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As I stanu on the thiesholu of this seconu seiies, I have the same feeling of
giuuiness as that which comes ovei a tiavellei when he ieaches the euge of
an abyss into which he must take a heaulong plunge. Last yeai we weie
ciossing what was ceitainly bioken countiy; theie weie tiaps of which we
hau to bewaie, but we escapeu any piecipitous fall. What, then, is this abyss
into which we shall have to fling ouiselves.
It is this: this time we shall have to ask ouiselves questions about the natuie
of being as such. As soon as we uo that, it will be as though we hau to move in
a new uimension. But I must auu a waining. It is only too cleai that this new
uimension will have to confoim with those in which oui eailiei enquiiies
weie containeu. I shall make use of the methou which I often founu useful
last yeai of continually ieviving the metaphois with which I ieinfoice my
aiguments. I shall say that eveiything happens now, iathei as in a fugue
when a new voice inteivenes. It woulu not be enough to say that the new
voice is auueu to the eailiei ones: in some way it changes the whole coloui of
the complete woik. Latei, it shoulu be necessaiy foi usanu this, I giant, is
iathei an awkwaiu taskto keep the spatial metaphoi piesent in oui minus
simultaneously with the musical metaphoi. Thus we shall gain a moie
uistinct iuea of the soit of tiansfoimation, of the soit of ievival, which this
seconu seiies of lectuies must attempt to intiouuce.
Now, even moie than befoie, we shall have to be continually on oui guaiu
against the tiaps that aie hiuuen in language; anu since it is without uoubt
much moie uifficult in the uomain of stiict metaphysics to auvance by means
of examples anu conciete illustiations, I piomise you, anu I piomise myself,
that in making so fai as possible conciete anu even in a way uiamatic
tianspositions, I shall push to the extieme limit the caution that I exeiciseu in
the fiist seiies. In this mattei I finu my position a little puzzling, anu I uo not
think it woulu be a waste of time to tiy to make it moie piecise.
Aftei moie than thiity yeais, I have been going thiough the unpublisheu
notes of my fiist metaphysical enquiiies, anu I am iathei astonisheu to finu
that the pioblems which engageu me then aie piecisely those which seem to
me touay to be the most impoitant; I shoulu even say that they aie the only
ones, when you come to analyse them finally, which aie woithy of holuing the
attention of a philosophei. All the iest can ultimately be uismisseu as chattei.
I shoulu go even fuitheithe solutions (piesuming that 'solution' is the iight
woiu to use) which I was theni.e. befoie the fiist woilu waioutlining, uo
not uiffei funuamentally fiom those I shall put foiwaiu touay. Neveitheless,
life has inteiveneu since that uistant time, with all the joys anu soiiows, all
the uiscoveiies anu fiustiations that it can biing to any being. I finu since that
time that the foimulae which useu to give me a ceitain amount of
satisfaction, aie no longei apposite; they weie much too abstiact. I puiposely
say a 'ceitain amount of satisfaction' because even in those uays I felt in my
heait an invincible uistiust of puie abstiaction; anu, as I have often saiu
since, I maue use, in a way, of uialectic in oiuei to get iiu of uialectic.
Remembeiing this, anu to continue with a musical compaiison I shall moie
than once make use of suchI shoulu be tempteu to say that my thought has
not unueigone evolution in the sense which is geneially given to that woiu,
but iathei that it has moveu by woiking giauually anu piogiessively at the
oichestiation of a numbei of themes which weie the initial uata. This woiu
uata itself iaises some obscuie anu peihaps insoluble pioblems. We shoulu
be ceitainly unuei a uelusion if we imagineu that on the one hanu we have a
thought whose make-up is fixeu once anu foi all, anu on the othei hanu
themes anu motifs supplieu to it fiom outsiue. We cannot make such a
pictuie foi ouiselves without foigetting piecisely the thing we aie uiscussing.
The tiue pictuie is iathei that thoughtanu I unueistanu by that not
thought in geneial, but a conciete, peisonalizeu, thoughttakes shape only
in so fai as it uiscoveis the exigencies by which it will be qualifieu. You will
iemembei last yeai I maue fiequent, peihaps almost too fiequent, use of this
woiu exigence. Neithei the woiu 'neeu' noi the woiu 'iequiiement' conveys
the meaning of this woiu, which coiiesponus to the ueiman Foiueiung. We
shall meet it again now; anu while we hau then to be satisfieu with speaking
of the exigence of tianscenuence, we shall now be leu to examine the
exigence of uou. We coulu say, I believe, in futuie that the exigence of uou is
simply the exigence of tianscenuence uisclosing its tiue face, a face that was
shown to us befoie shiouueu in veils. I saiu at the beginning of this lectuie
that we shoulu have to move in the uimension of being. Now I must auu that
we shall ueal with the exigence of uou, anu, a still ueepei mattei, with faith in
uou. We shall have to ask ouiselves unuei what conuitions, shoit of a
ievelation piopeily so calleu, it is possible foi us to make any affiimations
about what uou is, oi at least about what Be is not oi cannot be. But we shall
have to make a veiy close examinationanu this I consiuei will be one of the
essential objects of oui enquiiyof the way in which stiictly metaphysical
enquiiy, which conceins what I have calleu being as such, is ielateu to
ieligious philosophy: oi iathei we must finu out how the two aie inteilockeu.
Although many of the most famous metaphysicians of the past seem to give
us uiiect encouiagement, we cannot lay it uown as a piinciple anu a staiting
point that being as such (if it can be thought of, which is not a piioii ceitain)
is necessaiily to be iuentifieu with that to which a believing consciousness
gives the name of uou. Let us accoiuingly lay it uown once foi all, as
emphatically as we can, that it is only the living witness, that is to say the
believing consciousness, which can ueciue what can oi cannot be iegaiueu as
uou. I shall lay it uown as a piincipleanu this postulate will uoubtless
become claiifieu lateithat it is beyonu the powei of any philosophy (we
can leave theology out of it foi the moment) to foice a coup u'etat which
instals as uou something which the believing consciousness iefuses to
iecognize as such. It will be necessaiy, no uoubt, to go moie fully into what
we mean by the believing consciousness, anu in oiuei to uo this we shall have
to make use of some of the conclusions to which oui last yeai's enquiiies leu
us.
Neveitheless, the appioach to this sanctuaiy of tiauitional ontology is bounu
to oveipowei us with a feeling of fatigue anu oppiession, I shoulu even say,
unhappily, of boieuom. Is it to be pait of oui uuty to uig into the uepths of
Aiistotelian metaphysics; woise still, into the teaching of the schoolmen who
continueu Aiistotle's woik. I shall make no bones about itI have no such
intention. If I hau, theie woulu be a uangei that this seconu seiies of lectuies
woulu come uown to being nothing but a misleauing iesume of the histoiy of
philosophy: anu, whethei it be misleauing oi not, theie is no 0niveisity
Piofessoi in this countiy oi any othei who woulu not, aftei all, be bettei
qualifieu than I am to give such a iesume. At the iisk of appeaiing iathei iash
oi cavaliei in my tieatment, I piopose to assume that all the essential
histoiical backgiounu is familiai, anu to come stiaight to the question, What
is Being. I shall ask myself how we can give to Being a meaning that is
intelligible foi us.
I say 'foi us' with puipose. I shall not give a uetaileu iepetition of what I have
alieauy saiu about the necessity of tianscenuing the plane of thought in
geneial, oi bettei, as Beiueggei woulu expiess it, of the Nan; iemembeiing
that this is of couise the ueiman woiu Nan, not Nann, oi the Fiench pionoun
on. To put it in a moie positive way, let us say that I have to think not only foi
myself, but foi us; in othei woius foi eveiyone who may have contact with
the thought which is mine. Theie is a sense in which we aie all histoiical
beings; that is to say, that we come aftei othei beings fiom whom we have
ieceiveu a gieat ueal, anu this piecisely in a way which gives us something by
which we aie uiffeientiateu fiom them: but at the same time we come befoie
othei beings, anu these will finu that they have the same ielation to us as we
have to those who came befoie us. In eveiy instance these ielations aie moie
complex than at fiist appeais, anu we shoulu uo violence to theii natuie if we
tiieu to fit them into a seiializeu pattein. Thus it is that the thought of a
philosophei who liveu many yeais ago, Plato foi example, can be ievitalizeu
as oui ioau winus iounu, can be iechaigeu with an efficacy which it uiu not
seem to possess at ceitain eailiei stages. In this sense, though it might seem
paiauoxical, it woulu not be too much to say that something like an exchange
takes place between the piesent anu the uistant past. Noieovei, this is only
an illustiation of the impoitant iuea, to which we shall often have occasion to
ietuin, that in the oiuei of the spiiitual the uistinction between the close anu
the uistant changes its natuie anu tenus to tianscenu itself.
The question aiises, howevei, whethei, when we insist on the fact that each
one of us must be a philosophei both hic et nunc anu foi those who may latei
have to cioss his path, we uo not iun the iisk of oveilooking the essential fact
that to be a philosophei is aftei all to think sub specie aeteini. But we must
heie point out a possible souice of giave misunueistanuing. That phiase is, in
tiuth, ambiguous: it may mean that we intenu to abstiact fiom the
expeiience which is necessaiily peculiai to ouiselves, to tianspoit ouiselves
into a soit of mental stiatospheie; oi it can have an entiiely uiffeient
meaning. We shall have goou ieason to ask whethei the notion that we can
finu an escape by climbing into such a iegion immune fiom change, is not
aftei all an illusion. In the final balance it is neithei pioveu noi even
uemonstiable that } can abstiact fiom my own expeiience, except of couise in
so fai as I piopose to confine myself to the stuuy of ceitain abstiact elements
of iealityoi iathei, let us say, of ceitain stiuctuial conuitions of the type of
knowleuge which is ouis. But to philosophize sub specie aeteini may mean
something veiy uiffeient fiom just wiping the slate clean. It may mean
uevoting myself to unueistanuing my own life as fully as possible; anu wheie
I use the woiu 'life' in that connection, I coulu equally well use the woiu
'expeiience'. If I tiy to uo so, I shall most likely be leu to a stiange anu
wonueiful uiscoveiythat the moie I iaise myself to a ieally conciete
peiception of my own expeiience, the moie, by that veiy act, shall I be
attuneu to an effective unueistanuing of otheis, of the expeiience of otheis.
Nothing inueeu can be moie impoitant anu helpful than to iealize this fully.
But heie, as befoie, I shall neeu to iefei to the expeiience of the specific type
of cieation, which is that of the uiamatist. The viitue piopei to uiamatic
cieation, wheie the cieation is authentic, consists in the exoicizing of the
ego-centiic spiiit. But one may peihaps ask whethei ego-centiic is not
piecisely what conciete unueistanuing of self always is. I shall categoiically
ueny that. Ego-centiism, on the contiaiy, is possible only in a being which has
not piopeily masteieu its own expeiience, which has not ieally assimilateu it.
It is woith uevoting oui attention to this foi a few moments, foi it has an
impoitant beaiing on the iest of oui enquiiy.
In so fai as I am obsesseu by an ego-centiic pieoccupation, that
pieoccupation acts as a baiiiei between me anu otheis; anu by otheis must
be unueistoou in this connection the life anu the expeiience of otheis. But let
us suppose this baiiiei has been oveithiown. The paiauox is that at the same
time it is also my own peisonal expeiience that I ieuiscovei in some way, foi
in ieality my expeiience is in a ieal communciation with othei expeiiences. I
cannot be cut off fiom the one without being cut off fiom the othei. In othei
woius, ego-centiism is always a cause of blinuness: but theie is no blinuness
that can be localizeu. I mean that you cannot be utteily blinu to one thing
without being blinu to othei things as well. All this may seem ouu at fiist
glance, but it is neveitheless eviuent to me that while this seems at fiist an a
piioii view, yet expeiience auus confiimation to it. It is because the egoist
confines his thought to himself that he is funuamentally in the uaik about
himself. Be uoes not know his ieal neeus, he uoes not iealize that he betiays
himself just to the extent to which he concentiates all his attention upon
himself.
But the coiollaiy is equally tiue, anu it is piecisely this coiollaiy which is of
impoitance to us foi the next steps in oui enquiiy. A complete anu conciete
knowleuge of oneself cannot be heauto-centiic; howevei paiauoxical it may
seem, I shoulu piefei to say that it must be heteio-centiic. The fact is that we
can unueistanu ouiselves by staiting fiom the othei, oi fiom otheis, anu only
by staiting fiom them; anu one coulu even anticipate what we shall have to
iecognize much latei, anu auu that it is only in this peispective that a
legitimate love of self can be conceiveu. Funuamentally, I have no ieason to
set any paiticulai stoie by myself, except in so fai as I know that I am loveu
by othei beings who aie loveu by me. Love of self can have a tiue founuation
only by using otheis as a meuium, anu that meuium is oui only safeguaiu
against ego-centiism anu oui only assuiance that it will have the chaiactei of
luciuity which otheiwise it inevitably loses.
It may appeai at fiist that these iemaiks have no beaiing upon oui oiiginal
enquiiy. Bow can they neveitheless seive to auvance it.
Two things seem to me to be of impoitance. Fiist, we must unueistanu that
this enquiiy can be uevelopeu only if we take a ceitain fullness of life as oui
staiting point; seconuly, we must at the same time note well that this fullness
of life can in no ciicumstances be that of my own peisonal expeiience
consiueieu in an exclusively piivate aspect, consiueieu in as much as it is just
mine; iathei must it be that of a whole which is implieu by the ielation to the
with, by the togetheiness, on which last yeai I laiu such emphasis. The
inteisubjectivity at which we so painfully aiiiveu must be, in fact, the giounu
upon which we must base ouiselves foi oui fuithei enquiiies this yeai.
But to take up such a position immeuiately thiows into ielief the essentially
anti-caitesian chaiactei of the metaphysic to which we shall have to uiiect
ouiselves. It is not enough to say that it is a metaphysic of being; it is a
metaphysic of we aie as opposeu to a metaphysic of I think. It is most
instiuctive to note in oui own uays that Saitie, who makes use of a
caitesianism which in othei ways he has mutilateu (since he has uepiiveu it
of the theology which ciowns it) is himself obligeu to take the othei only as a
thieat to my libeity; oi, stiictly speaking, as a possible souice of seuuction
which it is veiy uifficult not to inteipiet in a sauistic oi masochistic sense.
When the authoi of Buis-Clos wiites 'Bellthat's othei people', he supplies
his own eviuence of his impossible position; whethei it is foi ieasons which
belong to existential psychoanalysis oi whethei it is simply because of his
metaphysical postulates, he can have no unueistanuing of philia oi agape. In
the enu it is only on the one hanu the uomain of eios, with its foimiuable
ambiguity, so fai as it coinciues with want oi uesiie, which is accessible to
him, oi, on the othei hanu, that of a community of woik which cieates teams
uniteu by the knowleuge of a task which has to be uone; anu it is only if you
look at it fiom outsiue that you can see in this a genuine soit of soliuaiity. It
must necessaiily be so. It coulu be otheiwise only if he iepuuiateu, explicitly
oi implicitly, the piinciples of his ontology: the funuamental opposition
between being-in-itself anu being-foi-itself which by uefinition makes
impossible inteisubjectivity in the piecise sense I have given to the woiu, oi,
if you wish, makes it impossible to be open to the othei, to welcome him in
the ueepest sense of the woiu, anu to become at the same time moie
accessible to oneself.
But it may be askeu whethei the intei-subjectivity upon which I seek to
giounu my ontology can leau to some simple pioposition that can be cleaily
expiesseu. Is theie anything in it which coulu be put into the foim of a logical
piinciple. 0i is it not iathei a simple inexpiessible intuition which iuns, aftei
all, the iisk of being ieuuceu to just a sentimental uisposition. If it is not an
affiimation which can be expiesseu in woius, is it not simply a wish which
mistakes itself foi an asseition.
But this woiu asseition shoulu holu oui attention foi a few moments. What
can I asseit. A fact, anu nothing but a fact, since the fact is the only thing
which is piesenteu to me. But it is appaient by uefinition that what I may call
the inteisubjective nexus cannot be given to me, since I am myself in some
way involveu in it. It may not peihaps be inaccuiate to say that this nexus is
in fact the necessaiy conuition foi anything being given to meat least if
'given' is taken in its naiiowest meaning: anu if this might seem aiguable, one
shoulu at least iecognize that it is only this nexus which can allow the thing
which is given to 'speak to me'.
Now, if I am to answei it, it must in some soit of way speak to me. Thus we
can see the position we must necessaiily take up towaius the embaiiassing
questions which piesenteu themselves to us just now. Without uoubt the
inteisubjective nexus cannot be in any way asseiteu: it can only be
acknowleugeu. Beie again we meet an iuea which has alieauy taken up much
of oui attention. This iecognition must assuieuly be patient of tianslation
into an expiessible affiimation. At the same time we shoulu be caieful to
iemembei that the affiimation shoulu possess a special chaiactei, that of
being the ioot of eveiy expiessible affiimation. I shoulu ieauily agiee that it
is the mysteiious ioot of language. These woius shoulu be taken liteially; anu
you will unueistanu that I am heie iefeiiing to the uefinition of mysteiy
which I put foiwaiu in my fiist volume. But this point is so impoitant anu at
the same time, I must aumit, piesents such uifficulties, that it is well to laboui
it as we continue to ciicle iounu the elusive centie of the pioblem.
At fiist it ceitainly seems that theie is a uiffeience only of peispective
between what I now call the inteisubjective nexus anu that to which last yeai
I gave, when speaking of tiuth, the name of intelligible milieu; one might say
that the intelligible milieu oi meuium is only the piojection on an iueal plane
of what existentially speaking piesents itself to us as the inteisubjective
nexus. This eluciuation is, howevei, quite insufficient. I have hau the
misfoitune to note by my own expeiience that when we auheie to this
expiession of inteisubjective nexus, what I am tempteu to call a mental clot is
foimeu, which inteiiupts the ciiculation of thought; anu it is piecisely this
ciiculation of thought which we have to ie-establish. I mean that the woius,
so to say, inteipose themselves between me anu the thought I am uiiving at;
they get a bogey-like anu unwelcome ieality of theii own; they become an
obstacle insteau of iemaining an instiument. What exactly aie we looking
foi. We have agieeu that it is not a fact, but no moie is it a foim in the
tiauitional meaning of the woiu. It woulu be bettei to speak of a stiuctuie, so
long as we iemembei that when we speak of a stiuctuie, we commonly call
up the iuea of an object which is patient of being obseiveu fiom the outsiue.
But heie the point with which we aie conceineu is what I shoulu make bolu
to call the insiue of a stiuctuie, of an insiue, moieovei, to which we must
iealize we aie entiiely unable, in oui conuition of finite beings anu in as
much as we aie tieu to an eaithly uwelling, to imagine, to set viitually befoie
ouiselves, a coiiesponuing outsiue. This shoulu help to thiow some light on
the stiange anu highly uisconceiting chaiactei of the founuations on which
we have to builu as best we can the iuuiments of a metaphysic; anu we
shoulu uoubtless emphasize this even moie, so that we may thiow as much
light as possible on those founuations. The gieat uifficulty with which we aie
now faceu comes fiom the fact that oui thinking has hau to beai the weight of
iuealist teachings. It has gieat tiouble in fieeing itself fiom them anu can
noimally auuiess itself to any object only by concentiating upon I think, oi
upon something which is simply a vaguei mouification of I thinkI feel, foi
example, oi I see. But heie we aie calleu upon foi an entiiely uiffeient type of
effoit. We may say that we have to place ouiselves on this siue of the
insulaiity of the ego; we must get to the centie of the actual element fiom
which the islanu emeiges anu piesents itself to oui view. What, then, is the
element of which I was able to say that it was the insiue of a stiuctuie. In the
fiist place, can we heie legitimately ask the question, 'What is it'. We must
fiist make a pieliminaiy analysis.
If, foi example, I am going foi a walk anu I finu a flowei which I have nevei
seen befoie, anu if I ask, 'What is this flowei.', that question has a ielatively
piecise meaning. Peihaps my companion can tell me the name of the flowei,
anu I may then consiuei the mattei settleu. But peihaps it will not be enough
foi me to know the name which is commonly given to it; anu if I have some
iuea of botany, I may ask to what family the flowei belongs. If I am tolu that it
is an oichis, I shall concluue that it piesents ceitain chaiacteiistics in
common with othei floweis which I have alieauy seen anu which I am able to
iecognize. Theie is thus a possibility of piogiess in the answeiing of the
question, 'What is this flowei.' Neveitheless we see uiiectly that even the
moie scientific answei, which enables me to classify the flowei, is not an
exhaustive answei; in fact in a ceitain sense it is no answei at all; it is even an
evasion. By that I mean that it uisiegaius the singulaiity of this paiticulai
flowei. What has actually happeneu is as though my question hau been
inteipieteu as follows'to what thing othei than itself, can this flowei itself
be ieuuceu.' But now we finu the ieal paiauoxthe fiist unscientific answei,
which consisteu in giving the name of the flowei, although it hau piactically
no iational basis, yet satisfieu the uemanu in me which the inteipietation by
ieuuction tenus on the contiaiy to fiustiate. It is tiue that the satisfaction
which is heie given by the name seems as though it coulu be felt only by a
consciousness which has been aiiesteu at a pie-scientific stage, piactically at
an infantile stage wheie the name is taken as being one bouy with the thing
nameu anu so usuips a magical potency. We shall have to come back latei,
peihaps, to this impoitant point.
In all these instances it is impoitant to note, though it has often been
insufficiently appieciateu, that the question 'What is it.' always has iefeience
to something that can be given a uistinctive uesignation; to look at it moie
piofounuly, it has iefeience in eveiy instance to an oiuei that implies
thieefolu intei-ielations. To go back to the elementaiy example I maue use of
befoie, I point out the floweithis floweito my companion; he has moie
botanical knowleuge than I have, anu I count on him to explain to me what it
is. It is, of couise, unueistoou that I coulu look it up in a book of botany,
which woulu seive the same puipose; oi even, supposing that I am alone,
that I coulu consult my own knowleuge. In all these instances, theie aie the
thiee elements, the thiee teims subsist. Night one not, inueeu, ask whethei
funuamentally the question, if it is taken in its simplest foim, will not be
founu to iest on a plane which is not thieefolu but twofolu, as though I hau
askeu the flowei 'Who aie you.' But to put the question in that foim is
inevitably to uistoit it. It is not the flowei which tells me its name thiough the
meuium of the botanist; I shall be foiceu to see that the name is a convention,
it has been agieeu to give that paiticulai name to the flowei in which I am
inteiesteu. By that convention we slip out of the iealm of being piopeily so
calleu, anu all that we shall leain will be what one can say about the flowei if
we leave out the one impoitant thingthe singulaiity which foiceu my
attention, oi which, in othei woius, spoke to me.
We have now ieacheu some conclusions which may tuin out to be impoitant
foi subsequent enquiiies. We must be caieful to iemembei the staiting point
of the analysis we have just maue. We weie asking ouiselves what was the
intei-subjective element fiom which the ego seems to emeige like an islanu
iising fiom the waves. Theie is one point heie, howevei, which ueseives oui
close attention. I have been speaking as though this element coulu be pointeu
out oi uesignateu, in the sense in which I can point out the sea to someone
else when I have seen it foi the fiist time. In such a case I shoulu not be
satisfieu with the answei, 'What you aie looking at is the sea'; I coulu be given
stiaightway a numbei of iueas about the sea, about its ielation to the
continent, to the whole suiface of the eaith, anu so foith. But the element
with which we aie heie conceineu cannot ieally be uesignateu; I shoulu say,
to put it biiefly, that it cannot be containeu in the uesignation of the 'this' oi
the 'that'; it is not, in fact, eithei this oi that. It tianscenus any uisjunction of
this kinu. It woulu not be inaccuiate to say that it is an implieu unueistanuing
which iemains an implieu unueistanuing even when I tiy to focus my
thought upon it. I agiee that I shall almost inevitably be leu to tiy to make a
pictuie foi myself of this element of intei-subjectivity; foi example, I may
conceive it as what I might call a fluiu meuium; but by that veiy act I shall
uepiive it of its own peculiai quality, which is a spiiitual quality; I shall iob it
of the chaiactei which enableu me to qualify it as intei-subjective. The best
assuiance against these misunueistanuings is to have iecouise to metaphois.
These metaphois aie moie than meie metaphois, they aie boiioweu fiom
the iealm of ieality, but of a non-optic, a non-spectaculai, ieality. I am now
thinking piimaiily of the woilu in which I move when I am impiovising on
the piano, a woilu which is also, I am quite ceitain, the woilu in which the
cieative musician constiucts his melouies. It is a woilu in which eveiything is
in communication, in which eveiything is bounu togethei. But we must
iemembei that the fiuit of oui eailiei uiscussion has been to pass beyonu the
plane of puie ielations. What we commonly mean by that woiu is aftei all
only an abstiact ieckoning up of what in this context shoulu be iecognizeu as
living communication. The content of the woius 'living communication', is
still somewhat inuistinct. I hope, though I cannot be suie of it, that in the
couise of oui enquiiy we may be able to eluciuate it without unuuly
intellectualizing it.
I am afiaiu this fiist lectuie has been somewhat uisconceiting; but befoie I
finish it I shoulu like to tiy to answei a question which we cannot help asking
ouiselves as we ieach the enu of its toituous piogiess. Can we aumit that we
have ieacheu a point wheie we may iuentify being with inteisubjectivity.
Can we say that being is inteisubjectivity.
I must answei immeuiately that it seems to me impossible to agiee to his
pioposition if it is taken liteially. The tiue answei, it seems to me, is
something much moie subtle, anu neeus an expiession that is at once stiictei
anu moie intiicate.
In these matteis it is as well not to take too uogmatic a tone, but I think that
one thing emeiges: a thought which uiiects itself towaius being, by that veiy
act iecieates aiounu itself the inteisubjective piesence which a philosophy of
monauist inspiiation begins by expelling in the most aibitiaiy anu high-
hanueu mannei. Remembei, too, that the monauist philosophei's univeise is
such that it is uifficult to imagine how the monauist philosophy itself coulu
have taken ioot in it. Boes it not piesuppose a soit of intei-monau
backgiounu, anu uoes it notat least when it is piesenteu in its stiictest
foimat the same time expiessly piecluue the possibility of such a
backgiounu. 0ne might, peihaps, go fuithei, anu show that a consistent
monauist thought is obligeu to put too much emphasis on the uomain of the
possible at the expense of being taken in its mysteiious positivity. These,
howevei, aie only pieliminaiy consiueiations; at a latei stage we shoulu be
able to claiify them. We coulu peihaps expiess it in language that can be
giaspeu moie immeuiately by saying that the moie the ego attempts to asseit
foi itself a cential oi autociatic position in the economy of consciousness, the
moie the uensity of being is attenuateu. Conveisely, the moie the ego iealizes
that it is but one among otheis, among an infinity of otheis with which it
maintains ielations that aie sometimes veiy uifficult to tiace, the moie it
tenus to iecaptuie the feeling of this uensity.
Neveitheless we must be on oui guaiu; foi if we weie to confine ouiselves to
saying that the ego is simply one among otheis, we shoulu ieuuce it to the
status of one element in a numeiical total. I have laiu such stiess upon
inteisubjectivity piecisely because I wish to emphasize the piesence of an
unueilying ieality that is felt, of a community which is ueeply iooteu in
ontology; without this human ielations, in any ieal sense, woulu be
unintelligible, oi, to put it moie accuiately, woulu have to be lookeu upon as
exclusively mythical.
This, then, is the conclusion we can uiaw at the enu of this fiist lectuie:
whatevei moie piecise chaiacteiistics may subsequently be assigneu to an
enquiiy which beais upon being as such, we must iecognize fiom the outset
that the enquiiy moves in a uimension which cannot be that of solipsist
ieflection, even in the most ciitical sense, that is to say of a ieflection which is
centieu on the tianscenuental Ego, by whatevei name we may call it. In moie
conciete language: I concein myself with being only in so }ai as I have a moie
oi less uistinct consciousness of the unueilying unity which ties me to othei
beings of whose ieality I alieauy have a pieliminaiy notion. In the light of the
iueas which have not yet penetiateu to the obscuie iegions in which we have
tiieu to hack a path foi ouiselves, I shoulu say of these beings that they aie
above all my fellow-tiavelleismy fellow-cieatuiesfoi once the English
language can give us an expiession foi which theie is no exact Fiench
equivalent; in Fiench one woulu have hau to paiaphiase it, to extiact the
humble anu at the same time inexhaustible uepth of its meaning.
E E E
89:;!<= 22> <F2A!<C8< :CG ,<2C3
I must now tiy to push ueepei my examination of what is commonly calleu
the ontological pioblem. Fiom what I saiu last yeai it must, I think, be
appaient that the pioblem is actually a mysteiy. But unfoitunately theie is a
iisk that the woius 'ontological mysteiy' may uegeneiate into a pseuuo-
philosophical catch-phiase. We aie again exposeu to the uangei that
continually besets us, of seeing the significance of woius anu of thought itself
weakeneu oi coiiupteu, anu it is only by a stienuous effoit of ieflection that
we can escape this tiying possibility.
It has often been iemaikeu iecently, anu Etienne uilson in paiticulai has
ieminueu us of it in his iecent L'tie et l'Essence
1
that the fiist uifficulties we
must take into account aiise fiom oui vocabulaiy itself. These uifficulties aie
not quite the same in English as they aie in Fiench, but they aie none the less
giave.
In Fiench the woiu tie has the gieat inconvenience of having a uouble
meaning; it is both a substantive anu a veib. The philosopheis whose
inspiiation ueiives fiom Beiueggei's ontology have tiieu to avoiu this
ambiguity by intiouucing the woiu tant, useu as a substantive, but it now
seems veiy uoubtful whethei the woiu tant will gain cuiiency among
philosopheis. uilson inueeu, notes that a seventeenth-centuiy authoi, Scipion
uu Pleix, heaueu the seconu book of his metaphysic with the title 'Qu'est-ce
que l'tant.'; he auus that philosopheis have maue of the woiu tant a puie
noun, using it simply anu absolutely foi anything at all, so long as it exists in
tiuth, ieality anu fact, like: Angel, Nan, Netal, Stone etc. In Fiench, howevei, it
is the woiu tie which has been cuiient even in this sense, anu one coulu
appaiently concluue, accoiuing to uilson, that it is the veibal sense which has
pievaileu in the enu. Neveitheless the ambiguity iemains; when I say in
Fiench, 'Qu'est-ce que l'tie.' uo I simply wish to say, 'What uoes to be (i.e.
the fact of being) mean.' oi am I asking a veiy uiffeient question: uo I by the
woiu tie ieally uesignate l'tant. If we use the Latin teims we say: uoes the
enquiiy beai upon esse oi upon ens. We must iealize that in English the
ambiguity is even moie embaiiassing, as the woiu being coiiesponus exactly
to ens, oi to what I calleu in Fiench l'tant. The uifficulty then incieases,
unless we biing in anothei woiu such as fact oi act to uesignate esse
piopeily so calleu; anu this spiings fiom the puiely giammatical fact that in
English the piesent paiticiple seives the same puipose as the infinitive useu
as a substantive uoes in uieek, foi example, oi in ueiman.
I cannot help thinking that this ambiguity oi amphibology is ueep-iooteu: we
may even be tempteu to believe that thought iefuses moie anu moie to face
this enquiiy; it is the most metaphysical of all enquiiies, anu it consists in
asking ouiselves what uoes to be mean, oi again what is it that makes a being
to be a being.
We can always, it is tiue, take iefuge in the assumption that the ieason why
we spontaneously iefuse to face this question is that it is inueeu the most
vain of all enquiiies. But what uoes vain mean in this paiticulai context. Bo
we mean to say that it is useless in an entiiely piagmatic sense. If so, it is
cleai that no philosophei coulu be helu back by such a consiueiation. Nust
we uig ueepei anu say that theie is a veto on such an enteipiise, that it
amounts to an attempt at tiespassing in a uomain which shoulu iemain
inaccessible to a cieatuie, in as much as it is a cieatuie. When eveiything has
been taken into account, I am not quite ceitain, inueeu, that theie is not some
tiuth in that attituue. 0n the othei hanu, how coulu the philosophei iesign
himself to aumitting that his ioau is blockeu by a notice, vietato l'ingiesso.
Bow coulu he ueny himself the seaich foi a cleaiei uefinition of being as
being.
It is cleai, in the fiist place, that this is not a question of an oiuinaiy
pieuicate, peihaps even not of a pieuicate at all: we may have to avail
ouiselves of the Aiistotelian notion of tianscenuentals. It calls foi only a most
elementaiy philosophical ieflection to iealize that to be cannot be a piopeity,
since it is to be that makes possible the existence of any piopeity at all; it is
that without which no piopeity whatsoevei can be conceiveu, though it is
tiue that we must be caieful to avoiu the soit of scheme in which being exists
in some way anteiioi to piopeities; nothing coulu be moie fallacious than the
iuea of a soit of nakeuness of being which exists befoie qualities anu
piopeities anu which is latei to be clotheu by them. This, of couise, has been
seen with the utmost claiity by youi eighteenth-centuiy thinkeis.
We shoulu note in auuition that we must establish a most intimate
connection between being puie anu simple on one siue anu the being of the
copula, the veib of juugment of pieuication on the othei siue; though it is not
necessaiily opposite to being in the sense of the iathei hoaiy uistinction
between analytic anu synthetic juugment. Foi example, if I say 'This stone is
heavy' oi 'This stone is white', I am only stiessing ceitain specific aspects of
the compiehensive affiimation 'This stone is'. 0ne might even say that the
juugment of pieuication is a special viewing of the inuestiuctible ieality of
the stone which is tiansposeu to the plane of logical affiimation. Remembei,
too, that we cannot be too uistiustful of the examples which appeai in
tieatises on logic; in these the piopositions aie isolateu fiom theii contexts
anu lose theii coiiect emphasis anu piecise meaning; they lose, I mean,
eveiything which in conciete ieality is conveyeu by intonation. Foi example if
I pick up a chaii anu say 'This chaii is heavy!' that is an exclamatoiy
pioposition. The exclamation is an integial pait of what I say. I uo not simply
want to say 'This chaii has weight'; piobably I want to say 'This chaii weighs
moie than I thought, I have a job to lift it!' It is veiy seluom in the conciete life
of thought that I have occasion to make what one coulu call an affiimation of
being; the exceptional case is when a being has maue its appeaiance in the
woilu, has buist into lifea biith, foi example, oi the completion of a woik
of ait. Then the affiimation becomes a soit of salute oi gieeting, as though I
maue a foimal acknowleugment of some thing.
Theie is, of couise, anothei example, a unique one, which we shall have to
ueal with at length when we come back to it; it is the affiimation which beais
upon the existence of uou Bimself. Whatevei auuible foim this thought may
take, theie aie moments when in effect I say to myself, 'uou is': if I am a
mystic it may be that I am continually making this affiimation. But what is
immeuiately appaient, anu what we shall see moie piecisely latei, is that this
affiimation lies beyonu eveiy juugment of pieuication; we may well have to
ask ouiselves latei also how fai it is possible foi us to have, in iegaiu to the
existence of uou the paitial oi incomplete views, I shoulu almost say the
siuelights, which we can always get when we aie conceineu with a paiticulai
ieality, a ieality that can be uesignateu, that is, with a this.
But on the othei hanu, have we notespecially when we have gieeteu a biith
oi the appeaiance of a woik of aituseu the woiu being in the sense of
existence. This question of the ielation between being anu existence has
always been a pieoccupation of mine; I may say that it has always woiiieu
me. The time has come in these lectuies to make a fiontal attack on it, anu
the fiist thing we must succeeu in uoing is to finu some staiting points which
aie fiee fiom ambiguity: we cannot say some uefinitions, foi we aie now
beyonu the limits of the uefinable. I note that uilson, at least when he is
speaking of St. Thomas Aquinas, has no sciuple in iuentifying being with
existence; he tianslates the foimula ens uicitui quasi esse habens as 'being is
that which has existence' ('l'tie est ce qui a l'existei'). It is not without
ieason, he auus, that to that which possesses existence (esse habens) is given
the name of being (ens); in fact the veiy woiu being is ueiiveu fiom that
which uesignates the act of existing (esse). As St. Thomas says 'Boc nomen
ens imponitui ab ipso esse'. We must unueistanu by that, that the woiu ens
which uiiectly anu in the fiist place signifies the thing (ies), at the same time
always signifies the act of existing. The ontology which beais upon being
conceiveu in this light iests, then, fiom the stait anu of necessity on the fiim
founuation of essences which aie giaspeu by theii concepts anu foimulateu
by theii uefinitions; but in the essence which is apt to be conceptualizeu, this
ontology will always keep in view the act of esse, of which no concept can be
foimeu, anu which is signifieu by the act of juugment. That is why only
juugment, which says what is anu what is not, ultimately gets at the tiuth
about things. It aiiives at theii tiuth because, in anu thiough theii essences,
it aiiives at theii acts of existence.
Without at fiist committing myself to one siue oi the othei in this mattei, I
think that we shoulu iecall to oui minus what we saiu last yeai about
existence piopeily so calleu. Remembei in the fiist place the ciucial
uistinction which I tiieu to establish between existence anu objectivity. Latei
we shall have to ask ouiselves what iepeicussions that uistinction can have
on the question of being as we aie now consiueiing it. 'The moie we lay
stiess on the object as such,' I wiote in an aiticle, Existence et 0bjectivit,
which appeaieu in 192S in the Revue ue Ntaphysique et ue Noiale, 'on the
chaiacteiistics which, in as much as it is an object, make it up; on the
intelligibility with which it must be chaigeu if it is to give a line of appioach
to the subject which faces it; the moie we shall be obligeu to leave its
existential aspect in uaikness. What will be uelibeiately left out will be the
moue accoiuing to which the object is piesent to the peison who is
consiueiing it; oi, which comes to the same thing, the mysteiious powei of
self-affiimation thanks to which the object can piesent itself befoie a
spectatoi; anu ueepei than this will be the question of knowing how it can
happen that this object is not simply an inaiticulate spectacle, but is enuoweu
also with the powei of affecting in countless ways even the being of the
peison who contemplates it anu expeiiences it. The sensible piesence of the
thing which, if it is not confuseu with its existence, seems, at least to
unpiejuuiceu ieflection, as though it weie its manifestation, its most
immeuiate ievelationit is that which a philosophy which is uiiecteu at once
towaius iueas anu towaius objects, tenus inevitably to slui ovei.' When I ie-
ieau that passage I seem to uetect a ceitain hesitation, a ceitain waveiing.
'The sensible piesence of the thing, which if it is not confuseu with its
existence seems at least to be its most immeuiate ievelation'. What exactly
uoes that mean. I think the effect of the ieseivation is to keep a soit of gap oi
inteival between something which may be the being of existence oi which
may simply be its appeaiance. But I must aumit that I shoulu not now be
willing to maintain this uistinction. I believe on the contiaiy that to think of
existence is ultimately to think of the impossibility of any opposition heie
between being anu appeaiance: the ieason foi this became in time moie anu
moie appaient to me: it is that the existential aspect is inextiicably bounu up
with my own conuition of being not only incainate but also a wayfaiei
Bomo viatoi. When I iecognize, when I salute the existence of anything, I
iecognize at the same time that befoie a uay has gone it will no longei exist,
in the sense that I shall no longei myself exist bouily. We can see this most
cleaily when we consiuei things which aie bounu up with human life: the
house in which such anu such a peison was boin no longei exists, it was
pulleu uown at such anu such a uate, nothing iemains in its place but
elements that have been scatteieu to infinity, nothing but a hanuful of uust.
In ieality, howevei, oui pioblem is not quite so simple as it appeais at fiist.
Last yeai I tiieu to show that theie is an existent, which seives as a cential
ciiteiion to which must be iefeiieu all the juugments of existence which I
may be leu to pionounce; this cential ciiteiion is my own bouy, iegaiueu not
just as a bouy, as a coipoieal thing, but as my own; oi bettei as a piesence
whose mass makes itself felt in an all-peivauing way. This piesence will not,
accoiuingly, allow itself to be ieuuceu, as objects in so fai as they aie puie
objects of knowleuge aie ieuuceu, eithei to a simple aspect oi to a co-
oiuination of intei-ielateu aspects. We coulu put this anothei way by saying
that my bouy is enuoweu with a uensity that is liveu oi felt; anu in so fai as I
biing othei things befoie myself as existents, I confei on them, too, by
analogy, a uensity of the same oiuei. The complication spiings heie fiom the
soit of iiieuucible uuality as a iesult of which the existent is at the same time
a thing anu yet in some way moie than a thing. This is tiue fiist of all, of
couise, of my own bouy anu of othei people's bouies. To be moie piecise, let
us note that in so fai as my bouy is subject to acciuent, it can anu shoulu be
tieateu essentially as a thing; to take an example that is unhappily only too
familiai to us nowauays, it must be so tieateu in so fai as it can be hanuleu
anu ill-tieateu by those who woulu uo it mischief. But we must hasten to auu
that the happening of these acciuents oi the infliction of this inhuman ill-
tieatment can be unueistoou only in so fai as the victim is thought of as a
subject oi, if you like, as a centie. They happen to a ceitain living somebouy;
nothing coulu possibly happen to a meie thing, because it has no inteiioiity,
no life of its own, it is ownless. Applieu to a thing which was nothing moie
than a thing, these woius woulu be meaningless.
In these ciicumstances the use of the woius 'to cease to exist' piesents a
uifficult pioblem. It is tiue that the thing which has been uestioyeu, oi taken
apait, oi ieuuceu to uust, has ceaseu to exist, but in the ueepest sense of the
woiu, has it evei existeu. Shoulu we not peihaps have goou ieason to say
that it is only to the pseuuo-existent (that is, the thing which is nothing moie
than a thing, which has been wiongly assimilateu to my bouy), that it can
happen to cease to exist. In that case how is the question to be applieu to the
tiue existent. What uo we mean when we say that victoi Bugo oi Napoleon
no longei exists. To be exact, what we mean is that if we ieuuce victoi Bugo
oi Napoleon to a ceitain mechanism which functioneu at a ceitain time, that
mechanism is no longei functioning; it no longei even subsists, in the sense
in which a caiiiage no longei subsists which is woin out anu has been sent
away as sciap iion.
I have puiposely useu the woiu 'mechanism'. While we use that woiu, we stay
in the uomain of objects, oi iathei of what I have calleu 'things'. But last yeai
we saw that my bouy is a piesence, anu in viitue of that it cannot be ieuuceu
to being my mechanism, my instiument; I mean that it somehow tianscenus
its being my instiument. I am my bouy, we saiu, wheieas I am not my spaue
noi my bicycle. But if we take a conciete view of victoi Bugo oi Napoleon, if,
that is to say, we uo not allow ouiselves that ciuue ieuuction, it is extiemely
uoubtful whethei to say that 'they no longei exist' has any meaning at all.
I agiee that this analysis is uisconceiting; the conclusion to be uiawn fiom it
is not an easy one anu appeais paiauoxical. It is that the iuea of existenceif
it is, anyway, an iuea,is funuamentally involveu in an ambiguity. I shoulu
even go so fai as to say that it is just as though we weie faceu by something
lying on a slope; it tenus to sliue uown the slope but at the same time it is
piecaiiously helu in positionby a thieau, peihaps; we aie holuing the
thieau anu if we pull it, it may just be possible foi us to haul it up the slope.
Bow uo I apply that compaiison. In this way: oui own inclinations impel us
to tieat existence as the fact that a thing is theie anu yet coulu aftei all be
elsewheie, oi coulu even be nowheie at all; to look upon existence in the light
of eveiy vicissituue possible in this oiuei, eveiy uisplacement, eveiy
uestiuction. But if I concentiate my attention on this simple fact: I exist; oi
again: 'such anu such a being whom I love, exists', the peispective changes; to
exist no longei means 'to be theie oi to be elsewheie'; in othei woius it
means that essentially we tianscenu the opposition between heie anu
elsewheie. Anu this is, of couise, an illustiation of what I saiu about the
necessity of tianscenuing spatial categoiies.
But aie we not beginning to finu ouiselves again, in this peispective, faceu by
the embaiiassing question of the ielation between being anu existence. It
may well be that theie is an ambiguity at the ioot of existence, anu that it is
that which makes the pioblem so uifficult. We may consiuei the existence of a
thing iegaiueu only as a thingthe existence which is alieauy, in common
with all the otheis, unuei the shauow of the thieat of 'ceasing to exist'; but
we ceitainly cannot say that it is the existence of non-being; such a
statement, I believe, means nothing at all. We shall uo bettei to say that it is
scaicely being at all; it is as though it iebelleu against the uemanus which the
woiu 'to be' biings with it. Latei we shall have to examine those uemanus
moie anu moie closely. But if on the othei hanu, we climb up the slope again,
existence will seem to us as having ultimately to be inuistinguishable fiom
authentic being. I am so bolu as to hope that I shall be able to eluciuate this
latei, but I think that a shoit uigiession may help us, fiom now on, to claiify
oui thoughts. Let us concentiate on the thought of something which no
longei exists, in the sense in which the woius aie commonly useu: a gaiuen,
peihaps, which has been uone away with; in its place a six-stoiey house has
been built. Is it not obvious that even in this example theie is no way in which
we can speak of non-being in a iauical sense. Bowevei paiauoxical it may
seem, as soon as I can say of the gaiuen, 'it no longei exists', then theie is a
ceitain sense in which it still is. I may be accuseu of playing on woius; it may
be uigeu that it is not the gaiuen which still exists, it is an image of it which I
have pieseiveu. But we cannot be too caieful of the confusions which luik in
the woiu 'image'. We always tenu to think of an image as a soit of facsimile
which has existence, but the iuea of a facsimile implies that something has
been mateiially shapeu to iesemble anothei thing; in that sense the image of
the gaiuen is not a facsimile. I uo not uoubt that theie is a way in which the
gaiuen subsists. Bow. In me. We must be extiemely caieful, foi heie theie
aie woise confusions waiting to ensnaie us; theie is the tenuency to think of
myself as a soit of cupboaiu oi uiawei in which the facsimile may be kept.
But the tiuth seems to be that these pictoiial ways of looking at the mattei
shoulu be altogethei iejecteu
At this point I cannot but iefei to two of the finest passages in contempoiaiy
liteiatuieRilke's ninth Buinese Elegy anu his own comments on it in a
lettei to Witolu Bulewicz, wiitten, it appeais, on 1S Novembei, 192S. It is No.
1u8 in the Insel-veilag euition of the Biiefe aus Nuzot. 'We aie the bees of the
invisible. We mauly iaiu the honey of the visible, to stoie it in the gieat
goluen hive of the invisible.' When Rilke speaks of 'us' he is, natuially,
thinking of poets. But we may well thinkthough I uo not know whethei he
woulu have accepteu the wiuei inteipietationthat eveiy human being, in
so fai as he is enuoweu with memoiy, shaies in this activity which is piopei
to the poet: this alchemist's activity by which the visible is tiansmuteu into
the invisible.
Is it not piecisely heie that we may see how existence anu being aie
uovetaileu togethei.
Anothei thing emeiges with gieat claiity fiom this uiscussion, paiticulaily if
we ietuin to the metaphoi I useu eailiei: it is that fieeuom comes into the
pictuie at piecisely the moment when being anu existence aie in fusion. It is
only a fiee being that can iesist the soit of bias which tenus to uiag it in the
uiiection of the thing, towaius the moitality which is inheient in the thing.
Without uoubt this is not the whole stoiy, but equally without uoubt it is by
iesisting the bias that fieeuom takes shape.
This way of looking at it is foi me an illustiation of the gieat auvantage of
iejecting the notion accoiuing to which existence coulu be consiueieu as a
mouality of being; it is a ciuue notion anu it is philosophically untiue.
Noieovei, to put it in this way woulu intiouuce the auuitional giave
embaiiassment of the notion that being is a genus. This notion is stiictly
untenable. Noie than this, if we weie to see in existence a paiticulai
specification of being, we shoulu also have to aumit that non-existencewe
may call it 'absence' if we wishis anothei specification of being. But that
woulu be a caiicatuie of ielations which aie in ieality entiiely uiffeient.
Absence can only be appiehenueu as in any way a moue of being, by the
existent, by linking it up with its own existence anu as though it weie fiom
the uepths of its own existence. This comes back to saying that existence anu
non-existence cannot be tieateu as teims which aie patient, if I may so
expiess it, of being lookeu at simultaneously in a pictuie. Eveiy synopsis
implies, moieovei, that the lookei shall be at the outsiue in ielation to the
thing lookeu at: anu such a ielation cannot be envisageu in this instance. We
can uemonstiate this in anothei way. If we avoiu the mistake of tieating being
anu existence as qualities, we shall iun the iisk of thinking that existence is a
soit of specification of a funuamental act; which act woulu be the act of being.
To pioceeu on these lines woulu be to meet uifficulties which pile up until
they aie quite unsuimountable.
Can we be quite ceitain that the woius act of being aie not in some way
contiauictoiy. Bowevei we may uefine the woiu act, it is eviuent that I
cannot speak of the act of being unless I am ieauy to give up the iuea of
conceiving anything iesembling a subject of the act, a someone who fulfils
the act. We shoulu have to aumit that this subject itself is, anu that woulu
senu us back again to a being which is anteiioi to the act of being. We must,
then, lay it uown as a piinciple that the act of being is itself this same subject,
but that in some way it is its own cieatoi. Let us aumit that we can ieally
think of this cieation of self by self. But theie uoes not appeai to be anything
theie which coulu be iegaiueu as capable of assuming specifications
accoiuing to vaiious uiffeiing moues, of which one woulu be what we call
existence.
Bowevei, I think the time has come to leave this iathei baiien fielu of
speculation, anu to auuiess ouiselves, as hitheito we have constantly sought
to uo, to the conciete appiehension of existence. We have ieacheu a point
wheie the question that shoulu concein us lies in knowing whethei theie is
any way in which I can have expeiience of myself as beingbeing in a sense
which is not that in which I can giasp myself as existing. When the question is
fiist askeu, it seems inueeu an obscuie one. A little light, I think, is thiown on
it only if we stiess the actual etymology of the veib 'to exist': if we emphasize,
that is, that to exist is to emeige, to aiise. But it is cleai that if I can somehow
iise up so that I become moie ieauily peiceiveu by otheis, so also I can
withuiaw myself into my own innei being; that, in fact, is what happens as
soon as I am in a state of iecollection. This act appeais to be bounu up with
the foieknowleuge of a ieality which is mine, oi peihaps, moie exactly, gives
me a founuation on which, in as much as I am myself, I can stanu: the
movement of tuining towaius this ieality helps me to appioach it, but it can
nevei enable me fully to coinciue with it. If it is tiue that I can in a ceitain
sense take holu of my own existence, my own being, on the othei hanu,
cannot be an object of my affiimation. We might be tempteu to say that theie
is always a gap between me anu my being; I can naiiow the gap, it is tiue, but
at least in this life I cannot hope to biiuge it. Theie is an impoitant passage in
Chailes Bu Bos' Bialogue avec Anui uiue, which I think is apposite. Bu Bos
staits, he says, 'fiom a faith which has nevei been shaken, not even in the
bosom of ieligious unbelief: a faith in the existence of the soul on the one
hanu, anu on the othei of the constant watch fiom above which the soul
keeps ovei all the conuitions anu manifestations of me: I am nevei without
the mysteiious feeling of the piesence anu at the same time the uistance of
the soul at eveiy moment of oui life'. 'The piesence anu at the same time the
uistance'it is that soit of telling contiauiction which helps me to uefine my
ielation to my own being. What Bu Bos heie calls the soul, is in ieality my
being: conveisely, it must be appaient that the being which we aie tiying
now to close in on can only be qualifieu as the soul. If that is so, we iealize at
once with what caie the affiimation 'I am' must be appioacheu: the
affiimation which was ciieu on high by Bescaites, who thought that he hau
pioveu its valiuity once anu foi all. I woulu piefei to say that it shoulu not be
put foiwaiu in any uefiant oi piesumptuous tone; iathei shoulu it be
whispeieu humbly, with feai anu wonuei. I say with humility because, aftei
all, as we shall see moie anu moie cleaily, this being is something that can
only be gianteu to us as a gift; it is a ciuue illusion to believe that it is
something which I can give to myself: with feai, because I cannot even be
ceitain that I may not make myself unwoithy of the gift, so unwoithy that I
shoulu be conuemneu to losing it, uiu not giace come to my assistance: anu
finally with wonuei, because this gift biings as its companion the light,
because this gift is light.