffer annular element with fingers,
which can cause damage if closed on a
large casing string, without using a lower
closing pressure. Shaffer elements colour
code for Nitrile rubber is blue and for
Natural rubber elements it is red.


421

4 Annular preventers
4.1 Annular preventer checklist
Record the date of the last major overhaul (API RP 53 section 17.10.3).
Verify that the annular preventer is suitable for H
2
S operations (NACE
0175).
Confirm that there is a spare element and seal kit present.
Make sure the rig crew understands the correct method of storing the
seals and elements?
Check that the hydraulic seals are replaced every three years (OEM).
Validate that the control hoses are at least 1-inch ID (preferably 1
inch).
Verify that a stripping (surge) accumulator bottle (of 11 US gallons) has
been installed (API RP 53 section 21.2).
Check the stripping bottle precharge pressure (ca. 400 psi/27.6 bars).
Confirm that the elements close within 30 seconds if smaller than 18
inches, or within 45 seconds if larger than 18 inches. Note: Elements
must relax to full bore within 30 minutes (API Spec 16D [2005] section
5.1.1).
Make certain the rig crew understands that Cameron annular preventers
require 3,000-psi/200-bar operating pressure from the annular preventer
regulator.
Test for any damage to the bore surfaces.
Verify that the stationary seal weep holes are open.
Inspect the condition of the fitted element.
Check NDT inspection records of the lifting eyes.
Verify that the rig crew understands that there is a special element for
the Shaffer annular preventers in case the sealing on large objects is
required?
Confirm that no unauthorized welding has been performed on any well
control equipment (API RP 53 section 17.11.7). (*)


422

Figure 86
Severely corroded BX
ring on top of the
annular preventer. The
top of the annular
element is important
because in an
emergency we might
have to install either
another annular BOP or
a snubbing unit.

Figure 87
Damaged BX sealing
area on top of the
annular preventer. If
needed, this can be
repaired in situ by a
Vetco engineer using a
cold-welding method.

Figure 88
Damaged and cracked
BX sealing area.


423

Figure 89
Annular element closing
on an open hole by
means of a so-called
CSO (complete shut-
off). Not recommended
except in an emergency
situation as it can
severely overstress and
damage the element.

Figure 90
Annular element closing
on the drill pipe.

Figure 91
It is often difficult to
remove the Hydril
screw-type annular
preventer cap.

424

Figure 92
The cap could not be
tightened all the way. The
lock screw could not secure
the cap. The locking of the
cap was performed by
means of unauthorized
welding of a plate on the
housing.

Figure 93
Hydril MSP annular
preventer with an element
that seems in order.
However, the element is no
longer relaxing to the full
bore. The rubber might be
too hard. A new element
needs to be installed.

Figure 94
Shaffer annular preventer
element not relaxing to the
full bore. What was the shelf
life of this element?


425

Figure 95
Element worn way
beyond the acceptable
level. It is no longer
able to provide
protection to the bore.

Figure 96
Bottom section of the
element missing, most
likely due to relaxing
problems. This element
was damaged by the
test tools of the BOPs.

Figure 97
Bottom of a Shaffer
element tested to the
point of destruction.
API recommends
testing the annular
element periodically
only to 70% of the
working pressure. Only
during an acceptance
test may we be
required by the
operator to test the
annular BOP to full
working pressure.

426

Figure 98
Top view of the
Cameron annular
preventer, which
contains a donut and
an element.

Figure 99
Cameron element and
donut, which need to
be changed as one set.
When the donut does
not show any obvious
damage, the donut still
needs be renewed, to
ensure that the
element and donut
have the same
hardness to prevent
relaxing problems.

Figure 100
When testing the
hydraulic circuits of this
annular preventer,
significant leaks were
observed from the
CLOSE to the OPEN
side. The circuits of
Hydril and Shaffer
preventers are tested
to 1,500 psi; the
circuits of the Cameron
annular BOPs need to
be tested to 3,000 psi.


427

Figure 101
Improper storage of
the annular preventer
element. It is not
protected from sunlight
or fluorescent light, and
is becoming egg-
shaped because of the
weight coming from the
top.

Figure 102
As a result of
unauthorized welding,
this annular element's
main housing has been
completely destroyed
during a pressure
testing.


428

5 Gate valves
5.1 Gate valves checklist
Record the date of the last five-yearly major service (API RP 53 section
17.10.3).
Verify that this service include the HCR actuators.
Check that the HCR valves are installed on the outside of the BOP.
Confirm that the crew uses OEM-recommended grease in the valves.
Validate that the valve handles are colour-coded and all present.
Ensure that the HCRs are fitted with valves containing a handle to allow
mechanical override?
Verify that there are sufficient spare valves of all sizes in stock.
Confirm that the gate valves are trimmed for H
2
S.
If fitted, check the condition of all the check valves (non-return valves)
in the kill line.
Ascertain the kill line diameter is more than 3 inches/75 mm for
pressures of 5,000 psi/345 bars and above.
Make sure grease nipples covers are fitted.

Figure 103
Choke outlet. The HCR
valve is a balanced valve:
both the hand wheels of
the manual and HCR valves
are missing. The HCR valve
must be installed on the
outside and the manual
valve on the inside of the
outlet. Do you spot another
very unsafe practice here?


429

Figure 104
Seal ring area and all the
studs severely corroded.

Figure 105
Gate is corroded. It needs
to be replaced.

Figure 106
Gate valve stripped for
inspection. Gate and body
bushings need to be
renewed.

430

Figure 107
Unauthorized welding of the
direction arrow. This check
valve housing must be
replaced immediately.

Figure 108
Check valve in very poor
condition. The valve is
stuck and the spring
assembly is missing. API
allows the rig owner to
replace the non-return
valves with a gate valve,
which is much more reliable
and resistant to the
aggressive mud than the
check valves.

Figure 109
Line-up of the valves from
the spool piece. One
manually operated valve is
installed at the inside of the
BOPs: the HCR is on the
outside. There is also a
check valve installed.


431

Figure 110
HCR actuator with the
control hoses in a very poor
condition. The fire-resistant
layer cannot be adequately
protected by the damaged
stainless-steel harness.

Figure 111 - Unbalanced and balanced valve.
Here we show the difference between an unbalanced valve (left-hand picture)
and a balanced valve (right-hand picture). The balanced valve has a balance
stem, which is installed at the bottom of the gate to equalize the in-line
pressure. The balanced valve will close much easier when there is pressure in
the lines. The HCR valve needs a hand wheel, as does the manual valve. This
will allow the crew to close the HCR valve manually in case hydraulic supply
is lost.
Note: The hand wheel of the HCR valve cannot open the valve.

432

6 Introduction to the choke and kill
manifold

Figure 112 - Modern Cameron choke and kill manifold.
Two manual chokes and two remote chokes are installed. The buffer tank is
divided into two sections. The high-pressure vent line or so-called 'panic-
line' is not present.
The choke and kill manifold on MODUs, or the choke manifold on land rigs,
are installed to circulate the kick or influx out while maintaining a constant
pressure on the casing. If the chokes are opened too far, the pressure in the
casing will drop, and this will increase the influx of the kick. If the chokes
are not opened far enough, the pressure of the casing might rise too high,
and the formation at the casing shoe might fracture. This might cause an
external blow-out outside the casing.
An external blow-out on land rigs means RUN to safety!
An external blow-out on the MODUs means SWIM to safety!
There are three different types of chokes:
1. The remote choke, which is operated from the remote choke panel at
the doghouse of the Driller. Some people call these chokes 'auto-
chokes', as in the past these chokes could be used as an automatic
function.
2. The manual choke, which is only used if the remote chokes are not
operational or if certain lines are plugged. The manual choke can only be
operated at the choke manifold itself.


433

3. The positive choke, which is a non-adjustable fixed choke where only
orifices with a different flow capacity (also known as 'Beans') can be
changed.
None of the chokes needs to hold pressure, but they must hold a
'backpressure' on the casing while passing fluid. None of these chokes need
to be pressure-tested during the routine tests.

Figure 113
Cameron remote choke.

Figure 114
The Cameron remote choke is
operated hydraulically.
The choke position indication is
pneumatically controlled. The tip is
made of solid tungsten carbide,
which is very hard steel, but
sometimes we find the tips cracked.

Figure 115
Cameron manual choke.
Figure 116
Cameron manual choke.
The tip of the choke is not solid, but
a tungsten carbide cover is soldered
on the tip and sometimes this cover
comes lose.


434

Figure 117 - Positive choke shown without the orifice installed.
The orifices are called 'Beans' named after his their inventor, John Bean.
These positive-displacement chokes are unable to hold pressure.

Figure 118 - Cameron FLS valve (complete assembly).
There are different pressure ratings for these valves. The valves up to a
10,000-psi working pressure (10M) will have grease nipples installed, with
NPT fittings connected to the body. This means that there might be contact
between the threads and the (aggressive) drilling fluids.
The grease nipples of the valves above 10M will have so-called 'auto-clave'
grease fittings installed, where the fitting seals on a seat instead of the
threads. There will be no contact between the mud and the threads.
Regardless of the type of grease nipple installed, it is a very good practice to
cycle the valves before removing the grease caps, in order to remove any
trapped pressure from the body. Next, we have to train the rig personnel not
to stand in front of the grease fittings when they remove these caps.


435

Figure 119 - Grease nipple (10M). Figure 120 - Grease nipple (15M).
The grease nipples can also be used to vent the pressure from the body
using pins to lift the balls of the check valves. The valves upstream the
chokes (seen from the BOP up to the chokes) must have the same pressure
rating as the ram BOPs (API Spec 16C). For the valves downstream the
chokes (seen from the chokes venting to the mud/gas separator or to the
overboard/flare pit), there is no pressure rating but a temperature rating.
Due to excessive expansion of the gas from the kick straight after the
chokes, a severe temperature drop is very likely since expansion requires a
lot of heat. So, the valves downstream the chokes have a special
temperature rating and code.
Temperature tables for valves as per API Spec 6A
Temperature
Classification
Operating range
(degrees Fahrenheit)
K -75 to 180
L -50 to 180
P -20 to 180
S 0 to 150
T 0 to 180
U 0 to 250
V 35 to 250
X 0 to 350
Y 0 to 650
X and Y: See API Spec 6A Appendix G


436

Standard Valve Trim Materials
API Material
Class
Service Application Partial Pressure
(psi)
CO
2
H
2
S
AA - General General service. Non-corrosive oil
and gas applications, such as
manifolds and Christmas trees.
<7 <.05
BB - General
(Low CO
2
)
General service oil and gas
applications, where resistance to
weight loss corrosion is required
due to the CO
2
condition.
7 to 30 <.05
CC - General
(High CO
2
)
General service oil and gas
applications, when resistance to
weight loss corrosion is required
due to the CO
2
conditions.
>30 <0.05
DD - Sour service General service sour oil and gas
application, where resistance to
sulphide stress cracking is required
due to the H
2
S conditions.
<7 >.05
EE - Sour service
(Low CO
2
)
Extreme sour oil and gas
both the sulphide stress cracking
and weight loss corrosion are
required due to the H
2
S and CO
2

conditions.
7 to 30 >.05
FF - Sour service
(Medium CO
2
)
Extreme sour oil and gas
both the sulphide stress cracking
and weight loss corrosion are
required due to the H
2
S and CO
2

conditions.
>30 >.05
HH - Sour service
(High CO
2
)
Most extreme service applications,
when high concentrations of H
2
S,
CO
2
and chlorides are present.
>30 >.05


437

Material Classification
We can use this chart to determine the actual material based on the
materials classification
API Spec 6A
material
Classification
Body and
bonnet
material
Stem
material
coating
Gate
material/
coating
Seat
material
coating
AA - General service
Non-corrosive
Low alloy steel AISI 41XX
Nitrided
AISI 41XX
Nitrided
AISI 41XX
Nitrided
BB - General service
Slightly corrosive
Low alloy steel AISI 410 SST
Nitrided
AISI 410 SST
Chrome-plated
Stellite TM 3
CC - General service
Highly corrosive
AISI 410
Stainless steel
AISI 410 SST
Nitrided
AISI 410 STT
Chrome-plated
Stellite TM 3
DD - Sour service
Non-corrosive
Low alloy steel AISI 41XX
Nickel-plated
AISI 41XX
Hard-faced
Stellite TM 3
EE - Sour service
Slightly corrosive
Low alloy steel AISI 410 SST
Nitrided
AISI 410 SST
Hard-faced
Stellite TM 3
FF - Sour service
Moderate corrosive
AISI 410
Stainless steel
AISI 410 SST
Nitrided
AISI 410 SST
Hard-faced
Stellite TM 3
HH - Sour service
Highly corrosive
Low alloy Cad
w/alloy 625 or
solid alloy 718
Alloy 718 Alloy 718
Hard-faced
Stellite TM 3
Grease Specifications Cameron valves
Service
Service
Temperatures
Part number
(25 lbs tins )
Standard -20 to 250F 700668
Low temperature -20 to 250F 700672
Low temperature -75 to 350F 711027-02
Diesel-resistant -20 to 350F 713837-02
High temperature -20 to 500F 710194-02
Source: Cameron EB 693G
Conclusion
The above tables will provide us with the codes used on the gate valves, for
what purpose or what temperature rating these valves are purposely built
for. If the rig is operating in a H
2
S zone, the code for the valves should be
DD or higher. Even on existing rigs, if the well conditions change or the rig is
upgraded to high-temperature operations, we have to consider whether we
should order special grease that is fit for purpose.
The piping of the choke and kill manifold must not have sharp bends or
elbows installed. Due to the increasing speed of the mud in sharp elbows,
the gas bubbles are compressed until they implode. The kinetic energy from
the inside of the bubble will attack the wall of the pipe, which we call erosion

438

(cavitations). The standard 90-degree elbows for piping is only 1.5 times the
diameter.
Note: API recognized this problem, and in their standards, the minimum
radius of 90-degree elbows in the piping of the choke and kill line must be at
least 10 times the nominal diameter of the pipe in use, both upstream
and downstream the chokes.
As this observation is not very practical, target blocks are often installed. At
the blind flanges of these targets lead plugs are installed, whose purpose it
is to absorb the kinetic energy of the gas bubbles thus preventing erosion
of the walls of the piping.

Figure 121 - Sharps bends create
excessive erosion in the piping.

Figure 122 - Lead plug for inspection.
Clearly visible is the impact of the implosions in the lead. The lead is doing
what it is designed for!
Sometimes there are small air pockets behind the lead plugs. During
pressure testing through very small channels, a pressure build-up behind the
lead plugs is possible. Next, the pressure is rapidly vented and the trapped
pressure pushes the lead plugs out. The solution to this problem is not to
remove the lead plugs and thus loose their absorption capacity, but to drill a
few inch holes in the lead to vent any trapped pressure.


439

Figure 123
Lead plugs might be pushed
out due to trapped pressure.
Drill pressure-equalizing holes in the lead plug to prevent them from 'travel-
ling' through the system.

440

7 Choke and kill manifold
7.1 Choke and kill manifold checklist
Record the date of the last service performed on the gate valves (API RP
53 section 17.10.3).
Verify that the pressure rating of the upstream chokes is the same as
that for the ram preventers (API RP 53 section 8.2).
Check that no NPT-threaded connections larger than 2 inches are fitted if
the pressure is 3,000 psi/200 bar or above (API RP 53 sections 8.2.b and
10.2.1b). Note: It is preferred that no NPT-threaded fittings are used
(GWP).
Ensure that there is a direct-overboard line (panic line) fitted (API RP 53
section 8.2).
Inspect the wall thickness measurement records. Note: The observed
wall thickness must be at least 87.5% of the original wall thickness (API
RP 574).
Examine the records of the last visual inspections of the chokes (API RP
53 section 8.4).
Check the certification for Coflexip hoses and verify that borescopic
inspections have been carried out as recommended by the OEM.
Verify that the targets are installed in sharp bends, or that the bend
radius R > 10d (R = radius and d = nominal diameter of piping) (API RP
53 section 8.3.1).
Confirm that the buffer tank is separated into two sections (API RP 53
section 8.2).
Check the pressure test records of the choke manifold.
Ascertain that the remote choke unit is located on the drill floor.
Verify that the valve handles are numbered and colour-coded on the
choke manifold.
Confirm that the remote-operated choke takes circa 25 to 30 seconds to
fully open in a controlled manner.
Check that only heavy-duty pressure gauges with flanged connections
are fitted to the manifold.
Validate that the rig carries an emergency air receiver or N
2
bottle that is
connected to the remote choke panel (API RP 53 section 8.2.k).
Inspect the calibration period for the gauges in use (API RP 53 section
12.5.3g).
Verify that the control panel is fitted with a range of pressure gauges.
Confirm that the pressure-equalizing holes are drilled in all the lead
targets plugs fitted.
If installed, inspect the condition of check valves (API RP 53 section 8.4).
Confirm that there are temperature sensors fitted for the HP/HT
applications.
Verify that there is a glycol ethylene injection unit for HP/HT wells.
Check that there is sufficient glycol ethylene present. (*)


441

Figure 124
Choke manifold with a
single buffer tank, which is
not in compliance with the
API RP 53 standards. We
must be able to isolate a
blockage or a leak, and to
continue our operation.

Figure 125
The radius of the bends in
the piping of the choke
manifold should be at least
10 times the nominal
diameter of the piping to
prevent corrosion. This
radius is only 1.5 times the
diameter of the pipe and is
therefore not allowed here,
even if heavy-wall 90-
degree elbows are installed.

Figure 126
Choke valves with severe
scoring on the seal rings.
The sharp corners of the
slot of the valves have
proved to be very
vulnerable to H
2
S. These
valves were declared
obsolete in the mid 1980s,
but they are still present on
certain rigs.

442

Figure 127
The valve gates must be
spotless, as they seal steel-
to-steel with high
pressures. The black arrows
indicate the areas where
small leaks in the past
made a small impression on
the gates.

Figure 128
Checking the stroke
adjustment of the gate. The
slots of the gates must be
precisely lined up with the
piping ID, otherwise a very
rapid washout will be the
result.

Figure 129
Weekly greasing is
necessary. Ensure that the
valves are cycled first to
remove any trapped
pressure in the body. Only
OEM-recommended grease
must be used.


443

Figure 130
Check valves require very
frequent maintenance, as
they are not reliable with
abrasive mud and
chemicals. Due to the very
low reliability of the check
valves exposed to abrasive
drilling fluids, the
installation of a standard
gate valve could be
considered.

Figure 131
Refrain from using NPT
fittings over 2 inches and
over 3,000-psi working
pressures.

Figure 132
Three-inch NPT-threaded
bull plug: a recipe for a
serious accident.

444

Figure 133
Short-radius 90-degree
elbows and severely
corroded studs on flanges
have made this section a
severe safety hazard.

Figure 134
Poor condition of the check
valve and studs. Very
severe levels of corrosion
have been covered by a
large layer of paint. Paint
does not hold pressure!

Figure 135
A sharp bend and severe
corrosion creating a very
unsafe situation on this kill
line. When was the last wall
thickness measurement
performed?


445

Figure 136
Lead or fluid target blocks
need to be installed instead
of 90-degree elbows with
too small a radius.

Figure 137
Blind flange with the lead
plug still present. This is a
clear indication of the
bombardment of gas
bubbles, as the lead has
adequately absorbed this
energy. It is good practice
to drill equalizing holes in
the lead to give an escape
route for any pockets of gas
trapped behind the plug, so
preventing the pressure
from forcing the plug out of
its socket and blocking
pipes in the system. This
can happen when the flow
through the pipes is
stopped, and the trapped
gas expands.

Figure 138
Blind flange where the lead
plug has gone missing. The
plug might end up inside
the BOP or at the chokes.
We consider it not good
practice just to remove the
lead.

446

Figure 139
A common shackle pin
welded in a 15M union to
act as a 'blind plug'. This is
a foolish thing to do; this
crew has really
underestimated the
dangers of high pressures!

Figure 140
Gauges of 2 inches and
larger must be of the
flanged type. A diaphragm
is installed in the flange to
prevent abrasive drilling
fluids from coming into
contact with the NPT
thread.


447

Figure 141
High-pressure gauge with
NPT-threaded connections.
This is a very poor choke
manifold because of the
following:
The piping is bent.
The valve handles are
missing.
The valve handles are
not colour-coded.

Figure 142
New manifold under
construction, but a single
buffer tank is installed and
2-inch NPT-threaded
fittings are present. This is
not as per the API Spec
16C standards.

Figure 143
Welding over a threaded
fitting in a high-pressure
system is a very dangerous
practice. This valve should
be taken out of the
manifold system straight
away! It is more than
possible that the entire
connection explodes under
pressure.

448

Figure 144
Washed seat on the remote
choke.

Figure 145
Replaceable parts for the
choke valve. The tungsten
carbide tip is soldered onto
the valve; it sometimes
comes loose and starts to
travel through the system.
Special Cameron
instructions are required to
reconnect this tip.


449

Figure 146
Remote choke with a crack
in the tip. This crack was
not clearly visible when the
choke was still in the OPEN
position.

Figure 147
After fully opening up this
remote choke, the cracked
pin fell apart into three
pieces!

450

Figure 148
Check valve, which is often
used to separate the mud
standpipe manifold from
the choke and kill manifold.
The installation of two gate
valves is also allowed to
separate the two circuits,
and is much more reliable
to handle abrasive drilling
fluids.

Figure 149
Swaco remote choke panel.
Despite the presence of the
handpump, most Swaco
panels still need emergency
air/nitrogen to maintain
their choke position
indication, when these
sensors are pneumatically
operated. This panel has a
nitrogen bottle.


451

Figure 150
Fully digital remote choke
panel. There are API
standards for the size and
the brightness of the digital
display.

Figure 151
Home-made crossover
welding with NPT threads.
It is extremely dangerous
to fabricate home-made
equipment for high-
pressure equipment.

Figure 152
Cut-away view of the
home-made/-welded
crossover.

452

Figure 153
Coflexip hose's external
construction with two
internal linings: Rilsan and
Coflon. Rilsan is a
standard-temperature
hose for temperatures up
to 100C. Coflon is a high-
temperature hose for
temperatures to 130C.
Coflon is much more
resistant to heavy brines
and acids, which will
damage the Rilsan hose
even at low temperatures.

Figure 154
Coflexip hose's internal
construction. Notice that
the fire resistant layer is
optional, and needs to be
specified when ordering a
new hose.


453

Figure 155
Minimum bend radius
(MBR) for the Coflexip
hose. Rule of thumb: the
MBR is approximately 12
times the OD of the
Coflexip hose.

Figure 156
Coflexip hoses need to be
sent back to the OEM
every year to test that the
MBR is still correct, and to
undergo a borescopic
inspection to check the
condition of the internal
lining. API recommends
following the OEM
instructions.


454

Figure 157 - Diagram of the nitrogen back-up system for the supply
of emergency air.

Figure 158 - Diagram of the air back-up system.


455

8 Introduction to the BOP HPU

Figure 159 - Modern Koomey unit for a surface BOP.

1 Rig air supply connection
2 Oil mister air supply air pumps
3 By-pass valve pump governor
4 Pump governor air pumps
5 Isolation valves air pumps
6 Air pump drive
7 Suction valve air pumps
8 Section strainer air pumps
9 Check valve air pump discharge
10 Triplex pump (electrically driven)
11 Electro-hydraulic switch triplex pump
12 Start-stop station triplex pump
13 Suction valve triplex pump
14 Suction strainer triplex pump
15 Check valve triplex pump discharge
16 Isolation valve accumulator bottles
17 Accumulator bottles

456

18 Relief valve accumulator circuit
19 Strainers (to protect the regulators)
20 Manifold regulator-manually operated
21 Check valve exhaust manifold circuit
22 Control valves
23 By-pass valve
24 Regulator for shear ram supply
25 Dump valve vent accumulator circuit
26 Three-way valve air annular regulator
27 Annular BOP regulator remote operated
28 Accumulator pressure gauge
29 Manifold pressure gauge
30 Annular BOP pressure gauge
31 Pressure sensor accumulator pressure
32 Pressure sensor manifold pressure
33 Pressure sensor annular BOP pressure
34 Oil mister air supply air regulators
35 Air regulator annular regulator
36 Air regulator annular pressure sensor
37 Air regulator accumulator pressure sensor
38 Air regulator manifold pressure sensor
39 Air junction box
40 Sight-glass
41 Tank inspection cover
41 Manipulator valve
43 Check valve
44 Relief valve
45 Connection for the supply auxiliary circuit
46 Vent line


457

The BOP HPU (hydraulic power unit) consists of three hydraulic circuits:
1. The accumulator circuit
2. The manifold circuit
3. The annular BOP circuit
The accumulator circuit pressure is 3,000 psi for most rigs. This circuit feeds
both the manifold and the annular BOP circuit. The manifold circuit is
normally regulated down to 1,500 psi. On most rigs the regulator for this
circuit is a manual regulator without a remote function. Several modern rigs
have made this manifold regulator remotely controlled as well - this is a
great help in case a drill string has to be hung off. The rams and the choke
and kill HCR valves are connected to the manifold circuit.
The annular preventer circuit is regulated down from 800 to 1,500 psi,
depending on the type of annular preventer that is installed. The regulator
for the annular preventer must be remotely operated from at least two
remote-operated stations. Only the annular preventer is connected to the
annular BOP circuit.
On the manifold a bypass valve is installed, that can bypass the manifold
regulator to create 3,000 psi on the complete manifold system, in case
shearing operations are required, or extra pressure is required for the pipe
rams to seal better. On this modern manifold this is not the case, as the
shear blind rams have their own independent regulator installed. This is an
extra facility which is not required by the standards, but it is a very good
drilling practice.
The HPU has two independent pump systems for the BOP HPU: one or two
electric-driven triplex pumps and two or three air-operated pumps. The
triplex pumps must start at 90% of the working pressure, which is 2,700 psi.
As it has a much higher capacity, the triplex pump will start first. The triplex
pumps will kick out at 3,000 psi. The start/stop function is controlled by an
electric-hydraulic switch.

Figure 160 - The triplex pump is a positive-displacement pump.
This means that it will positively discharge liquid from the suction source to
the discharge, regardless of the discharge pressure involved.

458

Figure 161
The electric-hydraulic
switch that starts/stops
the triplex pumps
contains mini-switches to
change its setting.
The air-driven pumps must start at 85% of their working pressure, which is
2,550 psi. The air pumps normally will kick out at 2,850 psi. The start/stop
function of these pumps is controlled by the pneumatic pump governor.

Figure 162 - Modern air pump set-up.
Both the air pumps and the triplex pumps have check valves installed in the
discharge lines, to prevent fluid from flowing back from the accumulators to
the mixture/storage tank. With this set-up another type of pump governor is
used. Most older and surface BOP HPUs use pump governors as shown in
Figure 163.

Figure 163
Pump governor which controls the
start/stop function of the air pumps.


459

For different pressure ranges springs of a different-style are available. The
red line indicates the hydraulic pressure coming from the accumulator
system, and the blue line indicates the rig air.

Figure 164 - Conventional HPU with an old-fashioned AKR-type
regulator for the annular preventer circuit.
This schematic provides a clear indication of the different air and hydraulic
circuits.


460

Accumulator bottles
Most accumulator systems for the surface BOPs have a working pressure of
3,000 psi. Some high-pressure shear circuits work with 5,000-psi
accumulator bottles. The accumulators are precharged with an inert gas
(nitrogen) to provide a 'constant' pressure and to drive out the hydraulic
fluid quickly. There are four different types of accumulators available:
1. the bag-type accumulator (normally 11-US-gallon bottles are installed)
2. the float-type accumulator preventer (varying from 15 to 85 US gallons)
3. the spherical-type accumulator (normally containing either a bag or a
float of 85 US gallons)
4. the piston-type accumulator, which comes in various sizes

Figure 165 - Shaffer bladder-type accumulator.
The Shaffer bladder-type accumulator is normally precharged to one third of
the working pressure or 1,000 psi with conventional surface BOPs.
Accumulators are pressure vessels and are normally hydrostatically tested at
least every ten years as per the API standards.


461

Figure 166 - Cameron bladder-type accumulator with different
components.
Bladder-type accumulators are precharged from the top. The actual fluid
that is usable for this type of accumulators depends on the closing ratio of
the ram BOPs, and varies from 4 to 5 US gallons.

Figure 167 Spherical-type accumulator with a bladder.
The disadvantage here is that the accumulators are very large; if one
accumulator fails, a lot of capacity will be lost at once.

462

Figure 168 - Spherical-type accumulator with a float.

Figure 169
Piston-type accumulators are normally used in compensating systems on
floating rigs, to separate the high-pressure air or nitrogen from the high-
pressure oil. A piston-type accumulator system is used when we want to be
absolute certain that the two systems are adequately separated.


463

Regulators
We need regulators to reduce the accumulator pressure into the pressure for
our other two main circuits, the annular BOP circuit and the manifold circuit,
which connect the rams and the HCR gate valves. There are four types of
regulators available:
1. Air-operated regulators called AKRs (air-controlled regulators), which are
remotely operated from the remote panels. AKRs are installed on the
annular BOP circuit.
2. Manual operated regulators called MKRs (manually controlled regulators),
which are normally installed at the manifold circuit.
3. The air-operated regulator with an air motor called TR (true reading)
regulator, which is installed on modern HPUs for the annular BOP circuit.
4. The hydraulically operated regulators, which we normally install in the
subsea pods for subsea BOP control circuits.

Situation A

Situation B
Figure 170
Cameron manual
regulator.
Figure 171 - Manual regulator.
In situation A, the supply is open and the outlet
pressure will increase. In situation B, the vent is
open and the outward pressure will decline as
the regulator starts to vent.

Figure 172 - Typical AKR regulator.

464

Situation A

Situation B
Figure 173 - In situation A, the input pressure supplies fluid to the
output to increase the output pressure.
In situation B, the pressure is coming down from the output venting to the
vent port. If the air pressure is lost, the supply pressure will be isolated and
the outlet pressure vents to zero psi. Consequently, the closed annular
preventer will be opened by the force of the large rubber element. A blow-out
will be the result!

Figure 174
TR regulator installed on the
surface HPU.
Figure 175
The TR regulator is a failsafe type of
regulator when air pressure is lost.


465

Figure 176 - AKR regulator. Figure 177 - TR regulator.

Figure 178 - HKR regulator.

Figure 179 - HKR regulator.

466

Figure 180 - Two different ways to use control valves.
There are two different ways to use control valves: either manipulator-type
valves on the subsea BOP control panels, or selector-type valves used on the
surface BOP HPU systems. You cannot see the difference from the outside;
only the inserts are different.


467

Remote-control panels

Figure 181 - Old-fashioned driller's panel.
The disadvantage of this panel is that no valve position indication is
provided. So the Driller does not know for certain the position of the BOP
components. Most rigs are using homemade labels to indicate the latest
operation of the BOP. This system generates human error on a large scale!

468

Figure 182 - Modern driller's panel.
For all surface BOPs on MODUs, and on most modern rigs, the old-fashioned
panels have been replaced for the electro-pneumatic panels. This panel
provides a valve position indication, so the driller knows exactly what the
position of the BOP components is.


469

9 BOP HPU
9.1 BOP HPU checklist
Record the date of the last accumulator capacity test as per API RP 16E,
API RP 53 section 17.7.1 and API Spec 16D (2005) sections 5.1.2 and
5.1.4
Verify that the rubber hoses are not fitted in the main accumulator
supply system. Note: This is a single-point failure.
Confirm that the unit is divided into four equal banks with isolation and
drain valves on the bottle or racks (API Spec 16D section 5.1.3.2).
Ensure that only TR-type regulators are used. Note: AKR-type regulators
are no longer acceptable.
In case of MODUs, check that the following alarms are present (API Spec
16D section 4.3.3.1.g.g):
o Accumulator low-pressure alarm
o Rig air low-pressure alarm
o Emergency power engaged
o Pump-running indication
Verify that the accumulator pre-charge pressure is at least 1,000 psi/69
bar.
Confirm that the accumulator bottles are hydrostatically tested every 10
years (API 510 section 6.5 and API Spec 16D section 3.1.2.3).
Make sure the unit located is in a safe place as per API Spec 16D section
2.2.4.6 (i.e. not on the drill floor).
Check the pressure control circuits.
Verify that the triplex pump starts pumping at 2,700 psi/186 bars and
stops pumping at 3,000 psi/200 bars.
Confirm that there is an emergency air back-up system fitted (API Spec
16D section 1.5).
If electrically operated, verify that the system has a battery back-up
system (UPS) for the remote-control panels.
Check that the shear-blind valve panel has extra protection such as a
fool's box (API Spec 16D section 2.2.2.7).
Verify that there are safety signs posted on equipment that starts
without warning (Equipment Starts Automatically).
Check the calibration records for the pressure gauges (API RP 53
sections 12.3.6 and 12.5.2).
Make sure only engraved signs are used on panels (i.e. no graffiti). (*)

470

Figure 183
BOP hydraulic power unit
(HPU) for a land rig with a
newly designed Koomey
Type 80 unit. Notice the
failsafe TR regulator for the
annular preventer circuit.

Figure 184
To comply with the API
standards, the accumulator
banks should be divided
into at least four sections.

Figure 185
Here there are only two
banks of accumulator
bottles, which are not
equally divided either. This
is not acceptable.


471

Figure 186
Accumulator bottles that
can be individually isolated.
This is a much more
reliable way to operate.

Figure 187
Leaking accumulator bottle
temporarily repaired with
rope. Why not fix it
properly?

Figure 188
Note the level of corrosion
around the bottom of the
accumulator bottles on this
jack-up rig.

472

Figure 189
Accumulator bottles
adequately marked with
safety signs and
identification numbers.

Figure 190
accumulator bottle
underneath the bracket.
Every ten years a
hydrostatic test needs to be
performed as per the API
standards.

Figure 191
Triplex pump plungers.
Ensure that the packing
sets do not leak
excessively. On this triplex
pump the piston rods are
bent, thus creating
excessive heat around the
packing glands and rapid
wear of the packing
material.


473

Figure 192
Only one air-operated
hydraulic pump is present
here. GWP is to fit two
pneumatic pumps.
Regulations only require
pumping systems with
separate power sources.
This could be two electric
pumps if one is supplied
through the emergency
switchboard.

Figure 193
Note the manual valve
installed on the middle
pump between the pump
and the relief valve.

Figure 194
This Chinese-designed HPU
has a manually adjustable
AKR valve installed. When
air pressure is lost, this
valve will go to maximum
pressure first, after which
the pressure has to be
manually lowered.

474

Figure 195
This relief valve exhaust
cannot release the pressure
as there is a bull plug in the
vent. The plug has been
painted and has been in
situ long enough for the
paint to come off!

Figure 196
Relief valve with the correct
vent installation. Two-
yearly recertification is
required.


475

Figure 197
No manually operated
valves should be installed
on the discharge side of the
triplex pumps, between the
pump and relief valve. If
we start the pumps with
this valve still closed, the
discharge lines might blow
up! A check valve is
present to prevent the
pressurized fluid from
venting back to the tank.

Figure 198
Fool's box cover installed to
prevent the unintentional
operation of the shear blind
rams.

476

Figure 199
Creative but inadequate
solution, as it will prevent
the remote operation of the
shear blind rams in an
emergency.

Figure 200
Another example of an
illegal restriction for the
shear blind rams. The
remote operation of the
shear-blind rams is no
longer possible.


477

Figure 201
New, remote air-operated panels for a
land rig. There is no indication of the
BOP function's position. At least the
left-hand panel is fitted with pressure
gauges. It is vital that the rig crews
know the position of the rams at all
times.

Figure 202
Severely corroded hydraulic
piping for the BOP on a
jack-up rig.

Figure 203
Poor quality of the flexible
hoses. The fire-resistant
layer is no longer
adequately protected by the
stainless-steel covers.

478

Figure 204
The AKR regulator for the annular
preventer will lose its output when
the rig air supply is lost! Next, the
annular BOP will open up during a
well control situation causing a blow-
out!

Figure 205
The failsafe-type TR
regulator. When rig air is
lost, the latest-set pressure
output remains. Manual
adjustment is also possible,
and should be preset before
starting operations.

Figure 206
The annular regulator could
not be operated from the
rig floor on this unit. API
requires the remote
operation to be able to
remotely alter the closing
pressure of the annular BOP
during stripping operations.


479

Figure 207
A driller's panel without valve
position indication is only allowed on
land rigs. The usage of these tags
can fall off and easily lead to
confusion. Good working practice is
to fit the panels with indicator lights
to show the ram position.

Figure 208
Dangerous remote-control panel;
even the tags are not present.

480

Figure 209
This remote-control panel
does not even deserve its
name.

Figure 210
A remote-control panel
with the valve position
indication is required on all
offshore rigs.


481

Figure 211
Soluble-oil/water mixture
tank. Any contamination
with lubricating oil will lead
to the growth of bacteria
and fungus. Most land rigs
use hydraulic oil in the well
control systems.

Figure 212
A nitrogen back-up system
will supply 'pneumatic
pressure' to the HPU
solenoids in order to
preserve the remote-
control ability, if rig air
pressure is lost. We can
install similar emergency
rig air/nitrogen circuits for
the BOP HPU, similar to the
ones we use for the remote
choke panels.

Figure 213
Air back-up system
installed for the driller's
remote panel. There should
be a check valve installed
to prevent the air from
flowing back from the air
pressure vessel to the rig
air circuit in a black-out
situation.

482

Figure 214
Poor condition of hard
piping on a land rig. The
homemade well control
pipes will pollute the
control fluid with metallic
contaminates, which could
damage the control vales
and the hydraulic circuits
of the BOP components.

Figure 215
When water/soluble-oil
mixtures are used, a
refractometer can be used
to measure the correct
solution of the BOP fluid.
Between 2 and 5% is
recommended. It is
important that the fluid
sample temperature is
20C.

Appendices

483

Chapter 08
Appendices
1 Appendix 1 Drive Chains Inspections........................................ 484
2 Appendix 2 API RP 8B Explanations and Category of Inspections .. 493
3 Appendix 3 Electrical Hazardous Areas: Explanation ................... 496

Appendices

484

1 Appendix 1
Drive Chains Inspections
1.1 I nspection and Chain Service Schedule According to API
SPEC 7F
A roller chain drive requires proper and timely maintenance to deliver satis-
factory performance and service life.
The maintenance programme must be established to assure the fol-
lowing:
The sprockets are correctly lubricated.
Drive interferences are eliminated.
Damaged or worn chains or sprockets are replaced.
The sprockets are properly aligned.
The chain is correctly tensioned.
Guarding is in good condition and properly installed.
The inspection intervals of chains are:
After the first 50 hours of operation.
If the chain drives are subject to heavy shock loads, every 200 hours.
Ordinary drives: every 500 hours of operation.
The inspection consists of the following:
the lubrication system
the drive interferences
damaged chain or sprockets
chain wear
sprocket wear
sprocket misalignment
chain tension
the chain guards

Figure 1 - Chain assembly.

Appendices

485

The lubrication system
For manual lubrication:
Ensure the oil has the correct grade.
For drip lubrication:
Ensure the flow rate is sufficient and directed onto the chain correctly.
For oil bath lubrication:
Slinger disc or oil stream lubrication: ensure all orifices are clean and the
oil is correctly directed onto the chain.

Figure 2 - Lubricant flow into the chain joint.

Recommended
grade
Temperature in F Temperature in C
SAE 5 -50 to +50 -46 to +10
SAE 10 -20 to +80 -29 to +27
SAE 20 +10 to +110 -12 to +43
SAE 30 +20 to +130 -7 to +54
SAE 40 +30 to +140 -1 to +60
SAE 50 +40 to +150 +4 to +66
Figure 3 - Recommended oil viscosities for various temperatures.
Appendices

486

The drive interferences
Inspect for any evidence between the drive components and other parts of
the equipment. Impact between the chain link plates and a rigid object can
cause plate fatigue and chain failure.
Beware of debris build-up between the chain and sprockets, as even small
amounts of debris this can cause tensile loads large enough to break the
chain if forced through the drive.
Damaged chain or sprockets
Inspect the chain for cracked, broken, deformed or corroded parts. Correct
the cause of damage and replace the chain if any discrepancies are found.
Inspect the sprockets for chipped, broken or deformed teeth. Be aware that
a damaged or worn chain will rapidly damage a sprocket. The worn chain will
ride very high on the sprocket teeth and rapidly creates abnormal wear on
the teeth.
Chain wear
The maximum wear in most chain drives is considered 3% wear elongation.
With 3% wear the chain does not engage the sprocket properly.
On drives with sprockets with more than 66 teeth the allowable wear is
limited to 200/N (N = number of teeth on the largest sprocket) and may be
substantially less than 3%).
On fixed-centre non-adjustable drives the allowable wear elongation is
limited to one half of one chain pitch.

Figure 4 - Measurement of chain elongation.

Appendices

487

Measured length ANSI
chain No.
Chain
pitch
Number
of pitches
Nominal At 3% wear
(inch) (inch) (inch)
25 0.250 48 12.000 12.375
35 0.375 32 12.000 12.375
41 0.500 24 12.000 12.375
40 0.500 24 12.000 12.375
50 0.625 20 12.500 12.875
60 0.750 16 12.000 12.375
80 1.000 12 12.000 12.375
100 1.250 20 25.000 25.750
120 1.500 16 24.000 24.719
140 1.750 14 24.500 25.250
160 2.000 12 24.000 24.719
180 2.250 12 27.000 27.812
200 2.500 10 25.000 25.750
240 3.000 8 24.000 24.375
Figure 5 - Chain wear elongation limits.
Sprocket wear
A worn-out sprocket is not nearly as well defined as a worn-out chain. Check
for roughness, reduced tooth thickness and visibly hooked sprocket tooth
tips.
The pitch of a new chain is much shorter than the effective pitch of the worn
sprocket, so the total chain load is concentrated on the final sprocket tooth
before disengagement.
Then, when the chain disengages from the sprocket, the roller is jerked out
of the hooked portion of the sprocket tooth and that results in a shock load
on the chain as the load is transferred from one tooth to the next.
Appendices

488

Figure 6 - Worn-out sprocket.
Sprocket misalignment
Inspection for significant wear on the inside surfaces of the chain roller link
plates and on the sprocket flange faces. This wear indicates misalignment.
If 5% or more of the link plate thickness is worn away, or if there are
sharp gauges in the link plate surface, the chain should be replaced
immediately.
If 10% or more sprocket tooth flange thickness is worn away, the
sprocket should be replaced.
The maximum amount of axial misalignment is obtained from the following
formula:
Maximum offset - 0.045 P inch (P = chain pitch in inches)
This formula applies to both single- and multiple-strand chains.
Chain tension
Measure the total mid-span movement. If this exceeds the tabulated limit,
adjust the centre distance to obtain the desired amount of slack.
If the elongation exceeds the available adjustment and wear elongation still
has not exceeded 3% of the functional limit, remove two pitches and rein-
stall the chain. If the minimum adjustment will not permit shortening two
pitches, the chain may be shortened one pitch by using an offset link or off-
set section.
Recommended possible mid-span movement AC in inches
Tangent length between sprockets in inches
Drive centre
line
10 20 50 50 70 100
Horizontal to
45 degrees
0.4 - 0.5 0.8 - 1.2 1.2 - 1.8 2.0 - 3.0 2.8 - 4.2 4.0 - 6.0
45 degrees to
vertical
0.2 - 0.3 0.4 - 0.6 0.5 - 0.9 1.0 - 1.5 1.4 - 2.1 2.0 - 3.0

Appendices

489

Figure 7 - Mid-span movement.
Guards
Inspect the guards to ensure they are not bent or deformed so that intended
clearance is reduced. Any designed openings in the guard (mesh) must not
be enlarged. The guards must not be deformed or damaged, especially
around the mounting points. Make sure all the fasteners are secure and all
safeguarding devices such as pressure sensors and interlocks are
functioning.
Appendices

490

Roller chain drive troubleshoot guide
Condition/
symptom
Possible cause What to do
Missing at assembly. Replace chain. Missing parts
Broken and lost.
Find and correct cause of
damage.
Replace chain.
Exposed to moisture.
Replace chain, protect
from moisture.
Rusted chain
Water in lubricant.
Inadequate lubrication.
Replace lubricant, protect
lubricant from water
ingress, and replace chain.
Provide or re-establish
proper lubrication, replace
chain if needed.
Chain striking an
obstruction.
Replace chain, eliminate
interference.
Loose casing or shaft
mounts.
Tighten fasteners,
mounts.
Excessive chain slack. Re-tension the chain.
Excessive chain wear. Replace and tension chain.
Excessive sprocket wear.
Replace sprocket and
chain.
Sprocket misalignment. Replace chain and
sprockets if needed,
realign sprockets.
Inadequate lubrication. Replace chain if needed,
re-establish proper
lubrication.
Chain pitch too large. Redesign drive for smaller
pitch chain.
Excessive
noise
Too few sprocket teeth. Check to see if larger
sprockets can be used, if
not redesign drive.
Wear on the
inside roller
link plates and
one side of
the sprockets
Sprocket misalignment. Replace the sprockets and
chain if needed.
Realign drive.
Re-tension chain.

Appendices

491

Condition/
symptom
Excessive sprocket wear. Replace sprocket and
chain.
Chain clings to
sprocket
Sprocket misalignment. Replace the sprockets and
chain if needed, realign
the sprockets.
Excessive chain slack. Re-tension the chain.
Excessive chain wear. Replace and re-tension the
chain.
Excessive sprocket wear. Replace sprockets and
chain.
Chain climbs
sprocket teeth
Extreme overload. Replace chain.
Eliminate cause of
overload.
Cotters installed improperly. Install new cotters.
Striking obstruction. Replace chain, eliminate
interference.
Replace chain, reduce
vibration.
Vibration. Use larger sprockets.
Missing or
broken cotters
Excessively high speed. Replace chain.
Reduce speed.
Redesign drive for smaller
pitch chain.
Exposed
surfaces
corroded or
pitted
Exposure to corrosive
environment.
Replace chain.
Protect from hostile
environment
Cracked link
plates
(stress
corrosion)

Exposure to corrosive
environment combined with
stress from press fits.
Replace chain.
Protect from hostile
environment.
Inadequate lubrication. Replace chain.
Re-establish proper
lubrication.
Turned pins

Overload. Replace the chain.
Eliminate the cause of the
overload.
Enlarged holes

Overload. Replace chain.
Eliminate the cause of the
overload.

Appendices

492

Condition/
symptom
Broken pins

Broken link
plates

Extreme overload. Replace chain.
Replace sprockets if
indicated.
Eliminate cause of overload or
redesign drive for larger pitch
chain.
Cracked link
plates (fatigue)

Loading greater than
chain's dynamic
capacity.
Replace chain.
Reduce dynamic loading or
redesign drive for larger
chain.
Battered link
plate edges

Chain striking an
obstruction.
Replace chain.
Eliminate interference.
Worn link plate
contours

Chain rubbing on
casing, guide, or
obstruction.
Replace chain if 5% or more
height is worn away, or any
evidence of heat
discoloration.
Re-tension chain.
Eliminate interference.
Speed too high. Replace chain.
Reduce speed.
Sprockets too small. Replace chain.
Broken, cracked
or deformed
rollers

Chain riding too high
on sprocket teeth.
Use larger sprockets, or
possibly redesign drive for
smaller pitch chain.
Replace chain.
Re-tension chain more often.
Speed or load too high. Reduce speed or load.
Possibly re-design for smaller
pitch chain.
Pin galling

Inadequate lubrication. Provide or re-establish proper
lubrication.

Appendices

493

2 Appendix 2
API RP 8B Explanations and Category of
Inspections
2.1 Drilling Lifting Equipment I nspections
Category I (Ref. API RP 8B / ISO 13534 section 5.3)
This category involves observing the equipment during operation for
indications of inadequate performance. When in use, equipment shall be
visually inspected on a daily basis for cracks, loose fits or connections,
elongation of parts, and other parts of wear, corrosion or overloading. Any
equipment found to show cracks, excessive wear, etc., shall be removed
from service for further examination. The equipment shall be visually
inspected by a person knowledgeable in that equipment and its function.
Category II (Ref. API RP 8B / ISO 13534 section 5.3)
This is Category I inspection plus further inspection for corrosion,
deformation, loose or missing components, deterioration, proper lubrication,
visible external cracks, and adjustment.
Category III (Ref. API RP 8B / ISO 13534 section 5.3)
This is Category II inspection plus further inspection, which should include
NDT of critical areas and may involve some disassembly to access specific
components and to identify wear that exceeds the manufacturer's allowable
tolerances.
Category IV (Ref. API RP 8B / 13534 section 5.3)
This is Category III inspection plus further inspection for which the
equipment is disassembled to the extent necessary to conduct NDT of all
primary-load-carrying components as defined by manufacturer. Equipment
shall be:
disassembled in a suitably-equipped facility to the extent necessary to
permit full inspection of all primary-load-carrying components and other
components that are critical to the equipment;
inspected for excessive wear, cracks, flaws and deformations.
Corrections shall be made in accordance with the manufacturer's
recommendations. Prior to Category III and Category IV inspections, all
foreign material such as dirt, paint, grease, oil scale, etc., shall be removed
from the concerned parts by a suitable method (e.g. paint-stripping, steam-
cleaning, grit-blasting).
Appendices

494

Periodic inspection and maintenance categories and frequencies (Ref. API RP
8B and ISO 13534 Table 1)
Frequency
Days Months Years
1 7 1 3 6 1 2 5
Equipment
Inspection category
Crown block
sheaves and
bearings
I II III IV
Drilling hooks
(other than sucker-
rod hooks)
I II III IV
Travelling blocks,
hook block and
block-to-hook
adapter
I II III IV
Tubing hooks and
sucker-rod hooks
I II III IV
Elevator links I II III IV
Casing elevators,
tubing elevators,
drill-pipe elevators
and drill-collar
elevators
II III IV
Sucker-rod
elevators
II II III IV
Rotary swivel-bail
adapters
I II III IV
Rotary swivels I II III IV
Power swivels I II III IV
Power subs I II III IV
Spiders, if capable
of being used as
elevators
I II III IV
Dead-line tie-down/
wire line anchors
I II III IV
Drill string motion
compensators
II III IV
Kelly spinners, if
capable of being
used as hoisting
equipment
I II III IV
Riser- and
wellhead-running
tools, if capable of
being used as
hoisting equipment.
II III IV
Safety clamps, if
capable of being
used as hoisting
equipment.
I II III IV
NOTE: The above recommended frequencies apply for equipment in use during the specified
period.

Appendices

495

2.2 Results of inspections
Acceptance criteria (Ref. RP 8B / ISO 13534 section 5.3)
Acceptance criteria shall be established based on experience and
manufacturer's recommendations. Worn equipment that does not meet the
acceptance criteria shall not be accepted for operation.
Rejected equipment (Ref. RP 8B / ISO 13534 section 5.3)
Rejected equipment shall be marked and removed from service.
Surface indications (Ref. RP 8B / ISO 13534 section 5.3)
Surface indications identified by NDT may be allowable of non-allowable
depending on their size, shape and location, as defined by the manufacturer.
Allowable surface indications) Ref. RP 8B / ISO 13534 section 5.3)
Allowable surface indications are surface indications of such a size, shape
and location that they need not be removed.
All references are taken from API RP 8B / ISO 13534.
Appendices

496

3 Appendix 3
Electrical Hazardous Areas: Explanation
3.1 Overview
It is an undeniable fact that drilling units are involved in the exploration and
production of hydrocarbons. In other words, drilling rigs are engaged in the
search and recovery of petroleum products, including highly combustible
gases.
Now what are the precautions we take in order to minimize the risks, which
come with this potentially dangerous business? These precautions are:
Identify the areas where combustible gases might occur or might be
present.
Close the boundaries of those areas.
Ventilate and alarm those areas.
Make sure no equipment in those areas can generate sparks or initiate
explosions.
If the situation gets out of control, initiate a total rig shutdown.
It will be no surprise that Class Rules (ABS Rules for Building and Classing
MODUs) and Statutory Regulations (2001 IMO MODU Code) address these
areas of concern.
3.2 I dentification and classification
Hazardous areas are all those areas where, due to the possible (continuous
or intermitted) presence of a flammable atmosphere arising from the drilling
or well-testing operations, the use of machinery or electrical equipment
without proper consideration may lead to fire hazard or explosion.
Hazardous areas are classified in three different zones: Zone 0, Zone 1 and
Zone 2.
Zone 0 areas are normally only found on production platforms, not on
MODUs.
ZONE 1
Area in which an explosive gas/air mixture is likely to
occur in normal operation.
ZONE 2
Area in which an explosive gas/air mixture is not likely
to occur, or in which such a mixture, if it does occur,
will only exist for a short time.
Also, a distinction is made between enclosed locations, semi-enclosed
locations and outdoor locations. Typical examples of hazardous areas on
board a rig are the rig floor, substructure/moonpool, shale shaker area,
(active) mud pits, mud pump room and sack store. For a substantial list of
Zone-1 and Zone-2 hazardous areas, refer to ABS MODU Rules 4 (Chapter 1,
Section 3) "Classification of Areas" or 2001 IMO MODU Code Chapter 6.2
"Classification of Hazardous Areas".

Appendices

497

Hazardous-area plans should be approved by the Classification Society and
the Flag State. Signs should be placed at appropriate spots, so that people
know that they enter a hazardous zone.
Although not called for by any regulation, escape routes should, if possible,
not run through hazardous areas. Where practicable, the fire main should be
routed clear of the hazardous areas.
Hazardous-area drawings should be posted in a conspicuous manner at
several locations on the rig. This is especially the case where people decide
on/issue/approve permits to work: on the bridge (OIM/Captain), in the
drilling office (STP/RM) and in the engine control room (TC/Chief Engineer).
For example:
Is the welding job inside an enclosed hazardous area?
Where does the welder run his cables?
Where is his portable welding machine located?
Does the door, which is now kept open to accommodate the welding
cable, affect the extent of the hazardous area?
All the maintenance operations on electrical equipment in hazardous areas
require a work permit.
General descriptive information regarding the identification and classification
of hazardous areas should be part of the unit's Operations Manual. Prior to
the arrival of well-testing equipment on board an updated plan reflecting the
location and layout of this temporary equipment should be submitted for
approval.
Guidance for the placement and safe operation of the well-testing equipment
should be part of the unit's Operations Manual. The areas around potential
sources of gas release should be classified as appropriate for the duration of
the well-testing operations.
Containment and adjacent spaces
Now that the hazardous areas are identified, we have to make sure that the
atmosphere does not affect the adjacent enclosed spaces. For that purpose
the following conditions prevail for access openings between hazardous
areas and non-hazardous locations:
ZONE 1
Access is fitted with self-closing gastight doors forming
an air lock.
ZONE 2
Access is fitted with self-closing gastight doors that
open into the non-hazardous location.
Where ventilation arrangements of the intended safe space are considered
sufficient by the Flag State Administration to prevent any ingress of gas
from the Zone-1 location, the two self-closing doors forming an air lock may
be replaced by a single self-closing gastight door, which opens into the non-
hazardous location and has no hold-back device.
Air locks are regarded as hazardous areas. A gastight door contains a seal
made out of rubber, cotton or another material.
Appendices

498

When is a door gastight?
Let the door close by itself and run the ventilation system. If you can feel a
draft with your hand then the door is not gastight.
Note: Watertight doors might be gastight but they are not self-closing.
Piping systems should be designed to preclude direct communication
between hazardous areas of different classification and between hazardous
and non-hazardous areas.
For structural fire protection, bulkheads and decks between hazardous areas
and adjacent machinery spaces of category A or control stations should be of
an A-60 rating. Bulkheads and decks between hazardous areas and all other
spaces should be at least of an A-0 rating.
3.3 Ventilation and alarms
When we run into gas, we want to dispose of the gas to an outdoor area; on
top of that we want to be informed about it.
Ventilation
Enclosed hazardous spaces should be ventilated in such a manner that the
enclosed hazardous spaces are maintained with under-pressure in relation to
the less hazardous/non-hazardous spaces and non-hazardous enclosed
spaces are maintained in overpressure to adjacent hazardous spaces.
The philosophy behind this is obvious: no explosive gases must be able
escape/migrate to other areas. Non-hazardous gases are allowed to enter
the hazardous area, not the other way round.
The following conditions prevail for non-hazardous enclosed spaces adjacent
to hazardous areas:
The space has ventilation overpressure in relation to
the hazardous space.
ZONE 1
Loss of ventilation overpressure is alarmed at a
manned station.
Ventilation is such that the air flow with the door open
goes from the non-hazardous space into the Zone-2
location. ZONE 2
Loss of ventilation is alarmed at a manned station.
Ventilation for hazardous areas is to be completely separate from that of
non-hazardous areas. Where passing through hazardous areas, ducts
serving non-hazardous areas are to have overpressure in relation to the
hazardous area.
Ventilation ducts servicing hazardous areas are not allowed to run through
accommodations, service spaces or control stations. And vice versa:
ventilation ducts of accommodations, service spaces or control stations
should not pass through hazardous areas.

Appendices

499

The means provided for stopping the power ventilation servicing hazardous
areas should be entirely separate from the means provided for stopping
ventilation of other spaces.
Bear this in mind: The last thing we want to do in case of fire somewhere
outside the hazardous areas is to stop the ventilation of the hazardous
areas!
Gas sensors and alarms
An approved fixed automatic gas detection and alarm system should be
provided, arranged in such a way as to monitor continuously all enclosed
areas of the unit in which an accumulation of flammable gas may be
expected to occur.
CH
4
combustible-gas detectors must be located all over the rig, especially in
the hazardous zones. Upon detection an audible and visual alarm is initiated
via the fire and gas panel, indicating the level and location of the gas
accumulation.
In addition to the fixed sensors there should be two portable gas detectors
on board each rig. Cans of test gas should be available in order to test the
system.
3.4 Electrical and mechanical equipment
When we run into flammable gas we do not want it to be ignited. That is why
strict rules and regulations apply to mechanical and electrical equipment in
hazardous areas.
Electrical equipment
All the electrical equipment should be properly earth-bonded. Bolted
connections are not considered earth-bonded; only welded connections are
regarded as such. Electric cables have to be properly secured. Splices in
cables in hazardous areas should be avoided.
The equipment should be certified for the intended zone. This means that
the equipment is to be linked to a certificate via a label or tag, indicating
that an independent certifying body has carried out type-approval tests on it
and has certified it as suitable for the intended use.
Needless to say, there should be no departure from the design thus tested
and approved.
Appendices

500

Only the following types are permitted:
Intrinsically safe EXi
Flameproof (explosion-proof) EXd
Increased safety EXe
ZONE 1
Pressurized-enclosure (purged) EXp
As Zone 1
ZONE 2
Any equipment of a type which ensures absence of
sparks or arcs and of hot spots during normal op-
eration and which is to the satisfaction of the ad-
ministration.
Intrinsically safe (EXi)
These circuits are incapable of releasing sufficient electrical or thermal
energy under normal or abnormal conditions to cause ignition of a specific
hazardous atmospheric mixture in its most easily ignited concentration. They
have such low power consumption that there is not enough energy
around to generate a spark.
EXi circuits are fed via barriers, interfaces between the EXi and the non-EXi
circuits. The barriers should be located in non-hazardous areas. Cables of
EXi circuits should have a blue colour, and EXi cables and non-EXi cables are
not allowed in the same junction box.
Explosion-proof (EXd)
This equipment is located in heavy enclosures which can stand the forces of
an internal explosion. The flanges of EXd enclosures have large sealing
surfaces in order to create a flamepath.
There is no gasket between the flanges but a very small clearance of
approximately 0.1 mm. Therefore, do not get confused and mix up
explosion-proof junction boxes with watertight junction boxes!
When an explosion takes place inside the box the pressure will be relieved
via the flamepath to the outside atmosphere. Due to this very small
clearance an expansion of the gases takes place which extinguishes all
flames.
Flamepaths are prone to corrosion and their maintenance should be
incorporated in the unit's planned maintenance system. Flamepaths are to
be opened up on a yearly basis and have their flanges cleaned and coated
with some kind of Vaseline to protect them against the salty environment.
Increased safety (EXe)
Increased safety equipment is normally placed in sealed boxes, using an O-
ring seal. The special designed cable connections are double-secured, to
prevent the electrical connections become lose which could create heat or
sparks.

Appendices

501

Pressurized-enclosure (purged) (EXp)
Purged systems have their enclosures, junction boxes etc. over-pressurized
in relation to the outside hazardous atmosphere, hence preventing
hazardous gases to enter.
Normally the purge medium is air, which should be drawn from a non-
hazardous location. Loss of purge air should at least trigger an audible
and visible alarm at a normally manned control station, or an automatic cut-
out of the system.
A start interlock should allow ample time to pre-purge the equipment prior
to the (re)start; according to ABS rules the enclosure has to be purged with
a minimum of ten air changes.
For MODUs with a Certificate of Fitness issued by the HSE (British
government) to operate on the UK Continental Shelf, the following additional
requirements apply:
All electrical equipment on the rig is to be earth-bonded and yearly
checked, via the planned maintenance system, to be less than 1 ohm.
All electrical equipment in hazardous areas is to be properly identified
and labelled or tagged.
Hazardous-area equipment is to be maintained and proof hereof is to be
recorded as per unit's PMS.
ABS MODU rules require the power for large DC motors (drawworks, mud
pumps, rotary table and top drive) to be automatically disconnected upon a
gas alarm in conjunction with a fire alarm anywhere on the rig. However,
this rule is not followed as the industry agrees that this would jeopardize
well control procedures and create an even more dangerous situation.
Mechanical equipment
Mechanical equipment in hazardous areas should be limited to that
necessary for operational purposes.
Ventilators
Ventilation of hazardous areas should be maintained by non-sparking fans.
This also goes for the supply and exhaust ventilators for the hazardous
spaces which are located outside on deck. Their electric motors should
obviously be explosion-proof. For an extensive list of requirements regarding
design, material and type test, refer to ABS MODU Rules 4 (Chapter 11:
Non-Sparking Fans).
Diesel engines
Internal-combustion engines on the rig have to be provided with spark
arrestors in their exhaust uptakes. Diesel engines are normally not located in
hazardous zones, unless they are essential for operational purposes. Such
installations will be subject to special consideration from the side of the
Class and the Flag State Administration. If so, their hot parts should be
properly insulated.
Dampeners which close on overspend trip should be installed in the intakes
for combustion air, smothering the engine in case of drawing in combustible
gas.
Appendices

502

Third-party equipment
We already discussed about well-testing equipment, but what about mud-
logging containers, wire line units, etc. that are shipped to the rig to be
located in a hazardous area?
Standard North Sea practice, implemented by coastal states, follows the
steps as listed below:
The portable cabins should be A-60 insulated.
Entrance should be via an air lock.
Ventilation is to be drawn from a non-hazardous area.
Power is to be shut down upon loss of ventilation/overpressure.
Start the interlock to facilitate ample pre-purge time prior to restoration
of power.
Fire- and gas-alarmed cabins with the signals/alarms linked into the fire
and gas panel of the rig.
PA and rig alarm system must be extended to the portable
cabin/container.
3.5 When the situation becomes uncontrollable
The moment the explosion hazard extends outside the hazardous zones, a
total rig shutdown should be initiated. For that purpose two shutdown
buttons for main generator and emergency generator prime movers should
be provided at strategic locations.
One of these locations is normally the rig floor, the other one has to be
outside the hazardous areas, for instance the drilling office inside the
accommodation. The following facilities should be operable after a total rig
shutdown.
Emergency lighting for the duration of thirty minutes of:
Every embarkation station on deck and over the sides
Service and accommodation alleyways, stairways and exits, trunks and
elevators
Machinery spaces and main generating spaces including their control
positions
Ballast and machinery control rooms
Below-mentioned emergency equipment located in non-enclosed spaces
should be suitable for Zone-2 hazardous areas:
Blow-out preventer control system
General-alarm system
Public-address system
Battery-supplied radio communication installations
Under normal conditions, HSE regulations call for an overpressure in the
accommodation of 50 Pascal, generated by the HVAC system. Combustible-
gas sensors are located at the intakes of the HVAC system.

Appendices

503

Intake dampeners in the system will close automatically upon gas detection,
or their closure is manually initiated via the fire and gas panel, hence
preventing the ingress of gases.
The accommodation bulkhead facing the rig floor should be of A-60 rating,
including portholes. Now a temporary safe refuge (TSR) is created. The crew
should muster inside the accommodation. Hand-held GMDSS radios
(including recharging facilities) have to be provided at the muster stations.
When lifeboats are outside the "shade" of the accommodation they should
be shielded off by bulkheads against heat radiation from the rig floor,
making an embarkation feasible.
3.6 Electrical equipment in hazardous areas
Within many industries flammable atmospheres exist. The possibility of
igniting the atmosphere and causing an explosion, which would cause injury
to personnel and damage to equipment, must be avoided.
In the drilling industry, being predominately on small confined locations, the
risk to personnel is even higher. People simply have no place to run! Drilling,
like most offshore installations and ships used in the transportation of oil,
uses EX equipment as a way of reducing the possibility of electrical
equipment igniting any flammable atmosphere.
During drilling operations there is a constant possibility of gas from the
strata, permeating into the open drilling-mud circuit, coming to the surface
and creating the flammable atmosphere.
Mining is another industry where there is a constant danger of gas during
normal operations. Other industries endeavour to contain all flammable
substances and remove or vent them in a safe manner.
Electrical equipment suitable for use in potentially explosive atmospheres is
the correct way to describe this electrical equipment. This is a mouthful and
by use it has been shortened to EX equipment or just EX.
The term EX equipment is used to describe any piece of electrical
equipment, which is certified for use in potentially explosive atmospheres or
what is commonly known as hazardous areas.
For an installation or plant to be safely protected from the ignition of
flammable atmospheres by electrical equipment, an assessment of the level
of risk is needed.
This risk is grouped into zones where Zone 0 has the highest risk level
Zone1 and Zone 2 reducing the risk levels. These zones are grouped
together to be called the hazardous areas. Any area which is not classified as
Zone 0, 1 or 2 is called non-hazardous. These zones do not take into
account the expected substance to be released, only the possibility of it
being present.
EX equipment have several sub-groups, each with a different concept of
providing the safety standard. The higher the likelihood of gas, the more
severe the protection methods are. Some can only be used in Zone-2 areas.
Appendices

504

Another group can be used in Zones 1 and 2 and a much smaller group in
Zones 0, 1 and 2. The zone is used to select the types of protection, which is
allowed. The substance present within the process is used to specify the EX
equipment with temperature rating and gas group being of prime
importance.
The selection of the equipment for one industry or plant cannot be taken as
suitable for a similarly looking location within another. The drilling industry
has one advantage on this point: the groups of gases and substances
expected to be found are the same throughout the world and therefore
similar EX equipment will be located in similar locations on many drilling
units worldwide.
Drilling has evolved a set of recommended practices for the zoning of the
drilling units. These practices are widely used and make the work of the
electrical-maintenance staff easier in knowing that one rig is very much the
same as the next. However, each rig has to have a defined plan, accepted
and passed by the certifying authority as complying with their and all
published oilfield recommended practices.
Specification of the EX equipment, apart from the electrical function which it
is to perform, must take the following into account:
the zone in which it is to be fitted
the gas or substance expected
the surface temperature allowed for the EX equipment
Once the electrical equipment has been specified it is handed over to the
electrician to be fitted. The engineer has to select the equipment to be safe,
but it must be installed correctly or all the expensive EX equipment will not
provide the level of safety expected. The installation of the EX equipment,
which may look neat and tidy, well marked and up to the visual standards
expected, may have hidden faults, which will make it unfit for use in the
hazardous zone.
Several points which would infringe the certification and make the
equipment unsafe are the following:
The cable glands are of an incorrect type.
Glands are incorrectly fitted.
The removal or non-fitting of seals and gaskets.
The equipment has been moved for whatever reason. It may well have
been taken from one zone to another and not be certified for the new
zone.
EX equipment is mounted too close to another piece of EX equipment.
Cable entries are not correctly blanked.
Mounting holes have been drilled through the enclosure to make a fixing
point.
Cables are terminated incorrectly inside the enclosure.
Too many cables are inside the enclosure.
Spare cable cores are not terminated to earth.
Not all the cover bolts have been fitted.
Not all the cover bolts are of the correct specification or type.
The gap between joints on EXd equipment is above the maximum gap
permissible.
The correct identification of the equipment has not been added to the
rig's EX equipment register.

Appendices

505

Incorrect use of silicone sealant.
Incorrect use of electrical tape as temporary repair or cover for cables
entering the EX glands.
The equipment has to be installed by a person who has the knowledge to
understand all of the above (and more) points. More importantly, this person
must know when to ask his supervisor when he is not sure of the
requirements.
It is evident that the skills required carrying out installation and mainte-
nance of EX equipment is much higher than those required for non-EX (i.e.
industrial) equipment. The safety of the installation depends upon all the
equipment being fit for purpose. To continue to be fit for purpose, EX
equipment must be installed to the standard laid down in the certification
supplied with the equipment.
EX equipment is safety-critical equipment and is expected to be maintained
in satisfactory condition throughout the entire life of the installation or plant.
To ensure that the EX equipment is maintained correctly a formal system of
inspection and maintenance needs to be in place.
The levels of maintenance and installation of EX equipment vary considera-
bly: some are exemplary, others are in such a poor condition they cause
concern. Once EX equipment maintenance standards slip the effort in terms
of costs and time to bring the installation back to acceptable standard is not
insignificant.
It seldom happens that only one piece of EX equipment has not been main-
tained; normally whole areas or in most cases all areas have been ne-
glected. It normally takes a dedicated team to be shipped out to the instal-
lation to just tackle the EX equipment problems.
It is evident from our inspections that on various locations the electrical staff
do not understand the concepts and requirements of EX equipment. They
think they are doing a good job but because of lack of knowledge they fail to
understand they are placing a greater risk to the installation due to this par-
tial knowledge. This widespread problem needs careful monitoring. Unfortu-
nately, we do not believe this situation is confined to the drilling industry.
Core staff should be encouraged to undertake training in the EX standards to
reduce the risks of poor EX maintenance. After all, the company takes time
and effort to specify the correct equipment and locating it in the correct
zone.
If the EX equipment is not installed and maintained by knowledgeable
maintenance electricians it will become just as non-EX as any industrial
equipment with all the inherent dangers.
Appendices

506

3.7 Maintenance of EX equipment is a lifelong commitment
Definitions
The subject of EX equipment has many statements and designations. They
all are very important and can easily cause confusion. A list of the major
statements is given below.
EX equipment Electrical equipment designed for use in areas where
potentially explosive atmospheres may exist.
Hazardous area Area or space where potentially explosive atmospheres
may exist at some time.
Zone Area designation defined by the length of time during
which potentially explosive atmospheres might exist at
that point or area.
Classification
society
The society which provides the rules according to
which the installation is built and maintained, thereby
allowing insurance cover for the installation to be is-
sued, e.g. ABS, DNV, Lloyd's and others.
Certification
authority
The company, which tests electrical equipment and
issues a certificate to indicate the equipment, satisfies
the requirement for EX equipment, e.g. UL, FM,
CENELEC, BASEEFA and others.
EX type The method in which the equipment provides protec-
tion against the ignition of potentially explosive atmos-
pheres.
Division USA designation of the area defined by the length of
time and probability that potentially explosive atmos-
pheres may exist at that area.
MODU Code The IMO code for the construction and equipment for
mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs).
IMO International Marine Organization for the improvement
of safety standards, regulations and the issuing of
guidelines on marine safety.
3.8 What are the flammable substances on drilling units?
Mobile Offshore Drilling Units and land rigs are predominately engaged in
the drilling for hydrocarbons, oil and gas. They are designed for this
purpose and all the equipment is designed, installed and maintained for the
expected gases.
The flammable substances on board are not confined to the drilled
formation fluids. The rig also has paint storage, fumes from diesel storage
tanks, helicopter refuelling systems and gas produced from the charging of
batteries. All of these gases are explosive when in the critical mixture.

Appendices

507

The main area of concern is formed by the drilling fluids and the area
around the well opening. With correct use of drilling fluid, major gas
releases are minimized. However, the equipment which is located in the
potentially hazardous areas must be designed and maintained for the time
the well gives problems and gas is present on the rig and within the mud
system.
All oil contains a combination of hydrocarbons. The proportions of the gas
types within crude oil vary throughout the world. In general, it is assumed
that the drilling industry encounters natural gas, H
2
S, aviation fuel and
diesel fumes.
Each of these gases or vapours has a different property. The properties of
these gases are needed to ensue the EX equipment is correctly chosen for
the area and the expected gas.
3.9 Definitions EX Equipment
3.9.1 Basic concepts of protection
Protection of EX equipment is split into several specific types. All are
labelled EX followed by a letter, which indicates the way EX protection is
achieved.
The list is:
EXd Explosion-proof
EXe Increased safety
EXi Intrinsic safety
EXm Moulded/encapsulated
EXn Non-spark/Non-incendive (flammable)
EXo Oil-filled
EXp Pressurized
EXq Quarts-/sand-filled
EXs Special
The way protection is achieved can be roughly defined as:
containing the danger within the equipment
exclude the dangerous gas from contact with electrical-ignition sources
reduce the source of ignition by design and construction
From these characteristics several specific types of protection have been
evolved. Each will use one of the above forms as a basis.
The specific type of protection will achieve the necessary level of safety by
use of one of the basic forms with additional designs and concepts.

Appendices

508

3.9.2 Protection type EXd (explosion-proof)
Definition EXd
The type of protection in which parts that can ignite an explosive
atmosphere are placed in an enclosure, which can withstand the pressure,
developed during an internal explosion of an explosive mixture; and which
prevents the transmission of the explosion of the explosive atmosphere
surrounding the enclosure.
BS 5501 part 5

3.9.3 Protection type EXe (increased safety)
Definition EXe
The type of protection by which measures are applied so as to prevent
(with a higher degree of security) the possibility of excessive
temperatures and the occurrence of arcs and sparks in the interior and on
external parts of an electrical apparatus which does not produce excessive
temperatures in normal service.
BS 5501 part 6

3.9.4 Protection type EXm (moulded/encapsulated)
Definition EXm
A type of protection in which the parts which could ignite an atmosphere
(by sparking or heat) are enclosed in a compound in such a way that this
explosive atmosphere cannot ignite.
BS 5501 part 8

3.9.5 Protection type EXi (intrinsically safe)
Definition EXi
A circuit in which no spark or thermal effect produced under prescribed
test conditions (which include normal operation and specified fault
conditions) is capable of causing ignition of the explosive atmosphere.
However, the method by which intrinsic safety is achieved makes it
necessary to ensure that not only the electrical apparatus exposed to the
potentially explosive atmosphere, but also the associated electrical
apparatus with which it is connected, is suitably constructed.
BS 5501 part 7

Appendices

509

3.9.6 Protection type EXn (non-incendive)
Definition EXn
A type of protection applied to an electrical apparatus in such a way that,
in normal operations, it is not capable of igniting a surrounding explosive
atmosphere so that a fault capable of causing ignition is not likely to
occur.
BS 5501 part 3

3.9.7 Protection type EXo (oil-filled)
Definition EXo
A type of protection in which the electrical apparatuses or part of the
electrical apparatuses are immersed in oil in such a way that an
explosive atmosphere, which may be above the oil or outside the
enclosure, cannot be ignited.
BS 5501 part 2

3.9.8 Protection type EXp (pressurization)
Definition EXp
A type of protection by which the entry of a surrounding atmosphere into
the enclosure of electrical apparatus is prevented by maintaining, inside
the enclosure, a protective gas at a higher pressure than the surrounding
atmosphere.
The overpressure is maintained either with or without a continuous flow
of protective gas.
BS 5501 part 3

3.9.9 Protection type EXq (quarts-/sand-filled)
Definition EXq
A type of protection in which the enclosure of electric apparatus is filled
with a material in a finely granulated state, so that in the intended
conditions of service, any arc occurring within the enclosure of an
electrical apparatus will not ignite the surrounding atmosphere. No
ignition shall be caused either by flame or excessive temperature on the
surface of the enclosure.
BS 5501 part 4

Appendices

510

Definition EXs
Apparatus which does not quite meet the requirements of a particular
British Standard may be certified under BASEEFA standard "Special
protection EXs" providing it is established that, after close scrutiny of the
design and testing of the apparatus, it is capable of operating safely in
the hazard which it was designed for.
SFA 3009 / HSE (M) 01
3.10 I dentification of electrical equipment located in hazardous
areas
Electrical equipment is generally enclosed. Enclosures are provided for both
personnel and equipment protection. Electrical equipment should be
protected against external influences which could impair the explosion-proof
protection (e.g. chemical, thermal, mechanical, vibration or moisture
effects). All electrical equipment installed in a hazardous area should be
marked as such.
Examples of equipment markings:

EEXed IIc T6
EEX: equipment for hazardous area, European standard
ed: type of protection used. In this case, dual protection: increased
safety + flameproof enclosure
IIc: classification of the flammable material which may be present in the
atmosphere. In this case, hydrogen sulphide gas.
T6: maximum temperature of the enclosure surface. In this case: 85C.

EX Class 1, Group D, Division 1, T2
EX: equipment for hazardous area, US standard
Class 1: hazard category: gas and vapours
Group D: kind of gas. In this case, propane or methane.
Division 1: suitable for area where there is intermittent hazard in
normal operation
T2: temperature class. Maximum temperature of enclosure: 300C.

Class 1, Zone 1, AEX, ia, IIc, T6
Class 1: hazard category: gas or vapours
Zone 1: area for which the equipment is suitable
AEX: EX-equipment built to American standards
ia: protection method (intrinsically safe circuit)
IIc: gas classification group
T6: maximum temperature of the enclosure surface. In this case: 85C.
If electrical equipment installed in hazardous areas is not marked as such, it
is not fit to operate in these areas.

Appendices

511

References
API RP 505 and API RP 14F
IEC publication 50-426/529
IEC 600 79-10/79-14/79-17
ISA RP-12.1.01/RP-12.6/RP-12.24.01
ISA S12.4/S12.13 S51.1
NEC articles 500 through 505 and article 550
NFPA 496 and 497
UL 913
3.11 HAZARDOUS AREA GUI DE ( UK)
Quick Guide to Degrees of Protection - FLAMMABILITY
Quick Guide to Degrees of Protection - INGRESS
Flammability - Hazardous areas are those areas in which there exists a risk
of explosion because flammable atmospheres are likely to be present. These
atmospheres are either man-made (e.g. in petrochemical plants) or natural
(e.g. in coal mines). It is important to ensure that all electrical equipment
installed in a hazardous area cannot form a spark or hot surface that could
ignite the flammable atmospheres. This is achieved by having the equipment
examined and tested by a recognized testing authority before it is used in a
hazardous area.
If the equipment passes this examination, then a Certificate of Conformity is
issued that specifies the limits of use of the equipment.
Ingress - Ingress is the term given to the risk of equipment being punc-
tured by solid bodies and from the ingress liquids.
Warning: Users are advised to refer to BS 5345 Parts 1 and 6 prior to in-
stallation of equipment in hazardous areas.
PROTECTION CONCEPTS
ZONE HAZARD PROTECTION CONCEPTS
0 An explosive gas/air mixture is
continuously present for long
periods
EXia or EXs
likely to occur in normal
operation.
EXd, EXe, EXib, EXp, EXia, EXs
not likely to occur in normal
operation.
All concepts suitable for: Zone 0
and 1, EXn, EXo and EXq
Appendices

512

STANDARDS FOR METHODS OF PROTECTION
METHOD OF
PROTECTION
PERMITTED ZONE
OF USE IN UK
CODE LETTER
IEC, EX, CENELEC,
EEX
General requirement - -
Oil immersion 2 o
Pressurization 1 or 2 p
Powder filling 2 q
Flameproof 1 or 2 d
Increased safety 1 or 2 e
Intrinsic safety 0, 1 or 2 * ia or ib
Non-incendive 2 n #
Encapsulation 1 or 2 m
Special 1 or 2 s
* ia: Zone 0, 1, 2. ib: Zone 1, 2. not Zone 0. # n: used locally in UK.

GAS GROUPING TEMPERATURE CLASSIFICATION
Gas

No. Group
CENELEC EN
50 014, IEC
Representative
gas
T Class / IEC
79-7
Max. surface
temperature
I*
(mining)
methane T1 450C
IIA propane T2 300C
IIB ethylene T3 200C
IIC hydrogen T4 135C
T5 100C
T6 85C

Appendices

513

CERTIFICATION CODE
(CENELEC marking information - example [EEx ia] IIC T4)
[ E EX ia ] IIC T4
Associated
apparatus*
Certified to
the
CENELEC
standard
Explosion-
protected
Protection
concept (IS)
Associated
apparatus*
Apparatus
group (gas
group)
Temperature
classification
(not Gp I)
* Located in a safe area and may be connected to a hazardous area

Quick Guide to Degrees of Protection - INGRESS - UK
INGRESS PROTECTION (IP) CODES - BS EN 60 529: 1992
FIRST NUMERAL
Protection against solid bodies
SECOND NUMERAL
Protection against liquids
0 No protection 0 No protection
1 Objects larger than 50 mm 1 Vertically dripping water
2 Objects larger than 12 mm 2 Angled dripping water -75 to 90C
3 Objects larger than 2.5 mm 3 Sprayed water
4 Objects larger than 1.0 mm 4 Splashed water
5 Dust-protected 5 Water jets
6 Dust-tight 6 Heavy seas
7 Effects of immersion
8 Indefinite immersion

Examples:
IP 67 = Ingress Protection: dust-tight and protected against immersion
IP 56 = Ingress Protection: dust-protected and protected against heavy seas
Appendices

514

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