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THE GREAT IDEAS

1071
iNTRODUCTION
caused, or how it causes other acts, not on how
the acts it causes are affected by outward cir-
cumstancesbeyond its control.
The problemof the freedom of the will seems,
therefore, to be primarily psychological and
metaphysical. It requires us to consider freedom
in terms of cause and necessity. It appeals to such
distinctions as that between the caused, the un-
caused, and the self-caused, or to the difference
between the predetefmined, the contingent,
and the spontaneous event. To this extent the
problem is metaphysical. Butitis psychological
insofar as the kind of event with which we are
concerned is an interior act of a living thing
and, even more specifically, of an intelligent
being, a being which has mind in some sense of
that term. We do not ask \vhether stones and
vegetables have free will because we .do not
usually suppose that they have will. Even those
who, like Aristotle, attribute desire to aU things
or who, like William James, find a striving to-
ward goals in at least all living things, do not
refer to volition or the voluntary in the absence
ofimagination or thought.
The italicized words in the foregoing para-
graph indicate ideas which have the most funda-
mental bearing on the discussion of will, and
hence the relation of this to other chapters. The
chapters on CAUSE and NECESSITY (and those
on FATE and CHANCE) deal wi thdoctrines which
both affect and are affected by various theories
of the will's freedom. But ifwe are to postpone
the question offree \vill until the nature of will
itself is considered, we must begin with defini-
tions which employ terms discussed in the chap-
ters on MIND and DESIRE.
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN thought and action
sets the stage for the discovery of a .factor or
facuitywhich serves to connect them. Acting
may follow upon thinking, but not without the
Chapter 100: WILL
T
HE great controversy over the freedom of
. . the will tends to overshadowthe theory of
the will itself. For some thinkers the two no"
tions are inseparable. As the word "choice" pop-
ularly connotes freedom in choosing .between
alternatives, so for them liberty belongs to the
very nature of the will. But others who affirm
that men can act freely or voluntarily also deny
that the will itself is ever free.
Still others who distinguish between volun-
tary and reflex the part of brute
animals as well as .men-also' distinguish . be-
tween the voluntary and the free. They reserve
freedom to men alone on the ground that men
alone have ,vills. Far from identifying will with
free will, they differentiate between those acts
of the will which are necessitated and those
which are free.
It would appear from this sampling of con-
flicting opinions that the issue concerning free
will presupposes, and often conceals, diverse
theories of the will-different conceptions of
its nature, its various acts, and its telationto
other faculties. Those who affirm andthose who
deny the will's freedom of action hardly meet
on that issue if they proceed from different con-
ceptions of what the will is and how it operates.
The matter is further complicated by differ-
ent conceptions of freedom. Even those who
define will in somewhat similar terms conceive
its liberty differently. As the chapter on LIB-
ERTY indicates, freedom has many meanings-
theological, Inetaphysical, psychological, moral,
natural, and civil. What is called free in one of
these senses may not be so regarded in another.
But one thing is clear. If, as Hobbes thinks, the
only sense in which freedom can be affirmed is
that of natural or sense in
which a man can do what he wills \vithout re-
straint or compulsion-then the will is not free,
for its freedom depends on how its own acts are
LASSALLE. What Is Capital?
l\1ENGER. Grundsiitze der Volksulirtschaftslehre
RUSKIN. Munera Pulveris
JEVONS. The Theory of Political Economy
--. Money and the Mechanisln of Exchange
BAGEHOT. The Postulates ofiEnglish Political Econ-
olny
L. H. MORGAN. AncientSociety
GEORGE. Progress and Poverty
T. H. GREEN. The Principles of Political Obligation
(M) )
HOWELLS. The Rise of Silas Lapham
S. BUTLER. Note-Books
FRAZER. The Golden Bough, PART v
A.MARSHALL. Principles of Econolnics
J. N.KEYNES. The Scope and Method of Political
Economy
HAUPTMANN. The Weavers
KROPOTKIN. Anarchism
B.ERNS;rEIN. Evolutionary Socialism
J. B. CLARK. The Distribution of Wealth
,VEBER. The Protestant Ethic andthe Spirit ofCapital-
ism, CH 2,5
SINCLAIR. The Jungle
PEGUY. Basic Verities (Destitution and Poverty;
Socialism and the Modern World)
DEWEY and TUFTS. Ethics, PART III, CH 22-25
W. C. MITCHELL. Business Cycles
T. VEBLEN. The Theory ofthe Leisure Class
--. The Place of Science in Modern Civilization,
PP 5
6
-45
6
_.-. The Instinct of Workmanship, and the State of
the Industrial Arts, CH 5
HAMSUN. Growth ofthe Soil
DEWEY Reconstruction in Philosophy, CH 8
UNDSET. Kristin Lavransdatter
TAWNEY. The Acquisitive Society
--. Religion. and the Rise of Capitalism
SHAW. Widowers' llouses
--. Major Barbara
--". The Intelligent Woman's Guideto Socialsm and
Capitalism
BEVERIDGE. Unemployment
BERLE and MEANS. The Modern Corporation and
Private Property
E. CHAMBERLIN. The Theory of Monopolistic Com-
petition
MARITAIN. Freedom in the Modern World, APPEN
DIX I
F ANFANI. Catholicism, Protestantism and Capitalism
BELLOC. The Restoration of Property
A. R. BURNS. The Decline of Competition
J. M. KEYNES. A Treatise on Money
--. The General Theory of Employment, Interest
and Money
GILL. Work and Property
STEINBECK. The Grapes of Wrath
VON NEUMANN and MORGENSTERN. TheorY(j)f
Games and Economic Behavior
1070
HU1-fE. Interest
--.OfMoney
--. Of Refinement in the Arts
-.-.. Of Taxes
A. SMITH. Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and
Arms
J. S. MILL. Principles of Political Economy
--. Socialisn2
DOSTOEVSKY. A Raw Youth
11ARX. The Poverty of Philosophy, CH I, 2 (3-4)
--. A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy
--. Critique ofthe Gotha Programme
ENGELS. Herr Eugen Duhring's Revolution in Science,
PART II-III
--. The Origin ofthe Family, Private Property and
the State
II.
LANGLAND. Piers Plowman
BIEL. Treatise on the Power and Utility of Moneys
T. MORE. Utopia, BK I
LUTHER. On Trading and Usury
CALVIN. Institutes of the Christian Religion, BK III,
CH 10
T. WILSON. A Discourse upon Usury
MUN. A Discourse of Trade
MOLIERE. L'avare (The Miser)
MANDEVILLE. Ine Fable ofthe Bees
FRANKLIN. Poor Richard's Almanack
VOLTAIRE. "Commerce," "Money," "Property,"
in A Philosophical Dictionary
LESSING. Minna von BarnhelJn
TURGOT. Reflections on the Formation and
tion ofthe Riches
CRABBE. The Village
BENTHAM. Defence of Usury
MALTHUS. An Essay on Population
SOUTHEY. Essays, Moral and Political, IV
RICARDO. The Principles of Political Econ01ny and
Taxation
J. MILL. Elements of Political Economy
BALZAC. Eugenie Grandet
--. Old Goriot
--. The Rise and Fall of Cesar Birotteau
COURNOT. Researches into the Mathematical Princi-
ples ofthe Theory of Wealth
GOGOL. Dead Souls
PROUDHON. What Is Property?
--. The Philosophy of Misery
BASTIAT. Economic Sophisms
--. Harmonies of Political Economy
THOREAU. Walden
DICKENS. Oliver Twist
---. Great Expectations
LESLIE. The Love of Money
VVHEWELL.The Elements ofMorality, BK IV, CH 3-4;
BK VI, CH 3
--. Six Lectures on Political Economy
THE GREAT IDEi\S CHAPTER 100: \VILL 1072
intervention of a determination or a desire to
translate thought into deed. PIato, in the Re-
public, divides the soul into three parts, of
,,,hich one, reason, is the facul ty of thought and
knovdedge, and the other tvvo, spirit and appe-
ti te, are principles of action. Both spirit and
appetite need to be guided and ruled by reason
but, according to Plato, reason depends also
upon spirit, for \vithout its support even \vis-
dom must fail to influence conduct. Though he
does not use. the ,vord, the role he assigns to
spiri t as the auxiliary of reason corresponds to
the function perfonned by ,,,hat later ,vriters
call "will."
The \vord '\vill" appears in the English trans-
lation of i\ristotle. It is used less frequently
than other words-such as "wish," "choice,"
"purpose," "impulse," "appetite," "desire"-
to designate a lTIotivating force, but along \"ith
them it signifies the factor \vhich turns thought
into action. Unlike Plato, who separates spirit
and appetite, Aristotle makes appetite thege-
neric notion, and treats will and desire as modes
of appetite. But sometimes "desire" is used as
a synonym for "appetite," and sometimes
"wish" or "choice" is substituted for '\vill."
In his treatise On the Motion of Animals, we
find Aristotle saying that "the living creature
is moved by intellect, purpose, wish, and appe-
tite. All these are reducible to mind and desire.
For both imagination and sensation have this
much in cornmon with mind, that all three are
faculties of judgment. However, will, impulse,
and appetite are all three forms of desire,
while purpose belongs both to intellect and to
desire." But in the treatise On the Soul, we find
him insisting that appetite be considered as the
single "faculty of originating local movelnent,"
though if the soul were to be divided into a ra-
tional and an irrational part, he would assign
wish to the calculative or deliberative reason,
desire and passion to the irrational part.
"Wish," he writes, "is a form of appetite, and
when movement is produced according to cal-
culation, it is also according to \vish, but appe-
tite can originate movement contrary to calcu-
lation, for desire is also a fornl of appetite."
What is said of purpose and ,vish is also said
of choice. All three someho\v combine reason
and desire. Giving choice a'S the cause of specifi-
cally human action, and desire combined with
deliberation as the origin of choice, Aristotle
speaks of choice as "either desiderative reason
or ratiocinative desire." Lacking reason,
mals do not have choice, according to Aristotle
or for that matter wish 01 purpose either; bu;
insofar as their appetites <;lrestirred by sensation
or imagination, and the desires aroused lead to
action, animals behave voluntarily.
When the \-vords "desire" and "appetite" are
so used, not to name the generic faculty of
originating movement, but to signify a motiva-
tion different in kind from wish, purpose, or
choice, they correspond to ,,,hat Aquinas later
calls "animal appetite" or "sensitive desire."
This is for him the sphere of the emotions or
passions. He treats the impulses of fear and
anger, for example, as acts of the sensitive appe-
tite.
The kind of desire which, for Aristotle,
pends upon practical reason, Aquinas caIIs "in-
tellectual appetite" or "rational desire." Since
"will" is for him just another name for the de-
sire or appetite which is determined by reason
rather than sense, he necessarily holds that irra-
tional animals do not have \vill.
Aristotle says that "the apparent good is the
object of appetite, and the real good is the pri-
mary object of rational ,,,ish." Aquinas distin-
guishes some\vhat differently between the ob-
ject of the passions and the object of the will.
For each sort of appetite or desire, the object
takes its special character from the faculty by
which it is apprehended. sensible good, per-
ceived or imagined, stands to the sensitive ap"
petite as the intelligible good, judged by reason,
stands to the intellectual appetite or will.
In one place Aristotle differentiates between
wish and choice by saying that \ve can wish for
the impossible, \vhereas choice is always ofthings
\vithin our power. But his more usual
tion is in terillS of means and ends. end is
what \"e vvish for," he ,,,rites, "the means what
we deliberate about and choose." Aquinas also
divides the acts of the will according as they
concern lneans or ends, but where Aristotle
mentions only choice and ,,,ish, .A.quinas enu"
merates three acts of the will ,vith respect to
ends (volition, intention, and enjoyment) and
three \vith respect to means (consent, choice,
and use).
According to .Aquinas, each of these acts of the
:will responds to a distinct act of the practical
reason and, except for the \vill's last acts, each
may in turn be followed by further practical
thought. This progressive determination of the
'Will by reason goes on until the. use of means
leads to action, and action leads to the enjoy-
ment of the end accomplished. As in practical
reasoning ends come before means, so for the
will the end comes first in the order of inten-
tion; but in the order of execution action begins
'With the means.
LIKE ARISTOTLE AND Aquinas, Kant and Hegel
conceive will as a faculty of desire or activity
founded upon reason, and so they attribute will,
as they attribute reason, to man alone. But both
Kant and Hegel go further and almost identify
will in its pure state \vith. reason.
"The faculty of desire," writes Kant, "in so
far as its inner principle of determination as the
ground of its liking or predilection lies in the
reason of the subject, constitutes the will"; and
he goes on to say that the will, "in so far as it
may determine the voluntary act of choice ...
is the practical reason itself." Only man can
claim "possession of a will which takes no ac-
count of desires and inclinations,. and on the
contrary conceives action as possible to him,
nay, even necessary, which can only be done by
disregarding all desires and sensible inclina-
tions."
In this last statement,I(ant seelns to use the
word "desire" in a sense which is opposed to
will. The context indicates that he has in mind
something like the distinction made by Aqui-
nas between sensitive and rational desire. This
indication is confirmed by his own distinction
between brute and human choice. "That act
which is determinable only by inclination as a
sensuous impulse or stilllulus would be irration-
al brute choice (arbitriu1n brutum). The human
act of choice, however, as human, though in
fact ajfected by such impulses or stimuli, is not
determined by them; and it is, therefore, not
pure in itself when taken apart from the ac-
quired habit of determination by reason." But,
according to Kant, the human act of choice can
be determined solely by reason. Only then is it
"determined to action by the pure wilL"
One point must be observed, to which\ve
shall subsequently return. The pure ,,,ill is for
1073
Kant a free will. "The act of choice that is
determined by pure reason," he \vrites, "is the
act of free will. ... The freedom of the act of
voli tional. choice is its independence of being
determined by sensuous impulses or stimuli.
This forms the negative conception ofthe free
\vilI. The positive conception offreedomis given
by the fact that the will is the capability ofpure
reason to be practical of itself." Insofar as pure
reason is able to become practical, that is, to
determine choices and direct action, independ-
ently of all sensuous impulses or inclinations,
that reason is in itself the pure \vil1, and that
\vill is in its very essence free.
For Hegel also, freedom is of the essence of
will. "Freedom," he writes, "is just as funda-
mental a character of the will as weight is of
bodies. Heaviness constitutes the body.and is
the body. The same is the case \vith freedom
and will, since the free enti ty is the will. Will
,,,ithout freedom is an empty word, while free-
dom is actual only as will, as subject."
Though the passions enter into the sphere of
the subjective ,vill, according to Hegel, will
transforms them. "Subjective volition-Passion
-is that which sets men in activity, that which
effects 'practical' realization." When it is occu-
pied ,vith the passions, the subjective will, He-
gel writes, "is dependent and can gratify its de-
sires only within the limits of this dependence."
The passions, however, are common to both
men and animals. animal too has in1pulses,
desires, inclinations," Hegel says, "but it has
no will and must obey its impulses if nothing
external deters it." Only man, "the wholly un-
determined, stands above his impulses and may
make them his own, put them into himself as
his own. An impulse is something natural, but
to put it into my ego depends on my will."
Hegel explains this aspect of the \vill by ref..
erence to that" element of pure indeterminacy
or that pure reflection of the ego into itself
\vhich involves the dissipation of every restric-
tion and every content either imnlediately pre-
sented by nature, by needs, desires,and im-
pulses, or given and determined by any means
\vhatever." But indetenninacy is only one mo
nlent of the will, its negative aspect. The second
moment occurs in "the transition from undif-
ferentiated indeterminacy to the differentia-
tion, determination, and positing of a deter-
THE 'GREAT IDEAS CHA.PTER 100: WILL 1075
phenomena, following according to physiologi-
calla\vs upon neural events to whichtne idea
corresponds. The willing terminates with the
prevalence of the idea.... vVe thus find that
we reach the heart of our inquiry into volition
when we ask' by what process it is that the
thought of any given object comes to prevail
stably in the mind." The answer Jamesgivesis
that it is "the essential achievement of the\vill
... to attend to a difficult object and hold it
fast before the mind. The so-doing is .the .fiat.
... Effort ofattention is thus the essentialphe-
nomenon of the wilL"
Though Freuddoes not use the ,vord "will,"
or analyze voluntary movements in ideo-motor
terms, he does attribute to what he calls "the
ego" the function which Locke and James as-
cribe to will. "In popular language," he "vrites,
"we may say that the ego stands for reason and
circumspection, while the id stands for the un-
tamed passions." To the ego is given, "the task
of representing the external world for the ia,"
and so of protecting it from destructive con-
flicts ,vith reality.
In. discharging this: function, "on behalf of
the id, the ego controls .. the path of access 4:0
motility,. but," Freud continttes, "itintetpo-
lates between desire and action theprocrastinat-
ing factor of thought, during which it makes
use of the residues of experience stored up in
memory. In this way itdethrones the pleasure-
principle, which exerts undisputed sway over
the processes in the id, and substitutes forit the
reali ty-principle, which promises greater securi-
ty and greater success."
As THE PROBLEM OF the will's freedom involves
the question of whether or how' its acts are
caused, so the will's action raises a pfoblem con-
cerning ho\v it causes the ." voluntary effects. it
produces. In Locke's view, we are equally at a
loss to explain how one hoay moves another
and how aUf own bodies aremoved by our ,viII.
"The passing of motion out of one body into
another," he thinks, "is as obscure and incon-
ceivable as how our minds move or stop our
bodies by thought;; which we every mOlnent
find that they do."
If we could "explain this and make it intelli-
gible,"Locke says in another place,. "then the
next step would be to understand creation."
"deter11lines the will to the successive
,tiary actions. " And' though Locke speaks of\vill-
iog as if it were an act of thought, he distin-
guishes between the mind's power of under-
standing and of willing.. 1'he one isa passive,
the other is an active power. Understanding or
,tt'erceptivity is "a power to receive ideas or
thoughts"; will or motivity is the "power to
threct the operative faculties to motion or rest/'
In this.conception of the will as the power the
mind has to control the faculties, or the mo-
tions of the body, which can. be voluntarily
exercised, Locke, like I-Iobbes before him and
William James after, explains the will's action
in terms of thinking of the motion to be per-
forllledor the deed to be done. Discussing the
tlleoryof what he calls "ideo-motor action,"
James says that "a supply of ideas ofthe various
movements that are possible, left in themem-
ory by experiences. of their involuntary
formance, is thus the first prerequisite of the
voluntary life." Reflexive or other innately de-
termined movements do not depend upon con-
sciousness of the movement to. be
f-fhatis why. "voluntary movement must .. be,
secondary, not primary functions of our organ-
ism"; or as he says in another place,' the action
which.. is.. performed .voluntarily' 'must . Defore
that, at least once, have .beenimpulsive orre-
flex." ,
The kind of idea which initiates; a voluntary
movement. James calls a "kinaesthetic image"
---an image' of the sensations. which will be
perienced when the fl1.0Vement takes place. "In
perfectly simple voluntary acts," he writes,
"there is nothing else in the mind but the kin-
aesthetic image, thus defined, of what the act
is to be." In certain cases, however, there must
be "an additional mental antecedent, in the
shape ofa fiat, decision, consent, volitionalman-
date .... before the movement canfollow." This
becomes necessary' .\vhen contrary kinaesthetic
images vie with one another to initiate antag-
onistic movements. "The express fiat, or act of
mental consent to the movement, comes in when
the neutralization of the antagonistic and. in-
hibitory idea is required.
"With the prevalence, once there as a fact,
of the motive idea," James goes Oll, "thepsy-
chology of volition properly stops. The move-
ments which ensue are exclusively physiological
untary .movements, Harvey's. distinction
tween natural and animal motions, or I-Iohbes'
distinction between vital and anima!;motiollst;'
"There be inanimals, "fi'Hobbes writes, "two
sorts of motions peculiar to them: onecaUetl
vital ... such as are the course of the blood,t:ne
pulse, the breathing, the concoction,'
excretion, etc.; to which motions there' neeCls
no help of imagination. The other is animal mo'"
tion, otherwise called voluntary motion, as togo,
to speak, to move any of our limbs, in sucn
manner as is first fancied in our minds.... Be-
cause going, speaking, and the like volunta:ry
motions, depend always upon a precedent
thought of whither, which way, and what, it is
evident that the imagination is the first internal
beginning of aU voluntary motion."
But the imagination, according to Hobbes,
gives rise to voluntary motions througharous-
ing desire or appetite. When desires and
sions,hopes and fears, alternately succeed one
another, what Hobbes means by "deliberation"
takes place; and, he declares, "in deliberation
the last appetite or aversion, immediatelyacJ."
hering to the action, or to the omission thereof,
is that which we call Will, the act (not the fac-
ulty) of willing. And beasts that have delibera-
tion must necessarily also have wilL The defini-
tion of the will given commonly by the Schools,
that it is a 1-ationalappetite, is not good. ForiE
it were, then could there be no voluntary act
against reason. For a voluntary act is that which
proceedeth from the will, and no otl)er."
Locke disagrees with Hobbes' view that will-
ing is an act of desire. "That the will is perfectly
distinguished from. desire," he thinks, may be
seen in the fact that desire "may have a quite
contrary tendency from that which our wills
set us upon." Desire, according to Locke, "is
an uneasiness of the mind for want of some ab-
sent good"; whereas will is the "pavver to begin
or forbear, continue or end, the several actions
of our minds, and motions of our bodies, barely
by a thought or preference of the mind order'"
ing or, as it were, commanding the doing or not
doing, such or such a particular action.... The
actual exercise of that power, by directing any
particular action or its forbearance, is that whicll
we call vali tion or willing."
Though volition is not an act of desire, l ..ocke
holds that it is the uneasiness of desire whicfll
1074
minacy as a content and object." Both of;these
moments are partial, each the negation. of the
other. ','The indeterminate will," in Hegel's
opinion, is "just as one-sided as<the,wHl,rooted
in sheer determinacy. What is properly called
the will includes in ,itself both the p.ueceding
moments."
As the unity of both these moments, the will
"is particularity reflected into itself and so
brought back to universality, i.e., it is individ-
uality. It is," Hegel continues, "theself-de-
termination of the ego, which means that at one
and the same time the ego posits itself as its
o,vn negative, i.e., as.restricted and detern1i-
nate, and yet remains by itself, i.e., in its self-
identity and universality." While the two pre--
vious moments of the will are "through and
through abstract and one-sided," the third
moment gives us the individual will and free-
dom in the concrete. "Freedom lies neither in
indeterminacy nor indeterminacy; it is both of
these at once.... Freedom is to will something
determinate, yet'in this determinacy to be
by oneself and to revert once more to the uni-
versal."
IN THE TRADITION OF THE great books, other
,vriters place the essence of the will not in its
freedom, but in its being the cause of the volun-
tary acts performed by animals and men. The
students of physiology from Aristotle to WlI-
Iiam James distinguish the movements of the
various bodily organs-the heart, the lungs, the
organs of digestion, excretion, andreproduc-
tion-from those movements of the whole ani-
malar of its members which are somehow based
upon desire and imagination or thought.
Aristotle sometimes calls these physiological
changes "non-voluntary" and sometimes "in-
voluntary," though he has another meaning for
"involuntarv" when he describes the conduct
of a man, fear, to do something
contrary to his wishes, e.g., the captain \vho
throws his cargo overboard to save his ship.
completely non-voluntary motion is one which
occurs quite apart from any. knowledge of the
end, or \vithout conscious desire, whereas the
involuntary involves some conflict of desires.
When the involuntary in this special senseis
not considered, only a twofold division is made,
as in James' distinction between reflex and vol-
THE GREAT IDEAS CHAPTER 100: WILL 1076
Hume agrees that "it must forever escape our
most diligent inquiry" how "the motion of our
body follows upon the command of our will."
That it does, he says, "is a matter of common
experience, like other natural events. But the
power and energy by which this is effected, like
that in other natural events, is unknown and
inconceivable. "
No less mysterious to Hume is the coming
into "existence of an idea, consequent to the
command of the will," which seems to imply a
"creative power, by whichit raises from nothing
a new idea, and with a kind of Fiat, imitates the
omnipotence of its Maker." How "this opera-
tion is performed, the power by which it is
produced," seems to him "entirely beyond our
comprehension. "
Spinoza and Descartes take a different view
of the relation between the will and the intellect
or understanding. Neither admits that the hu-
man will forms new ideas, or, as Spinoza says,
that there are "mere fancies constructed by the
free power of the will." Both conceive the will's
activity as consisting in assent or dissent to
ideas, their affirmation or negation. But be-
yond this point they part company.
For one thing, Descartes distinguishes be-
tween the will as a faculty of choice and the
understanding as a faculty of knowledge, where
Spinoza holds that "the will and the intellect
are one and the same." Since Spinoza denies
that will and intellect are anything except "the
individual volitions and ideas themselves," it
is more precise, he suggests, to say that the in-
dividual volition (i.e., the affirmation or nega-
tion of this idea) and the individual idea af-
firmed or denied are one and the same.
In consequence, they differ with respect to
the power of volition. Spinoza criticizes the
supposition he finds in Descartes, that "the will
extends itself more widely than the intellect,
and is therefore different from it." Whereas
Descartes thinks that "the faculty of compre-
hension which I possess ... is of very small ex-
tent and extremely limited," Spinoza says, "I
am conscious of a .will so extended as to be sub-
jeer to no limits." We can affirm or deny much
more than \ve can know with certitude.
This difference between Spinoza and Des-
cartes reveals itself most strikingly in their con'"
ception of God's will. According to Descartes,
the omnipotence of God lies in the supremacy
of his will-in its absolute independence even
with respect to the divine intellect. "It is self-
contradictory that the willti'0f God should not
have been from eternity indifferent to all that
has come to pass or ever \vill occur.... Thus,
to illustrate, God did not will . . . the three
angles of a triangle to be equal to two right
angles because he knew that they could not be
otherwise. On the contrary ... it is because he
willed the three angles of a triangle to be neces-
sarily equal to two right angles that this is true
and cannot be otherwise." Against Descartes'
voluntarism, Spinoza declares it absurd to say
that "God could bring it about that it should
not follow from the nature of a triangle that its
three angles should be equal to two rightangles."
Such different conceptions of the will or of its
power necessarily lead to opposite conclusions
concerning free will-in man or God. The hu-
man mind, according to Spinoza, "cannot be
the free cause of its own actions." In each of its
volitions, as in each of its ideas, it is determined
by a cause. The supposition of an infinite will
in God does not exempt that will from the need
to be determined in its acts; nor can God "on
this account be said to act from freedom ofwill."
Yet Spinoza also affirms that "God alone is a
free cause, for God alone exists and acts from
the necessity of his own nature." Freedom does
not reside in the will, nor in the absence of ne-
cessity or causal determination, but rather in
self-determination. It does not consist in choice,
but in the absence of compulsion by causes
which lie outside one's own nature. Hence only
an infinite being-a causa sui in Spinoza's sense
-can be free.
Descartes, on the other hand, places freedom
in the will and identifies it with the power of
choice. "The faculty of will," he writes, "con-
sists alone in our having the power of choosing
to do a thing or choosing not to do it ... or
rather it consists alone in the fact that in order
to affirm or deny, pursue or shun, those things
placed before us by the understanding, we act
so that we are unconscious that any outside
force constrains us in so doing." Descartes seems
to conceive the will as cause of itself in its acts
of choice. But he does not attribute to the hu-
man will the autonomy Spinoza ascribes to God.
"The knowledge of the understanding,"he
wri tes, "should always precede the determina-
tion of the will"; and in another place he says
that "our will impels us neither to follow after
110r to flee from anything, except as our under...
standing represents it as good or evil."
In order to be free, Descartes explains, "it is
not necessary that I should be indifferent as to
the choice of one or the other of two cantraries;
but contrari\vise the more I lean to the one-
"vhether I recognize clearly that the reasons of
the good and the true are to be found in it, or
,vhether God so disposes my inward thought-
the more freely do I choose and embrace it."
The \vill always retains "the po\ver of directing
itself to\vards one side or the other apart from
any determination by the understanding." The
human will is, in this sense, always undeter-
mined from without, though it is not ahvays
indifferent to the alternatives confronting it.
It is indifferent, Descartes holds, only when a
man "does not know what is the more true or
the better, or at least when he does not see
clearly enough to prevent him from doubting
about it. Thus the indifference which attaches
to human liberty is very differentfrom that
which belongs to the divine."
THE DENIAL OF FREE WILL in the tradition of
western thought seems to follow from the prin-
ciple that every happening must have a cause.
In the sphere of human conduct, voluntary acts
are no less determined effects of prior causes
than involuntary acts. Though both are equally
necessitated, the difference between the volun-
taryand the involuntary, according to Hobbes,
Locke, and Hume, consists in the fact that
when a man acts voluntarily, he does what he
himself has decided to do.
The fact that his decision to act in a certain
way is itself caused, does not, in the opinion of
these writers, abolish the freedom of his action,
but only the freedom of his vvill. If freedom is
attributed not to a man's will, but to the man
who can do what he wills, then, these writers
think, there is no conflict between freedom and
necessity-or between freedom and the uni-
versal reign of causality. For them freedom is
abridged only by external forces which coerce a
man to act contrary to his wishes or constrain
him from acting as he \vills. Freedom in this
sense is incompatible only \vith exterior com-
1077
pulsion, not with the inner causal determination
of every act of the will.
To those whodeny free will, it does not seem
to be an entirely satisfactory answer to say, as
Descartes does, that we are immediately con-
scious of our. freedom of choice. In the Third
Set of Objections, urged by Thomas Hobbes
against Descartes, Objection XII (which is di-
rected against Medi tation IV wherein Descartes
discusses free will) contains this statement: "\Ve
must note here also that the freedom of the will
has been assumed without proof, and inopposi-
tion to the opinion of the Calvinists." In reply-
ing, Descartes merely repeats his original state'"
ment of the evidence for free will.
"I made no assumption concerning freedom,"
he writes, ",vhich is not a matter of universal
experience. Though there are many who, look-
ing to the divine foreordination, cannot con-
ceive how that is compatible with liberty on
our part, nevertheless no one, when he con-
siders himself alone, fails to experience that to
will and to be free are the same thing (or rather
that there is no difference between \vhat is vol-
untary and what is free)." To Gassendi who, in
another set of objections, also denies "the in-
determinateness of the \vill," Descartes replies:
"These matters are such that anyone ought to
experience them in himself rather than be con'"
vinced of them by ratiocination. ... Refuse
then to be free, if freedom does not please you;
I at least shall rejoice in my liberty, since lex-
perience it in myself, and you have assailed it
not \vith proof but with bare negations merely."
The experience of free will is no proof either,
the opponents reply, for the experience is open
to the suspicion that it is illusory rather than
real. It may be, Hume suggest, only "a false
sensation or seeming experience which we have
... of liberty or indifference in many of our
actions." We suffer this illusion, even foist it
upon ourselves, he further suggests, because we
are motivated by "the fantastical desire ofshew-
ing liberty." In the same vein, Freud later dis-
counts objections to the determinismofpsycho-
analysis. on the part of those who refuse to rec-
ognize the hidden causes which control their
actions. "You have an illusion of a psychicfree'"
dom within you which you do not want to give
up," he says. But this "deeply rooted belief in
psychic freedom and choice" must be given up
THE -- GREAT IDEAS
CHAPTER 100: WILL 1078
because it "is quite unscientific.... It must
give way before the claims ofa determinism
which governs even mental life."
THE DILEl\.1MA OF FREE WILL or determinism
does not seem to other writers to be so easily
resolvable. "All theory is against the freedom
of the will," says Dr. Johnson; "all experience
for it." Tolstoy states the dilemma in similar
terms. "Regarding man as a subject of observa-
tion" -by the rational- methods of the sciences,
Tolstoy writes, "we find a general law of neces-
sity to which he (like all that exists) is subject.
But regarding him from within ourselves as
what we are conscious of, we feel ourselves to be
free. This consciousness is a source of self-cogni-
tion quite apart from and independent of rea-
son. -Through his reason man observes himself,
butoniy through consciousness does he kno\v
himself.... You say: I am not free. But I have
lifted my hand and let it fall. Everyone under-
stands that this illogical reply -is an irrefutable
demonstration of freedom. That reply is the
expression of a consciousness that is not subject
to reason."
Theproblemcannot be solved, Tolstoy thinks,
by ignoringone side of the question. To do that
is to put the problem "on a level on which the
question itself cannot exist. In our -time," Tol-
stoy continues, "the majority of so-called ad-
vanced people-that is, the crowd of ignora-
muses-have taken the work of the naturalists
who deal with one side of the question for a
solution of the whole problem." But to admit
that "from the point of view of reason man is
subject to the law of necessity ... does not ad-
vance by a hair's breadth the solution of the
question, which_has another, opposite, side,
based on the consciousness of freedom.' , Not
only does this "unshakable, irrefutable con-
sciousness of freedom, uncontrolled by experi-
ment or argument" constitute for Tolstoy "the
other side of the question," but it is also for him
that "without which no conception of man is
possible. "
William James takes a somewhat different
viewof the dilemma of free will or determinism.
Conceiving the act of free will-in_ terms of the
exertion of an effort on our part which is not
determined by its object, James is willing to ad-
mit t h ~ our consciousness of freedom may he a
delusion. "Even in .effortlessvolition we have
the consciousness of the alternative being also,
possible. This is surely a delusion here," -he
writes; "why is it not a delpsion everywhere?"
Hence it seems to him that "the question of
free will--is insoluble on strictly psychological
grounds."
But if the existence of free will cannot me
proved from experience, neither, in his opinion,
can determinism be scientifically demonstratecl.
"The most that any argument can do for deter-
minism," he says, "is to make ita clear and se"
ductive conception, which a man is foolish not
to espouse, so long as he stands by the great
scientific postulate that the world must be one
unbroken fact, and that prediction of all things
without exception must be ideally, if not ac-
tually, possible." For those who accept this
postulate, "a little fact like effort can form no
real exception to the overwhelming reign of
deterministic law."
Yet it remains a postulate, and postulation is
not proof. Furthermore, there is "a moral pos-
tulate about the Universe ... which would leacl
one to espouse the contrary view ... the pos-
tulate that what ought to be can be, and that bad
acts cannot be fated, but that good ones must be
possible in their place." As scientific law and pre-
diction -seem to call for the postulate of deter-
minism, so moral responsibility and the genuine-
ness of moral options seem to demand free will.
Hume recognizes that "it may be said ...
that, if voluntary actions be subjected to the
same laws of necessity with the operations of
matter, there is a continued chain of necessary
causes, pre-ordained, and pre-determined,
reaching from the original cause of all to every
single volition of every human creature." But
he does not think that the assertion of "no con-
tingency anywhere in the universe; no indif-
ference; no liberty," requires us to give up our
notions of moral responsibility, and to abstain
from making judgments of praise or blame con-
cerning human actions. "The mind of man is-so
formed by nature," he writes, "that, upon the
appearance of certain characters, dispositions,
and actions, it immediately feels 'the sentiment
of approbation or blame. The characters which
engage our approbation are chiefly such as o n ~
tribute to the peace and security of human so"
ciety; as the characters which excite blame are
chiefly such as tend to public detriment and
disturbance. "
In Hume's opinion, "remote and uncertain
speculations" concerning the causation of h u ~
man character or conduct, or concerning the
general structure of the universe, do not affect
"the sentiments ,vhich arise from the natural
and immediate view of the objects.... vVhy
should not the acknovvledgen1ent of a real dis-
tinction between vice and virtue," he asks, "be
reconcileable to all speculative systems of phi-
losophy, as well as that of a real distinction be-
tween personal beauty and deformity ?" James
takes the exactly opposite view. A doctrine of
necessity or determinism is for him incompat-
ible with llloral responsibility, or with the dis-
tinction between virtue and vice. Holding that
free "vill is indispensable to the moral life,
James chooses -"the alternative of freedom." In
doing so he confesses that"the grounds of his
opinion are ethical rather than psychological."
He does go one step further into what he calls
"the logic of the question." Since postulation is
not proof-since a postulate is not an undeni-
able axiom but an expression of what James else-
where calls "the will to believe"-thekind of
dilemma which is formed by conflicting postu-
lates can be resolved only by the exercise offree
choice. The alternatives of free will and deter-
minislll constitute that kind ofdilemnia for
James, and so it seems to him quite properthat
the first act offree will should be to believe in
free will.
"\Vhen scientific and moral postulates war
thus with each other," he writes,"andobjec'-
tive proof is not to be had, the only course is
voluntary choice, for skepticism itself, if sys-
tematic, is also voluntary choice." Hence belief
in free will "should be voluntarily chosen from
amongst other possible beliefs-. Freedom's first
deed should be to affirm itself. \Ve ought never
to hope for any other method of getting at the
truth if indeterminism be a fact. Doubt of this
particular truth will therefore probably heopen
to us to the end of time, and the utlllOSt that a
believer in free will can ever do \vill be to show
that the deterministic arguments are not coer-
cive. That they are seductive," James concludes,
"I am the last to deny; nor do I deny that effort
may be needed to keep the faith in freedom,
when they press upon it, upright in the mind."
1079
IN THE TRADITION OF THE great books, not all
,vho affirm free will think that to do so requires
them to deny the universal reign of causality
in nature; nor do-they base their affirmation on
our -illlmediate consciousness of free choice or
Inake it an act of faith---,.a pragmatic postulate.
Kant, for example, explicitly disclaims that free-
dom is a matter of faith. "It is the only one of
all- the ideas of pure reason," he says, '\vhose
object isa matter of fact." This means for him
that its objective reality can be proved. In con-
trast, "the existence of God and the immortali-
ty of the soul are matters offaith," by which
Kant fi1eans- that they must be postulated -by
the practical reason as conditions necessary for
the conceivability of the summum honU1n which
the moral law commands us to seek.
In order to understand Kant's proof of free-
dom, it is necessary to remember that he con'"
ceives the -freedom of the \vill in terms -- of -its
autonomy, and its autonomy in terms of the
fact that- the practical reason, with which -the
pure ,,,ill is identical, legislates for itself in pro-
claiming, and. obeys only itself in upholding,
the moral law. "Autonomy of the will," he
vvrites, "is that property of it by which it is a
law unto itself.... Now the idea of freedom is
inseparably connected with the conception of
autono/ny, and this again -with the universal
principle of morality." The moralla\v, Kant
goeson,"expressesnothing else than the auton'"
omy of the pure practical reason, "and "this
self-legislation of the pure and, therefore, prac-
tical reason is freedom in the positive sense."
In saying that "a free will and a will subject
to moral laws are one and the same," ,Kant
thinks that he may be suspected of circular rea-
soning, in that he appears to Inake freedom a
condition of morality and at the same time to
infer freedom from the existence of the moral
law. There is no question that for him freedom
"must be the foundation of all moral laws and
the consequent responsibility." But, he ex-
plains, no inconsistency results from calling
"freedom the condition of the lllorallaw" and
also lllaintaining that "the moral law is the con-
dition under which we can .first become con-
scious of freedom," if it be understood that
"freedom is the ratio essendi[ground ofbeingJof
the moral law, while the moral law is theratz'o
cognoscendi [ground of kno,ving] of freedom."
THE GREAT IDEi\S
CHAPTER 100; vVILL
1081
ed by reason as an evil or lackincr in any wa
, b y.
Consequently man wills happiness of necessity,
nor can he \vill not to be happy, or to be un-
happy. No,v since choice is not of the end, but
?f the it is not of the perfect good, which
IS happIness, but of particular goods. Therefore,
man. not of necessity, but freely."
.LIke AqUInas, Locke holds that "to be deter..
?,Y our own judgment is no restraint to
lIberty. But ,vhere Locke thinks the "const t
d
.. an
eterminaHon to a pursuit of happiness
b
'd ' no
a n gment of liberty," Aquinas holds that b
e
-
"man wills happiness of necessity," his
'VI11 IS not free in the volition of its natural end.
Yet Locke does lTlention the case '\vherein a
man is at Ii berty in respect of \villing"- the
case in which "a man may suspend the act of his
choice from being determined for or against the
thing proposed, till he has examined ,,,hether it
be really of a nature in itself and consequences
to make him happy or not."
In this type of case Aquinas Ioeates ,vhat is
peculiar to the causality of freedoln. Sometimes
the judgment of reason is detennined by its
object, as when it contemplates the final end of
actions. But "Then it deliberates about alterna-
tive means (which are both particular and con-
tingent), reason can judge either way. What
determines it to judge this way rather than
that? Aquinas' answer is that such judgments
of the reason are voluntary, in contrast to rea-
son's involuntary assent to self-evident truths,
\vherein it is determined entirely by the object
being considered. But if a voluntary judgment
is one in which the will detennines the reason's
assent, and if reason's judgments concerning
means are voluntary in this sense, then the act
of the reason which causes the will's act of
choice is itself an act caused by the will. The
will's choice is, therefore, not uncaused; but,
as Aquinas conceives it, the vvay in which it is
caused makes it self-determining, and to this
extent free.
THE GENERAL THEORY OF the will figures most
prominently in the theology of Aquinas and in
the philosophy of Kant and Hegel. They not
only present the most elaborate analyses of its
nature and its relation to reason but, in the
tradition of the great books, they are the most
stalwart defenders of its freedofl1. Their differ--
operation. It is ahvays moved by the reason,
even in its acts of choice, and so these acts,
wherein the will is free, are also caused.
\Vhere Kant identifies will wi th free will
(\vhich implies that the will is free in all its acts),
Aquinas distinguishes between those acts of the
will which are necessitated and those ,vhich are
free. He quotes Augustine to the effect that
"natural necessity does not take away the lib-
erty of the will," for that liberty exists only in
the will's choice of means, not in its voli tion of
the end. "Just as the intellect naturally and of
necessi ty adheres to first principles," Aquinas
explains, "so the will adheres to the last end."
And just as the intellect assents of necessi ty to
those "proposi tions which have a necessary con-
nection with first principles, namely, demon..
strable conclusions," so the will adheres of ne-
cessity only to those things "which have a nec-
essary connection wi th happiness." Wi th regard
to all else-the whole realm of particular goods
which are merely contingent means-the will
is not necessi tated, and so its choice among
them is free.
Although Aquinas says that unless man has
free choice,' 'counsels, .exhortations, commands,
prohibitions, re,vards and punishments would
be in vain," he does not postulate free will as
an indispensable condition of moral conduct.
Rather he shows how reason in causing the will's
choices at the same time leaves them free. "The
root of liberty," he writes, "is the will as the
subject thereof, but it is the reason as its cause.
For the will can tend freely to,vards various
objects precisely because the reason can have
various perceptions of good." When, for exam-
ple, "the deliberating reason is indifferently dis-
posed to opposite things, the will can be in-
clined to ei ther. " The freedom of the \vill's
choice ,,,ith respect to particular means thus
lies in the fact that, with respect to all con-
tingent matters, "the judgment of reason may
follow opposite courses, and is not determinate
to one."
"Inall particular goods," .A.quinas writes, "the
reason can consider an aspect of some good and
the lack of some good? ,vhich has the aspect of
e.vil; and in this respect it can apprehend any
SIngle one of such goods as something to be
chosen or to be avoided. The perfect good
alone, which is happiness, cannot be apprehend-
THE APPARENT CONFLICT BETWEEN freedom
and nature arises for Kant because he conceives
the act of free will to be absolutely spontaneous.
It is as uncaused as the swerve of the atoms
(discussed in the chapter on CHANCE) on which
Lucretius bases the existence of free will. There
is another conception of freedom that does not
attribute to free will any special character which
brings it into conflict with ordinary causality.
It does not belong tcj) liberty, Aquinas thinks,
that '''vhat is free should be the first cause of
itself." Not only is God the ultimate cause of
what a lnan freely chooses to do, as He is the first
cause of every natural event, but the will as a
natural faculty of man never moves itself to
mena. "The notion ofa being that has free ,viII,"
,vrites Kant, "is the notion ofa causa 1l0umenon"
-of a cause which does not operate under the
temporal conditions of causality. "The
notion of causality as physical necessity . .. con-
cerns only the existence of things so far as it is
determinable in tirlle and, consequently, as phe-
nomena, in opposition to their causali ty as things
in themselves."
To remove "the apparent contradiction be-
tween freedom and the mechanism of nature in
one and the same action, \ve must remember ...
that the necessity of nature, which cannot co-
exist with the freedom of the subject, appertains
only to the attributes of the thing that is sub-
ject to time-conditions, consequently only to
those of the acting subject as a phenomenon.
... But the very same subject," Kant contin-
ues, "being on the other side conscious of him-
self as a thing in himself, considers his existence
also in so jar as it is not subject to time-conditions,
and regards himself as only determinable by
la\vs which he gives hilnself through reason."
In the latter mode of supersensible existence,
man exercises the causality of a free will. He is
not in any way subject to the natural necessity
which governs all physical things. Yet the t,vo
worlds-the moral world of freedom and the
physical ,vorld of necessity-meet in the same
act. "The rational being," Kant explains, "can
justly say of every unlawful action that he per-
forms, that he could very well have left it un-
done; although as appearance it is sufficiently
determined in the past, and in this respect is
absolutely necessary."
1080
We kno\\T that our ,vi11 is free from kno,ving
the existence of the Inoral la,v.. We know that
the moralla,v exists, for other\vise reason could
never judge, as it does, that we ought to have
done ,vhat \ve did not do. It is not freedom but
the moral la\v "of \vhich ,ve become directly
conscious (as soon as we trace for ourselves max-
ims of the \vill)." T1his, Kant says, "first pre-
sents itself to us, and leads directly to the con-
cept of freedom." vVhenever a man judges that
"he can do a certain thing because he is con-
scious that he ought," then, according to Kant,
"he recognizes that he is free, a fact \vhich but
for the moralla\v he would never have known."
The freedom which Kant thinks can be di-
rectly deduced from the moral law is a very
special kind of causality. In the sensible ,vorid
of nature, each cause is in turn the effect of
some prior cause. None is the first or uncondi-
tioned cause, an uncaused cause. But for I(ant
freedom is "a faculty of absolute spontaneity"
and consists in "the unconditioned causality of
the cause ... a causality capable of producing
effects independently of and even in opposition
to the power of natural causes, and capable,
consequently, of spontaneously originating a se-
ries of events."
Ho\v are these two modes ofcausali ty-which
Kant calls "the causality of nature and ofjree-
d0I11"-compatible \vith one another? To af-
firm both would appear to get us into the antin-
omy in vvhich the thesis that "causality accord-
ing to the laws of nature is not the only caus-
ali ty ... a causali ty offreedomis also necessary,"
is contradicted by the antithesis that "there is
no such thing as freedom, but everything in the
world happens solely according to the laws of
nature." Yet Kant thinks he can show that
"this antinomy is based upon a mere illusion,
and that nature and freedom are at least not
opposed."
It would be impossible, he admits, "to escape
this contradiction if the thinking subject, which
seems to itself free, conceived itself in the same
sense or in the very Sa11'le relation when it calls
itself free as \vhen in respect to the same action
it assumes itself to be subject to the la\vs of na-
ture." But the contradiction is only apparent
or illusory if man belongs to two worlds-the
sensi ble world of natural phenomena and the
supersensible vvorld ofintelligible beings or nou"
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
I. 'The existence and nature of "vill: its relation to reason or mind and to desire or emotion
2. The analysis of the power and acts of the will
2tl. The objects of the will: the scope of its povver
2b. The motivation of the will
(I) Therational determination of the will's acts by judgments concerning good
and evil or by the moral law
(2) The sensitive determination. of the will's acts by estimations of benefit and
harm, or pleasure and pain: the impulsion of the passions
PAGE
1083 CHAPTER 100: WILL
4. The divine \vill
4a. The relation of the divine "vill and intellect 1091
4
b
The freedom of the divine will: thedivine will in relation to the possible and the
impossible
2C. The acts of the \vill 1088
(I) The classification and order of the will's acts: means and ends
(2) The several acts of the will with respect to ends: their antecedents and con-
sequences
(3) The several acts of the will \vith respect to means: their antecedents and
consequences
3. The functioning of will in human conduct and thought
3a. The role of the \vill in behavior
(I) The distinction bet\veen the voluntary and the involuntary: the conditions
of voluntariness; comparison of men and animals \vith respect tovolun-
tary behavior 1089
(2) The range of pur].1osive conduct: the relation of habit and instinct to the
voluntary
3b. The role of the ,,,ill in thought 1090
(1) The distinction between knowledge and opinion in relation to the \villful in
thought: the ",rill to believe and wishful thinking
(2) The will as cause of error
(3) Religious faith as dependent on an act of will or practical reason
5. The freedom of the ,,,ill
sa. Interpretations of the meaning of free will
( I) The freedom of the will as consisting in a freely choice or
j udgment of the reason
(2) The freedom of the will as consisting in the freedom of a mahto act or
to act: freedom from external constraints orcoercions 192
(3) The freedom of the will as consisting in a totally uncaused or spontaneous
act
(4) The freedom ofthe will as the autonomy of the reason legislating for itself:
the identity of pure ,,,ill and free will
Sh. for the freedom of the will
(I) Man's immediate consciousness of his freedom of choice: reason's reflexive
knowledge of its autonomy
(2) Thefreedolll of the will as deriving from the indetern1ination of practical
reason judging particular goods
(3) The deduction of free viill from the moral la\v or from the fact of pure
practical reason
(4) Free will as a pragrnatic option: the postulation of free will as an indis-
pensable condition of moral responsibility and action
se. i\rguments against the freedom of the will: free will as a violation of the course of
nature or the reign of causality; the ilnpossibility of proving free will 1093
rationality and freedom, they do not draw the
same moral consequences from their affirmation
of free will as pivotal inhuman life.
Aquinas, like Aristotle, does not find moral
goodness only in the \tvilI. dn the contrary, tile
rectitude of the ,vill depends on the goodness 01'
the end it adheres. to and the means it chooses.;
But like the Stoics, Kant. makes the will
sole reposi tory of moral goodness.
As Epictetus says that all good and evil lie in
man's "vill, and that the morally neutral sphefc
is "in the region outside the ,vill's control," so
Kant begins his moral philosophy with the state'!'
ment, "Nothing can possibly be conceived in
the world, or even out of it, which can be callell
good \vithout qualification, except a Good Will."
In his view, "a good will is good not becallse 01'
what it performs or effects, not by its aptness
for the attainment ofsome proposed end, but
simply by virtue of the volition; thatis, it;is
good in itself." In another place, he adds' that
"though not indeed the sole and complete good,"
the \vill, good in itself, "must be the supreme
good and the condition of every other, even of
the desire of happiness."
These fundamental issues concerning the will
in moral philosophy are more fully treated in
the chapter on DUTY. The problems of the ,vill
in political theory are considered in the cha].1-
ters on LAW and STATE-es].1eciallythoseprob..
lems which involve the concept of the sovereign
will and the distinction of the particular wiH
and the general will, the andtfie
will of all. The strictly theological problems
concerning God's freedom and man's freedom
in relation to God's will are also reserved for
treatment else\vhere.
THE GREAT IDEAS 1082
ences in principle and in reasoning may, how-
ever, obscure the .common ground they share.
This may be seen in their conception of free-
dom. Aquinas does not attribute autonomy or
spontaneity to the \viII. Yet in his view offree
choice as a self-determining.act of the will, there
is something analogous to Kant's autonomy;
and \vhere Kant makes the pure will essentially
free and spontaneous, ,Aquinas holds that the
\vill, with respect to \villing or not willing, is
ahvays free and inviolable. It is absolutely with-
in "the power of the will," he writes, "not to
act and not to "viIL" He does not try to explain
such freedom of exercise in the same way as
freedom of choice.
It is only with regard to the latter that
Aquinas appeals to the causal reciprocity be-
tween reason and will to show how the \vill's
act of choice can be both free and caused.
The kind of causation which Aquinas thinks
takes place in free choice-the will determining
the reason to make the practical judgment by
which it is itself determined-seems to involve
a circularity, or perhaps simultaneity, in action
and reaction. If this is possible only. because
reason and will are spiritual powers, then here
too there is some likeness to Kant's theory of
the will's action as belonging to the super-
sensible \vorld rather than to the domain of
physical movement.
On one other point, they tend to agree even
more plainly. "Free choice," writes Aquinas,
"is part of man's dignity." Man's digrlity for
Kant-his membership in what I(antcalls "the
kingdom of ends"-is "rendered possible by the
freedom of the wilL" But though they share
this opinion of the source of human dignity in
7e. Free "vill in relation to sin and salvation
(I) The freedom to sin: .Adam's freedom and the freedom of fallen human
nature
(2) The relation of freedom to grace
10. Will as a term in political theory
loa. The sovereign will: the will of the people; the will of the majority
lob. The relation of la\v to will
10C. The general ,vill, particular wills, the will of each, and the will of all
6. The analysis of the \vill's range of freedoln
6a. The limitations on the freedom of the will: the distinction between acts of the
will which are necessitated and acts of the "vill which arefree
6b. The distinction bet\veen the ,vill's freedom of exercise and the will's freedom of
choice
6c. The voluntary be?avior and behavior resulting from free
choIce: companson of men and anImals with respect to freedom
1085
PART !--II,Q 6, A 2, REP I 646a-c; A 8 650d-
651c; Q 9, A 6, ANS 662a-d; Q 10, A I 662d-
663d; Q 12, A I 669c-670b; Q 13, Al 672d-
673c; A 5, REP I 675c-676b; Q 17, A I 686d-
687c; Q 18, A 7, ANS 698c-699c; Q 19, AA 3-6
704c-708a; Q 24, A 2, ANS 727d-728c; Q26,
A I, ANS 734a-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q
50, A5 10b-d; Q62, A3, REP 1 61c-62b; Q 77,
A I 145a-d
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVII
[91-15] 79b-c; XVIII [1-75] 79d-80c esp [64-
75] 80c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 61a-c; 64a-c;
PART III, 165c; PART IV, 272a
27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT II,
SC II [51-67] 114a-b; [163-182] 115b-c; ACT
III, SC II [80-96] 121a / Othello, ACT I, SC III
[322-337] 212b-c
30 BAcoN: Advancement of Learning, 55b-d;
66c-d; 67a-b
31 DESCARTES: l'vfeditations, III, 82d-83a; IV
89a-93a / Objections and Replies, DEF I 130a;
AXIOM VII 132a; 141d; 215d-216c;228c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 31 366d-367a;
PART II, AXIOM 3 373d; PROP 391a-394d;
PART III, PROP 9, SCHOL 399c; THE AFFECTS,
DEF I, EXPL 416c-d
REFERENCES
CHAPTER 100: WILL
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For exalnple, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK II [265--283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in53 JAMES :Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. \Vhen the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
thepage. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or n10re of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, UK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265--283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follo"vs; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehelniah, 7:45-(D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intern1it-
tently rather than continuously in the "vork or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
1. The existence and nature of will: its relation
to reason or mind and to desire or emo-
tion
7 PLATO: Republic, BK IV, 350b-353c
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK IX, CH 5 [I047b
35-I048a24] 573b-c / Soul, BK III, CH 7 {43Ib2-
12] 664a-b; CH 9 [432a22-b7] 664d-665a; CH
10 [433a23-26] 666a
9 ARISTOTLE: Motion ofAnimals,cH 6 [7oobI5-
25] 235d-236a / Ethics, BK VI, CH 2 387d-
388b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 10 [I368b33-I369a4]
612a-b
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [251-
29.3] 18b-d
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, .BK II, CH 10, 148c;
149d-150a; CH 23 170a-172d
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VI, CH 4 108c-
10gb / Sixth Ennead, TR VIII 342d-353d
18 AUGUSTINE: Conftssions, BK VIII, par 19-24
58b-60a / City of God, BK lX, CH 4-5 287a-
289a; BK XIV, CH 6-9 380b-385b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A
8, ANS 82c-83b; Q19, AI, ANS and REP 2 108d-
10ge; A 2, ANS 109c-110b; Q 54, A 2, ANS
285d-286c; Q 59 Q 75, A 6, ANS
383c-384c; Q 80, A2 428a-d; Q 82 431d-436c;
Q 83, AA 3-4 438d-440b; Q 87, A 4 468b-d;
194
J095
19
6
197
19
8
199
1100
THE GREl\T IDEAS
7. The implications of free will
7a. Free will as a source of human dignity: its relation to slavery and civil liberty
7b. The factors of freedom and necessity in the philosophy of history
7e. Human freed0m in relation to the will of God: fate, predestination, and provi-
dence
7d. God the object of the human \vill: the quiescence of the will in the beatific
VISIon
8. The \vill as a factor in morality and in society
8a. The inviolability of the will: its freedom from external compulsions or cons,traints
8b. The goodness or malice of the will
(I) The conditions of the will's recti tude or disorder
(2) A good will as the exclusive or principal human good
8e. The will and virtue: justice and charity as habits of the will
8d. The will and duty: the categorical imperative
8e. The will and right: the harmony of individual \vills in external practical relations
9. Differences among men in the sphere of \vill
9a. The distinction between Inen of strong and weak will: cultivation of \vill po\ver
9b. The pathology of the will: indecision, obsession, compulsion, inhibition
1084
1087
43ge; A4, REP 3 43ge-440b; Q87, A 4468b-d;
PART I-II, Q I, A6, REP 3 614a-c;Q 3, A4, REP
3-4 625a-626b; Q8, AI, ANS and REP 3 655b-
656a; Q 9, A I 657d-658d; A 3, REP 3 65ge-
660a; A 4, ANS 660a-d; A 6, REP 2-3 662a-d;
Q12, A I, REP 1,3 66ge-670.b; A 5, ANS 672a-e;
Q 13, A I 672d-673e; A 3, ANS 674c-675a; A 5
675c-676b; Q I4 677b-681a; Q 15, A 3,ANS
682e-683b; A 4 683b-684a; Q 16, AI, REP 1
684b-d; Q I7, A S 68ge-690b; Q 19, A 3 704e-
70Sa; AS,ANS 705d-707a; A10, ANsand REP I
7l0b-711d; Q 20, A I, ANS and REP I 712a-d
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, I [I]-III [21] la-
4b;PURGATORY, XVI [52-84] 77b-d;xVIII [1-
7S] 79d-80e
27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilusand Cressida, AC'r'II,
sc II [SI-67] 114a-b; 115b-e
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning,66e-d
31 DESCARTES: Rules, I, Id-2a I Discourse, PART
III, 50b / Meditations, IV 89a-93a I Objections
and Replies, 125b-e; AXIOM VII 132a; .. 141d;
216b-c; 228e
31 SPINozA:Ethics, PART III,PROP9, SCHOL 399c;
PART IV, PROP 61 443a-b; PROP 63443d-444a;
APPENDIX, III 447b; XXXII 4S0e-d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI,
SECT 33 186a; SECT 37 187a-b; SECT 48--49
190e-191a
38 ROUSSEAU: 337d,..3:38a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 16ge-170al Fund. Prin.
Metaphysic of Morals, 264d-265b esp 265b;
271e-d; 279b,d; 282d-283b / Practical Reason,
298a-300a; 306d-307a; 318e-32tb esp319c-d
I Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 367e
/ Science of Right, 397b-398a I Judgement,
477b-e; 571e-572a; 605d-606b [En 2]
46 HEGEL: Phlosophy of Right, PART II, par 139
48d-49b;. ADDITIONS, 90-91 t30b-131d
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 310d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 796a-798b; 807a-808a
2b(2) The sensitive determination of the will's
acts by estimations of benefit and harm,
or pleasure and pain: the impulsion of
the passions
8 .A.RISTOTLE: Soul, BK III, CH 10 [433a21-31]
665d-666a; [433b5-I3] 666b; CH II [434aIO-
IS] 666d-667a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK III, CH I [IIII
a
21]-CH 2
[IIII
b
I9] 357a-e; CH 4 359a-c; BK X, CH I
[I 172al 8-27] 426a; CH 2 [1172b35-I173a41427a
/ Rhetoric, BK I,CH 10 611e-613a passim
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK VII, SECT 55
283b-e
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 6,
A 4, REP .3 647b-648a; AA 6-7 649a-650d; Q
9, A 2 658d-65ge; A 4, CONTRARY 660a-d; A
S' ANS and REP 2-3> 660d-662a; Q 10, A .3
664d-665e
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I...,II, Q
77, A I 145a-d
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, I [I)-Ill [21]
CHAPTER. 100: WILL
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR VIII,CH 1-4
342d-344d
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vIII,par 19-24
58b-60a / City of God, BK IX,CH 4-:5 287a-
289a; BK XXII, CH 2, 587b-d
19 AQUINAS: Sun1ma Theologica, PART I, Q 82,
A 4 434e-435c; PART I-II, Q 9 657d,..662d;
Q 17, A 5 68ge-690b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 64b-e
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, IV, 90b-93a / Ob-
jections and Replies, 126a-b; DEF I 130a;
AXIOM VII 132a; 228e
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 4-11 398d-
400b; PART IV, PROP 9-:19 426d-429d; PROP
63443d-444a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, .CH VII,
SECT .3 131d-132a; CH XX, SECT 6 l77a-b; CH
XXI, SECT 29-S7 184d,..193c. passim; .SECT 73
198c-19ge
42 KANT: Pure ReasOn, 164a-165e;236d-23Jal
/ Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 259a-e;
262a-e; 264d-265b; 279b,d-287d esp 282b-
283d, 284d-285a I Practical Reason, .298a-
300a; 301a; 304a-d; 315e; 318e-d; 327a-329a;
330e-331a;341e-342a I Intro. Metaphysic of
Morals, 385e-386b; 389a-390a,e I Jtidgement,
571e-572a;605d-606b [n 2] ,
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, .. par 25-26
l8a-e; PART I, par 3S 21a-h; ADDITIONS, 22
120e-d I Philosophy of History, INTRa, 166b;
PART IV, 362b-d
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 310e-d; 592b-d
53 JAMES: Psychology, esp 792b-795b,
798b-799b; 807a-814b
54 FREUD: General bltroduction, 592d-593a
2h(1) The rati()nal deterwinationof the will's
acts by judgments concerqing good and
evil or by the moral la.w
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics,BKVI,C:aS[I46b.36"I47a
II] 200d-201a / Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 7
[I072a26-29] 602b / Soul, BKIII, CH 7 [431bI-
12] 664a-b; CH 9 [43
2bI
3]-CH 10 . [433
bI8
]
665a-666e; CH IO [433b27-3o]666e-d
9 ARISTOTLE: Motion ofAnimals,cH 6 [700b1S]
-CH 7 [70Ia39] 235d-236d./ Ethics, BK III, CH
2 357b-358a; CH .3 [III3
a
3]-CH 4 [III3
bI
]
359a-e; BK VI, CH 2 387d-388b; CH 13
394b-d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 10 611e-613a pas-
SIm
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [877-891]
5Sd
14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 121b I Timoleon, 197c..
198a
17 Sxth Ennead, TR VIII, c:a 1-4
342d-344d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I,Q 6, A
I, .REP 2 28b-d; Q I9, A 7, ANS 114d-115d;
Q 2I, A I, REP 2 124b-125b;Q 27, A3,REP 3
155e-156a; Q 59, AI, REP3 306c-307b; Q 82,
A 2, ANS and REP .3 432d-433e; A 3, REP 2
433e-434e;A 4 434e-435e; Q 83, A 3 438d..
2b. The motivation of the will
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK III, CH 9 [432bI3]-CH 10
[433b30l665a-666d
9 ARISTOTLE : Ethics, BK III, CH 2':":4 357b-359c
/ Rhetoric, BK I,CH 10 [1368bI-1369b27] 61le-
613a
1086 THE GREAT IDEAS 2 to 2
(1. The existence and nature of will: its relation to 9, ANS 116d-117d; Q 20, A I, ANS and REP.3
reason or mind and to desire or emotion.) 120a-121b; Q 21, A I, REP 2 124b-125b; Q
54, A2, ANS 285d-286e; Q 59, A I, ANS and REP'
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH VI, SECT 57-63 1306e-307b; A 2 307e-308b; A 3, ANS 308b-
36d-38e passim / Hun1an Understanding, BK 309a; A 4, ANS and 2-3 309a-310a; Q 62
II, CH VI 131b-e; CH VII, SECT 3 131d-132a; A 8323e-324a; Q 75, 6,ANS 383e-384c;
CH XXI, SECT 5-6 17ge-180a; ,SECT I5181e; 82, A 2, REP 1-2 432d-433e; AA 4-5 434c-
SECT 29-48 184d-190d passim; SECT 73 198e- 436e; Q87, A4, REP 2 468b-d; Q l0S, A4, ANs
19ge; CH XXIII, SECT 18 209a; SECT 28 211b-d; 541e-542a; PART I-II, QQ 1-5 609a-643d; Q 6,
SECT 30 212a-b; BK IV, CH XIII, SECT 2 363d- A4, REP 2 647b-648a; Q9, AI, ANsand REP 3
364a 657d-658d; A 6, ANS and REP 3 662a-d; Q 10
35 BERKELEY: I-/uman Knowledge, SECT 26-28 AI, ANS and REP 3 662d-663d; A2 663d-664d:
418a-e; SECT 144 441d Q 13, A 2, ANS 673e-674e; AA 3-5 674e-676b;
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV Q18, A6 697d-698e; A7, ANS 698e-69ge; Q19,
SI-S3472b-474b A I, ANS and REP 1,.3 703b-d; A2, REP I 703d-
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338a 704e; A 3 704e-705a; A S, ANS705d-707a.
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 150e Q20, AI, ANS and REP 1-2 712a-d '
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 164a-165e esp 164b-c; 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVII
234e-236a esp 235e-d; 236d-237a / Fund. [9I]-XVIII [7S] 79b-SOc
Prin. Metaphysic of ]vforals, 256a-d; 264d- 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 87e; 93e; PART III
265a; 271e-d; 279b; 280b-e; 282d-283b; 165b-e .,
284d-285a / Practical Reason,303b-304b; 27 SHAKESPEARE: Othello, ACT I, SC III [322-337]
314a-d; 315e; 329b-e I Pref. Metaphysical 212b-'-e
Elements of Ethics, 367e / Intro. Metaphysic 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, IV 89a-93a I Objec-
of Morals, 385a-d; 386b-d / Judgement, tions and Replies, AXIOM VII 132a
483d-484b; 508d [En I] SPINOZA:Ethics,PART III, PROP 4-11 398d-
43 11ILL: Utilitarianism, 400b esp PROP 9, SCHoL39ge; PART IV, PROP
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 4 19 429d; PROP 63 443d-444a
12d-13a; par 22 17e-d; par 25-26 18a-e; ADDI- 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 8I 186b
TIONS, 17 119a; 26 121a-b; 90 130b-d I Philos- 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH
ophy of History, INTRO, 163a.. 164a; PART IV, XXI, S.ECT 5, 17ge; SECT IS ISle; SECT 4
1
362b-d 188b-e; BK IV, CH X, SECT 19 354a-e
53 JAMES: Psychology, 51a-b; 660b-661a; 767a; 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 26-
2
9
814b-820b esp 814b-8l5a, 816a-817b, 8l9a 418a-e
54FREun: Hysteria, 1IOe / Interpretation of 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VII,DIV
Dreams, 276e; 351d; 353a-b / Ego and Id, SI-53 472b-474b; DIV S8 476a-b
702e-d; 715e-d / War and Death, 760d-761a 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals,
/ New Introductory Lectures, 837b-838d esp 256a-d; 259a-b I Practical Reason, 298a-300a;
838b 304a-307d esp 304a-d; 315e; 327a-329a; 350c-
351b I Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics,
367c I Science ofRight, 397b-398a; 403b-404d
/ Judgement, 584d-585c; 605d-606b [En 2]
43 MILL: Representative Government, 331b-c /
Utilitarianism, 463e-464d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, .PART I, par 39
21d; par 41 22e-d; par 4S 23e-d; PART II, par
107 40b-e; par 19-1 I I 41a-e; ADDITIONS, 8
117e-d; 26 121a-b; 70 127b / Philosophy of
History, PART IV, 319b-320a
53 JAMES: PJychology, 660b-661a;767a-768a;
787a; 814b-819a; 830a
54 FREUD: Hysteria,110c I Ego and Id, 715c-
716a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 800d-
801a I New Introductory Lectures, 838b-839b
esp 838e-d
2. The analysis of the power and acts of the will
2a. The objects of the will: the scope of its
power
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK VI, CH 8 [I46S37-b6]
200b; [I46b36-147SII] 200d-201a / Meta..
physics, BK XII, CH 7 [I072s2J-"h4] 602b-e
I Soul, BK III, CH 7 [43Ib2-12] 664a-b; CH 10
[433
aI
J--3I ] 665d-666a; [433bS-I8] 666b-c
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK III, CH 2-4 357b-35ge;
BK VI, CH 2 387d-388b
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK III, CH 24 203e-
210a; BK IV, CH I 213a-223d
17PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR I, CH 8-10 81d-
82b / Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 3S, 177d-
178a
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VIII, par 19-24
58b-60a / City of God, BK XII, CH 8 346d-
347b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 19, A
I, REP 1-3 108d-10ge; A 3, ANS 110b-111e; A
6, REP 1-2 113e-114d; A 7, ANS 114d,..115d; A
1089
3a(2) The range of purposive conduct: the
relation of habit and instinct to the
voluntary
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK IX, CH 5 573a-c I
Soul, BK II, CH 5 [417a21-418a3] 647d-648e;
BK III, CH 4 [429bS-9] 661d
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK III, CH 5 359c-361a
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VIII, par 10-1 I
55e-56b
19 AQUINAS: Sum1na Theologica, PART I, Q 18,
A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 83, A 2, ANS 438a-d;
Q 115, A4, ANS 589d-590c; PART I-II, Q6, A 4,
REP 3 647b-648a; Q 12, A 5, ANS and REP 3
672a-c; Q 13, A2 673c-674c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q50,
A I, REP I 6a-7b; A 3 8b-9a; A 5, REP 1,,3
10b-d; Q 71, A 4, ANS and REP 3 108b-109a;
Q 94, A I, REP to CONTRARY 221a-d
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 39a-40a; 179b-e
28 HARVEY: On Anilnal Generation, 456c-458a
paSSIm
42 KANT: Fund. Prin. MetaphYJic ofMoraIs, 256d-
257a; 264d-265a; 279b,d-287d esp 282b-283d
/ Practical Reason, 316c-3I7a / Pref. Meta-
physical Elements of Ethics, 378a-b
43 MILL: Utilitarianis1n, 463c-464d
44 BOSWELL: johnson, 135c-136a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy ofRight, INTRO, par I716c;
PART I, par 41 22c-d; PART II, par 123 44a-b;
ADDITIONS, I I 1I8a; 78 128c-d
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 288b-d
3a(1) to 3a(2) CHAPTER.IOO: WILL
ANS 697d-698c; A 7, ANS 698e-69ge; Q 20 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 456e-458a
712a-716d; Q 21, A2 718a-d passlm
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 64a-e; PART IV, 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 24b-26b
272a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI,
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 55b-d; SECT 5, 179c; SECT7-I1 180a-d
67a-b 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 164a-165e esp 164b-c;
SECT 5, 179c; BK IV, CH X, SECT 19 354a-e 234c-236a esp 235c-d; 236d-237a jFund. Prin.
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV .lvfetaphysic of Morals, 264d-265a; 279b,d;
51-52 472b-473c; DIV 58 476a-b 282d-283b; 284d-285a; 286c-287d / Practical
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 169c-170a / Fund. Prin. Reason, 296a-d; 307d-314d; 331e-337a,e /
j\1etaphysic of Morals, 264d-265a; 275b; Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 386b-d / judge-
279b,d-287d esp 282b-283d / Practical Rea- ment, 587a-588a
son, 293d [fn 3]; 296a-d; 307d-314d; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART II, par 115
337a,e /lntro. Metaphysic of Morals, 383e-d; 42b-c; par 117 42c-d; par 139 48d-49b; ADDI-
385a-e / judgement, 463a-467a; 571c-572a; TIONS, 5 116d-117a; 10 117d-118a; 90 130b-d
587a-588a;607e 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 120b-c / Descent
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 72 of Man, 291b; 292e-294c passim
31c; PART II, par 115 42b-e / Philosophy of 50 MARX: Capital, 85c-d
History, INTRO, 165a-166b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XII, 548d-549d;
53 JAMES: Psychology, 291a-295a; 790a-798b esp BK XIII, 578b-579d; EPILOGUE II, 689c-690a
792a-b, 794a-795a, 797b-798a; 807a-808a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 4a-7a; 8a-b; 9a-17b esp
54 FREUD: Ego and Id, 715c-716a / New Introduc- 11b-12a, 13a-14b, 17a-b; 47b-52b esp 49a-b,
tory Lectures, 838b 51a-52a; 71b [fn I]; 269a-274a esp 272a-273a;
291a-295a esp 293a, 294b-295a; 704a-
706b; 767b-790a esp 767b-768a, 790a; 827a-
835a esp 827b
54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-
Analysis, 13a-e / General Introduction, 454b-
476a,c passim, esp 473b-d
3a(1) The distinction between the voluntary
and the involuntary: the conditions of
voluntariness; comparison of men and
aninlals with respect to voluntary be-
havior
7 PLATO: Laws, BK IX, 746a-748d
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK V, CH 5 [10158
27-
b
3] 535d;BK IX, CH 5 573a-e / Soul, BK III,
CH 9-11 664d-667a
9 ARISTOTLE : Motion of Animals, CH I I 239a-d
/ Ethics, BK III, CH'I [II09b30]-CH 2 [IIIlb9]
355b,d-357b; CH 5 359c-361a; BK V, ClI 8
[113SaI5]-CH 9 [II36bI 4] 383a-384d; BK VI, CH
2 [II39aI7-2I] 387d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 10
[1368b7-13] 611d; CH 13 [I373b27-:'37] 618a
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 12, 173a-c
12 EP1CTETUS: Discourses, BK III, CH 7, 183c-
184a
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR VIII, CH 1-4 342d-
344d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 18,
A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 19, A 12, REP 2 118d-
119d; Q 41, A 2 218c-219d; Q 47, A I, REP I
256a-257b; Q 81, A 3, ANS and REP 2 430c-
431d; Q 82, A I, ANS and REP I'] 43Id-432c;
Q l0S, A 4, REP 2-3 541c-542a; PART I-II, Q I,
A 2, ANS 610b-61Ib; Q 6 644a.. 651e; Q 7, A 2,
ANS 652d-653e; Q 9, A 4, REP I 660a-d; Q II,
A 2, ANS 667b-d; Q 13, A 2 673c-674c; Q IS,
A 2 682a-c; Q 16, A 2 684d-685b;Q 18, A 6,
ANS 697d-698c; Q 19, A 6, ANS and REP 3
707a-708a; Q 20, A 2, REP 3 712d-713e; Q 21,
A 2, ANS 718a-d
20 AQUINAS: Sum1na Theologica, PART I-II, Q72,
A3, ANS and REP 1-2 113b-114a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 61a-b; 64b-c;
87c; 93c
2c(3) The several acts of the will with respect
to means: their antecedents and conse.
quences
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK III, CH 10 [433aI 3-3
I
]
665d-666a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK III, CH 2-3 357b-359a;
BK VI, CH 2 387d-388b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 59,
A 3, REP I 308b-309a; Q 60, A 2 311a-d; A 3,
ANS 311d-312b; Q83, A3 438d-439c; PART I-II,
Q 9, A 3, ANS and REP I 659c-660a; A 4, ANS
660a-d; QQ 13-17 672d-693d
42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals,
265c-267d esp 266c-267d / judgement, 586a-b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 767a-790a esp 767a-768a;
827a.:835a
3. The functioning of will in human conduct
and thought
3a. The role of the will in behavior
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK VI, CH' I [I025b
22-25] 547d; BK IX, CH 5 [I047b35-1048a24]
573b-c; CH 7 [1049a5-8] 574c / Memory and
Reminiscence, CH 2 [453815-31] 695b-d
9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 6-11
235d-239d / Ethics, BK III, CH 1-5 355b,d-
361a; BK VI, CH 2 387d-388b
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [251- 293)
18b-d; BK IV [877-891] 55d
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH I I 116d-
118d
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VIII, par 19-27
58b-60e
19 AQUINAS: Sununa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A
8, ANS 82c-83b; Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-I07c;
Q 19, A 4, ANS and REP 4 111c-112c; Q 20, A I,
REP I 120a-121b; Q 25, A I, REP 4 143d-144c;
PART 1-11, Q I 609a-615c; Q 3, A 4, REP 3-4
625a-626b; Q 6 644a-651c; Q 9, A I, ANS and
REP 3 657d-658d; Q II, A I, REP 2666b,d-
667a; Q 12, A I, ANS 66ge-670b; Q 13, AA 4-5
675a-676b; QQ 16-17 684a-693d; Q 18, A 6,
1088 THE GREAT IDEf\S 2c to 3a
(2b. The "lotivation of the will. 2b(2) The sensi- 2c(2) The several acts of the will with respect
tive determination of the will's acts by esti- to ends: their antecedents and conse-
mations of benefit and harm, ()'4 pleasure quences
andpain: the impulsion of the passions.) 8 A S I
RISTOTLE: ou, BK III, CH 10 [433aI 3-3
I
]
1a-4b; PURGATORY, XVIII [1-75] 79d-80c; 665d-666a; [433
b
5-18lW56b-e
PARADISE, I [97--
1
4
2
] 107b-d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK III, CH 2 [IIIIb20-29]
22 CHAUCER: Manciple's Tale [17,97-144] 490a-b 357e-d; CH 3 [1112bI3-1113a3] 358c-359a; ClI
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 64a-e 4 359a-c; BK VI, CH 2 387d-388b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 9-18 426d- 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 20,
429d A I, ANS and REP 3 120a-121b; PART I-II
35 LOCKE: Hunzan Understanding, BK II, CH VII, QQ 8-12 655a-672e '
SECT 3 131d-132a; CH XX, SECT 6 177a-b; 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. of A10raIs,
CH XXI, SECT 12 180d-18la; SECT 31 185c-d; 256a-b; 265c-267b esp 266a-c; 271d-279d esp
SECT 34-35 186a-d; SECT 40 187d-188b 273d-277b / Practical Reason, 327d-329a I
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338a Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 367e /
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 164a-165c; 234e-236a esp judge1J1ent, 586a-b; 594b-595d
235c-d / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 53 JAMES: Psychology, 767a-798a esp 767a-768a,
259a-b; 260a-c; 265b; 284d-285a / Practical 788a-b, 790a, 791b-792b, 796a-b
Reason, 298d-300a; 306d-307a; 341c-342a /
Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385e-386b /
judge1nef1J, 477b-c; 571c-572a; 605d-606b
[fn 2]
43 MILL: Liberty, 269c-270c passim / Utilitarian-
ism, 463c-464d
49 DAR'VIN: Descent of Man, 310c-d; 316a-317a;
592b-d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 796b-797b; 799a-b; 808b-
814b; 829b-830a
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 363b-364b;
377e-378b / Instincts, 412c-414b passim, esp
413d-414a; 419a-420a / General Introduction,
592d-593a / Beyond the Pleasure Principle,
639a-640c / Ego and Id, 702c-d / New Intro-
ductory Lectures, 838c-d
2c. The acts of the will
2c(1) The classification and order of the will's
acts: means and ends
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 2 [1094aI8-22]
339b; CH 4 [I095aI3-20] 340b; BK III, CH 2
[IIII
b
20-29] 357c-d; CH 3 [III2bI3-1113aI2]
358c-359a; CH 5 [I I 13
b
3-5] 35ge; BK VI, CH 2
387d-388b
19 AQUINAS: SUmnla Theologica, PART I, Q 19, A
2, REP 2 109c-l10b; A 5, ANS 112d-113e; Q20,
A I, ANS and REP 3 120a-121b; Q 83, A4, ANS
and REP 1-2 439c-440b; PART I-II, Q I, A 6
Q 6, A 4, ANS 647b-648a; Q 8, A 2,
ANS and REP I 656a-d; A 3 657a-c; Q 9, A 3
659c-660a; A 4, ANS 660a-d; Q 12, A 4 671c-
672a; Q 13, A 3 Q IS, A 3 682c-
683b; Q 16, A3 685b-686a; Q 19, AA 7-8 708a-
709d
31 DESCARTES: Dz'scourse, PART III, SOb
35 LOCKE: Htonan Understanding, BK II, CH XXI,
SECT 52-53 191d-192b
42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals,
256a-b; 257c-d; 265c-267b;274d-275b /
Practical Reason, 327d-329a / Pref. Metaphysi-
cal Elelnents of Ethics, 367e
53 JAMES: Psychology, 51a-b
THEGRE.A.T- IDE1\:5
1091
Sa. Interpretations of the meaning of free will
5a(1) The freedom of the will as consisting in
a freely determined choice ora free
judgment of the reason
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK IX, par, I 61e-d /
City ofGod, BK XXII, CH 30, 617e-618a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 19,
A 10 ll7d-118b; Q 59, A 3 308b-309a; Q 62,
A3, REP 2 31ge-320b; A8, REP 2-3 323e-324a;
Q 82, A I, REP 3 431d-432e; Q 83 436e-440b;
PART I-II, Q I, A I, ANS 609b-610h; A 2, ANS
61015-61115; Q 6, A 2, ANS and REP :2 646a-e;
Q 13, A 6 676c-677b; Q 17, A I,REP 2686d-
687e
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVI [52-
84] 77b-d; XVIII [1-75] 79d-80e
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART III, 49b-d; SOb /
Meditations, IV, 9015-9115 / Objections and
Replies, AXIOM VII 132a; 14115; 141d;228e
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK III [80-134]
13Ba
5., The freedom of the will
4b. The freedom of the" divine will: ,the divine
will in relation to the possible and the
impossible
OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 33 :191 Psalms, 135:6
-(D) Psalms, I34:6/Isaiah,I4:24-27; 46:9-
13-(D) Isaias, 14:2 4-27; 46:9-12 / Jeremiah,
51 :29-(D) Jeremias, 51 :29 / Daniel, 4 :34-35
-CD) Danel, 4:31-32
NE\V TESTAMENT: Matthew, 20:1-16/ John, 5:21
/ Romans, 8 :28-39; 9:15-26 / I Corinthians,
12:18/ Ephesians, 1:3-11 esp 1:9,1:11/ James,
1:18
4a. The relation of the divine will and intellect
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessons, BK XIII, par 19
l15e-d / City of God, BK XII, CH 18354a-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14,
A 8, ANS and REP I 82e-83b;Q 19, A I, ANS
108d-l0ge; A2, REP2-410ge-110b; A3, REP 6
110b-111e; A4, ANS and REP 4 l11c-112c; A 6,
REP 2113c-114d; AII, REP I 118b-d; Q21, AI,
REP 2 12415-12515; A2l25e-d; QQ 22-24 127e-
143e; Q 25, A I,REP4 143d..;144e; Q26, A 2,
REP 2 150e-151a; Q27, AA 3-5 15Se-157e; Q50,
A I, ANS 269h-270a; Q54, A2, ANS 285d-286e;
Q 59, A 2, ANS 307e-308b;Q105, A I,REP 2
538d-53ge; PART 1-;11, Q 1, A4, REP I 612a-
613a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 27115
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 228a-e;
22ge-d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 17 36215-363e;
PROP 32-33 367a-369a esp PROP 33, SCHOL 1-2
367e-369a
42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals,
265a-c / Practical Reason, 303b-304a;321b-e;
324b-325a
.fa to 5'a(l) CHAPTER,'100: WILLi
20 AQUINAS: Summa Q 93, 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BJ{
A4, REP I 218b-d; Q97, A3, REPi237b:..238b; 3'88a-b
PART III, Q Q2I, IrAN,S 8234- 17PLoTrN{js:'Sixt:h Ennead,TRvIII 342d:-353d
824d; A 4, PART III SUPPL, fSAuGUSTINE: Confessions, BKvn, par 6 44d-
Q72, A R:EPS920c:-922b " '" ," 45a; BK XIII, pat 4s123a / CityofGod, BK v,
21 DANTE: Divine 'Comedy; I?ARADISE,IIl [64....90] CHIO 215e-216e; BK XXI,CH
110a-b; 135d-136a' BK.XXII, CH 30, 617d-618a
23 HOBBES : Leviathan, PART II, 113b:..e; 162e 19 AQUINAS : SU1nma Theologica, PART I, Q 19,
3()BACON: Advancement of Learning, 38a AA 3-4 110b-112e; A 10 117d-11815; Q 22, A 3,
31 DESCARTES : Objections and Replies, 228a-c REP 3130d-131e; Q23, A 5, REP 3
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 7 35515; PROP A6, REP 3137d-138e; Q25, AA
16'--17 362a-363e; PROP 367a-369a; Q4 I,A 2 218e-'-219d; Q46,A I, REP9-IO 2S()a-
APPENDIX 369b-372d; PART II,PROP 3, SCHOL 252d; Q 47, A I, REP I 256a-257b; Q 59, A 2,
374b-e; PARTIV, PREF 422b,d-424a ANS 307e-308b; Q 60., A I, REP 2 310b-311a;
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK III {80-I34] 137a- Q 61, A 5, REP I
138a; BKYII [139-173] 220a-221a 394e-396a; Q I04, AA 3-4 537b-538e; PART
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge,sEcT 29-33 I-II, PROLOGUE 609a,e
418e-419a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL,
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 150e-151b Q9I , A I, REP 21016b-1017c
42 KANT: Fund. Prine Metaphysic of Morals, 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, IV, 9015 /Objections
265b-e; '276h-277a / Practical'Reason,303b- and Replies, 228a-'-e; 22ge-d
304a; 321h-c; 324b-325a; 325d:.326a; 32815 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 7 35515; PROP
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II,J?75a- I6-17362a..;363e esp PROP IT, SCHOL 362e-
677b; 680b-e; 68415-d 363e; PROP 32-35 367a-369a; ApPENDIX 36915-
372d; PART II, PROP 3, SCHOL 374b-e; PART IV,
PREF 422h,d-424a
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BKYI!
221a /' Samson Agonistes [30-329] 346a-15
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK Ii, CH XXI,
SECT 50-51 191b-e
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 106
433e-d
42 I(ANT: Practical Reason, 30315-30415 / Intro.
Metaphysic of Morals, 393e / Judgement, 594d
[fn I]
51 TOLSTOY: WarandPeace,EPILOGUE 1I, 684e-d;
685e; 69315,
3b to 4
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, APPENDIX 36915-372d
35 LOCKE : HUlnan IV, CH XIII
CH xx, SECT I!)-16 393a-394a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 240b-243e / Judgement,
601d
43 MILL: Liberty,
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XIII, 58515
53 JAMES: Psychology, 636a-b; 644a-b; 652a-659a
passim, esp653a-654a, 659b [fnI]; 660b-661b;
820a-b
54 FREUD: War and Death, 760d-761a I New
Introductory Lectures, 819b-c; 874e,,:d; 882a-b
3b(2) The will as cause of error
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, IV 89a-93a esp 90b-
91h / Objections and Replies, 167a-b; 215d-216c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 49, SCHOL,
392e-393e
3b(3) Religious faith as dependent on an act of
will or practical reason
18 AUGUSTINE: C01?ftssions, BK I, par I 1a-b;
BK VI, par 6,;-8 36e-37e; BK VIII, par 10-12
55e-56b; par 18-25 57d-60a; par 28-29 60d-
61a
20 AQUINAS: SU11zmaTheologica, PART II-II, Q 2,
A I, REP 3 391a-392a; AA9-IO 398e-400b;
Q 4, A 2 403d-404c
30 BACON: Advancement ofLearning,:41b-d
31 DESCARTES: Rules, III, 4d-5a / Objections and
Replies, 12Se-126b
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 252 219a-220a; 268-282
222a-223b; 284 223b-224a; 287 224a-b I
Geometrical Demonstration, 440a-b
35 LOCKE: Toleration, ISh
40 GIBBON: Decline anil Fall, 296b-e
42 KANT: Judgement, 604d-606d esp 606a-d;
607e-610a esp 607e
46 HEGEL: Philosophy ofHistory, PART IV, 350a-b
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 196a-198b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 652b-653a; 661h; 826b-
827a
4. The divine will
NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 12:1-2 / Ephesians,
I :9-1 I / II Timothy, 1:8-10
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK IV, CH I,218b-
219a; CH 3, 224d
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VII, ,par 6 44d-
45a; BK XI, par 12 9215; BK XII, par 18, 103a-b;
BK XIII, par 5 111d / City of God, BKX,CH 7,
303a; BK XII, CH 14 350d-351b; CH 17, 354a;
BK XXII, CH 2 587b-588a
19 AQUINAS: SU111ma Theologica, PART I, QQ 19-
21 108d-127e; Q 59, A I, ANS 306e-307b; A 2,
ANS 307c-308b; Q 60, A I, REP 2 310b-311a;
Q 61, A 2, REP I 315c-316a; Q 62, A 6, REP I
322a-d; Q 63, A I, ANS 325e-326e; Q 66, A 2,
ANS 345d-347b; PART I-II, Q I, A 2,REP 3
61015-61115; Q 10, A I, REP 2 662d-663d; Q 19,
AA9-IO 709d-711d; Q 39, A 2, REP 3 790d-
79115
1090
(3a. The role oj the will in behavior. 3a(2) The
range oj purposive conduct: the 1
1O
elationoj
habit and instinct to the voluntary.)-
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE I, 665a-d
53 JAMES: 7115 [fn I]; 7415-7815
esp 75b,77a,.b;80a; 9015-93aesp 92a-93a;
691a-b; 704a-706besp 706a-b; 767b-768a;
774a; 788a-789a; 790b-791a
3b. The role of the will in thought
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK II, CH 5 [4I7a21-bI] 647d-
648a; BK III, CH 4 [429b5-9J 661d / Memory
and Reminiscence, CH 2 [453aI5-3I] 695b-d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [777-817]
54b-d
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BKVUI, par 20-21
58e-59a
19 AQUINAS: SurnmaTheologica, PART I-II, Q 6,
A 7, REP 3 650a-d; Q 9, A I, ANS and REP 3
657d-658d; Q 10, A 2, ANS 663d:.664d; Q II,
AI,REP I 66615,d-667a; Q 13, A 4, REP 2
675a-e; Q 14, A I, REP I 677b-678a; QI6, A I,
REP 3 684b-d; A 4, ANS 686a-d;QI7, A I,
ANS 686d-687e; Q 19, A3, REP 3704e-705a
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, III, 83b-c; IV 89a-
93a passim / Objections andReplies, 125e-126b;
167a-b; 215d-216e
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 49, DEMONST-
SCHOL, 391e-392c
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 99 191a / Geometrical Dem-
onstration, 43915-44115
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI,
SECT 5, 17ge; SECT 12 180d-181a;sEcT 17-19
182a-e; SECT 38, 187e; BK IV, CH XIII 363e-
36415; CH XX, SECT 15-16 393a-394a
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV
53473e-474h
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 240b-243e
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 5-9
par 13 15e-d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 38115-38515; 666b-667a;
818b-820b esp 820a
3b(1) The distinction between knowledge and
opinion in relation to the willful in
thought: the will to believe and wishful
thinking
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [777-817]
54b-d
19 AQUINAS: SZl1nnza Theologica, PART I-II, Q13,
A 4, REP 2 675a-c; Q 17, A6, ANS 690b-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 67,
A 3, ANS 83b-84d; PART II-II, Q 2,A I 391a-
392a
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III,
148a-150d; 154a-156e; 159d-163e; 166a-171a;
175c-178a
28 HARVEY: }vIotion ofthe Heart, 28315
30 BACON: Advancelnent ofLearning, 27a-c; 38d-
39a
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 125e-126b
THE GREAT IDEAS
6. The analysis of the will's range of freedom
6a. The limitations on the freedom of the will:
the distinction between acts of the will
which are necessitated and acts of the
will which are free
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK III, CH 2 357b-358a;
CH 4-5 359a-361a passim, esp CH 5 [I I I4
a
3I -
b25] 360c-d; BK VI, CH 2 [II39bS-II] 388a-b
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses 105a-245a,c esp BK I,
CH I 105a-l06c, CH 18 124a-125a, CH 29 J34d-
I3Ba, BK II, GIl 5 142c-144a, CH 10 148c-150a,
CH 23 170a-172d, BK III, CH 2 177c-178d, Cll
10 185d-187a,cH 14 189c-190a, CH 18 192a-c,
BK IV, CH I 213a-223d
12 AURELIUS: Meditations 2S3a-310d esp BK II,
SECT 16 259a, BK v, SECT 19 272a) BK VI, SECT
6b. The distinction between the will's freedoln
of exercise and the will's freedom of
choice
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q
6, A3 646d-647b; A7, REP 3 650a-d; Q 9, A3
659c-660a; Q 10, A 2, ANS 663d-664d; Q 13, A
6, ANS 676c-677b
35 LOCKE: Hunzan Understanding, BK II, CH XXI,
SECT 12 180d-181a
6c. The distinction between voluntary be-
havior and behaviol- resulting from free
choice: comparison of men and animals
with respect to freedom
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK III, CH 2 [I I I I
b
6-9] 357b
17PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR III, CH 3 93d-94c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 19,
A 10, ANS 117d-118b; A 12, REP 3 118d-119d;
Q 59, A 3, ANS 30Bb-309a; Q 115, A 4, ANS
589d-590c; PART I-II, Q 6, A 2 646a-c;Q 10,
CHAPTER 100: WILL 1093
16 275b-d, SECT 22 276a, BK VII, SECT 16
280d, BK VIII, SECT 16-1 7 286d, SECT 28 287c,
SECT 4
8
289c, BK X, SECT 34-35301a-b, BK
XII, SECT 3 307b-d
18 AUGUSTINE: City ofGod, BK V, CH 9-
10
213b-
216c
19 AQUINAS: SU1nma Theologica, PART I, Q 18, A
3, ANS I06b-l07c; Q 19, A3, ANS 110b-111c; A
10, ANS 117d-118b; Q 60, AA 2-3 311a-312b;
Q 62, A 8 323c-324a; Q 82, AA 1-2 431d-433c;
Q 83, A I, REP 5 436d-438a; A 2, ANS 438a-d;
PART I-II, Q I, A 5 613a,-614a; A 7 614c-615a;
Q 5, A 4, ANS and REP 2 639a-640b; A8, ANS
and REP 2 642d-643d; Q 10 662d-666a,c; Q
13, AA 5-6 675c-677b; Q 17, A 5, REP 3 689c-
690b; A 6, ANS 690b-d; AA 7-9 690d-693d
20 AQUINAS: Sunzma Theologica, PART I-II, Q50,
A 5, REP 3 10b-d
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVIII
[1-75] 79d-80c; XXI [34-72] 85b-d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART III, 165c
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART III, SOb I Objec-
tions and Replies, AXIOM VII 132a; 141b; 141d;
228c
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI,
SECT 12 180d-181a; SECT 52-53 191d-192b;
SECT 57 193b-c; SECT 59 193d-194a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 164a-165c esp 164b-c;
234c-236a esp 235c-d; 236d-237a I Fund.
Prine Metaphysic of Morals, 259c-260c; 264d-
265b I Practical Reason, 325d-326b
44 BOSWELL: johnson, 407b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 8-21
14c-17c; PART II, par 118 42d-43b; ADDITIONS,
90130b-d
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 159a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XIII, 577a-582a
esp 57Bd-579a; BK XIV, 605b-d; BK XV, 630c-
631a; EPILOGUE II, 68Ba-694d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 291a-295a esp 291a-b, 293a;
38Ba; 821b-B22b; 830a
5c. Arguments against the freedom of the will:
free will as a violation of the course of
nature or the reign of causality; the im-
possibility of proving free will
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [251 - 293]
18b-d
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR I 78a-82b
18 AUGUSTINE: City ofGod, BK V, CH 9-10 213b-
216c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 83, A
I, REP 1-5 436d-438a; PART I-II, Q 13, A 6,
REP 1-3 676c-677b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVI
[52-84] 77b-d
22 CHAUCER: Nun's Priest's Tale [15,238- 2 56]
456b-457a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 113b
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 218c-219a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 7 355b; PROP
16-17 362a-363c; PROP 26-APPENDIX 365b-
372d; PART II, PROP 48--49 391a-394d; PART
III, 395a-d; PART IV, PREF, 422b,d-423b
35 LocKE: HUlnan Understanding, BK I, CH II,
SECT 14, 10Bd-109a; BK II, CH XXI, SECT22-25
183b-184b; SECT 48--52 190c-191d passim, esp
SECT 49 190d-191a
35 HU11zan Understanding, SECT VIII
478b-487a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 140b,d-143a; 164a-171a
I Fund. Prine Metaphysic of Morals, 279b,d-
287d esp 282b-284d, 285c-287b I Practical
Reason, 291a-293b; 296a-d; 301d-302d; 307d-
314d esp 310b-311d; 331c-337a,c; 340a-342d
I Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 390b,d-391a /
judgement, 571c-572a
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 392d-393a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 692c-
696d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 291a-295b esp 293a-294a,
295a-b; 822b-826a; 848b-849a
54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-
Analysis, 13c / General Introduction, 454b-c;
462d; 486d
5c to 6c Sa(2) to ShC4)
117b-c; 12 118a-c; 17 119a; 67-68 126d-127a'
95 132b '
Sh. Arguments for the freedom of the will
Sb(l) Man's immediate cSnsciousnessof his
freedom of choice: reason's reflexive
knowledge of its autonomy
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VII, par 5 44c-d
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 141a-b;
216a
35 HUME: Hun1an Understanding, SECT VIII, DIV
72, 483c-d [fn I]
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 338a
42 KANT: Fund. Prine Metaphysic of lv/orals,
283b-d I Practical Reason, 291b-c; 302a,-303b'
310b-311d I Judgement, 604c-d; 606c-607c '
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 392d-393a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 688a-
689b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 661a; 797b-798b; 820b-
823a esp 821b-822a; 848b-849a
5b(2) The freedom of the will as deriving from
the indetermination of practical reason
judging particular goods
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK III, CH 2-3 357b-
359a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 19, A
3, ANS 110b-111c; Q 22, A 2, REP 4-5 128d-
130d; Q 59, A 3, ANS 308b-309a; Q 82, A 2
432d-433c; Q 83, A I 436d-438a; PART I-II, Q
6, A 2, REP 2 646a-c; Q 10, A I, REP 3 662d-
663d; AA 2-4 663d-666a,c; Q 13, A 6 676c-
677b; Q 17, A I, REP 2 686d-687c; A 6, ANS
690b-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q
109, A 2, REP I 339c-340b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI,
SECT 52-53 191d-192b; SECT 57 193b-c;
SECT 73 198c-199c
5b(3) The deduction of free will from the
moral law or from the fact of pure
practical reason
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 164a-171a; 236d-237a I
Fund. Prine jV1etaphysic of l\1.orals, 279b,d-
287d esp 280b-c, 282b-283dl Practical Reason,
291a-d; 302a-303b; 304a-d; 307d-314d esp
310b-311d; 331a-337a,c; 348b-349b I Intro.
Metaphysic of Morals, 390b,d-391a
5b(4) Free will as a pragmatic option: the pos-
tulation of free will as an indispensable
condition of moral responsibility and
action
42 KANT: Practical Reason, 291b-d; 348b-349b
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 471d-472a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II,
694d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 294a-295a; 820b-827a
esp 822b-823a
1092
(Sa. Interpretations of the meaning of free will.
Sa(l) Thefreedom of the as consisting
in a freely determined choice or a free
judgment of the reason.)
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 154b-159a
35 LOCKE: Hun1an Understanding, BK II, CH XXI,
SECT 48-54190c-192c passim; SECT 57 193b-c;
SECT 73 198c-199c
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338a
44 BOSWELL: johnson, 392d-393a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 388a; 787a; 820b-822a esp
821b-822a;825a-826a
Sa(2) The freedom of the will as consisting in
the freedom of a man to act or not to act:
freedom from external constraints or
coercions
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 59b; 86c; PART II,
112d-113a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI,
SECT 7-27 180a-184c; SECT 57 193b-c; SECT 73
198c-199c; CH XXIII, SECT 18 209a
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VIII, DIV
73 483c-484a
Sa(3) The freedom of the will as consisting
in a totally uncaused or spontaneous
act
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [251-293]
18b-d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 7 355b; PROP 17,
COROL 1-2 and SCHOL 362b-363c; PROP 32
367a-b; PART II, PROP 48 391a-c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 140b,d-143a esp 141b,d-
142d; 164a-165c; 167d-171a; 237a-b I Fund.
Prine Metaphysic ofMorals, 279b,d-280a; 281c-
283b; 285a-d I Practical Reason, 292a-293b;
296a-b; 301d-302a; 304a-b; 307d-308c; 311a-
b; 327d-328a / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals,
383c-d; 386b-d; 392d-393c I judgement, 463a-
465c; 571c-572a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 692c-
694d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 223a-b; 388a; 787a
Sa(4) The freedom of the will as the autonomy
of the reason legislating for itself: the
identity of pure will and free will
42 !(ANT: Pure Reason, 236d-237al Fund. Prine
Metaphysic ofMoraIs, 264d-265a; 279b,d-287d
esp 280b-c, 283d-285a I Practical Reason, 291a-
293c; 296a-d; 297a-314d esp 302a-d, 307d-
311d, 314a-d; 326a-b; 327d-329a I Intro.
Metaphysic of Morals, 386d-387a,c; 390b,d-
391a; 392d-393c / judgement, 463a-465c;
571c-572a; 587c-d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 4-17
12d-16c passim, esp par 4 12d-13a, par 7 14a-c,
par 14-15 15d-16b; par 2217c-d; par 2919a-b;
PART II, par 106-107 40a-c; PART III, par 142
55a; par 149 56b; ADDITIONS, 4 116a-d; 7
THE GREAT IDEAS
7c to 7d CHAPTER 100: 'iVILL 1095
[74-144J 137d-138c;BK XXIV (57,-551] 176c- 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART II, 408c
177a / Odyssey, BK XIV [441-445] 264c; BK 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 14tb
XVIII [117-15] 28sb-c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, APPENDIX
5 AESCHYLUS: Agamelnnon [160-2541 53d-54d 372d passim
/ Choephoroe 70a-80d esp [269-314] 72d-73b, 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK III [80-134]
[885-1076] 78d-80d / Eumenides 8la-91d 138a; [167-:'216] 139a-140a; BKV [224-245]
5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King 99a-113a,c esp 180a-b; [506-543] 186a-187a; BK VI [:168-188]
[
12
97-1415] I11b-112b /Oedipus at Colonus 200a; BK VII [139-173] 220a-221a; BK IX [342-
114a-130a,c esp [258-291] 116c-d, [939-1015] 375] 254b-2s5b; BK X [1-62] 274b-275b;
123a-d I Philoctetes [169-200] 183d-184a; [615-64] 287b-288b / Areopagitica, 394b-
[1316- 1347] 193d-194a 395b
5 EURIPIDES: Helen [711-721] 304d-30sa I 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VIII, DIV
Electra 327a-339a,c. esp [11687:1359] 337d- 78- 81 48sc-487a
339a,c /Heracles Mad [1255-1357] 376a-d / 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 230b
Orestes 394a-410d esp [478-629] 398d-400b 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 334a-33sc
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 7b-8a;20a-22a; 44 BOSWELL: johnson, l73c;392d-393a; S49c
46c-d; BK III, 98b-99a; BK VII, 2l8b-220b; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, Is8c-
BK IX, 29lb-c 160b; 161d-l62a; 182d-184d
7 PLATO: Republic, BK x, 439b-441a,c J Laws,48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 396b;
BK I, 650a-b; BK IV, 679a.,b; BK X, 765d-769c 409b-410b
esp 767c-768b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK IX, 342a-344b;
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH If l06a-b; 3s7b-358b; BK X, 447d; BKXI,481d; BK XII,
CH 12 118d-120b; CH 17, l23c-d; BK III,CH 22, 553b; BK XV, 619d-620a; 630d-631c; EPILOGUE
197c-198b; CH 24, 208d-210a; BK IV" CH I, I, 650b-c; EPILOGUE II, 675a-677b; 680b-c;
218b-219c; CH 3, 224d; CH7, 233d-234a 684b-d
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SECTII 258a-b; 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers' Karamazov, BKV,
BK III, SECT II 262a-b; BK VI, SECT 44 278b-c 121d-137c passim
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK IV [332-361] 176a-l77a 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 246c-247d
14 PLUTARCH: Coriolanus, l88d-189c / Sulla, / General Introduction, s82a-b
370c-371b
15 TACITUS: Annals, BKIIl, 49b-c; BK IV, 69a; 7d. God as the object of the human will: the
VI, 91b-d quiescence of the will in. the beatific
17PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR 82c-97b vision
passim OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 33:18--23 i Deuteron-
AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK II, par 14 12a-b omy, 4:29 / I Chronicles, 16:11; 28:9-(D)
/ City of God, BK I, CH 36 BKIV, CH I Paralipomenon, 16:11;28:9 / I[Chronicles,
33 206c-d; BK V, CH I 207d-208c; CH 9:-10 15:2-4,I2-'15-(D) II Paralipomenon, 15:2-
213b-216c; BK XVIII, CH2, 472d-473a 4,12-15 /.Psalms,27: 8; 42 :1-:-6;63:1- 0;7:4;
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, QI7, A 7.3:25,28; 84:2-:3; II9: IO-{D} Psalms,26:8;
I, ANS IOOd-lOld; Q19, A8116a-d; Q22" A2, 41:1-6;62:1-6; 69:4;
REP4-5 128d-130d; Q 23 132b-141a; Q83, A Isaiah, 26:8-9-(D) Isaias, 26:8-9 / Jeremiah,
I, REP 2-4 436d-438a; Q 100, A 2, REP I 29: 13-(D) jeremias, 29: 131 Amos, 5:4-8
522b; Q 103, A5, REP 3 531b-532b; Q 105, A4 ApOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 1:1; 13: 1-9-
541c-542a; Q116 592d-s9sc passim; PART I-II, CD) OT, Book of Wisdoln, 1:1; 13 :1-9
Q 6, A I, REP 3 644d-646a; A 4, REP I 647b- NEW TESTAMENT: Philippians, 3:7-10
648a; Q 9, A 6 662a-d; Q 10., A 466sd-666a,c; 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions,BKI, par I la-b; BK
Q 21, A 4, REP 2 719d-720a,c VII, par 22 50a;BK XII, par II IOld / City of
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, VII [61-96] God, BK XIV, CH II 385d..387a;BK XV, CH
10b-c; PURGATORY, XVI [52-15] 77b-d; 21-22 41sb-416c; BK. XXII, CH30,
PARADISE, I {94-142] 107b-d; III [64-90] / Christian Doctrine,BK I, CH 4 625b-c; CH 15
110a-b; xx [31-148] 137a-138b 628b-c
22 CHAUCER: Troilusand Cressida, BK IV, STANZA 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I,Q 12, A
150-154 108a-b / Nun's Priest's Tale [15,236- I, ANS SOc-SIc; A8, REP 4 s7b-s8b; Q59, A 4,
256] 456b-457a / Canon's Yeoman's Tale REP .3 309a-310a; Q 60, A 5 Q 82,
[16,940 -949] 487a A2, ANS 432d-433c; A3, ANS and. REP 3 433c-
23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH XXV, 3sa-b 434c; Q 95 506b-s10a; Q 100 S20d-S22b; Q
23 I-IOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 113b-c; PART IV, 105, A 4, ANS s41c-s42a; Q III, A2, ANS s69c-
272b-c 570b; PART I-II, QI,A 8 615a-c; Q2, A8
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 250a; 342a-b 622b; Q3, A I 622c-623a; A4 62sa-626b; Q4,
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT III, SC II [220- AA 1-4 629d-632c; Q 5, A I, ANS 636d-637c;
223] SIb / King Lear, ACT I, sc II [128-164] A 4, ANS and REP 2 639a-640b; A 5, REP I
249a-b 640b-641a; Q 9, A 6 662a-d; Q II, A I, REP I
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XIII, 577a-578b
581c-s82a; BKXIV, 60sb-d; BK xv,
631a; EPILOGUE II, 688a-690a
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v
127b-137c passim '
7b. The factors of freedom and necessity in the
philosophy of history
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK III, 49c; BK IV, 69a; Bl{
VI, 91b-d / Histories, BK I, 194b
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK I, CH 36 149c'-d;
BK IV, CH 33 206c-d; BK V, CH I 207d-208c
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVI
[52-15] 77b-d
43 MILL: Representative Government, 332a-d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy ofRight, PART III, par 340-
347 110b-111c; par 352-360 ll2b-114a,c I
Philosophy of History, INTRO, 160b-164d;
168b-d; 170a-172b; 175c-l76c; 179b-c; 182d
l86a-c; 203c-206a,c; PART IV, 3l5a;348a;
368d-369a,c
50 MARX: Capital, 7c; lOb-lIb
51 TOLSTOY: tVar and Peace, BK III, 140b; l43a-c;
l44d; BK IX, 342a-344b; BK X, 389a-391c;
40Sa-b; 430d-431a; 447c-448c; 465c-467a;
BK XI, 469a-472b; BK XIII, 563a-571a; BK XV,
618b-621b; EPILOGUE I, 645a-650c; EPILOGUE
II 675a-696d
7c. Human freedom in relation to the will of
God: fate, predestination, andprovidence
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 3/ Exodus, 4:21 ; 7-
14 esp 7:3, 9:12, 10:1, 14:17 / Deuteronomy,
11:26-28;3:15-20 / Joshua, 11:19-20; 24:14-
24-(D) Josue, II :19-20; 24:14-24 / judges,
9:23 / I Kings, 8:57-58-(D) III Kings, 8:57-
58 / fob, 3:23; 12:14-2 5; 34:29/ Psalms, 119:
36; 14I:4-(D) Psalms, 118:36;
138:15-16; 140:4 / Proverbs, 21:1 lccle-
siastes, I :2-4,14-15; 3 :14-15; 6:10; 9:1-
2; II :5-6 / Isaiah, 14 :24-27; 63 :17; 64 :8"-(D)
Isaias, 14:24-27; 63:17; 64:8 / Malachi, 4:6-
(D) Malachias, 4:6
ApOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 7:16; 19:4-
(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 7:16;
15 :11-20-(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus,
15: 11--21
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 6:10; 20:1-16 esp
20:15-16; 23:37; 26:39/ Luke, 22:3-4/ john,
5:21; 6:22-71 esp 6:37, 6:40, 6:44-45, 6:64-6;,
6:7-71; 10:26-29; 12 :37-40; 13 :I8-27-(D)
fohn, 5:21 ; 6:22-72 esp 6:37, 6:40 ,
6:65-66, 6:71-72; 10:26-29; 12:37-40; 13:18-
27 / Acts, 4:27-28 ; 7:51; 13:48 ; 17:24-
esp 17:26 / Romans, 8:28-9 :26 esp 8:28-3
9:18-21; II :1-10 / I Corinthians, 7:21- 23
9:16-17; 12 / Ephesians, 1:3-12; 2:8-10
/ Philippians, 2:12-13 / I Thessalon
ians, 5:18 / II Thessalonians, 2:11-14-(
II Thessalonians, 2 :10-13 / II Timothy,' I
/ james, 4:13-15 / I Peter, 1:1-5
4 HOMER: Iliad, BK VI [342-358] BK x
1094
(6. The analysis of the will's range of freedom.
6c. The distinction between voluntary be-
havior and behavior resulting from jree
choice: comparison oj men. and animals
with respect to jreedom.)
A 3, ANS 664d-665c; Q II, A 2 667b-d; Q 12,
A 5 672a-c; Q 13, A2 673c-674C;Q IS, A 2
682a-c; Q 16, A 2 684d-685b; Q 17, A 2 687d-
688b
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 218c-219b
31 DESCARTES : Discourse, PART v, 59c-60b /
Objections and Replies, 156a-d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II,CH XXI,
SECT 8-11 180a-d
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 164a-165c / Practical
Reason, 316c-317a / PrefMetaphysical Ele-
ments of Ethics,372a-b /lntro. Metaphysicof
Morals, 386b-d; 393c-d ! Judgement, 584d-
58sd;
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par I I
lsa-b;PART I, par 47 24a-b; ADDITIONS, 4
l16a-d; 10 ll7d-1l8a; 28 l21b / Philosophy of
History, INTRO, 168d; PART III, 304d-30sb
49 DARWIN: Descent ofMan, 311b-d
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II,689c-
690a
7. The implications of free will
7a. Free will as a source of human dignity; its
relation to slavery and civil liberty
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica,PART I, Q 59,
A 3, CONTRARY 308b-309a; Q 62,A 8, REP 3
323c-324a; Q 96, A 4 512d-513c; PART
PROLOGUE 609a,c; Q'20, A 6, REP 3 716b-d;
Q21, A3, REP 2 718d-7l9c
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, V [19-84]
112b-113a
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua :and Pantagruel, BK I,
65c-d
26 SHAKESPEARE:JuliusCaesar, ACT I, sc II [135-
161] 570d-57la
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 49, SCHOL,
394c-d
32 MILTON: Areopagitica, 394b-395b
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XII, 8sa
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 338a / Social Contract,
BK I, 389a-d; 393b-c
42 KANT: Fund. Prine Metaphysic of Alorals,
271d-279d esp 273d-277b / Practical Reason,
32sd-326b; 327d-329a; 341b-342c; 344a;
346b-348b esp 348a:.b; 355a-d /Judgement,
594b-s9sc
43 MILL: Liberty, 316b-d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 18
16c-d; par 21 17a-c; PART I, par 3621b-c;
par 48 24b-c; par 57 26b-27a; ADDITIONS, 14
118c-d; 36 122b-c; 62 126a; 67 '126d / Philos-
ophy of History, INTRO, 161a-c; PART I,
230a-c; 236a-c; PART IV, 3s0b..:c
7e(1) The freedom to sin: Adam's freedom and
the freedom of fallen human nature
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 3 / Deuterononzy, II:
26-28; 30:15'-20 / Joshua, 24:I4-24-(D)
josue, 24 :14-2 4 / Isaiah, 5:1-7- (D) Isaias,
5: 1-7
ApOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 15:J:1-20-(D) aT,
Ecclesiasticus, 15: I 1-2I
NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 5:1243:21 / Hebrews,
10 :26-31
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VII, par 5 44c-d
/ City' of God, BK V, CH 9-10 213b-216c; BK
XII, CH 21 357a-b; BK XIV, CH 11-12 385d-
387b; CH 15 388d-390a; BK XXII, CH I, 587a-b;
CH 30, 617c-618a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 17, A
I, ANS 100d-101d; Q22, A2, REP 4 128d-130d;
A 3, REP 3 130d-131c; Q 23, A I, REP I 132c-
133b; A 3, REP 3 134b-135a; Q 24, A 3 142d-
143c; Q 47, A 2, ANS 257b-258c; Q 62, A 3,
REP 2 319c-320b; A 8 323c-324a; Q 63, A I,
REP 4 325c-326c; AA 5':"'7 329a-332b; A 9, REP
3 333b-d; Q 83, A 2, ANS and REP 3 438a-d;
Q 100, A2 521c-522b; PART I-II, Q I, A 7, REP
I 614c-615a; Q6, A8 650d-651c; Q9, A 6, REP
3 662a-d; Q 21, A2 718a-d
20 AQUINAS: Sumlna Theologica, PART I-II, Q74,
AA 1-2 129a-130a; Q 109, A 2 339c-340b; A.A
7-10 344a-347d
21 DANTE: Divine COlnedy, PURGATORY, XVI
[52- lOS] 77b-d; XVII [82]-XVIII [75] 79b-80c;
PARADISE, I [94-142] 107b-d; IV [64-114]
111b-d; V [19-30] 112b; VII [2S-33] 11Sc
30 BACON: Advancenzent of Learning, 17d-18a
32 lVhLTON: Paradise Lost, BK III [80-134] 137a-
138a; [167-216] 139a-140a; BK V [224-245]
CHAPTER 100: WILL
1096 THE GREAT IDEi\S 7e to 7e(2)
(7. The implications oj free will. 7d. God as the 180a-b; [56-543] 186a-187a; BK IX [34
2
-375)
object oj the human will: the quiescence oj BK x [1-'16] 274b / Samson Ago-
the will in the beattific vision.) lustes [373-4
1
9] 347b-348b / Areopagitica'
394b-395b '
666b,d-667a; A.A 3-4 667d-669b; Q 12, A 2 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 8c-d; 10c-d; 15d-16a
670b-c; A 3, REP I 670d-671b; Q13, A I, ANS 46 HEGEL: Philosophy oillistory, PART III, 304d-
672d-673c;Q 16, A 3, CONTRARY and REP 3 305b
685b-686a; Q 19, A 9, ANS 709d-710b; A 10 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 689b
710b-711d 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Kara1nazot', BK v,
20 AQUINAS: SUlnma Theologica, PART I-II, Q 127b-137c passim
62 59d-63a; PART II-II, Q 25, A I 501b-502a;
A 12 509c-510b; Q 26, AA 2-3 511a-512c; Q 7e(2) The relation of freedom to grace
27, AA 3-
8
522c-527b; PART III, Q 9, A 2, REP OLD TESTAMENT: Psalms, 95 :7-9--(D) Psalms,
3 764c-765a 94:7-9 / Proverbs, 1:20-33 / Isaiah, 5:1-7-
21 DANTE: Divine Con1.edy, PURGATORY, XXI [34- (D) Isaias, 5:1'-7
7
8
] 85b-d; PARADISE, I [97-142] 107b-d; III NEW TESTAMENT: john, 1:1-18 esp 1:5, 1:10-
1
3;
[43-9] 109d-110b; xx [130-141] 138a; XXI 5:21; 6:37,64-66; 8:31-J6; 10:26--29; 12:37-
[64-75] 138d-139a; XXVI [25-36] 146a 40; 13 :18-27 / Acts, 7 :51; 13 :38-48; IS :I-II
42 KANT: Practical Reason, 325a-327d esp 326b- / Romans, 4-8; 9:9-18; 11:5-10,26--'32 / I
327a; 337a-355d esp 346b-347c Corinthians, 7:21'-23; 9: 1,19-21 / II' Corin-
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, thians, 3:17; 6:1-:2 / Galatians, 4; 5:
1
-4,13,
127b-137c passim 18,22-24 / Epheszans, I :J-12; 2 :4-10 / Philip-
7e. Free will in relation to sin and salvation pians, 2:12'-13 / Titus, 3:3-7 I james, 1:2 5;
2 :10-12 / I Peter, 2 :15-16 / Revelation, 3 :20-
(D) Apocalypse, 3:20
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK IX, par I 61c-d I
City ofGod, BK X, CH 32 319d-322a,c; BK xv,
CH I, 398a-c; BK XXII, CH I, 587a-b; CH 30,
617c-618a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 23, A
3, REP 3 134b-135a; AA 5-6 135d-138c; A 8
140a-141a; Q 62, A 3, REP 2 319c-320b; A4,
ANS 320b-321b; Q 83, A2, CONTRARY 438a-'d;
Q95, A I, REP 3,5 506b-507c; Q 100, A2, REP I
521c-522b; PART I-II, Q 5, A 5, REP I 640b-
641a; Q 9, A 6, REP 3 662a-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q
108, A I, ANS and REP 2 331a-332b; Q 109, A
2 339c-340b; Q 110, A4 350d,-351d; Q III, A2
352d-353d; Q 113, A 3 362c-363c; A 5 364b-
365a; PART II-II, Q 183, A 4, REP I 627d-628d
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, I [22-
84] 53b-S4a; v [58-66] 59c; VII [37-60]62d-
63a; XI [25-45] 69a-b; XII [115-136] 71c-d;
XXI [34-72] 85b-d; XXVII [124-142] 95d-96a;
PARADISE, III [64-90] 110a-b; VII [64-84]
115d-116a; xx [31-148] 137a-138b; XXI [52-
75] 138d-139a
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, IV, 91a-b / Objec-
tions and Replies, 125c-126b
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK II [1027-1331
133b; BK III [56-4IS] 136b-144b esp [130-134]
138a, [227--2.38] 140b; HK XI [2S1-262] 304b-
305a; BK XII [576-605] 331b-332a
33 PASCAL: Prol!incial Letters, 141a-166b esp
154b-lS9a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 238b
43 MILL: Libertv, 296b-297b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART II, par, 140,
50a / Philosophy of PART III,310a.-
311a
8to 8b(1)
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov,BK v,
127b-137c passim
8. The will as a factor in morality and in society
Sa. The inviolability of the will: its freedom
from external compulsions or con-
straints
7 PLATO: Gorgias, 285c-d
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses 105a-245a,c esp BK I,
CH I 105a-106c, CH 17-29, 123b-138a, BK II,
CH 5 142c-144a, CH 10 148c-150a, CH 23 170a-
172d, BK IV, CH I 213a-223d
12 AURELIUS: lvfeditations 253a-310d esp BK II,
SECT 9 257d, SECT II 258a-b, SECT 16 259a,
BK v, SECT 8 269d-270b, SECT 19 272a, SECT
34 273c, BK VI, SECT 16275b-d,' SECT 22 276a,
BK VII, SECT 16 280d, BK VIII, SECT, 16-17
286d, SECT 28 287c, SECT 48 289c, BK IX,
SECT 7 292b, BK X, SECT 34-35 301a-b, BK XI,
SECT 36 306c, BK XII, SECT 3 307b-d
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK V, CH 10, 216a-b;
BK IX, CH 4 287a-288b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 82, A
I, ANS and REP I 431d-432c; Q83, AI, REP 1-5
436d-438a; Q 105, A 4, REP I 541c-542a; PART
I-II, Q 6, A 4 647b-648a; A 5, REP I 648b-
649a; Q 9, A 4, REP 2 660a-d
21 DANTE: DitJine Conzedy, PARADISE, IV [64-
114] 111b-d
25 MONTAIGNE:, Essays, 14a
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK IX [342-35oJ
254b-255a / San1son Agonistes [134.8-1379]
369a-b
35 LOCKE: Toleration, 3c-4a / HUlnan Under-
standing, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 59 193d-194a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 164a-b; 168d-170d;
235c-d / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic' of Morals,
279b,d-280a; 281c-283b; 284d-285a / Prac-
tical Reason, 301d-302d; 304a-d; 307d-308c;
316a-b; 327d-328b / Intro. Metaphysic of Mor-
als, 386b-d; 392d.,393a/ judgement, 605d [n2]
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 73, 218d-219a; NUM-
BER 79, 233c-d
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 407b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 91-
9235d-36a
48 MELVILLE: lvfoby Dick, 370b-371a; 408b-409a
51 TOLSTOY: WTar and Peace, BK XIII, 577a-582a
esp 578d-579a, 581d-582a; BK XIV, 605c-d;
BK XV, 630c-631a
8b. The goodness or malice of the will
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK IV, CH 9 [II28b20-30]
376a,c
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 35,
177d-178a
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VIII, par 19-24
58b-60a / City of God, BK XII, CH 3-9 343d-
348b; BK XIV, CH 6-9 380b-385b
19 AQUINAS: SU1nma Theologica, PART I, Q 48,
1097
AA 5.-6 263a-264d; Q49, AI, REP I 264d-265d;
PART I-II, Q 4, A 4 631d-632c; Q 9, A 6, REP 3
662a-d; QQ 18-21 693b,d-720a,c esp QI9
711d
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVII
[82]-XVIII [75] 79b-80c
42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphyst"cofMorals, 256a-
261d esp 256a-b, 257c-d; 265c / Pracdcal
Reason, 304a-307d; 314d-319b esp 316a-317d;
321b-329a; 356a-360d / Intro. !vletaphysic of
.Z'vforals, 389a-390a,c / judge1nent, 591b-592d;
595a-d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART II, par 114
42a-b; PART III, par 142e-I57 55a-57d; ADDI-
TIONS, 92-100 131d-133a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 826a-827a
8b(1) The conditions of the will's rectitude or
disorder
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BKI, CH 13 [II02bI3-II03a
4] 348a-c; BK VI, CH 2387d-388b
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 17 122d-124a
14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 121b / Timoleon, 197c-
198a
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH35, 177d-
178a
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VII, par 22 50a;
BK XII, par I I 101d / City of God, BK IX, Cll
4-5 287a-289a;BK XII, Cll 3 343d-344b;
CH 6-8 345b-347b; BK XIV, CH 6-9 380b-385b;
CH< ,II 385d-387a; CH 15 388d-390a; BK XV,
CH 21-22 415b-416c
19 AQUINAS: SU1nma Theologica, PART I, Q 49,
A I, REP 3 264d-265d; PART I-II, Q 4, A 4
631d-632c; Q 5, A 7, ANS 642a-d;Q6, A 4,
REP 3 647b-648a; Q 19 703a-711d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q50,
A 5, ANS and REP 3 10b-d; Q 55, A I, REP 2
26b-27a
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XI [22-66]
15b-d; PURGATORY, Ie-XXVII 53a-96a esp I
[22-84] 53b-54a, 59c, VII U7-60]
62d-63a, XI [25-45] 69a-b, XII [115-136] 71c-d,
XVI [52-15] 77b-d, XVII [82]-XVIII [75] 79b-
80c, XXI [34-78] 85b-d, XXVII [124-142] 95d-
96a; PARADISE, XV [1-6] 128b-c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 159a.,162c
30 BACON: Advancement ofLearning, 72a
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, IV 89a-93a
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK IX [342-375] 254b-
255b / San1son Agonistes [1334-1379] 368b-
369b
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 24b-26b; 44a-53a
42 KANT: Practical Reason, 321b-329a / Pref
Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 365b-d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 81
34c-d; ADDITIONS, 51 124c-d / Philosophy of
History, INTRO, 166b;PART III, 312d-313a;
PART IV, 365c
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Kara1nazov, BK V,
127b-137c paSSilTI
THE GREAT IDEAS
1099
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics,BK IV, CH 4 [I29Ib30-'-'38]
491a-b; CH 9 [1294b35-39] 494d .
14 PLUTARCH: Tiberius Gracchus, 678h.. d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PARTII, lOOe-101a; 117e-d;
130b-131a; 131d-132a; PART IV, 272c
35 LOCKE: Civil Government,cH VII, SECT 87-94
44a-46e passim; CH VIII, SECT 95-99 46c-47e;
CH XIV, SECT 16.3-168 63a-64e passim;cH XIX,
SECT 240-243 81b-d
Spirit ofLaws, HK I,3e;.BK II,
4b; BK III, 12d-13a; BK: IV, BK V,
30b-e
38 ROUSSEAU: Political Econ01ny, 369a-370d /
Social Contract, BK I, 392d-393b; BK II, 395a-
396d; 399b-400c; BK III, 409b-c; BK III-IV,
41ge-427a
42 KANT: Science of Right, 436e; 437e-d; 439a-
. 441d;445a-e; 448b.. d; 450a-b
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 39, 126e-127a; NUMBER
51, 164a-165a; NUMBER71, 214d-215a;NuMBER
78, 230d-232a
43 MILL: Liberty, 268b-271d
46 HEGEL: PhilosophY of Righl, PART III, par 281
95b-d; par 320.. 106e / Philosophy of F/istory,
INTRO, 172d-173a; 175b-e; PART 1n,302a-d
51 TOLSTOY:o War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 680b-
684a
lOb. The relation of law to will
7 PLATO: Laws,:BK, III, 669b,.6i70e; BK rv, 681b-
682e; BK IX,
9 ARISTOTLE : Ethics, HK x, CH 9 [II80aI4-24]
434d-435a / Politics, BK III, CH 16 485b-486e;
BK VI, CH .3' 521c.. 522a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 21,
A2, REP I 125e,.d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 90,
A I, REP 3 205b-206b; Q96, AS, ANS and REP 3
233d-234d
23 I-IoBBEs: Leviathan, PART II, 130c; 130d-131a;
131d-132b; 132d-133a; PART IV, 272e
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH IV, SECT 21 29d;
CH VI, SECT 57-:-6.3 36d-38c; CH XI 55b-58b esp
SECT 137 56d-57b; CH XIII, SECT I5I59d-60a;
CH XIX, SECT2I274a-b
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK V, 30b-c;
BK Xl, 69a
38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy, 369a-372b /
Social Contract, BK I, 393b-c; BK II, 395b-d;
399b-400C;BKIII, 419d-420a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, l10e / Fund. Prine lV1eta-
physic ofMorals, 273d-274a ; Science of Right,
401c-402a; 412e-d; 416b-417a; 435a-437e;
438d-439a; 448b-d; 450a; 450d-452a
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 78, 230d-232a
43 MILL: Liberty, 316b-d I Representative' Govern-
ment, 327b,d-332desp328d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 219
72d-73a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 170c-
178a; PART IV, 327d-328a; 350b-c; 361e-d;
364d-365a
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Nlanifesto, 427a-b
CHAPTER .. 100: .WILL
19 AQUINAS: Sumlna" Theologca,PART I-II, Q I 9,
A8, AN.S 708d-709d
20 SUlnlnaTheologica, PART 1,-11, Q 84,
A4, ANS and REP 5176d-178a
21 DANTE: Divine CoInedy, PURGATORY, V [1-21]
59a; XVIII [76-145] 80d-81b; PARADISE, IV
[64-90] 111b-e
22 CHAUCER: Clerk's Tale [8572-8583] 308a /
Second Nun's Prologue [15,469-4891 461a /
Parson's Tale, par 53.::..61 526b-530a
25 MONTAIGNE:Essays, 115b-121e; 124e-125a;
159a-162e; 200d-205b;492b-493a
26 SHAKESPEARE :3rd Henry VI, ACT III, SC II
[123-195] 87e-88a / Richard III105a-148a,e /
Taming of the Shrew, ACT IV, SC I [191- 214]
218b-c / Richard II 320a-35ld / Julius Caesar,
ACT IV, SC III [145-195] 589d-590e
27 SHAKESPEARE: Othello, ACT I, SCllI [302-410]
212b-213a; ACT II, seIII [29-27] 217b-219d /
King Lear, ACT V, SC II 278d-279a / Macbeth,
ACT I, SC VII [28"782] 28ge-290b
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 76d-77e
42 KANT: Fund. Prine Metaphysic of Morals,
258b-c / Practical Reason, 326b-327d; 356a-
360d j Pref..MetaphysicalElements of Ethics,
368d-369a; 36ge-370c
43 MILL: Liberty, 295b-296b; 30De / Representa-
tit/e Government,346c-3S0a' passim I Utili-
tarianism, 463c-464d
48 MELVILLE: A1obyDick, 123a-124a;137b-138a;
409b-410b
51 'TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 15a-16a; BK IV,
177d; BK VI, 235a; BK x, 441c-442a;BKXIII,
575b-c; 578b; BK XIV, 58ge-590c;605b-d
53 JAMES: Psychology,80a.;83b esp 8Ib-83a; 274a-
275a; 795b;798b-801a; 817a-819a; 826a.,827a
54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 884b-e
9b. The pathology of the will: indecision,
obsession, compulsion, inhibition
23 I-IoBBEs: Leviathan, PART I, 77d
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 38a-e; 138e... 139a;481d
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick esp 123a-b, 135a-138a,
404b-411a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK III, 115d.;116a;
HK V, 203a-d; BK VI, 235a-238e;245d-246a;
266e-267e; BK VII, 291b; HK VIII, 304b-30Sa;
BK XI, 519a-e; 527b-528b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 828b-829a
54 FREUD: Hysteria, 81e-86a esp82b-d, 83d-84c;
90a-b; 99c-102a I Interpretation of Drea1ns,
247d-248b I General Introduction, 550d-556d
esp551b-552a; 572b-e; 612a-b /Ego and Id,
713e-716e passim / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and
Anxiety, 719b-d; 729a-733e esp 731e-d
10. Will as a term in political theory
lOa. The sovereign will: the wIll of the people;
the will of the nlajority
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK III,
432b-c
9bto lOb
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 13d-14c
38 ROUSSEAU: Political Econornv, 372b-373b I
Social Contract, BK I, 393b-e
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 190c-d; 236d-237a I
Fund.. Prin. Aletaphysit! of1\1orals, 253d-254cl;
260a-261d; 265c-266d;
273d-279d esp 277d-279d / Practical Reason:
321b-329a; 330d-331a / Pref. lYIetaphysical
Elelnents ofEthics, 365b-d; 373d/lntro. lVfeta-
physic ofMoraIs, 386b-d; 388b-e; 389a-390a,c;
390b; 392b-393a / Science ofRight, 416b-417b
/ Judgement, 571e-d; 605d-606b [fn 2]
43 MILL: Liberty, 296b-e / Utilitarianism, 446a-d;
453c-454a; 458b-459b; 469d-470b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO," par 29
19a-b; PART I, par 79 33a-e; PART II, par 133
47a; par I3547b-d; par 140 49b-54a passim;
PART III, par 148-14956a-b; ADDITIONS, 84-
129b; 86 129c; 95 132b / Philosophy ofHistory,
PART IV, .
53 JAMES: Psychology, 272b-273a; 797b-798a;
807a-80Ba
9a. The distinction between men of strong and
weak will: cultivadon of will power
5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone [1-99] 131a-132a. I
Electra [.328-A7I] 158c-159d
5 EURIPIDES: Hippolytus [.373-430] 228b-d I
Electra [907-956] 335b-d; [959-987]
8 ARISTotLE: Soul, BK III, CH
665a-e; CH II [4.34a5-15] 666d-667a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VII, CH 1-10 395a-403c
/ Rhetoric, BK I, CH 12 [I372bII-I6] 616b
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 2 l06d-lOBb;
CH 5 110b-c; BK II, CH IS 155e-156b;
CH 9237d-238d
12 AURELIUS: l'vleditations, BK VII, SECT55 283b-c
18 AUGPSTINE: Confessions, HK VIII, par 26r2 7
60b-e
Be. The will and right: the harmony of indi-
vidual wills in external practical rela-
tions
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 114a.,115a / Pref. l\lfeta-
physical Elements of Ethics, 371b-372a I Intra.
Metaphysic ofMorals, 386d-387a,e / Science of
Right 397a-458a,e esp 397b-398a, 400b,d-
402a, 416b-417a, 435a-b, 448b-d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy ofRight, INTRO, par 4,l2d;
par 19 16d17a; par 21 17a-c; par 29--3019a-c;
par .33, 20b-e; PART I, par 34-40 21a-22e; par
44-45 23c-d; parS7, 26d; par
par 73-75 31e-32b; par 7933a-e; par 81-82
34e-d; par 10439b-d; PART II, par 107 40b-c;
par 113-114 41d-42b; par 117-118, 42e"'d; par
120 43e-d;par 127-13 45b-46a; par 132, 46b;
par 141, 54c-d;PARTIII,par 15I--rI55 57a-c;
par 217, 72b; par 258, 80b-e; ADDITIONS, 20
119d-120b; 52 124d-125a; 82 129a
50 MARX: Capital, 37e-d; 83d-84a
9. Differences among men in the sphere of will
1098
(Sb. The goodness or malice uf the will.)
8b(2) A good. will as. the exclusive .. or prin-
cipal human good
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH II 116d-118d;
CH 22 127c-128C; CH 25 129d-'131b; CH 29
134d-138a; BK II, CH I6156b-158d; BKIII,
CH 10 185d-187a
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK IX, CH 4 287a-
288b
19 AQUINAS: SUlnma Theologica, PART I-II, Q I,
A I, REP 2 609b-610b; Q 3, A 4 625a-626b;
Q 19, A I, REP 2 703b.. d
. 30 BACON: Advancement ofLearning,72a
42 KANT: Fund. Prine Metaphysic ofMorals, 256a-
261d esp .. 256a-b, 257c-d 1PracticalReas-on,
314d-319b. esp 316a-3!7d; .321b-329a. /.
i\1etaphysic of Morals, 389a-390a,e / Judge-
lnent, 591b-592a
43 Utilitarianism, 453e.-454a; 463e-464d
Se. The will and yirtue: justice and charity as
habits of the will
9 A.RISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 13 [II02bI3-
II03a4] 348a-e; BKII, CH () [II06b36-II07a3]
352e; BK III, CH 1-5 355b,d-361a;BK v, CH
8'-11 383a-387a,e; BK VI, CH 2 387d-388b;CH
1.3 [I I4s
a
3--5] 394d; BK VII, CH I-10 395a-403e
18 AUGUSTINE: CityofGod, BK IX, CH 4'-5 287a-
289a';BK XII,. CH 8-9346d-348b; BKXIV, CH
6-9 380b'-385b; BK XV,CH 21...,..22 415b-416c
19 AQUINAS: SUmlna Theologica, PART I, Q 21,
AI, REP I 124b-:l2Sb; A2, REP r125e-d; Q59,
A4, REP 3309a-310a; QOO, A5, ANS and REP 4
QQ 95-96 506b-S13e;QIOo 520d-
522b; PARTI':-II, Q 5, A 5,REP I 640b-641a;
Q I3,A I,'ANS.672d-673e; Q 19, A10, ANS710b-
711d
20 AQUINAS: Sum1na Theologica, PART I__H, Q50,
A 510b-d; Q 55, A I, REP 226b-27a; Q 56, A 6
34b-3Sa; Q 59, A 4, ANsand REP 248e-49a; Q
60, AA Q 62, A361c-62b;A4, ANS
62b-63a; PART II-II, Q23,A8, ANS488d-48ge;
'Q 24, A 1 489d-490b; AID, REP .3 496d... 498a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART III, 240d; 245b-c
38 ROUSSEAU: Political Econon1Y,
/ Social Contract,BJ-( I, 393b-e
42 KANT: Fund. Prine Metaphysic of, Morals,
256a-b
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 463c464d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 8Ib-B3b,; 186b-187a; 807a-
808a; 816a-819a esp 8lBa
sd. The will and duty: the categorical imper-
ative
12 i-\URELIUS: Meditations, HK VIII, SECT 32 287d-
288a
19 AQ'UINAS: SumlnaTheologica, PAE.TI, Q 25,
A 3, REP 3 145b-147a; PARTI-II,<QI9,AA 3-6
704e-708a; AA 9-10 709d-711d
21 DANTE: Dittine Conledy, PARADISE, V [13--84]
112b-113a
CROSS-REFERENCES
lOco The general will, particular wills, the will
of each, and the "rill of all
23 HOBBES: Leviathan,PART II, lOGe-lOla
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH IV, SECT 21 29d;
CH XIII, SECT 151 59d-60a; CH XIX, SECT 212
74a-b
38 ROUSSEAU: Political Econ0n1Y, 369a-370d;
372b-e / Social Contract, BK I, 392d-393b; BK
II, 395a-398b; 399b-400e; BK III, 409b-4l0a;
4l8a; BK IV, 425a-427a
1.
II.
Listed below are \vorks not included in Great Books ofthe FVestern World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
I. \Vorks by authors represented in this collection.
II. \Vorks by authors not represented in this collection.
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of AdditionalR'eadings \vhich follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
VOLTAIRE. "Free-Will," "WIll," in A Philosophical
Dictionary
--. The Ignorant Philosopher, CH 13
T. REID. Essays on the Active Powers ofthe Human
Mind, I-II
BENTHAM. An Introduction to the Principles ofMorals
and Legislation, CH 8-10
GODWIN. An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice,
BK IV, CH 5-6
J. G. FICHTE. The Vocation of Man
SCHELLING. Of Human Freed01n
SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea, VOL I,
BK II, IV; VOL II, SUP, CH 19-20; VOL III, SUP, CH 28
J. MILL. Analysis of the Phenon1ena of the Hunlan
Jvfind, CH 24-25
BALZAC. The Wild Ass's Skin
LOTZE. Microcosmos, BK II, CH 5
BAIN. The Emotions and the Will
EMERSON. "Po\ver," in The Conduct of Life
E. HARTMANN. Philosophy of the Unconscious, (A)
I-II, IV, VII
H. SIDGWICK. The lvtethods of Ethics, BK J, ClI 5
GEORGE ELIOT. Daniel Deronda
T. H. GREEN. The Principles of Political Obligation,
(F, G)
---. Prolegomena to Ethics, BK II
RIBOT. The Diseases ofthe Will
BERGSON. Tin1e and Free Will
WUNDT. Outlines of Psychology, (14)
BOSANQUET. Science and Philosophy, 15
BRADLEY. Ethical Studies, I
--. Collected Essays, VOLl (14); VOL II (26-28)
ROYCE. The World and the Individual, SERIES 1'(10)
l\1ANN. Buddenbrooks
fl. COHEN. Eihik des reinen Willens
T. HARDY. The Dynasts
WOODWORTH. Psychological Issues, CH 2
MOORE. Ethics, CH 6
McTAGGART. The Nature of Existence, CH 40, 57
B. RUSSELL. Our Knowledge ofthe External World,
VIII
--. The Analysis of Mind, LECT 14
LOSSKY. Freedonz of Will
GARRIGOu-LAGRANGE. God, His Existence and Na-
ture, PART II, CH 4; APPENDIX 4
--. The One God, CH 19,22-23
MARITAIN. Scholasticism and Politics, CH V
SANTAYANA. The Realm of Spirit, ClI 4-5
EPICURUS. Letter to lvlenoeceus
CICERO. De Finibus (On the Supreme Good), III-IV
ANSELM OF CANTERBURY. De Libera Arbitrio
BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX. Concerning Grace and Free
Will
DUNS SCOTUS. Opus Oxoniense, BK I-II, IV
--. Reportata Parisiensia, BK l, DIST 10, QQ I, 3;
BK IV, DIST 49, QQ 9, 17
VALLA. Dialogue on Free Will
LUTHER. A .Treatise on Christian Liberty
CALVIN. Institutes ofthe Christian Religion, BK II, CH 5
SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, XI (3), XIX,
XXIII-XXIV, XXX (9, 16-17), xxxv (5)
BURTON. The Anatomy of Melancholy, PART I, SECT
I, MEMB II, SUB-SECT I I
JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS. Cursus Philosophicus Tho-
,nisticus, Philosophia Naturalis, PART IV, Q 12
De la recherche de la verite, BK I,
CH I (2), 2
BOSSUET. Traite du libre arbitre
CUD\VORTH. .A Treatise of FreeuJill
LEIBNITZ. New Essays Concerning Human Under-
standing, BK II, CH 2 I
J. EnwARDS. A Careful ... Enquiry into the Modern
. Notions of Freedonl of Will
ADDITIONAL REL4DINGS
CHAPTER 100: WILL 1101
EPICTETUS. The Manual
AUGUSTINE. On Free Will
.---. On Grace and FreeWill
=--. On the Predestination ofthe Saints
AQUINAS. Summa Contra Gentiles, BK I, CH 72 - 88 ;
BK III, CH 88-98
.---. Quaestiones Disputatae, De Veritate, QQ 22, 24;
De lvlalo, Q 6
DESCARTES. The Principles of Philosophy, PART I, 6,
32, 34-35, 37, 39, 4
1
-4
2
HUME. A Treatise of Human Nature, BK II, PART
III
HEGEL. Science of Logic, VOL II, SECT II, CH 3
J. S. MILL. A System of Logic, BK VI, CH 2 .
____-. An Examination of Sir William Hamtlton's
Philosophy, CH 26
W. JAMES. "The Dilemma of Determinism," in
The Will to BelietJe
FREUD. The Predisposition to Obsessional Neurosis
1100 THE GREAT IDEAS HIe
(10. Will as a term in political theory.) 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 114b-d I ofRig/u,
437e-d; 448b-d; 450a-b; 451e-452a
43 MILL: Liberty, 268b-27ld I Representative'
Govenunent, 327b,d-332d esp 332a-d
46 HEGEL: -Philosophy offfRight, PART I, par 84-
35a; PART III, par ISS 57e; par 219 72d-73a.
par 257 80b; par 258, 80d-8! b; par 270,
86e; ADDITIONS, 48-49 l24b-e; 51 124e-d; 162
l43b-144e / Philosophy of History, INTRO,
l70e-17le; l72d-173e; 203b-206a,e; PART I
2lla-e; PART IV, 363e-d; 366c-367a '
54 FREUD: Group Psychology, 686d-687b [fn 2]
For: The general consideration ofthe will in relation to desire, emotion, and mind or reason, see
DESIRE 3b(I); EMOTION I; MIND Ib(2), Id, Ie(3)-Ig; PRUDENCE 4a, Sb; REASONING
se(3); SENSE 3e.
Other discussions of the voluntary, the involuntary, and the nonvoluntary, see ANIMAL
Ia(3), 4b; HABIT6c;KNOWLEDGE8b(2); MAN Ia; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY sa;
VIRTUE AND VICE 4e( I).
The bearing of the voluntary on the distinction between knowledge and opinion, see KNOWL-
EDGE 4b; OPINION 2b.
The discussion of rationalization or wishful thinking, see DESIRE Sb; EMOTION 3b; OPINION
2a; REASONING sa.
The theory of error which attributes error to free win, see MIND sa; TRUTH 3d(2).
The conception of faith as dependent on an act of the will or practical reason, see GOD 6C(2);
KNOWLEDGE 6c(S); METAPHYSICS 2d; OPINION 4a; RELIGION Ia.
The understanding of the divine will and its relation to the divine intellect, and for the
problem of God's freedom, see GOD4e, 4g, SC, Sg; LIBERTY Sd; MIND log.
Discussions relevant to the various doctrines of, and the many-sided controversy over, the
freedom of the will, see CAUSE 3; CHANCE Ib; FATE 3,5; LIBERTY IC, 3c, 4a-4b, sa-sc;
Ia; METAPHYSICS 2d; !vIIND le(3); NATURE 2f; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY
sa-sa(I), sa(3); PRUDENCE 4a ; PUNISHMENT 2a; VIRTUE AND VICE 5e.
Other discussions which have a bearing on the implications of free will, see GOD 7d; 'I-IISTORY
4a(I); LIBERTY IC, sa, 5c;LoVE sa, sa(2); NATURE 6b; SIN 3b-3c, 6a; SLAVERY 2d, 3d;
VIRTUE AND VICE 8h.
The ethical doctrine which l11akes a good will the exclusive or principal good, see GOOD
AND EVIL 3b-3b(2); and for the relation of the will to duty, the moral law, and the cate-
gorical imperative, see DUTY I, 5; JUSTICE Ie; LAW 4c; LIBERTY 3c; NECESSITY AND
CONTINGENCY sa(2); PRINCIPLE 4b.
The moral theory which judges the rectitude of the will by the ends it adheres to and by the
means it chooses, see HAPPINESS 3; LIBERTY 3c; PRUDENCE 3a; VIRTUE AND VICE 4e(2)-
4e(3); and for the consideration of the will in relation to virtue, especially prudence,
justice, and charity, see HABIT Sb; JUSTICE IC, Ie; LOVE la, Sb; PRUDENCE 4a; VIRTUE
AND VICE 2a( I), SC, 8d(3).
Another treatment of the pathology of the will, see DESIRE 6b; EMOTION 3C(2).
The will as a concept in political theory, and especially in relation to law and sovereignty, see
DE!\10CRACY Sb; GOVERNMENT Ih; LAW Ib; MONARCHY Ia(2).