PHL 232 tutorial notes TA: Daniel Walsh Email: danielwalshphilosophy@gmail.com Website: http://danielwalshphilosophy.blogspot.

ca Modality (Notes from SEP article on the Epistemology of Modality) What is modality? The modality of a statement/proposition is the manner in which it is true: necessarily true, possibly true, contingently true. A statement S is necessarily true if S is true in all possible worlds. A statement S is possibly true if S is true in at least one possible world. A statement S is contingently true is S is possibly true but not necessarily true. Possible Contingent. If S is necessary then it's possible but it's not contingent. Contingent propositions depend on facts of the world. Possible propositions that are also necessary do not. The modality of a property is the manner in which it is had by a substance: necessarily (essentially) and contingently (accidentally). Object O has property P essentially iff O has P in all possible worlds (etc.) The modality of a substance is the manner in which it exists. Object O is necessary iff O exists in all possible worlds (etc.) De re modality / De dicto modality Some people think modality attaches to objects in addition to statements. De re modality is modality that is predicated of an object, and attaches to the object independently of language. Jones is necessarily human. Here the modality is applied to Jones. De dicto modality is modality that is predicated of a statement, and attaches to the statement.

'Jones is human' is necessary. Here the modality is applied to a statement about Jones. Some controversial characterizations: Epistemic necessity S is epistemically possible iff S is not-ruled-out by what one knows, or S is epistemically possible iff S is not ruled out a priori. S is epistemically necessary iff S is guaranteed by what one knows, or S is epistemically necessary iff S is a priori true. Logical necessity S is logically necessary iff the denial of S implies a contradiction. S is logically possible iff the denial of S does not imply a contradiction. Conceptual necessity S is conceptually necessary iff ~S is ruled out by a conceptual framework: All bachelors are men. S is conceptually possible iff S is not ruled out by a conceptual framework: Some bachelors are wealthy. Metaphysical necessity S is metaphysically necessary iff S i true in all counterfactual situations. S is metaphysically possible iff S is true in some counterfactual situation. Realism / antirealism about modality The realist about modality supposes that modal claims are true or false. The antirealist supposes that they are neither. Knowledge of modality is knowledge of possible worlds Given realism: 1. 2. 3. 4. Can we know modal statements? Do we know any modal statements? In not, are we justified in believing any modal statements? If we are, what does our justification consist in? Justification about modalities does not seem to be empirical.

Descartes's move How do we know if x is metaphysically possible? We ask if it is conceptually possible. If it's conceptually possible then it's metaphysically possible. Clear and distinct (mental) perception of possibilities entails metaphysical possibility. (CDP) If I clearly and distinctly perceive that P, P is true. Clear and distinct propositions are fully apprehended by the mind. God exists. God would not systematically deceive us with respect to clear and distinct propositions. Therefore clear and distinct propositions are known. Arnauld's objection (the standard objection) If CDP is a good epistemic principle it must be determinable from one's perception of it whether or not a seemingly clear and distinct perception is in fact clear and distinct. Reid's objections to the move from conceivability to possibility One can understand a demonstrably false proposition. Example: x is both a square and a circle. Every proposition that is necessary stands in opposition to one that is contradictory, and so one that conceives of one, conceives of the other. In a successful reductio demonstration one is asked to conceive of a proposition which one then goes on to prove leads to a contradiction.

Do Reid's objections succeed? A priority A proposition P is a priori iff P is knowable apart from experience. A posteriority A proposition P is a posteriori iff P cannot be known apart from experience. This is essential a posteriority.

Necessity A proposition P is necessary iff P is true in all possible worlds. Contingency A proposition is contingent iff P is true in some but not all possible worlds. Analyticity A proposition P is analytic iff P is true in virtue of its meaning. Syntheticity A proposition P is synthetic iff P it true at least in part in virtue of the way the world is. Kant P is a priori P is necessary If P is a priori then knowledge of P is not dependent on the world and so is true in all worlds. P is a posteriori P is contingent If P is a posteriori then the truth of P is dependent on the features of the actual world and so P's truth is contingent. P is analytic P is a priori (and so necessary) If P is analytic then P is true in virtue of its meaning rather than any feature of the world and so is a priori (and so is necessary). P is synthetic either P is a priori (and so necessary) or P is a posteriori (and so contingent. Can a proposition be synthetic a priori? Consider: A wholly green thing is not wholly red. This is a priori. Is is analytic? Not wholly red is not part of the meaning of 'wholly green'. Time is a necessary condition for experience. This is a priori by way of what Kant calls transcendental reasoning. But it does not seem to be analytic.

(Transcendental reasoning takes a feature of experience and asks what is necessary for that experience.) Kripke Necessary A priori A posteriori A moon is a natural satellite Hesperus is phosphorus (Kripke) Contingent I exist (Kripke) Saturn has 60 moons