Kaleem 1

Philosophical Approaches to Social Sciences

Research Paper First Draft Hashim Kaleem 2014-02-0454

Can there be laws in the Social Sciences like the laws in Natural Sciences?

Amber Riaz 30th of November, 2013

Kaleem 2 Can laws in the Social sciences be like laws in the Natural Sciences?

Social sciences have been pitted against natural sciences whereby scientists have drawn comparisons between the two and have examined both in regards to various aspects.[1][2] Unfortunately for the former, the comparison has resulted in an inferior status which has been embraced by some social scientists themselves. One of the major reasons why a secondary status has been associated to social sciences is the alleged inability of social sciences to produce laws. Scientific laws, as argued by many, lend credibility to a particular field of science as it is presumed that explanations offered by that science almost always implicitly invokes laws which in turn strengthen these explanations. Kincaid states the reason for this in Defending laws in the Social Sciences as explanations become far more compelling if their explanatory statements are well-testified which follows repeatable manipulation of data in a controlled environment. This process itself requires laws and results in newer laws. In Kincaids own words, Laws, explanation and confirmation go hand in hand.3 Having established a general significance of laws in sciences, I shall now move on to discussing the possibility of laws in the social sciences. In the course of this paper, I will first introduce the opposition against laws in the social sciences analyzing argument from complexity.4I will then refute these objections on the grounds of this attack being considerably reductionist appealing to the approach

Natural sciences are concerned with phenomenon that occurs naturally such as the study of Physics, biological sciences etc. whereas social sciences deal with social issues and study human interactions engaging in understanding, interpreting and explaining for instance economics, anthropology, political sciences. 2 Fritz Machlup notes in Are social sciences really inferior? that the grounds for comparison between the two sciences are often Verifiability of hypothesis, exactness of findings, objectivity of observations and explanations, predictability of future events etc. 3 See Harold Kincaid Defending Laws in the social sciences. Laws are relevant to social sciences for many social scientists largely claim that social sciences are deeply involved in explaining human actions and interactions. This, as pointed out, requires laws. (Pg.2 of the article.) 4 There are various objections to social laws but for a focused and in-depth discussion of the topic, I shall not pretend to cover all such objections. I therefore render other objections such as(including but not limited to) teleological nature of social sciences and objections concerning objectivity and interpretation out of the scope of this paper.

Kaleem 3 of redescription of posited inquiry making a case for social laws. Conclusively, presenting a synthesis of both the sides, I will make a final commentary on our topic which has both intrigued and inspired contemporary philosophical debates. Many authors have been skeptical of the possibility of laws in social sciences out of which any attempt to make a case for such laws is tagged as impractical, impossible or irrelevant .5 Most often such an approach is rooted in the understanding of social phenomenon as too complex to be transformed into laws. This argument from complexity emanates out of the understanding that scientific law is the rule by which two phenomenon are connected with each other according to the principle of causality that is to say as cause and effect.6 Opposition to social laws argues that social phenomenon is complex because of a large number of variables which contribute as causes of human action. This is taken as an important contrast between natural and social sciences. According to Popper in Prediction and Prophecy in the Social Sciences, natural scientific phenomenon is taken to be recurrent, fairly isolated and simple, on the other end human phenomenon is considered singular, interactive and complex.7It follows from this contrast that it is easier to formulate laws in natural sciences where as in the case of social sciences, because of the interactive nature of phenomenon and an increasing number of underlying variables, the possibility of a regularity in patterns is excluded making it almost impossible to extract laws out of it. McIntyre explains this in the following words, In social science it is held that we face a subject matter that is constantly changing, due to the continual realignment of the relationship between the critical influential variables that underlie human behaviorAs humans we affect and are affected by each otherour systems never remain stationary

L.McIntyre & M.Martin, The Philosophy of Social Sciences . Introduction to Part ii. Pg. 39 (Examples of such authors are the likes of Michael Scriven and F.A.Hayek. 6 See The theory of Complex Phenomenon by F.A.Hayek. pg 66. In The philosophy of Social Sciences. 7 Michael Scriven endorses a similar view in A Possible Distinction between Traditional Scientific Disciplines and the Study of Human Behavior. Popper,Karl. Prediction and Prophecy in the Social Sciences 1965.

Kaleem 4 long enough to determine the exact relationship between variablesIn order to come up with laws we would need some type of stability in the phenomenon under investigation.8 Consider an example of the above idea: In an attempt to study the causes of political instability in the Middle East, there would be several considerations to be accounted for. Because the subjectmatter of our inquiry is societal, we cannot exactly demarcate what would be relevant in our inquiry. This is to say that there would be numerous factors all contributing to political instability within Middleeast, we might be able to identify some of them for example an authoritative regime, an oppressive culture so on and so forth. However, we would never have an exact causational link between these factors and the over-all instability because of the complexity of the subject-matter as many other possibilities would be playing a role which we havent yet identified. In the highly unlikely scenario of having identified all the factors after a tedious process, a second problem could arise that these factors are no longer contributing to the final effect as human actions and their motivations exist in a continuum whereby taking phenomenon as a constant is sufficiently problematic.9 At best, we can make more or less credible generalizations about this complex phenomenon which can still not qualify as laws as in the case of natural sciences which can give sharply-fixed probabilities springing from the nature of natural theory for example calculating velocity of a rocket fired into the air.10 Now, before we move on to addressing these objections, lets first summarize what the contention has been so far. We have thus far argued that objects of social science are open-ended and complex in such a way that they are practically unpredictable. Social institutions are in a continuous state of flux and shall appear to be indeterminate to us. This does not fit well with our conception of

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McIntyre,Lee C. Complexity and Social Scientific Laws. Pg 131. Other Examples of Social complexity: Demand/Supply theories, psychological experiments etc. which are also vulnerable to the same objections (though the strength of objection may vary) 10 Davidson,Donald. Psychology as Philosophy. Pg. 81.Print

Kaleem 5 general laws which require a steady state of objects under study or even if they change, it should be in some regular and apprehensible way. In Brian Fays words, General laws are universal, well confirmed empirical hypothesis which state that under situations X, if a then b, ceteris paribus. 11 Having reiterated the crux of oppositions argument, we revert to defending the possibility of social laws. Doing so, I will argue that the problem of complexity can be eliminated as it is rather selfimposed and can be dealt with if we redescribe/redefine our subject-matter. I will also argue that the problems highlighted by the opposition could also be faced by natural sciences rendering the attack too reductionist in approach and preclude the possibility of laws in both natural and social sciences. In order to respond to the argument from complexity, we need to first analyze where does this complexity originates from. According to McIntyre, social phenomenon is not inherently but derivatively complex. In fact, it is complex only as described and defined at a particular level of inquiry which shapes the subject matter as well. Complexity comes from the level of questions we pose to a particular phenomenon. Therefore, social sciences might be complex at a certain level of inquiry but since complexity is merely a function of this level of inquiry altering the course of our inquiry can lead to the problem not remaining complex anymore solving the dilemma. McIntyre states, A subject matter is not so much discovered then, as it is defined by the questions that we ask about the phenomena we are interested in having explained- it is shaped by our descriptions. 12 An important consideration we can extract out of this is that the absence of laws on one particular level of inquiry does not and should not mean that laws would not possible at all levels. This asks us to; redecribe or redefine our level of inquiry and consequently our subject matter opening up
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Fay, Brian. General Laws and Explaining Human Behavior pg.103. Print McIntyre,Lee.C. Complexity and Social Scientific Laws pg 132. Print

Kaleem 6 the possibility of social laws. However, does this completely solve our problem? Whereas it might be conceded now that there is a possibility of some laws in social sciences after a process of redescription however that would not suffice to our task of finding laws in a particular level of inquiry that interests us. Redescription therefore would be more of a compromise on the explanatory power of laws.13 One can always point out that this then reduces our rigorous efforts in understanding and explaining human action to mere tautological statements which have already been covered in the past. This also implies that a stagnation of social sciences will follow with minimalistic progress as opposed to natural sciences which continuously engages with phenomenon finding newer laws. For example, it is erroneous to compare truism like, If a man wants to drink Carlsberg beer, then he general will if the opportunity is there and no other desire overrides to a law which states the inertia of a body falling in a vacuum. Whilst this concern does have a valid point to make, it is not entirely irrefutable. Two responses can be offered to this. Firstly, we shall appeal to the distinction between simple and complex which is not a constant and second the possibility of altering descriptions even at a particular level of inquiry. In order to explain the first one, it would be best to look at the example of natural sciences as a case study. It can be said without doubt that natural sciences such as physics have shown tremendous progress in explaining scientific phenomenon which was once considered to be absolutely incomprehensible and more importantly complex. Take for instance- Newtonian laws of gravity. Before these laws were actually discovered, we attached a complex status to the subject-matter which baffled the investigators at that time. However, the same laws are often taken as a starting point for many complex and newer problems in the status quo. We can extract one lesson out of this analogy, that the distinction between simple and complex is subject to the passage of time so matter that seems very complex even within
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It is a compromise on the explanatory power because post-redescription, we are susceptible to a change in subject-matter to the extent that it no longer remains in the realm of social sciences. This follows from a descriptivist vision of social sciences which endorses the legitimacy of a certain level of description and vocabulary. It is then that we might be able to state some very obvious law -like propositions which would not be of much help as they do not explain what we wanted to be explained.

Kaleem 7 social sciences can be simplified with greater engagement with the subject matter. The idea is that even if at this point in time, we might not be able to point out exact scientific laws at a certain level of inquiry we still, more often than not, are able to establish nomological14 connections which provide us with useful insights to understand human actions. So, at best, this attack is fairly reductionist because it imposes a harsh requirement of explaining phenomenon in a narrow sense of vocabulary and description. It is not cognizant of the fact that even at a particular level of inquiry there are many different possible descriptions, categories and vocabularies. Having summed up the first refutation to the argument from complexity, I shall now move on to addressing the second problem with such an approach. The problem that we need to identify is that under the conditions imposed on social sciences defying the possibility of laws, even natural sciences will not be able to produce law-like explanations.15 In natural sciences, our descriptions and theories have the leeway to evolve so that regularity can be attained. This involves using different routes of inquiry and changing vocabularies. On surface, this might seem that we have digressed from our original inquiry but that certainly does not mean that our findings are necessarily truistic. McIntyre gives the example of natural sciences theories which witnessed a transition from phlogiston to oxygen which highlights the importance of redescription. Within the same realm of natural sciences, phenomenon such as evolutionary biology and genecology are still considered very complex yet scientists continue to inquire into them without any resistance. The purpose of stating this is essentially to highlight similarities in the problems faced by both natural and social sciences based on which I can say that if one is not hindered in the face of such problems, why the latter should be judged negatively. Conclusively, this paper presents an optimistic view of the possibility of laws in social and natural sciences. It does concede that the progress (in terms of finding laws) has been evidently faster in
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Nomological means something that just is. That is not necessarily logically connected neither are they theoretically explicable. They can be conceived of building blocks. 15 See McIntyre pg. 136 and Kincaid.pg 114 and 117

Kaleem 8 the case of natural sciences. However, ruling out the possibility of any laws et.al. in social sciences is not the best position to take. In particular, the field of economics has produced claims that are extremely well-confirmed and hence possess the explanatory and predictive power to a considerable extend. For example the laws of supply and demand assuming complete information and stability (opposite of which would be times of war for eg.). It is similar to natural sciences law which also assumes that holding everything else constant such and such would be the course of action of a particular natural kind. Yet again, laws in social sciences might not be able to compete with the ones in natural sciences in terms of quantity but we at the minimum- need to recognize a solid possibility of social sciences being able to produce laws which shall enhance the human understanding of social phenomenon.

Kaleem 9 Works Cited Davidson,Donald. Psychology as Philosophy. Philosophy of Social SciencePg.79-90 Fay, Brian. General Laws- Explaining Human Behavior Philosophy of Social Science Pg. 91-110 Hayek, F.A. The Theory of Complex Phenomenon , Philosophy of Social Science. Pg. 55-71 Popper,Karl. Prediction and Prophecy in the Social Sciences 1965. Kincaid, Harold. Defending Laws in the Social Sciences Philosophy of Social Science Pg 111-130 Machlup,Fritz. Are Social Sciences Really Inferior?, Philosophy of Social Science.Pg. 5-21 McIntyre,Lee.C. Complexity and Social Scientific Laws Philosophy of Social Science Pg 131-144 Scriven,Michael. A Possible Distinction between Traditional Scientific Disciplines and the Study of Human Behavior. Philosophy of Social Science. Pg. 71-78