G.R. No.

116192

November 16, 1995

EUFEMIA SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GENEROSA S. CRUZ, respondents.

Facts: Cruz had purchased a land in Bataan. The adjacent land of the private respondent was still owned by the Atty. Nuguid however it was being used by the petitioner and there was a house constructed on it. The respondent found out the petitoner was enroaching her property when she tried for the relocation of her lot. The respondent talk to the petitioner that the old fence would be removed and will replaced by the new fence which will cover her true area of the property of the petitioner. The petitioner refused to agree on the proposition of the respondent and threaten her for legal action. Out of fear, the respondent filed an action against the petitioner. The trial court decided the case in favor of the respondent. Issue: Whether the act was forcible entry or unlawful detainer Held: It is neither forcible entry or unlawful detainer but it is about boundary dispute which be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria. Forcible entry is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. While unlawful deatainer, it is unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entity, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession. In case at bar, the complaint that does not show the entry whether legal or illegal. It does not show on how the pettitioner constructed the land and place the fence. It is silent on whether the possesion of the petitioner became legal before the demand of the respondent. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same for more than

one year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment. This is especially true where his possession thereof was not obtained through the means or held under the circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary ejectment.

G.R. No. 141614

August 14, 2002

TERESITA BONGATO, petitioner, vs. Spouses SEVERO A. MALVAR and TRINIDAD MALVAR, respondents. Facts: Spouses Malvar filed a complaint for forcible entry against petitioner Bongato for illegally entering and erecting a house of light materials on the land owned by the spouses. MTCC rendered a decision agaisnt the petitioner to vacate the land, pay the rentals, attonerys fee and cost of the suit. It is affirmed by the RTC. Respondent Judge granted motion for reconsideration only for the determination of the house involved if the it is situated on the same lot or different lot that is involved in the anti-squatting case. The CA stated that the MTCC had the jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in not finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction since the Complaint was filed beyond the one-year period from date of alleged entry Held: Three Basic Principle: Forcible entry, one employs force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to deprive another of physical possession of land or building. As a general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. There are exceptions to this rule. Ordinarily, an appellate court cannot refer to the record in another case to ascertain a fact not shown in the record of the case before it yet, it has been held that it may consult decisions in other proceedings, in order to look for the law that is determinative of or applicable to the case under review. In some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to the matter in controversy. Factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court. Indeed, the review of such findings is not a function that this Court normally undertakes. However, this Rule is not absolute; it admits of exceptions, such as (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when a lower courts inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which -- if properly considered -- will justify a different conclusion; (5) when there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record. In case at bar, the house of the petitioner was not situated on the land of the spouse rather it is on the anti-squatting case. The house already preexisted before the year 1992 of illegal entry. It

is stated that father of the petitioner constructed the house in 1935 and she just continued living there. Respondent Severo admitted that he had knowledge of house since 1987. Forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process. One year is the time period for bringing an action against forcible entry. However if it is made thru stealth then the counting period would start upon the time when the plaintiff had the knowledge about it. If a year had already elapsed, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession.

G.R. Nos. 120652

February 11, 1998

EUGENIO DE LA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and CRISTINA MADLANGSAKAY VILLANUEVA, respondents. Facts: Petitioner Cruz claims the owner and actual possesor of the land possessor of the lot, having possessed and occupied it openly, publicly, notoriously, adversely against the whole world, and in the concept of an owner, for more than thirty years, at the commencement of this controversy. Private Respondent Villanueva purchased the same lot from the Ramon Brothers who claims to be the successor-in-interest of the previous possesor of the said land. On 1959, Petitioner borrowed from the parents of respondent mortaging the parcel of land as a security. Then by 1987, the land became subject of application for registration under Land Registration Act. Ramos brothers claim they better claim than the petitioner because they are the successor-in-interest of the previous possesor of the disputed land. The court dismissed the case because the land had not been reclassified for other purposes and remained part as forest reserves. . Then after that, the respondent bought the land from the brothers. The petitioner filed a complaint agaisnt the respondent for reconvenyance with damages. The complaint was dismissed. On appeal, petittioner contend that his uncle gave the land to his mother on 1930. Issue: Whether or not the pettitioner have better rights over the residential lot to which he devoted an abundance of time, effort and resources in fencing and cultivating the same Held: The petitioner cannot use the Republics vs. Court of Appeals and Miguel Marcelo, et al. The case cannot be applied because the petitioner in that case acquired the possesion of the disputed land and cultivate it in good faith after the classification of the land. In the case at bar, Cruz possesed and occupied the land after the land was declared by the government as forest reserve and inalienable. The remained land is classified as part of the land until it was declared alienable or disposable land behest of the Ramoses. So there is no disposable land to speak of. The property cannot be acquired by prescription because it is stil classified by the government as forest reserve and inalienable.

G.R. No. 138971

June 6, 2001

PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA), petitioner, vs. HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City (Branch 54); and the Heirs of the Deceased Spouses JUAN CUIZON and FLORENTINA RAPAYA, respondents. Facts: The subject of the present controversy is a lot of the Opon Cadastre situated in Lapu-Lapu City, registered in the names of Florentina Rapaya, Victorino Cuizon, Isidro Cuizon, Ursula Cuizon, Benito Lozano, Isabel Lozano, Pelagia Lozano, Augusto Lozano, Valeriano Ybaez, Jesus Ybaez, Numeriano Ybaez, Martino Ybaez, Eutiquio Patalinghug, Celedonio Patalinghug, Santiago Patalinghug and Silvino Patalinghug. On 1982, Jorgea Igot-Soroo, Frisca Booc and Felix Cuizon executed an Extrajudicial Partition, in which they declared themselves as the only surviving heirs of the registered owners of the aforesaid lot. The land was subject to expropriation proceeding. The newly registered owners would have compromise agreement with the Export Processing Zone Authorithy (EPZA). In 1996, Private respondents would file a complaint for nullity of documents, redemption and damages against the petitioner and Igot-Soroo et al. The complaint alleges that the petitioners excluded the private respondents from the extrajudicial settlement. Issue: Whether or not the appellate court erred in not holding that private respondents claim against expropriated property had prescribed. Whether or not the appellate court erred in not holding that reconveyance does not lie against the expropriated property." Held: 1.)Petitioner states that the respondents claim against the property has already because the two year period within which unduly excluded heir may seek new settlement had already lapsed by the time respondents file thier complaint. A perusal of the foregoing provision will show that persons unduly deprived of their lawful participation in a settlement may assert their claim only within the two-year period after the settlement and distribution of the estate. This prescription period does not apply, however, to those who had no part in or had no notice of the settlement. The only exception to the above-mentioned prescription is when the title remains in the hands of the heirs who have fraudulently caused the partition of the subject property or in those of their transferees who cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value. In this regard, title to the property in the present case was no longer in the name of the allegedly fraudulent heirs, but already in that of an innocent purchaser for value the government. Moreover, the government is presumed to have acted in good faith in the acquisition of the lot,

considering that title thereto was obtained through a Compromise Agreement judicially approved in proper expropriation proceedings. 2.) An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes four years from the discovery of the fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.Registration of real property is considered a constructive notice to all persons and, thus, the four-year period shall be counted therefrom. Private respondents action for reconveyance based on fraud has already prescribed. Even an action for reconveyance based on an implied or a constructive trust would have already prescribed just the same, because such action prescribes ten (10) years from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. The imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is in possession of the property. In effect, the action for reconveyance is an action to quiet the property title, which does not prescribe. Undisputedly, private respondents are not in possession of the disputed property. In fact, they do not even claim to be in possession of it, even if to do so would enable them to justify the imprecriptibility of their action. It must be remembered that reconveyance is a remedy of those whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another. Such recourse, however, cannot be availed of once the property has passed to an innocent purchaser for value. For an action for reconveyance to prosper, the property should not have passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

G.R. No. 161028

January 31, 2005

TERESITA V. IDOLOR, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GUMERSINDO DE GUZMAN and ILUMINADA DE GUZMAN and HON. JOSE G. PINEDA, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 220, Quezon City, respondents. Facts: On March 21, 1994, to secure a loan, petitioner Teresita Idolor executed in favor of private respondent Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial foreclosure upon failure to redeem the mortgage on or before September 20, 1994. Upon the failure of the petitioner to pay the loan, respondents sought for extrajudicial proceeding agaisnt the REM. On June 25, 1998, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for annulment of Sheriff's Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction against private respondents, Deputy Sheriffs Marino Cachero and Rodolfo Lescano and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City alleging among others alleged irregularity and lack of notice in the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings subject of the real estate mortgage. On July 28, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining concerned parties from causing the issuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject property in favor of the De Guzman spouses. On September 28, 1999, the respondent court granted the petition and annulled the assailed writ of preliminary injunction. Issue: Whether or not the respondent Court erred in finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in enjoining the private and public respondents from causing the issuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject parcel of land in favor of private respondents. Held: Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be aright in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Failure to establish either the existence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction or that the defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends to endanger the existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous

irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. In the instant case, we agree with the respondent Court that petitioner has no more proprietary right to speak of over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction. It appears that the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to private respondent Gumersindo on May 23, 1997 and the sheriff's certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997. Petitioner had one year from the registration of the sheriff's sale to redeem the property but she failed to exercise her right on or before June 23, 1998, thus spouses de Guzman are now entitled to a conveyance and possession of the foreclosed property. When petitioner filed her complaint for annulment of sheriff's sale against private respondents with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on June 25, 1998, she failed to show sufficient interest or title in the property sought to be protected as her right of redemption had already expired on June 23, 1998, i.e. two (2) days before the filing of the complaint.

G.R. No. 106043 March 4, 1996 CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY LANDLESS RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION INC. (COCLAI), Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (NHA), respondents. Facts: The subject land was formerly timberland. On 1956, the Bureau of Forestry released the said land as alienable and disposable public land. On 1964, Petitioners COCLAI were granted authority to survey the land for purposes of subdivision into residental lots. On 1979, NHA filed extrajudicial proceeding before the CFI of Misasmis Oriental to aqcuire a lot including the subect land. The COCLAI intervening the case, they claimed that instead being paid by money they prefer to acquire residential lots in any housing are of NHA. Upon learning of the anullment of title of the subject land, NHA sought for the suspension of extrajudicial proceeding. The SC declaring the land as public land. On May 10, 1983, the President of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 2292 reserving the entire area of subject land for the Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) Project to be implemented by the NHA. Under the said proclamation, the NHA was granted the authority "to develop, administer and dispose of lot located at Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City, in accordance with the guidelines of the Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program and the approved development plan of the area. The NHA, through its agents, with the help of the policemen and claiming authority under P.D. 1472, demolished the structures erected by the COCLAI members. This action prompted the COCLAI to file a forcible entry and damages case against the NHA employees and police officers with the Municipal Trial Court. This prompted petitioner to file a case for forcible entry on which the trial court decided in its favor. During the pendency of the civil case, a special patent was issued for the entire subject land. The petitioner sought the execution of decision, which was countered by a case for quieting of title by the NHA. Issue: Whether or not the National Housing Authority (NHA) is entitled to the injunction prayed for Whether or not NHA has a better right to the said lot

Held: 1.) Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be a rightin esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. Hence, it should only be granted if the party asking for it is clearly entitled thereto. In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals was justified in ruling that NHA was entitled to the writ of injunction. NHA was entitled to the writ of injunction because of the pendency of anappeal for forcible entry; the special patent issued to it by the presiden tover the parcel of land. So, when petitioner moved for the issuance of a writ of execution before the MTCC on July 23, 1990, a certificate of title had already been issued to NHA. In view of this intervening development, NHA filed a complaint for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. Thus, it was only proper for the Court of Appeals to direct the Regional Trial Court, where Civil Case No. 90-337 was pending, to grant the writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the decision of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11204 as there was a material change in the status of the parties with regard to the said land. Clearly, the government, through the NHA will be prejudiced by the impending enforcement of the decision in Civil Case No. 11204 which directs the said agency to restore the members of petitioner to their respective possession on portions of Lot No. 1982.

2.) The Original Certificate of Title (No. P-3324) issued to respondent NHA serves as a concrete and conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to the property. Accordingly, once a decree of registration is issued under the Torrens systems and the one year period from the issuance of the decree of registration has lapsed, without said decree being controverted by any adverse party, the title becomes perfect and cannot later on be questioned. Furthermore, in the case at bench, the original certificate of title was issued by the Register of Deeds, under an administrative proceeding pursuant to Special Patent No. 3551. Thus, it is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding as the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law. Moreover, the said certificate of title was not controverted by petitioner in a proper proceeding nor did it show that the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title by the register of deeds to NHA was tainted with bad faith or fraud. Hence, said certificate of title enjoys the presumption of having been issued by the register of deeds in the regular performance of its official duty. Also OCT No. P-3324 issued in the name of respondent NHA, clearly states:

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, the said parcel of land with all the appurtenances thereunto of right of belonging unto the NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY and to its successors-in-interest or assigns forever, subject to private rights, if any there be. Clearly, the certificate of title vested not only ownership over the lot but also the right of possession as a necessary consequence of the right of ownership. Respondent is not merely the administrator of the said lot. It cannot be denied that Proclamation No. 2290 gave authority to the NHA to dispose of Lot No. 1982. In the said Proclamation the President of the Philippines granted to NHA the authority to "develop, administer and dispose" of Lot No. 1982, located at Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City, "in accordance with the guidelines of the Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program and the approved development plan of the area.

G.R. No. L-16995

October 28, 1968

JULIO LUCERO, movant-appellee, vs. JAIME L. LOOT, ET AL., oppositors-appellants. Ramon Gonzales for movant-appellee. Jaime L. Loot for and in his own behalf as oppositor-appellant. Facts: Trial court granted the writ of possesion in favor of Lucero. There was an opposition on the part of oppositors, all surnamed Loot. The lower court failed to see merit in the opposition interposed. It explained why: "The opposition interposed by the oppositors to the effect that there are defects in the reconstitution of the records and that the motion is not under oath is trivial in its nature and consequently untenable." Issue: Whether or not the order granting the writ of possession was in accordance with law Held: Yes A writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings. the issuance of the decree of registration is part of the registration proceedings. In fact, it is supposed to end the said proceedings. Consequently, any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time up to the issuance of the final decree, may be subject to a judicial ejectment by means of a writ of possession and it is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked by thesuccessful claimant. If the writ of possession issued in a land registration implies the delivery of the possession of the land to the successful litigant therein, a writ of demolition must, likewise issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the latter, which, without said writ of execution would be ineffective.

Vencilao v. Vano, 182 SCRA 492 Facts: Three cases are consololidated given that there are same parties and and parcels of land in question:

The heirs of late Juan Reyes filed for an application for registration of the subject parcel of the land. A reconveyance case filed agaisnt them by The second case is about the death of the administratix of the owner of the estate. Tranfer Certificate of Title were issued in the name of several persons. A writ of possesion against the petitioners were filed.
One of the registered owners of the land who filed a petition for complaint against the occupants who refused to vacate the land and sign the sheriffs return.

Issue: 1.) Whether or not that the said respondent judge erred in issuing a writ of possession without any complaint filed in court for forcible entry and detainer, nor for recovery of ownership and possession of the parcels of land in question against the herein petitioners. 2.) Whether or not respondent judge erred in issuing a writ of possession against the petitioners herein, who were not parties to the registration proceeding and who were not defeated oppositors of the said application for registration. Held: The petition is impressed with merit. Petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor defeated oppositors in the said land registration case, as their names dont appear in the amended application for registration. They have occupied the subject parcels of land for more than 30 years which began long before the application for registration; and that even after registration, they continuedto possess the land. In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its registration in his name necessarily carried with it the right of ownership. the issuance of the writ of possession is therefore sanctioned by existing laws in this jurisdiction and by the generally accepted principle upon which the administration of justice rests. a writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree.