Young vs.

Sy
G.R. 157745 September 26, 2006 Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.: Forum Shopping; Litis Pendentia Facts: 1. The case involves 2 petitions for review under Rule 45 which were consolidated. Both petitions originated from a Complaint for Nullification of Second Supplemental Extra-judicial Settlement, Mortgage, Foreclosure Sale and Tax Declaration filed by the petitioner Genalyn D. Young. In her complaint, she alleged that the extra-judicial partition executed by her mother that adjudicated an unregistered parcel of land solely in favor of the latter, is unenforceable, since at the time of the execution, she (petitioner) was only 15 years old and no court approval had been procured; that the partition had been registered with the Register of Deeds; that Lilia Dy obtained a loan from spouses Manuel Sy and Victoria Sy (respondents) and mortgaged the subject property; that the property was foreclosed and sold to the highest bidder, respondent Manuel Sy; that a Certificate of Sale for this purpose had been registered with the Register of Deeds; and that, thereafter, respondents obtained in their name a tax declaration over the property in question. 2. The petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint, attaching the Supplemental Complaint and she invoked her right, as co-owner, to exercise the legal redemption. 3. The RTC denied the Motion hence the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA denied the petition and held that the cause of

action of the petitioner in the Supplemental Complaint is entirely different from the original complaint; that the Supplemental Complaint did not merely supply its deficiencies; and that, at any rate, in the event the trial court issues an adverse ruling, the petitioner can still appeal the same, hence, the petition under Rule 65 is not proper. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. 3. While the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus (re: Supplemental Complaint) was pending in the CA, trial in the RTC continued. On August 29, 2001, a day before the hearing slated for August 30, 2001, the petitioner filed a Motion to Cancel Hearing, alleging that she was indisposed. On the day of the hearing, respondents, through counsel, objected to the postponement and moved for the dismissal of the case for non-suit. The RTC sustained the objection and issued the assailed August 30, 2001 Order dismissing the Complaint. 4. On top of the foregoing appeal, the petitioner, four months after filing her Notice of Appeal to the CA, filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70610 to annul the same RTC Orders that comprise the subject matter of the ordinary appeal. The petitioner raised essentially the same issues. CA denied the petition and held that the dismissal of the case by the RTC on the ground of non prosequitur has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits that may constitute an error of judgment correctible by ordinary appeal and not by certiorari; that the petitioner actually chose the mode of ordinary appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal on January 31, 2000; and that since the remedy of appeal was available, then the petition for certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, must fail. ISSUE: Whether or not there is forum shopping

YES, the Petitioner guilty of forum shopping 1. Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. There is forum shopping where there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata. 2. The petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a petition for certiorari with the CA, engaged in forum shopping. When the petitioner commenced the appeal, only four months had elapsed prior to her filing with the CA the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and which eventually came up to this Court by way of the instant Petition. 3. The elements of litis pendentia are present between the two suits. Both suits are founded on exactly the same facts and refer to the same subject matterthe RTC Orders which dismissed Civil Case No. SP-5703 (2000) for failure to prosecute. In both cases, the petitioner is seeking the reversal of the RTC orders. The parties, the rights asserted, the issues professed, and the reliefs prayed for, are all the same. It is evident that the judgment of one forum may amount to res judicata in the other.

Leobrera vs. CA
G.R. No. 80001 February 27, 1989 Ponente: Cortez, J.:

Facts: 1. The petitioner was granted a credit facility and revolving fund by BPI consisting of several amounts. Both were secured by a mortgage. The facility was granted as part of an amicable settlement between BPI and Leobrera wherein the latter agreed to drop his claims for damages against the former for its alleged failure to deliver on time three export letters of credit opened in Leobrera's favor. In 1984, the facility was entirely converted into a revolving promissory note line. The line was last renewed on 21 March 1986 evidenced by two 90-day promissory notes. 2. Leobrera also obtained from BPI a separate three-year term loan in the amount of P 500,000.00 evidenced by Promissory Note. This three-year term loan was secured by a third real estate mortgage. Upon maturity of the 90-day notes, BPI and Leobrera negotiated on the terms of their renewal. No agreement having been reached by them, so BPI demanded the full payment of the loan. 3. Leobrera failed to settle his loan account thus BPI prepared to foreclose the real estate mortgages securing the same. Before BPI could institute foreclosure proceedings however, Leobrera filed on 6 January 1987 a complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin BPI from foreclosing the mortgages.

4. The trial court issued an order restraining BPI from foreclosing the real estate mortgages securing the 90 day loans and, after hearing, issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, on 9 February 1987, the bank wrote Leobrera claiming that he failed to pay the amortization due on the three-year term loan, as a result of which, BPI opted to accelarate the maturity of the loan and called the entire loan due and demandable. Leobrera likewise failed to remit the amount due and BPI thus threatened to foreclose the real estate mortgage securing the loan. 5. Before BPI could foreclose the mortgage, petitioner filed with the trial court on 11 March 1987 a "Motion to File Supplemental Complaint," attaching the supplemental complaint which prayed for the issuance of an injunction to restrain BPI from foreclosing the third mortgage. The next day, 12 March 1987, the trial court granted Leobrera's motion to file the supplemental complaint and issued a restraining order enjoining BPI from proceeding with any "Legal, court or other action" arising from the promissory note evidencing the three-year term loan. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in admitting the supplemental complaint YES. 1. The Court ruled that when the cause of action stated in the supplemental complaint is different from the causes of action mentioned in the original complaint, the court should not admit the supplemental complaint; the parties may file supplemental pleadings only to supply deficiencies in aid of an original pleading, but not to introduce new and independent causes of action.

As to the supplemental complaint, what likewise militates against its admission is the fact that the matters involved therein are entirely different from the causes of action mentioned in the original complaint.

2. The petitioner's main cause of action in the original complaint filed in Civil Case No. 15644 concerned BPI's threat to foreclose two real estate mortgages securing the two 90 day promissory notes executed by petitioner in 1986. Petitioner alleges that this threatened foreclosure violated the terms of the 1980 amicable settlement between BPI and petitioner.While the supplemental complaint alleged acts of harassment committed by BPI in unreasonably opting to declare petitioner in default and in demanding full liquidation of the 1985 three-year term loan. This three-year term loan, as previously mentioned, was entirely distinct and separate from the two promissory notes. It was independent of the 1980 amicable settlement between petitioner and BPI which gave rise to the credit facility subject of the original complaint. Although there is Identity in the remedies asked for in the original and supplemental complaints, i.e. injunction, petitioner's subsequent cause of action giving rise to the claim for damages in the supplemental complaint is unrelated to the amicable settlement which brought about the grant of the credit facilities, the breach of which settlement is alleged to be the basis of the original complaint. As the allegations reveal, the P 500,000.00 three-year term loan is a transaction independent of the P 800,000.00 credit facility and BPI's questioned act of threatening to foreclose the properties securing said loan was the result of an alleged default by petitioner in the payment of the amortization due for 9 February 1987 and not because of any circumstance related to the 1980 amicable settlement.

The two causes of action being entirely different, the latter one could not be successfully pleaded by supplemental complaint.

ons, they must, in order to have such e f f e c t , b e formally offered in evidence.

Santos vs Lumbao Director of lands vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: 1. Defendant through his lawyer, filed an answer therein admitting the averment in the complaint that the land was acquired by the plaintiff through inheritance from his parents, the former owners thereof. 2.Subsequently, the defendant changed his counsel, and with leave of court, amended the answer. In the amended answer, the admission no longer appears. The alleged ownership of the land by the plaintiff was denied coupled with an allegation that the defendant is the owner of the land as he bought it from the plaintiffs parents while they were still alive. 3. A f t e r t r i a l , t h e l o w e r c o u r t u p h e l d t h e d e f e n d a n t s ownership of the land. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the defendant is bound by the admission contained in his original answer. Issue: Whether or not the contention of plaintiff correct NO. The original pleading had been amended such that it already disappeared from the record, lost its status as pleadings and cease to be judicial admissions. While such may be utilizeda g a i n s t t h e p l e a d e r a s e x t r a j u d i c i a l a d m i s s i Facts: 1. Respondent spouses Lumbao filed an action for reconveyance with damages against petitioners. Petitioners are survivors and legitimate heirs of Rita Santos who allegedly sold 2 parcels of land to respondents when she was alive by virtue of a document called bilihan ng lupa, The repsondents even claimed that the execution of the document was signed and witnessed by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo. 2. After having acquired the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession and built a house which they occupied as exclusive owners up to the present. The respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in their favor. 3. Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned. 4. Finally, the respondents Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other heirs, the estate left by Maria, which

included the lot already sold to them. Due to refusal of petitioners to convey the said propert, the spouses filed the action. 5. The lower court (RTC) dismissed the complaint of ground of lack of cause of action as the spouses allegedly did not comply with the required barangay conciliation. The CA granted and ordered the petititoners to convey the land to the spouses, hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the admissions made are admissible and binding YES. As a general rule, facts alleged in a partys pleading are deemed admissions of that party and are binding upon him, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule.

Lupa," petitioner Virgilio, in his cross-examination, denied having knowledge of the sale transaction and claimed that he could not remember the same as well as his appearance before the notary public due to the length of time that had passed.

Gardner vs. CA
G.R. No. L-59952 August 31, 1984 Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J.:

Facts:

1. An answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. And in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a partys pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented.However, in the case at bar, petitioners had not adduced any other evidence to override the admission made in their answer that Virgilio and Tadeo actually signed the [Bilihan ng Lupa. Hence, the general rule that the admissions made by a party in a pleading are binding and conclusive upon him applies in this case.

1. The case involve several transfers of the subject real property. It appears that petitioners the Gardner spouse enter into an agreement with Respondent spouses, the Santoses to subdivide 2 parcels of land and executed an absolute deed of sale in favor of the latter. The real truth is that what occurred was a sale in trust since the petitioner obtained an amount of money from the respondents, who inturn promised to improve the land.

2. In the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979, the signatures of petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared thereon. Moreover, in petitioners Answer and Amended Answer to the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages, both petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo made an admission that indeed they acted as witnesses in the execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979. However, in order to avoid their obligations in the said "Bilihan ng

2. Apparently, the Santoses transferred the properties to the Cuencas who in turn transferred it to the Verroyas who executive a mortgage over the lot. Then Verroya executed a deed of transfers to the Natividads. Note that from the titles of the Cuencas (the Second Transferees) to the titles of the Natividads (the Fourth Transferee), the Adverse Claim of the Gardners continued to be carried, and that throughout the successive transfers, the petitioners continued to remain in possession, cultivation and occupation of the disputed properties.

3. In their Answer, the Santoses claimed that the sale to them was conditional in the sense that the properties were to be considered as the investment of the petitioners in the subdivision venture and that in the event that this did not materialize they were to reconvey the lots to petitioners upon reimbursement by the latter of all sums advanced to them; and that the deed of sale was to be registered for the protection of the Santoses considering the moneys that the latter would be advancing. 4. Hence, the Gardners filed an action for declaration of Nullity, Rescission and damages against the 5 transferres and mortgagees. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners declaring the transfers null and void. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC but reconsidered it decision and ruled that the sale of land to Natividads are valid.

overturn their findings thereon. Santos likewise admitted against his own interest that the petitioners did not receive from him any consideration, which corroborated the declarations of the petitioners. The Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement express that the true and real nature of the agreement between the parties, which was for a subdivision and not a sale transaction.

2. All Five Transfers were absolutely simulated and fictitious and were, therefore, void ab initio and inexistent. Contracts of sale are void and produce no effect whatsoever where the price, which appears therein as paid, has, in fact, never been paid by the purchaser to the vendor.

Issue: Whether or not the admissions made by Santos in the pleadings are admissible

Cabili vs. Badelles

Facts:

NO.
1. Elections of November 10, 1959, Respondent Badelles and Petitioner Cabili were rival candidates for the office of city mayor of Iligan City. Cabili was proclaimed elected and thereafter assumed office, succeeding Badelles the incumbent.

The testimony of Ariosto Santos is at variance with the allegations in his Answer. As a general rule, facts alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of that party and binding upon it, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An Answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence.

1. Santos himself, in open Court, had repudiated the defenses raised in his answer and against his own interest, his testimony is deserving of weight and credence. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court believed in his credibility and we find no reason to

2. Thereafter, Badelles filed a case for quo warranto, questioning Cabili's right to hold the office on the ground that the latter was not a resident of the City for at least one year prior to his election. The petition was filed by the law firm of San Juan, Africa and Benedicto, as counsel for Badelles. Badelles was also represented by several other lawyers but the senior counsel was Atty. Africa, who, in the initial hearing, explained that he is the one in charge of the case, and therefore, requested that all pleadings, notices, orders and other papers be served at his office at 480 Padre Faura St., Manila. In

order to avoid any confusion in the service of pleadings and orders, he made of record that only service at the given address will be considered as service on petitioner Badelles and counsel. The Court took note of said request of Attorney Africa.

NO. 1. In accordance with the provisions of Rule 27, Section 2, service of decisions should be made to the lawyers on record and not to parties. In a long line of decisions, the Court have held that when a party appears by an attorney who makes of record his appearance, service of pleadings is required to be made upon said attorney and not upon the party 2. A notice given to the client and not to his attorney is not a notice in law and that service upon a party who has an attorney of record is not a compliance with Rule 27, Sec. 2, which makes service upon counsel mandatory; and that personal information by a party of the rendition of a decision does not satisfy the right of counsel to receive a copy of the decision rendered.

3. The lower court dismissed the petition with copy of the decision sent to the office address of Atty. Africa and was received the same day. It appears however, that, in the interim, i.e. on December 28,

1959, Badelles, who was then in Iligan City, requested the judge for a copy of the decision. Badelles, was given a copy but refused to sign a receipt therefor. The judge ordered his court interpreter to record the fact of said delivery of a copy to Badelles. This order was complied with. The judge also telegraphed the law office of Atty. Africa in Manila that copy of the decision was sent to them on December 1959 and that petitioner Badelles personally was furnished a copy also on that same day. The telegram was received by Atty. Africa on December 29, 1959. 4. Upon receipt of the decision on January 4, 1960, the Africa Law Office, counsel for Badelles, sent a notified appeal by registered mail on the same date. On January 5, 1960, Badelles filed his own notice of appeal to with a corresponding cash appeal bond of sixty pesos. The Counsel for Cabili objected to the appeal on the ground that it was filed beyond the period. 5. On February 15 and 19, 1960, respectively, the court dismissed the appeals filed by Badelles and his counsel on the ground that the same were filed beyond the five-day statutory period for appeal, as provided in Section 178 of the improvised Election Code. A motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for Badelles was denied for lack of merit, so Badelles filed the petition for certiorari and mandamus in CA to annul said orders. CA granted.
Issue: Whether or not the service to the client was valid