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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Robin Raphel

Type of Event: Interview
Date: December 8, 2003
Special Access Issues: none
Additional notes: NA~... . .
.Prepared by: Scott All .
Reviewed by: Len Haw e
Team Number: Three (Counterterrorism Policy)
Location: Main State
Participants - Commission: Scott Allan and Len Hawley
Participants- State: John-Alex Romano

Interviewee Background

Ambassador Raphel was the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs from
August 1993 through June 1997. Since then she served as Ambassador to Tunisia, from
1997-2000, and as the vice president of the National Defense University, from 2000-
2003. She is currently State's coordinator for Iraqi reconstruction efforts.

Early Views

Upon becoming the Assistant Secretary, Raphel described a general lack of South Asia
interest in Washington. While some at State were very committed, it was hard to get
sustained focus on the region because of its geographic distance and lack of vibrant
economies. Pakistan and other countries were low priorities for official Washington as
other issues, such as the rebuilding of the Warsaw bloc, occupied attention in the mid
1990's. During that time, the South Asia bureau's main concerns centered on Indo-Pak
. relations, Pakistani democratization and the nuclear issues. There was also "great
concern" about the worsening situation (civil war and narcotics trafficking) in
Afghanistan; Raphel noted that "Afghanistan was not a central focus for people in this
town [Washington]" and that "there was noJight-shinning-ther-e-:~aphel-hoped-that.-----
efforts, at this time, could be made to stabilize Afghanistan and "get it back on its feet."

Raphel said that the Taliban appeared in mid-1994, when its troops were escorting
commercial convoys across southern Afghanistan. At that time, little was known about
the group and their early rhetoric focused on bringing "law and order" to the southern
part of the country. Raphel noted that they were not spouting a radical message at the
time and were seen by Washington as "conservative Pashtuns, [who were] pretty much in
tune with southern Afghan values."

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Engaging the Taliban

In mid 1994, as the Taliban was exerting its influence in southern Afghanistan, State's
policy was to end the fighting and stabilize the country. This remained the case through
her entire tenure. Raphel indicated that State was engaging all the factions and providing
them with the same message-work with each other and form a broad-based government.
One group was not seen as any more legitimate than another. According to Raphel, we
did not favor any faction, including the Taliban, over another -- "[w]e approached them
all evenhandedly," Raphel said. She had no reason to believe that the CIA was secretly
supporting the Taliban.

But concerns with the Taliban grew Raphel said. While it continued to emphasize its
preference for stability and order, the Taliban's rhetoric became less and less "in sync
with a lot of their actions." This was especially the case with women's rights. And
human rights violations appeared to increase as the movement seized Kabul, in
September 1996, and was also extending its influence to non-Pashtun parts of the
country. Concern grew "when its [the Taliban's] conservative elements began to assert
themselves."

As a result, Raphel indicated, State's approach toward the Taliban changed. She noted
that State increased its objections regarding rights violations. But this did not mean that
we stopped engaging the Taliban, Raphel said. She called for continued U.S.
engagement with them (and all parties) since harsh ultimatums would probably be
counterproductive. Sanctions, she said, would "not go far because they [the Taliban]
didn't have much to loose."

Raphel confirmed that she met with the Taliban during her tenure. There were a "few"
Washington meetings and she also conducted meetings with them in Peshawar and
Khandahar. Raphel estimated meeting the Taliban half a dozen times. Raphel said she
would press them to work with the other warring factions, address narco-trafficking and,
as time went on, call their attention to human rights violations. Taliban responses were
usually consistent in that they would claim to be establishing "order" in a chaotic
Afghanistan. They would also ask Raphel for patience as they addressed their internal
problems.

When the Taliban took control of Kabul in September 1996, the movement sought
international and U.S. recognition. State told Taliban representatives that the U.S. would'
not grant this because Washington "recognized states not governments."

In connection with Bin Ladin, he was on the radar screen. She remembers when he was
in Sudan and when he appeared in Afghanistan. Raphel said that during her time at the
South Asia bureau, Washington requested that the Taliban expel Bin Ladin but noted that
Washington did not request that they turn Bin Ladin over to the United States. The
feeling, she said, was that we should "keep him on the run."

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Pakistan

Pakistan favored the Taliban. The Taliban leaders provided Islamabad with a friendly
Pashtun government which gave Pakistan "strategic depth" in the event of a conflict with
India. Here Pakistani forces could retreat and regroup in neighboring Afghanistan if
Pakistan suffered an Indian invasion. During her tenure, the Pakistanis denied aiding the
Taliban but support became more "blatant" as time went on. Raphel also believed that
the Pakistanis saw the Taliban as unsophisticated and thus easy to manipulate.

UNOCAL

Raphel said that there was much skepticism about the success of a UNOCAL pipeline,
but it was worth giving it a try. Raphel believed that, at the time, the UNOCAL project
was "an extremely good idea" because, it could be a carrot for the warring factions. In
order for the pipeline to succeed (and for royalties to be paid to Afghanis) the factions
would have to make peace. There was a possibility that it could be a "unifying factor for
Afghanistan" she said. The pipeline could also reduce tensions between India and
Pakistan since it would run to markets in both of those countries.

Raphel said that early in the project's life, UNO CAL may have favored working with the
Taliban. But it quickly became apparent that UNOCAL would have to work with all the
factions to .seek a stable Afghanistan for their project. UNOCAL representatives met
with Raphel three or four times and, Raphel recalled, asked her about political questions
in the region. Raphel said that with UNOCAL being an American company, they had no
problem providing the company with assessments of the political situation in the area.
The State Department, she said, provided little else.

Future Recommendations

Raphel said it is essential for the United States to stay engaged in South Asia and
committed to Afghanistan, where warlordism is problematic. Additionally, keeping
Indo-Pak tensions low is very important over the long term.

Wealthy countries must be willing to assist the countries of South Asia. It benefits the
U.S. and others to promote education, economic development and opportunity in South
Asia. This must be done is a way which is not "smothering" or which can be
characterized as "colonial" by detractors.

Raphel noted how Washington used one ideology, radical Islam, to defeat another,
communism, in Afghanistan. This, she cautioned, while successful in the short run, came
back to haunt the U.S. As a result, policymakers should consider the dangers when
working with highly ideological movements.

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