Medina vs.

City of Baguio Doctrine: It is settled that a municipal corporation, unlike a sovereign state, is clothed with no inherent power of taxation. The charter or statue must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it. And the power when granted is to be construed strictissimi uris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting that power must be resolved against the municipality. Inferences, implications, deductions, all these, have no place in the interpretation of the taxing power of a municipal corporation. !acts: "laintiffs #edina and de la $osa, owners and operators of movie houses in the %ity of &aguio, paid, under protest, the amounts of "',()) and "',*)), respectively, for municipal license pursuant to +rdinance no. ,,. !urther, #edina and plaintiff -antamaria, also an owner and operator of a movie house in the city of &aguio, paid for additional taxes under +rdinance no. .(. +n the other hand, plaintiff &enguet Development %o., Inc., paid under +rdinance /o. ')) the amount of "0,112.22 as specific tax for gasoline and oil. Thereafter, "laintiffs brought an action in the %ourt of !irst Instance of &aguio seeking to nullify +rdinances /os. .(, ,, and ')) of the %ity %ouncil of &aguio on the ground that they were enacted without authority or power, and are oppressive, un ust and unreasonable, and to recover the taxes and fees they had paid as itemi3ed in the complaint. After trial, the court rendered decision declaring +rdinances /os. ,, and ')) valid and legal but rendering +rdinance /o. .( null and void while denying the claim of the plaintiffs for reimbursement of the different amounts paid by them. !rom this decision only the plaintiffs appealed assigning from errors as committed by the lower court. Issues: '. 4hether or not respondent %ity of &aguio has the power to levy a tax upon theaters and gasoline stations which are operated within its limits. (. 4hether or not respondent %ity of &aguio has the power to levy a tax upon articles used in businesses which are operated within its limits. 5eld: '. Appellants apparently have in mind section (110, paragraph 6c7 of the revised Administrative

%ode, which empowers the city of &aguio merely to impose a license fee for purpose of regulating the business that may be established in the city. The power as thus conferred is indeed limited, as it does not include the power to levy a tax. &ut on 8uly '1, ',2*, $epublic Act /o. 0(, was enacted amending the charter of said city and adding to its power to license the power to tax and to regulate. And it is precisely having in view this amendment that +rdinance /o. ,, was approved in order to increase the revenues of the city. In our opinion, the amendment above adverted to empowers the city council not only to impose a license fee but also to levy a tax for purposes of revenue, more on when in amending section (1106b7, the phrase 9as provided by law9 has been removed by section ( of $epublic Act /o. 0(,. The city council of &aguio therefore, has now the power to tax, to license and to regulate provided that the sub ects affected be one of those included in the charter. (. It is settled that a municipal corporation, unlike a sovereign state, is clothed with no inherent power of taxation. The charter or statue must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it. And the power when granted is to be construed strictissimi uris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting that power must be resolved against the municipality. Inferences, implications, deductions, all these, have no place in the interpretation of the taxing power of a municipal corporation. An examination of section (110 6c7, of the revised Administrative %ode, as amended, will reveal that the power given to the city of &aguio to tax, to license and to regulate only refers to the business of the taxpayer and not to the articles used in said business. This is clearly inferred from a reading of said section and from the concluding sentence appearing therein, to wit, 9and such other businesses, trade and occupations as may be established or practiced in the city9. 4herefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the only modification as to +rdinance /o. ')), which is hereby declared null and void. Defendant is hereby ordered to return to the &enguet Development %o., Inc., the amount of "0,122.22 it has paid as specific tax. /o pronouncement as to costs. Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation Inc. v Municipality ( now City) of asig! Metro Manila :$ ; '1((0) August ,, ())1 6%onstitutional <aw = >minent Domain, >xpropriation, ?alid and Definite +ffer7

!A%T-: %ourt of Appeals affirmed the lower court@s decision of declaring respondent municipality 6now city7 as having the right to expropriate petitioner@s property for the construction of an access road. "etitioner argues that there was no valid and definite offer made before a complaint for eminent domain was filed as the law reAuires 6Art. 01, $ules and $egulations Implementing the <ocal :overnment %ode7. $espondent contends that a letter to purchase was offered to the previous owners and the same was not accepted. I--B>: 4hether or not a letter to purchase is sufficient enough as a definite and valid offer to expropriate. 5><D: /o. !ailure to prove compliance with the mandatory reAuirement of a valid and definite offer will result in the dismissal of the complaint. The purpose of the mandatory reAuirement to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acAuisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court of action.

M"#ICI $LI%& 'F M(&C$"$&$#! B"L$C$#! )'#. $*+I$#' *. *$(,!M"#ICI $L M$&'+! M(&C$"$&$#! B"L$C$#! "etitioners vs.I/T>$#>DIAT> A""><<AT> %+B$T and "5I<I""I/> "I">C#>$%5A/DIDI/: %+$"+$ATI+/, respondents :.$. /o. E('(., 8anuary (,, ',**!A%T- +! T5> %A->: In ',E1, respondent "hilippine "ipes and #erchandising %orporation filed withthe +ffice of the #unicipal #ayor of #eycauayan, &ulacan, an application for apermit to fence a parcel of land covered by Transfer %ertificates of Title /os.('1'.1 and 0E*E,. The fencing of said property was allegedly to enable the storageof the respondentFs heavy eAuipment and various finished products such as largediameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors, bridgecomponents, preGstressed girders and piles, large diameter concrete pipes, andparts for low cost housing.In the same year, the #unicipal %ouncil of #eycauayan, passed $esolution/o. (1*, manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondentFs parcel of landcovered by Transfer %ertificate of Title /o. 0E*E,. +n #arch '), ',E., the -pecial%ommittee recommended that the "rovincial &oard of &ulacan disapprove or annulthe resolution in Auestion because there was no genuine necessity

for the#unicipality of #eycauayan to expropriate the respondentFs property for use as apublic road. Thus, the "rovincial &oard of &ulacan passed $esolution /o. (0* disapproving andannulling $esolution /o. (1*. The respondent, then, reiterated to the +ffice of the #ayor its petition for theapproval of the permit to fence the aforesaid parcels of land. +n +ctober (', ',*0,however, the #unicipal %ouncil of #eycauayan, passed $esolution /o. (', -eries of ',*0, for the purpose of expropriating anew the respondentFs land. The "rovincial&oard of &ulacan approved the aforesaid resolution on 8anuary (1, ',*2. Thereafter,the petitioner, on !ebruary '2, ',*2, filed with the $egional Trial %ourt of #alolos,&ulacan, &ranch ?I, a special civil action for expropriation.+n August (E, ',*2, the trial court issued an order declaring the taking of theproperty as lawful and appointing the "rovincial Assessor of &ulacan as courtcommissioner who shall hold the hearing to ascertain the ust compensation for theproperty. +n 8anuary '), ',*1, the appellate court affirmed the trial courtFsdecision. 5owever, upon motion for reconsideration by the respondent, the decisionwas reGexamined and reversed. The appellate court held that there is no genuinenecessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road as there were severalother roads for the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for theproposed public road. The court, taking into consideration the location and si3e of the land, also opined that the land is more Ideal for use as storage area forrespondentFs heavy eAuipment and finished products. 5ence, this petition. ISS"(S4hether or not there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use asa public road 4hether or not the #unicipality of #eycauyan can validly expropriate thesub ect road +"LI#.S4e agree with the respondent. The urisdiction of this %ourt in cases brought to us from the %ourt of Appealsis limited to the review of errors of law, factual issues not being proper in certiorariproceedings./one of the exceptions warranting nonGapplication of the rule ispresent in this case. +n the contrary, we find that the appellate courtFs decision issupported by substantial evidence. The petitionerFs purpose in expropriating the respondentFs property is toconvert the same into a public road which would provide a connecting link between#alhacan $oad and &ulac $oad in ?alen3uela, &ulacan and thereby ease the trafficin the area of vehicles

coming from #acArthur 5ighway. The records, however,reveals that there are other connecting links between the aforementioned roads. The petitioner itself admits that there are four such cross roads in existence. Therespondent court stated that with the proposed road, there would be seven. There is no showing that some of the six other available cross roads havebeen closed or that the private roads in the subdivision may not be used formunicipal purposes. 4hat is more likely is that these roads have already beenturned over to the government. The petitioner alleges that surely the environmentalprogress during the span of seven years between the first and second attempts toexpropriate has brought about a change in the facts of the case. This allegationdoes not merit consideration absent a showing of concrete evidence attesting to it. There is no Auestion here as to the right of the -tate to take private propertyfor public use upon payment of ust compensation. 4hat is Auestioned is the existence of a genuine necessity therefor. In the case of %ity of #anila v. %hinese %ommunity of #anila 62)"hil. 02,7, this %ourt held that the foundation of the right to exercise thepower of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. %ondemnation of private property is ustified only if it is forthe public good and there is a genuine necessity of a public character.%onseAuently, the courts have the power to inAuire into the legality of theexercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there isa genuine necessity therefor In the case of De Hnecht v. &autista, 6')) -%$A ..)7, this court furtherruled that the government may not capriciously choose what privateproperty should be taken. %iting the case of 8.#. Tuason C %o., Inc. v. <and Tenure Administration 6supra7, the court held that with due recognition then of thepower of %ongress to designate the particular property to be taken and how much thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation, it is stilla udicial Auestion whether in the exercise of such competence, the partyadversely affected is the victim of partiality and pre udice. That the eAua lprotection clause will not allow. There is absolutely no showing in the petition why the more appropriatelot for the proposed road which was offered for sale has not been thesub ect of the petitionerFs attempt to expropriate assuming there is a realneed for another connecting road. Moday vs Court of $ppeals

#oday is a landowner in &unawan, Agusan del -ur. In ',*,, the -angguniang &ayan of &unawan passed a resolution authori3ing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a ' hectare portion of #oday@s land. "urpose of which is to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the -angguniang "anlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by &unawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the expropriation nonetheless. ISS"(- 4hether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the -angguniang "anlalawigan. )(L*- Ies. >minent domain, the power which the #unicipality of &unawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental -tate power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government@s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the -tate, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. !or the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be ust compensation. The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is Jbeyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same.K This was not the case in the case at bar as the -" merely stated that there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the -" did not even bother to declare the -& resolution as invalid. 5ence, the expropriation case is valid. Masi/ip v. City of asig ..+. #o. 012134! January 51! 5662 G the power of eminent domain is not inherent in <:B and must be expressly provided for by statute F$C%S<ourdes Dela "a3 #asikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which the %ity of "asig sought to expropriate a portion thereof for the Jsports development and recreational activitiesK of the residents of &arangay %aniogan. This was in 8anuary ',,2. #asikip refused. +n #arch (0, ',,2, %ity of "asig sought again to expropriate said portion of land for the alleged

purpose that it was Jin line with the program of the #unicipal :overnment to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.K "etitioner protested, so %ity of "asig filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. The #otion to Dismiss filed by #asikip was dismissed by the rial court on the ground that there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property. %ase was elevated to the %ourt of Appeals, which dismissed petition for lack of merit. 5ence, this petition. ISS"(4L/ there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property )(L*>minent domain is Jthe right of a government to take and appropriate private property to the public use, whenever the public exigency reAuires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonably compensation therefor.K It is the power of the -tate or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government. This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the power thereof to the <:Bs, other public entities and public utility corporations, sub ect only to constitutional limitations. <:Bs have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authori3ed by statute. -ec. ',, <:%: <:B may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and landless, upon payment of ust compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the %onstitution and pertinent laws. "rovided: 6'7 power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not acceptedM 6(7 <:B may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least '1N fair market value of the property based on the current tax declarationM and 607 amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on

the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property There is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at $ainforest "ark in "asig %ity. >vidently, there is no Jgenuine necessityK to ustify the expropriation. The records show that the %ertification issued by the %aniogan &arangay %ouncil which became the basis for the passage of +rdinance /o. 2, authori3ing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the #elendres %ompound 5omeowner@s Association, a private, nonGprofit organi3ation, not the residents of %aniogan.