International Relations 1919-1963

The Peace settlements of 1919

Europe had been drawn up into two armed camps by the beginning of the second decade of the C.20th. Each great power in Europe sought to gain pre-eminence and this caused great tensions and ealousy. Throughout the period 1900-191! there were a series of crises which could ha"e spar#ed a ma or war$ but it was only when the assassination of %rchdu#e &ran'-&erdinand of %ustria-(ungary by a )erb nationalist in )ara e"o in 191! occurred that a ma or war bro#e out. The countries of the two armed camps pledged to support each other and Europe was plunged into a war. The two armed camps were* The Triple Alliance - Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy The Triple Entente - rance, Russia and Great !ritain" +any other countries were in"ol"ed$ including ,apan and the -)% .after 191/0. The Empires of the 1reat Powers were also in"ol"ed in the conflict which caused the war to widen into a 2orld 2ar. The suffering of the participants in the 1reat 2ar was so appalling$ that when the war came to an end in 3o"ember 1914$ many hoped ne"er to repeat such an e5perience again$ and a mood of pacifism grew in the 1920s. &rance had suffered particularly badly in the war$ so when the diplomats met at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919$ their representati"es$ led by Prime +inister Georges #lemenceau$ pledged to ma#e 1ermany pay. 6ritain$ led by Prime +inister $a%id &loyd-George$ was more sympathetic to 1ermany. 7loyd-1eorge realised that if 1ermany was harshly punished this would cause great resentment amongst the 1ermans and could cause tensions in the future. (e also belie"ed that a strong 1ermany would be a good trading partner for 6ritain$ and that a healthy 1erman economy would pre"ent the rise of e5tremist parties either Communists or &ascists. 8n the other hand 7loyd-1eorge had to listen to 6ritish public opinion which was calling for 1ermany to be 9s:uee'ed until the pips s:uea#;9 The other great "ictorious power was the -)%. 7ed by President 'oodro( 'ilson$ the %mericans had no great desire to punish the 1ermans. <n ,anuary 1914 2ilson had proposed his ourteen )oints$ which was a blueprint for a fair peace settlement at the end of the war. 8ne of its main points was the idea of a &eague o* +ations which would try to pre"ent ma or wars through negotiation. 2ilson did not wish to punish the 1ermans$ but at the Peace Conference he was o"erruled by Clemenceau and 7loyd1eorge. The Treaty o* ,ersailles was the peace settlement with 1ermany$ it was "ery harsh. <n effect 1ermany had to* - accept blame for starting the war

- lose all of its colonies - lose most of its army$ na"y and all its airforce - lose huge territories in Europe - pay reparations of =>.> billion. The 1ermans hated the Treaty of ?ersailles and throughout the 1920s and 19@0s her politicians tried to re"erse the terms of the treaty. <n the 1920s (itler and the 3a'is gained support as they promised to re"erse the treaty. <n the 19@0s when the 3a'is were in power$ (itler set about re"ersing these terms. 6ritain belie"ed that (itler should be allowed to do this and this policy of letting the 1ermans ta#e bac# their lands and building their armed ser"ices was called Appeasement. 6ritain also appeased <taly and ,apan. <taly oined 6ritain and &rance in 191A after territorial gains were promised to the <talians if they fought against the 1ermans. <n 1919 <taly gained "ery little and felt snubbed. ,apan had fought alongside 6ritain in the &irst 2orld 2ar but was snubbed by the 1reat Powers in 1919. 6oth <taly and ,apan faced economic problems in the 1920s and were dominated by right-wing e5treme go"ernments. To sol"e their problems both countries set about creating empires. 6ritain and &rance let them get away with this as they were not prepared to start a ma or war. This was appeasement. )ummary of ?ersailles and the other peace treaties
Treaty Treaty of ?ersailles B 1ermany Treaty of )t. 1ermain B %ustria Treaty of Trianon B (ungary Treaty of 3euilly B 6ulgaria Treaty of )e"res B Tur#ey 7oss of territory 7oss of 8ttoman Empire Result )e"erely punished .see notes for details0 %ustria-(ungary split. 7oss of territory to new countries e.g. Poland$ C'echoslo"a#ia and Cugosla"ia

<n Central and Eastern Europe$ the conse:uences of the &irst 2orld 2ar were much more dramatic than they were in the 2est. <mperial power was swept away in %ustria-(ungary$ Dussia and the 8ttoman Empire. %ustria-(ungary collapsed by 1914 and the map of Europe was re-drawn with the creation of new states from the remains of the old. The successor states were %ustria$ Poland$ (ungary$ Cugosla"ia and C'echoslo"a#ia. Each national group was determined to achie"e independence from imperial interference. This was #nown as the right of +ational -el*-$etermination. (owe"er$ in each of the new countries minorities felt that their rights were not recognised properly. &or e5ample$ in C'echoslo"a#ia there were C'echs$ )lo"a#s$ Duthenes$ Poles$ (ungarians$ 1ermans$ ,ews$ 1ypsies$ Domanians etc.. The 8ttoman Empire was destroyed. 6y the treaty of )e"res 1920$ Tur#ey was cut bac# to @00$000 s:uare miles and its territory in the +iddle East was gi"en as mandates to 6ritain and &rance. 1reece declared war in 1921 to gain land from Tur#ey$ but was beaten. <n 1922 +ustapha Eemal .%tatur#0 became President of the Tur#ish Depublic and abolished the )ultanate .8ttoman Emperors0. 6y the treaty of 7ausanne 192@ Tur#ey agreed to gi"e up its 3orth %frican territories and its %rabian #ingdoms. 8ne and half million 1ree#s and Tur#s were swapped between 1reece and Tur#ey. .Today this would be called ethnic cleansing0.

DussiaFs losses were the greatest. Dussia had surrendered to 1ermany in 191/ and lost huge territories by the Treaty o* !rest-&ito%s. 191/. <n 3o"ember 191/$ the 6olshe"i#s sei'ed power in Dussia. The 6olshe"i#s were communists$ committed to the creation of a classless society. Dussia was not in"ited to the Paris Peace Conference because the other 1reat Powers feared communism and because Dussia continued to fight a ci"il war until 1921. The treaty of ?ersailles punished 1ermany harshly. The other treaties were e"en more se"ere to %ustria-(ungary$ Tur#ey and 6ulgaria. Dussia lost a great deal while communism was being established. 6ritain and &rance were wea#ened by the war and had to borrow money from the -)% to help rebuild. The -)% emerged as the strongest country from the &irst 2orld 2ar. Tip0 #ompare this map o* Europe in 1911, (ith the one in 1919" 2a.e sure you are *amiliar (ith these territiorial changes" A good .no(ledge o* these maps (ill help you greatly"

The 7eague of 3ations

The concept of a 7eague of 3ations to deal with international problems was the brainchild of 'oodro( 'ilson. <n &ebruary 1914 he had put forward a proposal for peace #nown as the ourteen )oints. 2ilsonFs &ourteen Points proposed a fair deal for 1ermany and the establishment of a 7eague of 3ations. 2hen 1ermany signed the %rmstice in 1914$ they belie"ed that the peace deal would be based on the &ourteen points. %s you will #now 1ermany and %ustria-(ungary were dealt with se"erely. (owe"er$ the 7eague of 3ations did come into e5istence. The 7eague of 3ations was established so that the 1reat Powers and other member countries could discuss issues rather than resort to war. The 7eague also had other responsibilities e.g. a world health programme and an international court of ustice. 6ut$ the 7eague had a number of fatal wea#nesses. &irst$ three important countries were not part of the 7eague* -)%$ -))D and 1ermany. <t may seem surprising that the -)% was not in the 7eague$ but although 2ilson wanted %merican membership$ many leading %merican politicians wanted to #eep out of international affairs. This policy of #eeping to themsel"es was #nown as isolationism. <n fact 2ilson had had a lot of trouble getting the -)% into the 2ar in 191/G President Doose"elt faced a similar problem between 19@9-19!1. The -))D was not allowed to oin until 19@! because its 6olshe"i# go"ernment was not recognised by the other 1reat Powers. 1ermany was not allowed to oin initially as one of the punishments imposed by the Treaty of ?ersailles. .1ermany was a member from 192>-19@@0. ,apan left in 19@@ and <taly in 19@/.

% second fatal wea#ness was the fact that the 7eague of 3ations did not ha"e an army. <f a conflict arose$ member states had to supply forces at their own e5pense. %ll were reluctant to do so$ especially 6ritain and &rance who were effecti"ely the only strong countries in the 7eague. (ow could the 7eague enforce its willH Economic sanctions were one method of control$ but these were usually ineffecti"e if non-7eague countries could supply goods instead. % third wea#ness was to do with organisation. Each of the member countries sent delegates to the %ssembly$ but real power was concentrated in the hands of the Council$ made up of permanent members 6ritain$ &rance$ <taly and ,apan in 1920. Each member of the council had the right of "eto$ which meant that one "ote against could stop action being agreed.

(ow did the 7eague of 3ations wor# for a better worldH

The 7eague of 3ations had set itself a wider tas# than simply waiting for disputes and hoping to sol"e them. Through its agencies$ the 7eague aimed to fight po"erty$ disease and in ustice all o"er the world. Defugees The 7eague did tremendous wor# in getting refugees and former prisoners of war bac# to their homelands. <t is estimated that in the first few years after the war about !00$000 prisoners were returned to their homes by the 7eaguesF agencies. 2hen a refugee crisis hit Tur#ey in 1922$ hundreds of thousands of people had to be housed in refugee camps. The 7eague acted :uic#ly to stamp out cholera$ smallpo5 and dysentery in the camps. 2or#ing conditions The <nternational 7abour 8rganisation was successful in banning poisonous white lead from paint and in limiting the hours that small children were allowed to wor#. <t also campaigned strongly for employers to impro"e wor#ing conditions generally. <t introduced a resolution for a ma5imum !4-hour wee# and 4 hour day$ but only a minority of members adopted it because they thought it would raise costs in their own home industries. (ealth The (ealth Committee$ which later became the 2orld (ealth 8rganisation$ wor#ed hard to defeat the dreadful disease leprosy. <t started the global campaign to e5terminate mos:uitoes$ which greatly reduced cases of malaria and yellow fe"er in later decades. E"en Dussia$ which was otherwise opposed to the 7eague$ used the (ealth Committee to ad"ise it on pre"enting plague in )iberia. Transport The 7eague made recommendations on mar#ing shipping lanes and produced an international highway code for road users.

)ocial problems The 7eague blac#listed four large 1erman$ Iutch$ &rench and )wiss companies$ which were in"ol"ed in the illegal drug trade. <t brought about the freeing of sla"es in 6ritishowned )ierra 7eone. <t organised raids against sla"e owners and traders in 6urma. <t challenged the use of forced labour to build the Tanganiy#a railway in %frica$ where the death rate among %frican wor#ers was a staggering A0J. 7eague pressure brought this down to !J which they said was Ka much more acceptable figure.F E"en in areas where it could not remo"e social in ustice the 7eague #ept careful records of what was going on and pro"ided information on problems such as drug traffic#ing$ prostitution and sla"ery. )uccesses in international disputesH <t is "ery easy to blame the blame the 7eague for the failure of the )econd 2orld 2ar$ but it did achie"e some successes. <n 1920 the 7eague successfully dealt with a feud between )weden and &inland o"er the %aland <salnds and between 1reece and 6ulgaria in 192A. 3e"ertheless these were disputes between small and wea# countries. 2hen the 1reat Powers were in"ol"ed e.g. +anchuria 19@1 .,apan and China0 and %byssinia 19@A .<taly and %byssinia0$ the 7eague failed because the aggressor members did not want the 7eague to pre"ent their actions.

The +anchurian Crisis 19@1

<n many ways ,apan was a new nation in the early Twentieth Century. &or three hundred years ,apan had remained isolated and had resisted foreign inter"ention. Then in 14A@ ,apan was opened up to foreign contact by Commodore Perry on the behalf of the -)%. The ,apanese had no desire to become a 2estern colony and so modernised rapidly to catch up with the 1reat Powers. 6y the turn of the century ,apan had fought successful wars with both China and Dussia and had made it plain that it sought a sphere o* in*luence in the &ar East. ,apan fought with &rance$ 6ritain and the -)% in the &irst 2orld 2ar$ but she felt poorly rewarded by the peace settlements of 1919. Iuring the 1920s ,apan faced considerable problems e.g. a rapidly growing population and a lac# of land. ,apan had long had an economic interest in 2anchuria$ a part of 3orthern China. China was a complete mess by the 1920sG it was a country torn apart by warlords and e5tremist politicians. <n 19@1 the ,apanese stage-managed an attac# on the ,apanese owned +anchurian railway by LChinese bandits.M To protect their interests the ,apanese army too# control of the whole region. 6oth China and ,apan appealed to the &eague o* +ations to arbitrate. The significance of the 2anchurian Incident is that it was the first real test of the 7eague of 3ationFs principle of collecti%e security. Theoretically$ the 7eague should ha"e placed economic and military sanctions upon ,apan as the aggressi"e member state. The problem was that the 7eague was seriously wea#ened by the nonmembership of the -)% and Dussia. <n effect$ the 7eague was comprised of only two 1reat Powers$ 6ritain and &rance$ and a host of lesser nations. %ny act of collecti"e
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security would call for the leadership of 6ritain and &rance$ but this was "irtually impossible as both countries were in the grip of depression and were immersed in the problems of maintaining their own empires. 6ritain and &rance$ acting for the 7eague of 3ations$ were not strong enough to force ,apan out of China$ and neither country wanted to ris# their colonies in the &ar East. This was appeasement$ 6ritain and &rance had undermined the 7eague of 3ations in return for short term peaceG ,apan got away with adding +anchuria .later called 2anchu.uo0 to its empire. The 7eague appeared to ta#e some action o"er the +anchurian <ncident by sending &ord &ytton to the region on a fact-finding mission. 7ytton too# a year to report bac# to the 7eague. %s each day passed the ,apanese became increasingly entrenched in +anchuria. Perhaps this appeasement was understandable under the circumstancesG it is "ery unli#ely that the general public in 6ritain and &rance would ha"e had the stomach for a ma or war with ,apan in the &ar East$ literally thousands of miles from Europe$ a region which meant "ery little to ordinary Europeans. <t is unli#ely that the na"ies of 6ritain and &rance would ha"e felt comfortable with or e"en ha"e afforded such a conflict. The conse:uences of failure meant not only a loss of prestige$ but also in"ol"ed a direct threat to European colonies e.g. )ingapore$ in the &ar East. ,apan left the 7eague in 19@@$ as a result of the 7ytton report$ and it thus lost a powerful member state. The in"asion of +anchuria highlighted the fact that the 7eague was neither able nor willing to act decisi"ely when dealing with aggressors$ particularly when they were powerful members of the 7eague. ,apan acted as a role model for other aggressi"e nations e.g. 1ermany and <taly in the 19@0s. The +anchurian <ncident and the 7eagueFs failure to deal with it was a serious blow to the organisation. <f ,apan could act without serious conse:uence$ what #ind of message was being sent to other potentially aggressi"e nations in the 19@0sH

The %byssinian Crisis 19@A

6enito +ussolini was born the son of a "illage blac#smith and schoolmistress in 144@. (e fled to )wit'erland in 1902 to e"ade military ser"ice. (is dramatically "aried early career included acti"ity as manual labourer$ a teacher$ and a ournalist$ before he finally ser"ed$ and was wounded$ in the &irst 2orld 2ar. <n 1919 he founded the Kfascisti di combattimentoF$ which in 1921 became the <talian &ascist party. <ts bac#ing and +ussolini9s own tactics accounted for his rise to power between 1919 and 1922$ when Eing ?ictor Emmanuel <<< appointed him Prime +inister. +ussolini was the first fascist dictator to emerge in Europe after the &irst 2orld 2ar$ and was a model for others$ most notably (itler who greatly admired him in the 19@0s. +ussolini called himself K<l IuceF$ the Iu#e$ and had grand ambitions to ma#e <taly great again. +ussolini li#ed to see himself as an heir to the Doman Emperors$ li#e them he wished to build and maintain an Empire in the +editerranean. <taly gained some lands from %ustria-(ungary in 1919$ but generally the <talians felt snubbed at ?ersailles and were not treated as a 1reat Power as they had e5pected. The <talians were encouraged to thin# of themsel"es as a 1reat Power and yet their trac# record in military terms was poor. They had been defeated by nati"e troops in A3yssinia .Ethiopia0 in 149> and had suffered se"ere losses during the &irst 2orld 2ar. The <talian image of themsel"es did not match up to the reality.

<$ (aile )elassie$ Emperor of %byssinia$ am here today to claim that ustice which is due to my people$ and the assistance promised to it eight months ago$ when fifty nations asserted that aggression had been committed in "iolation of international treaties. )elassieFs speech to the 7eague of 3ations$ ,une 19@>

Emperor Haile Selassie of Abyssinia The crisis o"er %byssinia came to a head in the %utumn of 19@A. +ussolini demanded e5tensi"e territories in %byssinia. Emperor (aile )elassie of %byssinia appealed to the 7eague of 3ations for help. Through the 7eague of 3ations 6ritain ga"e the impression that it would stand up to any <talian aggression. <taly in"aded %byssinia and all eyes turned to the 6ritish$ as a leading member of the 7eague$ to ma#e good their promises of punishing <taly. 6ut 6ritain had no intention of going to war with <taly o"er %byssinia$ after all they could hardly pre"ent <talyFs aggression in %byssinia. -nfortunately$ the 6ritish public did not see it that wayG all they saw was the 6ritish go"ernment gi"ing in to aggression when only a few months before was upholding the 7eagueFs principle of collecti"e security against aggressors. The 7eague of 3ations was seriously undermined by 6ritainFs unwillingness to get tough. 6ritain continued to support sanctions against <taly until ,uly 19@>$ by which time +ussolini was thoroughly annoyed by 6ritain and the 7eague which <taly left in 19@/. +ussolini completed the con:uest of %byssinia despite 6ritain and the 7eague$ but most seriously +ussolini began to lean towards an alliance with (itler 6ritish policy in 19@A should ha"e been either to go to war with +ussolini and to ha"e brought him down or to ha"e agreed to +ussoliniFs claims and brought <taly into an alliance with 6ritain and &rance. 3either policy was properly followed and disaster was the result. <n 19@> +ussolini formed the Dome-6erlin %5is with (itler$ which led to a full military alliance$ the Pact of )teel$ in 19@9.

Mussolini and Hitler: the Rome-Berlin Axis Agreement of 19 ! (itlerFs foreign policy aims
(itler aimed to ma#e 1ermany into a great power again and this he hoped to achie"e by* N N N N destroying the hated ?ersailles settlement$ building up the army$ reco"ering lost territory such as the )aar and the Polish Corridor$ and bringing all 1ermans within the Deich.

This last aim would in"ol"e the anne5ation of %ustria and the ac:uisition of territory from C'echoslo"a#ia and Poland$ both of which had large 1erman minorities as a result of ?ersailles. There is some disagreement about what$ if anything$ (itler intended beyond these aims. +ost historians belie"e that the anne5ation of %ustria and parts of C'echoslo"a#ia and Poland was only a beginning$ to be followed by the sei'ure of the rest of C'echoslo"a#ia and Poland and by the con:uest and permanent occupation of Dussia as far east as the -ral +ountains. This would gi"e him what the 1ermans called lebensraum .li"ing space0 which would pro"ide food for the 1erman people and an area$ in which the e5cess 1erman population could settle and colonise. %n additional ad"antage was that communism would be destroyed. (owe"er$ not all historians agree about these further aimsG %.,.P. Taylor$ for e5ample$ claims that (itler ne"er intended a ma or war and at most was prepared for only a limited war against Poland. 2hate"er the truth about his long-term intentions$ (itler began his foreign policy with a series of brilliant successes .one of the main reasons for his popularity in 1ermany0. 6y the end of 19@4 almost e"ery one of (itlerFs aims had been achie"ed$ without war and with the appro"al of 6ritain. 8nly the 1ermans of Poland remained to be brought

within the Deich. -nfortunately$ it was when he failed to achie"e this by peaceful means that (itler too# his fateful decision to in"ade Poland. 19@@ (itler promises to get bac# all that was lost by the Treaty of ?ersailles. (e promises to ma#e 1ermany powerful and to gain lebensraum .li"ing space0 for the %ryan master-race. (itler introduces conscription for the army. (e orders the build up of submarines$ tan#s and an airforce. This rearmament was strictly forbidden by the Treaty of ?ersailles. (itler bac#s a 3a'i coup in %ustria$ but it fails when +ussolini mobili'es <talian troops on the %ustrian border. (itler realises he will need +ussoliniFs support if he is to complete an Anschluss with %ustria. 19@A 1ermany regains the )aar after 1A years under international rule. (itler claims the credit. (itler announces the e5istence of the Luftwaffe .airforce0. 6ritain and 1ermany sign the Anglo-German +a%al Agreement. The 1erman na"y was limited to @AJ of 6ritainFs. +ussolini attac#s %byssinia and falls out with 6ritain and &rance. 7eague of 3ations seriously wea#ened. (itler remilitarises the Rhineland. (itler and +ussolini sign the Rome-!erlin A4is. +ussolini promises not to inter"ene in %ustria. 1ermany and <taly support &ranco in the -panish #i%il 'ar. Anti-#omintern )act signed by 1ermany$ <taly and ,apan. Each pledges to support the others in conflicts against communism. (itler forces the Ans"hluss (ith Austria. 6ritain let (itler do this. 3obody in 6ritain wanted a war with 1ermany. <n )eptember 19@4 (itler forces C'echoslo"a#ia to gi"e up the -udetenland. 6ritainFs Prime +inister$ 3e"ille Chamberlain$ agrees to (itlerFs demands. Chamberlain belie"ed that if (itler got what he wanted$ 6ritain could a"oid war with 1ermany.This was called appeasement. 19@9 <n +arch 19@9$ (itler in"ades the rest of C'echoslo"a#ia. (itler and +ussolini sign the )act o* -teel. <n %ugust 19@9 (itler and )talin sign the +a5i--o%iet )act. (itler in"ades )oland. The )econd 2orld 2ar begins.

19@!

19@>

19@/ 19@4

(itler$ %ryan supremacy and lebensraum

(itler wanted to ma#e 1ermany self-sufficient B that is$ the country should be able to produce its own food and raw materials so that it did not ha"e to depend upon other countries. This policy was #nown as autar#y. (itler drew up a our 6ear )lan in

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19@> with the aim of ma#ing 1ermany sel-sufficient. +ore raw materials$ such as coal$ oil$ iron and other metals were produced and synthetic raw materials$ such as rubber$ fuel and te5tiles were de"eloped. The &our Cear Plan was e5pensi"e and had not made 1ermany self-sufficient by 19@9$ o"er a third of raw materials were still ha"ing to be imported. 2hen it was ob"ious that 1ermany could not achie"e self-sufficiency$ the 3a'is decided to ta#e o"er or dominate countries with the raw materials and food it needed e.g. 3orway B iron ore$ C'echoslo"a#ia B metals$ -#raine B wheat$ Domania B oil. This was the policy of lebensraum .li"ing space0. This economic KneedF to attac# other countries matched up con"eniently with long held 3a'i beliefs about 1erman superiority. (itler promised to loo# for lebensraum in Eastern Europe in +ein Eampf. (e ustified 1erman aggression by claiming racial supremacy o"er the )la"s .sla"es0 and ,ews. 6y ta#ing control of Eastern European countries (itler was e5panding 1erman power and prestige$ gaining access to cheap or free raw materials$ gaining territory for the 1ermans and gaining an opportunity to e5terminate )la"s and ,ews. (itlerFs 19!1 attac# on the -))D was also a product of the long term 3a'i hatred of communism.

Dearmament 19@!-19@9
%fter the appalling casualties of the &irst 2orld 2ar a "iew de"eloped that the most effecti"e way to a"oid war in the future would be to reduce weapons through a monitored system of world disarmament. 6ut no country was willing to gi"e up its arms if other countries were not going to follow suit. <n fact$ none of the 1reat Powers disarmed although they all agreed to it in principle. %s 1ermany was still militarily wea# in 19@@$ (itler had to mo"e cautiously at first. (e withdrew from the $isarmament #on*erence and the 7eague of 3ations on the grounds that &rance would not agree to 1erman e:uality of armaments. (itler insisted that 1ermany was willing to disarm if other states agreed to do the same$ and that he wanted only peace. 1ermany was forced to disarm by the Treaty of ?ersailles$ but &rance did not disarm at the same time$ and this caused tensions between the two countries. The 1ermans resented the &rench and feared military interference. &or instance$ &rance was able to simply wal# unopposed into the Ruhr in 1973 to secure reparations payments.

The )aar 19@A

The )aar was returned to 1ermany .,anuary 19@A0 after a plebiscite resulting in a 90J "ote in fa"our. Though the plebiscite had been pro"ided for at ?ersailles$ 3a'i propaganda made the most of the success$ and (itler announced that now all causes of grie"ance between &rance and 1ermany had been remo"ed.

The Dhineland 19@>

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Encouraged by +ussoliniFs fall out with 6ritain and &rance$ (itler too# the ris# of sending troops into the demilitarised 'one of the Dhineland in +arch 19@>. Though the troops had orders to withdraw at the first sign of &rench opposition$ no resistance was offered beyond the usual protests. This was a "ital step in rebuilding 1erman power. )trong fortifications and forces here would stop &rance coming to the help of her East European allies. 2hy did 6ritain and &rance not inter"eneH &rance and 6ritain did nothing to pre"ent the remilitarisation of the Dhineland. The &rench were ner"ous of going to war without 6ritainFs bac#ing. +any 6ritish politicians felt that (itler should be allowed to go Linto his own bac# gardenM. The 6ritish public did not yet see (itler as a threat$ rather he seemed a strong potential ally against 6olshe"i# Dussia.

The )panish Ci"il 2ar 19@>-19@9

The )panish Ci"il 2ar was a conflict between Dight-wingO&ascist army rebels$ lead by 1eneral &ranco$ against the 7eft wing Depublican go"ernment$ bac#ed by armed wor#ers9 militias. 2hat transformed the conflict was the EuropeanOinternational dimension* &ranco loo#ed to &ascist 1erman and <taly for helpG the Depublicans to 6ritain$ &rance$ then )o"iet Dussia. (itler was :uic# to see the opportunity and respond. (e pro"ided aircraft and >$000 1erman troops. )o the Depublican side in )pain was forced to appeal to )o"iet Dussia. )talin agreed$ sending to )pain hundreds of military ad"isers and e:uipment. The +oscow-based international Communist organisation the PCommunist <nternationalP

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.PCominternP0 put out an appeal to all countries to "olunteer to fight on the Depublican side in <nternational 6rigades. )talin was an5ious to depri"e &ascism of an easy "ictoryG such an outcome could only strengthen 3a'i 1ermany$ Dussia9s potential enemy. The )panish Ci"il 2ar ended in a &ascist "ictory for 1eneral &ranco in 19@9. (itler had supported &ranco$ most notably by the bombing of the 6as:ue town of 1uernica by the 1erman Condor 7egion.

#i"asso$s painting %&uerni"a$ "ommemorating the &erman destru"tion of the to'n during the Spanish (i)il *ar+ %ustria 19@4
<n ,uly 19@! (itler suffered a setbac# to his ambitions of an Anschluss .union0 between 1ermany and %ustria. The %ustrian 3a'is$ encouraged by (itler$ staged a re"olt and murdered the Chancellor$ Egelbert Iollfuss. (owe"er$ when +ussolini mo"ed <talian troops to the %ustrian frontier and warned the 1ermans off$ the re"olt collapsedG (itler$ ta#en abac#$ had to accept that 1ermany was not yet strong enough to force the issue and disclaimed responsibility for the actions of the %ustrian 3a'is. <n 8ctober 19@> (itler and +ussolini signed agreements #nown as the Rome-!erlin A4is" This clinched +ussolini9s drift into the arms of (itler. They described it as Pan a5is around which can re"ol"e all those European states with a will to collaboration and peace.P <n reality it ga"e (itler the ally he had lac#ed so far .as well as ending any <talian ob ections to a future 1erman mo"e on %ustria0. (itler seemed at the centre of a new alliance$ potentially global in scope and ambitionG a cause of concern to 6ritain$ &rance$ Dussia$ e"en the -)%. The Anschluss with %ustria .+arch 19@40 was (itlerFs greatest success to date. +atters came to a head when the %ustrian 3a'is staged huge demonstrations in

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?ienna$ 1ra' and 7in'$ which #hancellor -chuschnigg8s go"ernment could not control. Dealising that this could be the prelude to a 1erman in"asion$ )chuschnigg announced a plebiscite about whether or not %ustria should remain independent. (itler decided to act before this too# place$ in case the "ote went against unionG 1erman troops mo"ed in and %ustria became part of the Third Reich. <n a plebiscite organised by (ilter after the Anschluss$ 99./AJ of %ustrians supported the union with 1ermany. <t was a triumph for 1ermany$ 6ritain and &rance again did no more than protest$ and it dealt a se"ere strategic blow at C'echoslo"a#ia which could now be attac#ed from the south as well as from the west and north. %ll was ready for the beginning of (itlerFs campaign to ac:uire the 1erman-spea#ing )udetenland$ a campaign which ended in triumph at the +unich Conference in )eptember 19@4.

%ppeasement and Chamberlain

%ppeasement was the policy of gi"ing in to some of the demands of dictators li#e (itler and +ussolini in the hope that they would be satisfied and not as# for more. This policy has been most closely identified with 6ritish and &rench foreign policy in the 19@0s. The leading figure in 6ritain was +e%ille #ham3erlain. 6ritish politicians traditionally held the "iew that Eastern Europe fell under 1ermany9s sphere o* in*luenceG Chamberlain wanted to turn 1ermany eastwards to act as a bulwar# against Communist Dussia. %fter 1919 the 6ritish policy towards 1ermany was to recognise that there were a number of 1erman spea#ing peoples outside 1ermany who would one day want to be part of the Deich. %ppeasement aimed to achie"e 1erman reunification peacefully. 6ritain would and could not effecti"ely defend the new countries of Eastern Europe e.g. Poland$ C'echoslo"a#ia$ and therefore encouraged these states to ma#e concessions to 1ermany in a peaceful way. Chamberlain9s mista#e was the failure to recognise that 6ritain was declining in power and prestige and he also failed to recognise that &ascism and 3a'ism were unappeasable. %ppeasement was a "ery popular part of 6ritish foreign policy. 3o one wanted a repeat of the &irst 2orld 2ar. Chamberlain had total faith in the policy of appeasement and belie"ed that e"entually (itler could be controlled. (is hopes decei"ed him as he admitted with the outbrea# of hostilities* KE"erything that < ha"e wor#ed for$ e"erything that < ha"e hoped for$ e"erything < ha"e belie"ed in during my public life$ has crashed into ruins.F

2ea#ness of &rance
Iuring the 19@0s &rench go"ernments followed 6ritainFs lead. The &rench were "ery ner"ous of further 1erman aggression and attempted to wea#en 1ermany as far as possible. The &rench put their faith in a series of alliances with the new Eastern European states$ these were #nown as the &ittle Ententes. +ilitarily the &rench

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established a huge networ# of military defences on the 1erman border #nown as the 2aginot &ine. 6etween 191/-19!0 &ranceFs democracy produced !! go"ernments under 20 different Prime +inisters. This rapid change of go"ernments left &rance wea# and di"ided. There were deep di"isions between left and right wing parties. This decline depri"ed 6ritain of the one strong ally who could ha"e helped to stand up to 1ermany. &rench wea#ness was one of the main reasons why 6ritain and &rance did not stand up to 1ermany in the mid 19@0s.

)udetenland and the +unich %greement 19@4

%fter the Anschluss (itler turned his attention to C'echoslo"a#ia and the three million )udeten 1ermans. The region was now bordered by 1ermany on @ sides. <n %pril 19@4 Chamberlain and (alifa5 made it clear to Ialadier that they would not guarantee &rance or C'echoslo"a#ia if the latter were attac#ed. 6ritain and &rance put pressure on 6enes$ the C'ech President to gi"e in to 1ermany. Chamberlain tried to con"ince (itler that he could ha"e what he wanted without resorting to war. The <ssues C'echoslo"a#ia was a new country$ born out of the collapse of the %ustro-(ungarian Empire. The new state was set up as part of the Treaty o* -t" Germain .the treaty which had dealt with %ustria-(ungary in 1919.0 Ethnically C'echoslo"a#ia was di"erse with large numbers of C'echs$ )lo"a#s$ Poles and (ungarians. 8ne of the largest minority groups was the )udeten 1ermans who li"ed in the mountainous region of western C'echoslo"a#ia. This region was relati"ely wealthy compared to the rest of the country and contained all the ma or industrial comple5es such as )#oda. (itler detested C'echoslo"a#ia for its )la" peoples$ especially as they had control o"er ethnic 1ermansG he also disli#ed the fact that C'echoslo"a#ia was a successful democracy. <n fact in 19@4 it was the last democracy in eastern Europe.

(,e"hoslo)a-ia 19 .-19 9
Eonrad (enlein

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(itler encouraged and supported the )udeten 1ermansF claim for self-determination. <n the middle of the 19@0s Eonrad (enlein had come to prominence as the leader of )udeten 1erman nationalism. (itler fuelled (enleinFs political agitation and there were a number of riots and marches led by (enlein in opposition to C'ech control of the region. (itler pro"o#ed problems in the region by mobilising 1erman troops and the C'echs did the same in retaliation. -nder pressure from 6ritain and &rance$ 6enes$ the C'ech President offered (enlein "irtually e"erything he had been calling for. (enlein refused because (itler wanted an e5cuse for in"asion. <n an effort to calm things down$ Chamberlain flew to meet (itler in a series of three meetings. Chamberlain <t is at this moment that appeasement reached its most notorious point. Chamberlain met (itler on three occasions before a peace deal could be thrashed out* 10 !erchtesgaden B 1Ath )eptember 19@4 20 Godes3erg B 22nd )eptember 19@4 @0 2unich B 29th )eptember 19@4 %t 6erchtesgaden Chamberlain made it clear to (itler that 6ritain would accept selfdetermination for the )udetenland. 6ut (itler wanted more than this$ secretly he was loo#ing for an e5cuse to in"ade C'echoslo"#ia and not ust the )udetenland. % wee# later Chamberlain flew to meet (itler at 6ad 1odesberg to finalise the agreement made at 6erchtesgaden. 2hen he arri"ed he found that (itler was not ust as#ing for the )udetenlandFs right of self-determination$ but was as#ing for the withdrawal of C'ech troops from the )udetenland and was also demanding territories on behalf of Poland and (ungary. (itler had won the support of two countries who might otherwise ha"e allied with C'echoslo"a#ia against 1erman aggression. 6ritain and &rance were reluctant to agree to these demands and so Chamberlain returned to 7ondon to prepare for war. &or the ne5t wee# tension built as each country began to mobilise. Then +ussolini stepped in with the proposal for a four-power conference in +unich on the 29th )eptember. Chamberlain flew to meet (itler$ +ussolini and Ialadier .of &rance0 at +unich. (ere Chamberlain ga"e into 1erman claims for the )udetenland. The C'echs were completely ignored by this decision$ as were the Dussians. &or a brief moment Chamberlain was triumphant. (e returned to 6ritain with his Kpiece of paperF which had a"erted war and which promised peace between 1ermany and 6ritain in the future. 8n 8ctober 1st 1ermany too# the )udetenland$ and Poland and (ungary gained the territories they had been see#ing. %s the wee#s passed the gloss on ChamberlainFs success began to fade and when (itler in"aded the rest of C'echoslo"a#ia in +arch 19@9$ the policy of appeasement was seen to ha"e failed. Conclusion of the )udeten Crisis 2hat are the conclusions one can draw from this episodeH

1>

(itler became increasingly popular in 1ermany$ he had achie"ed "ictory without a war and it encouraged him to loo# for other foreign policy successes i.e. Poland. C'echoslo"a#ia was destroyed. % small$ but strong democracy had been abandoned by the 1reat Powers. Dussia had not been included in the +unich %greement and )talin felt compelled to come his own arrangement with 1ermany .3a'i)o"iet Pact 19@90. <t can be argued that +unich saw appeasement fail$ that (itler could not be trusted. (owe"er it has been argued that Chamberlain bought time at +unich$ time in which 6ritain could rearm for conflicts in the future.

C'echoslo"a#ia +arch 19@9

<n +arch 19@9$ (itler completed his con:uest of C'echoslo"a#ia$ as he had wanted all along. (itler too# direct control of the western C'ech lands$ and a puppet state was set up in )lo"a#ia. <t was clear that (itler could not be trusted from now on.

1rowing tensions and relationship with the -))D

<n the late spring and summer of 19@9$ 6ritain and 1ermany prepared for war. %fter the +arch anne5ation of C'echoslo"a#ia$ it was clear that (itler could no longer be appeased. Deluctantly 6ritish diplomats began to put out feelers towards the -))D as a potential ally against (itlerFs 1ermany. %n alliance with a communist state went against all 6ritish instincts$ despite the looming spectre of conflict the 6ritish go"ernment was in no rush to sign an alliance. )talin was also ner"ous. (e suspected that (itler would attac# the -))D at some point$ but he was not ready for war. (itler wanted to attac# Poland$ but he did not want to fight the -))D. )talin was not ready for war and was happy to let (itler attac# Poland$ as long as the -))D gained something from it. The stage was set for the most unli#ely agreement of the 19@0s;

The 3a'i-)o"iet Pact 19@9

Iespite their political differences$ both 1ermany and the -))D needed each otherFs co-operation in the autumn of 19@9. %s (itler prepared to ta#e bac# the Polish Corridor$ he did not want to get embroiled in a war with the -))D. )talin was well aware of 1erman ambitions in the -))D$ but saw this pact as an opportunity to gi"e time in order to further prepare defences and for the -))D to control an e"en greater buffer 'one against 1ermany. The Pact was totally cynical on both sides. (itler and )talin #new they would go to war with each other e"entually$ but neither were ready for a war o"er Poland in 19@9. The 3a'i-)o"iet Pact sol"ed this. (itler and )talin agreed to di"ide Poland between them;

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The 3a'i-)o"iet Pact was a disaster for 6ritain. They had now lost a potential ally. The -))D was the only country that could ha"e helped 6ritain stop a 1erman in"asion of Poland. <n fact$ ma"eric# +P 2inston Churchill had urged 6ritain to sign an agreement with the -))D all through the summer of 19@9$ despite his own suspicions of communism. 6ritain did not hurry the negotiations with the -))D belie"ing that there was still time to spare. Chamberlain was wrong$ (itler had already signed a deal with )talin.

Poland and war

7i#e C'echoslo"a#ia$ modern Poland was born out of the Paris Peace Treaties of 1919. (istorically there had been a Polish #ingdom$ but both 1ermany and Dussia had swallowed this up in the Eighteenth Century. The Paris Peace Treaties ga"e the ethnic Poles their own country again. (itler disli#ed Poland$ especially as it dro"e a wedge between 1ermany proper and East Prussia. This )olish #orridor ga"e Poland access to the sea at Ian'ig .1dans#0. There were many ethnic 1ermans li"ing in the Polish Corridor. (itler claimed that these people had the right to li"e in 1ermany. <n +ein Eampf (itler promised his readers that he would restore this land$ ta#en by the Treaty of ?ersailles$ to 1ermany. (itler started to ma#e mo"es against Poland in +arch 19@9 ust as 1ermany in"aded the rest of C'echoslo"a#ia. Control of C'echoslo"a#ia ga"e (itler a southern border with Poland. %nti-Polish propaganda was published in 1ermanyG this claimed that the Poles were mistreating 1ermans li"ing in the Polish Corridor. (itler wanted to use this as an e5cuse to Krescue his peopleF. 6ritain promised to support Poland if it was attac#ed. This was intended as a warning to (itler that appeasement had gone far enough. Chamberlain #new that 6ritain could ne"er effecti"ely help Poland. Poland was too far away for 6ritain to defend from 1ermany. Chamberlain hoped that he could still appease (itler and a"oid a ma or war. Tension mounted when +ussolini$ supported by (itler$ in"aded %lbania in %pril 19@9$ and in +ay 19@9$ <taly and 1ermany signed a military alliance #nown as the )act o* -teel. %s (itler prepared himself for war with Poland$ he began to offer Chamberlain the hope of negotiation and appeasement. (itler belie"ed that 6ritain would withdraw its guarantee to Poland$ ust as it had done with C'echoslo"a#ia. +any 6ritish politicians$ including Chamberlain$ belie"ed that (itlerFs claims to the Polish Corridor were only fair and reasonable. (itler offered to KprotectF the 6ritish Empire. (e said that Poland was the Klast problemF and that once it had been sol"ed he would retire and return to his true "ocation as an artist; Chamberlain was prepared to appease (itler$ but public opinion by then was turning against Chamberlain and appeasement. 8n %ugust @1st (itler ordered some )) soldiers to dress up as Polish soldiers. These men crossed into Poland secretly and attac#ed a 1erman radio station on the border. This ga"e (itler the e5cuse to declare war on Poland. 8n )eptember @rd 19@9 both 6ritain and &rance issued an ultimatum to (itler to end his attac# on Poland. <t was ignored. The )econd 2orld 2ar had begun. % few days after the 1erman in"asion of

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Poland$ Dussia in"aded from the East. &aced with two enemies and a lac# of modern weapons$ Poland was torn apart.

Test yoursel*
+a#e sure you ha"e completed your re"ision. Cou should then be able to answer the following :uestions without too much trouble* 2hich 6ritish Prime +inister is most closely associated with appeasementH 3ame three countries that were appeased by 6ritain in the 19@0s. <n which year did ,apan in"ade +anchuriaH (ow large an army was 1ermany restricted to by the Treaty of ?ersaillesH 2hich %frican state was in"aded by <taly in 19@AH 2hy did 6ritain try to turn a blind-eye to +ussolini9s aggressi"e foreign policy in 19@AH <n which war did both 1ermany and <taly support the fascist dictator 1eneral &rancoH 2hich clause of the Treaty of ?ersailles was bro#en by 1ermany in 19@>H 2hich country became part of 1ermany after the %nschluss of 19@4H 2hat was the name of the largely 1erman-spea#ing area of C'echoslo"a#iaH 2ho was the leader of the )udeten 1ermansH Essentially what was agreed to at the +unich Conference of 19@4H 2hich Polish port was claimed by 1ermany in 19@9H

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2hich agreement between 1ermany and Dussia pre"ented Dussia from declaring war on 1ermany in 19@9H 2hat is the 1erman word for the eastward e5pansion of 1ermany9s frontiers in the 19@0s and !0s which aimed to pro"ide new lands for the 1erman peopleH 2hy was 6ritain reluctant to formalise a defensi"e alliance with Dussia in the 19@0sH

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