C-Systems & Powerplants+CMRs

Maintainability & Maintenance Engineering + Maintenance Planning & Services
XM33 Training
3. Systems & Powerplant logic + CMRs Principles

based on Airbus experience
This document must be used for training purpose only. Under no circumstances should this document be used as a reference. It will not be updated.
This document and all information contained herein is the sole property of AIRBUS S.A.S. No intellectual property rights are granted by the delivery of this document or the disclosure of its content. This document shall not be reproduced or disclosed to a third party without the express written consent of AIRBUS S.A.S. This document and its content shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied. The statements made herein do not constitute an offer. They are based on the mentioned assumptions and are expressed in good faith. Where the supporting grounds for these statements are not shown, AIRBUS S.A.S. will be pleased to explain the basis thereof.
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Systems & Powerplant logic + CMRs - Principles

Table of Contents
1. Introduction 2. MSI Selection process

AIRBU S S. A. S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
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3. MSI Analysis
4. Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs) 77
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Table of Contents

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1.Introduction Objectives 1.
Systems and Powerplant Section

Zonal Section Structures Section
MSIMSI -Analyses
SSISSI -Analyses
ZonalZonal -Analyses
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The respective content of the Systems & PP , Structures and Zonal sections (or programs) of the MRB Report is based on the results from the works performed by the different MWGs and the ISC in order to define the initial minimum scheduled maintenance requirements , thanks to the MSG-3 method, through the MRB Process settled for a dedicated a/c program.
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1. Introduction
Systems & Powerplant
AIR BUS S .A .S . All righ ts reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
All systems & powerplant items are divided into a list of Maintenance Significant Items (MSI) MSI selection The MSI are analysed according to MSG-3 methodology MSI analyses
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2. MSI selection process

Before the actual MSG-3 analysis can begin, the aircrafts Maintenance Significant Items (MSIs) have to be identified, using a conservative approach (engineering judgement).
MSIs are those items identified by the manufacturer whose failure: could affect safety (flight or ground) and/or could be undetectable during operations and/or could have a significant operational or economic impact.
MSI Selection List MSI Selection List will be kept up to date after Entry into Service ( MSI Validation List)
Selection Process Before the actual MSG-3 logic can be applied to an item, the aircraft's significant systems and components must be identified. A significant item for systems and power plant is called a Maintenance Significant Item or MSI. These are items fulfilling defined selection criteria for which MSI analyses are established at the highest manageable level. Items fulfilling the selection criteria that are analyzed at another, higher, level are not called MSIs but MSI Elements. The process of identifying Maintenance Significant Items is a conservative process (using engineering judgment) based on the anticipated consequences of failure. Four selection questions have to be answered for each item: safety?, hidden failure?, operational repercussions?, economic repercussions? The top-down approach is a process of identifying the significant items on the aircraft at the highest manageable level.
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MSI selection Selection process 2. MSI
Could failure be undetectable or not likely to be detected during operations?
Could failure have significant operational impact? Could failure affect safety (on ground or in flight?)
Could failure have significant economic impact?
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2. MSI MSI selection Selection process

If at least one of four questions is answered with a "YES: MSG-3 analysis is required Highest manageable level must be confirmed Highest manageable level should be:
high enough to avoid unnecessary analysis not too many functions, not too complex low enough to ensure that all functions, functional failures and failure causes are covered but not too low, e.g. no screw level analysis
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2. MSI MSI selection Selection process

If all four questions are answered with a NO: MSGMSG-3 analysis is not required. Examples: items covered by zonal analyses (harness, tubing tubing)
items covered by structure analyses (engine mounts mounts) items for maintenance purpose only (Access doors doors)
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Table of Contents

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4. MSG3 Analysis procedure 3. MSI Analysis

Table of Contents
Analysis process & documentation Administrative data MSI Description / Data Sheet A (DSA) Failure Analysis / Data Sheet B (DSB) Consequences of Failure / Level 1 Analysis Task Selection / Level 2 Analysis
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Interval determination Task summaries and task data Sampling Maintenance Programme Evolution
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MSI Analysis Process
Administrative Data
Establish data to allow traceability and history

of analysis
MSI Description & Component Data
Functional Failure Analysis
Provide MSI description and component data Describe Functions, Functional Failures,
Failure Effects and Failure Causes
Determine the Failure Effect Category for

Failure Consequences
(Level 1 Analysis)
each Functional Failure
Determine if a task is applicable and effective

and for each selected task, determine an interval
Task & Interval Selection (Level 2)
Task Summaries & Task Data
Establish other task data for the MRB Report

as well as task accomplishment data
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Analysis Method The method for determining the scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals for systems and power plant, uses a progressive logic diagram laid down in the MSG-3 document. This logic is the basis of an evaluation technique applied to each Maintenance Significant Item (system, sub-system, module, component, accessory, unit, part, etc.), using the technical data available. Prior to applying the MSG-3 logic diagram to an item, a work sheet will be completed that clearly defines the MSI, its functions / functional failures / failure effects / failure causes and any additional data pertinent to the item. The process to be followed comprises the following basic analysis steps: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Establishment of administrative pages of MSI analysis. Collection of basic MSI data and establishment of an MSI description. Development of the MSIs functions, functional failures, failure effects and failure causes. Categorization of functional failures in accordance with their failure effects (Level 1 analysis). Determination of tasks based on rigorous selection criteria (Level 2 analysis). Determination of intervals for the selected tasks. Summary and combination of tasks (if relevant). Establishment of data for task planning and task accomplishment.
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MSI Analysis Documentation

Administrative Pages Data Sheet A Data Sheet B Level 1 and 2 Analyses Task Summary Sheet MRBR Interface Sheet Task Data
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The MSI analysis consists of the following types of form sheets: Administrative pages Cover sheet List of Effective Pages (LEP) List of Revisions (LOR) History of Changes sheet Applicability Assumptions Component Data sheet(s) Item Description sheet
Data Sheet A
Data sheet B Level 1 & 2 Analysis Level 1 sheets Level 2 sheets Task Summary sheet MRB Report Interface sheet Task Data sheet
Task Summaries
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Administrative Pages / Overview

Cover Sheet List of Effective Pages List of Revisions History of Change Applicability Sheet
Assumptions
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Administrative Pages These are pages intended to allow monitoring of the revision status and of the scope/applicability of the analysis. Cover sheet List of Effective Pages (LEP) List of Revisions (LOR) History of Changes sheet Assumptions (one or more pages) (1 page) (one or more pages) (one or more pages) (one or more pages)
Applicability Sheet (one or more pages)
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Administrative Pages / Applicability
Aircraft Aircraft Series Series
Engine/Propeller Engine/Propeller (whereapplicable) applicable) (where
Modnumber numberand andtitle title Mod
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All Modifications, that have an impact on the MSG-3 Analysis, shall be included and listed.
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Assumptions / Example
Assumptions Assumptions (open) (open)
Typical Assumptions are on MMEL status or Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) procedures, but also on open technical issues, that have an impact on e.g. task selection
Note: currently, assumption tables are applied from A380 programme onwards
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MMEL: Master Minimum Equipment List MEL: Minimum Equipment List The MMEL is an Airbus document, developed by the Flight Operations Support and Services Department. Operators use the Airbus MMEL as a reference for creating their own MEL, which is provided to their flight crews, line maintenance personnel, and/or flight operations personnel. It is important to note that an Operators MEL cannot be less restrictive than the Airbus MMEL. Both the MMEL and the MEL are legal documents that are either approved or accepted by Airworthiness Authorities. The MMEL and the MEL consist of component and system lists that are attributed a GO, GO IF, or NO GO status, depending on their impact on the safety of a flight. These attributes are defined as follows: GO or GO IF items can remain inoperative for a limited period of time. NO GO items prevent the dispatch of the aircraft. The MMEL and the MEL are both designed to ensure that an acceptable level of safety is respected, when an aircraft is dispatched with inoperative equipment. The MEL enables Operators to rapidly dispatch an aircraft, and avoid unnecessary delays or flight cancellations, without sacrificing safety.
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Assumptions Assumptions (open) (open)
Typical Assumptions are on MMEL status or Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) procedures, but also on open technical issues, that have an impact on e.g. task selection
Note: currently, assumption tables are applied from A380 programme onwards
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AFM: Airplane Flight Manual The Airplane Flight Manual is a book containing the information and instructions required to operate the aircraft safely. The pilot must comply with this AFM information. A typical AFM will contain the following: Limitations - the 'envelope' of maximum speeds; maximum weights; allowable centre of gravity range; maximum engine RPM, temperatures and oil pressures, etc (for the specified powerplant); and allowable manoeuvres and other limits, within which the aircraft must be operated to be safe. Operating procedures - aircraft procedures, speeds and configurations used to: Achieve expected performance and behaviour in Normal situations. Achieve safe outcomes in some specified Abnormal or Emergency situations (such as a forced landing after engine failure). Performance - the required variation of the aircraft's maximum allowable weights, as affected by air pressure and temperature, in order to: Take-off or land in available runway distance. Climb at the minimum required gradient, or greater gradient needed to clear obstacles in the intended flight path following take-off or missed approach.
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Assumptions Assumptions (closed) (closed)
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MSI Description / Data Sheet A

Data Sheet A consists of Component Data Sheet lists all components which are part of the system provides information about part numbers, reliability (MTBF, MTBUR
figures) Item Description provides information about system redundancies, experiences from other programs and about MMEL status describes the system and its components and provides information essential to understand defined functions, functional failures etc. to be analysed provides information about systems normal operation and failure behaviour, as well as fault detection and indication
DATA SHEET A
Data Sheet A / MSI Description Prior to applying the MSG-3 logic diagram to an item, data sheets will be established that clearly define the MSI, its function(s), functional failure(s), failure effect(s), failure cause(s) and any additional data pertinent to the item; e.g., ATA chapter reference fleet applicability manufacturer's part number brief description of the item expected failure rate hidden functions redundancy (may be unit, system or system management), etc. The descriptive part of the MSI analysis is an integral part of the analysis and will be included as part of the total MSG-3 documentation for the item.
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Data Sheet A / Component Data Sheet
Item Item Description Description ATA ATA Referenceon on Reference component component level level
Supplier Supplier Supplier Supplier Part Number Part Number Access Access MTBF MTBF MTBUR MTBUR Source Source ofData Data of
Qty: Qty: Quantityper per Quantity Aircraft Aircraft Zone(s) Zone(s)
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Data Sheet A / Component Data This sheet shall be used to list all component data relevant for MSI analysis. It is important to state the source of the reliability (MTBF/MTBUR) data quoted. Preferably, this reliability information should be based on relevant service experience. However, if specification or guarantee values are quoted, this should me made clear in the analysis. It is to be noted that the reliability data quoted need to be as realistic as possible in order to allow the selection of the highest possible intervals commensurate with the inherent reliability characteristics.
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Data Sheet A: Item description
Data sheet A shall be used to establish all data necessary to clearly define the MSI, its functional failure characteristics, indications, maintenance means and any additional data pertinent to the item.
All modifications relevant to, and covered by, the design are to be listed
Redundancies, in-service experience, MMEL status
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Data Sheet A / Item Description The author should be aware of the fact that, normally, no other descriptive data will be supplied with the MSG-3 analysis. The recipient / reader of the analysis, therefore, must be able to understand the item under consideration in sufficient depth to critically appraise the analysis prior to the meeting. The textual description should include a system overview (including reason for existence of system), functional description (operation in normal and any other mode) and information on indication, system interfaces, components, built-in tests and reference documentation (if applicable).
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Item description / Example
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Failure Analysis / Overview

The first step for the system analysis procedure is the identification of:
Function(s) - the normal characteristic actions of the item. Functional Failure(s) - how the item fails to perform its function. Failure Effect - what is the result of the functional failure.
Function
Functional Failure
Failure Cause(s) - why the functional failure occurs. Data Sheet B should consider single failures. Failure combinations are analysed in the subsequent Level 1 Analysis (if the functional failure is hidden).
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Failure Effect
Failure Cause
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Data Sheet B / Functional Failure Analysis After the basic MSI analysis data have been assembled, the actual analysis is begun by establishing the functional failure analysis. This means that the following must be identified for each MSI: Function(s) - the normal characteristic actions of an item Functional Failure(s) - Failure of an item to perform its intended function within specified limits Failure Effect(s) - what is the result of a functional failure Failure Cause(s) - why the functional failure occurs The functional failure analysis will be the basis for the categorization of the functional failures which in turn constitutes the basis for the task selection process. For protective devices (e.g. a filter bypass), Function and Functional Failure can refer to an additional failure, i.e. the failure or the event for what the device is designed for. Example Function: To bypass the hydraulic filter in the event of filter clogging. Functional Failure: Fails to bypass the hydraulic filter in the event of filter clogging. Failure Effect: No effect as a single failure. Under normal conditions the bypass is closed. Failure Cause: Filter bypass failed closed.
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Failure Analysis Hierarchy
Function 1
Function 2
Function 3
Functional Failure A
Functional Failure B
Functional Failure C
Functional Failure D
Failure Effect
Failure Effect
Failure Effect 1
Failure Effect 2
Failure Effect
Failure Caus e 1
Failure Caus e 1
Failure Caus e 2
Failure Caus e 3
Failure Caus e 1
Failure Caus e 1
Failure Caus e 1
Failure Caus e 2
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Failure Analysis Hierarchy Each MSI will have at least one function. With increasing complexity of the equipment, the number of functions will also increase. For every function, there should be at least one functional failure; there is no function that cannot fail. For every functional failure, there should be one failure effect only (if there is more than one failure effect for a given functional failure, either the functional failure or the failure effect(s) are probably incorrectly defined). For every functional failure, at least one failure cause must be given.
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Failure Analysis / Data Sheet B
Function Function
FunctionalFailure Failure Functional
FailureEffect Effect Failure
FailureCause Cause Failure
Important: Start with functions and not with failure causes
Data Sheet B is critical for the quality of the analysis
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Data Sheet B / Functional Failure Analysis When developing the Data Sheet B, it is essential to start with the functions and not with the failure causes (as in the case of a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis). If this is not observed, it can result in an analysis where complete functions are missing or where a failure cause is only covered once, even though the item might have different functions and different failure modes (e.g. a valve might have one or more electrical, and one or more mechanical failure modes).
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Data Sheet B: Example

A380
1: To provide controlled and regulated heating of the floor panels at each passenger door/emergency exit
1D: Failure to regulate the heating of one Floor panel at the correct operating Temperature (MOD 45670)
1D12: One heated floor panel defective (Temp Sensor)
1D1: Insufficient or excessive heating at the affected floor panel
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The above sheet is one of several pages making up a complete Data Sheet B and only shows some (not all) functional failures associated with function 1. The other sheets would also show that this MSI has not only one, but some 25 functions. The example shows that there is a one-to-one relationship between functional failures and failure effects. The example shows also that for some functional failures, there are more than one failure causes that can cause the failure to occur.
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Table of Contents
Analysis process & documentation Administrative data MSI Description / Data Sheet A (DSA) Failure Analysis / Data Sheet B (DSB) Task Selection / Level 2 Analysis
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Consequences of Failure / Level 1 Analysis 30 Interval determination Task summaries and task data Sampling Maintenance Programme Evolution
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Consequences of Failure / Level 1 Analysis

MSI Analysis Decision Logic
The decision logic has two levels: levels: Level 1: Questions (1, 2, 3 and 4) require the evaluation of each FUNCTIONAL FAILURE for determination of the Failure Effect Category (5,6,7,8,9).
Level 2:
Questions (A to F as applicable) then take the associated FAILURE CAUSES into account for selecting the specific type of task(s).
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The decision logic for systems and power plant has two levels: Level 1 (questions 1, 2, 3 and 4) requires the evaluation of each FUNCTIONAL FAILURE for determination of the Failure Effect Category; i.e., safety, operational, economic, hidden safety or hidden non-safety. Level 2 (questions "A" through "F", as applicable to the Failure Effect Categories 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9) then takes the FAILURE CAUSE (S) for each functional failure into account for selecting the specific type of task(s).
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Level 1 Analysis: Questions

1) 1)Is Isthe theoccurrence occurrenceof ofa afunctional functionalfailure failureevident evidentto tothe theoperating operating crew crewduring duringthe theperformance performanceof ofnormal normalduties duties? ?
Yes No
2) 2)Does Doesthe thefunctional functionalfailure failureor or secondary damage resulting secondary damage resultingfrom fromthe the functional functionalfailure failurehave havea adirect directadverse adverse effect effecton onoperating operatingsafety safety? ?
Yes
No
4) 4)Does Doesthe thefunctional functionalfailure failurehave havea a Yes direct adverse effect on operating direct adverse effect on operating Safety effects capability capability? ? 8 Yes No
Safety effects Operational effects Economic effects
3) 3)Does Doesthe thecombination combinationof ofa a hidden hiddenfunctional functionalfailure failureand and one oneadditional additionalfailure failureof ofa a system related or back-up system related or back-up function functionhave havean anadverse adverseeffect effect on operating on operatingsafety safety? ?
No Non-safety effects
7
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Level 1 Questions The MSG-3 decision logic diagram for Level 1 has the aim of categorizing the failure consequences. There are four first level questions, identified as questions 1 to 4. 1) 2) Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating crew during the performance of normal duties ? Does the functional failure or secondary damage resulting from the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating safety ?
Direct: To be direct the functional failure or resulting secondary damage must achieve its effect by itself, not in combination with other functional failures (no redundancy exists and it is a primary dispatch item). Ad verse Effect on Safety: Safety shall be considered as adversely affected if the consequences of the failure condition would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft and/or might cause serious or fatal injury to human occupants. Continued safe flight and landing is the capability for continued controlled flight and landing at a suitable airport, possibly using emergency procedures, but without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength. Operating: This is defined as the time interval during which passengers and crew are on board for the purpose of flight.
3)
Does the combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system related or back-up function have an adverse effect on operating safety ?
The question takes into account failures in which the loss of the one hidden function (whose failure is unknown to the operating crew) does not of itself affect safety; however, in combination with an additional functional failure (system related or intended to serve as a backup) has an adverse effect on operating safety.
4)
Does the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating capability ?
Ad verse effect on operating capability requires: either the imposition of operating restrictions or correction prior to further dispatch; or flight crew use of abnormal or emergency procedures (MMEL restrictions/procedures).
As a result of answering these first level questions, the functional failure is assigned to one of five failure effect categories, identified as categories 5 to 9: Evident Safety (Category 5) Evident Operational (Category 6) Evident Economic (Category 7) Hidden Safety (Category 8) Hidden Non-Safety (Category 9)
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FEC 8 Hidden Safety / Example
Functional Failure 2A: fails to isolate the APU bleed duct line from engine bleed pressure
1) IS THE OCCURENCE OF A FUNCTIONAL FAILURE EVIDENT TO THE OPERATING CREW DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF NORMAL DUTIES?
Answer: No, APU check valve malfunction in open

position is not evident to the operating crew because the check valve is not monitored
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FEC 8 Hidden Safety / Example (contd)
Functional failure 2A: Failure to isolate the APU bleed duct line from engine bleed pressure
3) DOES THE COMBINATION OF A HIDDEN FUNCTIONAL FAILURE AND ONE ADDITIONAL FAILURE OF A SYSTEM RELATED OR BACK-UP FUNCTION HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY ?
Answer: Yes, APU check valve in open position in combination with APU bleed duct leakage in sensitive areas may cause adverse effect to operational safety because A/C structure integrity may be affected. 8
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Special case safety / emergency equipments
For hidden failures of safety/emergency equipments,

additional failure is the event for which this function of the system or equipment is designed, A FEC 8 is to be selected. Safety/emergency = a device or system that: Enhances the evacuation of the aircraft in an emergency or If it does not function when required, results in a failure condition that might have an adverse effect on safety.
The
Mega pho n
Escap e Ro pes
Crash
Ox yge n
Ax e
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Level 1 / FEC 6 Example
Functional Failure 1A: Fails to protect the engine against recirculating

1) IS THE OCCURENCE OF A FUNCTIONAL FAILURE EVIDENT TO THE OPERATING CREW DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF NORMAL DUTIES?
Answer: Yes, because the engine indication is shown

on ECAM
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Level 1 / FEC 6 Example (contd)
Functional Failure 1A: fails to protect the engine against recirculating

2) DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OR SECONDARY DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A DIRECT ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY ?
Answer: No, because engine shut-down does not affect safety directly and adversely
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Answers to Level 1 Questions When answering the Level 1 questions, care should be taken to provide a sufficiently detailed explanation to the answer provided.
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Level 1 / FEC 6 Example (contd)
Functional Failure 1A: fails to protect the engine against recirculating
4) DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A DIRECT ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATING CAPABILITY ?
Answer: Yes, engine shut-down affects operating capability because A/C cannot be dispatched with one engine inoperative. 6
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Task Selection / Level 2 Analysis

The Level 2 Analysis takes the FAILURE CAUSES of each Functional Failures into account and provides a means whereby an applicable and effective task - or a number of applicable and effective tasks - can be selected.
According to MSG-3, the following maintenance tasks can be selected: Lubrication / Servicing Operational Check / Visual Check Inspection / Functional Check Restoration Discard
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Task Selection and Failure Effect Categories Once the applicable first level questions have been answered, the analyst is directed to one of the five Failure Effect Categories: a) b) c) d) e) Evident Safety (Category 5) Evident Operational (Category 6) Evident Economic (Category 7) Hidden Safety (Category 8) Hidden Non-Safety (Category 9)
Task development is handled in a similar manner for each of the five Failure Effect categories. For task determination, it is necessary to apply the failure causes for the functional failure to the second level of the logic diagram. There are six possible task resultant questions in the five Failure Effect categories.
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Level 2 Analysis: Applicability & Effectiveness

Task Applicability A set of conditions that leads to the identification of a task type when a specific set of characteristics of the failure cause being analyzed would be discovered and/or corrected as a result of the task being accomplished. Applicability is dependent on the task type. Task Effectiveness A specific set of conditions that leads to the selection of a task already identified to be applicable. Avoids, eliminates, or reduces the negative consequences of the failure to an extent that justifies doing the task at the selected interval. Effectiveness is dependent on task type and failure effect category (FEC).
A selected task must be applicable and effective.
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Level 2 Analysis overview

IS A LUBR ICAT ION OR S ERVIC ING TASK APPLIC ABLE & E FFECT IV E?
YES
LUBRI CA TION/SERVICIN G
NO
Regardless of the answer on question A, the next task selection question must be asked in all cases.
IS A CHECK TO V ERIFY O PERA TIO N APPLIC ABLE & E FFECT IV E ?

YES NO
OPERA TI ONA L/VISUA L CHEC K
IS AN INSPEC TIO N OR FUNC TIO NAL CHECK TO DE TECT D EGRA DAT IO N OF FUNCT ION APP LIC ABLE & EF FECT IV E?
YES NO
When following a safety effects path (FEC 5 and 8), all subsequent questions must be asked In the remaining categories (FEC 6, 7, 9), subsequent to the first question, a YES answer will allow exiting the logic. However, advancement to subsequent questions after deriving a YES answer is allowable, but only until the cost of the task is equal to the cost of the failure prevented. For FEC 5 and 8, if no task becomes applicable and effective a redesign is mandatory.
INSPE CTION/FUN CTION AL CH EC K
IS A RES TORAT IO N TASK TO RE DUCE FAIL URE RA TE APP LICAB LE &
EFFECTIVE?
RES TORA TI ON
YES
NO
IS A DISC ARD TAS K TO A VO ID FA ILUR ES OR TO RED UCE T HE FA ILUR E RAT E APPLIC ABLE & E FFECT IV E?
YES NO
DISCARD
IS TH ERE A TASK OR CO MBIN AT ION OF TASKS AP PL ICABL E & EFFEC TIV E?

TAS K/CO MBI NATI O N MO ST EFFECTI VE MU ST BE DO NE YES NO
REDESI GN I S M AN DAT OR Y
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Level 2 Analysis / Level 2 Formsheet

Functional Functional Failure Failure Failure Failure Cause(s) Cause(s) Fieldfor for Field Answersto toLevel Level22 Answers questions(YES/NO) (YES/NO) questions and and Explanationof ofanswers answers Explanation
Level22 Level questionsto to questions beanswered answered be Indicationof of Indication answer answer (YESor orNO) NO) (YES
Task Task Number(s) Number(s)
Task Task Description(s) Description(s)
Interval Interval justification justification
TaskInterval Interval Task Usage Parameter(s) Usage Parameter(s)

Level 2 Form Sheet There is only a single form sheet for the Level 2 analysis (although there are five different ways of progressing through the Level 2 questions). The form sheet has been arranged so that the failure related information from Data Sheet B (description and reference of the functional failure and the failure cause) is placed at the top of the sheet. The left part of the form sheet is used for a graphical representation of the Level 2 logic chart with the six task selection questions. On the left hand side of this graphical representation, the applicable task selection questions for a certain FEC are indicated. It also allows an indication of the YES or NO answer to each question. The main part of the form sheet is used for the answers to the task selection questions (i.e. YES or NO) and for the detailed explanation of these answers. At the bottom of the sheet, there is space for the task(s) that has resulted from the analysis. It comprises of the - The task number - The task description - The predominant (and the secondary) usage parameter selected for the interval - The task interval expressed in the predominant usage parameter - Optionally a secondary usage parameter and interval - Interval justification A single Level 2 form sheet may be used for the analysis of several failure causes only in those cases where all the answers and the explanations of the answers given on the sheet apply equally to all the referenced failure causes.
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Level 2 Analysis: Lubrication, Servicing

5 6 7 8 9 IS A LUBRICATION OR SERVICING TASK APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE ? Y N
A A A A A
LUBRICATION SERVICING
Any act of lubrication or servicing for the purpose of maintaining inherent design capabilities.
Purpose is: Failure Prevention

SAFETY EFFECTIVENESS (FEC 5, 8) OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS (FEC 6) The task must reduce the risk of failure to an acceptable level. ECONOMIC EFFECTIVENESS (FEC 7, 9) The task must be cost-effective.
APPLICABILITY
The replenishment of the consumable must reduce the rate of functional deterioration.
The task must reduce the risk of failure.
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Level 2 Analysis: Operational / Visual Check

5 6 7 8 9 IS A CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE ? Y N
B B
OPERATIONAL VISUAL CHECK
An operational/visual check is a task to determine that an item is fulfilling its intended purpose. The check does not require quantitative tolerances. This is a failure finding task. The question is only asked for Hidden FEC 8 & 9.
Purpose: Failure finding task !!!
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Level 2 Analysis: OPC, VCK selection criteria
APPLICABILITY Identification of failure must be possible.
SAFETY EFFECTIVENESS The task must ensure adequate availability of the hidden function to reduce the risk of a multiple failure. (FEC 8)
OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS Not applicable
ECONOMIC EFFECTIVENESS The task must ensure adequate availability of the hidden function in order to avoid economic effects of multiple failures and must be costeffective. (FEC 9)
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Level 2 Analysis: Inspection / Functional Check

5 6 7 8 9 B B B C C IS AN INSPECTION OR FUNCTIONAL CHECK TO DETECT DEGRADATION OF FUNCTION APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE ? Y N
INSPECTION / FUNCTIONAL CHECK
An inspection can be a General Visual Inspection (GVI), a Detailed Inspection (DET) or a Special Detailed Inspection (SDI). A functional check is a quantitative check to determine if one or more functions of an item performs within specified limits.
Purpose: Check for degradation !!! Potential Failure Finding

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Level 2 Analysis: Inspections GVI, DET, SDI

GENERAL VISUAL INSPECTION (GVI)
A visual examination of an interior or exterior area, installation or assembly to detect obvious damage, failure or irregularity. This level of inspection is made from within touching distance, unless otherwise specified. A mirror may be necessary to enhance visual access to all exposed surfaces in the inspection area. This level of inspection is made under normally available lighting conditions such as daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight or drop-light and may require removal or opening of access panels or doors. Stands, ladders or platforms may be required to gain proximity to the area being checked.
DETAILED INSPECTION (DET)

An intensive examination of a specific item, installation or assembly to detect damage, failure or irregularity. Available lighting is normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at an intensity deemed appropriate. Inspection aids such as mirrors, magnifying lenses, etc. may be necessary. Surface cleaning and elaborate access procedures may be required.
SPECIAL DETAILED INSPECTION (SDI)

An intensive examination of a specific item, installation, or assembly to detect damage, failure or irregularity. The examination is likely to make extensive use of specialized Inspection Techniques and/or equipment. Intricate cleaning and substantial access or disassembly procedure may be required.
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Level 2 Analysis: Insp / FNC selection criteria
APPLICABILITY Reduced resistance to failure must be detectable, and there exists a reasonably consistent interval between a deterioration condition and functional failure.
SAFETY EFFECTIVENESS The task must reduce the risk of failure to assure safe operation. (FEC 5, 8)
OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS The task must reduce the risk of failure to an acceptable level. (FEC 6)
ECONOMIC EFFECTIVENESS The task must be cost-effective; i.e., the cost of the task must be less than the cost of the failure prevented. (FEC 7, 9)
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Level 2 Analysis: Restoration

5 6 7 8 9 IS A RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE ? Y N
C C C D D
RESTORATION
That work necessary to return the item to a specific standard. Since restoration may vary from cleaning or replacement of single parts up to a complete overhaul, the scope of each assigned restoration task has to be specified.
From cleaning to overhaul !!! Purpose: Failure Avoidance
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Level 2 Analysis: RST selection criteria
APPLICABILITY The item must show functional degradation characteristics at an identifiable age and a large proportion of units must survive to that age. It must be possible to restore the item to a specific standard of failure resistance.
SAFETY EFFECTIVENESS The task must reduce the risk of failure to assure safe operation. (FEC 5, 8)
OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS The task must reduce the risk of failure to an acceptable level. (FEC 6)
ECONOMIC EFFECTIVENESS The task must be cost-effective: i.e., the cost of the task must be less than the cost of the failure prevented. (FEC 7, 9)
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Level 2 Analysis: Discard

5 6 7 8 9 IS A DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES OR TO REDUCE THE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE ? Y N
D D D E E
DISCARD
The removal from service of an item at a specified life limit. Discard tasks are normally applied to so-called single celled parts such as cartridges, canisters, cylinders, engine disks, safe-life structural members, etc.
Safe life limitEconomic life limit Purpose: Failure Avoidance

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Level 2 Analysis: DIS selection criteria
APPLICABILITY The item must show functional degradation characteristics at an identifiable age and a large proportion of units must survive to that age.
SAFETY EFFECTIVENESS A safe-life limit must reduce the risk of failure to assure safe operation. FEC 5 & 8
OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS The task must reduce the risk of failure to an acceptable level. FEC 6
ECONOMIC EFFECTIVENESS An economic-life limit must be costeffective: i.e., the cost of the task must be less than the cost of the failure prevented. FEC 7 & 9
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Level 2 Analysis: Task combination

5 E 6 7 8 F 9 Y N
IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION OF TASKS APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE ?
TASK MOST EFFECTIVE MUST BE DONE
Since this is a safety category (FEC 5 or 8) question and a task is required, all possible avenues must be analyzed. To do this, a review of the task(s) that are applicable is necessary.
From this review the most effective task(s) must be selected. All Level 2 analyses for FECs 5 and 8 that do not result in a task must be brought to the attention of the ISC.
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Level 2 Analysis: No task for FEC 5 or 8 ?

FEC 5
For all failure causes, it is necessary to derive an applicable and effective task. No exceptions are allowed.
FEC 8 Under exceptional circumstances, it may not be possible to derive an applicable and effective task: No redesign possible Lack of a task can be justified, if the probability of the functional failure occurring is low enough for ISC acceptance.
Failure becomes evident before scheduled failure-finding If a failure is hidden and the Level 1 analysis results in a FEC 8, the lack of a task may be justified by the fact, that the failure becomes evident long before an applicable and effective task can be carried out at any reasonable interval.
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Level 2 Analysis / Applicability & Effectiveness

TASK + Codes + Purp ose LUBRICAT ION OR SERV ICING ( LU B, SVC) FA ILURE PRE VENTION OPERAT IONA L OR VISU AL CHECK ( OPC, VCK) FA ILURE FIND ING INSP ECTION OR FUNCTIONAL CHECK ( GV I, DET, SDI, FNC) P OTENTIAL FAILUR E FIND ING
APPL ICAB IL ITY CRITERIA The replen ishment of the consumable must reduce the rate of functional deterioratio n. Identification of failure must be possible. SAFETY FEC 5 & 8 The task must reduce the risk of failure.
EFFECTIVENE SS CRITER IA OPERAT IONA L FEC 6 The task must reduce the risk of failure to an acceptable level. Not applicable. ECONOMIC FEC 7 & 9 The task must be cost effective.
The task must ensure adequ ate availabi lity of the hidden function to reduce the risk of a multiple failure.
The task must ensure adequ ate availabi lity of the hidden function in order to avoid econ omic effects of multiple failures and must be cost effective. The task must be cost effective; i. e., the cost of the task must be less than the cost of the failure preve nted. The task must be cost effective; i.e., the cost of the task must be less than the cost of the failure preve nted.
Reduced resistance to failure must be detectable, and there exists a reasonably consistent interval between a deteri oration condition and function al failure. The item must show functional degra dation char acteristics at an identifiable a ge, and a larg e proportio n of units must survive to that age. It must be possible to restore the item to a specific standard of failure resistance. The item must show functional degra dation char acteristics at an identifiable a ge and a lar ge proportio n of units must survive to that age.
The task must reduce the risk of failure to assure safe operation.
The task must reduce the risk of failure to an acceptable level.
RESTORATION (RST) FA ILURE AV OID ANCE
The task must reduce the risk of failure to assure safe operation.
DISCARD (D IS) FA ILURE AV OID ANCE
The safe life limit must reduce the risk of failure to assure safe operation.
An economic life limit must be cost effective; i.e., the cost of the task must be less than the cost of the failure prevented.
Pag e 57
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Level 2 Analysis / Level 2 example
8A) No: There is no applicable lubrication or servicing task because there is no consumable to replenish. 8B) No: A failure finding check is not applicable because there are no appropriate means to verify operation on A/C. 8C) Yes: Detailed visual inspection of APU check valve is applicable to detect degradation and is effective. 8D) No: The item does not show functional degradation at an identifiable age; therefore, no restoration task is applicable. 8E) No: The item does not show functional degradation at an identifiable age; therefore, no discard task is applicable. 8F) Yes: detailed visual inspection is applicable and effective.
10
Remove APU c hec k val ve for detailed vi sual i ns pecti on
Inter val s elec ted bas ed on r eliability pr edic tion and engineeri ng j udg ment FH
10 000 FH
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Table of Contents
12 15 20 25 30 39 58 62 71 73
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Interval Determination
The MWGs should select the most appropriate interval for each
maintenance task based on available data and good engineering judgment. The information needed to determine optimum intervals is ordinarily not available until after the equipment enters service. In the absence of specific data on failure rates and characteristics, intervals for systems tasks are largely determined based on service experience with similar systems/components.
A task should not be done more often than experience or other

data suggests simply because it is easily accomplished.
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General Considerations for Interval Determination As part of the MSG-3 logic analysis, the Maintenance Working Group has to determine the interval of each scheduled maintenance task that satisfies both the applicability and effectiveness criteria. The MWGs should select the most appropriate interval for each maintenance task based on available data and good engineering judgment.
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Intervals / Sources of Information

In order to determine the 'best initial' maintenance interval for each task, each MWG must assess the interval based on all relevant data that is available: Manufacturers tests and technical analysis Manufacturers data and/or vendor recommendations (based on test data or failure analysis) Customer requirements 'Best engineering estimates Service experience gained with comparable or identical parts, components and subsystems on other aircraft
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Interval Determination / Usage parameters

Usage Parameters Task intervals are established in terms of the measure of exposure
to the conditions that cause the failure at which the task is directed.
The most widely used usage parameters are: Flight Hours Flight Cycles Calendar Time (e.g. MO)
But also:
Engine Hours Equipment Operating hours Equipment Operating cycles

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Table of Contents
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Task Summary Sheet
Purpose: summarize tasks selected during Level 2

analysis (including intervals, associated failure effect categories and failure cause references).
Not to combine tasks derived from Level 2 analysis so that

they agree fully with the proposed MRB Report.
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Task Summary Sheet
Eachfailure failure Each cause and the cause and the relatedFEC FECto to be related be stated stated
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For each task stated on the Task Summary sheet, the task number, the task description, the usage parameter of the task interval and the interval itself have to be provided. In addition, for each task, all the failure cause references from which the task was derived and their associated failure effect categories must be given. The task numbers on the Task Summary sheet are normal sequence numbers, starting with 1 and continuing with 2, 3, etc.
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MRB Report Interface Sheet
Purpose:
To
summarize task description and task interval so that they can be directly transferred to the MPP (draft of MRB Report) To specify all additional data not derived from the analysis but required for the task section of the MRB Report.
Once reviewed and agreed by ISC, the MRB Report

Interface sheet Sheet becomes the source document for the Maintenance Review Board Report.
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MRBR Interface Sheet / Task Combination
Possible to combine tasks on the MRB Report Interface

sheet in order to
Combine
tasks that should be performed together for technical reasons Bring the wording of tasks proposed for the MPP/MRB Report and those in the MSG-3 analysis in agreement with each other
Tasks not affected by task combinations can be transferred

from the Task Summary sheet to the MRB Report Interface sheet without change
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MRBR Interface Sheet / Example

Interval expressedin in Interval expressed theappropriate appropriate the usageparameter parameter usage
Tasknumbers numbers Task (as usedon on (as used theTask Task the Summary Summary Sheet) Sheet)
LUB,SVC, SVC, LUB, OPC, VCK, OPC, VCK, FNC,GVI, GVI, FNC, DET,SDI, SDI, DET, RST, DIS RST, DIS Tasksequence sequence Task numbers (as numbers (as usedin inthe the used MRBR) MRBR)
Moststringent stringent Most evident and/or evident and/or hidden FEC hidden FEC (e.g.55 only (e.g. only insteadof of 5,6, 6,7) 7) instead 5,
Any Any additional additional remarks remarks Should always Should always bestated stated be (e.g.All, All,Mod Mod (e.g. No,A380-800) A380-800) No,
Description oftask task Description of as used inthe the as used in MRBReport Report MRB (after combining (after combining tasks from TSS) tasks from TSS)
Transferto to Transfer ZIP? ZIP? (YESor orN/A) N/A) (YES
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The MRB Report Interface sheet lists for each task the following data: The task numbers of the task(s) from the Task Summary sheet that the task on the MRB Report Interface sheet covers (after combining tasks) The task number of each task The three-letter task code The task description The Failure Effect Category or Categories The task interval The ZIP reference if the task is covered by the zonal program The applicability of the task Any additional remarks if applicable
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Task Data Sheet

Purpose of the Task Data sheet:
To
provide procedural information for task accomplishment To provide additional task planning data.
Task Data sheet for every task listed on the MRBR Interface sheet (not for every task on the Task Summary sheet)
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Task Data Sheet

Task Description and Planning Data
The level of detail for the task procedure should be such that a
MWG is able to assess task accomplishment procedure suitable for direct use during MPD development. it is necessary to provide a brief statement on the intent/purpose of the task (e.g. To detect wear-out of thebefore it fails completely).
The planning data shall be
Under Reason for Task

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Task Data Sheet

Interval Justification As part of the working group review of the analysis, substantiation/justification is to be provided for all intervals
The statement shall include

the
reason why the predominant usage parameter was chosen the secondary usage parameter is.
This justification can be
used as a basis for later task interval adjustments.

Note: currently, interval justification is applied from A380 programme onwards
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Table of Contents
12 15 20 25 30 39 58 62 71 73
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Applicability of Sampling
Sampling = examination of a specific number of items at defined
intervals to confirm that there are no unexpected degradation characteristics.
Non-sampled items may continue in service until sampling

results highlight the need for change.
Sampling can be considered for tasks in the systems and power

plant program if
the characteristics of the task and the associated failure processes

are such that a 100% - task accomplishment is not necessary and
the results of the sample task are equally applicable to the nonsampled items.
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Table of Contents
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Maintenance Programme Evolution

2 types of MP evolutions
NOT COVERED BY THIS PRESENTATION
Manufacturer
Fleet in-service experience (FAA/EASA approval)
Operator
Operator fleet in-service experience (local A/A approval)
MRB process
Operators encouraged to participate to MRB process
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The manufacturers evolution results shall be applicable to the whole fleet. This means that the resultant interval will be used as minimum interval by all operators (even for new operators), regardless of their previous in-service experience.
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Objective is to maintain safety, reliability, at minimum cost. Optimize the initial interval, task by task Exercise launched when the A/C manufacturer and the ISC
consider that sufficient in-service experience is collected.
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The term 'Evolution' is used to clarify that the exercise considers all means to improve the Maintenance Program and does not focus entirely on 'Escalation'. Although the goal is to justify greater task intervals, it is equally important to assess the need for additional scheduled tasks or more frequent intervals of some existing tasks. The evolution is performed on a task-by-task basis (individual review). The ISC will provide the new target / interval framework of the dedicated Maintenance Program Evolution.
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Industry domain
BR MR e N+1
Issu
ance nt e n (M ai oar d ew B R e vi por t) e R
Manufacturer domain
PD M n evisi o
r
Airline / MRO domain

OMP
ce n an i nt e g (M a ni n Pl a n ent) um c o D
r ra t o (Ope a nc e n te n ) M ai ra m g ro P
s s) sks k d s ) d) sk TaT aarT a ar d ar bc bc bc (Jo o J ( (Jo
ISC
(Industr y St eering Comm ittee)
Manufacturer domain
Other engineering data Data compilation & analysis
Evolution dossiers
Task reports
Nil findings / details of findings
MWG meetings (Maint enance W or king Group s)

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In order to conduct a complete study, the evolution exercise shall be handled in four phases that run concurrently. Only when all phases are complete can the decision be made to propose task interval evolution and changes to the MRBR. Phase 1 - Operators investigation and data reporting All operators is responsible for reviewing current in-service experience and reporting the necessary data to the manufacturer in an agreed format. Phase 2 - Data Compilation The reported data are collected by Airbus in a dedicated database. The next phase of the evolution exercise are only launched when Airbus, the ISC and the MRB are satisfied that the database contains a sufficient quantity (e.g. number of tasks reported) and quality of data (e.g. geographical distribution, A/C age).The database is then frozen and supplied to the ATA specialist responsible for each MSI, SSI or ZIP task. Phase 3 - Manufacturer's investigation The manufacturer is responsible for: -An engineering review of all tasks under consideration for evolution. o a review of the basis for the original task and interval selection (e.g. MSG-3 analysis, MWG minutes, ISC minutes). o a review of available engineering data (reliability data, Inspection Service Bulletins (ISB), Service Information Letters (SIL), Technical Follow-Up (TFU), etc). o a review with design/product support specialists to get their advice on the related task interval evolution. -Review of the database by the MSI, SSI, Zonal maintenance engineering specialists. -Compilation of the evolution dossiers to be reviewed during MWG Meetings.
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Industry domain
BR MR e N+1
Issu
ance nt e n (M ai oar d ew B R e vi por t) e R
Manufacturer domain
PD M n evisi o
r
Airline / MRO domain

OMP
an ce nt e n ( M ai ni ng Pl a n ent) m u D oc
r ra t o (Ope a nc e n te n ) M ai ra m g ro P
s s) sks k d s ) d) sk TaT aarT a ar d ar bc bc bc (Jo o J ( (Jo
ISC
(Industr y St eering Comm ittee)
Manufacturer domain
Other engineering data Data compilation & analysis
Evolution dossiers
Task reports
Nil findings / details of findings
MWG meetings (Maint enance W or king Group s)

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Phase 4 Maintenance Working Group (MWG) meetings and Industry Steering Committee (ISC) meetings By reviewing the evolution dossiers prepared by the manufacturer, the MWG discusses the evolution proposals on a task-by-task basis to agree on appropriate usage parameters, intervals and any other changes to the program. Operators are also requested to provide in-service experience during the Maintenance Working Group sessions. The MWG results are then summarized and presented to the ISC for acceptance.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction 2. MSI Selection process 3. MSI Analysis

3 6 11 77
4. Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs ) (CMRs)
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4. Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs)

Table of Contents
MRB Process / Type Certification interface CMRs CS 25.1309 Compliance Selection of CMRs Handling of CMRs CMR document Certification and Maintenance Coordination Committee (CMCC) Coordination of MRB and CMR Processes CMR document and MRB Report
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MRB process / type certification interface

CS/FAR 21/39 (AD, CN) AD, CN Service Service Bulletins
/
MRB PROCESS (CS/FAR 25.1529) Evaluation Methods (MSG-3) MRB Report

25.1529, Appx H
MPD TYPE CERTIFICATION PROCESS (CS/FAR 25)

Operators Approved Maintenance Program
2.Structure ALIs (25.571 & 25.603 25.1529 App.H 25.4) 1.Safe Life items (25.1529 App. H 25.4 25.571)
L/HIRF
(Assurance Plan)
3.Systems CMRs (25.1309 SSA 25.1529 App.H) 4. Ageing Systems Maintenance 5.Fuel ALIs
(SFAR 88 / CS25-981)
ALS Parts 1 to 5 ALS :

Airworthiness Limitation Section
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MRB Report : Means of compliance for 25.1529 Appx H Airworthiness Limitation Section : Part 1 Life Limited Parts Part 2 ALI document (Structure) Part 3 CMR document (Systems) Part 4 Ageing Systems Maintenance (ASM) Part 5 Fuel ALI document MPD: At EIS, MRBR tasks, ALS The MPD is a repository document not to be considered as a source document. Operator's approved maintenance : To be established from source documents.
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Certification Maintenance Requirements

A CMR is a required periodic maintenance task, established A CMR is intended to detect safety-significant latent failures
during the design certification of the aeroplane as an operating limitation of the type certificate. which would, in combination with one or more specific failures or events, result in a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition. airworthiness authority request.
A CMR is introduced in accordance with a specific

Particular rules apply for in-service handling of CMRs.

CMRs are mandatory and must be complied with
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Definition A Certification Maintenance Requirement (CMR) is a required periodic task, established during the design certification of the airplane as an operating limitation of the type certificate. A CMR is intended to detect safety-significant latent failures that would, in combination with one or more other specific failures or events, result in a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition. Hazardous: Failure Conditions, which would reduce the capability of the aeroplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating, conditions to the extent that there would be: (i) (ii) A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities; Physical distress or excessive workload such that the flight crew cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely; or
(iii) Serious or fatal injury to a relatively small number of the occupants other than the flight crew. Catastrophic: Failure Conditions, which would result in multiple fatalities, usually with the loss of the aeroplane. (Note: A Catastrophic Failure Condition was defined in previous versions of the rule and the advisory material as a Failure Condition which would prevent continued safe flight and landing.)
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CS 25.1309 Compliance
Airbus produces System Safety Assessments (SSA)

as part of their compliance with 25.1309.
SSA ATA 28
The numerical calculations performed to assess the
probability of significant Failure Conditions may lead to need for maintenance task(s) in order to achieve the safety objectives defined in the advisory material to 25.1309.
Most Most of ofSSA SSA tasks tasks are are Candidate CMRs Candidate CMRs
CMRs are a subset of the tasks identified during the type certification process. They usually result from a formal, numerical analysis (e.g. System Safety Assessment) conducted to show compliance with catastrophic and hazardous failure conditions.
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Selection of CMRs
From list of tasks required for 25.1309 compliance:

Delete
tasks performed by Flight Crew (these must be included in the Aircraft Flight Manual) Delete tasks where credit has been taken for component MTBF
Remaining tasks are Candidate CMRs (CCMRs). First

objective is to minimise the number that need CMR status.
AMC 25-19 allows some credit to be taken for tasks derived

from MSG-3 analysis and included in the MRB Report
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AMJ 25-19 Para 11a(1)(i) states that CMR status does not need to be applied if the CCMR is satisfied by Maintenance actions considered to be routine maintenance activity (and which are also identified as MRB tasks) based on engineering judgement and experience on similar aeroplane types.
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Selection of CMRs
EASA accept that an SSA task associated with either a
CAT or HAZ Failure Condition does not need to be identified as a CMR if all the following criteria are met:
It The
is considered routine maintenance activity MRB task interval is equal to or shorter than that derived in the SSA The task interval is quoted in usage parameter (not letter check) The MRB task is developed from Failure Effect Category (FEC) 8 safety logic
If any one is not met, a CMR is necessary
EASA require that an SSA task associated with a MAJ

Failure Condition be identified as a CMR if it is not an MRB task
MARCH 07 XM33 Trai ning Systems & Powerpl ant l ogic + CMRs Principl es Pag e 85
A task is considered routine if: it is performed on all aircraft of a similar size and complexity at a similar frequency and the consequences of not performing the task are similar on other aircraft and the safety consequences are evident without special understanding of the design
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Handling of CMRs
CMR One Star task (CMR*)
Task intervals quoted in the CMR document cannot be increased unless advised by the manufacturer following approval by the appropriate Type Certification Authority. CMR Two Star task (CMR**) Task intervals quoted in the CMR document may be increased only in accordance with escalation practices approved by the operators C Maintenance Authority. No CMR task may be changed or deleted unless approved by primary certification authority.
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CMR Categories There are two types of CMR tasks, which are handled as follows. One Star CMRs (CMR*) The tasks and intervals specified are mandatory and cannot be changed, escalated, or deleted without the approval of the responsible Certification Authority. Two Star CMRs (CMR**) Task intervals may be adjusted in accordance with an operators approved escalation practices or an approved reliability program, but the task may not be changed or deleted without prior responsible Certification Authority approval. Since CMRs are based on statistical averages and reliability rates, an exceptional short-term extension for a single CMR interval may be made on one aeroplane for a specific period of time without jeopardizing safety. The local regulatory authority must be notified as soon as practicable by the operator if any short-term extension allowed by the CMR document has taken place.
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Certification Maintenance Requirements Document
Contains data on CMR* and

CMR** tasks and task intervals,
Is referenced in the Type

Certificate Data Sheet,
Is published as the ALS part 3.

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CMR Document CMRs should be listed in a separate CMR document, which is referenced in the Type Certificate Data Sheet. The latest version of the CMR document should be controlled by an EASA-approved log of pages. In this way, changes to CMRs following certification will not require an amendment to the Type Certificate Data Sheet. The CMR document is published as the part 3 of the ALS (Airworthiness Limitations Section). The CMR document should clearly identify the two types of CMR tasks (CMR* and CMR**). The MRB Report should include a note indicating that the CMR document is the controlling document for all CMR tasks. When a CMR task corresponds to an MRBR task, whatever the respective intervals, this fact should be highlighted, for example, by flagging the task in the MRB Report.
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Certification Maintenance Coordination Committee (CMCC)

The CMCC is intended to grant operators an opportunity to
participate in the selection of CMRs Is an advisory committee for the type certificate applicant Consists of representatives of the
Manufacturer Operators (designated by the ISC) Certification Office MRB chairperson

Is reviewing Candidate CMRs for selection as CMR* and

CMR**
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Certification Maintenance Coordination Committee (CMCC) In order to grant operators an opportunity to participate in the selection of the CMRs, a Certification Maintenance Coordination Committee is convened. The CMCC reviews all Candidate CMRs and assesses the need for CMR status using a decision methodology that takes into account the results of the MRB process. The CMCC is formed by: - Operators designated by the Industry Steering Committee (ISC) Chair, - Airworthiness Authorities Aircraft Certification Office Specialists, - MRB Chair and nominated representatives, and - Airbus representatives During the MRB process, Airbus shall keep the Industry Steering Committee and the Maintenance Review Board informed of those tasks and intervals that arise from the Type Certification process. This will normally be achieved during the scheduled ISC meetings. When Preliminary System Safety Analysis data is available, CMCC meetings will be called by Airbus to review the candidates CMRs and discuss possible alternatives to a given CMR that would satisfy the intent of the CMR, while allowing reduced operational impact. To ease the work of the CMCC, Airbus will prepare an SSA/MSG-3 Compatibility Check that will list all Candidate CMRs and, where they exist, corresponding MSG-3 tasks. Following the CMCC activity, this document will record the reason for CMR status being applied or not and, where applied, the justification for either One Star or Two Star classification.
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Coordination of MRB and CMR Processes

Certification Process
Re-evaluation/Redesign Safety Analysis (25.1309, etc.) Design Properly justified Engineering Judgment TC Applicant
Candidate Certification Maintenance Requirement (CCMR)
Certification Maintenance Coordination Committee (CMCC)

CCMR vs. MRB task comparison CMR Selection CMR Categorization
Discussion & Feedback ISC

Manufacturers Operators Certification Authority Specialists MRB Chairperson TC Applicant Type Cert. Data Sheet
MRB MRB Report

For info only
Certification Authority Approval CMR Document Reference
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Interface between CMCC and ISC/MRB The CMCC may conclude that a CMR would be either alleviated or avoided if the MSG-3 analysis conclusions are changed. They may thus request the ISC to ask their MWGs to revisit a particular analysis to ensure that failure modes identified in the SSA had not been overlooked and that there is consistency in the categorisation of the failure effect consequences. The MSG-3 analyses should be updated only if the MWG conclude that original decisions were made without full awareness of potential safety related scenarios or if specific failure causes had been overlooked. The analysis shall not be changed simply to be compatible with the Candidate CMRs. MSG-3 logic shall not be overridden. This reassessment may lead to the derivation of safety route (FEC 8) instead of non-safety route (FEC 9) and/or more frequent task intervals. These changes may allow a Candidate CMR to be considered adequately covered by the MRB Report and hence justify no CMR status. Reassessment of the MSG-3 analysis resulting in selection of a new task does not necessarily imply that CMR status is no longer required. Unless the reassessment is due to applying logic to a function added since the original MWG activity, it may be difficult to argue that the task can be considered 'routine maintenance activity' and thus justify that CMR status is not required. CMCC meetings are held when result from Preliminary System Safety Assessments are available. This will allow the CMCC to make recommendations to the Manufacturer regarding design justification for CMR. This will also give reasonable timescale to the MWG, should a review of MSG3 hypothesis and conclusion were found justified.
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CMR Document and MRB Report
Equipment, systems and installations CS/FAR 25.1309 Systems Systems Design Design CMR CMR Requirements Requirements
MSG-3 analysis according to CS/FAR 25.1529
In the past (before 1997), Airbus forced compatibility between CMR Document and MRB Report. Nowadays, the MRB no longer allows Airbus to force compatibility. Thus a specific CMR may not appear in the MRB Report or may appear with a larger interval than permitted by the CMR document. The two processes are completely separated and it is not necessary to enforce compatibility between tasks from MSG-3 analysis and SSA Thus, the working groups should not be influenced by tasks and task intervals available in a preliminary form when the working group meeting takes place.
MARCH 07
Scheduled Scheduled Maintenance Maintenance Requirements Requirements
TYPE TYPE CERTIFICATION CERTIFICATION APPROVAL APPROVAL

MRB MRB APPROVAL APPROVAL
ALS P ART 3 CERTIFI CATION MAI NTENANCE REQ UIRE ME NTS
MAI NTENANCE REVIE W BO ARD REPO RT
Pag e 90
Past CMR Methodology In the past (before 1997), Airbus ensured full compatibility was achieved between the requirements arising from Type Certification activities and the recommendations arising from MRB activities. The compatibility exercise ensured that only the most restrictive maintenance requirement was published and that all repetitive scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals arising from the manufacturer's documentation were included in a single document (the MRB Report). Present CMR Methodology The internationally agreed guidelines provided by AMC 25-19 (EASA) / AC 25-19 (FAA) are to be followed in order to ensure a harmonized approach to the interface between CMRs and the MRB Report. The concept of compatibility is no longer acceptable as a defined procedure. As a result, any candidate CMR identified through the Type Certification process will now be assessed according to a new methodology that does not permit a task to be 'forced' into the MRB Report at a compatible interval. As a result: Not all repetitive scheduled maintenance requirements will necessarily be in the Systems & power plant section of the MRB Report, The interval of an MRB Report task may be greater than permitted by the identical task in the CMR document, The Failure Effect Category of an MRB Report task may be FEC 9 (non safety) while the identical task is identified as a safety related task in the CMR document.
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AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserv ed. Conf idential and propri etary document. This docume nt and all inf ormation containe d herei n is the sole property of AIRBUS S.A.S.. No intellectual property rights are granted by the deliv ery of this document or the disclosure of its content. This document shall not be reproduced or disclosed to a third party without the express written consent of AIRBUS S.A.S. This document and its content shall not be used f or any purpose other than that f or which it is supplied. The statements made herein do not constitute an are based on the mentioned assumptions and are in good f aith. Where the supporting grounds statements are not shown, AIRBUS S.A.S. will be explain the basis thereof . off er. They expresse d f or these pleased to
AIRBUS, its logo, A300, A310, A318, A319, A32 0, A321, A330, A34 0, A350, A40 0M a re registere d trademarks.
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C-Systems &amp; Powerplants+CMRs

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C-Systems &amp; Powerplants+CMRs

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Maintainability & Maintenance Engineering + Maintenance Planning & Services

3. Systems & Powerplant logic + CMRs Principles

Systems & Powerplant logic + CMRs - Principles

1. Introduction 2. MSI Selection process

4. Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs) 77

XM33 Tr aini ng Systems & Power plant l ogic + CMRs Principl es

Systems & Powerplant logic + CMRs - Principles

1. Introduction 2. MSI Selection process

4. Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs) 77

XM33 Tr aini ng Systems & Power plant l ogic + CMRs Principl es

Systems and Powerplant Section

Zonal Section Structures Section

Systems & Powerplant

AIR BUS S .A .S . All righ ts reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Systems & Powerplant logic + CMRs - Principles

1. Introduction 2. MSI Selection process

4. Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs) 77

XM33 Tr aini ng Systems & Power plant l ogic + CMRs Principl es

2. MSI selection process

MSI selection Selection process 2. MSI

AIRBU S S. A. S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Could failure be undetectable or not likely to be detected during operations?

Could failure have significant economic impact?

XM33 Tr aini ng Systems & Power plant l ogic + CMRs Principl es

2. MSI MSI selection Selection process

2. MSI MSI selection Selection process

XM33 Tr aini ng Systems & Power plant l ogic + CMRs Principl es

Systems & Powerplant logic + CMRs - Principles

1. Introduction 2. MSI Selection process

4. Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs) 77

XM33 Tr aini ng Systems & Power plant l ogic + CMRs Principl es

4. MSG3 Analysis procedure 3. MSI Analysis

MSI Analysis Process

Establish data to allow traceability and history

MSI Description & Component Data

Functional Failure Analysis

Determine the Failure Effect Category for

each Functional Failure

Determine if a task is applicable and effective

AIR BUS S .A .S . All righ ts reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Task & Interval Selection (Level 2)

Task Summaries & Task Data

Establish other task data for the MRB Report

MSI Analysis Documentation

AIR BUS S .A .S . All righ ts reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

4. MSG3 Analysis procedure 3. MSI Analysis

Administrative Pages / Overview

Applicability Sheet (one or more pages)

Administrative Pages / Applicability

Aircraft Aircraft Series Series

Engine/Propeller Engine/Propeller (whereapplicable) applicable) (where

Modnumber numberand andtitle title Mod

AIR BUS S .A .S . All righ ts reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Assumptions Assumptions (open) (open)

AIR BUS S .A .S . All righ ts reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Assumptions Assumptions (open) (open)

AIR BUS S .A .S . All righ ts reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Assumptions Assumptions (closed) (closed)

AIR BUS S .A .S . All righ ts reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

4. MSG3 Analysis procedure 3. MSI Analysis

MSI Description / Data Sheet A

AIR BUS S .A .S . All righ ts reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Data Sheet A / Component Data Sheet

Qty: Qty: Quantityper per Quantity Aircraft Aircraft Zone(s) Zone(s)

C-Systems & Powerplants+CMRs

C-Systems & Powerplants+CMRs