POLITICAL CONTENT OF THE RELATIONS 79 EG, like its Predecessors. thinks nothing of a policy of pinpricks.

It rather has confidence in the effect of a continuous critical dialogue. Furthermore it is generally sceptical about restrictions of international, economic or personal movements for the assertion of foreign policy goals.

This policy statement on relations with South Africa by the West German government in the Bundestag clearly meant that the Bonn government was quite comfortable with the political and socioeconomic status quo in the apartheid enclave. It implied, also the unpreparedness and unwillingness of the Bonn government to even contemplate pursuing a dissociative policy towards South Africa. As it were, to agree to the imposition of sanctions of the apartheid regime to change its racial policies and agree to the participation of the black majority in the governance of the country would bring about a disruption in the positive political and socioeconomic relations between Bonn and the white minority regime in Pretoria. As clearly indicated, therefore, the Bonn government was not ready to pursue any policy option that would disturb this relationship. THE ROLE AND INVOLVEMNT OF WEST GERMANY IN CIVIL WARS AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN AFRICA The official West German attitude towards civil wars and regional conflicts in Africa is that of strict neutrality. Thus in the years after 1949, successive governments in Bonn incorporated the policy of strict non-involvement in military conflicts in Africa as a cardinal objective of its African policy. This attitude was largely dictated by the Bonn governments institutionalized policy, often referred to as Friedenspolitik (policy of peace). It involved the renunciation of the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy and the pursuit of all measures that can bring about world peace and safeguard economic relations. With particular reference to Africa, West German position was that the continent was so impoverished and far too poor to engage in self destructive military conflicts which would only bring about great human suffering and hinder economic development. It is for these official reasons that governments in Bonn often show some concern regarding regional conflicts and civil war situations in the sub-continent. This concern is borne not only out of the likely socio-political consequences of such conflict, but also out of their possible adverse effects on the normal course of economic activities. It is against this background of socio-political and economic disruptions intrinsic to conflict situations that West Germany often found itself defending and supporting the status quo in Africa, d especially as evident u gs policy towards Portuguese colonial rule in Southern Africa and in its relation to apartheid South Africa. Apart from this, the West Germany membership of the Western Alliance also exerts some influence on the countrys attitude and policy towards situations in Africa. In support of the above

WEST GERMAN POLICY IN AFRICA observations, the Nigerian civil war and the Orgaden conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia wi1l be examined in some detail as case studies.

WEST GERMANY AND THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR The Nigerian civil war between 1967 and 1970 provides an opportunity to examine Bonns actual reactions to and policy on a civil war situation in Africa. Two points will be highlighted here. The first is the existence of a dichotomy between the policy pronouncements of the Bonn government and the activities and actions of its non-formal institutions of foreign policy, and, second, the fact that the declaration of its neutrality by the government in Bonn on a civil war situation in Africa is not always inviolable in order to demonstrate these two points, it will be necessary to examine the relationship between West Germany and Nigeria before, during and after the Nigerian civil war. Between October 1960 when Nigeria became independent, and July 1967 when the Nigerian civil war broke out, the relationship between the two countries can be described as very cordial indeed. This was particularly so in the economic and military spheres. On the economic front, Nigeria was West Germanys largest trading partner in sub-Sahara Africa in terms of export to West Germany and, second only to South Africa in terms of us import from West Germany. West German imports from Nigeria, at this time, consisted mainly of agricultural products such as cocoa, cotton, vegetable oil products and rubber, while Nigerian imports consisted mainly of machinery vehicles and chemical products. By the time the civil war broke out in July 1967, West Germany had imported goods worth D.M. 376.4 million from Nigeria, while goods exported to Nigeria amounted to D.M. 244.1 million, with a trade balance of D.M. 132.2 million in favour of Nigeria, 91 while the total amount of direct West German investment in Nigeria was estimated at about D.M. 25 million. In addition to these economic undertakings Nigeria also received development aid technical assistance from West Germany which were directed towards the expansion of infrastructural facilities promoting agricultural growth and the training of experts. In other words, West German development aid and assistance were aimed at enhancing Nigerias national deve1opment

it was established in October 1963. Under the Airforce training agreement, 85 Nigerian Airforce officers were sent to Hamburg in October 1963. Also under the conditions of the agreement, a team of West German Airforce personnel were seconded to Nigeria earlier in May 1963. Included in the team were Colonels G. Kathz and W. Thiming, both Commanders of the Nigerian Airforce between May 1963 and November 1965, and between November 1965 and January 1966 respectively. It was also under this agreement that the West German Airforce Commander, General Warner Tanitzki, announced the training of 1,000 Nigerian airmen, including 91 pilots over a 4-year period from 1963 to i967. There was also the delivery of military aircraft to Nigeria including transport planes, G91 jet fighters, DO 27 and P1.1149-5 training planes, all valued at 9 million. It was against this background of close economic and military relations that the Nigerian government expected West Germanys total support in the course of the civil war. The war was between the Federal Military Government of Nigeria and the Eastern part of the country, which became known as The Republic of Biafra. The secession bid by the Eastern Region was seen by many Nigerians more as a grave threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country as a corporate entity than as a struggle for national self-determination on the part of the Igbos. The Nigerian government therefore sought to defeat the secessionist bid through military means after the failure of diplomacy and economic blockade. Nigerias war

effort was concentrated on two issues: the acquisition of enough military equipment to defeat Biafra, and an attempt to dissuade the international community from giving support to Biafra, insisting that the civil war was strictly an internal Nigerian affair. West Germany reacted to the Nigerian civil war by recognising the Federal Military Government as the sole legitimate authority in Nigeria. This position vas justified by the then West German Ambassador in Nigeria, Gunther Gnodtke, who argued that it would be ridiculous for West Germany, which was seeking reunification, not to support the preservation of Nigerian unity. However, the West German support for the Federal Military Government was lukewarm, at best. The first major reason that can be adduced to explain the West German attitude has to do with the position of the other major Western powers. While the United States and Britain chose to be largely neutral, France anti Portugal actively supported and canvassed recognition for Biafra within the Western alliance. Apart from this, the Bonn government had to contend with the pressure exerted on Biafras behalf by Julius Nyerere of Tanzannia and Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d Ivoire. There was also the sharp division of West German domestic opinion in the church among the business community and between the constituent states.

82. WEST GERMAN POLICY IN AFRICA

With regard to the Western powers, the over-riding consideration behind their attitude was economic. Just at the outset of the war, Nigerias crude oil was beginning to gain increased portion of the oil market thus establishing the potentials of Nigeria as a major oil exporting country. However, the larger part of the oil producing areas in Nigeria came under Biafran territorial jurisdiction. The Western powers were conscious of this fact and did not want to jeopardize their position in case Biafra did succeed in its secession bid. This economic consideration helped to dictate the direction of the policy embarked upon by the Bonn government. It pledged political and some economic support to the Federal Government while, at the same time, it provided Biafra with material and humanitarian aid. In other words, West Germany, like the United States and Britain, positioned itself mid-way between the warring factions with a view to reaping political and economic benefits from whichever of the sides that eventually emerged victorious. In pursuance of this policy West Germany continued its economic relations with Nigeria. For example, Bonn agreed to extend the Eko Bridge in Lagos at a cost of 7 miI1ion. This undertaking was given in 1969 at the opening of the first phase of the bridge which was constructed with an earlier West German loan of 6 million. However, West Germanys continued political support and economic relations with Nigeria cannot be taken as an indication of unqua1jfj support for the Federal Government The provision of material and humanj.jan aid to Biafra by the non-formal Institutions of West German foreign policy, especially the Church, Solidarity Movement and Citizens Initiative Groups can indeed be described as attempts by West Germany at undermining Nigeria unity and territorial integrity. This lack of full commitment to Nigeria unity was rationalized on humanitarian grounds rather than in terms of the implied Political undertones. For example throughout the period of the war, there were reports, though denied by the Bonn government, of West German arms delivered to Biafra and of the participation of West German mercenaries on the side of Biafra. In spite of these denials, sympathy for the Biafran cause was certainly evident among the West Germany population. This was achieved through media manipulation and

propaganda by pro-Biafran lobby groups. For example, the war reported in some West German media publication as a war between the Muslim North and the Christian East. Such biased media propaganda campaigns led many West Germany to contribute to the Biafran relief fund. For example it was revealed in the Bundestag that the Bonn government contributed D.M. 25 million in 1968 and D.M. 38million in l969 towards humanitarian assistance for Biafra. Also by June 1969 both the Catholic Church and the Protestant church were reported to have donated D.M 54 Million towards humanitarian relief efforts in Biafra. The West Germans were so impressed by their contributions to

POLITICAL CONTENT OF THE RELATIONS 83 the Biafran cause that a government spokesman declared in June 1969 that no country had so far given Biafra more assistance than West Germany. From this statement, it can rightly be stated that the West German assistance to Biafra, whether humanitarian or otherwise, did, among other factors, help the secessionist state to hold out against the Federal Government for 2 1/2 years The West German strategy of running with the hare and hunting with the hound paid off at the end of the civil war. The country was among the few Western powers that still found themselves in the good books of the Nigerian authorities. Other Western powers, especially France had some problems, in re-establishing cordial relations with the Nigerian government mainly as a result of its open pro-Biafran policy.

Realizing that it had the unique advantage of still possessing an unimpaired and creditable relationship with Nigeria, West Germany moved quickly to consolidate this, position by granting Nigeria an aid package worth D.M. 20 million for reconstruction work in the waraffected zones. Furthermore, both the West German Catholic Organization, CARITAS, and the Protestant Church each provided another D.M. 15 million for the purchase of food and medical supplies for refugees in the war-affected areas. With these gestures of goodwill from the Bonn government and the Churches, relations between West Germany and Nigeria became enhanced. For example, at the end of the civil war in 1970, West German import from Nigeria had jumped to D.M. 566.7 million and exports to the country stood at D.M. 373.6 million. This jump in trade was mainly as a result of crude oil from Nigeria and the exportation of machinery for post-war reconstruction. Since then, the West- German Nigeria trade had witnessed such great expansion that, by 1980, West Germany had moved to position of Nigerias second largest supplier of goods and services with over 200 West German companies in Nigeria involved in strategic and civil works, production of chemicals and pharmaceuticals, manufacturer of electrical materials, and automobile assemblage.

THE OGADEN CONFLICT The Ogaden conflict broke out into a war between Somalia and Ethiopia in December 1977. The