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1. (U) PURPOSE: To describe strategic considerations for addressing political Islam. 2. (U) BACKGROUND: a. (U) Defining the Threat. Islam is simultaneously a religion, a political philosophy, and a school of law. merican policy planners, strategists, !ournalists and citi"enry are fi#ated on the religious aspects of Islam to the point where we find it difficult to organi"e a coherent and cohesi$e strategic defense against its ideology. %hile it is politically incorrect to wage war on a religion, it is, howe$er, permissible to defend against an ideological threat. Islam presents such a threat. b. (U) Just War Tra iti!ns. &ey consideration in assessing the nature and the scope of the threat is to understand that while the 'udaic, (hristian, and )ealist traditions of 'ust %ar are pacifist*defensi$e, Islam is aggressi$e*offensi$e.1 c. (U) Is"a#$s Gran Strateg%. There is an identifiable Islamic grand strategy. nd it has tactical, operational, and strategic le$els of war. )emembering that Tactical operations are aimed at operational centers of gra$ity, and that +perational attac&s are aimed at strategic centers of gra$ity, and that ,trategic attac&s are the orchestrating and coordinating operational attac&s against strategic targets (or centers of gra$ity), we find an identifiable pattern unfolding before us. (1) (U) Is"a#$s strategi& atta&'. %hile there are multiple sects, legal traditions and other $ariations within Islam, the acti$e elements within Islam are pursuing a pre$iously stated grand strategy laid down by a commonly accepted leader. -uhammad, both in his capacity of religious leader and military leader, established the strategic ob!ecti$e of political (as well as religious) domination of the world and he left behind a war fighting doctrine codified in the .oran, Islamic /aw, Islamic Traditions (0adiths) and reinforced by current interpretations in the modern era. %hat is uni1ue from a %estern standpoint is its autonomous, decentrali"ed e#ecution, which confuses and perhaps confounds defensi$e planners. ll the elements of a hostile grand strategy, accompanied by a supporting doctrine and a capable militia, are both in place and in motion. (2) (U) O(erati!na" Le)e"s !f Is"a#i& strategi& atta&'. The current resistance being e#perienced in Ira1, the patterns of Islamic based sla$ery against (hristians and other 2on* -uslims in ,udan and -auritania, the 3 rab*Israeli (onflict3, the 3Israeli*4alestinian3 problem, the operations being waged against the U.,. by l*5aida, the pronouncements of the recent Islamic (ongress held in -alaysia condemning 'udaism, and the infiltration of, for e#ample, the 6al&ans by ,audi and Iranian $ariants of Islam, are all distinct, +perational /e$el, e#pressions of a grand strategy. %e are confronted by strategic attac&. There is a disturbing inability to appreciate the significant, breadth and depth of these attac&s. (7) (U) Ta&ti&a" Le)e"s !f Is"a#i& strategi& atta&'* diligent re$iew of seeming $iolations of 8ene$a (on$entions and normally accepted rules of warfare re$eals that Islamic

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fighters are beha$ing within the conte#t of their !ust war principles, dictates of the .oran and pertinent parts of Islamic Tradition and Islamic /aw. +ur dismissal of these actions as 3criminal3, or blaming them on 3foreigners3 is a strategic failure to both understand the nature of the threat and ad!ust our response accordingly. The strategic threat is Islam. 7. (U) CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTER STRATEG+: a. (U) Defining the Ene#%. The most difficult part of de$eloping a counter strategy is assessing Islam as a political, ideological, and military enemy. +nce that psychological bridge as been crossed, the de$elopment of a counter strategy can proceed with a degree of celerity. The core issue is Islam as an ideological threat. The preferred le$ers of national power employed in response to this threat should be 9iplomatic and Information. (1) (U) First A#en #ent &!nsi erati!ns. %hile there are $ery real military and ideological threats emanating from Islam that lend themsel$es to standard military and ideological analysis and response, e#ceptional care needs to be gi$en to accommodating the (onstitutional protections afforded to the religious portions of Islam. The tas& before strategic planners is to carefully e#cise the ideological and military aspects of Islam that threaten U., interests. (2) (U) A P!"iti&a" Trinit%. s a military and ideological entity, Islam is composed of three parts: the .oran, the people and it:s local leadership (who perform political and military leadership responsibilities.) 8raphically, it may be portrayed as follows.

(7) (U) Centers !f Gra)it% an Criti&a" ,u"nera-i"ities. %ithin each subset, or element, of the political trinity there are strategic centers of gra$ity and critical $ulnerabilities. These should be made the target of diplomatic and informational operational attac&. Islamic scholars, the ser$ice colleges, and the national agencies can identify targetable centers of gra$ity

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and critical $ulnerabilities for each element of the political trinity and recommend themes for attac&. (;) (U) Strategi& Sea#s. The glue binding the elements of the political trinity is Islam:s strategic culture. Inherent in any strategic culture are e#ploitable contradictions that lend themsel$es to operational attac&. gain, Islamic scholars, the ser$ice colleges, and the national agencies can identify those contradictions suitable for operational information attac&. b. (U) De)e"!(ing a Strategi& Strateg%* (1) (U) Strategi& Target. The strategic target is political Islam. The strategic goal should be the demilitari"ation of Islam and<or the inducement of an Islamic e1ui$alent of a protestant reformation. This is a suitable, feasible, and acceptable goal. ny ideology created and propagated by men can be challenged and chec&ed by men. The ultimate 1uestion is: %hich side has the greater resol$e= (2) (U) O(erati!na" Targets. There are at least nine (>) identifiable operational le$el targets a$ailable for consideration: the centers of gra$ity for each of the three elements of the political trinity? the critical $ulnerabilities for each of the three elements of the political trinity, and the three strategic seams binding the three elements together. (7) (U) C!#(!nents !f the Strateg%. %hile the final form and content of any strategy is difficult to forecast, there are certain components that should be incorporated to protect our own centers of gra$ity. (a) (U) E u&ati!n !f P!"i&% .a'ers. strategy has to ha$e a common understanding of the true nature of the underlying problem. 4resently we do not ha$e that shared $iew. ,enior administration officials who belie$e that 3they hate freedom3 and that 3they are criminals3 and who 3don:t thin&3 operational attac&s 3are emblematic of the -uslim world3 do not ha$e the necessary understanding of the true nature of the threat to orchestrate the strategic response. These comments indicate that intelligence is not ade1uately informing policy. (orrecting these misperceptions should be a priority. (b) (U) E u&ati!n !f the Pu-"i&. This will be a critical and sensiti$e initiati$e. %ithin our own strategic culture, there is a public mistrust of go$ernment information programs and e$en e#ceptional products such as the old Soviet Military Power series were met with media and public s&epticism. In the blac& and white struggle of %orld %ar II, the Why We Fight series ser$ed our information interests well. 0owe$er, the religious o$ertones of this ideological threat, when $iewed against the bac&drop of the @irst mendment, poses a uni1ue and sophisticated series of information problems. The inherent credibility issues and le$el of sophistication necessary for conducting this portion of a defensi$e strategy will re1uire the assistance of -adison $enue. (c) (U) E u&ati!n !f the .e ia. This is a critical component. The U.,. media are tactically focused and do not, or cannot, embrace the strategic picture This predilection for the tactical story, accompanied by a relati$ely new phenomenon of A2ews (hatter and TherapyB,

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derails strategic focus. (ompare the outrage two years after 4earl 0arbor $ice a degree of indifference after >*11. +ur strategic seam can be split by the A2ews, (hatter and TherapyB phenomenon as portrayed below. critical characteristic of any defensi$e strategy will be an intensi$e program of media education to preclude the destructi$e drumbeat associated with tactical focused reporting.

;. POC/ %illiam 8awthrop, ,cience pplications International (orporation, (ounterinteligence @ield cti$ity, (CD7) E>>*CFGC, %illiam.8awthropHcifa.mil .

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-uslim !urists agree that the purpose of fighting (2on*-uslims) is to either con$ert them to Islam to secure payment of jizya. ,ee Ibn )ushd, The Distinguished Jurists Primer, ol !, (8arnet 4ublishing /imited, )eading, U.: 1>>;): ;E;. +f the four traditions of war ((atholic, 'udaic, )ealist and Islamic) only Islam codifies as a reason to go to war the con$ersion or sub!ugation of others. @re1uently, when confronted with this obser$ation, readers as& A%hat about the (rusadesB effecti$ely betraying a lac& of understanding of the moti$ations behind the @irst (rusade. Three signal e$ents helped trigger the (hristian response to Islamic e#pansion Islam &nown as the @irst (rusade: the destruction of the 0oly ,epulture and the (hurch of the 2ati$ity at the hands of the ,enior Islamic (leric ruling o$er 'erusalem and the loss of -ans"i&ert in 1DC1.