Is Globalization Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble? A Critique of Five Key Debates in the Social Science Literature Author(s): Mauro F.

Guillen Source: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 27 (2001), pp. 235-260 Published by: Annual Reviews Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2678621 . Accessed: 27/02/2014 15:50
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Annu. Rev.Sociol.2001. 27:235-60 ? 2001 byAnnual All rights reserved Copyright Reviews.

Is GLOBALIZATIONCIVILIZING,DESTRUCTIVE
OR FEEBLE?A CRITIQUE OF FIVE KEY DEBATES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCE LITERATURE
TheWharton ofSociology, University ofPennsylvania, SchoolandDepartment 19104; e-mail:guillen@wharton.upenn.edu Philadelphia, Pennsylvania nation-state, modernity, global culture Key Words convergence, * Abstract The sociological,economic,political,and anthropological literatures This chapter are devoting attention to globalization. discussesthevarious increasing connotations of theterm and putsit in historical theoretical and perspective. Existing is organizedaroundfivekeyissues or questions: research on globalization empirical theauthority Is itreallyhappening? Does itproduceconvergence? Does itundermine different Is a global culture in themakof nation-states? Is globality from modernity? thatis sensitive to sociologyof globalization ing? A plea is made fora comparative local variations andresistance interest, mediatein therelationship and to how agency, betweenglobalization causes and outcomes. The bulk of theearthmustnot only be spherical,butnot large in comparison withthe size of otherstars. -Aristotle (384-322 BC), as quotedby Dreyer(1953, p. l 18)

MauroF.Guillen

INTRODUCTION
Globalization is one of themostcontestedtopics in the social sciences. Observers and theoristsof globalization have variously argued that the rapid increase in cross-border economic, social, technological,and culturalexchange is civilizing, or feeble,to borrowAlbertHirschman's(1982) celebratedmetaphors. destructive, Harold Levitt's"Globalization of Markets"(1983) or Kenichi Ohmae's Borderless and consumer World(1990) promiseboundlessprosperity joy as a resultof globalto thisview,thehistorian Paul ization,i.e. theglobal as civilizing.In sharpcontrast Century (1993) againstour lack Kennedywarnsin PreparingfortheTwenty-First to deal witha global world,while political economist Dani Rodrik of structures ringsa similarbell ofalarminHas Globalization Gone Too Far? (1997) concerning freeinternational economic and financialflows(see also Gilpin the increasingly interpretation 2000, Mittelman2000). As in the civilizing view, the destructive
0360-0572/01/081 1-0235$14.00 235

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GUILLEN rather albeit predicting harmful as leading to convergence, regards globalization or the to either thecivilizing Unliketheadherents than beneficial consequences. other namely, PaulHirst andGrahame scholars, destructive viewsofglobalization, in Question Wadein "Globalizain Globalization (1996), andRobert Thompson a that has notyetchallenged process (1996), see it as feeble tionandItsLimits" of the modem world. other fundamental features thenation-state and I first and its timing. the In thischapter define Then,I review globalization onglobalization, with toresearch ofthevarious socialsciences main contributions and critique thediscussion perspectives. I organize an emphasis on sociological Does it really happening? Is globalization around five keydebatesor questions: ofnation-states? Is globality authority Does itundermine the produce convergence? Is a globalculture inthemaking? different from modernity?

WHATIS GLOBALIZATION?
is a process crossby,andresulting in,increasing fueled Intuitively, globalization andculture (Heldetal ofgoods, information, services, money, people, border flows to Giddens Anthony (1990,p. 64, 1991,p. 21) proposes 1999,p. 16). Sociologist or "distanciation" between space andtime, as a decoupling regard globalization Mittelman scientist James David Harvey (1989) and political whilegeographer a of space and time, globalization entailsa "compression" (1996) observe that the oftheworld. ManuelCastells(1996,p. 92) emphasizes Sociologist shrinking whenhe defines it as "an economy of theglobaleconomy informational aspects to workas a unitin realtimeon a planetary scale."In a simiwith thecapacity chains," Gereffi about global"commodity Gary (1994) writes larvein, sociologist ona globalscale.Management scholar is coordinated Stephen whereby production as driven notbyforeign trade Kobrin globalization (1997,pp. 147-148)describes flows. Politbut scaleandinformation byincreasing technological andinvestment as the"increasing globalization ical scientist Robert Gilpin (1987,p. 389) defines ofnational intrade, andmacroeconomic polfinance, economies interdependence "refers that globalization RolandRobertson (1992,p. 8) argues icy."Sociologist ofthe andtheintensification ofconsciousness tothecompression ofthe world both Albrow as a whole."Also sociologist Martin global(1997,p. 88) defines world that havean influence as the"diffusion ofpractices, valuesandtechnology ization ofRobertson tocombine theperspectives onpeople'slivesworldwide." I propose togreater as a process interdepenandAlbrow, andso define leading globalization and social awareness denceand mutual amongeconomic, political, (reflexivity) in theworld, in general (Guillen2001, Held et al 1999, units and amongactors 1995,p. 63). 1996,pp. 63-66,Waters pp. 429-31,Petrella and linis also an ideology withmultiple meanings however, Globalization, itappears with sometimes looselyassociated eages.As Cox (1996) has observed, to economic and reand withtechnocratic solutions neoliberalism development also appearslinkedto form (Evans 1997,McMichael1996,p. 177). The term the networks and organizations human rights, cross-border defending advocacy

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GLOBALIZATION

237

orworld environment, women's rights, peace (Guidry etal 1999,Keck& Sikkink 1998).Theenvironmental movement, inparticular, hasraised thebanner ofglobalismin its struggle fora cleanplanet, as in its"Think Global,Act Local" slogan (Held et al 1999,pp. 376-413). Thus,globalization is often constructed as an impersonal and inevitable force in order tojustify certain policiesor behaviors,however praiseworthy someofthem might be. In a broader historical sense, Mazlish(1993,pp. 6-7) andRobertson (1992,pp. 68-71) cogently that not argue only capitalism oradvocacy movements butalso Christianity, Islam,andMarxism havemadeglobalclaimsandharbored globalpretensions. Hirsch & Fiss (2000) document that use oftheterm "globalization" inthepressappears associated with ofreference, multiple ideological frames "financial including market," "economic and"culture." efficiency," "negative effect," The start ofglobalization is also a contested issue(Heldetal 1999).One could that thedawnofhistory. The literature, argue globalization with begins however, has tended todatethestart ofglobalization intheexperience more recently ofthe West. Atoneendofthespectrum, historians havenoted theimportance ofthefirst oftheEarth in 1519-1521(Mazlish1993).World-system theocircumnavigation rists maintain that theexpansion ofEuropean in thesixteenth capitalism century marks thestart ofglobalization (Wallerstein 1974;see also Waters 1995,pp.2-4). Someeconomic historians totheturn ofthetwentieth as theheyday point century ofinternational trade andinvestment before the convulsions ofWorld WarI andthe Great threw theworld into Depression spiraling protectionism (Williamson 1996). Robertson that (1992,p. 179) argues globalization "tookoff"between 1875 and 1925with the"time-zoning oftheworld andtheestablishment oftheinternational thenear-global of theGregorian calendar and theadjustable dateline; adoption ofinternational seven-day week;andtheestablishment andsignaling telegraphic codes."Murphy ofinternational (1994) recounts the history tofoster organizations andcommunication since1850.Students of socialmovements for transportation theabolition ofslavery, offemale woman ortheprohibition circumcision suffrage, theemergence of contemporary transnational networks can arguethat advocacy be traced backtothesecond half ofthenineteenth century (Keck& Sikkink 1998, pp. 41-72). A third ofscholars ofglobalization starts theanalysis attheendofWorld group of colonies,the WarII, withthecomingof thenuclearage, theemancipation renewed of trade and investment, and theeconomic riseof Northeast expansion Asia (Gilpin1987,pp. 341-44, 2000, Guillen2001, Kennedy 1993,pp. 47, 50, McMichael1996).Thereis also justification for thestory ofglobalization telling with ofpax americana intheearly1970sorwith theunraveling therise beginning ofneoliberal in thelate 1970sandearly1980s.In a moreconceptually ideology and informed between thetrade way,Kobrin (1997, pp. 147-148) distinguishes of nineteenth-century investment internationalization and thenetwork linkages andinformation tiesof latetwentieth-century globalization (see also Baldwin& is no agreement itwas Martin as to whether 1999,Held et al 1999). Thus,there with andMercator, James Watt andCaptain Magellan Cook,NixonandKissinger,

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GUILLEN orThatcher andReaganthat globalization started or,to be more precise, that the ofglobalization tobegin. itshould be noted that the narrative ought Lastly, English wasfirst usedaround 1960initsworld-wide senseas opposed term "globalization" toitsmuch older meanings oftheglobalas something spherical, total, oruniversal (Waters 1995,p. 2). Definitions andtiming aside,oneofthepersistent problems afflicting thestudy ofglobalization is that itis far from a uniform, irreversible, andinexorable trend. is a fragmented, and Rather, globalization incomplete, discontinuous, contingent, in many wayscontradictory and puzzling process(Giddens2000, Gilpin2000, etal 1999,Heldetal 1999, p. 294,Guidry p.43 1).Table1presents economic, finanandbibliographical indicators ofglobalization. Themeasures cial,social, political, in 1980 arepresented for the1980-1998period notbecauseglobalization started butrather becauseofdatalimitations. direct investForeign (excluding portfolio) as a percentage ofGDP is 2.5 times than ment greater today twenty years ago-and inthedeveloping Tradehas also grown, four times world. nearly greater although notas fast as foreign investment. Financial hasgrown fastest: globalization Foreign turnover increased between toworld exchange tenfold 1979and1997relative GDP, andassetshaveincreased than twofold as andboth cross-border bankcredit more a percentage ofworld GDP. of social exchangeacrossborders are also increasing Some key indicators rapidly, including tourism andinternational telephone calls(see Table1). Internationalmigration, on therise,has notreached levelsrelative to though important is of world Also the trend the number population. bucking globalization growing nation-states-from Nations members in 1980 to 184 by 1998.And 157 United than everseemtobe reasserting their identities andyearning moreethnic groups
TABLE 1 Indicators ofGlobalization, 1980-1998 Indicators 1980 1985 6.5 4.9 8.2 5.2 31.9 68.1 72.1 54.6 1990 8.0 6.6 8.5 6.4 27.5 76.0 81.8 55.0 1995 10.1 9.1 15.4 6.3 32.3 87.5 90.1 77.3 1998
11.7h
10.5h

A. Economic Inward direct investment foreign stock, 4.6 % world GDP 3.8 % GDP Developedcountries, % GDP 4.3 Developing countries, Grossvalueaddedofforeign affiliates, % world GDP offoreign Exports affiliates, % total world exports ofgoods, Exports + imports % world non-service GDP Developedcountries, % non-service GDP Developing countries, % non-service GDP 72.7 76.6 60.9

16.6h 7.8h

35.6 92.1h
95.1h

83.2h

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GLOBALIZATION TABLE 1 (Continued) Indicators Exports + imports ofgoods& services, % world GDP Developedcountries, % GDP Developing countries, % GDP B. Financial Daily currency exchange turnover, % world GDP' Cross-border bankcredit stock, % world GDPb Cross-border banking % world assets,
GDpb

239

1980 40.0 40.2 39.1 0.7 13.9 13.7

1985 38.8 39.4 36.6 1.3 19.9 19.9

1990 38.9 38.3 41.0 3.8 34.3 28.1

1995 42.9 41.2 49.5 5.6 33.1 28.5

1998
45.2h

43.8"' 50.6"' 6.8

C. Social & Political International tourist arrivals, % world population Stockofinternational % world migrants, International calls,minutes permillion $ world GDPd Internet number hosts, (thousands)e Nation-states with in the membership United Nations International number organizations,
populationc

3.5 1.5
-

6.7 1.8 1354 5 157 24180

8.6 2.0 1600 617 159 26656

9.9 2.2 2174 12881 184 41722 19459h 184 48350

157
14273g

D. Bibliographical Literature on globalizatioh, annual entriesf: Abstracts 89 Sociological Econlit 19 64 & International PAIS (Politics Relations) 69 Historical Abstracts 6 Literature Anthropological Books inPrint 48
aDataarefor1979,1984,1989,1995,and 1998. bDataarefor1981,1986,1991and 1995.
CEstimates.

142 269 101 81 2 92

301 608 309 103 6 328

1068 1044 366 166 1 689

1009 924 698 157 34 589

dExcludes international calls using cellular orprivate networks. phones eDataarefor1986,1991,1996,and 1997. fArticles orbookswith thewords in thetitle, orabstract. "global"or"globalization" subject heading
91981. h1997.

Sources: World Investment Trade Statistics Baldwin and Report;International Yearbook;UN Statistical Yearbook; Martin of Sociology, Univer(1999:12); Tschoegl(1998); Vernon Princeton (1998:198); MiguelCenteno, Department PennLibrary Yearbook Databases. sity; ofInternational Organizations;

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GUILLEN to create their own state-Palestinians and Kurds, Basques and Catalans, Scots andWelsh, and Kashmiris, Corsicans and Quebecois(Friedman Tibetans 1994, Geertz1998,Robertson 1992,p. 98-108; forthedissenting view,see Rapoport 1996).Meanwhile, thenumber of international organizations has morethan trebled.Among international advocacy groups, thoseconcerned with human rights, theenvironment, Esperanto, women's rights, andworld peace havegrown fastest (Keck & Sikkink 1998,p. 11; see also Meyeret al 1997,Murphy 1994). And theinternet hasaccelerated cross-border exchange during the1990s,although less than twoorthree ofthe percent population hasaccesstoitinmost countries except richones(Guillen thevery & Suarez2001). It is perhaps ironic to observe that thefastest increase amongtheindicators included in Table 1 does notrefer to globalization butto theliterature itself, on globalization. As shown in Figure1, there has beenan explosion in thenumber ofarticles on globalization in theeconomic, andpolitical published sociological, literatures. The number ofbookson globalization has also increased steeply. The historical andanthropological havelagged literatures, bycontrast, behind. Among topayattention thesocialsciences, sociology was thefirst toglobalization. Socistarted tocarry numbers ofarticles onglobalization the ology journals large during induced earlyandmid1970s,primarily byworld-system theorizing (Wallerstein to summarize haveattempted theliterature 1974). Some authors (e.g. Held et al edited volumes havebeencompiled 1999,Sklair1991,Waters 1995),andseveral & Centeno (Dunning 1997,Featherstone 1990,Hargittai 2001,Mittelman 1996, Sakamoto1994,Mander & Goldsmith themostbewildering fea1996).Perhaps of theliterature ture is notits sheersize buttheremarkable of authors diversity that havecontributed toit,ranging from scholars orsocialtheorists postmodernist whorarely, ifever, inempirical research tonumber-crunching engage empiricists, andmanagement consultants. politicians,

FIVE KEY DEBATES

in thischapter The fivekeydebatesthat I identify are notan exhaustive listof a issuesin thevastand richliterature on globalization. Theycapture, however, broadspectrum of social,political, andcultural themes ofinterest to sociologists andother socialscientists. howdifferent Table2 shows authors themselves position inthefive One should notassume those onthesamesideofthefence keydebates. a particular each other on other issuesor regarding question actually agreewith that they approach theissuefrom thesameperspective. exactly

Is It Really Happening?
Mostof thebooksand articles in thischapter discussed assumethat the simply world is becoming moreglobal,that more interrelated. is, Myriad policymakers, andacademics take itas axiomatic that is infact publicists, globalization happening without their claimwith data(e.g. Ohmae1990,Naisbitt & Aburdene supporting

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GLOBALIZATION
1400

241

1200-

*
1000,

Sociological
Abstracts

Econlit

800

PAIS
600I

Books inPrint

400

200

Historical Abstracts

0 1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

of globalization. Figure 1 The literature

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GUJILLEN

TABLE 2 Fivekeydebates aboutglobalization Answers in theLiterature Debate 1. Is It Really Happening? Yes andAburdene Naisbitt 1990 Ohmae1990 Castells1996:66-147 Rodrik 1997:9 Held et al 1999 2000 Gilpin No 256-267 Krugman 1994:146-148, Berger 1996:7-8,11, 19-21 Hirst andThompson 1996:1-3,18-98 Wade 1996:66-84 etal 1998 Doremus 2001 Fligstein Giddens 1990:63-64,1991:21-22 andStrange 1991:1-2 Stopford Robertson 1992:27,145 Friedman 1994:210-211 Berger 1996:2-7,19-21 Boyer1996:33,58 Cox 1996:28,30 n. 1 Albrow 1997:86,144,149, 189 Garrett 1998:1-11,34-37,51, 74, Held et al 1999:431, 441 Guillen 2001 3. Does It Vernon 1971:249-258,1998: Undermine the 172-175 of Authority Kennedy 1993:53-64, Nation-States? 122-134,330 Mazlish1994:4 Sakamoto 1994:19,36 Waters 1995:96-123 Cox 1996:26-27 McMichael1996:197-207 Mander & Goldsmith eds. 1996 Strange 1996:4-6,189, 196-198 Evans 1997:82-87 Kobrin 1997:155-163 Rodrik 1997: 1-6,46-67, 85 Stryker 1998:7-8,14-15, 17, 32-33 Vernon 1998:172-175 Mosher1999:25,35 Vernon 1971:265-270 Cox 1987:254-259,1992:30-31 2000:315-319 Gilpin1987:389-406, Stopford andStrange 1991:1-2, 97-136 Hirst andThompson 1996:143-194 Panitch 1996:84-86 Pierson 1994:1-9 Sassen 1996:25-30 Wade 1996 Albrow1997:164,168 Meyer etal 1997:153,157 Garrett 1998:1-2,11, 107, 157-158, 1999 HuberandStephens 1999 Held et al 1999:440 0 Riain2000 2001 Fligstein
1999

2. Does It Bell [1973] Produce andHannan1979: Meyer Convergence? 13-15 Levitt 1983 Williamson 1996 Meyer etal 1997:145,148, 152-154,161

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GLOBALIZATION TABLE 2 (Continued) Answers in theLiterature: Debate: Yes No Giddens1990:63-64,1991:21-22 Mittelman 1996 Meyeretal 1997:150,164

243

Sklair1991:75-81 4. Is Globality 1992:27,138Different from Robertson 145, 1995 Modernity? Waters 1995 Castells1996 Albrow1997:4,33, 95-101, 144 Kobrin 1997:147-154 Held et al 1999:429-431 5. Is a Global inthe Culture Making? McLuhan1964 McLuhanandFiore1967 Levitt 1983 Sklair1991:75-81 Waters 1995:124-157 etal 1997:162 Meyer

Smith 1990 Mazlish1993:14,16 Friedman 1994 1996:4,12,32-43 Appadurai Cox 1996:27 Portes1997 Geertz1998:107-1 10 KeckandSikkink 210-211 1998:32-34, Held et al 1999:374 Zelizer1999 andBaker2000 Inglehart

Robert economist and policymaker Reich (1991), forexample, 1990). Political and companies no longer are disappearing that "national economies" proclaims havea nationality; many skeptics. only peopledo. Thereare,however, case for the feeble against globalization argument the best-documented Perhaps tiestotheLabour scientist with has beenmadebyPaul Hirst, an Oxford political the In a recent that & Thompson (1996,pp. 1-3, 18-98) argue book,Hirst Party. It is as a process: trend ofthelasttwenty has beenoverstated years globalization andtrade are inworld andforeign investment notunprecedented they say, history, andJapan. in theso-called triad-Western North concentrated America, Europe, butnotmore that is becoming more international In sum, theeconomy argue they Wade(1996,pp. 66-84) echoesthese criticisms: scientist Robert global.Political to thesize of mosteconomies(see also The volumeof tradeis smallrelative than investment is greater foreign 1994,pp. 146-48,256-67); domestic Krugman and multinationals locatemostoftheir owners, topmanagers, assets, investment; et al 1998); and vast in their homecountries R&D activities (see also Doremus Southand areas of theworldhave notbeen affected namely, by globalization, Central Asia,andthebulkofAfrica. The argument forthe feebleness of globalization is usefulin thatit proits to visionsandmyths of globalization videsan important corrective assuming

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GUILLEN and irreversibility. Thereare,however, twokeycounterarguments. inevitability Regarding theissueoftheheterogeneous spread ofglobalization acrosstheworld, Castells observes that theglobaleconomy is notmeant to (1996,p. 102) correctly itcomprises theentire Earth. ofactivity encompass Rather, onlycertain segments in bothdeveloped and developing countries (see also Kobrin1997). The second is that ofthefeeblethesis counterargument proponents focusalmost exclusively onthe economic andfinancial ofglobalization tothedetriment ofpolitical, aspects social,andcultural ones.Theliterature offers anddiscusses evidence insupport of andcultural that political globalization is,on thewhole, quite persuasive (Castells 1996,pp.66-147,Meyer & Hannan 1979,Louchetal 1998,Petrella 1996,pp.63theAIDS pandemic, andtheglobalization ofthe 66). In addition, globalwarming, in an increasingly mediahaveheightened ourawareness ofliving interconnected world (Held et al 1999).In sum,scholars thefeebleness ofglobalization arguing in debunking have madea contribution certain and assumptions abouta myths has all toooften process that beenuncritically reified. areperhaps However, they toowedded toa "monolithic" ofglobalization andoblivious tothenotion concept is a network that ofrelationships that creates mutual globality awareness.

Does It Produce Convergence?

A second contested issueintheliterature onglobalization itsconsehastodo with ofsocieties a uniform toward ofeconomic, quencesas totheconvergence pattern andevencultural Mostfamously in modernizapolitical, organization. expressed tiontheory, thespread ofmarkets andtechnology is predicted to cause societies to converge from their preindustrial past,although totalhomogeneity is deemed Thislineofthinking was advanced unlikely. the1950sand 1960sbyboth during andsociologists economists (Guillen 2001,Waters 1995,pp. 13-15,Albrow 1997, historians suchas Jeffrey Williamson p. 49). Economic (1996) havedocumented in income andlabormarkets thenineteenth and first convergence during century decadesofthetwentieth. DanielBell (1973) argued fora technologiSociologist ofpostindustrial societies. callydriven convergence Further fortheconvergence thesis comesfrom theworld-society support apinsociology. Intheir summaries ofanextensive research proach empirical program on theworldwide ofeducational andother forms ofstate spread systems activity, John andhis associates ofrationalandstudents that theexpansion Meyer argue ized stateactivities has acquired a momentum of itsown,largely unaffected by inpolitical cross-national differences structure oreconomic rates. growth Rather, thediffusion ofrationalized follows the"exigencies ofglobalsocialorsystems whoselogicandpurposes arebuilt intoalmost all states." is The result ganization that as a wholeshowsincreasing "theworld structural similarities ofform among societies without, however, soshowing increasing equalities ofoutcomes among cieties" & Hannan areseenas exhibiting (Meyer 1979, pp.3, 13-15).Nation-states structural there is a "decoupling between convergent similarity, although purposes and structure, intentions and results." researchers conWorld-society arguethat comesbothfrom theworld-culture of rationalized and from formity modernity domestic that makeclaimson thestate the"consensus" overthe groups following

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GLOBALIZATION

245

formal acceptance of"matters suchas citizen andhuman rights, thenatural world anditsscientific investigation, socioeconomic development, andeducation." They evenpresent totheeffect evidence that andreligious nationalism fundamentalism "intensify isomorphism morethan it"(Meyer they resist et al 1997,pp. 145,148, 152-154,161). Social andpolitical as wellas historians theorists haveelaborated a comprehensivecritique ofthepresumed convergent consequences ofglobalization. Political historian Robert Cox (1996,p. 28, 30 n. 1) writes that "thesocialandethical content oftheeconomy" maybe organized differently in various parts oftheworld." Historian BruceMazlish(1993,p. 4) argues "no singleglobalhistory that is anticipated." Sociologist Anthony Giddens (1990,pp. 64, 175) adds an interesting twist whenasserting that "is a processofuneven globalization development that fragments as itcoordinates. is notnecessarily, [.. .] The outcome orevenusually, a generalized setof changes in a uniform butconsists in mutuacting direction, In another allyopposed tendencies." book(1991,pp. 21-22), Giddens elaborates: hastobe understood as a dialectical inwhich "Globalization events phenomenon, atonepole ofa distanciated relation often orevencontrary produce divergent occurrences atanother" (see also Giddens 2000,pp.30-31,Heldetal 1999,pp.431, 441). In a similar Jonathan Friedman vein,anthropologist (1994,pp. 210-11) asthat serts is theproduct ofcultural globalization fragmentation as much as itis the of modernist result and that homogeneity, "whatappearsas disorganization and often realdisorder is notanytheless systemic andsystematic." These social andpolitical haveneither theorists, however, engagedin empirical testing of their norbothered propositions to look forsupport in theexistThereis, though, a considerable ingliterature. research backbodyofempirical that or at least ingtheantithesis globalization anddiversity produces divergence does notundermine national scholar policiesandinstitutions. John Management andpolitical economist SusanStrange that the Stopford (1991,pp. 1-2) document interaction between multinationals andstates has produced increasingly complex in outcomes, a divergence whileDoremuset al (1998) showthatdifferentiated ofinnovation, national andinvestment remain inplace. systems trade, firmly Political scientist Garrett Geoffrey (1998,pp. 1-4, 10-11,34-37, 51, 74) has contributed themostextensive and solid body of empirical perhaps evidence, itrefers to theexperience oftheadvanced industrial democracies. though mostly in thecontext He argues anddemonstrates that of a globaleconomy empirically at least twopathsare possiblefornational and social policymakers: economic adherence either to neoclassical or to social democratic economics corporatism. Garrett's refutes viewsaboutconvergence, instead analysis simplistic proposing to viewthebalanceof left-right institutions as political powerand labormarket thetwokeyvariables in a contingent ofeconomic Thebest analysis performance. macroeconomic is obtained whenthetwovariables arealigned with performance each other. Forexample, redistributive andinterventionist with policiescombine labormarket institutions to produce macroeconomic encompassing performance interms ofgrowth andunemployment that matches orevensurpasses theachieveoflaissez-faire ments with weaklabormarket institutions. He policiescombined

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GUiLLEN that there are"enduring ineconomic concludes cross-national differences" policyandengagement oftheglobaleconomy. In a broader making study encompassing countries overonehundred during the1985-1995period, Garrett (1999) finds no ingovernment convergence expenditure patterns as a result ofglobalization. What hashappened overthelastdecadeis that many governments havepursued policies that buffer their citizens from thevagaries ofglobalmarkets and,in thepresence offree andknowingly capital mobility, interest to willingly accepted higher rates keepcapital athome. ofthevarieties ofcapitalism, Students havelongarmostly political scientists, firms andcountries guedthat pursue different ofincorporation into paths the global economy. Thus, German, andAmerican firms arecompetitive in French, Japanese, inthesameindustry theglobaleconomy, butrarely andmarket segment. German excelathigh-quality, firms industries suchas advanced maengineering-intensive chinetools,luxury and specialty chemicals automobiles, (Soskice 1998,Streeck 1991);French firms atlarge-scale technical undertakings suchas high-speed trains, ornuclear satellite-launching rockets, & Salais 1997,pp. 131-48); power (Storper Japanese firms at mostcategories of assembled household goods,namely, apconsumer and automobiles pliances, electronics, (Gerlach1992); andAmerican at software, or biotechnology firms financial & Salais 1997, services, (Storper pp. 174-88). have also presented Comparative organizational and sociologists qualitative to theeffect evidence that firms different modesofeconomic quantitative pursue action andadopt different forms organizational depending on theinstitutional and socialstructures oftheir home countries evenas globalization increases. Moreover, havecollected dataon newly industrialized countries in addition tothemost they a number advanced ones.Orru etal (1997) draw ofsystematic comparisons among East Asian andWestern European that countries, demonstrating uniquenational oforganization notonlypersist overtime totheinterpatterns butalso contribute national of firms. competitiveness Guillen (2001) presents systematic case-study andquantitative evidence that firms andlaborunions inArgentina, demonstrating intheir South ofbehavior, Korea,andSpaindiverged patterns organizational form, andgrowth evenas their becamemoreintegrated with theglobal homecountries thepost-World WarII period. economy during Takentogether, theempirical evidence andpolitical provided by sociologists incross-national scientists wellthe case for oratleast supports diversity, resilience, in themidst of globalization. It must be admitted, that worldpatterns however, also havea point, andone that is well supported researchers society byempirical evidence. Thereason behind these irreconcilable results seemingly empirical might be that research has mademeasurements at levelsof analysis and world-society abstraction than thefiner-grained higher ofcomparative and analysis sociologists scientists. political It should be notedthat somesociologists thevery terms oftheconverreject that without the gencedebateby arguing globalization homogenizes destroying local andtheparticularistic. Forexample, Viviana Zelizer(1999) argues that "the inmuch andproliferates the samewayas other ... differentiates economy culturally

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ofsociallifedo,without spheres losing national andeveninternational connectedness."Thus, globalization is notseenas precluding orcontradicting diversity. Like Zelizer, Robertson (1995,pp. 34-35) seestheglobalas the"linking oflocalities." themost controversial Perhaps aspect oftheconvergence debate hastodo with the ofglobalization impact oninequality across andwithin countries. Theevidence indicates that there unambiguously is today more acrosscountries inequality than ten, twenty, fifty orevenonehundred years ago. Stunningly, thegapinpercapita income between richanddeveloping countries has grown five-fold between 1870 and 1990 (Pritchett 1997,Temple1999).Thereare,however, several noteworthy developing countries that havemanaged toclosehalf ormore ofthegapsince1960, e.g. SouthKorea,Taiwan,and Ireland. Veryfewdeveloping countries, though, have consistently grown faster thanthemostadvancedones since 1980. Thus, development levelsacrosscountries appearnotto be converging as a result of globalization. tocross-national itis notclearwhether increased Bycontrast inequality, foreign in substantially trade and investment thelasttwenty during yearshaveresulted or unemployment within countries. has higher wage inequality Wage inequality in mostadvanced risen countries during thelastthree decades.In a review essay, several totheclaimthat Kapstein (2000) presents counterarguments globalization hasbeenthe causeofincreased is too that trade major wagepolarization, including smalla percentage ofGDP tohavea large andthat impact, is technological change theultimate cause ofwagepolarization. In agreement with of Kapstein's reading theevidence, Baldwin& Martin theempirical (1999,p. 21) summarize literature as follows: all studies find someimpact oftrade on thelabormarket in "Virtually both theUnited States andEurope. offindings, is wide.Some Therange however, find that trade accounted for noneofthewagegap,whileothers virtually assigned 100 percent ofthegap to trade. The consensus is perhaps 10-20 percent." range As opposedto wage disparities, overallindicators of incomeinequality within countries have notincreased the last and there is evidence during thirty years, andbecomeincorporated into that whencountries indicating groweconomically theglobaleconomy fall Discussions and rates (Deininger & Squire1996). poverty calculations oftheimpact ofglobalization on wageandincome within inequality tradeand investment countries shouldtakeintoaccountthatwhileforeign are domestic andprocesses still matter. powerful forces, politics and indiIn sum,globalization does notseemto compelgovernments, firms, as vidualsto converge in their of While this be patterns behavior. may regarded a welcomeaspect,it is important to bearin mindthatincreasing globalization has coincided intime with an exacerbation ofincome acrosscountries, disparities andthat at leastpart ofincomeandwage inequality ofthegreater within degree is countries due toincreased trade andinvestment. foreign

theAuthority ofNation-States? Does It Undermine

A third is whether thisprocess thetopicof globalization keyissue surrounding has outgrown thegovernance structures oftheinternational of states and system

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GUILLEN undermined theauthority of thenation-state. For example, economist Raymond that the ofmultinational Vernon (1971,pp.249,265-70,284)haslongargued spread creates "destructive and that there corporations political tensions," is a "needto reestablish balance"between political and economic institutions. Historian Paul that arelosingcontrol, Kennedy (1993,pp. 53-64, 122-34) asserts governments andthat erodestheposition of laboranddeveloping globalization countries, and degrades theenvironment. "Today'sglobalsociety," he writes, "confronts thetask ofreconciling andeconomic with technological change integration traditional political structures, national consciousness, socialneeds, institutional arrangements, and habitual waysof doingthings" (Kennedy 1993,p. 330). In a similar vein, that bothchallenges theautonKobrin (1997,pp. 157, 159) argues globalization and"raisesquestions aboutthe omyorindependent decision-making ofthestate in terms of sovereignty in itsexternal senseof a system ofmumeaning ordered that exclusive AndMazlish(1993,p. 4) argues tually territoriality." globalhistory is an attempt to "transcend thenation-state as thefocusofhistory." International relation's scholar Yoshikazu Sakamoto (1994,p. 19, 36) andpoin arguing that liticalscientist Robert Cox (1996,p. 26-27) concur globalization theregulatory ofinternational andreduce generates problems governance power ofstates. creates tenForRodrik (1997,p. 1-6), globalization socialandpolitical Andpolitical sionswithin andacross nation-states. theorist Michael Mosher (1999, a successful theboundary p. 35) asks,"is there wayofreconciling transgressing theboundary character of markets with activities of nation-states?" maintaining He further notesthatglobalization has placed two liberalpractices-theliberalismofthemarket andtheliberalism of democratic a collision citizenship-on the dilemma ofwhether "moral concerns atthe national border" course, raising stop (Mosher1999,p. 25). havealsojoinedthe ofstate ForWaters chorus Sociologists doomsayers. (1995, is an "attenuation ofthestate," a riseofinternational pp. 96-123),there organizaanda trend toward more"fluid" international relations. McMichael(1996, tions, pp. 197-207) also sees a declineof thestate.For Albrow(1997, p. 164), "the nation-state has failedto confine within itsboundaries, bothterritorial sociality and categorical. The sheerincrease in cross-national of ties,thediversification of socialorganimodesofpersonal andthemultiplication offorms relationships nature thenation-state as zation demonstrate theautogenic ofthesocialandreveal Evans(1997, timebound form." In a more justanother empirically grounded way, outthat thestate undermines becauseitsassociated pp.82-87) points globalization neoliberal is against thestate andnotbecauseglobalization is inextricaideology ifthere thestate. He further that thestate a comeback blyagainst argues maystage is a "return of theideological or a transformation of thestateand a pendulum," ofnewelements ofstate-society development synergy. The analysis economist SusanStrange is perhaps themost byBritish political articulation of theposition that theinternational of nationsophisticated system andthe ina globalworld. states nation-state itself arecoming under fire She writes aboutthe"declining ofstates" andpreempts several criticisms. authority possible she notesthatstateinterventionism is on therise,although in relatively First,

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matters. marginal Second,she arguesthatthereare morestatesin theworld, after especially 1989,butthat mostof thenewones are weak and lack control. Third, shepoints outthat theeffectiveness oftheEastAsianstate inorchestrating II economic was onlypossiblein a post-World growth War order in which protectionism ofthedomestic market was acceptable andmature technologies were available(Strange 1996,pp. 4-6). She further observes three powershifts in the globalworld, namely, from weaktostrong states, from states tomarkets, andfrom labormarkets to financial withsomepowerevaporating markets, or dispersing (Strange 1996,p. 189). Not surprisingly, thosewho arguethat globalization is a feebleprocessalso maintain thatit can be easilyhandledby nation-states. For example, Hirst& and Wade assert that states can (1996,pp. 143-49,170-94) (1996) Thompson cope withglobalization, have lost some freedom although they of action, especially financial flows. Feebleproponents, arenotalonechallenging concerning however, thenotion that the globalization undermines nation-state. has longmaintained that theglobalarenais a "playground" Macrosociology for where for andpolitical and states, they compete economic, military, supremacy survival. or theinternational farfrom Thus,theworld-system arena, threatening fosters them international states, actually (Wallerstein 1974, Tilly1992).Neorealist relations scholar Robert Gilpin (1987,pp. 389-406,2000,pp. 51, 319-23) points outthat reinforces theimportance ofdomestic as countries globalization policies, inregionalization, sectoral andmercantilistic in engage protectionism, competition tochanges in theinternational ofeconomic location response activities, resulting in a "mixedsystem," increasingly globalizedand at thesame timefragmented the (see also Berger 1996,pp. 7-2 1). A related, though distinct, argument against loss of state comesfrom presumed powerin thewakeof globalization political scientist Leo Panitch that (1996,p. 84-86).He rightly argues "today's globalization is authored and is primarily aboutreorganizing rather thanbypassing by states them" as Cox (1992, (see also 0 Riain2000,Poulantzas 1974,p. 73). Moreover, notawayfrom thestatebutwithin the pp. 30-31) observes, "powerhas shifted i.e. from orlabor ministries towards ministries andcentral state, industry economy notas passive banks."And sociologist Sean 0 Riain (2000, p. 205) sees states whether outofnecessity ordesire." as "adapting, pawnsbutrather Another influential socialscientist, SaskiaSassen(1996,pp.25-30),maintains that thestate doesnotlosesignificance. there is a redefinition ofthemodern Rather, ofsovereignty andterritoriality, a "denationalizing ofnational features territory." Cox (1987,pp. 254-59) argues that a transformation ofthe induces globalization notits diminution. & Strange state, Stopford (1991, pp. 1-2, 97-136) examine thenewpossibilities forstate action in theglobaleconomy andconclude that its rolehas actually becomemagnified andmorecomplex (see also Held et al 1999, to mostpolitical thenation-state is pp. 436-44). According scientists, therefore, aliveandwell, andthe order is unlikely tobereplaced Westphalian bya fragmented, ofglobalization, medieval one.A keyeffect has beentheriseofglobal however, cities-New York, roleandstature transcend London, Miami, Singapore-whose the inwhich nation-state tobe located they happen (Choietal 1996,Sassen1991).

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GUWLLEN Finally, theworld-society viewalso rejects theclaimthat globalization undertheexpansion mines nation-states. Noting ofstate bureaucracies sinceWorld War et al (1997,p. 157) write II, Meyer that "globalization certainly poses newprobitalso strengthens lems for states, but the world-cultural principle that nation-states aretheprimary with actors charged andmanaging those identifying problems on of their behalf societies." This argument is strikingly similar to theone offered byPanitch (1996,pp. 84-86) andPoulantzas (1974, p. 73). The modemnationstate, world-society scholars conclude, "mayhaveless autonomy than earlier but itclearly has more to do" (Meyer et al 1997,p. 157). The question ofwhether globalization undermines theauthority ofthenationstatecomesbestto lifewhenexamining theimpact of globalization on theviof thewelfare state.Rodrik ability (1997, pp. 49-67) arguesthatglobalization putsdownward on government forredistribution pressure spending andwelfare, theinteraction andthat oftrade riskand openness calls formorewelfare spending,butgovernments havetrouble themoney, an argument that finding Vernon (1998,pp. 172-175) finds persuasive. Stryker (1998,pp. 7-8, 14-15, 17,32-33) oftheevidence in that summarizes herassessment on globalization placeslimits a lossofpower for theworking expansionary policies, represents class,andcauses welfare state retrenchment. thechallenge According to thesesocial scientists, is "to engineer a new balancebetween and market society, one that will continue to unleashthecreative of private energies without the entrepreneurship eroding socialbasisofcooperation" (Rodrik havebecome 1997,p. 85). Thesearguments conventional wisdom neoliberal andjournalists. among ofpolicymakers Gloomy, ten forecasts theinability ofEuropean unsubstantiated, about welfare states topay for generous socialbenefits havebecomecommonplace sincetheearly1980s. Other scientists and sociologists, see things differpolitical however, utterly Political scientist Paul Pierson that thewelfare ently. state (1994,p. 1-9) argues has declined notso muchas a result ofglobalization butbecauseofsuchindirect actions ofconservative as reductions intherevenue governments base ofthestate andattacks ofinterest Thisis anargument onthestrength labor. groups, especially that Fligstein (2001)andGilpin Garrett (2000,pp.312-15)endorse. (1998,pp. 1-2, 11, 107, 132-33,157-58) empirically demonstrates theviability ofsocialdemoin theforms cratic evenwith to globalization of corporatism increasing exposure trade and capitalmobility. it is possibleto win cross-border He also proves that with elections redistributive andinterventionist andthat better economic policies, in terms of GDP growth and unemployment with performance obtains, though than inflation inthelaissez-faire countries Garrett higher (United States, Britain). that is compatible with macroeco(1998,p. 157)concludes "biggovernment strong nomic andthat do notdominate In a direct markets rebuttal performance" politics. ofRodrik dataonmore than100countries (1997),Garrett (1999) analyzes during the1985-1995period tofind that toglobalization doesnot reincreasing exposure ducegovernment Political scientist andsociologist Huber John spending. Evelyne conclusion that the welfare is compatible Stephens state with (1999) echoGarrett's globalcapitalism, do admit that socialdemocratic although they policiesaretoday

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moreconstrained than in theso-called "goldenage" ofthe1950sand 1960s(see also Western 1997). ForGarrett, Huber, andStephens andfor Fligstein thewelfare state is perfectly viableunder conditions ofglobalization. Moreover, itmaybe ablesimultaneously to deliversocial well-being and enhancenational competitiveness. Thus,they reject thetradeoff that neoliberals see between welfare expenditures andeconomic under ofglobalization. In spiteoftheexcellent, competitiveness conditions wellsupported research bythese authors, however, thedebate inthemediaandamong theworld politicians throughout remains heavily tilted in favor ofthoseblaming thewelfare for andvarious state declining competitiveness socialills.

Is Globality Different from Modernity?

the difficult hastodo with whether Perhaps most debate surrounding globalization itis merely a continuation ofthetrend toward orthebeginning ofa new modernity era.On onesideofthefence, Giddens that is (1990,pp.63,64) argues "modernity inherently globalizing," andthat "globalization [makes] themodesofconnection orregions between different socialcontexts acrosstheearth's becomenetworked surface as a whole." Thisviewfollows from the of"disembedding" directly concept or"thelifting out"of socialrelations from local contexts ofinteraction andtheir a restructuring acrosstimeand space,"whichGiddens(1990, p. 21) considers prerequisite for modernization. World-society scholarship takes sideswith Giddens on thispoint: in a "sharing" Globalization results ofmodernity acrosstheworld etal 1997,pp. 150,164). (Meyer side of thefence, Martin Albrow(1997, On theother British social theorist that is a "transformation, nota culpp. 4, 33, 95-101, 144) argues globalization andthe"transition to a newerarather than theapogeeoftheold." He mination," a stark distinction as the ofpractical ratiobetween proposes modernity imposition rest oftheworld theagency ofthestate andthe mechanism nality uponthe through ofthe ofthemarket, ideas to encompass thediversity thegeneration ofuniversal "theboundlessness of culture and promotes and globality as it restored world," rather than hotheendless anddiversification ofcultural renewability expression ofglobalization also orhybridization." Other noted socialtheorists mogenization insofar thesamedistinction support (Robertson 1992,pp.27, 138-145),especially for "The politics of identity substitutes as themodern-nation state is concerned: thepolitics ofnation-building" (McMichael1996,p. 234). is a central The debateovertherelationship between andglobality modernity If globality one forsociologists. is merely theresult ofan intensification ofmodthen therecent in thenumber ofbooksandarticles on this ernizing trends, surge tobe There a keytheoretical canhardly bejustified. subject is,however, argument madeinfavor is different from oftheviewthat globality modernity. ModernityWestern likethe Mercator anoutgrowth ofthe worldview. distorting projection-is theterms For reasonsof theoretical one shouldreserve consistency, "globalizaand to denote, tion," "global,"and "globality" respectively, processes, qualities,

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GUWLLEN byanyonemodel, paradigm, ordominated conditions that arenotsetintomotion a multiplicity In itsbroadest is about ofconceptions, sense, globality orworldview. the proliferation ofcrosshegemony; itis about notabout cultural orparadigmatic social,andcultural nature (Guillen political, national network tiesofaneconomic, inthecase ofauthors is especially germane 2001,Heldetal 1999).Thiscriticism process-neoliberals tobe aninevitable andsweeping whoconsider globalization inparticular-as out. pointed andMarxists Fligstein (2001) has aptly a distinction between globalKobrin Finally, (1997,pp. 147-48)hasproposed period ofmodem expansion century andtheprevious ization in thelatetwentieth is usefulempirically. The international of economy of theworldeconomy that geographical national century "links discrete, mutually exclusive, thenineteenth the flowsof tradeand investment." By contrast, markets cross-border through ofthelatetwentieth is driven scale of bytheincreasing century globaleconomy offirms alongthevalue-added thesurge incross-border collaboration technology, flows. ofinformation Thus,globalization integration chain, andthecross-border arefused "national markets because, this time around, has "substantive meaning" linked rather than acrossborders" (Kobrin1997,p. 148,see also transnationally Held etal 1999,pp. 429-31).

in theMaking? Is a GlobalCulture
has themost andcontroversial ofthedebates aboutglobalization Perhaps popular the of culture. there are a few scholars who only todo with rise a global Actually, is in themaking. The idea goes back to Marshall that a globalculture maintain & McLuhan's ofthe"globalvillage"(McLuhan1964,McLuhan concept slippery marketing researchers (Levitt 1983) upbysomeinfluential Fiore1967),later picked that theworld was becoming populated bycosmopolitan increasingly whoargued thata "cultureconsumers. Leslie Sklair(1991, pp. 75-81) writes Sociologist of the images, andtheaesthetic by symbols, ideology of consumerism"-driven theworld some andis having andtheself-image-has spread throughout lifestyle andeven thestandardization of tastes anddesires, momentous including effects, thefalloftheSovietorder. effects of Other sociologists, however, argue againstthe homogenizing differentiation should thatconsumer mass consumerism. Zelizer(1999) writes in theUS economy differentiaandpositsthat with segregation notbe confused can haveat the withconnection: "thesame consumer product tionis combined to distinZelizerurgessociologists samemoment universal andlocal meaning." at the thephenomenon ofworldwide diffusion andtheexperience guishbetween even as globalization morediverse receiving end,whichseemsto be growing intensifies anthropologist Arjun Ap(see also Held et al 1999,p. 374). Similarly, that "individuals and groups seekto annexthe padurai(1996, pp. 4, 21) argues ofthemass their ownpractices ofthemodem," andthat "consumption globalinto mediaworldwide selectivity, and,ingeneral, agency." resistance, irony, provokes & Baker dataover the1981-1998 cross-national attitudinal period, Inglehart Using

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in "paththough cultures andvalueschangeovertime, (2000) find that national about arguments thanconvergent ways.Even world-society dependent" rather choice and responsibility" (Meyer& of educated individual the"worldculture Howa globalculture ofannouncing a la McLuhan. Hannan 1979,p. 3) stopshort together world-culture as binding society and individuals ever, they do describe of(imperfectly) egalitarian justiceandparticipatory rep"byrationalized systems (Meyeret al and social interaction" polity, culture, resentation, in theeconomy, that thespreadof themass media researchers havefound 1997,p. 162). Other (Keck & advocacy groups to account fortheriseof cross-border is notenough ofmajor aspects "globalgovernance" Sikkink 1998,pp.32-34,210-11),although has beenon therisesince1850(Murphy 1994). ofcross-border communication andhistorians havenotedtheriseof whatmodPoliticaland social theorists as evidence the riseofa global against ernists would call"particularistic" identities a "resurgent afproducing culture. Cox (1996, p. 27) writes aboutglobalization a cultural Waters firmation of identities," whereas (1995, pp. 124-57) contrasts of muand consumption production and "religious mosaic"with globalcultural "ethnic feeling is Mazlish(1993, p. 14) notesthat sic,images, and information. can there be on the a powerful asks,"Whatcounterpart bond,"and skeptically "globalculture" scientist DeborahYashar(1999) rejects globallevel?"Political with that globand"globalcitizenship" butalso finds fault theargument concepts of alization hasinduced theproliferation ofethnic movements. In hercomparison inLatinAmerica, Yashar demonstrates that no asmovements clearly indigenous account for social,ornormative-can political, pectofglobalization-economic, the changes theriseofethnic-based activism sincethe1960s.Rather, globalization their claims. making characteristics ofthestate structures that activists facewhen forassessing the creates an unusually richlaboratory Cross-border migration of the term rise a globalculture. Portes (1997,p. 3) proposes Sociologist Alejandro ofimmigrants that communities" torefer tocross-border networks "transnational in also Portes herenorthere' but bothplaces simultaneously" are "'neither (see exhibit different etal 1999).Different transnational origins, communities, however, a monolithic andthey do notform andproblems, globalclass certainly features, to Portes, Friedman citizens. of cosmopolitan (1994) acceptsthebasic Similarly andZelizerbut of cultural byAppadurai, Smith, notion fragmentation proposed of societies cannot be correctly that in today'sworldtheexistence tribal argues In his in networks. how are embedded without global understood explaining they in must be seen a globalcontext. cultural diversity view, theidea of theemergence of Some of themostpersuasive against arguments the He that Clifford Geertz. observes a globalculture comefrom anthropologist interconmore more thoroughly world is "growing both divided, globalandmore itis that andmoreintricately at thesametime[ ...] Whatever nected partitioned it the is not inborderless and globalvillage defines deepgoing capitalism identity offamillikethe recurrence but more ondeepgoing something matters, agreements whatever the notion that else iardivisions, standing threats, arguments, persisting somehow maintained" the order of difference must be (Geertz 1998, mayhappen,

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GUILLEN pp. 107-110).Like Geertz, sociologist Anthony Smith is skeptical andnotesan interesting "initial problem" with theconcept of"globalculture": "Can we speak of 'culture' in thesingular? If by 'culture' is meant a collective modeof life,or a repertoire ofbeliefs, valuesandsymbols, we can onlyspeakofculstyles, then different tures, never justculture; fora collective modeof life[.. .] presupposes in a universe modesandrepertoires ofmodesandrepertoires. Hence,theideaofa 'globalculture' is a practical ininterplanetary terms" (Smith impossibility, except 1990,p. 171). The ultimate question abouttheallegedriseofa globalculture has to do with is emerging. Thediffusion ofEsperanto not whether a globallanguage hascertainly delivered and the"English-as-global-language" argument on earlyexpectations, seemsequallyfar-fetched and indefensible. As Mazlish(1993, p. 16) observes, a sort to "is becoming oflingua franca there areserious limitations English [but] of a globalculture." English theuse ofEnglish as thedailylanguage Moreover, in partsof theUnitedStatesand is beingchallenged as thedominant language than users theUnited Kingdom. Even on theInternet, fewer 50 percent of world as the and theproportion is dropping steadily knowEnglishas a first language, It is also instructive theworld. torecallthat the newmedium diffuses throughout mostsuccessful worldlanguage ever, Latin,evolvedintoa mosaicof Romance languages after spreading in itsvarious vulgarized forms throughout theterritory oftheRomanEmpire. theemerSmith (1990,pp. 185-86) notesthat, rather than what heldtogether we are genceof a "global"culture by theEnglishlanguage, is theemergence atoddsorinconof"culture areas"-not necessarily witnessing Russian, flict with eachother, as Huntington (1996) wouldhaveit.Thus,Spanish, ofcerArabic, French, Kiswahili, andChinese havebecometheshared languages taingroups, orpopulation strata acrosscountries locatedin specific communities oftheworld, LatinAmerica, theCIS, theArabworld, Subsaharan regions namely, EastAfrica, andSouth EastAsia,respectively. Africa,

TOWARD A COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBALIZATION

theoretical and The social scienceliterature on globalization contains important answers tothefive haveprovided different Scholars empirical disagreements. very Thebalanceofopinion tobe tilted, discussed in this keydebates chapter. appears Mostresearch either assumes ordocuments that is indeed however. globalization oftheworldandmostempirical studies-with thenotable happening, exception in political, society approach-do notfind convergence social,or organizational as a result of globalization. The mostpersuasive work to date patterns empirical that undermines thenation-state norerodes indicates globalization perse neither that theviability of thewelfare state.Some empirical evidence also documents it seemsthatno suchthing as a is different from globality modernity. Finally, is emerging. globalculture

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to thedebate has contributed sociology social sciences, Relative to theother havedeveloped in three socialtheorists ways.First, overglobalization important ofglobalization. Although nature andepochal implications anunderstanding ofthe or is a continuation ofmodernity is no agreement as towhether globalization there thethere is anincipient that outlines indetail what arethemain bodyofwork not, to sociologists havecalledattention Moreover, oretical andproblems. perspectives in addition toitsecoandaesthetic aspects ofglobalization reflexive, thecultural, 1990,1991, (Albrow 1997,Castells1996,Giddens dimensions nomic andpolitical 1995).Second,world-society Guillen 1992,Sklair1991,Waters 2001,Robertson and a macrophenomenological approach toglobalization scholars havedeveloped andthey have institutional theoretical foundation, the nation-state basedona sound theentire their evidence encompassing empirical viewwith systematic supported sociologists comparative etal 1997).Third, & Hannan1979,Meyer world (Meyer andsimon cross-national difference effects aboutglobalization's havetheorized evidence in theforms ofbothrichcase empirical ilarity. Theyhavealso offered and quantitative studies analyses(Guillen2001, Orruet al 1997). Sociologists, that histheimportant contributions economic needtocontinue reading however, andanthropologists aremaking scientists, management scholars, political torians, pheand empirical study of sucha complexand multifaceted to thetheoretical as globalization. nomenon globalization, indicate that in thischapter andcritique presented The analysis the nature However, oftheworld. far from a feeble is changing phenomenon, being further one.Although itis neither an invariably civilizing force nora destructive is already evidence available to enough is warranted, there investigation empirical a monolithic nor is neither either extreme (Held et al 1999). Globalization reject societal Itsimpact acrosscountries, sectors, and an inevitable varies phenomenon. oneneedstobe Itis contradictory, evenhaphazard. Therefore, time. discontinuous, andunintended One also needs about itsunexpected consequences. open-minded in shaping it. and resistance take into account the role that play agency, interest, to not Pieterse has does necessarily pose As out, globalization pointed (1996,p. 556) it begs to be engaged, and celebration. a choicebetween condemnation Rather, form (Geertz1998). comprised, given research. We arein invites additional certainly Thecomplexity ofglobalization and the need of theoretical work to cultural, further political, clarify economic, great with each other. We interact of globalization andhowthey aesthetic dimensions that move that the micro-macro i.e. lack theoretical gap, also perspectives bridge theindustry, from to thenation-state, theworld-system acrosslevelsof analysis of the and disagreements Many empirical community, organization, group. sector, atwhich duetothe levelsofanalysis different intheliterature various areprimarily will us to more gather researchers Understanding globalization require operate. still know and effects. We better data its and about myriad causes, manifestations, on such causes it and whatare its consequences aboutwhatexactly verylittle social as organizational variables structures, authority patterns, keysociological need to and social movements, to namebuta few.And sociologists inequality,

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GUWLLEN so that organizations work hard on government agencies andother data-gathering at various they paymoreattention in their surveys andcensusesto relationships levelsofaggregation. andthecomplexity Given theinfancy ofourefforts tounderstand globalization to asknotonlyforan intensification ofour ofthephenomenon, itseemssensible alsofor a comparative approach tothesociology of interdisciplinary awareness but enterprise (Smelser globalization. Comparing lies at theheart ofthesociological workin thedual sense 1976,Tilly 1984). We need to engagein comparative of usingmultiple methods of datacollection and analysis, and of applying our at various andempirical toolsto a variety ofresearch settings defined theoretical and similarities acrosssuchsettings ought to levelsof analysis. The differences to whichthecauses and effects of give us a handleon thepatterns according toanother. Without a comparative approach, globalization change from onesetting as puzzling andcontradictory as theliterature onglobalization promises toremain thephenomenon itself.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Center was funded from theJones attheWharton School Thisresearch bya grant I and a fellowship from the JohnSimon Guggenheim MemorialFoundation. RandallCollins, Paul DiMaggio, thank Howard Aldrich, MiguelAngelCenteno, Clifford Eszter VitHenisz, Albert Hirschman, Geoffrey Garrett, Geertz, Hargittai, John Steve BruceKogut, John Marshall Meyer, Evelyne Huber, Kimberly, Kobrin, SandraSuarez,Gabriel Meyer, James Mittelman, Walter Powell,John Stephens, for Adrian andViviana Zelizerfor comments helpful and/or Szulanski, Tschoegl, I amalso grateful providing mewith various references, information, andsources. Yi Jun, andGinaMok. tomywork-study research assistants AnneChun, theAnnual Reviews homepageat www.AnnualReviews.org Visit LITERATURE CITED
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