Division and Unity in the Baha'i Community:

Towards a Definition of Fundamentalism

Moojan Momen

Abstract:

The definition of fundamentalism advanced by the Fundamentalism Project

(directed by Martin Marty and Scott Appleby) suffers from a number of
problems not least of which is the fact that serious objections can be
raised against almost all of the points that it contains. Nowhere is
this more clearly demonstrated than when considering the Baha'i
community. In trying to apply these criteria to the Baha'i community,
one finds that the Baha'i community fits some well but is the diametric
opposite of others. The Baha'i community is strongly oriented towards
unity and it is this aspect that makes it appear to be fundamentalist
according to the Marty-Appleby definition. But the community is also,
with a few reservations, highly committed to the modern world, to
science and rationality and to democracy. Thus one finds that the
definition itself is not useful in relation to the Baha'i community.
Indeed it will be demonstrated that the definition has problems when
applied to other communities as well.
This article proposes that it may be more useful to use a
psychological definition of fundamentalism that sees the phenomenon as a
cognitive style, the individual's characteristic way of organising and
categorising perceptions and concepts. This makes fundamentalism a
value-free term in that there are no good or bad cognitive styles,
although different cognitive styles may be good or bad in a given
situation or for achieving a particular goal. This approach allows
fundamentalism to be seen as one end of a spectrum with liberalism at
the other. Thus any large enough religious movement will have a range of
individuals at different points on the spectrum.
Whether a fundamentalist group emerges from a large religious
movement then depends on the social dynamics within the movement. In
the
Baha'i community, certain mechanisms are in place that act to prevent
the emergence of fundamentalist groups and movements (and indeed of
other organised groups based around an ideological or political
position). In addition, certain changes set in motion in the last decade
mean that those of fundamentalist mind-set will increasingly be engaging
in non-confrontational dialogue with those of liberal views, a process
that may well result in the breaking down of fundamentalist certainties.
Furthermore this process is designed to dissolve power hierarchies in
the community, which will block the emergence of the charismatic leaders
typical of fundamentalist groups. These structures and developments may
act to make the emergence of fundamentalist groups in the future
unlikely.

PAPER:

In this paper, the phenomenon of fundamentalism is examined in relation

to the Baha'i Faith, a religion that is only 160 years old and, although
stemming from Islam, is now classified in most recently published
studies of religion as an independent religion. In trying to apply the
criteria or characteristic features of fundamentalism to the Baha'i
community, one finds a mixed picture emerging with the community fitting
some well but being the diametric opposite of others. This calls into
question the usefulness of these criteria and an alternative definition
is here proposed as being more accurate and value neutral. Finally the
social dynamics of the Baha'i community are examined for the manner in
which they deal with fundamentalism and the extent to which they
encourage or discourage it.

Religious fundamentalism came to the centre of the world's attention in

the 1970s and particularly with the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran.
There has been a mixed reaction in the scholarly community to the study
of fundamentalism with some on the one hand even denying that it is a
useful label1 while on the other hand Martin Marty and Scott Appleby
have produced a five-volume series of books in The Fundamentalism
Project describing, analysing and arguing for the usefulness of the
category. The analysis of those who argue for the usefulness of the
category has also been mixed with a noticeable tension among scholars
(and often even within the work of an individual scholar) between, on
the one hand, an inclination to treat it in value-neutral terms as a
phenomenon that has merely to be described and analysed and, on the
other, an inclination to treat it as a negative phenomenon requiring the
scholar to find ways of combatting it, controlling it or curing it.

It has been suggested that religious fundamentalism be defined in terms

of nine characteristic features drawn from the paper of Gabriel Almond,
Emmanuel Sivan and R. Scott Appleby:

1) a reaction against the marginalization of religion in society;

2) the selective use of tradition and modernity;

3) moral dualism;

4) absolutism and inerrancy of essential texts;

5) millennialism;

6) elect membership;

7) sharp boundaries;

8) authoritarian organization; and

9) strict behavioural requirements;2

In addition there are two features suggested for Islam by Said Amir
Arjomand but which have a more general application:

10) resistance against a scientific worldview and scientific principles

applied to religion and religious texts, and

11) resistance against the secular state.3

All of this was published as part of the Fundamentalism Project directed

by Marty and Appleby. One problem with accepting these as the defining
characteristics of fundamentalism is that even during the years that the
Fundamentalism Project was operating and certainly in the years since
the publication of the conclusions of the project, reports have
accumulated of other characteristic features of fundamentalism which
have been tested across different religions and in non-Western
environments. Studies have shown, for example, that fundamentalists
characteristically display:

12) a negative view of the participation of women in society;4

13) opposition to globalization;5

14) a traditional moral code and a negative view of homosexuality;6 and

15) xenophobia, ultra-nationalism and a negative attitude towards ethnic

minorities.7
The Baha'i Faith

The Baha'i Faith originated in the Middle East with its founder
Baha'u'llah (1817-1892) being exiled from Iran to what is now Iraq and
Turkey and finally to the Haifa-Akka area which was then part of the
Ottoman Empire and is now in the state of Israel.8 He appointed his son
`Abdu'l-Baha (1844-1921) as his successor and as the authorized
interpreter of his teachings. During the period of `Abdu'l-Baha's
leadership (1892-1921), the Baha'i Faith spread to North America and
Europe. The next leader was Shoghi Effendi (1897-1957), who was
appointed the Guardian of the Baha'i Faith and who, from 1921, directed
the spread of the Baha'i Faith around the world and its separation from
Islam. Since 1963, the Baha'i community has been led by an elected
institution, the Universal House of Justice.9 This body does not create
doctrine (as, for example, the Papacy does), but it does direct the
activities of the Baha'is and is charged with legislating in all areas
not covered by scripture. By 2006, some five million Baha'is are stated
to be found in 191 countries among more than 2,100 ethnic groups.10

Baha'u'llah states that the main purpose of his teachings is to take

humanity on to the next stage of its social evolution -- the stage of
world unity. Human beings need to overcome the divisions that maintain
the conflicts of the present-day world. In the oft-repeated words of
Baha'u'llah: "The earth is but one country, and mankind its citizens."11
For this to occur, a number of global institutions need to be
established and certain social changes need to be made; for example:
elimination of national, ethnic and religious prejudices, advancement in
the social role of women, and the abolition of extremes of wealth and
poverty. But above all, a global consciousness, a sense of being
citizens of one inter-connected world needs to arise within each
individual.

In the authoritative Baha'i texts there are a number of passages that

relate to the phenomenon of fundamentalism. In the time of Baha'u'llah,
the concept of fundamentalism did not exist but he refers to a
politically-oriented religious rigidity and prejudice, using the closest
word that existed at the time "religious fanaticism (bughd.á-yi
madhhabí)" and says for example that: "Religious fanaticism and hatred
are a world-devouring fire, whose violence none can quench."
Baha'u'llah's answer however is not to move towards secularism as
occurred in Europe throughout the 19th-20th century, rather he goes on
to say: "The Hand of Divine power can, alone, deliver mankind from this
desolating affliction." In other words, the answer is the birth of a new
religious impulse. Religious fundamentalism and fanaticism are seen in
the Baha'i worldview not as signs of the strength of a religion but as
signs of the end-stage weakness of a religious cycle. And so for
example, the second leader of the Baha'i Faith, `Abdu'l-Baha writes that
at first "true religion promotes the civilization and honour, the
prosperity and prestige, the learning and advancement of a people" but
later, "when it falls into the hands of religious leaders who are
foolish and fanatical, it is diverted to the wrong ends, until this
greatest of splendours turns into blackest night."12 Only the emergence
of the new youthful religious impulse that has the confidence to be
tolerant can counter this fanaticism. The underlying message here is, of
course, that the answer to the religious prejudice and hatred seen in
the world is the emergence of the Baha'i Faith.

It is clear therefore that religious prejudice and rigidity are

condemned. `Abdu'l-Baha states: "One of the forms of prejudice which
afflict the world of mankind is religious bigotry and fanaticism. When
this hatred burns in human hearts, it becomes the cause of revolution,
destruction, abasement of humankind and deprivation of the mercy of
God."13 Additionally, schools have an important role in educate children
in ways that mitigate against the rise of religious fanaticism: "Schools
must first train the children in the principles of religion, so that the
Promise and the Threat recorded in the Books of God may prevent them
from the things forbidden and adorn them with the mantle of the
commandments; but this in such a measure that it may not injure the
children by resulting in ignorant fanaticism and bigotry."14 In their
dealings with others, Shoghi Effendi urges Baha'is to tread a middle
road "neither fanatical nor excessively liberal."15

In the Baha'i teachings and beliefs, one can find points that point
towards both fundamentalism and liberalism. Some have described the
Baha'i Faith as fundamentalist and have pointed to such beliefs and
teachings as:

1. A traditional attitude towards sexual morality (permissible sex is

between married, heterosexual couples) and a generally traditional
individual moral code.

2. An anti-secularist position in that it considers that religion is the

best moral and ideological basis for society.
3. Baha'is tend to be actively seeking to convert others to their
viewpoint (although most would deny that they engage in
proselytisation).

4. Strict membership conditions, the transgressing of which brings,

after several warnings, administrative sanctions or even expulsion from
the community.

5. The belief that religious institutions should ultimately merge with

state institutions (although some Baha'is have dissented from this
position).

But there are also Baha'i positions and beliefs that point towards
liberalism:

1. A belief that Satan is the animal side of human, not a real existing
figure.

2. A belief that all humanity is one - no division into believer and

unbeliever or pure and impure.

3. The promotion of the social role of women.

4. A belief that religion should be in conformity with science and an

affirmation of the principle of evolution.

5. A lack of an idealization of the past and a condemnation of a blind

following of tradition; the faithful are working towards a better future
condition of society rather than trying to bring it back to an idealised
past community.

Indeed some of the fundamental Baha'i teachings can be interpreted as

promoting either fundamentalism or liberalism. Thus, for example, the
apparently triumphalist view that the world will eventually adopt the
teachings of the Baha'i Faith is moderated by indications that this will
not necessarily be the result of the activities of the Baha'is (i.e.
force of circumstances will also drive the world towards greater degrees
of unity) nor will it necessarily involve everyone adopting the Baha'i
Faith. Similarly, the presence of a strong authoritative institutional
structure may appear to point towards fundamentalism, but this is
mitigated by an increasing decentralization of decision-making processes
(see below).
This uncertainty about the positioning of the Baha'i Faith is reflected
in the academic literature. Researchers such as the sociologist of
religion Margit Warburg of the University of Copenhagen have found that
the Baha'is that she has studied in general have a liberal and
cosmopolitan outlook.16 On the other hand papers by two Middle Eastern
scholars, Juan Cole of the United States and Denis MacEoin of Britain,
have described the Baha'i community as fundamentalist.17

The Baha'i Community and the definition of fundamentalism

In this section, the Baha'i community will be examined in relation to

the criteria for fundamentalism listed above. In particular, the
comments of Cole and MacEoin, who have published previously on this
subject, will be reviewed. These latter authors need, however, to be
approached with caution. Cole, for example, has asserted that, in recent
decades, there has been a fundamentalist takeover of the Baha'i
leadership (the Universal House of Justice and the American elected
national Baha'i council, the National Spiritual Assembly) which has
moved the community from a relatively liberal position to an
increasingly fundamentalist one and he describes what he calls a
"culture war" going on.18 His position on this, however, is biassed by
his own conflict with the Baha'i leadership, which led to his departure
from the Baha'i community in 1996 after a period as a dissident at the
extreme liberal end of the spectrum. His articles are thus partly a
justification of his departure. Since his departure, Cole has taken on
the role of what the sociologist David Bromley defines as an "apostate":
"that subset of leavetakers who are involved in contested exits and
affiliate with an oppositional coalition".19 The oppositional coalition
in this case is a group of like-minded apostates who have formed a
"virtual community" on Internet e-mail lists. In so far as the points he
makes are true, they relate to the perceptions of this small number of
people and the "culture war" is a "virtual" phenomenon and does not
affect the vast majority of Baha'is who perceive their "real" community
in almost diametrically opposite terms to those described by Cole. I
have analyzed this in detail elsewhere20 and so there is no need to go
into details here. For the purposes of this article, it is sufficient to
say that one of the aims of these apostates is to turn the status of the
Baha’i Faith from that of what Bromley calls an "allegiant organisation"
(i.e. one that is in broad agreement with society) to that of a
"subversive" one, or a "cult" (one that is in a state of tension with
society)21 and one of the main ways of doing this has been to make the
Baha'i community appear rigid and fundamentalist. MacEoin shares a
similar personal history to Cole with regard to the Baha'i Faith.

One must start by agreeing with Cole and MacEoin that there is some
degree of fundamentalist-liberal tension within the Baha'i community,
indeed it would be surprising if there were not in a community the size
of the Baha'i one. Because of the social dynamics of the Baha'i
community, as described below, however, this tension tends not to be
played out in a conflictual manner within the Baha'i community. A
starting point for considering this matter would be to examine the
Baha'i Faith in relation to the characteristics of fundamentalism
described above and Cole's comments on each:

1) Reaction against the Marginalization of Religion in Society.

Baha'u'llah did react against the marginalization of religion in society
and he attributed the ills of the present day to this: "Religion is
verily the chief instrument for the establishment of order in the world
and of tranquillity amongst its peoples. The weakening of the pillars of
religion hath strengthened the foolish and emboldened them and made
them
more arrogant. Verily I say: The greater the decline of religion, the
more grievous the waywardness of the ungodly. This cannot but lead in
the end to chaos and confusion."22 Ultimately, the marginalization of
religion leads, the Baha'i texts affirm, to the weakening of the moral
code of society and its resultant disintegration. Having said this,
however, this would not appear by itself to be a very discriminating
distinction. Numerous Christian, Islamic and Buddhist leaders who would
be regarded as liberal also want to see religion back at the centre of
the public sphere, giving a lead in matters of morality.23

Cole asserts that, contrary to the position of the present Baha'i

leadership, the original writings of Baha'u'llah and `Abdu'l-Baha were
"anti-theocratic" and did not envisage that the Baha'i institutions
would become involved in governance. He has, however, confused a
number
of different issues. He states for example that "In his Treatise on
Leadership of the early 1890s `Abdu'l-Baha said that religious
institutions, including Baha'i ones, are never to intervene in affairs
of state or political matters unbidden . . ."24 In this work of `Abdu'l-
Baha, however, there is no mention of Baha'i institutions and it is not
religious institutions that `Abdu'l-Baha says should not intervene in
affairs of state, but rather professional religious leaders. Since the
Baha'i Faith has no professional religious leaders but rather has
elected councils made up from lay people, this statement of `Abdu'l-Baha
does not apply to the Baha'i institutions. On the contrary, Baha'u'llah
expressly says, and `Abdu'l-Baha reiterates, that the elected Baha'i
councils should in the future involve themselves in affairs of state.25
Since the Baha'i community has no religious professionals but is run by
elected councils made up of lay members it is, moreover, not correct to
call this a theocracy as Cole does.26

This desire to see religion at the centre of society does not lead to
the Baha'i community being fundamentalist, moreover, since individual
Baha'is and Baha'i institutions are prohibited from taking political
action at present. This prohibition has been in place since the early
1900s and means that the Baha'i community whether acting as individuals
or as a community should not be involved in trying to impose an Baha'i
ideology on others through political actions in the way typical of
fundamentalist groups. To what extent and when any Baha'i institutions
take part in any political action is under the jurisdiction of the
Universal House of Justice and it is impossible to predict how this may
develop in the future (in fact the Universal House of Justice has
mandated a small amount of political action at the international level
on such liberal issues as education for the girl child, human rights and
the social advancement of women27).

2. Selective Use of Tradition and Modernity. The Baha'i Faith is only

160 years old and there has therefore not been enough time for much
tradition to have developed. Indeed, in several instances, over such
matters as marriages, funerals, and setting prayers to music, for
example, Shoghi Effendi, expressly warned the Baha'is against allowing
traditions and rituals to develop.28 Moreover the elected Baha'i
councils do not make their decisions on the basis of tradition or
precedents but are advised to come to a decision on each major matter
after viewing the facts and the principles applicable. Baha'is do not
have any idea of an ideal past community which they are trying to
recreate as some fundamentalists do, rather they see themselves as an
evolving community trying gradually to bring out the implications of
Baha'u'llah's teachings.

The examples that Cole gives in this section are either erroneous,
forced or irrelevant. While Cole and MacEoin see pre-publication review
of anything that a Baha'i wants to publish as a means of enforcing
doctrinal conformity,29 the Baha'i authorities see it as a temporary
measure taken because the Baha'i Faith is still relatively obscure and
any public statements published by Baha'is are likely to be taken by
readers as representative of the Baha'i position. If, for example, a
Christian says that Christianity encourages suicide, then most people
know enough about Christianity to discount such a statement; but if a
similar statement is published about the Baha'i Faith by a Baha'i, the
majority of readers who know nothing about the Baha'i Faith would
probably assume it is correct -- else why would a Baha'i publish such a
statement? Baha'is writing in the academic sphere can ask for suitably
qualified people to review their work. The decision as to when this
requirement is lifted rests with the international leadership, the
Universal House of Justice, but Cole is incorrect to assert that its
temporary nature has ever been questioned by any Baha'i authority.
Indeed the measure has already been partially lifted in that materials
to be published on the Internet are exempt from it.30

3. Moral Manicheanism (dualism). There are problems with this criterion

for fundamentalism in that it is ambiguous and involves a great deal of
subjective judgement by the researcher. Almond et al. also acknowledge
problems when they say that "moral dualism or Manichaeanism is by no
means a distinguishing mark of fundamentalism" and is a feature of many
fundamentalist group "simply as a consequence of being militant".31 The
Baha'i case strengthens the argument that this is not a reliable
distinguishing feature.

The scriptures of all religions, including those of the Baha'i Faith,

have some degree of moral dualism inherent within them and evident in
their scriptures. This is particularly strong in the case of the
religions of the Abrahamic line where the founders of these religions
regard their message as the word of God and consequently those who
oppose them become the enemies of God and thus morally evil (even those
who are not enemies but simply unbelievers are morally or spiritually
flawed to some degree since they are not following God's path). This
attitude is, however, also evident in religions such as Hinduism and
Buddhism. In the latter, for example, Devadatta becomes an embodiment
of
evil trying to undermine and destroy the Buddha in his successive
lives;32 while the mythical history of the Mahavamsa becomes the means
by which modern Sinhalese Sri Lankan fundamentalists are able to paint
the Hindu Tamil minority in terms similar to the Nazi use of the terms
"Aryan" and "Semite".33 To decide then whether a group is fundamentalist
or not is not so much a matter of what is in the scripture (since most
scriptures have passages that can be interpreted in a dualist manner)
but is a matter of judging how these dualist concepts are interpreted
and how central they are in the group's thinking and activities.

The approach taken by, for example MacEoin, of quoting a number of

passages from authoritative Baha'i texts as evidence of the "intolerant
world" of the Baha'i Faith is, therefore, inherently flawed.34 One could
equally point to other texts in Baha'i scripture such Baha'u'llah's
abolition of the concept of ritual impurity,35 a key factor in the
tendency of some religions towards dualism, or his injunction "Consort
with all religions with amity and concord"36 as evidence of a move away
from fundamentalism. The evidence of Warburg,37 who carried out a
systematic and scientifically-designed survey (as against the anecdotal
and highly selective evidence presented by Cole38) points to the average
Baha'i among those she surveyed in Denmark being liberal and
cosmopolitan.

The Baha'i teachings do not in any case take a black and white view that
an individual is either "saved" or "damned". Salvation is seen as a
journey in which one becomes closer to God by acquiring the attributes
of God (attributes such as love, justice, purity, etc.). Since everyone
is on this journey and the important factor is not so much where one is
on the journey but how much progress one is making, it is clear that
there is no simple dualist division into "saved" and "damned" nor even
any easy way of making judgements about individuals (since an apparent
saint could be making little or no progress while an apparent sinner may
be taking giant strides forwards).39

4. Absolutism and Inerrancy. With this criterion, the picture is again

mixed when it comes to the Baha'i Faith. Certainly, the Baha'i Faith can
be said to be a text-centred religion: the writings of Baha'u'llah are
regarded as Divine revelation, the word of God, while the writings of
the successive leaders of the Baha'i Faith, `Abdu'l-Baha, Shoghi
Effendi, and the Universal House of Justice are regarded as divinely
inspired when each is writing within certain defined spheres. But this
seeming fundamentalism and authoritarianism is countered by a number of
anti-authoritarian and anti-dogmatic strands: Baha'u'llah's assertion
that, in many passages, it is not the literal but the metaphorical
meaning that is intended;40 the emphasis in the Baha'i writings on the
importance of human reason and scientific enquiry; and the categorical
statement of Shoghi Effendi: "Let us also remember that at the very root
of the Cause lies the principle of the undoubted right of the individual
to self-expression, his freedom to declare his conscience and set forth
his views."41 This complex situation can be summarized by saying that,
although all Baha'is have the right and indeed the obligation to study
the Baha'i scriptures and come to their own understanding of these, no
individual Baha'i has the right to claim authority for their
interpretation. Only the writings of Baha'u'llah, `Abdu'l-Baha, Shoghi
Effendi and the Universal House of Justice are authoritative for
Baha'is.

The question of what elements of the scripture should be taken literally

and what should be interpreted as metaphorical is one that has been the
subject of much debate among Baha'is which will no doubt continue, but
what Cole fails to make clear in his presentation is that, far from
being on the side of the literalists, the Universal House of Justice has
frequently come out against too narrow and literal an understanding of
Baha'i scripture.42 Cole also fails to mention that, in the article that
he quotes from the member of the Universal House of Justice, Peter Khan,
the latter asserts categorically that the fundamentalist notion that
Baha'is do not need scientific and academic studies because "all
knowledge" is contained in "the Revelation of Bahá'u'lláh" is considered
by him to be an "erroneous view" that is "pernicious", "dangerous, very
narrow, and quite wrong."43 There are also examples where Cole has cited
incorrectly in order to prove points.44

5. Millennialism and Messianism. The link between fundamentalism and

millennialism in Western religions has been clearly demonstrated in the
writings of several scholars.45 This link does not necessarily apply,
however, to fundamentalisms in other religions. The early Baha'i
community was clearly millennialist in outlook. Millennialist thinking
has, however, receded from the forefront of Baha'i thinking since
Baha'is regard the coming of Baha'u'llah as the fulfilment of the
millennialist and messianic expectations of all religions and
Baha'u'llah has stated that any future messenger of God will not appear
for a thousand years. Insofar as any millennialism remains, it has
shifted from what the American scholar of religious studies Catherine
Wessinger calls "catastrophic millennialism" (a sudden Divine
intervention in human affairs) to "progressive millennialism" (looking
to a gradual improvement in human circumstances through human efforts,
rather than supernatural means).46 Although small numbers of Western
Baha'is have over the years intensely discussed the possibility of some
future catastrophe, referred to in some Baha'i texts, such speculation
has decreased over the years and since the passing of the year 2000, the
last focus of such expectations, these discussions have almost
disappeared.47

6. Elect, Chosen Membership. While considering that they have possession

of the teachings that can bring a social salvation to the world, Baha'is
do not in general think of themselves as a saved elect, having a station
above that of other human beings. It is the person who is spiritual and
lives up to the moral teachings of religion who has the highest
spiritual station, whether they are Baha'is or not. Indeed, Baha'u'llah
in one of his writings complains that the people who have done him most
harm are not his enemies but those Baha'is who do not follow his
teachings48 and, similarly, `Abdu'l-Baha condemns the view that any
particular religious group is exclusively saved and states that
Christians who truly follow the teachings of Christ have more right to
call themselves Baha'is than a Baha'i who does not follow the teachings
of Baha'u'llah.49 In addition, Baha'u'llah calls upon his followers to
"Consort with the followers of all religions in a spirit of friendliness
and fellowship."50 In this way, the Baha'i Faith maintains a pluralist
and non-exclusive theology.51

7. Sharp Boundaries. In order to define itself any organised group will

create a boundary. Those within the boundary share a worldview,
collective norms, a hierarchy of values.52 In general, a group with weak
(porous) boundaries has a nebulous identity, non-binding doctrines and
few communal rules. A group with a sharp boundary will generally have a
strong identity, binding doctrines and communal rules. This factor is,
however, a poor discriminator for fundamentalism. Many religions,
especially traditional religions such as the Roman Catholic Church or
Islam, have sharp boundaries. Thus the correlation between this
criterion and fundamentalism is weak and it is not a reliable indicator.
The Baha'i community in the last half of the twentieth century has had a
sharp boundary and a strong identity but, as will be discussed below,
the last decade has seen the community move in the opposite direction.

8. Authoritarian Organisation. Many fundamentalist groups have a

charismatic leader but, apart from this figure, they have little in the
way of official hierarchies, a rational-legal framework or a
bureaucratic structure. By contrast, the Baha'i community has, in the
course of its history moved away from charismatic leadership and has, in
Weberian terminology, "routinised" this charismatic authority in a
hierarchy of elected councils ranging from the Universal House of
Justice at the international level, the ultimate authority in the world
Baha'i community, to councils at the local level called Local Spiritual
Assemblies. This organizational structure was authorised by Baha'u'llah
in his writings and slowly built up over a period of a hundred years by
Baha'u'llah's successors. Its authority, power and functioning is
described in more detail below. For here it is sufficient to state that
this elected organizational structure is mainly concerned with directing
Baha'i activities and maintaining unity in the community. It does not
determine doctrine or set dogma. Thus while most fundamentalist groups
are profoundly inimical to democracy, the Baha'i community has democracy
at the heart of its operations.

Cole has pointed to the doctrine that the Universal House of Justice is
infallible as evidence of authoritarianism. One point that needs to be
made is that this question has been little debated as yet among Baha'is
and anyone who makes statements about the matter is voicing personal
opinions rather than any agreed or authoritative positions. The only
scholarly paper written on the subject suggests that the infallibility
of the House of Justice is limited to the legislation of any laws that
are not explicitly contained in Baha'u'llah's writings. Baha'u'llah
writes that he has done this because circumstances change and thus there
is a need for flexibility in the legislative framework of the Baha'i
Faith. Even here, "infallibility" does not mean a fixed and unchanging
pronouncements. Any subsequent House of Justice can abrogate and alter
previous legislation.53 In fact, the Universal House of Justice has
declared a policy of refraining from laying down new laws in exactly the
sorts of areas that it might be imagined that they would legislate (for
example, over contraception and abortion) and has merely laid out the
spiritual principles involved and left the final decision to the
individual Baha'i. It has stated that this (moving away from laying down
prescriptions for all areas of human life and leaving such matters to
individual conscience) is part of the coming to maturity of humanity.54
In practice, the Universal House of Justice appears to have imposed very
few new laws upon ordinary Baha'is in the 44 years of its existence.55

Cole has asserted that the authority of the Baha'i institutions has been
used in recent years to promote a fundamentalist agenda. He can only
maintain such a position by being highly selective with his facts,
however. He mentions, for example in his paper, a group of ultra-
orthodox incarnationist Iranian Baha'is in the United Kingdom as an
example of a move towards fundamentalism56 but fails to mention that the
Universal House of Justice warned this group about its divisive
activities as it did with the ultra-liberal groups that Cole champions.
Thus the actions of the Universal House of Justice appear not to be
prompted by a desire to promote fundamentalism or a concern to enforce a
doctrinal orthodoxy but rather to be triggered by the formation of
cabals and factions that threaten the unity of the community and may
presage sectarian fission.

Another factor to be considered is that the Baha'i teachings emphasise

the importance of community and a social salvation rather than the
individualism and personal salvation of Protestantism, which is
reflected in what Robert Bellah has described as the "faith without
community" and privatism of much of contemporary religious life.57 This
communitarianism may (by contrast with the individualism of much of
modern life) be seen as institutional authoritarianism but this is no
more so than, for example, the Roman Catholic Church (and indeed, given
that the Baha'i institutions are elected and there are no professional
religious leaders, it is probably a good deal less so). Thus in general,
this criterion does not appear to be a very discriminating one.

9. Behavioural requirements. Fundamentalist groups tend to control the

activities of their members, such that their behaviour is finely
regulated and much of their time is taken up with group activities. Even
such matters as the dress worn and the music listened to can be
regulated.

Baha'is do not have a distinctive dress code and do not live in

segregated areas, unless they are forced to. Although the Baha'i
teachings endorse what may be regarded as traditional moral values (for
example that the only legitimate sexual relations are within a
heterosexual monogamous marriage), in fact the controlling effects of
this are mitigated by the fact that, as long as there is no injury or
compulsion involved, what goes on behind closed doors is not considered
the business of the Baha'i administration. It is only if the good name
of the Baha'i Faith is being brought into disrepute by the public
actions of any individual that the Baha'i authorities may act by first
warning the individual, then removing their administrative rights (such
a person is still regarded as a Baha'i but not a "Baha'i in good
standing" -- they are unable to vote or be voted for in Baha'i elections
and may not donate to the Baha'i Funds) and even here the Universal
House of Justice has reiterated Shoghi Effendi's insistence that the
Baha'i institutions should be "very cautious" in using this sanction "in
rare cases" and not "unless the matter is really very grave" and then
only after giving "repeated warnings".58

10. Resistance against a scientific worldview and scientific principles

applied to religion and religious texts. Although the Baha'i texts
consider that science should be guided in the choice of areas of
research by the moral values of religion, these texts are equally clear
that if religion does not agree with science, it risks becoming no
better than superstition. Cole erroneously implies that leading Baha'is
have expressed anti-scientific views.59

An area that MacEoin and Cole have both been critical of the Baha'i
institutions is their attitude towards academic methodology and this has
undoubtedly been the subject of much discussion. The Universal House of
Justice has specifically stated that it does not wish to prescribe or
proscribe any particular methodology60 but has commented that: "In
scientific investigation when searching after the facts of any matter a
Baha'i must, of course, be entirely open-minded, but in his
interpretation of the facts and his evaluation of evidence we do not see
by what logic he can ignore the truth of the Baha'i Revelation which he
has already accepted. To do so would, we feel, be both hypocritical and
unscholarly."61

11. Resistance against the Secular State. This criterion overlaps

considerably with the first criterion listed above and should probably
be merged with that. It does not, in any case, relate to the Baha'i
community which has from its earliest days had a policy of complying
both in letter and spirit with the laws laid down by whatever government
Baha'is are living under. The only exception to that is if the
government asks them to deny their Faith. As a result of their drive
towards unity and their attitude of obedience to government, Baha'is are
not engaged in demonstrating, preaching against the government or
launching terrorist attacks. Thus the activities of Baha'is tend to be
ignored by the media who prefer to report on religious groups engaged in
conflict and aggression.
12. A negative view of the participation of women in society. The Baha'i
community has been almost the exact opposite of this feature of
fundamentalism in that it has always strongly supported the promotion of
an active social role for women. This can be seen not only in the
authoritative Baha'i texts,62 but also in the existence of a Baha'i
Office for the Advancement of Women in New York that co-ordinates the
global efforts of Baha'i women with those of the United Nations and
UNIFEM (especially in areas such as the education of the girl child); a
number of national Baha'i Offices for the Advancement of Women and
Associations of Baha'i Women; strong support for UNIFEM at national and
local level; and the existence of many Baha'i development projects that
have the advancement of women as their main or subsidiary goal.63 A
qualitative social scientific study of gender issues in the Canadian
Baha'i community by sociologists Deborah van den Hoonard and Will van
den Hoonaard revealed that there was a gap between normative Baha’i
beliefs and actual practice but also found a great deal of interest in
and efforts being made to achieve equality among both men and women.64

13. Opposition to globalization. As with the previous point, the Baha'i

community represents almost the exact opposite of this feature of
fundamentalist groups. From its very inception, it has promoted the idea
that the present problems of the world can only adequately be addressed
by action taken at the global level. Since world unity is seen not just
as desirable but inevitable, the Baha'i teachings are focussed on the
steps that are necessary to achieve it and the means of making this
trend work to the benefit of the poor and disadvantaged and not just for
the enrichment of the already rich.65 The Bahai community has expended a
great deal of effort in building up relations with and supporting the
United Nations and its subsidiary organizations, which are the "cursed
other" of the fundamentalist holistic vision.66 Indeed this activity of
the Baha'is is a focus of attack by Christian fundamentalist groups.67

14. A traditional moral code and a negative view of homosexuality. The

Baha'i Faith can be said to reject the Enlightenment idea that it is
possible to build a moral code from scientific and rational principles
and also to reject the concept of natural law. It considers that only
religious teaching can be an effective basis for morality.68

As mentioned under 9 above, the Baha'i teachings take a traditional view

of sexual morality and may thus be said to comply with this feature of
fundamentalism. As pointed out under 3 above, however, there is not an
attitude that the homosexual is a "sinner" and therefore "damned", but
rather that Baha'u'llah has given all the guidance of the best way to
achieve spiritual progress and, if an individual chooses not to take
this guidance in one area, they are hindering their progress. Since no
human being is perfect, however, then all human beings are hindering
their progress in one area or another. Again as described under 9 above,
as long as there is no compulsion or injury involved, what goes on
behind closed doors is not a matter of regulation by the Baha'i
institutions. It only becomes the concern of the institutions, and may
eventually lead to sanctions, if it is damaging the reputation of the
community.69

15. Xenophobia, ultra-nationalism and a negative attitude towards ethnic

minorities. Fundamentalists are the antithesis and opponents of multi-
culturalism. By contrast, all forms of prejudice, national, racial and
ethnic, are condemned in the Baha'i writings as blocking the path to
world unity and thus holding human society back from spiritual and
material prosperity. While a moderate amount of nationalism can be
beneficial, the divisive effects of excessive nationalism and the
resulting xenophobia engendered are strongly condemned in the Baha'i
scriptures.70

The Definition of Fundamentalism

In all then, the Baha'i Faith presents a quandary for the defining
characteristics of fundamentalism in that it complies with some of them
but is diametrically the opposite of others. And indeed it is not the
only example of such difficulties. Counter-examples and problems with
any definition based on theological or sociological criteria can be
found for other religious communities. The most clear example of this is
the fourth criterion, absolutism and inerrancy of essential texts. There
are very few Muslims who do not consider the Qur'an to be the revealed
and inerrant "Word of God" but this does not make them all
fundamentalists; indeed until the rise of political Islam (Islamism) in
the 1980s, fundamentalists were a small minority. Similarly,
millennialism, while it plays a large part in the fundamentalism of
Shi`i Islam in Iran, particularly with the presidency of Ahmadinejad,
plays almost no part in the fundamentalism in the rest of the Islamic
world which is mainly Sunni. At the same time, although fundamentalists
exist among Buddhists, several of this list of characteristics would not
appear to apply to them (to a large extent items 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 of the
list).71

In the case of the Baha'i Faith there is the added complexity that,
since the religion is only about 150 years old, many of its teachings
already take modernity into account and so there is less inherent strain
between modernity and the teachings of the religion. This has the effect
that a Baha'i of fundamentalist inclination will, by virtue of these
matters being in the scripture, be forced to take positions on many
social issues that would, in other religions, be considered liberal. For
example, the five points that I have described above as Baha'i teachings
that point towards liberalism are promoted just as ardently by Baha'is
inclined to fundamentalism as by those inclined to liberalism. Thus a
mere consideration of the teachings advocated by any particular Baha'i
will not be a useful guide to distinguishing between those inclined to
fundamentalism and those inclined to liberalism.

Elsewhere, I have suggested that it may be better to look upon these

theological and sociological characteristics of fundamentalism as being
epiphenomena and that it would be more useful to look at the level of
the individual for a psychological definition of the phenomenon of
fundamentalism. I have suggested that it is useful to look at religious
fundamentalism and liberalism as two cognitive styles. Cognitive style
refers to the individual's characteristic manner of organising
information and categorising perceptions and concepts. It is a value-
free term in that cognitive styles are neither good not bad (although
some may be better for some purposes than others). It is moreover not
something that is fixed in an individual; it tends to be learned and can
alter with time especially as a result of the experiences of an
individual.

The fundamentalist mentality is characteristically one that sees things

in black and white terms -- things are good or bad, people are either
among the saved or the damned; the lines are clearly drawn. Historian
Richard Hofstadter describes such people as having a "one-hundred per
cent mentality"; they "tolerate no ambiguities, no equivocations, no
reservations and no criticism."72 The liberal by contrast see a spectrum
from good to bad with a grey area in the middle; some people may not be
believers but that does not necessarily make them bad. Fundamentalists
have a drive for certainty which can only be achieved by objectivity;
they consider the indecisive world of the liberal to be tainted by
subjectivity and personal opinion.

In experimental psychology, fundamentalist and liberal cognitive styles

can be reproduced by what is called "field-dependence versus field-
independence". In the former, the subject tends to see an object in
relation to its background (and this corresponds to liberalism), while
the latter tends to isolate objects and extract them from their
background (corresponding to fundamentalism).73 One can also see
similarities between fundamentalism and a convergent style of thinking,
which focuses from the general to the particular, analysing and aiming
for certainty; while liberalism corresponds to a divergent style of
thinking, which goes from the particular to the general, prizing
inductive, intuitive thinking and aiming for inclusivity rather than
certainty.74

This psychological definition of fundamentalism then produces the

characteristic social and theological features of fundamentalism
described above. Thus for example, the inerrancy of the scripture and
the view that the scripture has a plain meaning apparent to any reader
derives from the desire for certainty; the sharp boundaries of the
community and moral dualism derive from the black and white vision of
the world; and so forth. Even the observed sociological differences can
be accounted for by positing that as rural populations come to the
cities and become literate, they will at first tend towards
fundamentalism, because the early stages of education will tend to teach
simple dichotomies. As they become more educated, perhaps by the second
generation, and more used to thinking in a more complex and nuanced
manner, the result will be a more liberal cognitive style.

The psychological definition of fundamentalism also explains why

fundamentalist groups prefer to restrict contacts with the rest of
society. Even when living in cities, they form socially isolated
enclaves with the time of the members being taken up by a series of
contacts with other fundamentalists (fundamentalist trade and
occupational associations, clubs, colleges, holiday centres, etc.)
rather than with the wider society.75 Exposure to other cognitive styles
tends to erode confidence in the black and white attitude typical of
fundamentalists.
The social and theological manifestations of a fundamentalist cognitive
style may thus show themselves in two distinct ways. In the first, they
may be manifest in pietism, an inward-looking social enclave (that has
turned its back on the rest of the members of their religion), sometimes
characterised by a tendency to be highly mystical or legalistic and
perhaps seeking to re-create an ideal community thought to have existed
in the religion's past. The second pathway is more radical and
politicized: an often aggressively outward-looking grouping that seeks
to represent and lead the whole of the religion and aims to protect the
whole community from what it perceives to be the ravages of modernity,
secularism or the "great Satan" of cultural domination by an alien
religion. Some scholars have called both groups fundamentalists while
others have restricted the term to the latter group. Basing the
definition of fundamentalism on a psychological foundation may, to those
primarily interested in the political ramifications of fundamentalism,
appear to be less useful, but I would contend that it produces a more
thorough understanding of the phenomenon. Since I have discussed this at
length elsewhere, I will not lengthen the discussion here further.76

Seeing it as a cognitive style makes fundamentalism a value-free term in

that there are no good or bad cognitive styles, although different
cognitive styles may be good or bad in a given situation or for
achieving a particular goal. This approach allows fundamentalism to be
seen as one end of a spectrum with liberalism at the other and most
people somewhere in-between. Thus any large enough religious movement
will have a range of individuals at different points on the spectrum.
Whether a fundamentalist group emerges from a religious movement then
depends on the social dynamics within the movement.

Fundamentalism and the Social Dynamics of the Baha'i community

Much of what has been written above is theoretical and has little to do
with the practice and realities of Baha'i community life. In this
section, I propose to look at the social dynamics of the Baha'i
community and the ways in which this might interact with
fundamentalists.

The Baha'i community has in its 160-year history been in a continual

state of change and development. Indeed the leadership of the Baha'i
Faith has always pushed the Baha'i community onwards towards an ideal
based on the writings of Baha'u'llah rather than looking backwards, as
some fundamentalist groups do, towards an ideal community set in the
past.77 It is moreover an operating principle of Baha'i institutions
that past practices and decisions do not set a binding precent; each
major issue facing the community should be thought out anew based only
on the principles to be found in the authoritative Baha'i texts and not
on traditional practices. Thus there is only a limited scope for the
traditionalism that is the basis for some fundamentalist ideologies.

One consideration when looking at how fundamentalism is dealt with in

the Baha'i community is that the overarching principle of Baha'i
community life is the maintenance of unity. Indeed unity can be said to
be the ultimate aim of Baha'u'llah: "The fundamental purpose animating
the Faith of God and His Religion is to safeguard the interests and
promote the unity of the human race, and to foster the spirit of love
and fellowship amongst men."78 Since the Baha'i community claims to be
trying to unite the world, it clearly needs to be united itself. The
central mechanism for the maintenance of unity in the Baha'i community
is the concept of the Covenant, which was established by Baha'u'llah in
his writings and at the present time involves the loyalty that each
Baha'i expresses to the Universal House of Justice as the final arbiter
of all matters relating to the Baha'i Faith. One aspect of this doctrine
is that, as mentioned above, although Baha'is are free to read the
Baha'i scriptures for themselves and come to their own understandings of
it, no Baha'i can claim an authoritative status for his or her
understanding. Thus this doctrine of the Covenant acts to counter the
tendency, seen among charismatic leaders, especially fundamentalists
such as the American televangelists, to maintain that their
interpretation is the only valid interpretation of the text.

This focus on unity leads to a number of mechanisms in the community for

maintaining unity which have been the particular focus of criticism by
Cole and MacEoin. While the elected Baha'i councils hold the highest
level of authority within their respective areas of jurisdiction, there
are also a number of individuals appointed as "Counsellors" and
"Auxiliary Board members". These individuals tend to be well-experienced
Baha'is who, although holding no power, are charged with encouraging and
motivating Baha'is in propagating the religion and also with guarding
against disunity and schism. In this latter role, they are sometimes
required to speak to Baha'is who have been forming factions or cabals
around a particular position or claim. This function has led critics of
the Baha'i Faith to accuse these individuals of promoting fundamentalism
and uniformity of thought in the community. Cole for example speaks of a
"commitment to control of public discourse" on their part79 and states
that "Scriptural literalists, whether of the soft or hard variety, are
often promoted within the ranks of the Baha'i administration, especially
to the offices of 'Auxiliary Board Member' and 'Counselor,' and they
then use their offices for the promotion of anti-intellectualism."80 And
yet the two individuals whom he describes immediately after this latter
passage and whom one would assume are examples of what he has just
stated are not in fact Counsellors or Auxiliary Board members. So,
although he appears to be giving evidence for his assertion, he has in
fact given none.

This aim of world unity is not left as a vague hope in the Baha'i
scriptures. These scriptures acknowledge the many causes of disunity in
the world -- poverty, lack of education, the status of women and the
numerous forms of prejudice brought about by such factors as differences
of race, ethnic group, nationality, religion, class, wealth, levels of
education, culture and opinion--and these factors are addressed in the
Baha'i social teachings. One way of addressing these prejudices and
creating unity is within the Baha'i community itself so that the Baha'i
community can act as a model for what it is advocating for the wider
society.81 In the course of the development of the Baha'i community, its
successive leaders have made a point of trying to attract into the
community members of different races, religions, cultures, social
classes and minority groups. This deliberate policy introduces into the
community a great potential for discord as individuals from different
cultures, feuding groups, opposing religious backgrounds and
incompatible ways of thinking (such as fundamentalists and liberals)
enter the community and start to interact with one another in community
consultations and activities. This is, however, not seen as a threat but
rather as an opportunity to achieve, at the local level, the overall
goal of unity. Differences of race and colour, for example, are to be
welcomed: "If you meet those of different race and colour from yourself,
do not mistrust them and withdraw yourself into your shell of
conventionality, but rather be glad and show them kindness. Think of
them as different coloured roses growing in the beautiful garden of
humanity, and rejoice to be among them."82 Even differences of opinion,
such as that between fundamentalists and liberals, are to be welcomed
since someone with a different opinion to oneself may have access to an
aspect of the truth concealed from oneself: "Likewise, when you meet
those whose opinions differ from your own, do not turn away your face
from them. All are seeking truth, and there are many roads leading
thereto. Truth has many aspects, but it remains always and forever one.
Do not allow difference of opinion, or diversity of thought to separate
you from your fellow-men, or to be the cause of dispute, hatred and
strife in your hearts. Rather, search diligently for the truth and make
all men your friends."83

Thus even when there are opposing opinions, this can be a source of
creative energy leading to the unfoldment of a higher level of truth:
"The shining spark of truth cometh forth only after the clash of
differing opinions."84 However this result can only emerge if the
"clash of differing opinions" occurs within an overall context of unity.
Indeed this passage was written in the context of the process of
consultation which is the decision-making process in the Baha'i
community and occurs in an atmosphere set by prayer and concord.85
`Abdu'l-Baha says that if there is disunity then no beneficial result
will accrue. Indeed he goes further and says that "If they agree upon a
subject, even though it be wrong, it is better than to disagree and be
in the right." He then explains this by saying that if the decision is
wrong and unity is maintained, it soon becomes evident that the decision
is wrong and it can be corrected, but if there is disunity, then the
social structure itself is destroyed and no benefit can come.86 In
summary then, clashes of opinion, such as those that occur between
fundamentalists and liberals, are not viewed as being undesirable; but
rather they are seen as opportunities to uncover the truth (by having
different aspects of it exposed by people who see things differently)
and an opportunity to build unity (through transcending the differences
exposed).

The provisions of the Covenant described above prevent the formation of

groups within the community based on a platform of action such as a
fundamentalist action group. For example, while it is possible for a
fundamentalist study circle to operate, if they then tried to turn this
study circle into a platform for political action within the community,
they would find themselves running up against the mechanisms for
preserving unity described above, as indeed happened to what Cole calls
the "Iranian-British incarnationist group".87 Those going too far along
such a road would be cautioned by the institutions of the Counsellors
and Auxiliary Board members described above and, if they persisted, they
might even be sanctioned by the elected institutions. Thus such
separatist tendencies, whether at the fundamentalist or liberal extreme,
are checked in their early stages and those engaged in them are
encouraged to engage with the mainstream of the community rather than
maintaining their isolated dialogue with like-minded individuals, since
the later path that is seen as likely to end in conflict with the main
body and eventually secession. Dialogue, or what is called in the Baha'i
community "consultation", is seen as the best way not only of resolving
differences, but of transcending them and creating new levels of
unity.88

Decentralization, the devolution of power from the centre to the

periphery, has been a goal of the Baha'i administrative system since
1931 when Shoghi Effendi first pronounced it so.89 In practice, however,
as the Baha'i institutions were being established and developed, they
remained firmly under the control of the central leadership of the
Baha'i Faith. In the last three decades, however, there has been a
gradual devolution of the responsibility for planning the spread and
development of the Baha'i Faith down from the international level to the
national level. And in the last decade, there has been an even more
radical and significant structural change in the Baha'i community.
Responsibility for planning growth and development has been devolved
down to small clusters of communities and is now done on the basis of
local empirical knowledge rather than top-down commands.90 Cycles of
planning-growth-consolidation-reflection create what is called a
"culture of learning" at the local level, into which is also fed the
"learning" that is going on in other clusters and other countries. At
the same time, a programme of study courses (the Ruhi Institute
programme) has been developed to encourage individual Baha'i to move
from merely being passive recipients of pastoral care to taking
individual responsibility for being involved in the consultative process
and administering all aspects of Baha'i community life.91

These developments of devolving authority down to the local level and

enabling individual Baha'is to take greater responsibility for running
the community is of great importance since the Baha'i Faith has no
priesthood or professional religious class. Baha'u'llah envisaged a
community in which all members were equal with no individuals holding
power or authority (even individuals elected onto national or
international bodies have no individual authority; all authority rests
with the institutions). Since most Baha'is have come into the religion
from other religious cultures where the ordinary believer is expected to
defer to the understandings and instructions of a religious
professional, something of the same culture had been present in the
Baha'i community with prominent individuals leading communities. The
present programme is aimed at slowly dissolving such hierarchies, which
are almost always patriarchal and usually based on wealth, power and
knowledge.92
These developments have potentially a great effect on fundamentalism in
the Baha'i community since one of the aspects of the Ruhi programme is
that it involves group study of the Baha'i scriptures and encourages all
participants to develop their own understandings of them. Since there is
no imposed interpretation, some will tend to fundamentalist
interpretations will but others will be rationalist. The discussions of
these interpretations in the group is a powerful counter to the
fundamentalist certainty that there is a single, unchanging, correct,
plain interpretation of scripture.93 The dissolution of hierarchy
inherent in the process decreases the chances of any individual
accumulating the sort of personal charismatic authority typical of many
fundamentalist groups.94

Another feature of the present programme initiated by the Universal

House of Justice about a decade ago is the fact that Baha'i communities
are being encouraged to have an "outward-looking orientation' and to
throw their meetings open to all, especially their devotional meetings,
children's classes, junior youth activities and study circles.95 Part of
this involves moving away from a discourse that is particular to Baha'is
such that Baha'is and non-Baha'is are holding one conversation. This is
again a movement that counters the tendency of fundamentalist groups to
encapsulate the life of a believer in a fundamentalist "discursive
style" (the epistemic seclusion of a private and isolating discourse)
and a fundamentalist "ghetto" (social isolation with all social
interaction being with other fundamentalists).96 The result is a
blurring of the boundaries of the Baha'i community and the creation of
what is called a "community of interest", people who are not committed
Baha'is but who broadly support Baha'i aims and wish to work with
Baha'is in achieving these aims.97

It should be understood that the above four paragraphs are still more a
matter of potential and of aspiration rather than of achievement. The
process has only been underway for a little more than a decade and it is
really only in the last 5-6 years that most of the Baha'i community has
begun to get behind it. There has been resistance to the change in the
community from individuals who were comfortable with the old system,
from those who had a great deal of knowledge and experience invested in
the old system and from those whose positions of power in the community
are threatened by the changes. Thus this democratization of power and
responsibility is only in the early stages of its development and its
application throughout the Baha'i world is patchy. One can, however,
already see that youth, women, members of minority groups, those who
lack eloquence and are poorly educated, exactly the people who remain
silent in the hierarchical and patriarchal structures of most social
groups, are taking the lead in becoming tutors in the Ruhi courses,
cluster co-ordinators (for the core activities that are underway as part
of this raising up of human resources) and are among the most energetic
and enthusiastic in taking forward these changes.98 It is too early,
however, to make firm judgements about how successful the whole project
is in terms of moving individual Baha'is across the world into taking
responsibility for Baha'i community life and in removing hierarchical
social structures.

Conclusion

In this survey of the Baha'i Faith in relation to fundamentalism, it has

been observed that the Baha'i community has certain features that would
predispose it to fundamentali

m: millennialist roots, a desire to see

religion return to its focal place in society, and a traditional
attitude towards morality, especially sexual morality. Its social
teachings are, however, for the most part modern and liberal and its
advocacy of globalization and religious non-exclusivity directly
contradict basic fundamentalist positions. Thus the Baha'i Faith does
not appear to fit easily into the category of fundamentalism. It has
therefore been suggested that it may perhaps be better to move the
definition of fundamentalism from a social and theological level to an
individual psychological level, seeing it as a cognitive style which see
things in black and white terms.

A brief survey of the social dynamics of the Baha'i community has been
conducted looking at features that relate to fundamentalism. It has been
pointed out that, although the emphasis on unity and the mechanisms for
its maintenance can seem like the forced uniformity of fundamentalist
groups, in practice it works differently. Thus, since the Baha'i
community includes a wide range of people form all segments of society
in most of the places where it exists around the world, it is inevitable
that the community will include people who tend towards fundamentalist
thinking as well as those who tend towards a liberal thought. The social
dynamics of the Baha'i community, however, inhibit these fundamentalists
from creating a fundamentalist group or movement within the community.
Thus fundamentalists are forced to engage with the main body of the
community in consultation over the meaning of the scripture as well as
by working together in community activities. Since one of the mechanisms
that keeps fundamentalism going is to form social enclaves and since
prolonged exposure to other points of views tends to break down
fundamentalist structures of thought, this means that in the Baha'i
community it is unlikely that fundamentalist groups will be able to
sustain themselves for any length of time. Similarly, the programme
being developed in the Baha'is community presently is designed to
dissolve power hierarchies in the community, which will block the
emergence of the charismatic leaders typical of fundamentalist groups.
These structures and developments may act to make the emergence of
fundamentalist groups in the future unlikely.

1See for example, Jay Harris's objections to designating Jewish ultra-

orthodox movements as fundamentalist, arguing that it is erroneous to
subsume a European movement that arose as a reaction to assimilationism
under a label used to define an American Protestant reaction to
modernism; "'Fundamentalism': Objections from a Modern Jewish
Historian," in John S. Hawley (ed.), Fundamentalism and Gender (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 137-74; and the objections of Bjørn
Utvik to the classification of Islamic revivalism as a form of
fundamentalism; "Religious revivalism in nineteenth-century Norway and
twentieth-century Egypt: A critique of fundamentalism studies", Islam
and Christian-Muslim Relations, 17:2 (2006), pp. 143-157.

2Almond, G., E. Sivan and R. S. Appleby, "Fundamentalism: Genus and

Species", in M. Marty and R. S. Appleby (eds.), Fundamentalisms
comprehended (The Fundamentalism Project, vol. 5, Chicago : University
of Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 399-424), pp. 405-7

3Said A. Arjomand, "Unity and Diversity in Islamic Fundamentalism", in

Marty and Appleby, Fundamentalisms comprehended (pp. 179–198), see
pp.
182–185

4John S. Hawley (ed.), Fundamentalism and Gender, New York: Oxford

University Press, 1994; Charles W. Peek, George D. Lowe, L. Susan
Williams, "Gender and God's Word: Another Look at Religious
Fundamentalism and Sexism," Social Forces 69/4 (1991), pp. 1205-1221.

5Spickard, James V., "Human Rights, Religious Conflict, and

Globalisation –

Ultimate Values in a New World Order," International Journal on

Multicultural Societies,

vol. 1, no. 1 (1999), pp. 2-19. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/00

1385/138565e.pdf#page=3 (accessed 2 March 2008)

6Aubyn S. Fulton, Richard L. Gorsuch and Elizabeth A. Maynard,

"Religious Orientation, Antihomosexual Sentiment, and Fundamentalism
Among Christians," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 38
(1999), pp. 14-22; and Bruce Hunsberger, "Religious Fundamentalism,
Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and Hostility Toward Homosexuals in Non-
Christian Religious Groups," International Journal for the Psychology of
Religion 6 (1996), pp. 39-49.

7Bob Altemeyer and Bruce Hunsberger, "Authoritarianism, Religious

Fundamentalism, Quest, and Prejudice." International Journal for the
Psychology of Religion 2 (1992), pp. 113-133

8Moojan Momen, Baha'u'llah: A Short Biography, Oxford: Oneworld, 2007

9Peter Smith, A Short History of the Bahá'í Faith, Oxford: Oneworld,

1996

10The Baha'i World 2006-2007 (Haifa: Bahá'í World Centre, 2008), p. 249;
cf. The World Christian Database, which has continued the work of the
World Christian Encyclopedia, lists the total number of Baha’is as
7,684,618 and lists Baha’is in 220 of 238 countries -- a global spread
second only to that of Christianity; Gordon-Conwell Theological
Seminary, Leiden: Brill. Available from: http://worldchristiandatabase.o
rg/wcd/esweb.asp?WCI¼Results&Query¼1952 (accessed 22.05.07.).

11Baha'u'llah, Gleanings from the Writings of Bahá'u'lláh (trans. Shoghi

Effendi, Bahá'í Publishing Trust, Wilmette, IL, 1983), p. 250. Most of
the Baha'i scriptural references given in this article can be found at
http://reference.bahai.org.

12`Abdu'l-Baha, The Secret of Divine Civilization (Wilmette, IL: Bahá'í

Publishing Trust, 1990), p. 80

13`Abdu'l-Baha, The Promulgation of Universal Peace (Wilmette, IL:

Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1982), pp. 337-8

14Baha'u'llah, Tablets of Bahá'u'lláh revealed after the Kitáb-i-Aqdas

(Haifa: Bahá'í World Centre, 1978) p. 68

15Shoghi Effendi, Citadel of Faith: Messages to America 1947-1957

(Wilmette, IL: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1965), pp. 25-26

16Margit Warburg, "Baha’i: A Religious Approach to Globalization,"

Social Compass 46/1 (1999), pp. 47–56.

17See for example, Juan R.I. Cole, "Fundamentalism in the contemporary

U.S. Baha’i community", Review of Religious Research 43 (2002), pp.
195-217 (Available from: http://www-
personal.umich.edu/wjrcole/bahai/200
2/fundbhfn.htm (accessed

24.06.06); idem, "The Baha’i Faith in America as panopticon

(1963-1997)," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 37 (1998),
pp. 234-238. Available from: http://www-personal.umich.edu/wjrcole/bahai
/1999/jssr/bhjssr.htm (accessed

23.06.06); Denis MacEoin, "Bahá'í fundamentalism and the academic study

of the Bábí movement," Religion 16 (1986), pp. 57-84.

18Cole, "Fundamentalism", p. 197

19David G. Bromley, "Sociological perspectives on apostasy: an

overview," in D.G. Bromley (ed.), The Politics of Religious Apostasy:
The Role of Apostates in the Transformation of Religious Movements
(Westport, CT: Praeger), pp. 3-16, see esp. p. 5.

20Moojan Momen, "Marginality and apostasy in the Baha’i community"

Religion 37 (2007), pp. 187-209

21David G. Bromley, "The social construction of contested exit roles:

defectors, whistleblowers and apostates", in Bromley, Politics of
Religious Apostasy, pp. 19-48, see especially pp. 21-25

22Baha'u'llah, Tablets, pp. 63-4.

23See for example the report "Faith in the City", commissioned by Robert
Runcie, Archbishop of Canterbury, in 1985, which was widely regarded as
an effort to place the church in centre stage of the opposition to the
policies of Margaret Thatcher's government (see http://www.cofe.anglican
.org/info/papers/faithinthecity.pdf, accessed 23 April 2008).

24Cole, "Fundamentalism, p. 199.

25Baha'u'llah, Tablets, p. 27; Moojan Momen, "`Abdu'l-Bahá,s Tablet on

the Functioning of the Universal House of Justice", Lights of Irfan,
vol. 8 (Evanston, IL: `Irfan Colloquia, 2007), pp. 257-97.

26In line with other liberal intellectuals, Cole has a profound dislike
of any mixing of religion and government and regards this as evidence of
fundamentalism; cf Utvik, "Religious revivalism", p. 153.

27Baha'i World 2005-2006 (Haifa: Bahá'í World Centre, 2007), pp. 93-114.
See also http://www.bic.org, see under "Areas of Work" (accessed 27
April 2008)

28Hornby, Helen (comp.), Lights of Guidance: A Bahá'í Reference File

(5th ed., New Delhi: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1997), pp. 199, 389, 411,
476-7

29Cole, "Fundamentalism", p. 203; MacEoin, "Bahá'í fundamentalism," pp.

61-2

30The Universal House of Justice has also lifted the requirement that
translation of Baha'i scripture being published in journals or on the
Internet be reviewed at the Baha'i World Centre, letter of 30 June 1999
to all National Spiritual Assemblies.

31"Fundamentalism", p. 412

32See for example, I.B. Horner, "The Earth as a Swallower", Artibus

Asiae. Supplementum, vol. 23, Essays offered to G.H. Luce by his
Colleagues and Friends in Honour of his Seventy-Fifth Birthday (ed. Ba
Shin, Jean Boisselier and A.B. Griswold). Volume 1: Papers on Asian
History, Religion, Languages, Literature, Music Folklore, and
Anthropology, (Zurich: Artibus Asiae, 1966), pp. 151-159.

33Stanley J. Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed?: Religion, Politics and

Violence in Sri Lanka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp.
58-60, 129-139; Donald K. Swearer, "Fundamentalistic Movements in
Theravada Buddhism", in Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby,
Fundamentalisms Observed (The Fundamentalism Project, vol. 1, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 628-690), pp. 647-51.

34Denis MacEoin, "A Response to Moojan Momen's 'Marginality and

Apostasy'", Religion forthcoming 2008

35Baha'u'llah, The Kitáb-i-Aqdas (Haifa: Bahá'í World Centre, 1992), v.

75, p. 47

36Baha'u'llah, Kitáb-i-Aqdas, v. 144, p. 72

37Margit Warburg, "Baha’i: A Religious Approach to Globalization".

38In Cole, "Fundamentalism in the contemporary U.S. Baha’i community".
As well as being anecdotal, there are a number of other problems with
the data that Cole adduces in this article. Although the article is
supposed to be about fundamentalism in the U.S. Baha'i community, of the
various individuals whom he quotes as evidence for his assertions, at
least one was not a U.S. Baha'i (the individual referenced as "SRB 6
July 1997" on p. 205) and there are doubts whether two others were
resident in the United States (the individuals referenced as "SRB, Apr
4,1994" on p. 201 and "March 17, 2001" on p. 207; Brent Poirier,
personal communication, 4 May 2008). Furthermore, at least one of the
references that he gives (talk.religion.bahai 1999/07/28, on p. 209)
does not support the point he is making. An example of the highly
selective nature of what Cole quotes is the e-mail of the person
referenced as "SRB 6 July 1997" on p. 205 which is cut to make it look
fundamentalist whereas the writer in fact advocates looking at the
scripture scientifically and rationally (Brent Poirier, personal
communication, 4 May 2008).

39See for example, J.A. McLean, Dimensions in Spirituality: Reflections

on the meaning of spiritual life and transformation in the light of the
Bahá'í Faith (Oxford: George Ronald, 1994), pp. 39-46

40"In such utterances, the literal meaning, as generally understood by

the people, is not what hath been intended. Thus it is recorded: 'Every
knowledge hath seventy meanings,

of which one only is known amongst the people . . .' He also saith: 'We
speak one word, and by it we intend one and seventy meanings . . .'"
Baha'u'llah, Kitáb-i-Íqán: The Book of Certitude (Wilmette: Bahá'í
Publishing Trust, 1989), p. 255

41Shoghi Effendi, Bahá'í Administration (Wilmette: Bahá'í Publishing

Trust, 1968), p. 63.

42See for example, Universal House of Justice, Messages from the

Universal House of Justice 1963-1986 (Wilmette, IL: Bahá'í Publishing
Trust, 1996), p. 547.

43Peter J. Khan, "Some Aspects of Baha'i Scholarship." Journal of Bahá'í

Studies, vol 9, no. 4 (December 1999), pp. 43-64, see pp. 46-7.

44For example, Cole asserts that Nader Saeidi has "expressed outrage
that Bahau'llah's ability to work miracles had been questioned on the H-
Bahai discussion list." But Saeidi actually affirms that Baha'u'llah, in
the work in question, has said that he has not performed certain
miracles attributed to him; Saeidi merely points out that Cole's
assertion that this means that Baha'u'llah has stated that he cannot
perform any miracles is an unwarranted assumption; Saedi, "Sahifiy-i
Shattiyyih (Book of the River)," Journal of Bahá'í Studies, vol. 9, no.
3 (September 1999), pp. 25-61, see pp. 39-45. See also note 37 above.

45See in particular, Ernest R. Sandeen, The Roots of British and

American Millenarianism 1800-1930, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1970.

46Catherine Wessinger, "Millennialism With and Without the Mayhem," in

Millennialism, Messiahs and Mayhem, ed. Thomas Robbins and Susan J.
Palmer (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 47-59.

47Moojan Momen, "Millennialist Dreams and Apocalpytic Nightmares" in

Moshe Sharon (ed.), Studies in Modern Religions, Religious Movements and
the Babi-Baha'i Faiths. Numen Book Series. Studies in the History of
Religions. vol. 104 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 97-116

48"My imprisonment doeth Me no harm, nor do the things that have

befallen Me at the hands of My enemies. That which harmeth Me is the
conduct of my loved ones who, though they bear My name, yet commit that
which maketh My heart and My pen to lament." Baha'u'llah, Tablets of
Bahá'u'lláh, p. 70

49`Abdu'l-Baha, Paris Talks (London: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1995), pp.

45-6, 81; idem, Promulgation of Universal Peace, pp. 247-8; idem,
Selections from the Writings of `Abdu'l-Bahá (Haifa: Bahá'í World
Centre, 1978), pp. 29-30, 143; idem in Compilation of Compilations (3
vols. Ingleside, NSW, Australia: Bahá'í Publications Australia,
1991-2000), vol. 1, p. 372; idem, `Abdu'l-Bahá in London (London: Bahá'í
Publishing Trust, 1987), p. 106

50Baha'u'llah, Tablets of Bahá'u'lláh, p. 22

51Seena Fazel, "Religious Pluralism and the Baha’i Faith",

Interreligious Insight 1:3 (2003), pp. 42-49; idem, "Baha'i approaches
to Christianity and Islam: Further Thoughts on Developing an Inter-
Religious Dialogue", Baha'i Studies Review 14 (2008) 39-51

52George Schöpflin, "The construction of identity." Österreichischer

Wissenschaftstag 2001. Published by Österreichische
Forschungsgemeinschaft at http://www.nt.tuwien.ac.at/nthft/temp/oefg/tex
t/wiss_tag/Beitrag_Schopflin.pdf (accessed
28.06.06).

53Udo Schaefer, "Infallible Institutions?", Baha'i Studies Review, vol.

9 (1999/2000), pp. 17-45, see in particular pp. 30-32. To establish
these points, Schaefer quotes from the following writings of
Baha'u'llah, Tablets of Bahá'u'lláh, pp. 68, 129, 134, and `Abdu'l-Baha,
Will and Testament (Wilmette, IL: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1944), p. 20

54This is specifically stated to be an operating principle in a letter

from the Universal House of Justice to an individual Baha'i dated 5 June
1988; available at: http://bahai-library.com/uhj/morality.html (accessed
23 April 2008).

55Udo Schaefer, who is a lawyer, lists six enactments that he considers

that the Universal House of Justice has made. Four of these relate to
institutional arrangements and two relate to the applicability of laws
already existing in the writings of Baha'u'llah (Udo Schaefer,
"Infallible Institutions?", p. 33). The condemnation of female genital
mutilation appears in a compilation (dated 16 December 1998), which was
entitled "Aspects of Traditional African Culture" and distributed to all
Baha'i national spiritual assemblies in Africa. This may be what Peter
Khan, a member of the Universal House of Justice, refers to when he
cites this as legislation (Khan, "Some Aspects of Baha'i Scholarship",
p. 51) but it appears to merely more the taking of a position than what
would normally be called legislation. There have been a few cases of
what is clearly legislation affecting the individual; for example, the
ruling by the Universal House of Justice that LSD, peyote and similar
substances should be added to the prohibitions on opium made by
Baha'u'llah and on cannabis contained in a letter of `Abdu'l-Baha (in
Baha'u'llah, Kitáb-i-Aqdas, note 170, p. 238).

56Cole, "Fundamentalism", p. 208

57As described in Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan,

Ann Swidler, and Steven M Tipton, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and
Commitment in American Life (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 1985), see for example the description of "Sheilaism", pp. 221,
235, and pp. 71-75 on personal fulfilment and privatism.

58Shoghi Effendi and the Universal House of Justice in Hornby, Lights of

Guidance, pp. 50-60

59Cole implies that the member of the Universal House of Justice, Peter
Khan, is to be accounted as a fundamentalist (Cole, "Fundamentalism",
pp. 205, 206), who wishes "to affirm the existence of ether and the
chemical transmutation of elements" (Cole, "Fundamentalism", p. 205).
Cole gives as reference for this assertion Peter J. Khan, "Some Aspects
of Baha'i Scholarship," (Journal of Bahá'í Studies, vol 9, no. 4,
December 1999, pp. 43-64), p. 63. Khan says nothing at all about ether
on that page or any other page of this article and his statement about
"transmutation of elements" is against a naive and simplistic reading of
this.

60Compilation of Compilations, vol. 3, pp. 259-260

61Messages from the Universal House of Justice 1963-1986 (Wilmette, IL:

Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1996), p. 390.

62Compilation of Compilations, vol. 2, pp. 355-406

63Baha'i World 2005-2006, pp. 104-6. For an example of a development

project, see the Barli Vocational Institute for Rural Women in Indore,
India; see http://www.geocities.com/rainforest/2519 (accessed 23 April
2008).

64Deborah K. van den Hoonaard and Will C. van den Hoonaard, The
Equality
of Women and Men: The Experience of the Bahá'í Community of Canada,
Douglas, New Brunswick: W. C. and D. K. van den Hoonaard, 2006.

65See Dan Sarooshi, "International Law and Peace Between the Nations:
The Contribution of the Baha'i Faith" in Andrew Lewis and Richard O'Dair
(eds), Law and Religion, Current Legal Issues vol. 4 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), pp. 497-508; Zaid Lundberg, "Global Claims,
Global Aims: An Analysis of Shoghi Effendi's The World Order of
Bahá'u'lláh," and Wendi Momen, "Globalization and Decentralization: The
Concept of Subsidiarity in the Bahá'í Faith," in Margit Warburg, Annika
Hvithamar and Morten Warmind (eds), Baha'i and Globalisation, Renner
Series on New Religions, vol. 7 (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2005),
pp. 175-95; and the articles in Babak Bahador and Naz Ghanea, Processes
of the Lesser Peace (Oxford: George Ronald, 2002).

66See an account of this relationship at http://info.bahai.org/article-

1-6-0-6.html (accessed 27 April 2008). Also Baha'i World 2005-2006, pp.
16-18, 93-114, 229-34.

67See for example, http://www.contenderministries.org/UN/bahaiun.php

(accessed 27 April 2008)

68`Abdu'l-Baha, Secret of Divine Civilization (Wilmette: IL: 1990) pp.

97-8; Udo Schaefer, Bahá'í Ethics in Light of Scripture: An
Introduction, vol. 1: Doctrines and Fundamentals (Oxford: George Ronald,
2007), pp. 101-112, 150-55.

69Hornby, Lights of Guidance, pp. 365-8

70Shoghi Effendi, Light of Divine Guidance, vol. 1, p. 55; Shoghi

Effendi, The Promised Day is Come (rev. ed. Wilmette, IL: Bahá'í
Publishing Trust, 1980), p. 122. For an analysis of the Baha'i approach
to racism, see Richard Thomas, Racial Unity: An Imperative for Social
Progress (Ottawa, Ont.: Association for Bahá'í Studies, 1993).

71Hema Goonatilake, "Buddhist Nuns: protests, struggle and the

reinterpretation of orthodoxy in Sri Lanka," in Judy Brink and Joan P
Mencher (eds.), Mixed Blessings: Gender and Religious Fundamentalism
Cross Culturally (New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 25-39; Donald K.
Swearer, "Fundamentalistic Movements in Theravada Buddhism".

72Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (London:

Jonathon Cape, 1974), pp. 118-9

73See Herman A. Wikin, "A cognitive-style approach to cross-cultural

research," International Journal of Psychology 2 (1967), pp. 233-50;
idem, "Psychological differentiation and forms of pathology," Journal of
Abnormal Psychology 70 (1965), pp. 317-36

74Liam Hudson, Contrary Imaginations; a psychological study of the

English Schoolboy, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967

75Michael Baurmann, "Rational Fundamentalism? An Explanatory Model of

Fundamentalist Beliefs", Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4:2
(2007), pp. 150-166, see p. 163; Steve Bruce, Firm in the Faith (London:
Gower, 1984), pp. 86-88

76Moojan Momen, Understanding Religion, pp. 363-80

77Nancy Ammerman, "Accounting for Christian Fundamentalisms: social

dynamics and rhetorical strategies" in M. Marty and R. S. Appleby
(eds.), Accounting for Fundamentalisms (The Fundamentalism Project, vol.
4, Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 149-70), pp. 150-53.
Indeed one of the challenges faced by successive Baha'i leaders has come
from individual Baha'is who oppose the authority of the new leadership
by claiming that it is radically altering the religion from what has
been established by the previous leader; this claim of opponents of the
Baha'i leadership mirrors the words of Almond et al. that
"fundamentalists claim to be upholding orthodoxy (right belief) or
orthopraxis (right behaviour), and to be defending and conserving
religious traditions . . ." ("Fundamentalism", p. 402).

78Baha'u'llah, Tablets of Bahá'u'lláh 168

79Cole, "Fundamentalism", p. 204

80Cole, "Fundamentalism", p. 206

81This concept of the Baha'i community as evidence of the practicality

of the Baha'i teachings and a model of what could be achieved in society
as a whole is advanced by the Universal House of Justice in The Promise
of World Peace (Haifa: Bahá'í World Centre, 1985), pp. 24-5

82`Abdu'l-Baha, Paris Talks, p. 53

83`Abdu'l-Baha, Paris Talks, p. 53

84`Abdu'l-Baha, Selections, no. 44, p. 87

85The sentences preceding the "clash of opinions" sentence read: "The

members thereof [of the spiritual assembly] must take counsel together
in such wise that no occasion for ill-feeling or discord may arise. This
can be attained when every member expresseth with absolute freedom his
own opinion and setteth forth his argument. Should anyone oppose, he
must on no account feel hurt for not until matters are fully discussed
can the right way be revealed." `Abdu'l-Baha, Selections, no. 44, p. 87

86`Abdu'l-Baha, Bahá'í World Faith: Selected Writings of Bahá'u'lláh and

'Abdu'l-Bahá (Wilmette: Baha'i Publishing Trust, 1976), p. 411

87Cole, "Fundamentalism," pp. 208, 213

88This transcending of differences occurs in the context of programmes

of action (in areas such as expansion of the religion or social and
humanitarian projects) that help to redirect the energies that might be
expended in conflict into more creative paths, but this is too large a
subject to go into in this paper and not completely relevant; see
Michael Karlberg, Beyond the Culture of Contest, Oxford: George Ronald,
2004

89Shoghi Effendi, World Order, p. 42

90"Given the far-reaching developments occurring at the level of the
cluster and as more intensive programmes of growth are launched,
decentralization of administrative processes becomes ever more important
. . . The main consideration is related to the

devolution of the decision making process to the appropriate level of

the Bahá’í administration. In practice, this principle applies both to
the devolution of decision making by National Spiritual Assemblies to
the regional level, and by the Regional Bahá’í Council to the cluster
level" (Reflections on Growth, no. 10, Dec. 2005, p. 4).

91Universal House of Justice, Turning Point: Selected Messages of the

Universal House of Justice and Supplementary Material 1996-2006 (West
Palm Beach, FL: Palabra, 2006), pp. 146-7, 175

92For a more theoretical discussion of these developments, see Moojan

Momen, "Changing Reality: the Baha'i Community and the Creation of a
New
Reality", História, Questões & Debates, vol. 22, no. 43, (Jul-Dec 2005),
pp. 13-32; also available on-line at: http://calvados.c3sl.ufpr.br/ojs2/
index.php/historia/article/view/7860/5541. See also Karlberg, Beyond the
Culture of Contest.

93Barr, Fundamentalism (2nd ed, London: SCM, 1981), pp. 40-55, 279-80;
Bruce, Firm in the Faith, p. 79

94Almond et al., "Fundamentalism", pp. 408, 412-3

95Universal House of Justice, letter to the Baha'ís of the World, 17

January 2003, Turning Point, p. 177; International Teaching Centre,
Building Momentum, April 2003, Turning Point, pp. 395-6

96Baurmann, "Rational Fundamentalism?", pp. 162-3; Steve Bruce, Firm in

the Faith, pp. 80-88; idem, Religion in the Modern World (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), pp. 141-2; Ammerman, "Accounting for Christian
Fundamentalisms," 161-4.

97One Common Faith (prepared under the supervision of the Universal

House of Justice, Haifa: Bahá'í World Centre, 2005), p. 51; Universal
House of Justice, Turning Point, p. 200

98The following are from Reflections on Growth (published in Haifa by

the International Teaching Centre) which publishes reports from those
participating in the process from around the world. A tutor from London:
"We no longer need to leave it to the eloquent members of our community.
We are invited to acquire eloquence for ourselves" (Reflections on
Growth, no. 2, May 2004, p. 3). In Mongolia: "When the youth movement
was launched we found that perhaps targeting younger youth who are fresh
and open for learning and consistently working with them individually
and in groups could be the answer to our challenge of the lack of human
resources" (Reflections on Growth, no. 2, May 2004, p. 4). From United
States: "Women have appeared to be more receptive . . ." (Reflections on
Growth, no. 6, February 2005, p. 4). From Trinidad: "It is the
activities of these youth that is giving life to the Baha'i community"
(Reflections on Growth, no. 9, Oct. 2005, p. 5). In Tajikistan, young
people from the Roma (gypsy) community have been involved in the
programme: "The Roma youth have become inspired and transformed. They
are determined to learn and to change. They said they want to become
educated people . . ." (Reflections on Growth, no. 11, Mar. 2006, p. 5).