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Cold War History

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The shadows of Cold War over Latin America: the US reaction to Fidel Castro's nationalism, 195659
Vanni Pettin
a a

Spanish National Research Council, Human and Social Sciences Centre , Madrid, Spain Published online: 26 Aug 2010.

To cite this article: Vanni Pettin (2011) The shadows of Cold War over Latin America: the US reaction to Fidel Castro's nationalism, 195659, Cold War History, 11:3, 317-339 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682741003686115

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Cold War History Vol. 11, No. 3, August 2011, 317339

The shadows of Cold War over Latin America: the US reaction to Fidel Castros nationalism, 1956 59
` Vanni Pettina
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Spanish National Research Council, Human and Social Sciences Centre, Madrid, Spain

Scholars have addressed the problem of the Dwight Eisenhower administrations opposition to Fidel Castros nationalist insurrection (195659) following two main perspectives. Some authors have perceived it in terms of a response to the threat that Castros radical programme posed to American economic interests in Cuba. Other scholars have claimed that, in the 1950s, Washington did not have a clear perception of the differences between progressive nationalism and communism. This article offers a different explanation. It argues that the intersection between the Cold War and the decolonisation process played a crucial role in changing the USs perception of Latin American nationalism. Specically, the launch of the Peaceful Coexistence strategy by the Soviet post-Stalinist leadership increased Moscows ability to interact with nationalism of developing areas, pushing the Republican administration into a defensive position in the Third World. During the 1950s, this context strongly inuenced Washingtons diplomatic strategy in the Latin American and the Cuban scenarios, driving the Eisenhower Presidency to adopt a hostile position toward nationalist governments or nationalist inspired political movements such as Castros. Introduction In 1961, after the Cuban revolution had taken its denitive path toward socialism, the Eisenhower administration decided to sever its diplomatic ties with Fidel Castros
` graduated in Political Sciences at University of Florence, Italy (2004). He received his MA in Latin Vanni Pettina American Studies by the Universidad Complutense of Madrid and the Ortega y Gasset Research Center (Madrid, 2006). He is Doctor in Contemporary History from the Universidad Complutense of Madrid (IUOG) and the Spanish National Research Council. His research focuses on the US-Cuban relations between 1933 and 1959. ` , Center for Human and Social Sciences Studies (CCHS)-CSIC, Institute of Correspondence to: Vanni Pettina History, Madrid, Spain. Email: vanni.pettina@cchs.csic.es; vannipettina@hotmail.com
ISSN 1468-2745 print/ISSN 1743-7962 online q 2011 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14682741003686115 http://www.informaworld.com

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government. Nonetheless, American diplomacy had been critical of Castros nationalist movement almost since the summer of 1957. Existing literature has mainly tried to tackle this problem using a local perspective. Some scholars have focused on the issue represented by the USs determination to defend its historical economic hegemony in Cuba from Castros radical nationalism.1 Other authors have addressed the problem in terms of the Eisenhower administrations inability to differentiate between communism and Castros nationalism.2 This paper will argue that the Eisenhower administrations reaction to Castro was the consequence of a broader process that, in the early 1950s, negatively changed the Republican administrations perception of nationalism on a global scale. Particularly, it argues that the Soviet post-Stalinist leadership was able to gain superiority when it came to interact with nationalist elites in decolonised areas but also in developing countries, such as Latin American ones. This condition drew the Republican government toward a policy of containment of the radical nationalist phenomena in the periphery. The paper will try to demonstrate that the American policy toward the Cuban insurrection was also part of this global strategy aimed at containing the convergence between radical nationalism and communism in the Third World.

From the Break-Up of the Colonial Empires to the Cold War, the New Global Powers versus Nationalism The problem concerning the Eisenhower administrations reaction to Latin American nationalism, and hence to Castros Cuban brand, needs to be addressed from a global perspective. The Republican Presidency perceived Latin American nationalist movements as part of a broader political process that, in the early 1950s, was running through all the decolonised and developing world. From the American perspective, the critical point was represented by the interconnection between this new wave of nationalism and the bipolar conict scenario. For Washington, the convergence between nationalism and the Soviet foreign policy in the developing world launched a frightful threat towards its national security. In Iran in 1953, Indonesia in 1955 57, Guatemala in 1954 and in Cuba throughout 1957 61, to take some examples, the Eisenhower administration seemed to be unable, short of military intervention, to avert the convergence between the local nationalist elites and the indigenous communist parties. For American diplomacy, this scenario had represented a constant source of concern since the end of the 1940s. Just a few years after the end of World War II, in 1948, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had published an International Estimate entitled The Break-up of the Colonial Empires and its Implications for U.S. Security.3 In this document, the CIA identied the decolonisation process and the Soviet ability to take advantage of it as the main future challenge to western hegemony. More specically, American intelligence analysts stressed the risk that recently decolonised countries or nationalist movements, still struggling for independence, could adopt a pro-Soviet orientation:

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The growth of nationalism in colonial areas, which has already succeeded in breaking up a large part of the European colonial Systems and in creating a series of new, nationalistic states in the Near and Far East, has major implications for US security, particularly in terms of possible World conict with the USSR. This shift of the dependent areas from the orbit of the colonial powers not only weakens the probable European allies of the US but deprives the US itself of assured access to vital bases and raw materials in these areas in event of war. Should the recently liberated and currently emergent states become oriented toward the USSR, US military and economic security would be seriously threatened.4

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The CIA also regarded the anti-colonialist movements as a vector capable of transforming the bipolar conict into what Odd Arne Westad has dened as the global Cold War:5
The colonial independence movement, therefore, is no longer purely a domestic issue between the European colonial powers and their dependencies. It has been injected into the larger arena of world politics and has become an element in the broader problems of relations between Orient and Occident, between industrialised and underdeveloped nations, and between the Western Powers and the USRR.6

Finally, the CIA claimed that the injection of independence and nationalist movements into the broader East West conict, in the end, could strongly benet the Soviet Unions expansionist strategy. However, even if the CIA had warned that decolonisation and nationalism could represent a real advantage for the Soviet Union, in 1948 the path that Third World and developing nationalism was going to follow was still uncertain. In fact, as underlined by Westad, the NSC51 had shown that at the beginning of 1950 Washington still believed that the best way to avert communist inltration of nationalist movements was to cooperate with them.7 Then, during the 1950s this perception started changing, as Moscow gained some advantage in interacting with the developing world. The launch of Peaceful Coexistence during Georgy Malenkovs collective leadership and its strengthening during the Nikita Khrushchev years clearly represented a serious attempt to orient, by means of economic and political cooperation, the developing nationalism toward the Soviet Union.8 The reaction of both Democratic and Republican leaders in the US highlights how seriously Washington worried about the new Soviet strategy. In 1953, for example, the leader of the Democratic majority in the American Congress, William F. Knowland, dened Peaceful Coexistence as the Soviet Unions Trojan Horse in the developing world.9 Then, in 1955, during a gathering with Illinois manufacturers, John Foster Dulles gave an interesting proof of the sense of inferiority that characterised the American political leadership regarding the problem of the new Soviet Union strategy in the developing world: The Soviet rulers have an advantage in that they nd it easy to neglect the needs of their own people and have trained a large number of scientists and technicians whom they can send abroad as a symbol of promises which are alluring.10 Again, in 1956 the democratic presidential candidate, Adlai Stevenson, called a tragic irony that the United States, which has always stood for peace, freedom

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and justice, should have come to be regarded as an enemy of nationalist aspirations, whereas the totalitarian Soviet Union should become identied with the struggles of the oppressed and former colonial peoples.11 Washington, which since the time of the Woodrow Wilson administration had played an important role in advancing the decolonisation process, was now rapidly shifting toward a more conservative approach to the issue.12 For Stevenson, the Soviet peaceful offensive was producing a powerful and attractive call for nationalist elites, generating, at the same time, the impression that Washington had forgotten its anti-colonialist credentials. In this sense, there were many reasons that justied the growing American uneasiness regarding its relations with anti-colonialist movements or Third World nationalism. Firstly, as is well illustrated by John Lewis Gaddis, the need to preserve the alliance with European countries, which were at the same time still colonial powers and key partners in the struggle against the Soviet Union, represented an obstacle to the establishment of a constructive relationship with anti-colonial movements and decolonised countries.13 In 1956, during a news conference and using that easy speaking tone that had made him so popular, Eisenhower summarised the complexity of elements that were hampering the American diplomatic interaction process with nationalism in one of the hottest areas of the developing world, the Middle East. The President emphasised the need to guarantee access for Western European countries to natural resources in the Middle East, while, at the same time, supporting the legitimate aspirations of the people, economically, socially and politically, to self-rule. But, Eisenhower stated, it becomes a very difcult thing to do because of the antagonism and cross antagonism. They are not always running even in one direction. They seem to cross here and there. It is a very difcult thing.14 In this sense, a good example of what Eisenhower had dened as antagonism and cross antagonism was Egypt where, during the 1950s, the Republican administration had to deal with the strongly nationalist leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. Facing his increasing requests for military and political support, Washington had to balance its response by taking into account British and French opposition.15 Similarly, in Algeria, the Eisenhower administration had to modulate its response to the Algerian aspirations for independence, carefully considering the French position.16 If the European factor represented an American handicap, the Soviet Union could count, on its side, on some other proactive advantages that were widening the gap between Washington and Moscow when it came to interacting with the Third World. When, during the 1950s, the inexorable process of imperial collapse gave life to an increasing number of new nations in Asia and in Africa, the focus of the nationalist elites rapidly switched from the issue of political independence toward the quest for economic independence and, therefore, to the sources for achieving it.17 In this context, industrialisation was considered the only practicable way to x the gap between the developing Third World and the developed one. It was around the issue of economic modernisation that newly independent Asian and African countries met with Latin American republics. These, even if generally freed from Spanish imperial domination since the 1820s, had usually been unable to set up a balanced and

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equitable model of economic development. For Washington, the crucial point was that, in terms of capacity to interpret the developing nations quest for modernisation, the Soviets had some crucial advantages. First of all, it should be considered that until Walt Whitman Rostows proposal for a non-communist road to modernisation, Washington had no clear model to sell.18 During the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations, the target of American propaganda had been the issue of democracy. The main tools of the American effort to underscore the Stalinist totalitarian barbarisms had been the Voice of America, a radio station transmitting worldwide, and the United States Information Agency.19 This sort of propaganda had been useful in Europe, where the ghosts of Nazis and Fascist totalitarian regimes were still fresh, but it was not able to meet the needs of the developing world. In contrast, the Soviet Unions conversion from a mainly backward country, whose economy had been largely based on agricultural production, into a leading industrial power able to launch rockets and satellites was in itself a very powerful passport. As underlined by Eric Hobsbawm, the main attraction of the Soviet model was the most gifted invention achieved by its social scientists during the 1920s and 1930s: a scientic methodology for economic modernisation.20 In 1955, two leading American Kremlinologists clearly summarised the problem of the competition between West and East in terms of industrialisation models:
The communist appeal in underdeveloped areas is still formidable. In particular, it holds an attraction for those groups of the population who prefer drastic industrialization from above to the gradualist, evolutionary tradition of the West . . . For these groups, it is the USSR and China, not the Western industrial countries, which to borrow a phrase from Marx present to other underdeveloped areas an image of their own future.21

In 1955, the CIA issued a special report on Soviet bloc economic activities that alarmingly underlined the rapid expansion of its economic ties with Afghanistan, India and Indonesia. Stronger economic relations, the CIA added, are fast developing with Yugoslavia and Egypt; . . . other Arab states, notably Syria and Lebanon, have been object of the recent concerted trade activities.22 The Soviet trade/aid programme consisted of loans at low interest, usually 2.5 per cent, in return for the purchase of goods and service from bloc countries or for local exports.23 As frankly acknowledged by the Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, during a NSC meeting in November 1955: the United States seemed to have no equivalent to match these Soviet techniques.24 Indeed, between 1953 and 1956 Soviet trade agreements with developing countries increased from 113 to 203.25 The value of Soviet trade with Third World countries increased from $850 million in 1954 to $1.44 billion in 1956.26 Only a year later, during the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev could proudly claim that the new decolonised countries did not need to go begging to their former oppressor for modern equipment; they can get it in the socialist countries, free of any political and military obligations.27 American intelligence estimated that the Soviet trade/aid policy in Third World was also accompanied by a new political strategy. The CIA pointed out that the new

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scenario shaped by peaceful coexistence would have made it easier for communist parties to broaden their popular support by attracting non-Communists into united national fronts.28 The Soviet approach towards Third World nationalism had a long history and had gone through several stages. It was with Lenin, when the theoretical debate switched from the production models to the means to achieve power, which the Soviet position regarding nationalism had begun to change.29 Lenin considered the colonised world as the Wests weak point, the place where capitalisms contradictions would suddenly explode and thereby decided to focus Soviet attention on these areas.30 Arguing that communist parties were still too weak to lead the initiative, Lenin proposed at the Second Comintern Congress (July 1920) the possibility of tactical alliances with the anti-imperialist bourgeoisie. In 1922, during the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, the United Anti-Imperialist Front strategy was ofcially adopted as the main tool of Soviet foreign policy in the colonised world.31 It plainly afrmed that in the colonial World the main objective of communist parties was to support the antiimperial struggle and to cooperate with the progressive nationalist bourgeoisie. During 1940, the Bulgarian communist Georgi Dimitrov improved the strategy, shaping the new Peoples Democracy concept. Dimitrov recovered Leninist positions, stating that where communist parties were not ready to take power a sort of compromise had to be found with the nationalist agrarian, industrialist or commercial bourgeoisie.32 The Peoples Democracy strategy envisioned a political environment where communists and progressive nationalists could cooperate by focusing on shared priorities such as land reform or state planned industrialisation. After World War II, this model helped Moscow to smoothly start the process of sovietisation even in such East European countries where the political majority was anti-communist.33 In colonial areas, this tactic was basically carried on during the 1930s and interrupted only briey after World War II, when Soviet initiatives in some cases rested on military activities, as in Korea. But, the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) was nevertheless convinced that by the end of the war in Korea, Moscow had gone back to it.34 The shadows of the Cold War over Latin America In Latin America, Washington felt that Moscow was using similar tools and a similar strategy when it came to nationalism as those used in other developing areas of the world. In the Western Hemisphere, the twentieth century saw the birth of a new nationalist generation, which shared common aspirations with its Asian, Middle Eastern or North African counterparts. Early twentieth century nationalist n C vica Radical, held the rich exporting movements, like the Argentinean Unio oligarchy responsible for using its economic power to monopolise the political system, thereby avoiding political reforms. After 1929, the call for political change was overshadowed by the urge for economic development. In this context, the focus on state control over economic processes and the strong emphasis on industrialisation became central to many new political parties or nationalist movements that ourished

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between the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s. Modernisation and progress, in Latin America as in Asia or Africa, mostly meant industrialisation and agrarian reforms. After World War II, this political trend was still very active in the ntico, in Bolivia the Movimiento region. In Cuba the Partido Revolucionario Aute the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), in Peru ns government epitomised the Americana and, in Guatemala Jacobo Arbenz Guzma new Latin American nationalism.35 American intelligence traced this phenomenon, its analogies with other Third World nationalist movements, as well as its potential ties to the Soviet Unions global strategy. In October 1958, a few months before Fidel Castro conquered the last Batista stronghold in Cuba, the Central Intelligence Agency issued a report over 100 pages long, which focused on the problem of nationalism and socialism in Latin America. It is worth noting that the CIA did not use the word socialism as a synonym for Marxism. Rather, the Agency dened socialism as an ideology of modernisation based on a deep involvement of the state in the economic strategies of development. Socialism embodied peoples aspirations for industrialization and a higher standard of living. It entailed economic planning and nationalization to effect his goal and shared with developing nationalisms the common ambition of mans emancipation and freedom from foreign political and economic inuence. In fact, the report indicated that nationalist elites in Asia and the Middle East believed that socialism, understood as a modernisation theory, offered the means whereby the resources of a country could be mobilized for rapid industrialization. Most importantly, the document emphasised that many of the elements, such as underdevelopment, ignorance and poverty, that were contributing to the concurrent development of nationalism and socialism in Asia and the Middle East were also present in Latin America. The CIA also highlighted that, in the Western Hemisphere, the strong antiUS sentiment was akin to anti-colonialism in Asia and the Middle East, in which the U.S. is blamed for Latin Americas general backwardness and lack of industrialization in major areas.36 From the CIA point of view, the problem was that the socialist leaning of many nationalist movements in Latin America offered Moscow an unmatched opportunity to extend its inuence in the region. US intelligence emphasised that communists were actively trying to attract Latin American progressive nationalism toward the Eastern bloc. Moscows strategy was focused on stressing the compatibility between Soviet ` -vis world affairs or development issues and nationalist aspirations. positions vis-a In particular, the CIAs perception was that the Soviet Union was using two tools in its effort to detach Latin American countries and nationalist elites from Washington: the economic leverage and the Democratic Front of National Liberation strategy.37 The rst one referred to the economic offensive that Khrushchev had launched on the continent at the beginning of 1956. In January, Nicolai Bulganin, Malenkovs successor as Prime Minister, formally offered economic assistance to Latin American countries.38 It is worth noting that the Soviet initiative contributed to the worsening of the already poisoned relations between the US and many Latin American countries. Since the end

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of World War II, Washington had faced increasing complaints by Latin American leaders troubled by the decline of US aid to the continent after the relative plenty of the Roosevelt years.39 After World War II, countries like Brazil, Cuba and Argentina were going through a complicated stage of economic readjustment. One of the main problem affecting Latin American economies was the lack of internal and external capital to nance the consolidation of their industrialisation processes.40 Moreover, increasing international competition in terms of primary production was adding even more problems to the traditional commodities price instability. Indeed, in 1953, the end of the Korean War provoked a fall in international prices of the main exporting commodities, causing waves of ination that undermined the fragile position of the small Latin American middle class.41 In 1954, the CIA had warned that decreasing demand and lower prices for Latin American exports, especially in the US, had aroused the areas interest in expanding its trade with the Soviet bloc.42 These observations notwithstanding, the increasing globalisation of the Cold War had shifted American resources elsewhere, particularly to South Asia and the Middle East. Under Harry Trumans Four Point Program for technical assistance, only 2 per cent of total US aid went to Latin America.43 The new Republican administration not only followed a similar pattern, but accelerated it even further. Eisenhower considered that after the end of the Korean War American foreign aid should be substantially reduced, leaving room for private capital. As the new President saw it, in Latin America trade and private capital were more appropriate than public aid for fostering development.44 In 1956, Adolf Berle, Assistant to the Secretary of State during the Truman administration, denounced the aid policy in Latin America, underlining that during the Eisenhower administration it had dramatically decreased to an astonishing 1 per cent of total aid spent overseas.45 In this context, the only exception was Bolivia. In spite of its agrarian reform and nationalisation programmes, Washington helped the Bolivian nationalist revolution led by the MNR with a $30 million aid plan.46 Yet, in this case, the United States objective to avoid nationalism merging with socialism were clearly at the centre of its approach. As pointed out by James Siekmeier, the Eisenhower administration used the aid leverage to strengthen the equally nationalistic, but bitterly anti-communist, MNR moderate wing.47 By the end of its rst term, the Eisenhower administration was forced to review its aid policy as it faced an increasing Soviet challenge in the Third World.48 The Latin American position improved, even if still a minor aid recipient compared to South Asia or the Middle East.49 An articulated aid plan aimed at supporting Latin American development was largely incompatible with the administrations conservative approach to scal policies. And, indeed, it was not going to take shape until John Fitzgerald Kennedys Alliance for Progress initiative.50 The Soviet economic offensive was probably ineffective from a material point of view, given the low quality of the material offered and to the small lending capacity of Moscow.51 Still, it was able to hit a critical political point in the broader context of intercontinental relations. The Soviets had challenged Washingtons ability to deal with Latin Americas quest for modernisation. In 1953, John Cabot, Assistant to the

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Secretary of State for Latin America, had warned about the political consequences of the failure to support economic and political reforms on the continent. Cabot, who a year later resigned his post, warned that liberal elements on the continent were rapidly shifting toward communist positions:
Social reform is coming in Latin America, and may come by evolution or revolution. Reactionary elements, he [Cabot] said, do not want social reform, but are willing to tie down the safety valve and wait for the boiler to burst. Liberal elements faced with such opposition have become increasingly susceptible to communist inuence.52

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Thus, Cabots views explain the second point that the CIA had highlighted as a cornerstone of Soviet strategy in Latin America, the Democratic or United Front of National Liberation policy of interclass alliance or inltration of nationalist movements. As Cabot had implied, Liberal elements in Latin American societies, facing conservative opposition to reforms and American lack of interest in continental progress, were becoming responsive to communist inuence. If, as Joseph Gilbert points out, during the 1930s and 1940s Roosevelts New Deal had represented the model for continental modernisation, the nationalists were now increasingly turning to the Soviet model of development.53 Regarding this problem, General C.P. Cabells testimony before a Senate Committee investigating the means by which US diplomacy had challenged the Cuban insurrection in the late 1950s is of particular interest. Cabell, who had been Deputy Director of the CIA between 1953 and 1962 and Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 1951 and 1953, testied that in Latin America the CIA had been constantly concerned about the communists growing capacity to inltrate nationalist movements through the National Liberation strategy:
The so called national liberation strategy seeks to offset Communist numerical and political weakness through international organisational support and clandestine techniques of inltration and coordination. The program of Communism in Latin America is designed to develop unity of action around popular issues such as antipathy to dictatorship, ination, a desire for greater industrialization, nationalization of resources and wider and more stable markets.54

Cabells observations reected remarks already made by US intelligence services in the early 1950s. In fact, in 1952 the INR had noted that, after the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (October 1952), the Anti-imperialist United Front or its other label, the National Liberation Front had been ofcially adopted as a device for Soviet expansionism in the Latin American continent. The Latin American Communist Parties, which are part of the colonial and dependent sector of the Communist world picture, the INR observed, have for the past several years pursued a national liberation front program.55 Washingtons decision to support a coup against Arbenzs government, in 1954, was fostered by the perception that the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT), the Guatemalan Communist Party, was following a National Liberation strategy. For CIA analysts, in the long run the alliance between the PGT, the labour confederations and tico Nacional, threatened to lead to the Arbenz, under the ags of the Frente Democra

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establishment of a Peoples Democracy regime in Guatemala.56 Paul H. Nitze, the Chief of the Policy Planning Staff, emphasised this point during a bitter conversation with Thomas Mann, Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.57 When the zaro Cardenas latter had described the situation in Guatemala as similar to that of La Mexico in the 1930s, suggesting that the United States should let things in Guatemala take their course . . . and the pendulum . . . would have swung back, Nitze snapped. ve, he pointed out that during the last twenty years the Finding Manns statement na Communists have developed their mechanism, which makes the situation a little different in Guatemala from what it was in Mexico.58 Although the CIA knew that communist numbers were very low in Guatemala, American intelligence considered that the National Liberation strategy represented a tool that would obviate the numerical problem by securing key positions in the administration.59 Not surprisingly, the CIA directly linked what was happening in Guatemala to postWorld War II East Europe. As the Agency pointed out, in accordance with the National Liberation strategy Communist minorities took control and delivered to USSR domination the former countries of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Poland and others. Now, CIA analysts argued, the Soviets were trying to replicate their success in Guatemala.60 Of course, unlike Hungary or Czechoslovakia, Guatemala was thousands of miles from the Iron Curtain and, above all, from the Red Army. Yet the Eisenhower administrations developing global perception of the Cold War battleeld was stronger than these geographical considerations. Indeed, with the US-orchestrated coup in Guatemala, Latin America had fully entered the new global Cold War era. The Cuban case The analysis of the relationship between American diplomacy and the Cuban insurrection led by Fidel Castro between 1956 and January 1959 offers interesting clues on the impact of the Cold War on US relations with Latin American nationalism. In December 1956, Fidel Castro landed on Cubas eastern shore, leading a small group of armed men. His target was Fulgencio Batistas dictatorship. Batista had legitimately ruled Cuba between 1940 and 1944 but, on March 1952, he had abruptly recovered power through a military coup. Although Castros landing resulted in a failure, he was eventually able to reach the Sierra Maestra mountains where he started a guerrilla war aimed at bringing democracy back to the country.61 In the spring of 1957, after barely one year of struggle, US diplomatic sources estimated the chances of Batistas regime surviving through 1958 as low.62 The instability of the Batista dictatorship and the activity of a guerrilla movement worried Washington for many reasons. Firstly, there was the issue related to the copious American community residing on the island. Its destiny, in the case of an escalation of violence, was a matter of concern. Also, US diplomats worried about the huge American investments on the island and their fate in case the regime collapsed. Washington feared a scenario of chaos and anarchy, which could be generated by Batistas fall.63

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Nonetheless, American fears were mainly fuelled by the nuance of the emerging Castro leadership. Between September 1957 and January 1959, William Wieland, chief of the Middle American Desk (MID) at Foggy Bottom and Earl T. Smith, the American Ambassador in Cuba, were involved in several distinct efforts to nd a solution to the crisis. All of these attempts tried to avoid the victory of the main and probably most popular force of opposition to Batista, Fidel Castros 26th of July Movement.64 Thus, when at the end of 1958 Castros victory was only a matter of time, American diplomacy toyed with the idea of supporting a military Junta to prevent it.65 Indeed, as Secretary of State Christian Herter wrote in a Memorandum to President Eisenhower in December 1958: the Department clearly does not want to see Castro succeed to the leadership of the Government.66 During the rst stages of the insurrection, uneasiness toward Castro was fuelled by a lack of information concerning both his leadership and the 26th of July Movements political programme. This was in part because of the limitations geography imposed on the capabilities of American intelligence to investigate the Movement. In January 1959, the State Department issued a paper aimed at analysing the obstacles it had faced in collecting information on the political orientations of the insurrection. The document outlined that the virtual isolation of Castro and the other leaders of the Movement had proved a grave handicap to gathering hard intelligence.67 In fact, throughout the insurrection, Castros group had been isolated in the inaccessible Sierra Maestra mountains, encircled by Batistas army and cut off from the outside by the press censorship established by its regime. But, in reality, geography had only exasperated a deeper problem related to the collection of information. The real obstacle in gathering hard intelligence and the factor that fostered American hostility toward the insurrection during 1957 was the dichotomy represented by the vagueness of Castros political contents and his clear, radical nationalistic orientation.68 During the insurrection, Castros discourse had been politically vague or, as pointed out by the State Department, nebulous. In fact, at this time, the 26th of July Movement leader had not yet clearly formulated a political programme. Facing his sentence for the July 1953 assault on the Moncada Cuban Army Barracks, Castro had talked of democracy, agrarian reform and nationalisations of certain public services. But he had not entered into further details or specied the means by which he intended to carry out his reforms. In addition, between 1956 and 1959 he more than once changed the focus of his programme depending on his interlocutors.69 Commenting in February 1957 on Castros programme, John L. Topping, the ofcer in charge of political affairs at the American Embassy in La Havana, resumed American scepticism about the guerrilla leader and his movement. Topping argued that in his programme Castro had talked vaguely of agrarian reform, socialization of prots, industrialization of Cuba by Cubans. Yet the programme was too nebulous to allow a reliable assessment.70 He added that Castros call for democracy should be taken in quotes, because there is no indication of just what they conceive the term to mean. They [Castro and his followers] seem to prefer violence to negotiation, bullets to ballots.71 Being unable to make an assessment of his political

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programme, the American diplomats focused on the ideological implication of Castros discourse. In spite of his vagueness in term of political contents, Castro had been ideologically fairly understandable. He had stressed the urge for radical reform of Cuban politics and of its economic development model. Castro had attacked the old s progressive Mart politicians and claimed to be heir to Cubas Founding Father Jose 72 nationalism. John Topping translated Castros ideology in these terms: They (Castro and his followers) are hell-bent on change, and led by an unusual man dedicated, fanatical, impractical, possibly megalomaniac. There is reason to believe that he is exceptionally ambitious. He pictures himself as the great Cuban leader of the present generation. The American diplomat concluded that Castros ideology seemed to be nationalistic and somewhat socialistic, a judgement literally replicated in a State Department report in January 1959.73 Eventually, the lack of condence in Castro due to his political vagueness evolved into hostility. The Americans began identifying Castros ideological discourse as rooted in a progressive nationalism that, since the early 1950s, they recognised as being a threatening variable of the global Cold War scenario. Adjectives like nationalistic and socialistic, when describing Castros ideology, were the very same words used by the CIA to dene the kind of problematic nationalism spreading through the Third World and potentially being subjected to Soviet inuence. During 1958 this perspective was decisively strengthened by the perception that communists had the capacity to inltrate Castros movement using his radical nationalism like a Trojan horse. Through the rst year of the insurrection, Washington had generally linked the risk of a communist takeover in Cuba to the chaos generated by the insurrection in the country. In April 1957, a National Intelligence Estimate argued that Arbenzs overthrow had lowered the chance for communists to strengthen their position in Central America and the Caribbean. Nonetheless, the CIA considered the conditions in Cuba to be somewhat different. For American intelligence, the mere existence of non-Communist subversion involving exiled groups offered communists a chance to broaden their base.74 During a conversation with State Department ofcers in May 1957, Topping conrmed this opinion, stressing that communists were doing all they could to fan the breeze and had everything to gain from chaotic conditions in the country.75 William Wieland shared this view. In a memorandum to Roy Rubottom, the Assistant Secretary for Latin America, he argued that the insurrection was providing a fertile ground for a resurgence of communism in the island. Moreover, the State Department ofcial warned that even if the communists were biding their time in the current crisis, letting other resort to violence, they were ready to intensify their activity in the event of a breakdown of authority.76 After April 1958, American concerns over a communist takeover in Cuba grew. In fact, Washington began worrying about the increasing contacts between Castro and the Cuban Communist Party: the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP). From the very beginning of the insurrection, American diplomats had been busy trying to determine whether Castro could be considered a Marxist and what the nature of his relationship with the PSP was. Since 1957, Wieland and the MID had already concluded that Castro

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was neither a Marxist nor was the insurrection communist inspired. In spite of what he later claimed in his memoirs and during his declarations facing a Senate investigation, the American documents clearly show that even Ambassador Smith had come to the same conclusion.78 The CIA was also persuaded that Castro could not be classied as a Marxist. On 12 March 1958, a CIA agent was able to reach Castros headquarters in the Sierra Maestra, where he spent two weeks and had a personal talk with the rebels leader. In his report to the CIA director, Allen Dulles, the ofcer conrmed that Castro was not a Marxist and added that, even if some communists had joined the guerrillas, he did not nd much evidence of communist inltration into the 26th of July Movement.79 Indeed, the PSP had been initially very cold toward the 26th of July Movement and Fidel Castro himself. Communist leaders had at rst labelled the young rebel leader as a bourgeois adventurist. During the rst year of the insurrection the PSP had boycotted Castros insurrection.80 However, during the rst months of 1958 the PSP began to change its strategy. In an editorial column published in the middle of March by the communist newspaper Alerta, the PSP had declared that it felt sympathetic toward the action carried out by the rebels. It also offered to support and collaborate with the guerrillas in strengthening its link with the masses.81 Although we will have to await the opening of Cuban archives to be certain, this change was probably a consequence of the new directives for Latin American Communist Parties adopted in November 1957 at the Soviet Union Coordination of International Communist Movement Meeting. During the summit, A.B. Sivolobov, the head of the Latin American section within the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, had stressed the need for a more proactive policy in the Western Hemisphere. He had invited Latin American Communist Parties to renew their efforts to destroy the rearguard of the principal imperialist power in the region. Sivolobov had also pointed out that the last week of January should be declared the week of solidarity with the Cuban people.82 In Cuba, it is very probable that the new directive took the form of an intensication of the PSPs struggle against Batistas regime and, hence, led to the decision to support its main opposition force: Fidel Castro and his guerrillas. At rst, Castro had rejected the PSPs offer of support. The CIA agent who visited the Sierra Maestra headquarters had reported this to Dulles.83 But, as recalled by Ernesto Guevara in his memoirs of the guerrilla war, April 1958 was a turning point for the political equilibriums within the insurrection.84 Specically, the 26th of July Movement had called for a general strike to begin on 9 April. According to the original blueprint, the general mobilisation fostered by the strike and supported by the guerrilla army should have forced Batistas dismissal. During the preparation for the strike, the question of a communist participation had become a source of tension within the Movement. The liberal urban sector of the Movement, el llano, had strongly opposed communist participation. On the other hand, Guevara and Fidels brother l had been keener to accept communist participation.85 The details of the debate Rau are not yet well known but the anti-communist opinion prevailed and Castro excluded the PSP from joining the strike.

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A few days after the strike had begun, it was evident that the attempt had not succeeded. Poor planning, internal divisions and, above all, lack of organised and disciplined grass-roots support were cause of the asco.86 The failure shook the Movement. Castro went into attack, accusing the urban-moderates of sectarianism and blaming them for the failure. At a crucial meeting held at the beginning of May, Castro decided to concentrate all the Movements decisional power in the Sierra Maestra and was nominated the Supreme Commandant of the Movement.87 At the same time, the 26th of July Movement began to modify its position towards the PSP. Some communists joined the guerrilla force and in the summer of 1958 a communist lix Torres opened a new guerrilla front in the Yaguajay area, group commanded by Fe very close to where Raul Castro had earlier opened a second front.88 During the summer, the interaction between the PSP and Castros movement increased considerably and one of its top leaders, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, was seconded to the Sierra Maestra. In the course of 1958, the PSP became part of the opposition to the Batista regime.89 From April, American diplomacy had been tracing the communist approach and the beginning of the new relationship between the PSP and the 26th of July Movement. At the end of July, Topping wrote to the State Department pointing out that communism both internationally and through the Cuban Communist Party was trying to associate itself with Castros Movement, and is probably actively assisting it. According to Topping, the communists had penetrated the Movement, despite him being unable to assess to what extent.90 In the next few months, American reports lost some of the prudence they had showed between April and the summer. Indeed, in November a Special National Estimate issued by the CIA stressed that Castro was not sufciently in control of his far ung guerrillas to prevent communist inltration even if this is what he desired. For the CIA, communists had in the last months come to occupy moderately important positions in the movements. The report concluded that the nationalistic line held by the movement represented a horse which the Communists know well how to ride.91 In December 1958, Dulles successor, Christian Herter, debating with Eisenhower pointed out that communists were utilizing the Castro movement to the same extent, as would be expected. Apparently, Herter also took into consideration the possibility of using the 1954 Organization of American States Caracas Resolution, which had allowed Washington to intervene in Guatemala against Arbenz, to prevent Castro from taking power. However, in the end, Herter rejected that possibility pointing out that there was insufcient evidence on which to base a charge that the rebels are Communist dominated.92 Between the end of December and the beginning of January, American diplomacy tried to play its last card: the establishment of a military Junta led by the Cuban Generals Eulogio Cantillo n.93 The plan failed. On 2 January, Camilo Cienfuegos and n Barqu and Ramo Guevaras 26th of July Movements columns, after having entered La Havana, immediately took control of the Army headquarters, Camp Columbia, and its main a military base.94 The military coup was eventually stronghold in the city, La Caban prevented but the battle between Washington and Castro had just begun.

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Although it is certain that after April Castro had changed his strategy and opened the insurrection to PSPs participation, the state of the relationship between the Cuban Communist Party and the 26th of July Movement was not that described by the CIA. Certainly, Castros nationalism offered elements of compatibility with the communists strategies and, in fact, after a false start both subjects had found fertile ground for convergence. Nonetheless, Castro was in full control of his guerrillas and perfectly capable of preventing any attempt to inltrate his Movement. The Cuban rebel had consciously opened the insurrection to the PSP to alter to his advantage the political match of forces within the Movement and to gain more organised and disciplined support.95 Moreover, in spite of the PSPs relative numerical force, nationalism had traditionally held a hegemonic position over other ideological paradigms in Cuba, including communism. Since independence in 1898, governments, political parties and even trade unions had been dominated by nationalism and the communists had mainly followed from a subaltern position.96 In fact, when top communist leader Rafael Rodriguez joined the guerrillas in the Sierra, he had to accept Castros position as supreme leader of the opposition to Batista.97 At any rate, Castro was the one able to use the PSP for his objectives, not the other way round. On the one hand, then, the CIA and the MID were right: Castro was developing an increasingly close relationship with the communists. On the other hand, Castros assumption of the communist cause and ideology was far from certain in 1958. However, Washington at this point could not see matters in such shades of grey, and was far too quick to accept Castro as a lost cause. US ofcials failed to recognise that Castro was in control. But nationalists were now suspected, because they were considered targets and potential recruits for the communist camp. Washington became persuaded that the PSP was able to inltrate the 26th of July Movement using the nationalist card and, eventually, take control of the insurrection. By declining to engage with him, Washington only encouraged Castro to move solidly into the communist camp. Conclusions The convergence of the East West conict and the North South divide, on the brink of decolonisation, inaugurated one of the most dramatic phases of the twentieth century. After the end of World War II, Washington and Moscow began to see that decolonisation and peripheral nationalisms were capable of altering the Cold War balance of power. Indeed, in the 1950s, the launch of Peaceful Coexistence by Khrushchev strengthened the relevance of the Third World in the Cold War scenario. The ght for the hearts and minds of the Third World eventually resulted in an acceleration of the decolonisation process. It also created space and resources for accelerating development strategies. Drawn by the quest for modernisation of nationalist elites in Southern Asia and the Middle East, the two superpowers fought a war based on their own recipes for social and economic development. In Egypt, the new global Cold War helped Nasser to build dams, to refurbish his army and to shield

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his countrys independence from outdated European imperial dreams. In Morocco and Tunisia it supported the independence process. But the global Cold War did not just create opportunities. The increasing tensions between Washington and Moscow in the periphery from 1954 also produced dramas and came to interfere with the legitimate strategies of development. The state-based path to economic modernisation offered by the Soviet Union seemed to better match the needs of Third World nationalism. Also, political alliances, theorised by Soviet Marxism after the October Revolution, gave Moscow a powerful tool for approaching nationalism. This disparity of conditions was well perceived in Washington and, within the Eisenhower administration, it led to suspicion, if not hostility, towards peripheral progressive nationalisms. In Iran, for example, Washington feared that convergence between Mohammad Mosaddegh and the local Communist Party, the Tudeh, could change geopolitical equilibrium in the region. This perception led to an Anglo-Americansupported coup that in 1954 brought down Mosaddeghs nationalist government. Historiography has usually excluded Latin America from this global perspective. Nonetheless, as this article has tried to demonstrate, throughout the 1950s Washington clearly perceived the Western Hemisphere as part of a bigger game, where converging nationalism and Soviet foreign policy were threatening American security. In the Western Hemisphere, the global Cold War produced mixed results as well. As the Bolivian case shows, when the Eisenhower administration felt that nationalism was far enough from Moscow, it plainly helped and aided the process of reform carried on by nationalist movements. By contrast, in Guatemala, the global Cold War perception led to intervention. The interaction between Arbenzs nationalist government and the local Communist Party was read through a Cold War lens and targeted as Moscows likely effort to alter the equilibrium between the superpowers in the region. Although less evident, during its insurrection stage Cuba replicated this scenario. This article has shown that American diplomacy considered Castro a radical nationalist, not a Marxist. But, in the global Cold War context, his nationalism alone made him suspect. When, after 9 April, the 26th of July Movement and PSP began strengthening their relations, the Americans perceived that the communists were using Castros nationalism to inltrate and eventually gain inuence over the insurrection. The Eisenhower administration did not try to challenge this convergence and, in this sense, its reaction did not diverge very much from the one Washington had had in Iran or Guatemala. To be sure, it did not go about planning a coup, but this was because Castro was not yet in power. Instead, Washington tried to stop him from succeeding to the leadership of the Government. It is not easy to assess what would have happened without a global Cold War structure standing behind the Cuban scenario. Possibly some sort of compromise between Castro and Washington would then have been possible or, at least, tried by American diplomacy. But counterfactual history is swampy terrain. This article aimed to show that global considerations rather than purely economic aims or inability to differentiate between communism and progressive nationalism played a crucial role in affecting American perception of Castros nationalism and, hence, strongly contributed to shaping US strategy toward the insurrection.

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Acknowledgements
The Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation has funded this research through the project HAR2009-09844, directed by Dr. Consuelo Naranjo Orovio (CSIC-CCHS).

Notes
nica; Gott, Cuba. The same historical [1] See, for instance, Morley, Imperial; Alzugaray, Cro perspective, applied to the broader Latin American context, can be found in: Loayza, An Aladdins Lamp. [2] The issue related to the confusion between nationalism and communism in the Third World, during the Eisenhower administration, goes far behind the Cuban and the Latin American scenarios. The best resume of this historical perspective, applied to several different cases, can be found in: McMahon, Eisenhower. For Latin America see: Rabe, Eisenhower, especially 46 8. For the Cuban case see: Benjamin, The United States. [3] Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act (hereafter cited as CIA FOIA), The Break-up of the Colonial Empires and its Implications for U.S. Security, 9 March 1948, International Estimate, Condential, 1. [4] Ibid. [5] Westad, The Global. [6] Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act (hereafter cited as CIA FOIA), The Break-up of the Colonial Empires and its Implications for U.S. Security, 9 March 1948, International Estimate, Condential, 1. [7] Westad, The Global, 114. [8] Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchevs Cold War. [9] Views on Coexistence Idea in Washington, The New York Times, 17 November 1954, 3. [10] Dulles Condemns ,Guile . of Soviet on Aiding Underdeveloped Areas, The New York Times, 9 December 1955, 1 and 8. [11] Policy for US? Stevensons View, The New York Times, 22 April 1956, Section n. 4, 1. [12] See Manela, The Wilsonian. [13] Gaddis, We Now Know, 165. See also Connelly, A Diplomatic, 42 64. [14] The Transcript of Eisenhowers News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Issue, The New York Times, 5 April, 1956, 10. [15] Gaddis, We Now Know, 168. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchevs Cold War, 65. [16] Connelly, A Diplomatic, 61. See also, Yaqub, Containing. [17] Engermann and Unger, Towards a Global; see also, Touraine, Come liberarsi. [18] Westad, The Global, 33; Osgood, Words and Deeds, 9; See also Letham, Modernization as Ideology. [19] Belmonte, Selling the American Way, 50 70. [20] Hobsbawm, I Rivoluzionari, 68. [21] Current Communist Strategy in Non-industrialized Countries, Problem of Communism, September October 1955, Vol. IV, no. 5, United States Information Services, Washington DC. [22] CIA FOIA, Special Survey of Select Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in Certain Free World Countries (September 1955), Secret, 3. [23] Department of State Bulletin, Soviet Bloc Offensive in Less Developed Area, Vol. 38, no. 970, 144. Also see: CIA, FOIA, The Nature and Problems of Soviet Economic Penetration of Underdeveloped Areas, 14 March 1956, Secret. [24] Foreign Relations of the United States of America, 1955 57, Volume X, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, United States Government Printing Ofce, Washington 1989,

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Memorandum of Conversation at the 266th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, 15 November 1955. Kaufman, Trade, 64. Ibid. Pravda, 15 February 1956, quoted in Communism in the Underdeveloped Countries, Soviet Economic Expansionism, Problem of Communism, July August 1958, Vol. 7, no. 4, p. 31, United States Information Services, Washington DC. CIA FOIA, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-95, The Soviet Bloc Courses of Action Through Mid-1955, 25 September 1953, Top Secret, 6. Kanet, The Soviet, 5; Avieri, Marxist, 644. Fukuyama, El n, 151. Shinn Junior, The National Democratic, 379; Light, The Soviet, 80 90. n, The Communist Movement, 461. Claud See, for instance, Seton-Watson, The Eastern European; Krebs, Dueling Visions. US National Archives, Record Group 59 (hereafter quoted as NARA RG59) Records of Component Ofces of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1947 63, LOT87D33. n, 550; Carmagnani, Ame rica latina, 16 7; Halperin Donghi, Annino, Ampliar la Nacio nea, 295 6. See also Knight, Democratic and Revolutionary; Lambert, Historia contempora rica Latina. Ame Retrospective Collection, CIA Digital Reading Room, CIA Declassied Documents, Library of Congress Washington DC, Operation General Intelligence Aid, CSHB-F 52-890-2, (Est. Pub. Date) Principal Aspects of Socialism in Latin America, October 1958, Secret, vi vii. Ibid., vii. Sewell, A Perfect (Free Market) World?, 855; Zubok, A Failed Empire. Becker and McClenahan Jr., The Market, The State, 32 9. Hilton, The United States, Brazil; Ameringer, The Cuban Democratic Experience. South America is Beset by Internal Ination as World Prices Fall, The New York Times, 7 January 1953, 47 and 72. Siekmeier, Aid, Nationalism, 159. CIA FOIA, National Intelligence Estimate, Soviet Bloc Economic Warfare Capabilities and Courses of Action, NIE 10-54, 9 April 1954, Secret, 9. Bethell and Roxborough, Latin America, 22. Adamson, The Most Important, 54. The New York Times, 8 April 1956, 27. Lehman, Revolutions and Attributions, 185. Siekmeier, Persistent Condor, 201. Adamson, The Most Important, 48 9. Rabe, Eisenhower, 65 6. See, for instance, Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area. Graziosi, LURSS, 186; See also, Sewell, A Perfect. Cabot Points Way in Latin America, The New York Times, 18 March 1953, 47. Gilbert, What We Now Know, 21. Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate (hereafter cited as SISS Hearings), Communist Threat to the United States trough the Caribbean, hearings before the subcommittee to investigate the administrations of internal security act and other internal security laws, part III, testimony of General C.P. Cabell, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence, Agency, 5 November 1959, United States Government Printing Ofce, Washington 1960. Library of Congress, Washington DC. British National Archives, Foreign Ofce Department, American Department, General, A 1015/13, 1953, Communism in Latin America. Department of State, Intelligence Report No.

[25] [26] [27]

[28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35]

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[36]

[37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54]

[55]

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[56] [57]

[58]

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[59] [60] [61] [62]

[63]

[64]

[65]

[66]

[67] [68] [69] [70]

[71]

[72] [73]

5180.12. Communism in the Other American Republics, Quarterly Survey, October December, 1952, Secret, 10. CIA FOIA, Field Comments on NIE-70, Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affecting US, 4 March 1953, Secret, 2. In 1949, Paul H. Nitze joined the State Departments Policy Planning Staff and became George F. Kennans successor as Director of Policy Planning. In 1950, he wrote a classied memo for the National Security Council, NSC 68, which became the blueprint for the American strategy in the long Cold War years. In 1953, Nitze moved from the State Department to the Pentagon, serving as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. CIA FOIA, Conversation regarding Guatemala with Policy Planning Staff Members of State Department, 3 April 1953, Secret, 2. On this point see also: Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 191. CIA FOIA, Communist Penetration of Guatemala, 16 February 1954, Secret, 1. Szulc, Fidel, 289 300. CIA FOIA, National Intelligence Estimate, Number 80 57, Political Stability in Central America and the Caribbean Through 1958, 23 April 1957, Secret, 1. See also: NARA RG 59, Intelligence and Research. Division of Research for American Republics. Special Paper No. 132 (INR) LOT75D242 CU22 17 May 1957, Secret, 1. US National Archives, College Park, MD, Record Group 59 (hereafter cited as NARA RG59), 737.00/11-2157 Ofce Memorandum, United States Government. To ARA-Mr. Rubottom, Form MID Mr. Wieland and Mr. Stewart. Possible United States Courses of Action in Restoring Normalcy to Cuba, Secret, 1. SISS Hearings, Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean, Testimony of Earl T. Smith, Eighty-Sixth Congress, Second Session, Part 9, 27, 30 August 1960; Smith, The Fourth Floor, 228. NARA RG59, 737.00/3-2458, Ofce Memorandum, From MID, C. Allan Stewart, Thru MID, Mr. Wieland, to ARA Mr. Snow, Dr. Varonas Views on Civilian Military Junta Membership, Secret; CIA FOIA, SNIE 85/1-58, 16 December 1958, No. 288, Special National Intelligence Estimate, The Situation in Cuba, Secret, 2; see also Paterson, Contesting Castro, 207 9; Skierka, Fidel Castro, 64. Retrospective Collection, CIA Digital Reading Room, CIA Declassied Documents, Library of Congress Washington DC, Department of State, Memorandum for the President from Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter. Subject: Cuba, Top Secret, 22 December 1958, 3. NARA RG59, 611.37/1-1559, State Department. Draft White Paper on Cuba, Ofcial Use Only. On Castros dichotomy see Annino, DallInsurrezione, 71. OConnor, The Origins, 44 6. NARA RG59, 737.00/2-2857, Foreign Service Dispatch. From AmEmbassy Habana, to the Department of State, Washington. 28 February 1957, Situation in Cuba: Articles in New York Times by Herbert L. Matthews, Secret, 4. NARA RG59, 737.00/2-2857, Foreign Service Dispatch. From AmEmbassy Habana, to the Department of State, Washington. 28 February 1957, Situation in Cuba: Articles in New York Times by Herbert L. Matthews, Secret, 4. Annino, DallInsurrezione, 71. NARA RG59, 737.00/2-2857, Foreign Service Dispatch. From AmEmbassy Habana, to the Department of State, Washington. 28 February 1957, Situation in Cuba: Articles in New York Times by Herbert L. Matthews, Secret, 4; Library of Congress RG59 State Department Records, Staff Summary Biographic Supplement. Fidel Castro, Cuban Revolutionary Leader, 9 January 1959, Condential, 2.

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[74] CIA FOIA, National Intelligence Estimate, Number 80-57, Political Stability in Central America and the Caribbean Through 1958, 23 April 1957, Secret, 1. [75] NARA RG59, Records of Component of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 1947 63, Lot 75d242 Box 15, Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Revolutionary Development in Cuba and other Matters, 28 May 1957, Ofcial Use Only, 3. [76] NARA RG59, 737.00/11-2157 Ofce Memorandum, United States Government. To ARAMr. Rubottom, Form MID Mr. Wieland and Mr. Stewart. Possible United States Courses of Action in Restoring Normalcy to Cuba, Secret, 1. [77] NARA RG59, Records of Component of Ofces of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 1947 63, Lot 75D242 Box 15, INR Ambassador Hugh S. Cuming; DRA Robert A. Stevenson; Background Information on the Cuban Political Situation, Condential, 7 April 1958, 1. [78] NARA RG59 737.00/3-1058 Foreign Service Dispatch, From AmEmbassy, Habana to the Department of State, Washington. Fidel Castro Ruiz; Documents Concerning Him and His Activities: Appraisal, Secret. [79] CIA FOIA, NSC Brieng, Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, Report on (Portion Sanitized)s Visit to the Fidel Castro Headquarters in the Sierra Maestra (12 26 March 1958), 11 April 1958, Secret. n, The Cuban Insurrection, 220 1. [80] Bonachea and San Mart [81] Alerta article is quoted in Castro Rebels Reject Backing of Cuban Reds, Chicago Daily Tribune, 26 March 1958, 11. [82] The Meeting is summarised in a CIA paper: CIA FOIA, (EST PUB DATE) CPSU Coordination of International Communist Movement: Implement, created in 25 July 1958, Secret, 6. [83] CIA FOIA, NSC Brieng, Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, Report on [portion sanitised]s Visit to the Fidel Castro Headquarters in the Sierra Maestra (12 26 March 1958), Secret. [84] Guevara, Obras Completas, 465. [85] Balfour, Castro, 55; Sweig, Inside, 127; NARA RG59, LOT75D242 CU244, INR, DRA, Special Paper No. A-8-9, Raul Castro and Communist Inltration of the 26th of July Movement, 10 July 1958, Secret. [86] NARA RG59, 737.00/5-558, Foreign Service Dispatch, From AmEmbassy, Habana to The Department of State, Causes for Failure of General Strike Attempt, Condential; Balfour, Castro, 55. [87] Guevara, La Guerra, 167 72; Sweig, Inside, 150. [88] Sweig, Inside, 221. [89] Paterson, Contesting Castro, 185 6. [90] NARA RG59, 737.00/7-3058, Foreign Service Dispatch, From AmEmbassy to the Department of State, Fidel Castro Ruz; Documents Concerning Him and His Activities: Appraisal, Secret. [91] Retrospective Collection, CIA Digital Reading Room, CIA Declassied Documents, Library of Congress Washington DC, Special National Intelligence Estimate, The Situation in Cuba, SNIE 85-58, 24 November 1958, 3, n. 292. [92] Retrospective Collection, CIA Digital Reading Room, CIA Declassied Documents, Library of Congress Washington DC, Department of State, Washington, Memorandum for the President, Subject Cuba, 23 December 1958, 3. [93] Skierka, Fidel Castro, 64 6. [94] Paterson, Contesting Castro, 208 9; Coltman, The Real Fidel, 136 9. [95] Balfour, Castro, 54; Skierka, Fidel Castro, 61. [96] On Cuban nationalism see, for instance, Kapcia, Cuba; Rojas, Isla. [97] Skierka, Fidel Castro, 61.

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