Introduction

L
iberal revolutions have come to the Arab world before.
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, a “first” Arab
Awakening took the form of an intellectual revolution
in which a number of Arab thinkers started ques-
tioning the control of distant Ottoman despots over their na-
tions, and criticizing their own limited contact with the out-
side world. Their calls for intellectual, economic, and political
change laid the groundwork for a new Arab world, eventually
resulting in a wave of independence struggles in the 1940s and
1950s.
Ultimately, however, the first Arab Awakening fell short
of the aspirations of many of those who inspired it. In the end,
colonial autocracies were replaced with domestic ones—often
military-backed single parties that took advantage of their
revolutionary legitimacy to cement their grip on power. New
regimes paid little attention to developing political systems
whose checks and balances guaranteed access for all. They saw
pluralism as a potential threat.
Unrealized political as well as economic expectations,
and the failure to solve the Palestinian issue and provide good
2 Introduction

governance, marked the postindependence era in the Arab

world. For years, the only groups that contended with the rul-
ing elites were those whose organizing principle was religion.
Political Islam emerged as the only alternative to one-party
rule. Abuses by government personnel, especially the secu-
rity and intelligence services, and wealth concentrated in the
hands of a few kept tensions seething just beneath the surface.
Eventually, something had to give. When a Tunisian peddler
set himself on fire in December 2010, the second Arab Awak-
ening was launched, taking many by surprise.
The uprisings that breathed new life into the Arab world
in 2011 were inevitable, but achieving the protesters’ goals is
not. That eventual outcome lies in the hands of the people of
the countries involved. Outsiders, however, including pow-
erful Western governments, can affect events, but doing so
constructively requires clear thinking about events and their
root causes. Unfortunately, much Western thinking about
the Awakening is mistaken—with the resulting danger that
Western action may be misguided. In the brief span of two
years, the West lurched from calling this awakening an “Arab
Spring”—a name that implied expectations of an immediate
transition from autocratic regimes to democratic ones—to
seeing it now as some kind of an Arab inferno, because of the
rise of Islamic parties with their implicit or perceived threat to
liberal democratic advances and their potential flirtation with
jihadi violence.
Neither scenario need be permanent or inevitable. And
perhaps most important, the profound transformations Arab
countries are undergoing will take time. Although some east-
ern European nations can be said to have sped up the clock
after the fall of the Soviet Union, revolutionary political trans-
formation usually takes decades, not years. Western observers
Introduction 3

and policy makers need to have strategic patience as they fol-

low unfolding events.
The rise of Islamist parties was also to be expected, and
should neither surprise nor overly alarm anyone. They alone
had the preexisting organizational capabilities required to run
nationwide campaigns, and that allowed them to score elec-
toral victories far beyond their level of popular support.
But success in first-ever elections will not necessarily
translate into permanent control. Their promise of better gov-
ernance, which has helped attract support from many Arabs fed
up with the status quo, is now being put to the test. As they enter
the political fray, this time as decision makers, their perceived
“holiness” will be confronted with reality, and their ability to
deliver will be established. The question will be whether the
constitutional instruments that emerge from the transitional
period allow Arab publics—which are conservative but not by
and large supporters of theocratic states—to judge Islamists
and secular forces alike based on performance, not ideology.
It will take decades to build the foundations of political
systems that actually defend democracy and preserve its basic
tenets year after year. Some countries will succeed in this pro-
cess, others will struggle, and yet others will fail. Moreover, it
can’t be seen through a two- or even a five-year prism; it must
take its due course.
Those elements of society that lead the transformation
will help determine any country’s outcome. The Arab world
has long been dominated by two forces—an entrenched, un-
accountable elite on the one hand, and Islamists on the other.
But neither of these groups—which often have achieved an
uneasy modus vivendi—has ever demonstrated a genuine
commitment to pluralism.
Third forces are needed. Hope rests with a new genera-
4 Introduction

tion—the youth who started it all in the streets—that is more

committed than its elders to the principles of democracy. So
far, this revolutionary young generation has done a better job
of defining what it is against than what it is for, and this group
will need years to establish the organizational capacity and fi-
nancial wherewithal to achieve a lasting break from the past.
If it is to succeed where the first Arab Awakening failed,
this second Arab Awakening needs to be an assertion of uni-
versal values: democracy, pluralism, human rights. These are
not ideals that can be imposed upon a region from outside, but
they can be encouraged to grow—though it will require pa-
tience and an accurate understanding of both the actual con-
ditions and the kinds of actions that are likely to be effective.

In the end, the battle is not solely against the old powers—for
new ones may be animated by the same drives. More impor-
tantly, it is a battle for pluralism. Only when societies and their
elected leaders truly embrace tolerance, diversity, the peace-
ful rotation of power, and inclusive economic growth can the
promise of a new Arab world be realized.