PNNL-SA-87119

The Comprehensive Nuclear-TestBan Treaty (CTBT)

Dr. Theodore (Ted) W. Bowyer Laboratory Fellow Program Manager Nuclear Explosion Monitoring and Policy Program Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)

My Background
PhD - Nuclear Physics - Indiana University 1995
PhD Thesis n-p scattering spin observables near 200 MeV/c2

PNNL 1995-Present
Scientist and program manager for various nuclear detection projects A three-year assignment in the National Nuclear Security Agency Office of Nonproliferation Policy Scientific advisor
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

Currently
PNNL Laboratory Fellow Program Manager of the PNNL Nuclear Explosion Monitoring and Policy Program Chair of the United States Verification and Monitoring Task Force Radionuclide Subgroup Chair of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Radionuclide Expert Group Member of the National Academy of Sciences Study on Technical Aspects of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
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Nonproliferation and Arms Control is an Important Topic

The threat of the use of nuclear weapons has been a bipartisan concern for decades
Both in terms of the use of a nuclear weapon by a rogue state or terrorist and by the clandestine testing of nuclear weapons by countries seeking to improve their nuclear arsenals

Nuclear Testing Ban

The prohibition of nuclear testing has been one of the main goals (crown jewels) of nonproliferation advocates for decades Several treaties have been negotiated and are in force to limit nuclear testing, however, no global ban is in place
Did you know that?

The United States failed to ratify the Treaty in 1999, but the president has stated that we will be revisiting this decision

U.S. Position on Nuclear Testing

CTBT
In 1999, the U.S. Senate decided to not ratify the CTBT The United States supports the Treaty and the president has stated that CTBT is a high priority The U.S. does not plan to test a nuclear weapon, and does not plan to develop new nuclear weapons STATUS: 41 of 44 required States have signed; 33 have ratified (total of 157 have ratified) No signature: India, North Korea, Pakistan No ratification: China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, United States

LTBT, TTBT (TTBT Bilateral)

The LTBT and TTBT are long-standing nuclear testing treaties which we still support

STATUS: In force since 1963 (LTBT), 1990 (TTBT)

Previous Test Treaties

Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)
No atmospheric, underwater, or outer space nuclear tests; 1963

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)

No nuclear weapons owned (or tested) by non-P5 countries; 1967

Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)

No nuclear weapons tests above 150-kt; 1974

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET)

No peaceful nuclear explosion tests above 150-kt; 1976

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT);

No nuclear tests; Not in force

ALSO Unilateral moratoria Nuclear test site transparency

Which countries does the CTBT impact?

The CTBT has been described as:
the longest sought, hardest fought, arms control measure.

The Treaty is a multilateral treaty that mainly affects the P5 (China, France, Russia, UK, US) and the emerging states (India, North Korea, Pakistan)
Other States already cannot test under provisions of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)

Nuclear Testing Timeline

First U.S. Nuclear Test 1945 First Soviet Nuclear Test 1949 First U.K. Nuclear Test 1952 First Indian Nuclear Test 50 Megaton 1974 Atmospheric Test 1961 India and Pakistan Test 1998 First North Korean Nuclear Test 2006

1940

1950

1960
PNET 1963

1970
NPT 1968

1980
TTBT/PNET 1974-1990

1990

2000
CTBT Signings 1996-Today

2010

Atoms for Peace 1954

Discussions Start on Verification of a Test Ban 1958 Call for a Test Ban 1959 First CTBT Drafts 1962

CTBT Negotiations Start 1994 CTBTO Formed 1995

The CTBT
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty bans all nuclear explosions on Earth whether for military or for peaceful purposes The Treaty was signed by many countries starting in the early 1990s For the Treaty to go into force, the 44 nuclear capable countries must sign and ratify

The 40 nuclear capable countries and CTBT Status

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How do you monitor (verify) a CTBT?

It is a difficult challenge to monitor the entire world for nuclear tests, no matter how small Nuclear tests normally occur
Underground Above ground Underwater

Taking aside very small tests (lets limit our thinking to 1 kiloton or more), nuclear tests:
Shake the ground Emit large amounts of radioactivity Make loud noises if in the atmosphere (or hydroacoustic waves if underwater)
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Three Verification Components of the CTBT

The International Monitoring System (IMS)
Remote measurements to trigger further actions

The International Data Center (IDC)

Data handling and analysis

On-Site Inspections (OSI)

Local measurements to give high fidelity answers that a nuclear explosion may have occurred
These functions are stewarded by an autonomous UN Organization called the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (not affiliated with the International Atomic Energy Agency)

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The Technologies
Seismic sensors
Detecting earth movement Must separate explosions and 100+ earthquakes per day Can pinpoint the location of the event to with 1,000 km2 or better

Infrasound
Low frequency sound waves Affected by wind noise Most useful for atmospheric detonations

Hydroacoustic
Underwater blasts Very expensive sensors, but only a few are needed to monitor all of the oceans (and whales) because these pressure/sound travels far in water

Radionuclide detection
Atmospheric detonations Huge amount of radioactivity released Underground detonations Radioactive xenon will be released
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The International Monitoring System

The International Monitoring System was established with 321 stations and consists of the following sensors:
Seismic Airborne radionuclide Hydroacoustic Infrasound

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The IMS

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Seismic Monitoring

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Seismic Stations
Dense network Low threshold (<1 kt) Nearly instantaneous information (speed of seismic waves) Allows determination of the time and location to about 1000 km2

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Seismic Installations

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Infrasound Detection

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Infrasound Stations

Hydroacoustic Monitoring
Acoustic pulses travel great distances in the ocean because they are trapped in an acoustic "wave guide". called the Sofar channel. This means that as acoustic pulses approach the surface they are turned back towards the bottom, and as they approach the ocean bottom they are turned back towards the surface.

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Hydroacoustic Stations

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The International Data Center

Packed full of scientists that analyze data from the IMS Gigabytes of data analyzed every day Goal: use data from the IMS to pinpoint the probable location of presumed explosion to 1000 km2 or less
Use seismic methods and atmospheric transport modeling

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On-Site Inspection
Detection of radionuclides in the environment near a presumed ground zero
There will be targeted isotopes that will detected Only those needed for the inspection

Ground zero will be determined via a number of techniques including detection localization of after-shocks, penetrating radar, etc.

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Topics of interest to Nuclear Professionals

Goal: Incredibly sensitive detection of airborne radionuclides in the atmosphere indicative of a nuclear explosion Issues
Equipment ~106 times more sensitive than ordinary sensors Specialized techniques (no commercial off the shelf technology exists) to collect and measure radionuclide species that dont matter for other processes
Customized technology Custom software

Negotiation of on-site inspection techniques that are effective for the detection of nuclear tests, yet do not yield other unrelated sensitive information to inspectors
For example, national security sensitive information at a former nuclear test site
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Radionuclide Detection
Fission and activation products from a nuclear explosion can be liberated into the atmosphere and detected remotely Entire Earths atmosphere
4 1018 m3

Concentration ~ 0

Xe produced from a 1-kiloton nuclear detonation (after 3 days) ~1016 Bq = 10 mBq/m3

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Station

Easy to detectexcept

Concentration ~ 0 High Concentration

Radionuclide Stations

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RN Stations in the IMS

Airborne radioactive debris can be in the form of radioactive particles or radioactive gases Each completely automatic IMS radionuclide station consists of either
A particulate monitoring system or A particulate monitoring system and radioactive noble gas system

Each IMS radionuclide station may also send the physical debris to one of 16 laboratories for confirmatory analysis

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What Makes a Good Analyte for Detection of Nuclear Explosions?

Should be as definitive as possible
High signal-to-noise ratio No problems with interpretation

Should be possible to measure using ordinary means

Interpretation we must design idiot- (PhD-) proof technology Must be robust and have diagnostics

Systems or processes used to detect it should adhere to some fiscal reality

Target was $100k per system $1M is more like it
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Example: Radioactive Xenon Detection Systems

Radioactive xenon isotopes
Full of science and intrigue 131mXe, 133Xe, 133mXe, 135Xe
Large amounts produced and (likely) released from nuclear explosions Are definitive with the use of isotopic ratios Still a complex measurement for non-specialists, but we have had some success Fiscal realities

Status of the IMS Verification Regime

We are about 75% complete with the installation of stations Budgets are in the range of $100M per year for the network We expect the network to be near complete in 2014 There are still unanswered scientific, technical and logistical questions
How can we better discriminate between background and explosions? Can we improve the sensitivity of the network? How can new technology be put into the system in a cost effective way?

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On-Site Inspection
Presumably following detections in the IMS and a vote of an executive council, an on-site inspection may be called An On-Site Inspection is intended to provide additional evidence to clarify whether a nuclear explosion occurred and to gain facts to assist in the determination of a possible violator A number of technologies are allowed for an OSI
Local radionuclide monitoring for isotopes of interest Radiological survey via air and ground Environmental sampling (defined differently than in the NPT) Seismic aftershock & active seismic Multispectral imaging Drilling (for a cavity) Geophysical techniques (gravimetric, geomagnetics, etc.)

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On-Site Inspections
Radionuclides may be emitted at high levels near ground zero Other cues such as underground cabling, etc. might also point to testing activity

Gas Gas Gas Gas

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Technical Issues Related to OSI

What is the (minimum) set of radionuclides that can be used to determine a nuclear test has occurred?
Note we need to be able to confidently rule out other civil phenomena, such as reactor operation, medical isotope production, etc.

Can we effectively blind a gamma ray spectrometer so that information not related to the purpose of the inspection is not revealed? How can we effectively split environmental samples in the field? What is the most effective way to collect subsurface gases from the soil? What natural and manmade radionuclides could confound our results?

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What about very small tests?

The CTBT does not specify a lower yield limit The current lower level of detection limit for the IMS is in the range of 0.5 kiloton or better
The yield of the 2006 DPRK test, which was detected by the IMS, was probably less than 1 kt

Very small tests may be impossible to detect

Are those tests significant?

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The North Korean Test

DPRK announced that it was going to conduct a nuclear test and a few days later it did The IMS detected the event and was able to tell it was not an earthquake Radioactive xenon was also detected many miles away, though the detection was less confident

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National Technical Means

Art IV. Sec D. Para 37. The on-site inspection request shall be based on information collected by the International Monitoring System, on any relevant technical information obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, or on a combination thereof. The request shall contain information pursuant to Part II, paragraph 41 of the Protocol.

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On a related note.
The production of 99Mo medical isotopes needed for medical procedures around the world also produces and emits huge amounts (though at very low dose levels) of radioactive Xe Several production locations around the world
Emissions can be tracked across the world Scientific studies are underway to understand the isotopes emissions and ways to avoid or account for them

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Impact of Technology in the Policy World

Technology is agnostic
Remarkable impact has been made on policy issues, when the facts have been laid out Communication of scientific issues in an understandable way

Spin-offs
Development of sensitive airborne nuclear debris detection
Detection of the plume from Fukushima and verification that there was a fuel breach Application of sensitive network measurements of trace gases as they apply to the greenhouse gas problem

International Monitoring System

Automated Radioxenon Sampler-Analyzer

Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler-Analyzer

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IMS Radionuclide Laboratory (RL16)

Establishment of the IMS at WGB in Vienna

What is the future of the CTBT?

The issue is being taken up by the administration and there may be a vote in Congress at some point in the not too distant future If the U.S. ratifies, the next step would be to ensure other countries do as well In the mean time, we are busy building the IMS, establishing analysis algorithms in the IDC, and preparing techniques for on-site inspections

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Summary and Conclusions

The International Monitoring System (IMS) was created to verify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty On-site inspection is an emerging technical area The CTBT has not been ratified by many States, but the work continues to establish the IMS

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