CRIMINAL LAW CASES

CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES:
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 152133 February 9, 2006 CALIMUTAN, Petitioner,

ROLLIE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner Rollie Calimutan prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29 August 2001,1affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, of Masbate, Masbate, in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998,2 finding petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information3 filed with the RTC charged petitioner Calimutan with the crime of homicide, allegedly committed as follows That on or about February 4, 1996, in the morning thereof, at sitio Capsay, Barangay Panique, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and throw a stone at PHILIP CANTRE, hitting him at the back left portion of his body, resulting in laceration of spleen due to impact which caused his death a day after. CONTRARY TO LAW. Masbate, Masbate, September 11, 1996. Accordingly, the RTC issued, on 02 December 1996, a warrant4 for the arrest of petitioner Calimutan. On 09 January 1997, however, he was provisionally released 5 after posting sufficient bailbond.6 During the arraignment on 21 May 1997, petitioner Calimutan pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide charged against him.7 In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); (2) Belen B.

Cantre, mother of the victim, Philip Cantre; and (3) Rene L. Saano, companion of the victim Cantre when the alleged crime took place. Their testimonies are collectively summarized below. On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim Cantre and witness Saano, together with two other companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar in Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate. From the videoke bar, the victim Cantre and witness Saano proceeded to go home to their respective houses, but along the way, they crossed paths with petitioner Calimutan and a certain Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was harboring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as the culprit res ponsible for throwing stones at the Cantres house on a previous night. Thus, upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao ran away, petitioner Calimutan dashed towards the backs of victim Cantre and witness Saano. Petitioner Calimutan then picked up a stone, as big as a mans fist, which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his back. When hit by the stone, victim Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back. Witness Saano put himself between the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan, and attempted to pacify the two, even convincing petitioner Calimutan to put down another stone he was already holding. He also urged victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan to just go home. Witness Saano accompanied victim Cantre to the latters house, and on the way, victim Cantre complained of the pain in the left side of his back hit by the stone. They arrived at the Cantres house at around 12:00 noon, and witness Saano left victim Cantre to the care of the latters mother, Belen.8 Victim Cantre immediately told his mother, Belen, of the stoning incident involving petitioner Calimutan. He again complained of backache and also of stomachache, and was unable to eat. By nighttime, victim Cantre was alternately feeling cold and then warm. He was sweating profusely and his entire body felt numb. His family would have wanted to bring him to a doctor but they had no vehicle. At around 3:00 a.m. of the following day, 05 February 1996, Belen was wiping his son with a piece of cloth, when victim Cantre asked for some food. He was able to eat a little, but he also later vomited whatever he ate. For the last time, he complained of backache and stomachache, and shortly thereafter, he died.9 Right after his death, victim Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate. The Post-Mortem Examination Report10 and Certification of Death,11 issued and signed by Dr. Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning. The body of victim Cantre was subsequently embalmed and buried on 13 February 1996. Unsatisfied with the findings of Dr. Ulanday, the Cantre family, with the help of the Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation, requested for an exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre by the NBI. The exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre was conducted by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez on 15 April 1996, 12 after which, he reported the following findings Body; fairly well-preserved with sign of partial autopsy; clad in white Barong Tagalog and blue pants placed inside a wooden golden-brown coffin and buried in a concrete niche. Contused-abrasion, 2.3 x 1.0 cms., posterior chest wall, left side. Hematoma, 16.0 x 8.0 cms., abdomen, along mid-line. Hemoperitoneum, massive, clotte [sic].

Laceration, spleen. Other visceral organ, pale and embalmed. Stomach contains small amount of whitish fluid and other partially digested food particles. xxxx CAUSE OF DEATH: TRAUMATIC INJURY OF THE ABDOMEN. In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez affirmed the contents of his exhumation and autopsy report. He explained that the victim Cantre suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen. The laceration of the spleen can be caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone. Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed the possibility that the victim Cantre was stoned to death by petitioner Calimutan.13 To counter the evidence of the prosecution, the defense presented the sole testimony of the accused, herein petitioner, Calimutan. According to petitioner Calimutan, at about 1:00 p.m. on 04 February 1996, he was walking with his house helper, Michael Bulalacao, on their way to Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate, when they met with the victim Cantre and witness Saano. The victim Cantre took hold of Bulalacao and punched him several times. Petitioner Calimutan attempted to pacify the victim Cantre but the latter refused to calm down, pulling out from his waist an eight-inch Batangas knife and uttering that he was looking for trouble, either "to kill or be killed." At this point, petitioner Calimutan was about ten meters away from the victim Cantre and was too frightened to move any closer for fear that the enraged man would turn on him; he still had a family to take care of. When he saw that the victim Cantre was about to stab Bulalacao, petitioner Calimutan picked up a stone, which he described as approximately one-inch in diameter, and threw it at the victim Cantre. He was able to hit the victim Cantre on his right buttock. Petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao then started to run away, and victim Cantre chased after them, but witness Saano was able to pacify the victim Cantre. Petitioner Calimutan allegedly reported the incident to a kagawad of Barangay Panique and to the police authorities and sought their help in settling the dispute between Bulalacao and the victim Cantre. Bulalacao, meanwhile, refused to seek medical help despite the advice of petitioner Calimutan and, instead, chose to go back to his hometown.14 Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of what had happened to the victim Cantre after the stoning incident on 04 February 1996. Some of his friends told him that they still saw the victim Cantre drinking at a videoke bar on the night of 04 February 1996. As far as he knew, the victim Cantre died the following day, on 05 February 1996, because of food poisoning. Petitioner Calimutan maintained that he had no personal grudge against the victim Cantre previous to the stoning incident.15 On 19 November 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision,16 essentially adopting the prosecutions account of the incident on 04 February 1996, and pronouncing that It cannot be legally contended that the throwing of the stone by the accused was in defense of his companion, a stranger, because after the boxing Michael was able to run. While it appears that the victim was the unlawful aggressor at the beginning, but the aggression already ceased

after Michael was able to run and there was no more need for throwing a stone. The throwing of the stone to the victim which was a retaliatory act can be considered unlawful, hence the accused can be held criminally liable under paragraph 1 of Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code. The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on the left side was a treacherous one and the accused committed a felony causing physical injuries to the victim. The physical injury of hematoma as a result of the impact of the stone resulted in the laceration of the spleen causing the death of the victim. The accused is criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had not been intended. (Art. 4, Par. 1, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Narciso, CA-G.R. No. 03532-CR, Jan. 13, 1964) One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural consequences of ones illegal acts merely because one does not intend to produce such consequences (U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310). The crime committed is Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code. WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that accused ROLLIE CALIMUTAN is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code with no mitigating or aggravating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby imposes the penalty of imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as compensatory damages and the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Petitioner Calimutan appealed the Decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 August 2001, 17 sustained the conviction of homicide rendered by the RTC against petitioner Calimutan, ratiocinating thus The prosecution has sufficiently established that the serious internal injury sustained by the victim was caused by the stone thrown at the victim by the accused which, the accused-appellant does not deny. It was likewise shown that the internal injury sustained by the victim was the result of the impact of the stone that hit the victim. It resulted to a traumatic injury of the abdomen causing the laceration of the victims spleen. This is clearly shown by the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, a Senior Medico Legal Officer of the NBI after the exhumation of the victims cadaver The Court cannot give credence to the post mortem report prepared by Municipal Health Officer Dr. Conchita Ulanday stating that the cause of the victims death was food poisoning. Dr. Ulanday was not even presented to testify in court hence she was not even able to identify and/or affirm the contents of her report. She was not made available for cross-examination on the accuracy and correctness of her findings. Dr. Conchita Ulandays post mortem report cannot prevail over the autopsy report (Exh. "C") of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI who testified and was cross-examined by the defense.

Besides, if accused-appellant was convinced that the victim indeed died of food poisoning, as reported by Dr. Conchita Ulanday, why did they not present her as their witness to belie the report of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI. The trial courts evaluation of the testimony of Dr. Mendez is accorded the highest respect because it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of said witness. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch 46, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide is hereby AFFIRMED. The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution, dated 15 January 2002,18 denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Calimutan for lack of merit since the issues raised therein had already been passed and ruled upon in its Decision, dated 29 August 2001. Comes now petitioner Calimutan, by way of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking (1) the reversal of the Decisions of the RTC, dated 19 November 1998, and of the Court of Appeals, dated 29 August 2001, convicting him of the crime of homicide; and, (2) consequently, his acquittal of the said crime based on reasonable doubt. Petitioner Calimutan contended that the existence of the two autopsy reports, with dissimilar findings on the cause of death of the victim Cantre, constituted reasonable doubt as to the liability of petitioner Calimutan for the said death, arguing that x x x [I]t was Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate was the first physician of the government who conducted an examination on the cadaver of the victim Philip Cantre whose findings was that the cause of his death was due to food poisoning while the second government physician NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ronaldo Mendez whose findings was that the cause of the death was due to a traumatic injury of the abdomen caused by a lacerated spleen and with these findings of two (2) government physicians whose findings are at variance with each other materially, it is humbly contended that the same issue raised a reasonable doubt on the culpability of the petitioner. As there are improbabilities and uncertainties of the evidence for the prosecution in the case at bar, it suffices to reaise [sic] reasonable doubt as to the petitioners guilt and therefore, he is entitled to acquittal (People vs. Delmendo, G.R. No. 32146, November 23, 1981).19 In this jurisdiction, an accused in a criminal case may only be convicted if his or her guilt is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it does not demand absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error.20 In the Petition at bar, this Court finds that there is proof beyond reasonable doubt to hold petitioner Calimutan liable for the death of the victim Cantre. Undoubtedly, the exhumation and autopsy report and the personal testimony before the RTC of prosecution witness, NBI Senior Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Mendez, are vital pieces of evidence against petitioner Calimutan. Dr. Mendez determined that the victim Cantre died of internal hemorrhage or bleeding due to the laceration of his spleen. In his testimony, Dr. Mendez clearly and consistently explained that the spleen could be lacerated or ruptured when the abdominal

area was hit with a blunt object, such as the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre. It bears to emphasize that Dr. Mendez was presented by the prosecution as an expert witness, whose "competency and academic qualification and background" was admitted by the defense itself.21 As a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, Dr. Mendez is presumed to possess sufficient knowledge of pathology, surgery, gynecology, toxicology, and such other branches of medicine germane to the issues involved in a case.22 Dr. Mendezs testimony as an expert witness is evidence,23 and although it does not necessarily bind the courts, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals had properly accorded it great weight and probative value. Having testified as to matters undeniably within his area of expertise, and having performed a thorough autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre, his findings as to the cause of death of the victim Cantre are more than just the mere speculations of an ordinary person. They may sufficiently establish the causal relationship between the stone thrown by the petitioner Calimutan and the lacerated spleen of the victim Cantre which, subsequently, resulted in the latters death. With no apparent mistake or irregularity, whethe r in the manner by which Dr. Mendez performed the autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre or in his findings, then his report and testimony must be seriously considered by this Court. Moreover, reference to other resource materials on abdominal injuries would also support the conclusion of Dr. Mendez that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan caused the death of the victim Cantre. One source explains the nature of abdominal injuries24 in the following manner The skin may remain unmarked inspite of extensive internal injuries with bleeding and disruption of the internal organs. The areas most vulnerable are the point of attachment of internal organs, especially at the source of its blood supply and at the point where blood vessels change direction. The area in the middle superior half of the abdomen, forming a triangle bounded by the ribs on the two sides and a line drawn horizontally through the umbilicus forming its base is vulnerable to trauma applied from any direction. In this triangle are found several blood vessels changing direction, particularly the celiac trunk, its branches (the hepatic, splenic and gastric arteries) as well as the accompanying veins. The loop of the duodenum, the ligament of Treitz and the pancreas are in the retroperitoneal space, and the stomach and transverse colon are in the triangle, located in the peritoneal cavity. Compression or blow on the area may cause detachment, laceration, stretch-stress, contusion of the organs (Legal Medicine 1980, Cyril H. Wecht et., p. 41). As to injuries to the spleen, in particular,25 the same source expounds that The spleen usually suffers traumatic rupture resulting from the impact of a fall or blow from the crushing and grinding effects of wheels of motor vehicles. Although the organ is protected at its upper portion by the ribs and also by the air-containing visceral organs, yet on account of its superficiality and fragility, it is usually affected by trauma. x x x. Certainly, there are some terms in the above-quoted paragraphs difficult to comprehend for people without medical backgrounds. Nevertheless, there are some points that can be plainly derived therefrom: (1) Contrary to common perception, the abdominal area is more than just

the waist area. The entire abdominal area is divided into different triangles, and the spleen is located in the upper triangle, bounded by the rib cage; (2) The spleen and all internal organs in the same triangle are vulnerable to trauma from all directions. Therefore, the stone need not hit the victim Cantre from the front. Even impact from a stone hitting the back of the victim Cantre, in the area of the afore-mentioned triangle, could rupture the spleen; and (3) Although the spleen had already been ruptured or lacerated, there may not always be a perceptible external injury to the victim. Injury to the spleen cannot, at all times, be attributed to an obvious, external injury such as a cut or bruise. The laceration of the victim Cantres spleen can be caused by a stone thrown hard enough, which qualifies as a nonpenetrating trauma 26 Nonpenetrating Trauma. The spleen, alone or in combination with other viscera, is the most frequently injured organ following blunt trauma to the abdomen or the lower thoracic cage. Automobile accidents provide the predominating cause, while falls, sledding and bicycle injuries, and blows incurred during contact sports are frequently implicated in children. x x x The sheer impact of the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre could rupture or lacerate the spleen an organ described as vulnerable, superficial, and fragile even without causing any other external physical injury. Accordingly, the findings of Dr. Mendez that the victim Cantre died of internal hemorrhage from his lacerated spleen, and the cause of the laceration of the spleen was the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre, does not necessarily contradict his testimony before the RTC that none of the external injuries of the victim Cantre were fatal. Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution was able to establish that the proximate cause of the death of the victim Cantre was the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."27 The two other witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely Saano and Belen Cantre, had adequately recounted the events that transpired on 04 February 1996 to 05 February 1996. Between the two of them, the said witnesses accounted for the whereabouts, actions, and physical condition of the victim Cantre during the said period. Before the encounter with petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao, the victim Cantre seemed to be physically fine. However, after being hit at the back by the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, the victim Cantre had continuously complained of backache. Subsequently, his physical condition rapidly deteriorated, until finally, he died. Other than being stoned by petitioner Calimutan, there was no other instance when the victim Cantre may have been hit by another blunt instrument which could have caused the laceration of his spleen. Hence, this Court is morally persuaded that the victim Cantre died from a lacerated spleen, an injury sustained after being hit by a stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. Not even the post-mortem report of Dr. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer who first examined the body of the victim Cantre, can raise reasonable doubt as to the cause of death of the victim Cantre. Invoking Dr. Ulandays post-mortem report, the defense insisted on the possibility that the victim Cantre died of food poisoning. The post-mortem report, though, cannot be given much weight and probative value for the following reasons First, a closer scrutiny of the words used by Dr. Ulanday in her post-mortem report, as well as in the death certificate of the victim Cantre, reveals that although she suspected food poisoning as the cause of death, she held back from making a categorical statement that it was so. In the post-mortem report, 28 she found that "x x x the provable (sic) cause of death was due to cardio-

respiratory arrest. Food poisoning must be confirm (sic) by laboratory e(x)am." In the death certificate of the victim Cantre, 29 she wrote that the immediate cause of death was "CardioRespiratory Arrest" and the antecedent cause was "Food Poisoning Suspect." There was no showing that further laboratory tests were indeed conducted to confirm Dr. Ulandays suspicion that the victim Cantre suffered from food poisoning, and without such confirmation, her suspicion as to the cause of death remains just that a suspicion. Second, Dr. Ulanday executed before the NBI a sworn statement 30 in which she had explained her findings in the post-mortem report, to wit 05. Q: Did you conduct an autopsy on his cadaver? A: I did sir, but not as exhaustive as that done by the NBI Medico-legal. 06. Q: Now, what do you want to state regarding your certification on the death of PHILIP B. CANTRE? A: I stated in the certification and even in the Death Certificate about "Food Poisoning". What I stated in the Death Certificate was that CANTRE was a SUSPECTED victim of food poisoning. I didnt state that he was a case of food poisoning. And in the Certif ication, I even recommended that an examination be done to confirm that suspicion. 07. Q: What gave you that suspicion of poisoning? A: As there were no external signs of fatal injuries except that of the contusion or abrasion, measuring as that size of a 25 centavo coin, I based my suspicion from the history of the victim and from the police investigation. 08. Q: You also mentioned in your Certification that there was no internal hemorrhage in the cadaver. Did you open the body of the cadaver? A: As I have already stated sir, I did not conduct an exhaustive autopsy. I made an incision on the abdomen and I explored the internal organs of the cadaver with my hand in search for any clotting inside. But I found none. I did not open the body of the cadaver. 09. Q: You mentioned about a contusion you have observed on the cadaver. Where was it located? A: On the left portion of his back, sir. 10. Q: Now, is it possible that if somebody be hit by a hard object on that part of his body, his SPLEEN could be injured? A: Yes, sir. But that would depend on how strong or forceful the impact was. In contrast, Dr. Mendez described in his testimony before the RTC 31 how he conducted the autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre, as follows Q What specific procedure did you do in connection with the exhumation of the body of the victim in this case?

A We opened the head, chest and the abdomen. Q That was part of the autopsy you have conducted? A Yes, sir. Q Aside from opening the head as well as the body of the victim Philip Cantre, what other matters did you do in connection therewith? A We examined the internal organs. Q What in particular internal organs you have examined? A The brain, the heart, the lungs, the liver, the kidneys, the pancreas plus the intestines. xxxx Q The cause of death as you have listed here in your findings is listed as traumatic injury of the abdomen, will you kindly tell us Doctor what is the significance of this medical term traumatic injury of the abdomen? A We, medico-legal officers of the NBI dont do what other doctors do as they make causes of death as internal hemorrhage we particularly point to the injury of the body like this particular case the injury was at the abdomen of the victim. Q Will you tell as Doctor what particular portion of the abdomen of the victim this traumatic injury is located? A Along the midline but the damaged organ was at the left. Q What particular organ are you referring to? A The spleen, sir. The difference in the extent of the examinations conducted by the two doctors of the body of the victim Cantre provides an adequate explanation for their apparent inconsistent findings as to the cause of death. Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre, as opposed to the exhaustive autopsy performed by Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a ruptured spleen as the cause of death of the victim Cantre, then the latter, without doubt, deserves to be given credence by the courts. Third, that the prosecution no longer presented Dr. Ulanday before the RTC despite being included in its list of witnesses did not amount to a willful suppression of evidence that would give rise to the presumption that her testimony would be adverse to the prosecution if produced. 32 As this Court already expounded in the case ofPeople v. Jumamoy33 The prosecution's failure to present the other witnesses listed in the information did not constitute, contrary to the contention of the accused, suppression of evidence. The prosecutor has the exclusive prerogative to determine the witnesses to be presented for the prosecution. If the

prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, the prosecutor need not present all of them but only as many as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with for being merely corroborative in nature. This Court has ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses would not constitute suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the prosecution's case. Besides, there is no showing that the eyewitnesses who were not presented in court as witnesses were not available to the accused. We reiterate the rule that the adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression is not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Moreover, if the accused believed that the failure to present the other witnesses was because their testimonies would be unfavorable to the prosecution, he should have compelled their appearance, by compulsory process, to testify as his own witnesses or even as hostile witnesses. It was a judgment call for the prosecution to no longer present Dr. Ulanday before the RTC, perhaps believing that it had already presented sufficient evidence to merit the conviction of petitioner Calimutan even without her testimony. There was nothing, however, preventing the defense from calling on, or even compelling, with the appropriate court processes, Dr. Ulanday to testify in court as its witness if it truly believed that her testimony would be adverse to the case presented by the prosecution. While this Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals and affirms that there is ample evidence proving that the death of the victim Cantre was caused by his lacerated spleen, an injury which resulted from being hit by the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, this Court, nonetheless, is at variance with the RTC and the Court of Appeals as to the determination of the appropriate crime or offense for which the petitioner should have been convicted for. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which they are committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These two types of felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of malicious intent of the offender In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is "unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice." (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.34 In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner Calimutan any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, this Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides for the definition of reckless imprudence

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. There are several circumstances, discussed in the succeeding paragraphs, that demonstrate petitioner Calimutans lack of intent to kill the victim Cantre, and conversely, that substantiate the view of this Court that the death of victim Cantre was a result of petitioner Calimutans reckless imprudence. The RTC and the Court of Appeals may have failed to appreciate, or had completely overlooked, the significance of such circumstances. It should be remembered that the meeting of the victim Cantre and witness Saano, on the one hand, and petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao, on the other, was a chance encounter as the two parties were on their way to different destinations. The victim Cantre and witness Saano were on their way home from a drinking spree in Crossing Capsay, while petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao were walking from the market to Crossing Capsay. While the evidence on record suggests that a running grudge existed between the victim Cantre and Bulalacao, it did not establish that there was likewise an existing animosity between the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan.1avvphil.net In both versions of the events of 04 February 1996 submitted by the prosecution and the defense, it was the victim Cantre who was the initial aggressor. He suddenly punched Bulalacao, the helper and companion of petitioner Calimutan, when they met on the road. The attack of the victim Cantre was swift and unprovoked, which spurred petitioner Calimutan into responsive action. Given that this Court dismisses the claim of petitioner Calimutan that the victim Cantre was holding a knife, it does take into account that the victim Cantre was considerably older and bigger, at 26 years of age and with a height of five feet and nine inches, compared to Bulalacao, the boy he attacked, who was only 15 years old and stood at about five feet. Even with his bare hands, the victim Cantre could have hurt Bulalacao. Petitioner Calimutan sought only to protect Bulalacao and to stop the assault of the victim Cantre against the latter when he picked up a stone and threw it at the victim Cantre. The stone was readily available as a weapon to petitioner Calimutan since the incident took place on a road. That he threw the stone at the back of the victim Cantre does not automatically imply treachery on the part of petitioner Calimutan as it is highly probable that in the midst of the fray, he threw the stone rashly and impulsively, with no regard as to the position of the victim Cantre. When the victim Cantre stopped his aggression after being hit by the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan, the latter also desisted from any other act of violence against the victim Cantre. The above-described incident could not have taken more than just a few minutes. It was a very brief scuffle, in which the parties involved would hardly have the time to ponder upon the most appropriate course of action to take. With this in mind, this Court cannot concur in the declaration made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre as a retaliatory act. It was evidently a swift and spontaneous reaction to an unexpected and unprovoked attack by the victim Cantre on Bulalacao. That Bulalacao was already able to run away from the victim Cantre may have escaped the notice of the petitioner Calimutan who, under the pressure of the circumstances, was forced to act as quickly as possible. The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre with the specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of harming the victim Cantre. What is obvious to this Court was petitioner Calimutans intention to drive away the attacker who was,

at that point, the victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was, as earlier described, much younger and smaller in built than the victim Cantre.35 Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by a lawful objective when he threw the stone at the victim Cantre, his act was committed with inexcusable lack of precaution. He failed to consider that a stone the size of a mans fist could inflict substantial injury on someone. He also miscalculated his own strength, perhaps unaware, or even completely disbelieving, that he could throw a stone with such force as to seriously injure, or worse, kill someone, at a quite lengthy distance of ten meters. Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre was the proximate cause of the latters death, despite being done with reckless imprudence rather than with malicious intent, petitioner Calimutan remains civilly liable for such death. This Court, therefore, retains the reward made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals to the heirs of the victim Cantre of the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and another P50,000.00 as moral damages. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29 August 2001, affirming the Decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998, is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and is accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to a maximum period of two years and one day of prision correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latters death and P50,000.00 as moral damages. SO ORDERED.

****************** Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 82197 March 13, 1989 MANUEL L. vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Cortes & Reyna Law Firm for petitioner. The Solicitor General for respondents. SIQUIAN petitioner,

CORTES, J.: The information charging petitioner Manuel L. Siquian, the then municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, of the crime of falsification of public document under Art. 171, p. 4 of the Revised Penal Code filed by Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela reads as follows: That on or about the lst day of July, 1975, in the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, and within the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the accused Manuel L. Siquian, being then the Municipal Mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, taking advantage of his position as such Municipal Mayor did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare and, sign a false document, knowing it to be false, to wit. An official communication to the Civil Service Commissioner, dated July 1, 1975, which is required by law in order to support the appointment of a certain Jesusa B. Carreon to the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary which (sic) he appointed as such by stating and making it appear in said document that there was such a position existing and that funds therefore were available. When in truth and in fact, as said accused well-know (sic), there was no such position or item and no funds were available for said position in the Fiscal Budget of Angadanan for 1975-76, nor was there any special ordinance creating said position and appropriating the necessary funds therefor. xxx [Rollo, pp. 23-24.] Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and the trial of the case ensued. The facts as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) are as follows: It appears from the evidence that sometime in June 1975, Jesusa Carreon, 20 years old, single and a resident of Ilagan, Isabela, went to the accused Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor of the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, to apply for employment in the office of the Mayor. Earlier, she and her friends went to the Municipal Hall of Angadanan to ask information if there was any vacancy. When she was informed that there was, she went to see the accused in his house. The accused must have agreed to appoint her because he accompanied her to the office of the Municipal Secretary, Emilio Valenzuela. The latter, however, was not there. Even so, the accused told Jesusa Carreon to report for work the following day and that she should be included in the budget. The accused then accompanied her to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, Calo Battung the treasurer agreed that she could report for work. One week after, Jesusa Carreon went alone to the Office of the Municipal Secretary. He was there. When she went to the accused, she was told to go back to the Municipal Secretary to work for her appointment papers. She was appointed clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, on July 1, 1975 by the accused. xxx Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among others, of the availability of funds CS Form No. 203) dated July 1, 1975, issued by the accused Manuel L. Siquian, pursuant to the

requirements of Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1975, addressed to the Commissioner of Civil Service, Manila (Exh. "C"). xxx Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office (Exh. "A-l") on July 1, 1975, and promptly began to work on the same day. Her monthly salary was P 120.00. She rendered services for the months of July, August, September, October, November and December 1975 (Exhibits "B", "B-l" to "B-5"). She was not, however, paid. As early as October 1975, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to receive her salary, but she was told that there was no money yet. In November 1975, she went to see the accused, but the latter told her to see the treasurer. She went to the treasurer who told her that there was no money. because of this, she went to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan at the Provincial Capitol in Ilagan, Isabela, to ask (sic) information regarding her unpaid salaries. She was interviewed by Atty. Efren Ambrosia Provincial Administrator. Atty. Ambrosio asked her if she had complete appointment papers. hereafter, she filed her verified complaint dated April 20, 1976, against the accused. Her complaint is addressed to Governor Faustino N. Dy (Exhibit "G" and "G-1"). It also appears from the evidence that the Municipal council of Angadanan, Isabela, failed to enact the annual budget for the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 (Exhs. "H", "H-l", and "H-2"). Accordingly, and pursuant to PD No. 477, the annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted (Exh. "H- l"). Thus, the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 is the same as the Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976. No supplemental budget was enacted by the municipal council of Angadanan. In the Plantilla of Personnel for 1974-1975, which was deemed re-enacted for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, there was no new item or appropriation for the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary of Angadanan, Isabela. The new position of clerk in the office of the Municipal Council appearing in the Municipal Plantilla for Personnel (Exhibit "H-2") for 1974- 1975, was filled up as early as October 16, 1974 by the accused when he appointed Clarita G. Ramirez to that position (Exhibits "J" and "J-2"). With respect to the new position of a Clerk to the office of the Municipal Mayor in the Plantilla for 1974-1975, it was already filled-up by the appointment of Miss Marivic A. Tallod on June 16, 1975, by the accused (Exhibits "K" and "K-4"). As early as June 28, 1974, the same position was held by Miss Felicidad Visitacion who was appointed by the accused, but she resigned (Exhs. "K" and "K-l"). xxx [Rollo, pp. 26, 28, 29-30.] After trial, the Court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and decreed: WHEREFORE, finding the accused Manuel L. Siquian guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document as charged in the information, the Court hereby sentences said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from FIVE (5) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correctional (sic) as minimum to SEVEN YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine of THREE THOUSAND (P 3,000.00) PESOS. SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 35.]

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled as follows: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is in accordance with law and the evidence and is hereby therefore affirmed. Costs against the accused- appellant. SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 42.] Hence, this petition for review seeking reversal of the CA decision and the acquittal of petitioner Manuel L. Siquian. Petitioner contends that the respondent court has decided a question of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence when it affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting him of the crime of falsification despite the following A. The evidence on record which consists of the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, shows the absence of criminal intent on the part of the accused. B. There is no evidence that the accused took advantage of his position as Municipal Mayor when he made the allegedly falsified certification. C. The statement that "Funds for the position are available" is not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law. D. The petitioner was deprived of his right to due process of law when the trial court proceeded with the trial in his absence despite a pending petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court. [Rollo, p. 13.] Petitioner's arguments, however, are bereft of any merit. The offense of falsification by a public officer under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any public officer, employee or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: . . . 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of fact; . . .' It is settled that in this fourth kind of falsification, the following requisites must concur: (a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) hat he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false Cabigas v. People, G.R. No. 67472, July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA 18. All these requisites had been fully met in the case at bar. Petitioner, a public officer, being then the mayor of the municipality of Angadanan, Isabela, made an untruthful statement in the narration of facts contained in the certification which he issued in connection with the appointment of complainant Jesusa Carreon. The certification, having been issued by a public official in the exercise of the function of his office is a public document [U.S. v. Asensi, 34 Phil. 765 (1915)]. It is immaterial whether or not the Civil Service Commissioner to whom the certification was addressed received the document issued by petitioner. Since the certification was prepared by petitioner in accordance with the standard forms prescribed by the government (specifically the Civil Service Commission) pursuant to law, the certification was invested with the character of a public document [People v. Asensi, supra citing U.S. v. Vy Guico, 12 Phil. 209 (1908)] falsification of which is punishable under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Here,

falsification of such document was committed when the petitioner stated that funds were available for the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed when he knew that, in reality, the position itself did not even exist and no funds had been appropriated therefor. Petitioner's stance that the certification which he issued contained no narration of facts but rather a conclusion of law is not meritorious. The respondent court, upholding the Solicitor General's arguments, correctly ruled as follows: Conclusion of law" is defined as a proposition not arrived at by any process of natural reasoning from a fact or combination of facts stated but by the application of the artificial rules of law to the facts pleaded [Levins v. Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273, 12 p. 161; Black's Law Dict., p. 362]. From the above-cited definition, it can be deduced that the certification by the appellant that 'funds for the position are available' does not require the application of the artificial rules of law. To certify that funds are available for the position what one should do was (sic) to refer to the budget and plantilla of personnel of the applicable fiscal year and ascertain if such item exists and funds are allocated therefor. In the present case, despite the presence of the records which shows that there is no position and funds therefor referred to in the certification, the appellant, fully aware of the data provided by the records, certified falsely that "funds for the position are available" [Rollo, p. 41). It is undisputed that the Municipal Council of Angadanan failed to enact the annual budget of the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 and therefore, the annual budget for the last fiscal year, 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted under P.D. No. 477. In the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel (Exh. "B-2") accompanying the Annual Budget for the Municipality of Angadanan, Isabela for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975, there is no such position as Clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed. Accordingly, there is no appropriation made in the Annual Budget for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975 for such position, thus rendering petitioner's statement in his certification utterly false. The requisite of absolute falsity of the statement made in the document is met when there exists not even an iota of colorable truth in what is declared in the narration of facts [U.S. v. Bayot, 10 Phil. 518 (1908)], as in this case. From the foregoing, it can be seen that the first and third requirements laid down in the Cabigas case, supra, are fully satisfied. The second element of the offense is likewise present. Under the civil service rules and regulations, specifically the Guidelines in the Preparation of Appointment for Original Appointment (Exhs. "D" and "D-3"), a certification of the availability of funds for the position to be filled up is required to be signed by the head of office or any officer who has been delegated the authority to sign. As an officer authorized by law to issue this certification which is designated as Civil Service Form No. 203, as revised, the petitioner has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him in said certification which includes information as to the availability of the funds for the position being filled up. Contrary to petitioner's claim, the existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary when the falsified document is a public document. This has already been authoritatively decreed in the 1955 case of People v. Po Giok To [96 Phil. 913 (1955)]. The Court in the aforementioned case explicitly stated that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document. The rationale for this principal distinction between falsification of public and private documents has been stated by the Court in this wise: "In the falsification of public or official documents,

whether by public officials or private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed" [People v. Po Giok To, supra at 918, citing People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 (1924)]. In falsification of public documents therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial [People v. Pacana, supra]. Petitioner's plea for acquittal on the ground that the evidence for the prosecution shows the absence of criminal intent on his part must be denied. While this Court has declared good faith as a valid defense to falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts [U.S. v. San Jose, 7 Phil. 604 (1907)], such defense cannot serve to exonerate the petitioner since the element of good faith has not clearly been shown to exist in the case at bar. Under the applicable law at the time, petitioner, as municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela presides at all meetings of the municipal council [Section 2621 (d), Revised Administrative Code] and signs all ordinances and resolutions passed by the municipal council [Section 2624 (c), Revised Administrative Code]. He was thus aware that (1) for failure to enact a budget for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, Ordinance No. V of the Municipal Council of Angadanan, Isabela which was the Municipal Annual Budget of Angadanan, Isabela for Fiscal Year 1974-1975 was reenacted and (2) that under the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for that fiscal year, there were no funds appropriated for the position of clerk to the municipal secretary. His knowledge of these facts is shown by the fact that he even affixed his signature in attestation to the correctness of these documents; i.e. Ordinance No. V and Municipal Plantilla of Personnel. [See Exhs. "H-1" and "H-2", Folder of Exhibits, pp. 27-32]. He cannot claim good faith in issuing a certification of the availability of funds for the questioned position since at the time he issued such certification on July 1, 1975, the fiscal year 1975- 1976 had already commenced and no new ordinance creating the new position to which he appointed Jesusa Carreon had been enacted by the municipal council. In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioner must be held criminally liable for his act of issuing the absolutely false certification as to the availability of funds for the subject position. The law considers his act criminal since it amounts to an untruthful statement in a narration of facts in a public document [Article 171 (4), Revised Penal Code]. Criminal intent and the will to commit a crime are presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear [United States v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92 (1909)]. In this case, the presumption that petitioner committed the act with criminal intention, which arose from proof of his commission of the unlawful act, stands unrebutted. Petitioner's claim that there was no showing that he took advantage of his official position in falsifying the document should likewise be rejected. This essential element of falsification of a public document by public officer requires that the offender "abuse his office or use the influences prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him, in committing the crime" [U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 (1911)]. Abuse of public office is considered present when the offender falsifies a document in connection with the duties of his office which consist of either making or preparing or otherwise intervening in the preparation of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto 20 Phil. 376 (1911); People v. Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 (1957)], as in the case of petitioner who was charged with the duty of issuing the certification necessary for the appointment of Jesusa Carreon.

Finally, the alleged denial of due process of law committed by the trial court when it proceeded with the trial of the case in the absence of the petitioner despite a pending petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court is totally unfounded. A careful and thorough review of the record reveals that petitioner had been afforded due process when the trial court, in view of the absence of petitioner, granted continuances to enable the defense to present its evidence although the prosecution had rested its case as early as December 7, 1978. [See Original Records, p. 253, et seq.] It is a basic postulate in law that what is repugnant to due process is not lack of previous notice but absolute lack of opportunity to be heard [Tajonera v. Lamaroza, G.R. Nos. L-48097 & 49035, December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA 438]. Hence, this Court laid down this criterion to determine whether an accused in a criminal case has been properly accorded due process of law: . . . (I)f an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law. . . . [People v. Muit G.R. No. L-48875, October 21, 1982, 117 SCRA 696 citing People v. Castillo, 776 Phil. 73 (1946); Emphasis supplied.] Thus, there is no denial of due process when an accused is afforded the chance to present evidence on his behalf but due to his repeated, unjustifiable failure to appear at the hearings, the trial court ordered the case to be deemed submitted upon the evidence presented by the prosecution. For under such circumstances, he will be deemed to have waived his right to be present during the trial [Section 1 (c), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court] and his right to adduce evidence on his behalf [People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).] It is true that he filed a petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court. However, on the date set for the hearing of the petitioner's urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in the trial court due to the pendency of the petition for change of venue, he also failed to appear [See Order dated January 18, 1985, Original Records, p. 428]. In fact, Atty. Romeo Calixto, one of the counsel for the petitioner, manifested before the trial court that he was - withdrawing as counsel for his client for the reason that he has lost contact with the latter who already went abroad [See Original Records, p. 435]. Hence, the trial court cannot be faulted for rendering its decision on the basis solely of the evidence presented by the prosecution. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in conformity with law and settled jurisprudence, the same is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.

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MISTAKE OF FACT:

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-24978 March 27, 1926 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO DE FERNANDO, defendant-appellant. W. A. Armstrong Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee. VILLA-REAL, J.: This appeal has been taken by the defendant Fernando de Fernando from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, in which he was held guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty years cadena temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Buenventura Paulino in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the costs, by virtue of a complaint filed by the fiscal charging with the said crime. As a basis for his appeal the accused assigns the following errors as committed by the trial court: (1) in holding that the acts committed by the accused constituted the crime for murder; (2) in not holding that the accused was exempt from criminal liability and in not acquitting him. At the trial the following facts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: Before the day of the crimeseveral Moro prisoners had escaped from the Penal Colony of San Ramon, Zamboanga. The residents of the barrio of Municahan of the municipality of Zamboanga were alarmed by the presence of three suspicious looking persons who were prowling around the place. The accused Fernando deFernando who, at that time, was a municipal policeman, when passing in front of the house of one Remigio Delgado, was called by the latter's daughter Paciencia Delgado, who stated that her father wished to see him. When the policeman came up the house Remigio Delgado informed him that three unknown and suspicious looking persons, dressed in blue, prowling around his house. The accused remained in the said house talking with Paciencia Delgado, both being seated on a bench near the window. While they were thus talking, at about 7 o'clock at night, there appeared in the dark, at about 4 meters from the stairs, a person dressed in dark clothes, calling "Nong Miong." At the time the accused nor Paciencia Delgado knew who was thus calling. The accused inquired what he wanted but instead of answering he continued advancing with bolo in hand. Upon seeing thisFernando de Fernando took out his revolver and fired a shot in the air. As he saw that the unknown continued to ascend the staircase he fired at him. The unknown disappeared and ran to the house of a neighbor Leon Torres, where, after placing upon a table the bolos that he carried, he fell on the floor and expired. Remigio Delgado, who was in the kitchen and had recognized the voice of theunknown, on hearing the shots ran into the parlor, took hold of the arm of the defendant and asked him why he had fired at Buenventura Paulino. Fernando de Fernando only said "Let me go, that is a cross eyed person" for appellant.

and immediately repaired to the house of the teniente of the barrio, Santiago Torres, from where he telephoned to the chief of police advising him of what had happened. When the body was examined it was found that a bullet had penetrated the base of the neck at the right, imbedding itself in the left side under the skin. The status of the accused on the night in question was that of an agent of the law, to whom notice had been given of the presence of suspicious looking persons who might be the Moro prisoners who had escaped from the Penal Colony of San Ramon. The appearance of a man, unknown to him, dressed in clothes similar in color to the prisoner's uniform who was calling the owner of the house, and the silence of Paciencia Delgado, who did not at the time recognize the man, undoubtedly caused the accused to suspect that the unknown man was one of the three persons that the owner of the house said were prowling around the place. The suspicion become a reality in his mind when he saw that the man continued ascending the stairs with a bolo in his hand, not heeding his question as to who he was. In the midst of these circumstances and believing undoubtedly that he was a wrongdoer he tried to perform his duty and first fired into the air and then at the alleged intruder. But it happened that what to him appeared to be wrongdoer was the nephew of the owner of the house who was carrying three bolos tied together. At that psychological moment when the forces of far and the sense of duty were at odds, the accused was not able to take full account of the true situation and the bundle of bolos seemed to him to be only one bolo in the hands of a suspicious character who intended to enter the house. There is, however, a circumstance thatshould have made him suspect that the man was not only a friend but also a relative of the owner of the house from the fact he called "Nong Miong," which indicated that the owner of the house might be an older relative of the one calling, or an intimate friend; and in not asking Paciencia Delgado who was it was that was calling her father with such familiarity, he did not use the ordinary precaution that he should have used before taking such fatal action. Taking into consideration the estate of mind of the accused at the time, and the meaning that he gave to the attitude of the unknown person, in shooting the latter he felt that he was performing his duty by defending the owners of the house against an unexpected attack, and such act cannot constitute the crime of murder, but only that of simple homicide. He cannot be held guilty, however, as principal with malicious intent, because he though at the time that he was justified in acting as he did, and he is guilty only because he failed to exercise the ordinary diligence which, under the circumstances, he should have by investigating whether or not the unknown man was really what he though him to be. In firing the shot, without first exercising reasonable diligence, he acted with reckless negligence. The crime committed by the caused, therefore, is homicide through reckless negligence defined and punished in article 568, in relation with article 404, of the Penal Code, the penalty prescribed by lawarresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision correcional in its minimum degree. In view of the foregoing and reversing the appealed judgment, the accused is held guilty of the crimeof homicide through reckless negligence, and he is sentenced to suffer one year prision correcional, to pay the amount of P500 to the heirs of the deceased as an indemnity, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the costs and with credit of one-half of the preventive imprisonment already suffered. So ordered.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673 August 11, 2004

EDUARDO P. DIEGO, complainant, vs. JUDGE SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, DAGUPAN CITY, BRANCH 43, respondent.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.: This is an administrative complaint against Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/or rendering judgment in gross ignorance of the law. The facts and circumstances of the criminal case are summarized, as follows: a) On January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr., solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. The couple were both Filipinos. In the marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the name Crescencia Escoto, with a civil status of single; b) In a document dated February 15, 1978, denominated as a "Decree of Divorce" and purportedly issued to Jorge de Perio as petitioner by the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas (247th Judicial District), it was "ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between Jorge de Perio and Crescencia de Perio are hereby Dissolved, Cancelled and Annulled and the Petitioner is hereby granted a Divorce." c) Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with herein complainants brother, Manuel P. Diego, solemnized before the Rev. Fr. Clemente T. Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City. The marriage contract shows that this time, the accused used and adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil status of single.1

After trial of the criminal case for bigamy, respondent Judge promulgated a decision, on February 24, 1999, the dispositive part of which stated: WHEREFORE, for failure of the STATE to prove accuseds guilt beyond whisper of doubt, the COURT hereby orders her ACQUITTAL with costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.2 The decision states that the main basis for the acquittal was good faith on the part of the accused. Respondent Judge gave credence to the defense of the accused that she acted without any malicious intent. The combined testimonial and documentary evidence of the defense was aimed at convincing the court that accused Lucena Escoto had sufficient grounds to believe that her previous marriage to Jorge de Perio had been validly dissolved by the divorce decree and that she was legally free to contract the second marriage with Manuel P. Diego. In rendering the decision, respondent Judge reasoned, thus: While it is true that in our jurisdiction the matrimonial bond between Jorge de Perio and the accused are not yet annulled, it remains undisputed that cessation of the same was decreed in the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas, 247 th Judicial District, effective February 15, 1978. xxx The CHARGE filed against the accused is categorized as Mala en se (sic) which requires the indispensable presence of criminal intent/dolo. The felony on BIGAMY as defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code explicitly mandates that it must be committed with criminal intent. In other words, there must be an unquestionable demonstration on the part of the perpetrator that he/she criminally, willfully and unlawfully contracted a second marriage despite knowledge that his/her first marriage is still existing. As borne out by the evidence adduced, the accused contracted the second marriage after she was informed and furnished of the Divorce Decree which was granted by the Family District Court of Harris County Texas in her favor. As an ordinary laywoman accused being a recipient of a divorce decree, she entertains the impression that she can contract a subsequent marriage which she did when she married the late Manuel Diego. To the honest evaluation of the Court the act complained of against the accused is not patently illegal for the reason that she acted in good faith believing that her marriage was already annulled by a foreign judgment.3 Complainant herein alleges that the decision rendered by the respondent Judge is manifestly against the law and contrary to the evidence. He questions the evidentiary weight and admissibility of the divorce decree as a basis for the finding of good faith. In addition, complainant stresses that the evidence on record negates respondent Judges finding of good faith on the part of the accused. Thus, complainant urges this Court to impose sanctions upon

respondent Judge as, according to complainant, these acts amount to knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law. In his comment, respondent Judge explains that what was in issue was the criminal culpability of the accused under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent Judge does not dispute that the second marriage was bigamous because at the time it was contracted, the first marriage was still subsisting since divorce is not recognized in our country and because the accuseds first husband was still alive. Respondent Judge, however, maintains that what was controlling was whether by virtue of the divorce decree the accused honestly believed, albeit mistakenly, that her first marriage had been severed and she could marry again. According to respondent Judge, the same is a state of mind personal to the accused. He further stressed that knowledge of the law should not be exacted strictly from the accused since she is a lay person, and that ineptitude should not be confused with criminal intent. By separate manifestations, both parties agreed to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings. The Disputed Decision A careful study of the disputed decision reveals that respondent Judge had been less than circumspect in his study of the law and jurisprudence applicable to the bigamy case. In his comment, respondent Judge stated: "That the accused married Manuel P. Diego in the honest belief that she was free to do so by virtue of the decree of divorce is a mistake of fact." This Court, in People v. Bitdu,4 carefully distinguished between a mistake of fact, which could be a basis for the defense of good faith in a bigamy case, from a mistake of law, which does not excuse a person, even a lay person, from liability. Bitdu held that even if the accused, who had obtained a divorce under the Mohammedan custom, honestly believed that in contracting her second marriage she was not committing any violation of the law, and that she had no criminal intent, the same does not justify her act. This Court further stated therein that with respect to the contention that the accused acted in good faith in contracting the second marriage, believing that she had been validly divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.5 Moreover, squarely applicable to the criminal case for bigamy, is People v. Schneckenburger, 6 where it was held that the accused who secured a foreign divorce, and later remarried in the Philippines, in the belief that the foreign divorce was valid, is liable for bigamy. These findings notwithstanding, the issue before us is whether or not respondent Judge should be held administratively liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law. Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and penalized under Article 2047 of the Revised Penal Code. For conviction to lie, it must be proved that the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it is unjust. Knowingly means consciously, intelligently, willfully or intentionally. It is firmly established in this jurisdiction that for a judge to be held liable

for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and that the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.8 The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust. 9 This Court reiterates that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains the law. 10 As held in Alforte v. Santos,11 even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused, she still cannot be administratively charged lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge in rendering an unjust decision must still be proved and failure on the part of the complainant to prove the same warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint.12 There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. Gross Ignorance of the Law Anent the charge of gross ignorance of the law, Maozca v. Domagas,13 is instructive. Therein respondent judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law resulting in a manifestly unjust judgment for granting a demurrer to the evidence in a bigamy case. The grant of the demurrer to the evidence was based on the judges finding of good faith on the par t of the accused, anchored upon a document denominated as a "Separation of Property with Renunciation of Rights." This Court stated that said act of the judge exhibited ignorance of the law, and accordingly he was fined in the amount of P5,000. Also, in Guillermo v. Reyes, Jr.,14 where therein respondent judge was given a reprimand with a stern warning of a more severe penalty should the same or similar act be committed in the future, this Court explained: We have heretofore ruled that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. To unjustifiably hold otherwise, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. The error must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident bad faith. It is only in this latter instance, when the judge acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this Court. As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. It does not mean, however, that a judge, given the leeway he is accorded in such cases, should not evince due care in the performance of his adjudicatory prerogatives. Furthermore, in Wingarts v. Mejia,15 where therein respondent judge, although absolved of any guilt for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, was still imposed sanctions by this Court, thus:

In any event, respondent judge deserves to be appropriately penalized for his regrettably erroneous action in connection with Criminal Case No. 2664 of his court. We have repeatedly stressed that a municipal trial judge occupies the forefront of the judicial arm that is closest in reach to the public he serves, and he must accordingly act at all times with great constancy and utmost probity. Any kind of failure in the discharge of this grave responsibility cannot be countenanced, in order to maintain the faith of the public in the judiciary, especially on the level of courts to which most of them resort for redress.16 Applying these precedents to the present case, the error committed by respondent Judge being gross and patent, the same constitutes ignorance of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary action. Penalty After evaluation of the merits of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that respondent Judge be reprimanded with a stern warning of a more severe penalty in the future. The act of respondent Judge in rendering the decision in question took place on February 24, 1999 or before the effectivity, on October 1, 2001, of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which classified gross ignorance of the law as a serious charge and penalized the offense with a fine of not less than P20,000 but not more than P40,000. Applying the rule as then prevailing,17 and in line with applicable jurisprudence,18 the sanction on respondent Judge should be a fine in the amount of P10,000. WHEREFORE, Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

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MALA IN SE VS MALA PROHIBITA:

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.: JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance. The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder ),1 as amended by RA 7659,2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder: Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly

or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes: (1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned; (3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; (4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied). Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to proveeach and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied). On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 ( Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act ),

respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 ( The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees ); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085). On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law. On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan. On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash , and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash. As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it. Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution.3 Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature. If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing

therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality. In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon4 we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded. Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."5 And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus 1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons; 2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and, 3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with

its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at leastP50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law. In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed: "The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows: That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his coaccused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE , did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount orTOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less,THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows: (a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING ; (b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied). (c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT , the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF

STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;' (d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK." We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense. Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process. The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them;6 much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.8 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"

Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters. Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession. That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law: DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991 REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also? REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series. REP. ISIDRO: Series. REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series. REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination. REP. GARCIA: Yes. REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that REP. GARCIA: Two. REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration. REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice. REP. ISIDRO: Not twice? REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts. REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act. REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah. REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two. REP. GARCIA: A series.

REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series , we seem to say that two or more, di ba? REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di.... SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term "series?" REP. GARCIA: Series, oo. REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations.... REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series. REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination? REP. GARCIA: Yes. REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different? REP. GARCIA: Yes. SEN. TANADA: Two different. REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts. REP. GARCIA: For example, ha... REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition... DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989 SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or," to read, therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural. SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this. THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be.... SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more. SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x

THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say "acts of plunder" there should be, at least, two or more. SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President. Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3). On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal. Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "voidfor-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.10 But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities.11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.12 It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." 13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."14 A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." 15 The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." 16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,17 the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."18 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."19

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." 20 As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." 21 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety. Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.22 It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.23 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris24 [T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided. For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," 25 and is generally disfavored.26 In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.27 In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage. The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan28 must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e),

violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted. In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses. The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19). The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the public officer in: x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended). It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act , which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional. On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.29 The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.30 The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990 MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is P100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft? MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense. MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convict him? MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).

It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime. The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.31 A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts. Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of? ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder. JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law? ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor. JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder? ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4. JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4? ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution.32 We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal: SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby. Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved. As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733: SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.33 However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner: SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases? SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34 Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown. Indeed, 2 provides that Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."35 Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:36 The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for

ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature. There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society. The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se37 and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts. To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it. Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.

These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment. PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 115156 December 14, 1995 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GO SHIU LING, MARY ONG, TERESITA BAJAR y OBEDOZA, and TEODORO EVANGELISTA y DE LOS REYES,accused. ANTONIO COMIA y QUINERY, accused-appellant.

MENDOZA, J.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch CX, finding accused-appellant Antonio Comia guilty of conspiring with four others to import regulated drugs in violation of Art. III, 14 in relation to Art. IV, 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act (Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended). The facts are as follows: About the middle of August 1992, Chief Inspector Amador Pabustan of the Criminal Investigation Section of the Philippine National Police received a report from the International Police Organization (Interpol) that a large shipment of narcotics was arriving in Manila by air mail.

Accordingly, he conferred with the Collector of Customs at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Pastor Guiao, who ordered an inspection of parcels of commercial quantity coming from Hongkong, Singapore, Indonesia and Bangkok. On September 3, 1992, accused-appellant Antonio Comia went to the Airmail Distribution Center (ADC) at the NAIA to inquire about packages sent through TASCO, a brokerage firm engaged in freight facilitating and forwarding, in which Comia was working. Comia had been asked by TASCO Manager Lydia Dizon to follow up the release of the parcels of a client, Mary Ong, which were supposed to have left the Hongkong Airport on September 2, 1992. The cargo consisted of about 30 parcels which were addressed to various individuals and bearing the identifying marks "VGM" or "VGMO." Comia was informed by Teresita Bajar at the Air Parcel Division of the ADC that the packages had arrived but that they were being held for inspection, possibly even for seizure. He was informed that one of the packages marked "VGM" had arrived in bad order and that its contents, which turned out to be watches, had spilled out. Comia told Dizon what he had been told. Dizon, in turn, called up Mary Ong to inform her of the condition of the shipment. Comia talked to several officials of the ADC. Having failed to convince them to release his cargo, Comia went to see Acting Supervising Appraiser of the Air Parcel Division of the Airmail Distribution Center Emmanuel Laudit on September 9, 1992 to make an appointment for Teodoro Evangelista, the owner of TASCO and Comia's brother-in-law, to see Laudit. The same morning, Evangelista came and interceded for the release of the packages by suggesting to Laudit, "Perahin na lang eka iyan." Laudit advised Evangelista to speak instead with Collector Guiao. Meanwhile, the other packages of TASCO, marked "VGM, N "VGMO," and "TRE," were inspected. On September 8, 1992, a package marked "VGMO" and addressed to a certain "COMIA," was found to contain plastic bags containing crystals. When examined at the National Bureau of Investigation, the shipment turned out to be metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The matter was reported to the Commissioner of Customs and the Postmaster General. The following day, September 9, 1992, in their presence and in the presence of the PNP, nine parcels marked "VGMO" were opened. The parcels were addressed to different individuals. Two parcels, both addressed to "COMIA," were found to contain crystalline powder which when tested was found to be shabu. A total of 21.8 kilograms of shabu, with an estimated value of P50 million, was uncovered. Evangelista, who was present, was confronted with the cargo. He gave a statement to the police denying any knowledge of the importation and claiming that the cargo belonged to Mary Ong. Accordingly, Mary Ong was invited for questioning. She executed an affidavit admitting that the packages marked "VGM" were hers, but she claimed they were actually meant for Mrs. Go Shiu Ling, the sister of the sender in Hongkong. Ong claimed that she had merely been asked by Go Shiu Ling to facilitate the importation of the boxes which she (Mary Ong) thought contained watches. Based on Mary Ong's statement, Go Shiu Ling was also apprehended.

In an Information dated September 11, 1992, Comia, Teresita Bajar, Mary Ong, and Go Shiu Ling were charged with violation of Art. III, 14, in relation to Art. IV, 21 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The information alleged That on or about the 9th day of September, 1992, in Pasay City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously import or bring into the Philippines thru the Airmail Distribution Center, Domestic Road, this City, Metamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug. Upon their arraignment on September 18, 1992, the accused pleaded "not guilty." On October 12, 1992, the Information was amended to include Teodoro Evangelista, who, however, has remained at large. Trial proceeded except as to Evangelista. After the prosecution had rested its case, the accused filed separate demurrers to the prosecution's evidence. On April 15, 1993, the trial court dismissed the case against Bajar, on the ground that her complicity consisted merely of being in the working area of the customs examiners of the ADC, locating Comia's parcels, where she had no authority to be. The trial court held that this circumstance was insufficient to prove that she was in conspiracy with the others in the importation of shabu. On April 22, 1993, the trial court also granted the demurrers of Ong and Go. It held that Evangelista's affidavit, which implicated Ong, was inadmissible as evidence because Evangelista was not presented to identify it. Likewise, Ong's own affidavit, in which she pointed to Go as the real consignee of the packages, was also held to be inadmissible on the ground that it had been taken while she was under custodial investigation without assistance of counsel. (Ong was not confronted with the three parcels marked "VGMO." She admitted owning packages marked "VGM" but made no mention of the packages marked "VGMO" in her affidavit. Moreover, what she admitted was that the parcels were sent to her by one Yu Yen Jian, whereas the three parcels appeared to have been shipped by a certain Ching Ming). Comia's demurrer was, however, denied. He was found guilty and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00. The trial court found that TASCO's modus operandi was to have the cargo of clients divided into parcels which were then addressed to different individuals in order to reduce or entirely avoid customs duties. The addressees were people close to Evangelista, such as accused-appellant, who is his brother-in-law, Lydia Dizon, his sister-in-law, Joel Evangelista, his son, and Bert Tuazon, his neighbor. The names and addresses were likewise interchanged or fictitious addresses were given. The packages were coded with the initials of TASCO's clients so that they could be identified. The code names "VGM" and "VGMO" stood for Mary Ong. Comia's job was to monitor the packages as they arrived at the ADC, although they were not released there but at pilot post offices to which they were forwarded. Teresita Bajar knew the coded initials of TASCO's clients, having been given a list of them. She would monitor the packages of TASCO that had arrived and relay the information to Comia so that the latter could claim them at the Sta. Mesa satellite post office. In claiming them, Comia did not have to sign

nor show any identification for the packages he received for TASCO. The person in charge of the Sta. Mesa post office simply checked the items on his list. Comia refused to name the personnel from whom he claimed his packages. In this particular instance, Comia was following up the parcels of Mary Ong which left the Airmail Center of Hongkong on September 2, 1992. They were supposed to contain watches misdeclared as toys and gifts. In this way Ong was in the past able to import dutiable goods, such as calculators, without paying the corresponding taxes. Comia testified that although TASCO clients had used his name, it was the first time that Mary Ong used his name as a dummy addressee. Previously, Mary Ong had used the names of the other dummy addressees which had been given to her by Lydia Dizon. On the other hand, Comia's name was used by Rudy Hernandez, another client of TASCO. Comia said he consented to the use of his name by Ong at the instance of Lydia Dizon. Comia claimed he was a mere employee and delivery man and got nothing in exchange for the use of his name. Lydia Dizon, on the other hand, denied that she ever allowed Mary Ong to use Comia's name. In finding Comia guilty, the trial court held that he acted on his own in conspiracy with unknown partners, by using Mary Ong's coded initials "VGMO" and thereby making it appear they were part of Ong's shipment, since only the three parcels all addressed to Comia and marked "VGMO" contained shabu. The trial court held that the fact that Comia was persistent in his follow up showed that he knew the contents of the three parcels. The trial court held: If, as Comia claimed, he had been going to the ADC daily from the last week of August 1992 up to the first week of September 1992, he could not have failed to determine that the three parcels had arrived on September 3, 1992 and, therefore, there was no longer any need to follow-up even up to September 9, 1992 if his purpose was merely to determine whether or not they had arrived. That he had religiously gone to the ADC to follow up even after becoming aware of the arrival of the packages is an indication that he was there not merely to know if they had arrived but to secure their immediate dispatch to the satellite office. That he informed Laudit about Evangelista's wanting to see him (Laudit) as in fact Evangelista went to see Laudit to whom he proposed "Perahin na lang eka iyan" is an indication of his keen interest in having the parcels released. Such keen interest indicates prior knowledge of the contents of the parcels, for if, as claimed, they knew them to contain merely watches, and also as claimed, he got nothing for the use of his name, why the persistent follow-up? Comia has appealed, making the following assignment of errors: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING FROM THE MAZE OF DUBIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE THREE PARCELS IN QUESTION WHICH WERE FOUND TO CONTAIN PROHIBITED DRUGS. 1 II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PARCELS IN QUESTION WERE TO GO TO COMIA AND HIS CONSPIRATOR/S WHICH CONCLUSION WAS BASED ON THE

UNDUE AND ERRONEOUS INFERENCE DERIVED FROM THE TESTIMONY OF LYDIA DIZON TO THE EFFECT THAT SHE DID NOT GIVE THE NAME OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR PARCELS OF MARY ONG AS IT WAS A CERTAIN RUDY HERNANDEZ WHO WAS USING THE NAME OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 2 III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSEDAPPELLANT "SHOWS PROOF OF CONSPIRACY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN THE IMPORTATION OF THE THREE PARCELS OF SHABU SUBJECT OF THE CASE AT BAR. 3 IV THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ABSOLVING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED ON THE GROUND THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 4 The Solicitor General filed in lieu of an appellee's brief a Manifestation that, in his opinion, the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt and, for this reason, recommending the acquittal of accused-appellant Comia. We find accused-appellant's contentions and the Solicitor General's manifestation to be without merit. First. Accused-appellant and the Solicitor General contend that, instead of showing that Comia knew that the packages contained shabu, the fact that Comia was persistent in seeking the release of the packages shows that he did not know what the parcels contained. They contend that Comia knew that one parcel had been discovered to contain watches in commercial quantity, not toys or gifts as stated in the customs declaration; that the next step would be the seizure of the cargo; and that in following up the matter at the ADC, his only purpose was to try to prevent the seizure of the goods. They contend that if Comia knew that the packages contained shabu, he would have stopped going to the ADC and instead would have gone into hiding. This contention has no merit. It is clear from the evidence that Evangelista and his firm had connections with the people inside the ADC and the Sta. Mesa Post Office, because of which Evangelista and his firm were able to slip through customs commercial quantities of highly dutiable goods. Accused-appellant himself states in his brief that the fact that Emmanuel Laudit of the ADC allegedly warned Lydia Dizon that the shipment was going to be discovered "indicates [the] existence of an alliance with Laudit." Without such an "alliance," merely using dummy addressees with fictitious or inaccurate addresses on the parcels handled by the TASCO would not be enough to make the smuggling of goods and contraband possible. Indeed, Lydia Dizon herself, the TASCO manager, testified: ATTY. MARCOLETA: Q You said at the outset, Madam Witness, that you are presently jobless and that you last reported for work middle of August 1992, will you please explain to the Court the interruption in your work?

A Because in mid-August 1992 ADC called up our office, informing me to stop working and since then I have stopped working. COURT: Q Now, tell us, who in the ADC called you up? A Mr. Manny Laudit, Your Honor. Q Did it occur to you to inquire from him why he advised you to stop working? A Because according to him "mainit na daw ho" because it is from him was [sic] that we really get the information. Q Now tell us, what did you understand by "mainit?" A I cannot understand what he meant by "mainit." He just told me so. Comia's role was to monitor the packages as they arrived at the ADC. He saw to it that the packages bearing false addresses were not sent to the dead letter office or returned to their senders. He was known at the Sta. Mesa post office to which the packages were forwarded. This fact enabled him to have them released without having to sign for anything or produce proof of identity, as would have been the procedure for claiming parcels. Thus it is more likely that Comia kept on working for the release of the packages despite the discovery of the watches because of his friends at the ADC. He had reason to work hard for the release of the packages, now that the watches had been discovered and ranking officials of the ADC presumably already knew that TASCO's packages had been misdeclared. He had to have them released before the rest of the packages were inspected. When his efforts failed, Comia called on his brother-in-law, Teodoro Evangelista, who was the owner of the firm and a former customs policeman, so that the latter could use his influence. When Evangelista arrived, he assured Laudit that the packages contained only watches and boldly offered "Perahin na lang eka iyan." This is far different from the scenario which the Solicitor General has portrayed where an innocent man's name is used by another for unlawful purposes without his knowledge or consent. Comia was not a victim, nor was he framed up. Comia was not an ordinary employee of the TASCO. He is the brother-in-law of the owner of TASCO, Teodoro Evangelista, and the one entrusted by the latter to follow up matters at the ADC and the Sta. Mesa Post Office. He was the one who was in fact known to the employees there. Bajar testified that Comia would inquire from her about TASCO's expected packages two or three times a week or sometimes daily. 5 Laudit testified that in the four years he had known Evangelista, he had seen him only about five times, while he had been seeing accused-appellant regularly: FISCAL BERON: Q Now, do you know of a person by the name of Teodoro Evangelista?

A Teddy Evangelista, not Teodoro. Q Why do you know Teddy? A Because he was one of the facilitators/forwarders there who has some commercial parcels there that are coming from abroad sir. Q Since when have you known Teddy Evangelista? A Since four (4) years ago sir. 6 .... Q How often was Teddy Evangelista in your office for the four (4) years that you say had been in this business of facilitating release of parcels? A I have seen him only a maximum of five (5) times. COURT: Q Five (5) times during the four years? A Yes, Your Honor because he seldom comes to the office. It is only Tonying who goes to . . . Q Who is that Tonying that you mentioned? A Tonying, that fellow seated there Your Honor. (witness approaching the gallery and tap [sic] the shoulder of a man who responded to the name Tonying Comia) COURT: Q He is the one accused here? A Yes, Your Honor. Q What about him, why did you mention him when I was asking you about Teddy Evangelista? Q Tonying is the one who frequents our office to follow up their importations. 7 Even granting that Comia acted in good faith, he cannot escape criminal responsibility. The crime with which he is charged is a malum prohibitum. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances. As held inPeople v. Lo Ho Wing: 8

Moreover, the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a " malum prohibitum" because it is punished as an offense under a special law. It is a wrong because it is prohibited by law. Without the law punishing the act, it cannot be considered a wrong. As such, the mere commission of said act is what constitutes the offense punished and suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the act so punished, regardless of criminal intent. Likewise, in People v. Bayona, it was held: The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate to act." 9 Indeed, Comia cannot claim to have acted in good faith. Even assuming that he did not know that the packages contained shabu, the fact is that he tried to facilitate the importation of dutiable goods free of customs duties. It comes as a surprise therefore that in moving for the acquittal of accused-appellant the Solicitor General should downplay or minimize the role of accused-appellant by insisting that the latter was a "mere employee" who did not have a choice "but to assent to whatever his employer wanted to do," and that "besides, this practice of TASCO of using different addressed for a client has been admitted by no less than its manager, Lydia Dizon herself." 10 The fact is that accused-appellant Antonio Comia gave his consent for the importers of the illegal cargo to use his name for the purpose of concealing it from the authorities. He cannot now wash his hands and say he did not know that they would use his name to import shabu. He gave them license to use his name for whatever purpose and it was not at all unforeseeable that clients could employ the scheme to import shabu or other drugs and other contraband. Second. Accused-appellant argues that the trial court also erred in relying upon the testimony of Lydia Dizon that Mary Ong never used Comia's name, on the basis of which the trial court concluded that Comia had acted on his own together with his co-conspirators. Accusedappellant claims that Dizon had every reason to implicate him (Comia) as the sole perpetrator of the crime because as manager of TASCO she knew she could possibly be implicated in the crime. Accused-appellant points out that it was upon her instruction that Comia had gone to ADC on September 3, 1992 to inquire about the arrival of the parcels. But while this may be true, as already discussed the evidence against Comia, even without Dizon's testimony, is sufficient to support a finding of his guilt. Third. Appellant argues further that he cannot be convicted of conspiracy because the cases against his alleged co-conspirators, Mary Ong and Go Shiu Ling, were dismissed. The contention is without merit. In People v. Dramayo, 11 the Court affirmed the conviction of two out of seven conspirators originally accused of murder. This Court noted that there had been cases where, notwithstanding that a majority of the defendants have been acquitted, the accused had been held responsible for the crime charged, a moral certainty having arisen as to their culpability. 12 ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to 17 of Republic Act No. 7659, however, the penalty of life imprisonment is MODIFIED to reclusion perpetua.

SO ORDERED.

****************

Republic SUPREME Manila EN BANC

of

the

Philippines COURT

G.R. Nos. 133343-44

March 2, 2000 PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

PEOPLE OF THE vs. ILDEFONSO BAYONA y CALOSO, accused-appellant. QUISUMBING, J.:

On automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case Nos. TG-2436-95 and TG-2437-95, finding appellant guilty of two (2) counts of rape, sentencing him to death, and ordering him to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for each count of rape. The facts of the case are as follows: On October 31, 1994, at around 3:00 A.M., in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite, appellant entered the room where his daughter, Marilou, and his three (3) sons, Michael, Melvin, and Marlon, were sleeping. Appellant, who was wearing only his briefs, woke up his daughter, pulled her feet and dragged her towards him. Appellant started touching his daughter in her private parts. When Marilou struggled ("nagwawala"), appellant boxed her in the abdomen until she lost consciousness. When Marilou regained consciousness, she noticed that she was no longer wearing her shorts, only her t-shirt. She also found blood on her private parts.1 On November 2, 1994, at around 10 o'clock in the evening, appellant again entered the room where his daughter was sleeping. He told her that he would give her everything if she would accede to his sexual desire ("ibibigay niya ang lahat, pumayag lang ako.") When Marilou refused he boxed her. Then she lost consciousness. When she woke up, she found herself naked. She could barely stand up because of the pain in her private parts. 2 After the rapes, Marilou stopped going. to school. She told her paternal grandmother about the rapes but the latter merely advised her to just ignore it. She also told her paternal uncles about it. On November 11, 1994, two of her uncles, German and Lando Bayona, accompanied by the barangay captain, finally brought her to the Municipal Health Center for examination. 3 While

Marilou was being examined, her maternal aunt, Teresita D. Agaen, who was a Barangay Health Worker, saw the uncles. She asked Lando what they were doing there. He replied that they were having Marilou treated because she was always dizzy. When Marilou came out of the examination room, she saw her aunt and embraced her. She told her aunt that her father raped her. 4 On November 11, 1994, Marilou, assisted by her aunt Teresita, filed a Complaint 5 against her father, alleging that she was raped on three occasions - October 31, 1994, November 2, 1994, and November 8, 1994. During preliminary investigation, appellant could not be located at his address. On January 6, 1995, the investigating judge rendered a Resolution 6 finding probable cause that appellant raped his daughter on two occasions. For some reason, the aforesaid Resolution failed to include the rape committed on November 8, 1994. On April 18, 1995, appellant was charged with two counts of rape under the following Informations: 7 CRIMINAL CASE NO. TG-2436-95 INFORMATION The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, based on a verified complaint filed by one Marilou Bayona, hereby accuses ILDEFONSO BAYONA of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows: That on or about the 31st day of October, 1994, in the Municipality of Silang, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and with lewd designs, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with Marilou Bayona, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. CONTRARY TO LAW. Imus, Cavite, February 13, 1995. (SGD.) OSCAR Asst. Provincial Prosecutor CRIMINAL CASE NO. TG-2437-95 INFORMATION The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor based on a verified complaint filed by one Marilou Bayona, hereby accuses ILDEFONSO BAYONA of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows: That on or about the 2nd day of November, 1994, in the Municipality of Silang, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with deliberate intent and with lewd designs, by means of force and intimidation; did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal R. JARLOS

knowledge with Marilou Bayona, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. CONTRARY TO LAW. Imus, Cavite, February 13, 1995. (SGD.) OSCAR Asst. Provincial Prosecutor R. JARLOS

Upon arraignment on June 24, 1996, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio Atty. Crisostomo Dario, Jr., entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. 8 The two cases were jointly tried. 9 During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses; (1) Dra. Engracia A. dela Cruz, Municipal Health Officer of Silang Cavite; (2) Private complainant Marilou Derla Bayona, and (3) her aunt, Teresita Derla Agaen. Dra. Cruz testified that she examined the victim on November 11, 1994. She found that the hymen was not intact, the vagina had lacerations at 7 o'clock, which refers to the lower left portion of the vagina, and that the vagina easily admitted two fingers. She concluded that it was possible that the victim had sexual intercourse within the past three (3) days.10 After the prosecution rested, the defense requested for numerous postponements inorder to secure the presence of appellant's sons as witnesses. Having failed to do so, appellant was finally presented as sole witness for the defense. 11 Appellant categorically denied the rape charges. He claimed at the time of the alleged rapes, he was then working in Gitasin, Sitio Kaong, Silang, Cavite, which is more or less seven (7) kilometers from their residence where the rapes took place. Because of the distance, he explained he went home only during weekends. He further testified that he was separated from his wife because she eloped with another man, and that she egged their daughter to file the rape charges so that he will be imprisoned and could no longer filed adultery charges against her. He also testified that his daughter filed the rape charges because he spanked her for having an affair with the son of the brother of his wife's paramour. 12 On April 8, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision dispositive portion of the decision states:
13

finding appellant guilty as charged. The

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused ILDEFONSO BAYONA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in both criminal cases and sentences him In Criminal Case No. TG-2436-95, to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the victim Marilou Bayona the sum of P50,000.00 as damages; In Criminal Case No. TG-2437-95, to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the victim Marilou Bayona the sum of P50,000.00 as damages. Costs against the accused. SO ORDERED.

Hence, the present automatic review. Appellant now raises the following issues: 14 I. THE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE INCONCLUSIVE AND WEAK EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION. THE

Appellant contends, and the Office of the Solicitor General concur, that the trial court erred in imposing the death sentence since the two (2) Informations failed to allege the special qualifying circumstance of relationship between appellant and his daughter. Hence, appellant could only be convicted of the crime of simple rape, and not qualified rape. 15 Appellant, however, assails also the credibility of the victim by pointing out this inconsistency in her testimony - that the victim could not have felt the pain in her private parts during the rape since she testified that she was unconscious at that time. Appellant assails as baseless the conclusions made by examining physician since (1) there was no evidence of external aggression on the victim's body, and (2) there was only one vaginal laceration while the victim claimed she was raped three times. The medical certificate, appellant argues, is merely proof of loss of virginity and not of rape. The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the victim's categorical testimony, which never wavered even under rigorous cross-examination. A daughter would not accuse her own father of such a heinous crime unless it were true. Further, the medical certificate corroborates her testimony that she was indeed raped. In view of the failure to allege the special qualifying circumstance of relationship, the OSG recommends, however, the modification of the penalty and civil indemnity awarded to the victim. The pertinent issues here pertain first, to the credibility of witnesses; second, the sufficiency of the evidence against appellant; and lastly, the correctness of the penalty imposed upon him. Anent the first issue, the well-entrenched rule is that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially under cross-examination. 16 Appellate courts are bound by the findings of the trial court in this respect, unless it is shown that the trial court in this respect, unless it is shown that the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood, or misappreciated certain facts and circumstances which if considered would have altered the outcome of the case. 17 Our own review of the victim's testimony confirms the conclusion of the trial court that "her testimony deserves full faith and credence." 18 The alleged inconsistency in her testimony pertaining to the pain she felt during the rape is only minor detail and should detract from the weight and credibility of her testimony. 19 Errorless recollection of a harrowing incident cannot be expected of a witness especially when she is recounting details of an experience so humiliating and so painful as rape. 20 The conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged assault is likewise of utmost importance so as to establish the truth or falsity of the charge of rape. 21 In this case, the victim reported her ordeal to her paternal grandmother, who chose to ignore what happened. The victim turned to her paternal uncles who eventually brought her to the Municipal Health Office for physical examinations. The victim's conduct after the rapes reaffirm the truth of her charges.

Appellant contends that his wife merely used their daughter as an instrument to prevent him from filing adultery charges. This argument is too shallow. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject them to embarrassment and even stigma. 22 In the same vein, it is unbelievable for a daughter to charge her own father with rape at the expense of being ridiculed, 23 merely because he spanked her. Parental punishment is not a good reason for a daughter to falsely accuse her father of rape. 24 It would be the height of depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father for most of his remaining life in jail, if not put him to his death, and drag herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame. 25 Anent the second issue, we find that the elements of the crime of rape were duly proven by the prosecution. First, carnal knowledge took place between father and daughter as proven by the victim's testimony. In rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. 26 Further, the medical findings corroborate the findings of rape. While no external injuries were found on the body of the victim, we have ruled that it is not indispensable that marks of external bodily injuries should appear on the victim. 27 Medical authorities attest that no mark of violence may be detected if the blow is delivered to the abdomen. 28 Contrary to the assertions of appellant, it was not totally impossible for the victim to sustain only one vaginal laceration despite the repeated rapes. Lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible defloratidn. 29 Second, carnal knowledge took place under circumstances of force and intimidation since appellant would box his daughter to submissiveness. As we have held in one case: 30 In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former's moral ascendancy and influence over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation. That ascendancy or influence necessarily flows from the father's parental authority, which the Constitution and the laws recognize, support and enhance, as well as from the children's duty to obey and observe reverence and respect towards their parents. Such reverence and respect are deeply ingrained in the minds of Filipino children and are recognized by law. Abuse of both by a father can subjugate his daughter's will, thereby forcing her to do whatever he wants. As to the place of commission of the rape, we have held that for rape to be committed, it is not necessary for the place to be ideal, or the weather to be fine, for rapists bear no respect for locale and time when they carry out their evil deed. 31 Thus, rape has been committed even in the same room where other family members also sleep.32 Regarding the third issue, the basis for the imposition of the death penalty by the trial court was the existence of the attendant circumstance of relationship between the offender and the victim pursuant to Article 335, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which provides: . . . The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

xxx

xxx

xxx

A cursory perusal of the two Informations reveal that they failed to allege the age of the victim and her relationship to appellant. As early as People v. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559, 577 (1998) 33 we have ruled that both minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender must be clearly alleged in the Information and duly proved. In People v. Medina, 300 SCRA 98, 118 (1998), we held: . . . In a criminal prosecution, it is the fundamental rule that every element of the crime charged must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of this requirement is to enable the accused to properly prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. This doctrine is not a mere technicality; it rests on the constitutional principle that an accused is entitled "to be informed of the nature and cause" of the accusation against him, as stated in the information. 34 Accordingly, appellant can only be convicted of the crime of rape, which for lack of a better term, has been designated as simple rape.1wphi1 We affirm the award of indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape. 35 The award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape without need of further proof is likewise proper. 36Relationship between appellant and the victim can he appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. 37 Pursuant to Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, the presence of one aggravating circumstance justifies the award of exemplary damages. Hence, we likewise award exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 for each count of rape to deter other fathers with perverse or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their daughters. 38 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case Nos. TG-2436-95 and TG-2437-95 finding appellant Ildefonso Bayona y Caloso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the two counts of rape is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant's sentence is reduced toreclusion perpetua for each count of rape. He is also ORDERED to pay complainant for each count of rape the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Cost against appellant.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED.