Into Action
On the sixth of February the Battalion moved into active operations down to the railway in the Free State, as Orange River Colony was called. The objective was to protect the railway from the constant attacks of enemy, by using small corrugated iron block houses as protection against musket fire. These block houses were, as a rule, located about three-quarters of a mile apart, and were usually occupied by a non-commissioned officer with eight or nine men. (The
headquarters of larger formations, such as a Battalion, usually were involved in protecting some particularly vulnerable point such as a bridge or ford). The block houses were connected
by barbed wire fencing, into which the enemy could be driven. Where two great block house lines crossed the Boers were gradually forced into the apex of barbed wire, thus effectively cornering them. It was warfare of this kind that the 2nd Battalion experienced.
The branch line to Heilbron connected with the main line from Cape Town to Pretoria, (via Bloemfontein), at an acute angle; and it was into this corner that a great sweep by the British forces planned to drive as many Boers as possible that were still at large in the North Eastern portion of the State. The task of the Battalion was, by means of small posts, to fill up the spaces between the block houses on the Heilbron rail road, so that when the Boers were driven against it, they might be met by a line of fire all along the railway. The Regiment stayed on the lines until the 19th of February but were unable to capture the leaders of the enemy they were after, the "hit & run" guerrilla tactics proving to be effective. Consequently a new great super drive was planned, and the 2nd Leinsters moved to Frankfort, to take place in a combined operation of some 30,000 British troops.
were getting very low. Second in command of the Battalion, Major Drummond, together with Sergeant Major Smyth and two Yeoman, (mounted infantry), were sent back to Frankfort to draw more supplies and arrange for providing a relief to those left in the Valley. The Boers noticed the departure of Major Drummond and his men, and set off in pursuit, however the Major and his troops managed to keep in front. The party eventually arrived at Frankfort to discover that the authorities had apparently forgotten all about the Leinsters and signals were then sent out instructing the Battalion to re-group, collect itself together and return to Frankfort as quickly as possible. This is in itself was a very dangerous manoeuvre, as traveling across country without cavalry support was extremely dangerous. However the luck of the Regiment held out, and with joining of each detachment the Battalion grew stronger as it moved back down the valley on its way back to Frankfort. It was not long however before the enemy realised what was happening and the rearguard reported a group of Boers galloping towards them. At the same time it was reported from the forward skirmishers that a conical shaped hill overlooking a steep sided gully in front of the Battalion, was held by the enemy. The Adjutant ordered Sergeant Gaffney to take with him a detachment, and to attack the conical hill, removing the enemy from the position. Under heavy fire the troop, led by Sergeant Gaffney attacked the Boers who were not prepared for this movement, and Sergeant Gaffney's troop, now supported by a party led by Captain Sangster, were successful in removing the Boers from the hill. With the position now occupied by the Leinsters, the Battalion's transport moved across the gully at the gallop, and a small rearguard led by Lieutenant Fox safely saw the remainder of the Battalion start towards Frankfort. The Boers immediately re-occupied the hill, and were reinforced by the group that had originally been chasing the Leinsters. Having re-gained the high ground the Boers placed the Leinsters under very heavy fire. The position of the rearguard became very difficult, with the Leinsters taking a number of casualties. Fortunately Lieutenant Fox coolly and skillfully led both the rearguard and the wounded to safety and they closed up upon the Battalion. As it was by then late in the afternoon the 2nd Leinsters "dug in" whilst the Boers occupied the neighbouring heights. The next morning headquarters were requested to send mounted reinforcements, however the response was for the Battalion to remain were they were until the following day, when a mounted force would be sent from Frankfort at dawn. A mounted detachment of one officer and 25 Yeoman were duly dispatched, but were unable to locate the 2nd Battalion, and returned to Frankfort. This was clearly an unacceptable move, and they were dispatched again with orders not to return until they had found the 2nd Battalion. At dusk of the following day members of the 2nd Battalion of the Leinsters saw the party about two miles distant, and managed to attract their attention. The situation was that approximately half the Battalion had re-grouped, and had now been joined by the officer and 25 Yeoman. All the food had been exhausted, and with little other choice, the Battalion set off just before dawn moving in a great square, in single rank, with the transport in the centre. Half of the mounted men covered the front and half acted as the rear guard. Immediately that it became a light the Boers began to attack the rearguard but casualties sustained by the Leinsters were few. Moving quickly across country, the remaining detachments of the Battalion were collected, and with the mounted Yeoman providing a strong rearguard, it was late afternoon when the 2nd Leinsters reached Frankfort, hungry but safe, after a long day without food.
This example of the action between the 2nd Leinster Battalion and the Boers, although itself not large, was taken as an example by the authorities, of why moving infantry columns, without the support of mounted troops, should stop. It was shown that against a highly mobile enemy such as the Boers, infantry alone stood a very good chance of being overcome, and it was agreed by all, that the 2nd Leinster Regiment had been fortunate in their engagements in the Wilge Valley, casualties being so low. After a few days rest at Frankfort, the Battalion move towards the Tafal Cop to strengthen the block house line for a reverse drive scheduled to take place between the 5th and 7th of March. After this the 2nd Leinsters moved out for Heilbron, for service on the branch railway line between Heilbron and Wolbroeck (from the 9th and to the 13th). Night after night the Boers attacked the lines in their efforts to break through, but the British strategy proved to be successful, and a great number of prisoners and stores were captured. The objectives having been achieved the 2nd Leinsters were ordered to return to Pretoria arriving on the 14th of March, relieving the Cameron Highlanders in the Artillery Barracks, (the Cameron's leaving to take part in the operations in the Transvaal). Headquarters for the 2nd Battalion were at the Artillery Barracks but the greater portion of the Battalion went into garrison in the forts and block houses round Pretoria and along the railway running north to Pietersburg. On the 15 of April "C" company (who had been left in the West Indies), arrived from St. Lucia, and now for first-time in over three and half years, the whole Battalion was together, even if it was spread around Pretoria. The Boers by this time were seeking peace, and being in Pretoria, members of the Leinster Regiment were amongst those who saw the leader of the Boers, De Wet, in person. There was six weeks of negotiations, following which the articles of peace were signed in Pretoria on the 31st May, and the South African war was over.
coronation; the regulars and militia would return at once to their depots. This was a bitter blow to every regular officer, non-commissioned officer and man on the parade. "No one moved and the silence could be felt", reported an observer, and it was clear to all that the regular army and militia's took this to be a great insult. Capt. Whitton and his detachment returned to South Africa as soon as they could secure a suitable passage.