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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

9-11 Commission Interview

Interviewee: Impressions of CJTF Phoenix


Date: Wednesday, October 22,2003
Location: Kabul, Afghanistan
Participants: Colonel Milley;
Staff: Philip Zelikow, Kevin Scheid, Mike Hurley;
Dylan Cors (White House Representative)
Drafted by: Mike Hurley
Reviewed by: Philip Zelikow
Additional: None

Staff was taken to CJTF Phoenix, where the Kabul Military Training Center is located.
KMTC Deputy Commander Colonel Milley was our host. Milley and some of his
subordinates walked us through the facilities. KMTC is now a fully functioning base. Its
offices are well-established in a rehabilitated building. It contains rooms for the staff,
including offices, internet connections, and entertainment areas. The Center has a PX
and a superbly equipped gymnasium for staff. The colonel noted the military personnel
pull guard duty and the gym is seen as a welcome way to stay fit. Mess facilities are
equally impressive, with contractor Brown & Root ensuring the troops are well fed.

After the walk-through orientation, Colonel Milley briefed us on the role ofKMTC, and
the composition and training of the Afghan National Army (ANA). CJTF Phoenix, a
multinational effort, has the task of standing up the ANA, an Afghan national element
that is widely viewed as central to the stability of the Afghan government and the future
of Afghanistan. The solid establishment of the ANA will enable the U.S. to leave
Afghanistan one day.

Coalition Staff:

KMTC will have a total of 1200 Coalition personnel, with the U.S. providing the lion's
share.

The ANA will consist of a central corps, it will not be divided into brigades. It is to have
3 battalions, out of which there will be four "maneuver" companies. Americans, French
and British are all involved in the training. Advisors reach into the company level, even
lower in some cases.

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Goals:

Plans call for the ANA to have 8,900 fully trained soldiers by June '04. These soldiers
are projected to be "mission ready."

Colonel Milley said that Afghanistan had a warrior culture and was "leader-centric".
Consequently, Afghan soldiers have never really been system-oriented. Operating as
part of systems and teams needs to be reinforced in them.

Vetting of ANA Personnel:

There is a system of vetting the recruits for the ANA. It is important to note, however,
that Afghanistan hadlhas no national database. Vetting is somewhat more informal and
appears to be working. Essentially, Afghan leadership vouches for individuals. In this
culture, former mujahedin commanders, for example, know who fought with them, who
was a good soldier. Local leaders and commanders also know who was in the Taliban,
who was an al-Qaida sympathizer or who has a criminal background. That type of
information helps ensure that "bad elements" are weeded out.

Status in Afghanistan

According to Colonel Milley, ANA members are highly regarded in Afghanistan. There
is competition to get into the force. Moreover, the Afghan people, who have endured
years of abuse under the Taliban and local warlords, see the ANA as important to the
country's future. Local newspapers regularly play up the theme that when the ANA is
deployed to an area peace breaks out. Most of the population shares that optimistic and
welcoming view. Early indications are, therefore, that the ANA could become a source
of deep national pride.

The Difficulty of the Task

Milley recognized the enormity of the task. He said, and staffers agreed, that the U.S.
had not engaged in building a national army on this scale at least since the Vietnam
period. A lot is riding on this and it is important that it succeeds. It is unusual for a
conventional division to undertake this task. Typically, training of foreign militaries is
done by Special Forces, however,the magnitude of this problem is too great for SF
capabilities; in any event, the SF would normally train at the platoon level. The plan for
the ANA includes training in combined arms and company and battalion-level
maneuvenng.

The task is both new and challenging for the 10th Mountain, but Milley was confident it
would be equal to the task. "We are breaking new ground here," he said. But in doing
so we will build experience for the future that will be helpful in other theaters of the War
on Terrorism.

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ANA Leadership:

Colonel Milley commented that the commander of the ANA was not particularly able.
He believes this commander was selected more due to his connections in the Karzai
government than on account of his soldierly and leadership skills. He is not an
impediment, he just lacks vision and driving force. The battalion level commanders are
better, as are the company commanders. In fact, Colonel Milley said they compare very
favorably to other Third World national militaries. When they complete the training,
Colonel Milley said, they will be by far the strongest and most effective indigenous force
in Afghanistan and will overshadow any of the forces of the regional warlords.

Comments on Morale of U.S. Forces Assigned to CJTF Phoenix

Colonel Milley said that the morale of the U.S. personnel under his command is the
highest he has ever witnessed in his career. These soldiers, he said, know precisely why
they are here and why the work they are doing is so important. He personally wants to
strike the enemy, not so much for vengeance but our of a deep and ingrained sense of
justice. He said he has a son and daughter, both teenagers. "I don't want them to have to
deal with this problem when they are adults," he said. "We need to finish this on our
watch."

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COALITION JOINT TASK FORCE -
~

PHOENIX

United States

France United Kingdom

Romania Bulgaria

Afghanistan

..
Canada Mongolia Germany

-
\

Italy
Greece
Mission -====-
e
Coalition Joint Task Force PHOENIX executes a

broad-based training, mentoring, and

assistance program in order to enable the

Afghanistan National Army (ANA) to field a

mtsston-ready Central Corps NLT June 2004.


l~r cr,atP
((7J~)
~ 1JO~
vffp
w:
I
ANA CentralCrps e
o 2 x Light Infantry Brigades
~ 3 Infantry Battalions
~ Combat Support Battalion
~ Combat Service Support
Battalion

o "Quick Reaction" Brigade


~ Infantry Battalion
~ Armor Battalion
~ Mechaniz~d Infantry Battalion
~ Combat Support Battalion
~ Combat Service Support
Battalion
-=====-
Central Corps Milestones e

Dec 03 Constitutional Jan 04: 1 BDE ready for Jun 04: National
June 03
LoyaJirga (4 BNs) integratedoperations Elections
Essential Tasks
-======- e
o Assist in the development of doctrine and training
institutions
o Enhance and refine sustainable institutional training
programs
~ Individual Training
~ Unit Fielding
o Conduct follow-on training for fielded units
~ Collective Training
~ Functional Training
> Leader Development
o Conduct daily coaching and mentoring of leaders at
company through Corps level
~ Management ..
~ Administration
~ Training
> Maintenance
Task Organization
-=====- ~

CJTF PHOENIX HQ

ANA TRAINING CENTRAL CORPS BSB


ASSTGRP ASST GRP

-------,
MPRI I MOBILE TRNG I
TEAMS I SPEC TRNG I
-------
r~-----'jl~----~ '\
IIIIE3
~~ _..
'."'.'.'.'.'.'."'."".'.'
. ...
"'.'."
..
'.:.'.:.','.
..

Uiii
-====:....
Key Program Elements e
o Doctrine and KMTC Assistance Group
~ Staff mentors
~ NCO education program (UK)
~ Officer education (FR)
~ Contractor support
o Embedded Training Teams
o Base Support Battalion
o Mobile Training Teams
~ Programmed
~ Opportunity"
o Confidence missions
o Integration missions (OSG)
-===- Opportunity Trainin9--===-<eJ

o Coordinated through International Security


Assistance Force (ISAF)

~ Martial Arts (Belgium)

~ Sniper (Canada)

~ Communications (Germany)

~ Driver's Trainlnq (Germany)

~ Medical Training (Germany)


-===-IKey Program Element..a:s-===--
o Doctrine and KMTC
Assistance Group
~ Staff mentors
~ NCO education program
(UK)
~ Officer education (FR)
~ Contractor support

D Embedded Training Teams


D Base Support Battalion
D Mobile Training Teams
~ Programmed
~ Opportunity
D Confidence missions
o Integration missions (OSG)
-=====-
ANA Support Concept e
o Training area development, construction, and maintenance

o Barracks renovation and construction

o Soldier pay (!)

o Sustainment on all classes of supply (!)

o "Donation management" (!)


Recent Donations ~
-=====-

o Romanian SPG-9, ammunition

o Poland Mortars, small arms

o Belgium Sleeping Bags

o Bosnia 82mm Mortars, PKMs,ammunition, BOUjackets

o Russia 80 trucks (Kamaz), 40 Jeeps (GAZ)

o Spain Blankets, BDUs, pistol belts, sleeping bags


POL-E-CHARKHI
CENTRAL CORPS HQ
ANA 2ND & 3RD BDEs
ETT Camp

,-,
-====-
Camp Phoenix Population e
I TOTALS REPRESENT POPULATION AT PEAK (OCT 03) I
U.S. FORCES 726
ROMANIAN FORCES 22
FRENCH FORCES 52
BRITISH FORCES 22
BULGARIAN FORCES 20
CANADA 19
AAFES 02
INTERPRETERS (FULL TIME) 01
KBR SERVICE PERSONNEL 119
[USAID 120]
TOTAL 1105
-
\
Lessons Learned Phoenix I
-=====-
e
• Embedded trainers must have the experience base to
mentor their counterparts (need right number and rank)
• Coalition trainers are key - technical expertise.
• Timely equipment donations are critical to mission
success
• Officer and NCO Corps integration training is essential
• LOG for ANA is a major effort
• MTTs are significant value added
• OC approach (coach - teach - mentor) is the correct
method
• ANA is a force multiplier; ANA can replace US forces on
selected missions (WARRIOR SWEEP, MOUNTAIN VIPER)
• Creating an army takes time: quality over quantity
Recommended Changes to PHX II e
• RFF for force protection and BSB vice JMD

• Augment BSB for ANA logistics functions

• May increase if ANA expands


Way Ahead
-======-
~

• Long Haul Mission

• Quality and quantity of embedded trainers key to success

• Acceleration means more trainers: must maintain rank,

experience, and density

• Equip trainers to accompany ANA in order to reduce SOF

requirements

• Consider formerly creating an OCONUS TSB like unit


Camp PHOENIX

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