Analysis

February 4, 2014

Summary: A fierce power struggle between the governing AK Party and the Glen Movement has dominated Turkeys political scene, generating wide interest both domestically and internationally. Thus far, conjectural factors have been largely blamed for the crisis. Yet, it is the structural factors that have facilitated the feud and can better illuminate it, specifically Turkeys overly centralized and identity-imposing state and the Glen Movements inclination to attempt to influence policy even while not in government. This poses a grave challenge to Turkeys democracy and civilian politics. Turkey needs to address these structural challenges by devolving power to local administrations, eliminating the states ability of social engineering, and increasing the transparency of religious groups.

The Structural Roots of Turkeys Power Struggle

by Galip Dalay
Introduction Turkey has been experiencing a fierce power struggle between the governing AK Party and the Glen Movement, a religious group headed by Islamic cleric Fethullah Glen, who has lived in the United States since 1999. The first public contest between the parties took place in February 2012 when Turkeys intelligence chief, Hakan Fidan, was summoned to court for conducting secret negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) for a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish issue, a mission he had been entrusted with by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan. The Movement was widely believed to have been behind the summons since it opposes a negotiated settlement. Afterward, the discord was kept out of public eyes, but it had not been settled. The tension between both parties simmered because of their opposing stances on major domestic and foreign policy issues. But, when government officials announced in November 2013 that they were working on a draft proposal to close down private tutoring schools, arguing that the system in its current form puts unnecessary pressure on students and a financial burden on families, the covert dispute was once again brought to light. Since the Movement owns one-quarter of all private tutoring schools in Turkey, providing its main source of revenue and recruits, it viewed this decision as an attempt to deal a calamitous blow to its organizational structure. The Movement has employed an assortment of strategies to prevent this proposal from moving forward, with no effect yet. When the sensational graft probe of December 17 culminated in the arrest of scores of people, given the context and history, it was viewed by many as a politically motivated power struggle clothed in judicial investigations of corruption cases. That does not mean, however, that all judicial cases are ingenuous and premised on fabricated evidence, nor does it means the judicial aspect of the case be overlooked. Nevertheless, it points to the fact that the root of the charges may not be corruption; rather, it may be a power struggle between the sides. A religious group initiating a struggle of that kind and magnitude against a highly popular government is not only a novelty in Turkeys political history, it probably has few parallels, if any, in other democratic countries. The fact that this power struggle is taking place between an elected

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government and a religious organization is intriguing and unique. Wide media coverage has focused mostly on conjectural factors. But a thorough understanding of the issues requires a deeper examination of the events, with a special focus placed on structural roots of the current disquiet. The structural features of Turkeys highly centralized and identity-imposing state renders it ripe for power struggles. On the other hand, the Glen Movements self-conceived mission and its political activities illustrate the tendency that the Movement has developed for political engineering or the formation of an autonomous structure within the state. Turkeys Over-Centralized and Identity Imposing State The state is over-centralized in Turkey, and has a huge influence even over local issues. In most indicators of centralization, Turkey is far above the OECD average. For instance, the central government collects almost 70 percent of total revenues, far more than the OECD average of 58 percent.1 Even more striking, 85 percent of public servants work for the central government in Turkey, while only 15 percent work in local administrations. This is not only the highest among the OECD countries, but is also high for a unitary state. For example, 45 percent of public servants work for the central government in France, and only 15 percent work for the central administration in Sweden, both unitary states.2 This level of centralization creates incentives for any group that wants to wield influence in Turkey and have a presence within the state mechanism. State-society relations during the republican period are also useful to examine. From its inception, Turkey has been structured not as a modern state composed of citizens, but rather as an identity/ideology driven state composed of groups. Public institutions werent regarded in neutral terms; instead they were identified with certain ideologies. While the army and judiciary were traditionally regarded as defenders of Kemalism, a set of principles attributed to the founder of modern Turkey, the police were deemed as a nationalist hub, especially in the 1980-90s. As a reflection of this, the state did not regard itself as simply serving the public. Rather, it saw itself as having the duty to steer the public in the right direction. In this context, social
1 http://www.oecd.org/gov/44126584.pdf 2 Guven Sak, Turkey is a highly centralized unitary state, TEPAV blog, July 2, 2013

groups whose world-views and identities did not conform to that of the state were regarded as a possible threat. Such exclusionist policies of the state encouraged members of these groups to hide their identities when infiltrating state institutions. Yet, this situation has partially changed in the last decade. Coming from a particular religious socio- political background no longer poses a danger to a public servants job security. As the state has changed, so should religious and social movements in their approach to the state. Old Wine in a New Bottle? The Glen Movement occupies a unique place among all other socio-religious groups in Turkey. The Movement commands a network of thousands of schools, business conglomerates, and media empires, and has a huge presence within the bureaucracy, especially in the judiciary/police. Similar to all other Islamic-leaning groups, the Movement encouraged members to hide their identities, especially prior to 2000, when Islamic identity was most under scrutiny. The Movements most contentious aspect pertains to its activities within the bureaucracy. Kurds, liberals, secularists, and incarcerated former bureaucrats had voiced stern criticisms about the Movement, claiming that it had come to replace the erstwhile Kemalist tutelary and employ its bureaucratic might to both benefit the group and eradicate any potential rivals, especially within the bureaucracy. Previously arrested journalists, such as Nedim Sener and Ahmet Sik, and incarcerated former bureaucrats contend that they were punished because of their investigations into the activities of the Movement and their opposition to the malpractices and irregularities of its members within the state. At the time, the government prioritized the struggle against the tutelary, so it largely remained silent to these criticisms. In fact, it benefitted immensely from the Movements presence in the fight against the old guards, and, as a result of this alliance with the Movement, further facilitated their consolidation of power within bureaucracy. The feeling that the Movement has formed their own autonomous presence within the state cuts across the political spectrum. The government is the final player to come to this conclusion. A recently leaked phone conversation between Fethullah Glen and one of his followers only confirmed this widely shared belief. During the conversation, the

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follower informed Glen that if the government orders the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency to take action against Bank Asya, which is owned by the Movement, Movement members working there will stifle it. The Movements approach to the governments policy of settling the Kurdish issue through negotiations with the PKK is another case in point. The Movement tried to derail the process first by orchestrating their followers within the police/judiciary to initiate mass arrests of Kurdish politicians and activists, and secondly by trying to arrest the chief of intelligence for his role in the secret negotiations. These activities show the Movements tendency to operationalize its presence within the bureaucracy to attain its goals. Exercising power in such a way without accountability and without earning democratic legitimacy is reminiscent of the old Kemalist guardianship system. This endangers Turkeys democracy and civilian politics. The Way Forward The current crisis needs both short and long-term responses. Since the judiciary has been used for political power bidding, its response has inevitably been political in nature as well. That bodes ill for Turkeys state structure and democracy and creates a condition of exceptionalism. This needs to be cut as short as possible. At the same time, the government should not resort to actions that might result in brushing aside the corruption cases. The public has justified concerns regarding corruption and the government needs to do more to alleviate them. In the long run, the government needs to work swiftly on a comprehensive reform package. It should aim to restructure public institutions in such a way that they will not be dominated by any particular groups and will not serve as an instrument of social/political engineering. Turkey should devolve power to local administrations in order to ease pressure on the central administration. Removing Turkeys veto power on the European Charter of Local Self-Government could be a starting point. To increase transparency, the government needs to legalize all forms of religious groups by abrogating the law of closure of dervish lodges adopted in1925, which banned such groups. The Glen Movement also has to decide whether it will become a civil society organization or a new form of tutelary, wielding power without acquiring democratic legitimacy.

About the Author

Galip Dalayworks as a researcherin the political research department at the SETA Foundation in Turkey. He is also the book review editor of Insight Turkey. His opinion articles have appeared in AJE Opinion, AJE Magazine, Huffington Post, World Politics Review, Fair Observers, and in major Turkish dailies.

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