HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
What can happen What causes it to happen What's stops it happening What protects us if it happens pp
PEOPLE
SMS
PLANT
HAZARD ASSESSMENT
Improved procedures Improved training Verification & examination of SCE Risked based inspection
HAZARD MITIGATION
How bad will it be How How likely will it happen Are the risk tolerable Where should we focus our effort to reduce risk
What technical safety is about why do it when to do it key principles & techniques be able to participate in reviews
Drilling rigs
Technical Safety is applicable to all scopes, subsea, topsides, drilling rigs, FPSO etc
Oil Sands
Process Safety:
Process safety hazards can give rise to major accidents involving the release of potentially dangerous materials, the release of energy (such as fires and explosions), or both. These are events t that th t have h the th potential t ti l to t lead l dt to multiple fatalities and/or major environmental damage. Process safety management ensures there are Adequate Barriers to MAEs. MAE s.
Slide 5
An effective personal safety management g system y DOES NOT prevent major accidents events!
PERSONAL SAFETY
Po ss ibl e
Es ca lat ion
Lo P o ss es ten in tia l cr ea si ng
Major Industrial Disasters Flixborough UK Flixborough, UK, 1974 Explosion 28 workers killed (happened on a weekend so plant was minimal manned) Piper Alpha 167 killed in 1988 Clapham Junction Rail disaster (35 fatalities) Phillips p 66 Texas
Conclusion : Prescriptive approach not appropriate- move to a goal based approach, approach described in a Safety Safety Case Case. Prescriptive regime does not require identification and understanding of hazards. Involve workforce awareness of hazard management.
Petrobras PP-36 Brazil, 2001 Temsah Platform Egypt, 2004 High Platform Mumbai, 2005 Texas City Texas 2005
Footer
1984 1986 UK US Control of Emergency Industrial Major Planning and Accident HazardCommunity Right Act to Know Act
2003 World IEC 61511 SIS for the process industry sector, 8 Parts 1-3
Part 7 Conclusions
Slide 9
Dropped pp Objects j
Ship p collisions
Surface Blowout
MAXIMO
Audit
Corporate Audit Audit Program MA Class Verification Regulator
KPI /Target Verification Competency Assurance Operator Maintainer
Status Judgement
Verify
Status Judgement
Status Report
Testing
Review
Monitor
Critical Information Engineering TI Maintenance Status Processes Inspection Compliance Safety Action Monitor Compliance Case Tracking Morning MOC SC Equipment Performance and Audit call Maintenanc Standard Trip Process Compliance &e Condition S Surveillance ill C diti Classification etc t
Change Management System BOD ,/ Technical Std Stds s Operating Envelope Production Accounting System Competency Management System Incident Investigation Management Regulations Legislation
Status Judgement
Technical Integrity / Safety Engineer
Status Judgement
Process Owner Implementer
Process Procedure
CTO
Risk Management Maintenance Management Sys Permit
to work
Gap
hazardous substance
hazardous condition, a less hazardous form of a material, or facilities that minimise the impact of a hazardous material or energy
complexity and make operating errors less likely and that are more forgiving of errors which are made
barg
barg
Potential hazard Undesired event Protection layers Risk = Frequency x Consequence Th objective The bj i iis d driving i i the h risk to a tolerable level using Independent Layers of Protection Tolerable Risk
Intolerable Risk
HAZARD Identification
CONSTRUCTION SAFETY
OPERATIONAL SAFETY
HAZARD Assessment
CONSTRUCTION SAFETY
OPERATIONAL SAFETY
HAZARD Mitigation
CONSTRUCTION SAFETY
Standby vessel, the use of hot pressurised habitat, scaffolding, PPE, Approved workpacks, hot tapping, SIMOPS, PERMIT TO WORK, training ,
OPERATIONAL SAFETY
Sources of Information
Legislation & Regulations International Codes & Standards, Industry Standards, Company Standards
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
LPG
Scenario 5 S Scenario i 6 Scenario 7
Fatigue
Leak
Undesired event : major leak
Overpressure
S Scenario i 8 Scenario 9
Overfilling
Corrosion
Scenario 10
21
chemistry
100% 0%
Vent
process design p g
Plant air supply Dry air
FAL
FT
AV1 HS
FI
To preparation plant LT LI FQ
Package
Package
COMBUSTIBLE
INERT
2 Water Vent to atmosphere
TAH
Water
MET R
Y
Truck Acrylamide Delivery Hose
100% OXIDANT
0%
substance properties
equipment design
operating p gp procedures
22
Potential Risk
G P
Residual Risk
Safeguard s G P Recommendations
UE : More pressure PIC failure F= 10-1 / y Effects : 1 tonne of C3H6 released to atmosphere 140 mb within 80 meters Probability ignition = 0,6 (CHARAD) Impact : 2 fatalities on site Probability = 1 Rupture of C1 (P= 2*Pdesign) Probabilty : 0,5 C C a ta t a a s E-2 ts 33 E-2 t r r o o p p h ih i c c
Risk = 5.2 10-5/yr 10 5/yr x 0.07 x 0.1 x 0.5 = 1.82 10 10-7/yr 7/yr
Risk = 5.2 10-5/yr x 0.07 x 0.1 x 1 = 3.64 10-7/yr Probability of fatality 1 0.5 0.2
Leak
Deviation : other than water Cause : error during water drain operation Undesired event : 10 kg/s LPG to atmosphere Effects : LPG cloud with distance to LFL = 200 m, risk of flash fire Impact : fatal injuries to people outside within 200 m radius
25
Helicopter Operations
Recovery Measure
Mechanical Failure
Barrier
Barrier
Helicopter crash
Recovery Measure
Recovery Measure
Barrier
Pilot Error
Barrier
INHERENT DESIGN FEATURES + SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS (Layout, Structural Integrity) (Procedures, Equipment, Tasks)
Action
TASK
Displays Controls
Output Machine
Input
LOPA is a tool to determine the SIL (safety integrity level) of a SIF( safety Instrumented function) and evaluates the other protection layers individually by looking at the risk mitigation they lead to. Any layer of protection could be small, or significant, but overall the total risk reduction strategy should deliver an acceptable risk. risk Independent Protection Layers are often depicted as an onion skin. Each layer is independent in terms of operation. The failure of one layer does not affect the next. Designed to prevent the hazardous event event, or mitigate the consequences of the event.
Process
Input Output SV
Process
Safety valves
Sensors
Logic solver Final Typical applications for SIS Elements ESD - Emergency Shut Down System
HIPPS - High Integrity Pressure Protection System WHCP W ll H Well Head dC Control t lP Panel l
SIF
SIS
SIS
Process shutdown Operator Intervention P Process alarm l Basic Process Control System Process value Process control layer Normal behaviour
System composed of sensors, logic solvers, and final control elements for the purpose of t ki th taking the process t to a safe f state t t when h predetermined conditions are violated.
150
200
300
Effect
USACE CDL Superficial Damage Description of Component Damage Component has no visible permanent damage Component has some permanent deflection. It is generally repairable, if necessary, although replacement may be more economical and aesthetic Component has not failed, but it has significant permanent deflections causing it to be unrepairable Component has failed, and debris velocities range from insignificant to very significant Component is overwhelmed by the blast load causing debris with significant velocities
90% glass breakage No fatality and very low probability of injury Damage to internal partitions and joinery but can be repaired 70 mbar Probability of injury is 10%. No fatality 140 mbar House uninhabitable and badly cracked Reinforced structures distort 210 mbar Storage tanks fail 20%change 20% change of fatality to a person in a building House uninhabitable Wagons and plant items overturned 350 mbar Threshold of eardrum damage 50% change of fatality for a person in a building and 15% chance of fatal - TP Process Safety Series in 2009 open Consequences for a person the estimation Th h ld f l d
Moderate Damage
38
Types of fires scenarios Jet ignited releases of high pressure gas streams p y ignited g releases of 2 p phase or liquid q Spray streams Flash / Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) delayed ignition of a gas cloud Pool / Sea Surface ignited releases of low pressure streams accumulated on plated deck
Effects Eff t Heat released - thermal effects Products of combustion - toxic release Consequence C exposition effect = consequence Effects of fires will depend on Li id properties Liquid ti Flammability characteristics (L.F.L) Thermodynamics properties (heat of combustion, latent heat of vaporisation) i ti ) quantity of liquid or gas Atmospheric condition i.e Wind, Relative humidity
Fire size and duration - potential to cause escalation structural structural failure equipment failure / BLEVE impairment of escape routes fatalities
Documents the sequence of threats or causes that could lead to the "hazardous event" 'Logic Logic gates gates' AND /OR Strengths: widely used, clear and logical Weaknesses: diagrams can lack assumption info; complicated and time-consuming for large systems; can overlook failure modes and can be too simplistic
Types of detectors Smoke Detectors (Optical/ Ionisation) ) Heat Detectors ( FT/ RoR) Flame Detectors (UV/ UVIR/ IR/IR2/IR3) Hydrocarbon Gas Leak Detectors ( Line of sight , ultrasonic) T i G Toxic Gas Detectors D t t Open Path Gas leak Detectors VESDA
Provide rapid and reliable indication of the occurrence of a hazardous event involving fire and/or loss of containment of flammable or toxic inventories to : Emergency Shutdown (ESD 1) of affected Fire Zone ( on confirmed gas detection or fire detection ) Initiate Alarms Trigger emergency isolation and depressurisation of hydrocarbon inventories Initiate fire water deluge g system y (fire, sometimes toxic or flammable gas) Initiate CO2 or INERGEN or FMC 200 fixed fire extinguishing systems Trip power generation and electrical equipment Increase ventilation in enclosures Close dampers in HVAC air intakes
A 60 Firewall
C 1 200
1 000
800
Cellulosic fire
600
400
200
10
20
30
40
50
60
minutes
SD3-1.1.1 Individual Indi id al Sh Shut-Down t Do n Equipment 1.1.1 SD3-1.1.k Individual Shut-Down Equipment 1 1.1.k... 1k
SD3-1.j.1 Individual Indi id al Sh Shut-Down t Do n Equipment 1.j.1 SD3-1.j.k... Individual Shut-Down Equipment 1 1.j.k... jk
SD3-i.1.1 Individual Indi id al Sh Shut-Down t Do n Equipment i.1.1 SD3-i.1.k... Individual Shut-Down Equipment i i.1.k... 1k
To limit the loss of containment, by isolating hydrocarbon production and processing. To protect personnel, e.g. smoke and gas detection in the HVAC intakes of Buildings. To prevent ignition by elimination of potential sources of ignition. T reduce To d fl flammable bl or toxic t i inventory i t by b depressurisation d i ti th through h th the EDP system. t
ESD system shall take into account the the requirements that may arise during other possible (and likely to occur) abnormal or down-graded configurations. New hazards can appear as a consequence of the loss of essential utilities such as essential power, air, hydraulics, etc. These new hazards shall be identified, mitigated ad the associated risks shall be assessed.
Ignition sources identification: Apparatus which, separately or jointly, are intended for the generation, conversion of energy capable of causing an explosion through their own potential sources of ignition
Measures to limit the effect of explosions to a safe degree: > Explosion pressure resistant construction > Explosion relief devices > Explosion suppression by means of extinguishers, deluge, etc
When handling a number of different flammable fluids, , classification to be based on the most volatile fluid anticipated. Keep in mind that it does not address scenarios of major releases under catastrophic failures (ex rupture of a pressure vessel), but do not forget scenarios of operation and maintenance of equipment. Do not forget drain traps on process decks (potential Zones 0 & 1). Reduce risks through design improvements by reducing release sources, by grouping equipment and by optimizing ventilation. Avoid non hazardous area surrounded by hazardous areas (unless ventilation protected enclosure). Once minimum extent is determined determined, utilize distinct landmarks for the actual boundaries, to permit easy identification by operators.
Equipment q p spacing p g
EXTENT OF ZONES
FREQUENCY OF RELEASE
GRADE OF RELEASE
TYPE OF VENTILATION Secondary grade release: Flanges & piping connections, valves, tapings PSV, , vents, , sample p points, p , which in normal operation p do not generate release to atm Most pumps, compressors, No release sources: Pressure vessels, atm tanks, welded pipe, sealed drums,
Continuous grade release: Within tanks, above liquid interface, temperature > flashpoint s mps sumps Primary grade release: Sample points, PSV discharge, vents Pig launchers & receivers, sumps Some pumps, compressors, filters (if releases are part of normal operation)
Temperature class
Importance of ventilation (enclosures containing a source of release): Grade of release Continuous Primary Secondary q Adequate ventilation Zone 0 Zone 1 Zone 2 Inadequate q ventilation Zone 0 Zone 0 Zone 1 Dilution ventilation Non hazardous Non hazardous Non hazardous Overpressure p protection N/A N/A Zone 2*
: Vapour cloud explosion due to major leak at control valve in 6 inch feed line from LPG sphere : Catastrophic (estimation using TOTAL risk matrix) : Automated ESD system rated SIL2 (PFD=10E-2) : 1.25E-4/yr (source : CHARAD 5) for 1 inch leak
formation of major flammable vapour cloud with potential catastrophic impact in case of ignition* formation of limited flammable vapour cloud with limited in case of ignition*
Gas detection
ESD system
Control valve
66
PS Description Identifies System, linkage to MAE/Bow-Tie, Scope (Individual SCEs e.g. e g Shut Down Valves) and PS Goal (e.g. Isolation of Hydrocarbons). Function Performance Standard (Isolation of Hydrocarbons), Performance Criteria (e.g. Leakage Criteria or closure time referenced against a standard) & Assurance Task (e.g. Valve Function & Leak Test) via maintenance activities (e.g. AMOS, maximo, i SAP) t to h help l d demonstrate t t th that t th the critical iti l systems t achieve the performance standard with the required reliability throughout their life of service. Reliability/Availability, Survivability & Interdependency Level of performance (e.g. ESDV should achieve 100% reliability/availability of service) and interdependency (e.g. ESDV links with ESD system).
HAZARD REGISTER
Becomes the summary of Hazard Identification Identification, Assessment and Mitigation
Plated Main Deck reduces the likelihood of escalation between main deck and mezzanine deck
Utilities separate from Process, Process segregation of hazardous area from no hazardous area by distance Main Deck limits escalation
Mezzanine Deck
Cellar Deck
Duplex Stainless Steel Process less corrosion issues when you start operating Passive Fire Protection around RESDV the RESDV will survive for some time if impacted by a jet flame
S u bC e lla rD e c k Firewall
Technical Integrity (TI) is all about management of SCE ( HAZARD MITIGATION MEASURES) )
H A
Safe Operation
Z A R D S A
Plant Design
B Inspection
and Maintenance
Staff Competence
Mitigation Barrier H G
Alarms & Instruments Emergency arrangements
D Plant change
management t
EOperational p
Procedures
C O N S E Q U E N C E S
Permit to Work
DPlant Change E
Management
Operations Proedures
Staff Competence
Emergency H Arrangements
Thickness
Significant Failing in just one critical barrier sometimes is sufficient to cause incident Continuous monitoring & testing of Barriers is needed through suitable tools
Temporary procedures for changed situations Each Barrier is important risk assessed. Concurrent failure in barriers can result in Near Miss or MAE Case to operate
Defined & understood scope of work Hazards identified identified, risk assessed & Controls in place Work authorised
Role specific competency criteria for process safety Periodic inputs for updating Periodic assessment
Fire & Gas alarms Routine monitng of alarms / trips Defined procedure for management of inhibits / overrides
Periodic testing of ESD / trips and emergency systems Periodic Mock drills of ERP Emergency procedures updated
Development p of systematic y hazard identification processes Identification of gaps in controls measures Recognition of a need for ongoing improvement in control measures Increased layers of protection and control measures Improved emergency plans
ion
Residual Risk
P Procedural d l Measurements
Appraise
Select
Define |
Execute
Operate
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Iterations
Risk Risk Reduction Reduction Workshop Workshop ALARP ALARP Demonstration Demonstration e o st at o Cost Cost Benefit Benefit Analysis Analysis
Iterations
Step 5
.. the wonderful sight of the completed platform sailing away towards the sunset ..
.. but unfortunately, the design engineer didnt get his calculations quite right ..
ACETYLENE :FLAMMABILITY LIMITS (% by volume in air):Lower: 2.5Upper: 100 an extremely wide id range!!!!Other !!!!Oth chemicals with wide range : hydrogen, ethylene
FLASH POINT -Temperature above that the vapour pressure of a liquid can be ignited by a flame in a given atmosphere (generally : air) MINIMUM OXIDANT CONCENTRATION -Minimum concentration of the oxidant (generally oxygen) in the atmosphere to allow the combustion of a given combustible AUTO-IGNITION TEMPERATURE -Lowest temperature above which a given combustible can ignite spontaneously at an optimal concentration in a given atmosphere (generally : air) MINIMUM IGNITION ENERGY -Lowest Energy of an electric spark able to ignite a mixture at the optimal concentration of a given combustible in a given atmosphere (generally : air)
Corrosion (uniform (uniform, Pitting Pitting, Crevice, Crevice Stress Cracking Cracking, Intergranular, Galvanic, Selective, erosion, H2) Abrasion / wear / friction Fatigue High temperature corrosion Creep + combination of these modes Ageing of polymers Permeability
Prevention of leaks and spillages Tightness of equipment assembly Upper and lower limit of pressure and temperature Flanges facing carefully chosen in sever operating conditions Number of flanges to be minimized Assembly checked Tightness of mobile element Pumps Double mechanical seals or tandem arrangements Magnetic drive pump Valves B ll Bellow fitted fitt d valve l Prevention of leaks and spillages Strength of equipment Rules of design Regulations External recommended rules Internal recommended rule Potential corrosion to be taken into account Control of overfilling Instrumentation (level control, alarm, high level trip) Suitable relief discharge g with g gas/liquid q separating p g drum upstream p from treatment facility \Safety valve Emergency isolation valves or shut-off valves to prevent a serious leak Remote operated valves (operator) Automatic operated valve (part of a fully automatic system based on physical parameter sensors and/or gas detectors) Excess flow valve Shut off or reduce leaks Emergency material transfer
Controlling ignition sources Sources of ignition To identify and tend to eliminate them Some examples Electrical; friction; hot surfaces; burner flames; static electricity l t i it spark; k etc Controlling static electricity Bonding and grounding Relaxation Increasingconductivity with additives Dip pipes Controlling ignition sources Controlling electrical equipment Hazardous area classification Directive 1999/92/CE (ATEX 118a for safe use) Zone 0; 1; 2 for gases (20;21;22 for cloud of combustible dust) Classification of equipment Di ti 94/9/CE (ATEX 100a Directive 100 for f free f trade) t d ) Group II Category 1; 2; 3 Safeguarding of electrical equipment Selection of electrical equipment Directive 1999/92/CE Correspondence between zones and categories
Vessels
Pressure vessels Storage tanks Piping Systems Components (valves, connections, etc.) Relief valves and components Flare system (including headers, flare tips, knock-out drums, etc.) Master control devices Remotely operated valves Monitoring devices (LEL detectors, UV flame detectors, etc.) Alarms Suppression systems Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS), interlocks, etc.
Piping p g
Controls
83
Fire or Flames Furnaces and Boilers Flares Welding S k from Sparks f Tools T l Spread from other Areas
Spacing & Layout Spacing & Layout Work Procedures W k Procedures, Work P d pneumatic ti t tools, l Sewer Design, Diking, Weed Control, Housekeeping Procedures
Hot Surfaces Hot Pipes and Equipment Spacing (>600 F) A tomoti e Eq Automotive Equipment ipment Proced res Procedures Electrical Sparks from switches/motors Static Lightning Hand Held Electric Equipment
Area Classification Grounding, Inerting, Relaxation Snuffing, grounding, injection of steam in the vent Procedures
84
General principles: Provide access for fire fighting Provide clearance for maintenance (safe blinding blinding, opening, etc) and removal (with mobile equipment) Heavy equipment (> 100 kg) should be located at ground level (if possible) Equipment (pumps, (pumps heat exchangers exchangers, etc) that need to be maintained, opened, etc on a regular base should be located at the boundary of the unit unit. Equipment containing flammable materials should be located away from air coolers