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2.6
The Myth of Mentalizing and the
Primacy of Folk Sociology
L AW R E N C E A . H I R S C H F E L D
E volution may not select the best of all possible
solutions, but it does select among the best of
those available at any given moment. Over the past
30 years an extensive literature on Theory of Mind
has emerged, much implicitly or explicitly presum-
ing that mentalizing—imagining that others have
thoughts and feelings and other mental states that
motivate them to action—provides a better way of
predicting and interpreting the behavior of others
than more evolutionarily ancient social strategies.
Here I argue against this position, proposing that
mentalizing is not a particularly useful tool for
predicting and interpreting the behavior of others.
I suggest that this is true for three reasons. First,
mentalizing often, perhaps typically, misattributes
the mental states of others, either by inferring
that an individual holds a particular mental state
that he or she does not in fact hold or by ignoring
other aspects of mentalizing, such as the influence
that norms and statuses has on the mental states
that an individual is holding. Second, in addition
to mentalizing, humans and other social animals
possess an early developing, both in ontogenesis
and over evolutionary time, capacity for predict-
ing and interpreting the behavior of others, a fac-
ulty that we might call a Theory of Society. This
capacity allows, indeed compels, actors to parse
the environment into groups and calibrate the
importance of particular group membership in a
given circumstance. Third, following the lead of
the social sciences concerned with aggregations,
I consider the possibility that a folk capacity for
Theory of Society is generally a more “accurate”
strategy for predicting and interpreting the actions
of others because social position(ing) fundamen-
tally shapes social behavior.
Theory of Mind, mentalizing, mind reading,
Machiavellian intelligence, social intelligence,
social brain hypothesis, folk psychology, naïve
psychology. All these name a particular cognitive
19_Banaji_Ch2.6.indd 101
phenomenon: the capacity to attribute mental
states to others and use these attributions as the
basis for interpreting and predicting their actions.
Human society, a broad consensus agrees, rests
on a bedrock of mentalizing (Tomasello, 2006),
in significant measure because more highly devel-
oped mentalizing skills allow an individual to
manipulate and deceive cohabiting group mates
(Humphrey, 1976). The mentalizing corollary of
the prevailing assumption that the more accurate a
creature’s beliefs the more its survival is enhanced
(McKay & Dennett, 2009) is that the more accu-
rate an individual’s beliefs about what others think
and feel, the better is that individual’s chances of
survival.
To the contrary, in what follows I suggest that
mentalizing, despite the attention it has received
and the importance attributed to it, is ultimately
of sharply limited utility in interpreting and pre-
dicting the behavior of others in both the contem-
porary world and the sociocultural environments
in which mentalizing evolved. I will argue that
humans are in fact quite poor at appraising what
others and indeed what we ourselves are thinking
and feeling. In contrast, humans excel at interpret-
ing and predicting behavior in terms of unseen
social and cultural (nonmental) qualities (ranging
from “fixed” qualities such as gender or race, to
“variable” ones such as age, rank, or occupation,
and to “episodic” or transient ones such as coali-
tion partner or teammate). In negotiating social
interactions, mentalizing is less important than
attention to the contingencies of context, norma-
tive constraints on action, epistemic affordances of
the cultural environment, and the group dynam-
ics of the social milieu. These capacities allow
us to identify, interpret, and extrapolate from
experience—and ultimately guide our actions.
The mental states of others may be good to think
about; still, knowing who actors are and where
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102 Mentalizing
they find themselves (e.g., the social situations
they are in, their goals, the social positions they
and their interlocutors occupy, etc.) ultimately
are more important to understanding why they
behave as they do.
Assessing these alternative claims—the one
about mentalizing, the other about folk sociol-
ogy or group-based reasoning—involves posing a
series of narrower queries. Regarding mentalizing,
we ask two linked questions: (a) How accurately
do people appraise the states of mind of others?
and (b) Does an ability to accurately appraise
mental states enhance our understanding of oth-
ers’ actions? Regarding group-based reasoning,
we ask whether the ability to reliably identify who
someone is (which in part requires reliably iden-
tifying the nature of the relevant context) is more
useful as a strategy.
We know surprisingly little about either the
accuracy with which mental states are attributed
to others or the degree to which mentalizing
enhances an individual’s survival. In one relevant
study, although adults were found to be capable of
distinguishing their own, accurate beliefs from the
false beliefs of others, routinely they did not do so,
even on a task that appeared to require it (Keysar,
Lin, & Barr, 2003). Indeed, enhancing survival
may turn on inaccurate attributions regarding
one’s own mental states. Trivers (2010) has recently
argued that our success at deceiving others (the
supposed evolutionary payoff of a mentalizing
capacity) is enhanced when we deceive ourselves
(by reducing the social and cognitive costs of
deception). In short, deceiving others works bet-
ter if we do not know we are doing it.
Mentalizing is also surprisingly sensitive to
context, including culturally specific context.
Status differences affect how accurately one pre-
dicts another’s mental states (Rutherford, 2004),
the number of siblings a child has affects when
more highly developed mentalizing is achieved
(McAlister & Peterson, 2007), and the moral
valence of an action affects judgments of inten-
tionality (Knobe, 2003). To illustrate the contex-
tual contingencies of mentalizing, consider moral
valence and attribution of intentionality. A mor-
ally bad side effect of an action (say, damage to
the environment as an unforeseen consequence
of commercial exploitation)—but not a morally
good one—is judged intentional (Knobe, 2003), a
pattern of reasoning also found among preschool-
ers (Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006). The cultural
specificity of such judgments is underscored
by Uttich & Lombrozo’s (2010) finding that this
asymmetry turns on whether a norm is violated,
19_Banaji_Ch2.6.indd 102
regardless of its moral status. Thus, mentalizing
is shaped by culturally varying aspects of context
(to which even infants evince sensitivity; Onishi,
Baillargeon, & Leslie, 2007).
One interpretation of these results is that men-
talizing encompasses not only beliefs/desire psy-
chology but also “social influences on action and
thought” (Wellman & Miller, 2008). On this view,
mentalizing is the key process for interpreting
social experience, but it is tweaked or enhanced
with an understanding of social influences, to
make it even more informative of the actions of
others. Yet little direct evidence speaks to how
accurately people attribute mental states to others
(beyond measures of false belief) or whether such
attributions enhance survival. This is not sur-
prising if we consider the accuracy of conscious
deliberation about our own thought processes. In
a classic study, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) found
that verbal reports “are so removed from the pro-
cesses that investigators presume to have occurred
as to give grounds for considerable doubt that
there is direct access to these processes” (p. 238).
This is not to say that we do a poor job of inter-
preting and predicting the behaviors of others.
For many—arguably most—encounters, we seem
to do pretty well. We do not manage this, how-
ever, by mind reading. One class of lay interpre-
tation and prediction involves inferring another’s
actions based on what we know about the situa-
tion or social context. The move is a corrective to
a widespread (among lay and professional psy-
chologists alike) overestimation of the influence
of traits and dispositions (i.e., predilections to
behave in similar ways despite contingencies and
cultural affordances) in shaping our own behav-
ior, and especially that of others (Ross & Nisbett,
1991). This overestimation of the importance of
traits and dispositions can in part be traced to the
parallel confidence that (conscious) mental states
are the fundamental determiner of action, as traits
and dispositions are interpreted as crystallized
mental states (Wellman, 1990).
The situational turn in social psychology has
vitally changed the field, but it has ironically also
encouraged an impoverished notion of situation.
Often the situation is treated as if it means little
more than local contingency embedded in a par-
ticular setting—“the environmental attractions,
repulsions, and constraints” that shape behavior
(Mason & Morris, 2010). Little effort has been
made to develop models of what a situation actu-
ally is. A hint emerges from another area of social
psychology, intergroup relations. Much of our
attention in interpreting and predicting behavior
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The Myth of Mentalizing and the Primacy of Folk Sociology
is focused on groups, particularly the sorts of peo-
ple their members are rather than what they might
think. Groups are cultural entities, defined and
justified by norms and systems of moral belief,
sustained by commitment to the web of common
sense, and implicated in the organization and dis-
tribution of power and authority.
Recent work suggests that group-based social
reasoning (what I have called elsewhere “folk
sociology”) is governed by a distinct, arguably
core, cognitive knowledge structure (Hirschfeld,
1996; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007) that is orthogonal
to mentalizing (Clément, Bernard, & Kaufmann,
2011). Relative to group-based reasoning, mental-
izing may in fact be a later emerging, and more
limited, tool in our arsenal for social thinking
(Hirschfeld, Bartmess, White, & Frith, 2007).
More speculatively, rather than being the foun-
dation of human sociality, mentalizing may be a
by-product of a by-product, a way to think about
the causal potential of conscious mental states
enabled by the emergence of self-awareness rela-
tively recently in human evolutionary history.
Indeed, its importance in the literature may be
overestimated because of its importance to the
particular cultural environment from which that
literature emerges. As a set of papers in a recent
issue of Anthropology Quarterly illustrate, in many
cultural environments the predominant expecta-
tion is that it is difficult if not impossible to know
what others think and feel; indeed, the emphasis
on interpreting others in terms of (crystallized)
mental states (rather than the social categories
they occupy) is characteristic of a rather limited
range of cultures in North America and Northern
Europe, and for the most part the White males liv-
ing in them (Robbins & Rumsey, 2008).
If knowing who and what people are is a fun-
damental strategy for interpreting and predicting
their actions, then discovering who and what peo-
ple are—in short, discovering the sorts of groups
there are in society and who their members are—is
a fundamental task for the child. Not surprisingly,
as noted earlier, there is growing evidence of a
special-purpose cognitive device, a component of
core knowledge, dedicated to guiding the child’s
acquisition of this specific sort of knowledge. Like
other special-purpose devices, this one is robust,
requiring modest levels of environmental input,
early emerging, and operates outside conscious
awareness. Precursor saliencies are evident in
infants’ sensitivity to those social dimensions that
ultimately become culturally articulated and play
predominant roles in all known societies, includ-
ing age (Brooks & Lewis, 1976), gender (Quinn,
19_Banaji_Ch2.6.indd 103
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103
Yahr, Kuhn, Slater, & Pascalis, 2002), language
spoken (Mehler et al., 1988), and even race (Kelly
et al., 2005).
A recent study demonstrates the indepen-
dence of group-based reasoning and mentalizing
(Hirschfeld et al., 2007), two of whose findings
are particularly relevant to this discussion: first,
adult-like competence in group-based reasoning
emerges earlier than the corresponding adult-like
competence in mentalizing; second, culturally
specific, adult-like competence in group-based
reasoning develops intact, even when there is
significant impairment in social communication
generally, and mental state reasoning in particular.
Specifically, the study demonstrated that highly
impaired 6-year-old autistic children (who failed
a false-belief task) recruited culturally transmitted
racial and gender stereotypes as readily as unim-
paired controls when interpreting novel situations
(e.g., when asked to select the helpful person, they
chose a drawing of a White woman over a Black
woman more than two thirds of the time). As the
performance of unimpaired 3-year-olds (whose
use of gender and racial stereotypes did not differ
from those of older, autistic children and unim-
paired controls) in the same study demonstrated,
adult-like competence in group-based reason-
ing emerges before similarly advanced mental-
izing skills (i.e., the ability to grasp false beliefs).
Indeed, in some respects group-based reasoning
trumps the nascent mentalizing skills mastered by
younger preschoolers and impaired autistic chil-
dren (viz., the ability to recognize that individu-
als have desires and habitual preferences, such
as the recognition that a particular girl prefers to
play with trucks rather than dolls). Both unim-
paired 3-year-olds and highly impaired autistic
6-year-olds were more likely than unimpaired
controls and less impaired autistic 6-year-olds to
predict that the person would act in accord with
a cultural stereotype than a personal desire/habit-
ual preference, when the two conflicted (e.g., that
despite knowing that a particular girl prefers to
play with trucks over dolls, these subjects, when
asked whether she would play with a truck or a
doll, predicted that she would play with a doll).
What accounts for the priority of group-based
reasoning? The divergent natural histories of the
two competencies seems a reasonable explana-
tion. Highly developed mentalizing skills appear
to be unique to humans (Povinelli & Vonk, 2003);
in contrast, humans are among many creatures
that live in groups. Moreover, the complex social
(group) lives of some primate species are strikingly
evocative of extant human societies (i.e., presence
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104 Mentalizing
of multiple and often strategic affiliations, oppor-
tunistic as well as enduring group commitments,
transitive and inheritable statuses, and so on;
Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007). Such cross-species par-
allels, although informative, may obscure crucial
features of human group living. Although small-
scale human societies with relatively low levels of
socioeconomic integration are often (accurately)
described as based on relations of kinship, the
parallel with kin-based nonhuman primate group
structures risks being overdrawn. First, human
groups are seldom kin based in a strict biological
sense, even when the language (both indigenous
and scholarly) for describing them seems to be.
Human systems of kin reckoning never accu-
rately reflect degrees of biological relatedness; in
fact, they almost always distort it (as biological
relatedness is understood by the indigenous pop-
ulations themselves). For example, in one well-
studied class of kinship systems, individuals who
are related biologically to the same degree are
the most sought-after marriage partners if the
relationship is reckoned through the mother’s
line, whereas if it is reckoned through the father’s
line, they are incestuously close relatives (Lévi-
Strauss, 1969).
A more crucial difference between human and
other primate societies is the nature of and extent
to which human groups are linked in enduring
confederations (using the term broadly), some
of which define people of a single “kind,” some of
which define people of essentially other “kinds.”
Studies of neocortex across species have revealed
a close association between relative neocortex size
and number of individuals typically in a single
group (Dunbar, 1992). The association seems to
break down with humans; our neocortex seem-
ingly supports groups much larger than the typical
residential bands found among hunter-gathering
populations. The reason is that unlike other pri-
mates, human groups have invariably embraced
multiple residential bands, even when face-to-
face contact between members was infrequent.
Moreover, ethnographic and archaeological evi-
dence shows that these bands are systematically
linked in enduring exchange relationships. Not
only did modern humans engage in continuing
long-distance trade in goods (Tattersal & Schwartz,
2000) but also in the exchange of women between
groups (Chapais, 2008; Lévi-Strauss, 1969). First
contact reports suggest that people moved easily
and regularly between cultural groups and across
cultural “boundaries” (Fried, 1975). The human
capacity to learn multiple languages as readily
as acquiring a single language suggests that this
19_Banaji_Ch2.6.indd 104
social openness may be supported by an evolved
mechanism (Hirschfeld, 2008).
One way to imagine much group-based rea-
soning is as cultural affordances, predilections to
act that are shaped not by interiorized and personal
motivations but by commitment to cultural expec-
tations. These affordances support the emergence
of “communities of sentiment,” which Appadurai
(1990) illustrates with one strategy South Asian
beggars use to extract gifts. Beggars, he argues, lit-
erally entrap their “audience” into a fleeting sense
of debt by evoking the sentiments associated with
the web of obligation and counterobligation that
ordinarily links kinds of people rather than indi-
viduals per se. Neither the beggar nor the donor
believes that the evoked web of obligation in fact
actually reigns; only that the participants are com-
pelled to act in the short run as if it does in virtue
of expectations of mutual knowledge and commit-
ments to a mutually acknowledged set of cultural
entanglements.
This kind of engagement—and the powerful
ways it shapes behaviors independent of variation
in individual psychological motivation—is not lim-
ited to “tradition-bound” cultural environments
rich in interpersonal obligations and counterobli-
gations, and the political, economic, and religious
structures supporting them. We can see this in
the pull of patriotism and nationalist sentiments.
Personally I believe that nationalist chauvinism is
pernicious, yet every 2 years I find myself root-
ing for American athletes at the Olympics. How
do I reconcile this discrepancy? On one interpre-
tation—a version of a dual processing model—I
consciously hold a set of beliefs consistent with a
broader political position that favors, say, an inter-
nationalist perspective. “Hidden” behind these
beliefs are a set of nonconscious or implicit beliefs
and attitudes that, although inconsistent with this
conscious perspective, are widely held among
those with whom I live (Banaji & Greenwald,
1994). The force of the latter ultimately trumps the
former, so that my conscious, internationalist per-
spective is less a competing ethos than a cognitive
veneer over “truer” biases. An alternative expla-
nation is that my beliefs are shaped by a range of
cultural affordances, situations, and relations that
render certain engagements more readily effected
(as action) than readily accepted (as belief).
Claude Steele (1995) and his associates have
documented a similarly involuntary and less
trivial instance of this process. When minority
(or in another way stigmatized), but otherwise
confident and competent, test takers were even
briefly primed for representations disparaging
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The Myth of Mentalizing and the Primacy of Folk Sociology
their “kind,” performance declined relative to
performance in unprimed conditions. Like the
South Asian beggar’s audience, test takers need
not endorse these representations for the manipu-
lation to have effect; indeed, they may well actively
reject them. Perhaps as distressing—and the rea-
son that I prefer to conceptualize stereotypes as
cultural affordances—nonminority test takers’
performance is also sensitive to cultural represen-
tations disparaging some groups over others. But
in this case the effect is inverse: When primed with
the same cultural representations that negatively
affect performance among members of stigma-
tized groups, White test takers experience a boost
in performance compared to scores in unprimed
conditions (Walton, 2003)
In brief, behavior is often best understood in
terms of how the dynamics of social positionings
play out as they are mediated by group affiliation,
independent of an individual’s desires. Interpreting
and predicting others’ behaviors is less a function
of identifying whether dyadic relations are marked
by sincerity or deception than by situating actors
in cultural environments—and the roles the envi-
ronments afford—that define and preserve the
possibilities for action. Mentalizing is of limited
utility not because we lack interior landscapes that
are singular or opaque but because how we act is
so often despite rather than in virtue of them.
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