Sub-Conventional Operations 2006

DOCTRI NE
FOR
SUB CONVENTI ONAL OPERATI ONS
: December 2006.
: Headquarters Army Training Command.
: Headquarters Army Training Command,
ShimIa - 171 003,
India.
First Edition
PubIished By
Copyright
Reserved
This document wiII be reviewed after every five years.
Comments/Suggestions may be forwarded to Headquarters
Army Training Command, ShimIa.
INTEGRATED HEADQUARTERS
OF MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
(ARMY)
DOCTRINE FOR
SUB CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS
There can be four dangers to a State;
That which is of external origin
and internal abetment;
That which is of internal origin
and external abetment;
That which is of external origin
and external abetment;
And that which is of internal origin
and internal abetment.

- Kautilya
GeneraI JJ Singh
PVSM, AVSM, VSM, ADC
Chief of The Army Staff
FOREWORD
am pleased to release the ndian Army's Doctrine on 'Sub
Conventional Operations'. This document encapsulates our collective
wisdom and philosophy that we have acquired over almost five decades
in fighting such warfare.

As against conventional operations, such operations are fought in
the lower end of the 'Spectrum of Conflict' and entail application of combat
power to enhance the 'civil control' in an affected area rather than cause
`destruction', which generally is the motive in conventional warfare.
Therefore, while in the initial stages of a sub conventional war fighting
campaign, the use of minimum force by the security forces is inescapable
to create a secure and conducive environment, such campaign has to
necessarily hinge on addressing the root causes of the conflict, in line with
our national policy and strategy. t is in light of this fundamental principle
that have emphasised the concept of 'ron Fist with Velvet Glove', which
implies a humane approach towards the populace at large in the conflict
zone. This also entails the use of overwhelming force only against foreign
terrorists and other hardcore inimical elements, while affording full
opportunity to indigenous misguided elements to shun violence and join
the mainstream. t underscores scrupulous respect for Human Rights,
upholding laws of the land and encourages 'neutralisation' of terrorists by
seeking surrenders and apprehensions rather than only seeking 'kills'.
Concurrent conduct of perception management is also an operational
imperative and must be imaginatively undertaken as part of the public
information drive which hinges on effective dissemination of information
through the media.
Such a campaign demands that all military operations are people
centric and conducted in a manner that generates a groundswell for
peace and creates redundancy of the terrorists in the environment.
Therefore, the rules of engagement have to be formulated imaginatively,
in the backdrop of political, legal and moral parameters. t must always be
remembered that populace constitutes the centre of gravity of such
operations and, therefore, winning of their hearts and minds is central to
all our efforts during conflict management and resolution.
Training and junior leadership assume added significance in sub
conventional warfare. To be successful, leaders must learn and train their
command to perceive and react expeditiously with minimum force to
neutralise the target, without causing any collateral damage. Suitable
'frames of reference' coupled with the ability to generate hard intelligence
in a synergised manner and its real time exploitation are as such, key to
the success of such operations. We must force the terrorist on the back
foot by seizing initiative and making him reactive and resultantly,
insecure. This calls for perseverance and unstinted commitment towards
the populace to ensure the terrorist gets no safe sanctuary and people
willingly contribute to his neutralisation. An effective interface with the
media as part of our public information and perception management
operations also merits necessary attention.
Sub conventional operations are likely to remain a major
responsibility for the Army in the foreseeable future. n view of the same,
the imperative of inter service and inter agency synergy for successful
conduct of operations is essential. This publication provides guidance
and doctrinal basis for the planning and execution of sub conventional
operations by the ndian Army. This guidance is authoritative and will be
followed except when, the judgment of local commanders, dictates it
otherwise.
compliment the Army Training Command for its evolution.
31 December 2006 (JJ Singh)
General

1. The 'Sub Conventional Operations Doctrine' for the ndian Army
has been evolved from the varied experience of the ndian Army. A thin
line divides success and failure in such operations. Experience has
shown that the end results favour the side that adheres to the
fundamental principles for the execution of such operations.
2. The Doctrine encompasses the essence of these experiences and
outlines the fundamental principles and guidelines for the Army, in the
backdrop of current and emerging trends. This document is a logical
derivative from the ndian Army Doctrine and will provide a common
platform for the military professionals. t will also facilitate better
understanding of the application of military resources for effective conflict
management.
3. This Doctrine will be reviewed every five years and updated in
consonance with the prevailing environment.
31 December 2006 (KSJamwaI)
Lt Gen
PROMULGATION
Lt GeneraI KS JamwaI
AVSM, VSM**
GOC - in - C ARTRAC
DOCTRNE FOR SUB CONVENTONAL OPERATONS DOCTRNE FOR SUB CONVENTONAL OPERATONS DOCTRNE FOR SUB CONVENTONAL OPERATONS DOCTRNE FOR SUB CONVENTONAL OPERATONS DOCTRNE FOR SUB CONVENTONAL OPERATONS DOCTRNE FOR SUB CONVENTONAL OPERATONS DOCTRNE FOR SUB CONVENTONAL OPERATONS DOCTRNE FOR SUB CONVENTONAL OPERATONS

Insurgency

Proxy War
Terrorism
(Undertaken as part of
Insurgency/Proxy War, may aIso
be undertaken independentIy)
Border Skirmishes
Sub ConventionaI
Asymmetric Warfare
SUB CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS
Asymmetric Warfare entails unconventional ways and means to
target various elements of national power, to include Command,
Cont rol , Communi cat i ons, Comput ers, nt el l i gence,
nteroperability, Surveillance and Reconnaissance infrastructure,
services based industry, banking and financial services,
transportation and power sector. This type of warfare also
includes cyber and information operations, which are not covered
in the document.
Border skirmishes are also not covered in the document due to
security reasons. These will be dealt with in accordance with the
operational plans of concerned Commands and ntegrated
Headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Army) policy on the subject.
Subject
Introduction
EnvironmentaI Trends and Dynamics
of the ConfIict Zone
FormuIation of MiIitary Strategy
OperationaI Facets
InteIIigence
Winning Hearts and Minds
Training
Human Rights
Leadership
Emerging ChaIIenges
ConcIusion
Appendices
SeriaI
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Page
1
5
14
27
40
44
48
53
56
60
63
64
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
'Terrorism is the greatest national security threat our country faces
today. Combating this threat presents unique and unprecedented
challenges. The tactics adopted by terrorists, often with the
assistance of State-sponsors, require constant study and
analysis".
Dr Manmohan Singh
Prime Minister of India
1. Total war as an instrument of state policy has become less relevant
than ever before and resultantly, the probability of full-scale conventional
wars between nations is gradually receding as an option for settling
disputes. However, this has given further impetus to sub conventional
operations as the predominant form of warfare.
2. Sub conventional warfare is a generic term encompassing all
armed conflicts that are above the level of peaceful coexistence amongst
states and below the threshold of war. t includes militancy, insurgency,
proxy war and terrorism that may be employed as a means in an
insurrectionist movement or undertaken independently. Border
skirmishes also fall within this category. These are not being covered in
the document. Sub conventional warfare figures at the lower end of the
spectrum of conflict and entails protracted struggle. t could also be
characterised by asymmetry of force levels between the regular forces
and irregulars, wherein the force applied and the violence generated
depends on the modus operandi of the weaker side and the laws of the
land, which bind the actions of the Armed Forces. The modus operandi of
weaker side is generally characterised by irrationality, indiscrimination,
unpredictability and ruthlessly destructive behaviour.
1
3 2
Sub ConventionaI Operations Arena

Routine Law and
Order

Insurgency
& Proxy War

ConventionaI War

Heightened Law
and Order

NucIear War

UnIikeIy

Most LikeIy

LeveI
of
VioIence

A
m
y m
ay get
r
em
loyed
p
under CrPC
State
PoIice
CentraI Para
MiIitary Forces
(CPMF)

Army & CPMF
Management of ConfIict

Point where Army gets involved as an instrument of last resort

High ntensity
Conflict
Medium
ntensity
Conflict

Low ntensity
Conflict
Sub conventional operations arena comprises armed conflicts that
are above the level of peaceful coexistence amongst states and
below the threshold of war. These include militancy, insurgency,
proxy war and terrorism either employed as part of an insurrectionist
movement or independently. Border skirmishes also fall within this
category.
3. The management, and finally the resolution, of such conflicts
necessitates a multi-pronged thrust by all elements of national power to
address the root causes. The application of Armed Forces in the initial
stages is aimed at providing a secure environment, wherein various
institutions of the government can function devoid of any inimical
interference. Having provided this environment, the Armed Forces,
thereafter, function in a manner that strengthens the hands of the civil
authorities.
4. The ndian Army has been engaged in sub conventional
operations for over fifty years. These years have left footprints of both
success and failure. While each success was a reason for satisfaction,
failure was an occasion for introspection and learning. These five
decades have yielded wide and varied experience in our approach and
methodology to combat sub conventional threats. This period has also
enabled us to refine and hone our strategic and operational concepts,
besides refining our tactics to operate effectively in such conflicts.
5. The most pertinent aspect, which has influenced the evolution of
the doctrine, is the philosophy of 'ron Fist with Velvet Glove' enunciated
in 2005. t emphasises a humane and people-centric approach,
underscores the need for scrupulous upholding of laws of the land, deep
respect for Human Rights and minimum use of kinetic means, to create a
secure environment, without causing any collateral damage. t
propagates the use of overwhelming force against foreign and hardcore
terrorists, while affording a fair chance to indigenous inimical elements to
shun violence, surrender and join the mainstream as per laws of the land.
6. This Doctrine, besides encompassing our collective wisdom and
philosophy on fighting such operations, also endeavours to highlight to
civil society, the very basis for the Army's employment in such operations.
t also aims to provide an insight into various lines of operations
undertaken by the Army to create a secure and conducive environment
for the fulfilment of national policy and strategy.
Arm
ed Rebellion - S
uat on
it
i
m
ark
d by breakdown of
e
civil adm
inistration
an
l
w
& o
der m
ac
inery.
d
a

r
h
5 4
7. The ndian Army is widely regarded as one of the most
experienced and battle-hardened forces combating sub conventional
threats in the world today, on the basis of its strategic vision and functional
achievements. ts success manifests across inhospitable terrain
and climate, amidst complex and adverse circumstances. The Doctrine
for Sub Conventional Operations takes all these aspects into
consideration without being unduly affected by any particular conflict or
region, to give it a wider perspective.
8. Explanation of various terms used in the Doctrine are given at
Appendix A.
ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS AND DYNAMICS
OF THE CONFLICT ZONE
Chapter 1
Dr APJ Abdul Kalam
President
'The constant threat of low intensity proxy war and terrorism has
become a disturbing feature of national life. This constitutes the
new face of war"
EnvironmentaI Trends
1. GIobaI. Some of the trends manifesting in sub conventional
warfare at global level are as follows:-
(a) The communist ideology inspired insurgencies have
receded in the post Cold War era. However, insurrectionist
movements are likely to continue on account of religious, cultural
and socio-economic disparities. These will continue to be
exploited by state and non state actors to further their nefarious
designs as also to offset the asymmetry in combat power.
(b) Sensational terrorist acts in the international, regional and
domestic arenas have brought the scourge of terrorism into sharp
focus and vindicated ndia's long standing position on the
issue.
(c) Trans-national character of sub conventional conflicts has
galvanised a multi-national and multi-lateral approach to tackle
ENVRONMENTAL TRENDS AND DYNAMCS OF THE CONFLCT ZONE
7 6
such form of warfare. Resultantly, this has dissuaded Nation
States from employing terrorism as an instrument of state policy.
(d) Notwithstanding the positive fallouts of globalisation, the
virtues of the same are also being exploited by terrorists to their
advantage.
(e) Terrorism related to weapons of mass destruction, cyber
and information warfare have given a new dimension to this form
of warfare.
(f) The armed cadres of almost all contemporary insurgency
movements are increasingly showing scant regard for the security
of civilians, which the traditional insurgent or guerrilla of the
yesteryears showed. Today, almost all insurrectionist movements
are witnessing a very high profile of criminal terrorist activity that
aims to cause paralysis and disorder in civil society, which helps
the perpetrators to shape the asymmetrical battle space to their
advantage.
2. RegionaI. ndia shares land borders with six neighbouring
countries. nstabilities in the region are likely to have trans-national
spillover effects. Some of the major regional trends are as follows:-
(a) South Asia has emerged as the epicentre of global
terrorism.
(b) The vast and porous nature of our borders continues to be
exploited by inimical elements to vitiate our internal security
environment. Such trends are characterised by illegal
immigration, gun running, drug trafficking, circulation of counterfeit
currency, money laundering and other asymmetrical means to
impede initiatives to consolidate our comprehensive national
power.
Communism inspired insurgencies are on the decline.
Religious, cultural and socio-economic disparities emerging as
reasons for newconflicts.
Rise in terrorism marked by trans-national foot prints.
Benefits of globalisation being exploited by non state actors.
Weapons of mass destruction, cyber and information warfare
emerging as newthreats.
State support to terrorism giving rise to asymmetric form of
warfare.
Requirement of multi lateral and multi national approach to
meet newchallenges.
South Asia has emerged as the epicentre of global terrorism.
3. Domestic. Some of the trends on the domestic front are as
follows:-
(a) While good governance and honing of our law and order
mechanisms at the Centre and State levels have improved the
internal security dimensions, the socio-economic disparities
coupled with some of the religious and ethnic fault lines could still
provide grounds for vitiation of our internal security environment.
(b) Our multi-pronged national initiatives in J&K, North East
and the Naxal violence affected states are yielding positive results.
However, considering the prolonged nature of such campaigns,
conflict resolution is likely to take some time.
(c) The insurgencies in our extended neighbourhood are also
likely to impact on our national security matrix and, therefore, need
to be monitored.
ENVRONMENTAL TRENDS AND DYNAMCS OF THE CONFLCT ZONE ENVRONMENTAL TRENDS AND DYNAMCS OF THE CONFLCT ZONE
EnvironmentaI Trends
9 8

Causes

Proxy War
Terrorism
Insurgency
MiIitancy
IdeoIogicaI, Ethnic and
Linguistic Differences

PoIitico-Socio-
Economic Reasons

FundamentaIism and
Extremism

CataIysts

Interference by neighbouring states

Inept handIing of the
situation

Causes for the Vitiation
of InternaI Security Environment
Dynamics of the ConfIict Zone
4. Movements based on pol i ti cal aspi rati ons general l y
commence from the urban centres and more often than not from the state
capital or power centres of the estranged political factions. On the other
hand, movements driven by socio-economic aspirations generally begin
from deprived areas, which are often inaccessible and under developed.
Therefore, insurgencies, given their mass support base, have a strong
rural backing, while lowsupport terrorist movements are generally urban
centric, where sensational terrorist acts can drawmaximum publicity and
media mileage. Some of the dynamics of a sub conventional war fighting
arena are:-
(a) n the initial stages of the movement, there is great support
for the 'cause' and the populace practically nurtures the armed
cadres as their 'military'. This support starts to decline as
fatigue from the conflict sets in and the population begins to feel
the privations and becomes disenchanted with the armed
struggle.
(b) The terrorists manipulate the environment to enhance the
credibility of the cause and their relevance to the environment by
justifying the armed struggle as the most plausible option to fulfil
societal aspirations.
(c) The terrorists can strike anywhere in the sub conventional
conflict zone. Hence, the distinction between the front and rear,
which is well defined in conventional operations, gets blurred. Also
on account of this nuance, there are no non combatants amongst
the security forces as every individual has to remain prepared not
only to defend himself but also to carry out operations against such
threats, when required. Additionally, sub conventional operations
also blur the distinction between the strategic and tactical levels,
as an incident at the tactical level may have strategic implications.
(d) Terrorists also resort to direct and indirect measures to
psychologically influence various sections of the environment
and to keep the disenchanted segments of the populace
committed to the cause.
(e) The methods employed to terrorise the populace are either
'mass disruptive' or 'mass destructive'.
11 10
(f) When security forces get involved in conflict management,
the challenges posed are on account of lack of support from the
population and to some extent, possible subversion in various
institutions of the State.
A - LowViolence LowBase
B - LowViolence Large Base
C - Mid Violence Mid Base
D - High Violence LowBase
E - High Violence High Base
CorreIation between VioIence and LocaI Support
5. Various Scenarios. An analysis of the past and ongoing
insurrectionist movements reveals that the level of violence and the
degree of popular support for the movement are two major factors, which
impact the security spectrum. The correlation between these two factors
creates five possible scenarios.
(a) Low VioIence Low Base (A). This situation generally
indicates the beginning of a sub conventional conflict scenario,
wherein the insurgents commence employing subversive
activities to gain a foothold and create their support base. This
threat is often overlooked due to its low intensity. However, its
progression to the next level remains a distinct possibility and
needs pre-emptive multi-pronged initiatives employing various
elements of national power.
Blurring of the distinction between:-
o Front and rear.
o Strategic and tactical actions
o Combatants and non combatants.
Manipulation of the environment by terrorist to enhance his
relevance and credibility.
'Mass disruptive' or 'mass destructive' methods employed by
terrorists.
Terrorists also resort to direct and indirect measures to
psychologically influence various players of the environment.
Some Distinctive Features of Sub ConventionaI ConfIict Zone

B

E

C
A

D

VioIence
PopuIation Base
Chapter I : ENVRONMENTAL TRENDS AND DYNAMCS OF THE CONFLCT ZONE Chapter I : ENVRONMENTAL TRENDS AND DYNAMCS OF THE CONFLCT ZONE 13 12
(b) Low VioIence Large Base (B). This level characterises
the next state of a sub conventional threat, where the insurgents
are able to successfully establish a viable population base on the
strength of their popular cause. This stage normally marks the
beginning of violent activities. t is often the last stage when a
movement can be contained through multi-pronged initiatives
before a full-blown violent insurgency takes root. Such threats
need to be tackled with urgency.
(c) Mid VioIence Mid Base (C). Such a scenario is
characterised by full-blown insurgency. At this stage the
movement can either be in the ascent or descent cycle of its
popularity and violence. By virtue of its mid level violence and
popular support, the situation is at a stage where it can be
contained by a judicious mix of politico-military action.
(d) High VioIence Low Base (D). This scenario indicates a
typical terrorist threat, emanating from a small cadre base, with the
aim of influencing political decisions and creating a fear psychosis.
This form of terrorism can be employed by an external adversary
as part of proxy war or by an internal organisation to gain public
attention and influence international opinion. The struggle in this
case can strike sudden panic, but its ability to retain the tempo is
suspect given the lack of popular support. t can be defeated
through proactive operations based on sound intelligence.
(e) High VioIence High Base (E). This stage of sub
conventional threat perpetuates when there is widespread popular
support for the insurgency accompanied by a high degree of
violence. This is often seen in civil war type of situations.
6. Certain additional aspects defining the correlation between
violence and popular support, which merit attention, are as under:-
(a) ntensity of threat has inherent capability of moving from
one stage to the other and does not remain compartmentalised.
The level of popular support and degree of violence can vary due
to the success of either the Government or the insurgent / terrorist
groups.
(b) ncreasing popular support is crucial for the success of both
the insurgency and the counter insurgency operations. Therefore,
popular support is the final determinant of any movement or the
success of a counter insurgency campaign.
FORMULATON OF MLTARY STRATEGY FORMULATON OF MLTARY STRATEGY 15 14
FORMULATION OF MILITARY STRATEGY
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPERATIVES
Chapter 2
Military strategy is formulated based on the national security imperatives
that include the national policy, strategy and various directions given out
by the government from time to time. This strategy entails the interplay of
ends, ways, and means to create military conditions that facilitate the
realisation of the political end state.
GeneraI
1. The management of national security has been subjected to a
comprehensive reappraisal based on the recommendations of the Group
of Ministers set up as a sequel to the Kargil Review Committee Report.
This reappraisal was undertaken to review the national security system,
including the internal security mechanism, in its entirety. Chapter Vof the
recommendations deals with the internal security issues. (Note - various
aspects of the Group of Ministers' recommendations quoted in this
document have been extracted from the declassified text of the Report
available on the internet).
2. While law and order is a state subject, at central government level
the nodal agency dealing with the maintenance of internal security in the
country is the Ministry of Home Affairs.
LegaI Provisions
3. Aid to civil authority is a constitutional obligation for the ndian
Army. The provisions governing its employment in aid to civil authority are
contained in the following documents as amended from time to time:-
4. Primacy of CiviI Authority. When deployed in aid to civil
authority, the Army operates in the State concerned in cooperation with
the civil authority so that the situation affecting maintenance of public
order, which had necessitated its deployment, is effectively dealt with and
normalcy is restored. The Armed Forces Special Powers Acts of 1958 and
1990 do not displace the civil power of the State by the Armed Forces and
these only provide for the deployment of Armed Forces in aid of the civil
authority. The term 'Aid' postulates the continued existence of the
authority to be aided. This means that even after deployment of the
Armed Forces of the Union, the civil power continues to function, thereby
implying that while upholding the above principle, all actions of the Armed
Forces must contribute to strengthening of the hands of the State
authorities.
n the conflict zone, all actions of the security forces must have a civil
face and be directed towards strengthening the hands of the civil
authorities.
(a) Constitution of ndia, Articles 352 and 355.
(b) Code of Criminal Procedure, Sections 127 to 131.
(c) Armed Forces (Special Powers) Acts 1958 and 1990.
(e) Government of ndia (Ministry of Defence) Publication,
'Aid to Civil Authority - 1970'.
(d) Regulations for the Army, 1987 Edition, Paragraphs 301
to 307.
17 16
NationaI Strategy
5. Strategic Centre of Gravity. Populace invariably emerges as
the 'Centre of Gravity' in all sub conventional operations as, without
popular support, no insurrectionist movement can be sustained
indefinitely. Since grievances of the population are the likely cause for
commencement of any insurrectionist movement, the remedial measures
would involve their redressal in correct perspective. The role of the Armed
Forces in such a conflict is to act as facilitator to bring down the level of
violence so that a political process can be initiated. t is for this reason that
the military operations aim at enhancing the 'control' of civil authority in
the conflict zone rather than applying the military force for causing
'destruction'.
When the Army gets employed in combating insurgency, the 'A'
arm is always thicker than the 'B' arm.
While the strategy of the terrorists is to thicken 'A' arm, the
government agencies including the security forces, strive to
thicken the 'B' arm.
The common node in the two arms is populace, which is the
'CENTREOF GRAVTY'.
At the operational level, various antagonist population centres
emerge as the operational centres of gravity.
Strategic and OperationaI Centres of Gravity
6. End State. The end state sought by a national counter
insurgency campaign is always 'conflict resolution', which generally
succeeds 'conflict termination'. This entails demilitarisation of the conflict
zone and shaping the environment, wherein the remaining differences
can be pursued without violence. The requisite shaping of the
environment is affected through a concurrent application of all elements
of national power. This involves addressing the root causes of the
problem in right earnest. t is an arduous long haul, which requires clarity,
consistency, credibility and consensus. A counter insurgency campaign
would normally have multiple prongs, each being addressed
simultaneously by two or more elements of national power.
Various Prongs of the NationaI Initiative
7. The national strategy aims to employ various elements of national
power to gain control of the affected area and address root causes of the
conflict. Since this entails dealing with the attitudes and mind-sets of
people, the process is long drawn and laborious. Various prongs of such
a process are:-
(a) Creation of Secure Environment. The creation of a
secure environment is important to enable other elements of
national power to operate without fear of the terrorist gun and to
facilitate the initiation of the political process (where political
aspirations need to be addressed). The Army along with other
security forces have a lead role to play in the accomplishment
of this goal, ie, of creating a secure and conducive environment.
FORMULATON OF MLTARY STRATEGY FORMULATON OF MLTARY STRATEGY
B
FORMULATON OF MLTARY STRATEGY FORMULATON OF MLTARY STRATEGY 19 18

Smooth and
effective
functioning of
government
institutions.
(Schools,
hospitals,
public utility
services etc)

Transformation of the public
law and order marked
security environment into an
environment that can be
handled by the police.
(Law and Order)
Absence of fear of the terrorist's
gun.

Secure
Environment

Return of the
normal way of
life, wherein civil
liberties get fully
restored and the
people are able
to pursue their
lifestyles with
freedom, respect
and human
dignity.

Indicators of Secure Environment
(b) IsoIation of ConfIict Zone. The prevention of any
external support to the terrorists could entail targetting diplomatic,
moral, financial, material or personnel assistance. The
accomplishment of this goal has both internal and external
dimensions and therefore, while the security forces are applied on
the internal scene for preventing infiltration and/or exfiltration by
terrorists and the smuggling in/out of warlike material, other
elements of national power address the external dimension.
(c) Addressing LocaI Aspirations and Winning Hearts
and Minds. The addressing of local aspirations in terms of
developmental activities and restoration of full liberties along with
effective functioning of various institutions of the State
Government and their accessibility to the populace are important
to generate a groundswell for peace and for winning the hearts
and minds in the desired perspective. n addition, a political
dialogue should also be accompanied by suitable political
initiatives in pursuance of national policy objectives.
(d) PubIic Information and Perception Management. The
management of perceptions of all state and non state players in
the domestic, regional and international environment is of
paramount importance. These are essentially information
operations that are conducted concurrently throughout the
campaign. n fact, these operations must also cater to the needs of
the security forces so that all government and military personnel
view various developments in the correct perspective and
activities of inimical forces are not able to impact adversely on their
morale.
8. n addition, the national strategy also spells out tenets for the
application of various elements of national power besides highlighting the
mechanism for inter-agency cooperation and effecting synergy with
respect to developmental activity and for attaining operational and
intelligence synergy. This must be coordinated at the highest level. As per
the Group of Ministers' recommendations, the Chief Minister of the State
is recommended to head the 'Apex Body' that not only formulates conflict
zone specific policies and strategies but also coordinates and oversees
the functioning of all the agencies, including security forces, in the conflict
zone.
21 20

NationaI PoIicy
NationaI Strategy

MiIitary Strategy
RuIes of Engagement

(EvoIved in the backdrop of poIiticaI, IegaI and moraI constraints)
Risk Assessment
MILITARY STRATEGY
FormuIation of MiIitary Strategy : Process
MiIitary End State
9. Military end state entails creating conditions that are conducive to
the attainment of political objectives. Since conflict termination and their
political resolution are the ultimate end states sought, such conditions,
besides enabling the initiatives by the economic and informational
elements of national power to consolidate, also facilitate initiation of
political dialogue for a negotiated settlement.
Overarching Concept
10. Since the centre of gravity for such operations is the populace,
operations have to be undertaken with full respect to Human Rights and in
accordance with the laws of the land. The application of military power in
such operations is so regulated that it enhances the control by civil
authorities in the conflict zone besides strengthening their hands. This
underscores the importance of people friendly operations that are
conducted with a civil face.
Concept of AppIication of MiIitary Force
11. PeopIe Centric Operations. To a t t a i n a s e c u r e
environment, the military operations should aim, firstly, at neutralising all
hostile elements in the conflict zone that oppose or retard the peace
initiatives and secondly, at transforming the will and attitudes of the
people through a dexterous and integrated application of all resources.
The neutralisation of terrorists and their support base must be in
consonance with laws of the land so that the civil face of governance is
always visible. Terrorists must be afforded full opportunity to surrender
and only those terrorists, who do not accept the offer and continue to
resist, should be neutralised through kinetic means. The handling of over
ground workers too must always be as per laws of the land. The
orchestration of the military operations should be such that they also
induce the desired degree of agitational fatigue amongst the supporters
of the cause. However, since this lever works both ways, it should be
imaginatively employed, as it can prove to be counter-productive and can
at times, convert even the champions of non-violence into violence
seekers. The endeavour should be to bring about a realisation that
fighting the government is a 'no win' situation and that their anti
government stance will only delay the process of restoration of peace and
normalcy. Therefore, distancing from the terrorists is in their own interest
and the only plausible course of action.
23 22
However, the manifestation of such a realisation can take from a couple of
years to decades as attitudes take time to form and to change.
12. Manoeuvre versus Attrition Warfare. As the endeavour in
such a campaign is to enhance the control of government agencies in the
conflict zone, military power should be predominantly employed to target
the minds of the terrorists and other antagonist players in the
environment. This in turn highlights the importance of manoeuvre
warfare, which ensures placing of our resources at a position of
advantage vis--vis the terrorists. t also helps in creating insecurity for
the terrorists that resultantly forces them on the back foot and makes
them reactive to our proactive approach. However, such application
alone cannot achieve the desired military conditions. Therefore, taking
recourse to attrition warfare concept in the initial stages of the campaign
cannot be avoided. The inset figure highlights this aspect.
Manoeuvre versus Attrition Warfare

Employ-
-ment of
Kinetic
& Non -

Kinetic
means

(Transition from public
order to law and order
domain)

(Maximum application of attrition
warfare

Kinetic Means
Non Kinetic Means

nitial stages of conflict

Stage where conflict
resolution is in sight

Time Line: Conflict Management

EmpIoyment of Kinetic & Non Kinetic Means During Various Stages of
13. Integrated Approach. Since the ultimate aim of the military effort
is to strengthen the hands of the local civil authorities, the management of
the campaign must always show a civil face. Therefore, the counter
insurgency operations, notwithstanding the primacy of the military in the
initial stages, should always be coordinated at the highest levels through
the creation of an 'Apex Security Mechanism' headed by the senior state
executive. Such an arrangement facilitates the monitoring of various
prongs of the campaign in the proper perspective. However, for
facilitating synergy, the senior most Army Officer should have the clear
responsibility and authority for all operational planning and execution.
Some of the recommendations of the Group of Ministers on nternal
Security in this regard are placed alongside.
Encourages surrender and enables apprehension of
terrorists and over ground workers.
Also entails minimum use of force to eliminate
terrorists.
Manoeuvre
Terrorists / Antagonist pIayers of the enviornment.
While in the initial stage of the campaign attrition warfare concept has to be applied, in the later
stages, the application of military resources through manoeuvre and attrition warfare concept yields
better results.
Armed Forces
Attrition
(Elimination of Terrorists)
25 24

Paragraph 4.62
14. Lines of MiIitary Operations. The thrust of military operations in
the sub conventional conflict management scenario will be on executing
coordinated operations ranging from the border areas to the hinterland.
Various lines of military operations are:-
(a) Effective sealing of the borders to preclude trans-border
movement of terrorists and war waging material. This should be
undertaken in an integrated manner to ensure that the terrain,
obstacle system, troop deployment and surveillance devices are
optimally enmeshed to enable effective sealing operations.
(b) Establishment of a comprehensive counter terrorist grid in
the hinterland with focus on:-
(i) Denial of population centres to the terrorist.
(ii) Providing security to the military lines of
communication.
(iii) Ensuring security of various vulnerable areas and
vulnerable points.
(c) Effective public information and perception management
initiatives constitute a vital component of the campaign.
(d) Undertaking civic actions to address the aspirations of the
populace and winning their hearts and minds.
SALIENT ASPECTS OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF
GROUP OF MINISTERS ON INTERNAL SECURITY
(CHAPTER IV)
OPERATONAL FACETS 27 26
15. Constitution of 'Think Tanks'. Responses at various levels in
the sub conventional operations arena need to be continuously analysed
and refined. This is best achieved by constituting in-house pool of
qualified officers as 'think tanks' at Corps and Command levels, who are
fully dedicated to carry out an in-depth analysis of various developments
and events related to the conflict zone. This will also include evaluating
various personalities associated with the conflict to enable forecasting of
their likely moves and machinations.
OPERATIONAL FACETS
Chapter 3
General JJ Singh
Chief of the Army Staff
'Despite adverse conditions, the Army will present a much more
humane face since we are, after all, dealing with misguided youth of
our country. Use of minimum force with least collateral damage
shall be the approach, while conducting operations where civil
population is involved. However, the hardcore terrorist will be dealt
with firmly".
Mapping of the ConfIict Zone
1. t is imperative that the physical, human and informational facets of
the conflict zone are correctly understood and necessary data base
created. This entails liaison with other intelligence agencies including the
affected State Police. n specific terms, an intelligence mosaic should be
created on the following important facets:-
(a) Terrain. The terrain should be analysed in detail to
enable its effective domination and exploitation to our operational
advantage.
(b) PopuIation ProfiIe. To discern supporters, as well as
hostile and neutral sections of the populace.
(c) Root Cause(s) of the ProbIem. The causes that have
led to the conflict situation must be clearly understood prior to
deployment. These form the basis for assessing the challenges
FORMULATON OF MLTARY STRATEGY
29 28 OPERATONAL FACETS OPERATONAL FACETS
and for evolving operational imperatives. The causes must be
classified as primary and secondary, or in other words, causative
and aggravating factors. There is a tendency to fight the symptoms
of terrorism and violence in the area of conflict instead of
addressing the root causes. t is, therefore, imperative that in any
sub conventional scenario reasons for the unrest amongst the
populace are clearly understood before action is initiated to
administer the cure. Attempts to customise the response to all
kinds of challenges can lead to side affects, which may end up
aggravating the problem rather than solving it.
(d) ProfiIe - Terrorist Organisations. This should include:-
(i) Political and military structures.
(ii) ndigenous and foreign support structures of the
terrorists.
(iii) deologies and 'Code of Conduct' of various terrorist
organisations.
(iv) nter-se equations and nexus between various
terrorist organisations.
(e) Details of other security forces, governmental and non
governmental agencies operating in the conflict zone including
various intelligence agencies.
(f) Local, national and international media.
Orientation
2. Sub conventional operations are fundamentally different from
conventional operations. There is, therefore, a need for the Army to
orientate itself to the nuances of such operations, which are conducted
over sustained periods with restrictive rules of engagement vis--vis the
conventional operations. This orientation besides focusing on altering the
frames of reference amongst commanders at various levels, should also
endeavour to give them an insight into various facets of the multi-agency
integrated operations. The orientation of junior leaders and other ranks
must also endeavour to highlight that they would be fighting their 'own
people' and not an 'enemy' in an asymmetric environment. All ranks must
be made to understand the overriding importance of people friendly
stance and the civil face of military initiatives, which underscores the
importance of non kinetic measures as against the use of kinetic means.
3. Pre induction training for orientation of the troops should be
imaginatively planned and conducted in theatre battle schools. Where
feasible, the training facilities available at Counter nsurgency and Jungle
Warfare School, Vairengte should be optimally utilised. Details of
important training aspects are covered in Chapter 6.
Induction and DepIoyment
4. The induction into the conflict zone should be preceded by detailed
reconnaissance and liaison with the state government functionaries and
heads of various governmental and non governmental agencies in the
area of operations. The visits to the conflict zone should also be utilised
to understand the command and control structures besides confirming or
negating intelligence details that would have been mapped earlier.
5. To obviate depredatory activity against the inducting columns, it is
imperative that plans of induction, to include routes and timing, are
divulged strictly on 'need to know' basis. Necessary deception during
reconnaissance and liaison stage is also essential.
6. nduction should be undertaken speedily employing all possible
means. n areas where threat from improvised explosive devices exists,
road opening by units of Central Para Military Forces or by own troops
must be ensured.
7. The deployment in the area of operations should be on a grid
pattern, which should provide security to various population centres,
vulnerable areas/points and military lines of communications. This
deployment should be coordinated under the aegis of the apex security
mechanism, if in place; otherwise it should be undertaken in consultation
with other security agencies already operating in the conflict zone. For
better accountability by various security forces, it is imperative that these
are assigned clear roles and areas of responsibility. The Army, when
employed, assumes the lead role for operational planning and execution,
which has also been endorsed in the Group of Ministers'
recommendations (Chapter V, Paragraph 4.64). n addition, various
formation and unit headquarters should be preferably co-located with
state, division and district headquarters, for optimal civil-military liaison
and synergy of effort.
InteIIigence Generation
8. To enable conduct of surgical operations with precision, emphasis
should be laid on generation of intelligence rather than its acquisition. The
former underscores the importance of proactively working towards
tasking and gathering of intelligence rather than passively waiting for
various sources and agencies to provide intelligence. t should be
ensured that intelligence is also generated 'in depth', whereby we
develop sources right up to the terrorists' trans-border safe sanctuaries.
Although human intelligence will form the main stay in a sub conventional
campaign, electronic and signal intelligence also need to be suitably
dovetailed into the overall plan. The generation of intelligence, once the
contact has been established should also be given due importance and
suitable mechanism for its continuous generation should be co-opted into
the operational plans. This aspect has been dealt in detail in Chapter 5.
Lines of Operations - Important Tenets
9. The Army resources are applied essentially along four lines of
operations as given in the preceding Chapter. The tenets for the conduct
of operations along these lines are given in succeeding paragraphs.
10. Counter InfiItration Operations. t is important to isolate the
conflict zone from external material assistance for optimal utilisation of
Army resources. t is, therefore, essential that any external support is
intercepted and neutralised along the borders. Effective sealing of
borders, therefore, not only prevents external assistance to reach the
terrorists but also precludes their exfiltration to safe havens. The sealing
of borders should be undertaken in an integrated manner to ensure the
most effective use of terrain, troop deployment, artificial obstacle systems
and surveillance devices. The endeavour should be to create an all
weather, day and night detection and interception capability. t is also
important that measures are instituted to elicit accountability of the
civilians residing in the border belt, in consultation with civil authorities. A
seamless interface of the counter infiltration force with the troops
deployed on the counter terrorist grid is operationally imperative. While
border skirmishes also fall under the sub conventional operations
domain, these are not being covered in this document for security
reasons. These should be undertaken in accordance with the operational
plans of various formations and units deployed along the border.
Border sealing
Physical presence of troops.
Use of artificial obstacles.
ntegrated employment of surveillance means.
Elicit support of locals residing in border areas.
Seamless interface with counter terrorist operations in the
hinterland.
Counter InfiItration Operations
11. Operations in the HinterIand. The operations carried out in the
hinterland include patrolling, ambushes, raids, cordon and search,
search and destroy, establishment of vehicle and personnel check posts,
road opening, convoy protection and security of various static
installations, that includes various operating bases. The following
aspects should be borne in mind while carrying out counter terrorist
operations in the hinterland:-
(a) PeopIe FriendIy Operations.
(i) To obviate inconvenience to the populace,
operations should be based on hard intelligence rather than
being conducted on prophylactic basis.
(ii) Where operations result in causing inconvenience
to the locals, measures should be instituted to address their
daily basic needs. These measures should be instituted in
consultation with the state administration, where feasible.
(iii) The conduct of all ranks should be governed by
concept of 'ron Fist with Velvet Glove'. n addition, the Ten
Commandments of the Chief of The Army Staff and the Do's
and Don'ts pomulgated by the Army Headquarters must
also be adhered to. The same are given at Appendix B and
Crespectively.
(iv) To ensure that all army actions depict a civil face,
civil police personnel should be co-opted during
operations. Where the handling of women cadres is
visualised, Mahila Police should be incorporated during
operations. Contact with women folk in the area of
operations should only be through Mahila Police.

BattIefieId Turnout Tenets for Conduct
(b) RuIes of Engagement. The use of force should be
judicious and governed by explicit rules of engagement that must
hinge on the principle of 'minimum force', besides taking into
account the political, legal and moral stipulations. The endeavour
of security forces should be to neutralise the terrorists rather than
merely seeking their elimination. To obviate collateral damage, it is
imperative that operations are well planned, coordinated and
carried out with precision. All ranks must guard against any
provocations that may be induced by the terrorists or their
sympathisers. t must be remembered that any unsavoury
incident can act as a retrograde step to our initiatives for creating a
secure environment. Such situations demand extremely mature
handling.
(c) Comprehensive Surrender PoIicy. A comprehensive
policy that addresses the security and esteem needs of the
terrorists is important to encourage surrenders in the conflict zone.
This policy is promulgated by the government and entails a multi-
agency coordination to preclude its misuse and to ensure that post
surrender rehabilitation is implemented in the desired manner.
(d) Ingenuity in the AppIication of Combat Power. Such
operations mandate an ingenious approach and 'out of the box
thinking' to seize the initiative from the terrorists and to keep them
on the back foot. Concurrently, it is imperative that own activities
do not depict a pattern that can be exploited by the terrorists.
ngenious methods for intelligence generation and for interfacing
with the sources should be adopted.
Important Ground RuIes for Operating In
(e) SmaII Team Operations. n a sub conventional battle
field scenario, terrorists are eternally illusive, operate in small
groups, follow no pattern, don no uniform and mingle easily with
the civilian population. Moreover, resources of the security forces
are deployed over a large area of responsibility. n this
environment, operations based on small teams increase chances
of contact and success against terrorists. However, these teams
must possess the capabilities to group and regroup to cater for
various contingencies in the area of operations. The strength of
these small teams will vary according to the task and modus
operandi of insurgents.
(f) Conserving Combat Power. Friendly losses occur
because of a terrorist action, fratricide or 'blue on blue'
engagement, stress related attrition and battle accidents.
Measures should be instituted to obviate such losses. Training,
fool proof communications, detailed coordination and
management of stress, thus, assume added significance.
(g) OptimaI UtiIisation of Force MuItipIiers. ntegration of
all force multipliers in overall plan is a must for attaining military
ascendancy in the conflict zone. Such force multipliers
encompass both human and technological elements. The human
element of these force multipliers include village defence
committees and surrendered terrorists, who voluntarily cooperate
with the security forces. The technological element of various force
multipliers includes surveillance devices, signal interception
devices, anti improvised explosive detection and neutralisation
devices, direction finding equipment and unarmed aerial vehicles.
To enable integrated employment of all resources including the
force multipliers, it is axiomatic that signal communications are
imaginatively planned and include redundancy. Use of helicopters
for enhanced mobility of security forces and specialist dogs for
detection and tracking purpose also prove as valuable force
multipliers.
-
(f) mportance of peace for the overall prosperity of the people
and details of the government's peace initiatives.
(e) People friendly approach of the Army and its efforts in
alleviating their sufferings that have been caused by the terrorists.
(b) Efforts of the government regarding relief and rehabilitation
schemes to restore normalcy.
(a) Futility of the armed struggle and secessionist designs.
(c) Eroding credibility of terrorists and secessionist elements.
(d) mportance and efficacy of own operations.
12. PubIic Information and Perception BuiIding Operations.
Public information operations to influence perceptions of various players
in the conflict zone should be undertaken in accordance with
imaginatively evolved themes. At the operational level, these themes
could be:-
Media pIays a pivotaI roIe in infIuencing perceptions
13. Winning Hearts and Minds. Winning of the Hearts and Minds of
the populace is paramount to the success of sub conventional operations
and should be undertaken through deeds and by 'walking the talk'. This
reiterates the importance of people friendly operations. n addition,
sincere efforts must be made to address aspirations of the locals by
undertaking civic action programmes like resuscitation of schools,
medical facilities, communication network and projects that generate self
employment opportunities. Civic action programmes should be
preferably identified by the locals and their involvement from the inception
to completion is important. The upkeep of these projects must be ensured
till these are handed over to the local government authorities. To obviate
duplication of effort, these should be chalked out in conjunction with the
overall development plan of the area. This aspect has been dealt in detail
in Chapter 5.
MisceIIaneous Issues

14. Management of Stress. Sub conventional operations generate
stress, which if not managed on regular basis, impacts adversely on the
efficiency of troops and their morale. t is, therefore, important that
management of troops is given utmost importance and mechanisms
created to identify personnel under stress so that appropriate corrective
Be factually correct in all your reports.
Provide timely information.
Allegations to be investigated with dispatch and transparency.
Details of own operations and achievements should be
appropriately shared. Where necessary, additional information
should be provided without compromising security.
Qualified officers to be detailed at various headquarters, who
should be accessible to the media at all times.
measures can be instituted in time. An intimate interaction by
commanders at all levels with their commands contributes substantially
to the creation of necessary organisational climate within units and
formations. t is equally important that rest and recoup is factored into the
daily routine at sub-unit and unit levels. Arrangements must also be made
at all operating bases to enable all ranks to speak to their families on
telephone and for timely despatch and receipt of private mail. n addition,
recreational facilities should also be catered for at all bases.
Attend to physical and psychological needs of the troops.
Keep your troops well informed.
Provide time to troops to pray and visit unit religious institutions,
as per their liking.
Timely grant of leave.
Ensure regular games and recreational activities.
Ensure regular interaction of commanders with troops.
Facilitate resolution of domestic problems and ongoing disputes.
15. Ethos and Traditions. ndian Army draws its strength from its
ethos, traditions and culture that have shaped the organisation's thinking
over centuries. The essence of these manifests amongst all ranks in the
form of a spirit of self-denial, moderation, tolerance, respect for women
and elderly members of society and an ability to live in peace and
harmony in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious environment. The need for
continued reiteration and consideration of these values to the troops is,
therefore, sine qua non.
16. CompatibIe Logistics Support. Commanders at all levels must
ensure that compatible logistic support, to include replenishment of war
like material, supplies, medical and postal cover, are given due attention.
GuideIines for Media Interaction
Stress Management
Gauging Success of MiIitary Operations
17. The number of terrorists killed in action or captured alone cannot
help military commanders gauge the overall success of their operations.
This must also be measured by the enthusiasm or groundswell for peace
that operations generate within the populace.
18. Certain indicators for gauging success of military operations in the
conflict zone are as follows:-

(a) Success of border sealing operations, to include:-
(i) Number of infiltration attempts eliminated.
(ii) Terrorists killed in action during infiltration.
(iii) Number of terrorists who have managed to infiltrate.

(b) Success of operations in the hinterland to include:-
(i) Number of terrorists neutralised (killed in action,
apprehended and surrendered).
(ii) Recovery of war like material.
(iii) Attrition on own rank and file.
(iv) Violence profile (lowand high risk incidents).
(v) Civilian casualties.
(vi) Recruitment of locals into various terrorist outfits.
(c) Groundswell for peace, to include:-
(i) General stance of locals towards the Army.
(ii) Number of overground workers neutralised.
(iii) Degree of real time intelligence.
(iv) Local assistance for various civic action projects.
(v) Protests against the Army for any alleged Human
Rights violations.
(vi) Number of seditious media reports.
(d) Functioning of state government's institutions in the conflict
zone.
41 40 NTELLGENCE NTELLGENCE
INTELLIGENCE
Chapter 4
GeneraI
1. ntelligence is the medium for the real time flow of information
leading to conduct of successful operations. t ensures clinical execution
and specific targeting. t is also a manifestation of the support from the
people who are both a medium as well as a source, depending upon the
manner in which they are employed. Sub conventional operations are
synonymous with People's War due to wider representation of the
population and their capability to supplement security forces' effort
against the insurgents/terrorists.
2. Mapping of the environment would have already been undertaken
prior to the induction into the conflict zone. However, after induction,
intelligence effort should be utilised to fill the voids in the mapped
intelligence mosaic and to generate intelligence that facilitates creating
secure and conducive conditions.
GuideIines for Generation of ReaI-time InteIIigence
3. OperationaI and TacticaI InteIIigence. This necessitates
acquisition of intelligence in relation to the operational centres of gravity
and critical vulnerabilities of the terrorists. n specific terms, this will relate
inter alia, to intelligence on various terrorists groups, their support bases,
nexus between groups, their hierarchical structures, combat potential,
over ground workers, infrastructure for logistic sustenance, hideouts,
caches, past patterns of violence and depredatory activities, hardcore
terrorist cadres, sources of religious and / or ideological motivation and
interface between external support base and methodology for the
movement of men and material. There is also a need to acquire
intelligence on terrain and weather and howthese impact on the terrorists'
activity and conduct of own military operations.

4. Integrated Approach. Human, si gnal and el ectroni c
intelligence must be integrated for providing a cogent picture of the
conflict zone. This also highlights the importance of efficient interface
between various intelligence agencies, which must be coordinated under
the aegis of the apex security mechanism in the State. Suitable signal
communications with redundancy should cater for real time vertical and
horizontal sharing of intelligence.
5. CoIIation, AnaIysis and Dissemination. Suitable mechanism
must be created for effective collation, analysis and timely dissemination
of intelligence. t is important that the 'think tanks' created at Corps and
Command levels are given access to the data bank and their assessment
factored into the formulation of 'overall intelligence picture'. To enable real
time exploitation of the intelligence inputs, it is imperative that quick
reaction teams are earmarked at all levels.
6. StabiIity of InteIIigence Grid. A frequent change in the
counter terrorist deployment also disturbs the intelligence grid, which
takes time to establish. Therefore, it may be prudent to ensure continuity
of the counter terrorist grid and obviate frequent changes in the
deployment. The fluid nature of terrorists' activity should be dealt with by
employing reserves at all levels.
7. HandIing of Sources. t is axiomatic that the source
providing intelligence is protected. Tendency to launch post haste
operations, at times, results in the source getting compromised. While
speed in launching of operations is imperative, careless handling of the
source must be guarded against.
43 42 NTELLGENCE NTELLGENCE
8. EstabIishing Interface for Passage of InteIIigence. One of
the greatest challenges of sub conventional operations is the ability to
create suitable interface for the passage of human intelligence in a real
time frame. Terrorists institute checks and balances through the over
ground workers in a manner that it becomes virtually impossible for
anyone to visit or speak to security personnel either directly or on the
telephone. Not only do the over ground workers create necessary
deterrence for sources through their physical presence in the
environment, they also tap telephone lines at the telephone exchanges
for this purpose. Therefore, the interface must address the security needs
of the sources. While stale intelligence is available in plenty and only
contributes to discerning patterns, it is the real time intelligence passage
mechanism that has to be created imaginatively. The methods to be
employed should not disturb normal behavioral patterns and should not
catch the hostile eye.
Emphasis on proactive intelligence generation.
ntegration of human, signal and electronic intelligence.
Effective mechanism for intelligence sharing.
Stability of intelligence grid.
Protection of source.
Co-opt assessment of 'think tanks' into intelligence picture.
9. Dynamic EmpIoyment of TechnoIogicaI Resources.
(a) The electronic warfare resources should be deployed/
redeployed in the backdrop of terrorists' movement patterns. t is,
therefore, important that regular plotting of terrorists' movements
is incorporated in the collation plans. Concurrently, technological
resources must also be optimally utilised to provide security to own
personnel, material, operations and information.
(b) t is imperative to exploit the Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, ntelligence, nteroperability,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability of security forces. t
will assist in intelligence sharing, tracking the movement of
insurgents / terrorists and timely decision making. A tracking
matrix, which entails constant plotting of movement inputs to
generate a pattern over a period of time, must be maintained.
InteIIigence Operations
45 44 WNNNG HEARTS AND MNDS WNNNG HEARTS AND MNDS
WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS
Chapter 5
Rigveda
'Let not the fruits of action be the motive of your actions, otherwise
you might be disappointed and leave the path of right action".
GeneraI
1. Since populace comprises the centre of gravity, winning their
hearts and minds is central to the success of sub conventional
operations. To achieve this, it is imperative that military operations
besides being undertaken with a humane approach must also be
supplemented by developmental activity coupled with imaginative public
information and perception management initiatives. The inset figure
aptly highlights the success zone that is achieved by the application of
above initiatives.

Zone
comprising
maximum
yearning for
peace
PeopIe FriendIy
MiIitary
Operations
Civic Actions/
DeveIopmentaI
Work

PubIic Information
& Perception
Management
Operations
2. Winning Hearts and Minds has active and passive facets. Both
help create a conducive environment, generate a healthy image for the
Army and resultantly a groundswell for peace.
Passive Civic Action Active Civic Action

Construction and functioning
Concept of Civic Actions
3. These actions should be aimed at alleviating the sufferings of the
local populace and, as such, should always be identified by them. f not
undertaken imaginatively, these actions lose their relevance and begin to
be misconstrued as mere appeasement gestures. Therefore, the
involvement of the populace from inception to completion of various
projects is important. For better impact, preferably the local leaders
should inaugurate these projects. Necessary security arrangements
should always be provided until the project becomes an inseparable part
of the community life and its security is everyone's concern. Military
leaders should also cater for the upkeep of all civic action projects and
ensure these are maintained in good shape till taken over by the local
government agencies. For facilitating a coordinated development, all
civic action projects should be included in the government's overall
development plan of the conflict zone. This inclusion, besides eliminating

Respect to elders and
,
47 46 WNNNG HEARTS AND MNDS WNNNG HEARTS AND MNDS
duplication of effort, also helps to strengthen the hands of local governing
bodies. Where the change in attitudes is likely to take a long time, it may
be prudent to undertake projects that target the youth, in terms of
addressing their needs for education and for generating jobs.
4. ReIevance and PracticabiIity. Each region and every struggle
is unique in its expression, given the peculiarities of terrain, demography,
economy and social development index. This complexity leads to a
plethora of variables that should be correctly correlated to the ground
realities. Therefore, civic action projects should be identified accordingly.
n the initial stages, such projects are generally undertaken in isolation.
However, when the state government machinery starts functioning, these
projects should be coordinated jointly to ensure optimisation of
resources.
5. Experience shows that in the initial stages, the Army's effort for
civic actions is generally focused towards facilitating running of the
schools, providing medical and veterinary cover in remote areas along
with resuscitation of the medical facilities of the state and improving
accessibility to the remote areas. n the later stages of the campaign, the
focus shifts to empowering and 'helping people to help themselves'. This
includes emphasis on vocational training, women empowerment and
initiation of projects that facilitate generation of self employment
opportunities.
Effort employed on civic action projects should not be at the expense
of primary task of neutralising terrorists and their supporters, which
should continue in accordance with the laws of the land, to create a
secure environment.
The focus of civic action projects shouId be to
`heIp the peopIe to heIp themseIves'
Feedback on Civic Action Projects
6. An objective feedback system is important to ensure effective
monitoring to enable timely completion of projects. This feedback also
helps in understanding the aspirations of the locals so that future projects
can be planned accordingly. Such monitoring needs to be coordinated
under the aegis of the unified headquarters.
Participative
7. The 'Hearts and Minds' campaign should be participative in nature
with the local populace fully involved in its planning and execution. This
would find more acceptability amongst the locals, as it would meet their
aspirations. One such example is building schools. While our concept of
schools may follow a cosmopolitan outlook, each region may have
different needs in keeping with the local social fabric and economic
realities. Such needs must be catered for.
49 48 TRANNG TRANNG
TRAINING
Chapter 6
GeneraI
1. Sub conventional operations differ from conventional war in
several ways and, therefore, the approach to training for such operations
warrants different focus. n sub conventional operations, success hinges
on thorough understanding of the genesis and nuances of these
problems in correct perspective, especially since these operations are
conducted under the scrutiny of the populace, media and human rights'
activists. There is a need to change a soldier's mindset from fighting the
'enemy' in a conventional conflict, for which he is trained, to fighting his
'own people'. There is, therefore, a need to lay down a clear philosophy in
keeping with the identified training requirements.
2. The system of training must ensure that the troops are launched in
operations only after necessary orientation, adequate pre-induction
training and preparation. Training in a sub conventional environment
must remain a continuous process. The training involves gaining
proficiency in multi-dimensional activities, which range from physical
fitness, shooting skills, field and battle craft, including adoption of hard
target procedures, intelligence generation, small team operations and
employment of technology at the tactical level, to planning and conduct of
operations up to unit level. The content and conduct of training should
also include Arms/Services specific training, as well as training to
facilitate the conduct of synergised inter-agency complex operations.
Training Facets
3. Orientation. t is essential to understand the genesis of the
problem in the area. This would encompass public perception of the
problem, reasons for the struggle and inputs on various key players of the
environment. n addition, the units should acquire detailed knowledge of
the area of operations, its people, their customs, traditions, language and
religious beliefs. The political, social, economic and psychological
essence of the ongoing conflict needs to be understood and appreciated
since management of the environment forms an important component of
higher commanders' challenges. They must acquire detailed knowledge
of insurgents/terrorists, their organisation and modus operandi. t is also
critical to educate the inducting units about certain psychological ploys,
which may be used by the terrorists for misleading the people for
propaganda purposes.
4. LegaI Aspects. The Army has been involved in protracted
periods of deployment in sub conventional operations during the last fifty
years. However, one of the areas where the insurgents/terrorists have
taken advantage of prevailing circumstances is exploitation of law. t is,
therefore, essential that all important aspects relating to arrest, filing of
First nformation Reports and maintenance of documents should be
taught to inducting units. Units also need to be educated about loopholes
likely to be exploited by the insurgents/terrorists both to evade
prosecution and filing of false cases against security forces. The
understanding of the COAS Commandments and Do's and Don'ts
assume added significance in this regard.
5. PhysicaI and PsychoIogicaI Conditioning. Every trai ni ng
regimen focuses at both the mind and the body. Even as the two are an
integral part of training in the Army, sub conventional operations
necessitate a far greater reliance on training the mind, as the body
continues to get trained across the operational spectrum of combat.
Troops need to remain physically fit, mentally robust, and ready for round
51 50 TRANNG TRANNG
the clock operations. They should be able to fathom the tactics and
modus operandi of insurgents/terrorists and pre-empt these through
ingenious tactics. More often than not, environment appearing normal
may not be so and as such totally misleading. Men should be able to see
through such situations, which can make a difference between success
and failure.
6. Ingenuity. While drills and procedures form the basis for
operating in the environment, it is the innovativeness and creativity of
soldiers, which should be honed during training. t is especially relevant at
the tactical level, where all ranks must be trained to think 'out of the box'
solutions to complex problems and situations. The experience gained in
sub conventional operations, needs to be documented and disseminated
through an institutionalised mechanism.
Organisation of Training
7. Training of Inducting Units. Training should be progressive,
innovative and organised on the following lines: -
(a) Orientation Training. A unit training team should
carry out orientation training of the unit being inducted at its
previous peace location for a period of three months.
Fundamental aspects of sub conventional operations should be
focused on during this period. To ensure a pragmatic training
curriculum, it is imperative that the training team of the unit being
inducted not only visits the projected area of operations but also
undergoes a structured training capsule at the Counter nsurgency
and Jungle Warfare School, and also at the concerned Corps
Battle School.
(b) Pre-Induction Training. After the orientation training,
all units must be made to undergo pre-induction training at the
concerned Corps Battle School for a period of six weeks so that
they are fully geared to undertake the impending task. The
training should be practical incorporating the lessons learnt and
future trends.
(c) On the Job Training. On the job training should be
conducted in the area of responsibility along with the unit being
relieved, for a period of three to four weeks. However, honing of
basic skills should be a continuous process.
8. Training in Various SchooIs of Instructions and RegimentaI
Centres. ndividual training for officers in sub conventional warfare
should begin during pre-commissioning stage. The cadets should be
sensitised to salient aspects of sub conventional operations. Post
commission training should be built into various tactical courses. The
training for Junior Commissioned Officers and Other Ranks should also
start at regimental centres during recruit training and progressively built
into various promotion cadres and tactical courses. n addition, the
following aspects should also be given necessary importance:-
(a) Case Studies. Case studies are a very effective
method of assimilating lessons learnt during operations. These
should be incorporated in the training curriculum. Officers who
have participated in the specific operations should preferably
present the case studies. Centre for Army Lessons Learnt should
be optimally utilised for this purpose.
(b) Language Training. Nominated officers, Junior
Commissioned Officers and Other Ranks should be made to
undergo refresher language courses at regular intervals.
Maximum personnel of unit being inducted in the conflict zone
should also be imparted language training.
(c) NodaI Agency. Counter nsurgency and Jungle
Warfare School should become the repository, nodal agency and
'centre of excellence' for training in sub conventional operations.
53 52 HUMAN RGHTS TRANNG
The School, in conjunction with concerned Commands and
formation headquarters, should bring out regular bulletins
highlighting various facets of the insurrectionist environment along
with suggested measures and tactics to counter the dynamic
modus operandi of terrorists.
Junior Leaders' Training
9. Sub conventional operations are invariably decentralised at the
unit and sub unit level, thus placing heavy demands on junior leadership.
This aspect merits a total reorientation of junior leaders to include the
conditioning of their psyche, understanding of the situation, physical and
mental fitness, as also deep insight into the nature and conduct of
operations. Besides acquiring basic military skills, a junior leader should
be trained to operate effectively in the complexities of inter-agency
environment, which underscores the importance of understanding the
concept of operations and rules of engagement. This calls for honing the
technical, tactical and conceptual skills of junior leaders. t is also
imperative that adequate freedom is afforded to junior leaders to exercise
initiative to deal with various situations independently.
HUMAN RIGHTS
Chapter 7
GeneraI
1. Respect for Human Rights emanates from the very essence of
human behaviour and interaction. The ndian Army has nurtured Human
Rights with care and compassion for over two centuries and holds these
Fundamental Rights as one of its most cherished values.
2. Human Rights assume added significance in the context of sub
conventional operations as these operations necessitate the
employment of security forces with restrictive rules of engagement. This
is because such operations essentially require non kinetic means for the
management of conflict, consequent to the creation of a secure
environment, wherein the employment of kinetic means is a must in the
initial stages. Also, since these operations are conducted in small teams,
soldiers are often required to operate under Junior and Non
Commissioned Officers, and more often than not are required to take
independent decisions on the use of force. For such decision making, it is
important that all ranks not only possess suitable frames of reference but
also are fully conversant with the rights of the people, so that the rules of
engagement are drawn up in the context of legal provisions.
55 54 HUMAN RGHTS HUMAN RGHTS
MethodoIogy for Ensuring ScrupuIous Respect for Human Rights
3. Mechanism. With the Army's continued employment in counter
insurgency operations, there is a need to respond pragmatically to all
Human Rights issues. Towards this end, a Human Rights Cell has been
constituted at Army Headquarters, under the Adjutant General. The
Human Rights Cell processes allegations and reports, collects relevant
data and analyses these from the legal point of view. Similar mechanisms
also exist at Command and Corps levels. To ensure that Army
Headquarters policy on Human Rights is implemented down to the unit
level, formation and unit commanders must create suitable mechanisms
at their level as well. Such mechanisms, besides ensuring timely action
against any alleged Human Rights violation, also keep the environment
sensitised about this constitutional obligation. n addition, such
mechanisms also remain focused to preclude terrorists' machinations at
maligning security forces through contrived situations and manipulated
incidents.
4. PromuIgation of Orders. Exhaustive orders on the subject
have been promulgated from time to time. These include:-
(a) COAS Ten Commandments promulgated in the year 1993
and supplemented in 2005. Refer Appendix B.
(b) Do's and Don'ts while acting under the Armed Forces
Special Powers Act, 1958, prepared based on
Supreme Court Judgement on the Writ Petition
Numbers (C) Nos. 5328/80, 9229-30/82, Civil
Appeals Nos. 721/85, 722/85, 723/85. 724/85,
2173-76/91, 2551/91, Writ Petitions (C) Nos.
13644-45/84 decided on 27 November 1997 and subsequent
judgement on Petition No 4198 of 1999 passed in July 2001.
Refer Appendix C.

(c) Do's and Don'ts while operating under the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Refer Appendix C.
(d) Relevant provisions contained in Aid to Civil Authority 1970.
Deep respect for Human Rights and scrupulous upholding of
Laws of the Land.
Ensuring awareness amongst all ranks on Human Rights.
Expeditious investigation and disposal of alleged Human Rights
violations.
Promulgation of punishment meted out to defaulting personnel for
deterrent effect.
Zero toIerance to Human Rights vioIations.
Honour - living up to all the
Army values.
Integrity - do what is right
morally and legally.
LoyaIty - bear true faith and
al l egi ance t o t he ndi an
Constitution, ndian Army, your
regiment, unit and colleagues.
Zero ToIerance
5. The concept of 'ron Fist and Velvet Glove' promulgated in 2005
underscores the importance of Human Rights, which centres on 'Truth,
Justice and Transparency'. To ensure that requisite deterrence prevails
amongst the security forces on the
subject of Human Rights, it is
imperative that the fundamental
stance of the Army entailing 'Zero
Tolerance' is reiterated to one and
all from time to time. This must be
under t aken al ong wi t h t he
reiteration of basic army values,
which are 'zzat, mandari and
Wafadari' (Honour, ntegrity and
Loyalty). This also mandates commanders at all levels to expeditiously
investigate alleged violations to mete out speedy justice.
Army's OveraII Approach towards Human Rights
57 56 LEADERSHP LEADERSHP
LEADERSHIP
Chapter 8
Netaji Subash Chandra Bose
'Good leaders show greater than average willingness to take risks
and engage in unconventional actions to attain their goals".
ChaIIenges
1. Sub conventional operational arena poses the most difficult
challenge for testing the leadership acumen of commanders at various
levels. The volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity of the
environment impacts on the decision making and, therefore, underscores
the importance of suitable frames of reference and training to enable
commanders to operate effectively in an arena, which is largely 'grey'.
2. ChaIIenges at OperationaI LeveI. The challenges for the
leaders at operational level are:-
(a) Ensuring the correct orientation of their command for sub
conventional operations.
(b) Training of heterogeneous components of combat
resources.
(c) ntelligence generation.
(d) Coping with subversion in various institutions during the
initial stages of operations.
(e) Eliciting accountability of various security agencies in the
conflict zone and ensuring effective coordination and synergy in
the initial stages of the campaign (this is essentially on account of
the absence of unified headquarters at this stage).
(f) Preservation of own combat power and maintenance of
morale.
(g) Coping with the time differential in creating counter
measures for overcoming the technological capabilities of the
terrorist.
(h) Dealing with seditious media reports by subverted sections
of local media.
3. ChaIIenges at TacticaI LeveI. Challenges at tactical level
are:-
(a) ntelligence generation at grass roots level.
(b) Adhering to parameters laid down for engagement.
(c) Ensuring adherence to prescribed tactical norms during
operations.
(d) Stress management.
(e) Preventing attrition in own rank and file.
4. To meet the above challenges, it is imperative that leaders at all
levels possess necessary conceptual, tactical and technical skills and
understand the ways and means for the effective application of combat
resources.
59 58 LEADERSHP LEADERSHP
Improving Effectiveness of the Leaders
5. Effective leadership can be gauged from three facets, ie 'What a
leader must Be', 'What he must Know' and finally, 'What he must Do'.
Various aspects under these three categories are:-
(a) What a Leader Must Be. An effective leader must
possess the basic leadership traits, which enable him to operate
with an even handed approach. Some of the essential traits that
enable a leader to operate in a sub conventional operations arena
are alertness, physical and moral courage, decisiveness,
perseverance, integrity and loyalty to the organisational goals and
to other members of the team.
(b) What a Leader Must Know. An effective leader must
be conversant with the environmental realities including local
customs and traditions, the rules of engagement that have been
prepared in the context of political, legal and moral parameters,
the principles for the employment of force in an inter-agency
complex environment and the strengths and weaknesses of his
command. n addition, a leader must be a master of field craft,
battle drills and tactics.
(c) What a Leader Must Do. A leader must :-
(i) Work with a spirit of selflessness. The Chetwode
credo aptly highlights this spirit.
"The safety, honour and weIfare of your country
come first, aIways and every time.
The honour, weIfare and comfort of the men
you command come next.
Your own ease, comfort and safety come Iast,
AIways and every time."
(ii) Keep his cool under adverse situations and be
able to take pragmatic decisions.
(iii) Motivate his command to deliver with precision.
This will also necessitate leading by example.
(iv) Be able to outsmart the terrorists through guile,
guts and professional competence.
(v) Maintain high levels of combat worthiness of his
command.
61 60 EMERGNG CHALLENGES EMERGNG CHALLENGES
EMERGING CHALLENGES
Chapter 9
Kautilya
'A single assign can achieve, with weapons, fire or poison, more
than a fully mobilised army".
GeneraI
1. The ambiguity in the definition of terrorism, which was being
exploited by some to justify the use of terrorism on the adage 'one man's
terrorist being another man's freedom fighter', has to a great extent been
removed in the aftermath of various sensational terrorist strikes across
the globe. Therefore, while the global war on terrorism has resulted in
congruence of various nation states to deal with the scourge of lethal
forms of terrorism, the international community is yet to mature its thought
process on dealing with asymmetric threats in unison. These threats
entail the employment of non lethal and/or non kinetic means to target the
economic, informational and at times, even the diplomatic elements of
national power. n this regard, the exploitation of readily available
technology to the terrorists on account of globalisation is a cause of
concern.
Terrorism ReIated to Weapons of Mass Destruction
2. The proliferation of technology related to weapons of mass
destruction and its associated delivery vectors is fast emerging as a major
cause of concern. Certain emerging threats in this regard are as
under :-
(a) While technology related to manufacture of nuclear
weapons may be outside the capability of most non state actors/
terrorists, improvised nuclear explosive devices and radiological
dispersal devices (dirty bombs) could be used with devastating
consequences to life and property.
(b) Advances in bio-technology, molecular biology and genetic
engineering and the availability of such technology in the public
domain could be used with malicious intent to cause widespread
panic and breakdown of public health systems.
(c) Although use / manufacture of chemical weapons have
been banned under an international treaty, industrial toxic
chemicals could become the preferred alternative choice for use
by terrorists.
Cyber Terrorism and Information Warfare
3. Emerging asymmetric threats also include the proliferation of
technology related to the use of cyber and information warfare techniques
which can be used to cripple global informational links or economy of
target countries without crossing of international borders. These could be
used by terrorists or non state actors to target :-
(a) Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
ntelligence, nteroperability, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
infrastructure.
(b) Service based industry.
63 62 EMERGNG CHALLENGES
(c) Banking and financial services.
(d) Transportation sector, to include rail, road, shipping and
aircraft movements.
(e) Power generation and distribution.
Contours of Emerging ChaIIenges
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their likely
exploitation by terrorists - a major cause of concern.
Asymmetric threats including cyber and information warfare
techniques pose major challenges to command, control
infrastructure and economic stability of the nation.
Transnational signatures are likely in future terrorist attacks.
CONCLUSION
1. The challenges of sub conventional operations are going to seek
more and more involvement of the Armed Forces in times to come. On the
domestic scene, while the resolution of the ongoing insurgencies in J&K
and North East is likely to take some time, the possibility of prevalent
socio-economic facets being exploited by inimical elements to vitiate the
internal security environment is also a distinct possibility. Therefore, there
is a need for the men and women in uniform to remain live to the nuances
of our internal security scene and be prepared to counter various sub
conventional threats that may emerge from time to time. This Doctrine
provides the necessary tenets and guidelines for gearing up to meet such
challenges.
2. This Doctrine has covered various aspects related to the
understanding and meeting the challenges posed by insurgency,
terrorism and proxy war. Asymmetric warfare and border skirmishes also
fall in the domain of sub conventional warfare. However, these have not
been covered in this document. While asymmetric warfare is being dealt
by other government agencies, border skirmishes have not been covered
as these fall under the purviewof operational plans, which are classified.
3. An endeavour has been made to encapsulate our collective
wisdom and philosophy in this document. However, it must be
remembered that the dynamic nature of sub conventional operations
merits constant review to accommodate changes in keeping with
emerging domestic, regional and global trends.
4. This Doctrine being authoritative should be followed, except when
in exceptional circumstances, the judgement of local commanders
dictates it otherwise. The inclusion of salient aspects of this Doctrine in
curricula of various training establishments will also be ensured.
65 64
EXPLANATION OF TERMS
1. Spectrum of ConfIict. The spectrum of conflict ranges from
insurgency at one end to nuclear war at the other. While insurgency and
proxy war constitute low intensity conflict, total war, global war and
nuclear war constitute high intensity conflict.
2. Sub ConventionaI ConfIict Operations. Sub conventional
operations encompass all kinds of armed conflicts that are above the
level of peaceful co-existence amongst states and belowthe threshold of
war. t includes low intensity conflicts i.e. proxy war, insurgency and
terrorism. Border skirmishes also fall under this category. Sub
conventional operations figure at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict
and are characterised by asymmetry of force levels between the regular
and the irregular forces, with restrictive rules of engagement for the
former.
3. Proxy War. Proxy war is a war conducted between nations
utilising non state players to fight on their behalf. n any case, at least one
of them must employ a third party to fight on his behalf. The extent and
type of support provided by the states involved in proxy war will vary but
financial and logistical support are normally always provided.
4. Insurgency. nsurgency is an organised armed struggle by a
section of the local population against the state, usually with foreign
support. Possible causes of an insurgency include ideological, ethnic or
linguistic differences; or politico-socio-economic reasons and/or
fundamentalism and extremism. nterference by external forces or inept
handling of the situation may act as a catalyst to provide impetus to the
movement.
Appendix A
(Refers to Paragraph 8
of the ntroduction)
5. Terrorism. Terrorism is the unlawful use or threatened use of
force or violence against people or property to terrorise, coerce or
intimidate governments or societies; this is most often resorted to with the
aim of achieving political, religious, or ideological objectives. Terrorism
thrives on a fear psychosis and could be employed as a part of an
insurrectionist movement or independently.
6. AsymmetricaI Warfare. Asymmetric warfare is a term to
describe a military situation in which two belligerents of unequal power or
capacity of action, interact and take advantage of the strength and
weaknesses of themselves and their enemies. This interaction often
involves strategies and tactics outside the bounds of conventional
warfare. t may include use of cyber and informational warfare, and/or
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear related technologies.
7. Counter Insurgency. t is the use of all measures of
Government activity to combat insurgency, including operations by the
military, Central Para-Military Forces, economic development, political
reforms and perception management aimed at winning 'Hearts and
Minds' of people.
8. Counter Terrorism. Counter terrorism covers all offensive
measures taken to respond to terrorist acts and could include actions
taken by all government agencies, including the security forces of a
nation. The measures could be in terms of bringing terrorists to justice or
their elimination by direct action, isolation and application of pressure on
States that sponsor terrorism, amongst other measures.
9. Subversion. Subversion is an act calculated to undermine or
divert the loyalty of any person with a view to rendering him ineffective in
the organisation he belongs to or make him cooperate with an unfriendly
or enemy country or a dissident or disaffected group.
Note : For definition of the above terms, refer to the General Staff
Publications on the subject (being classified, relevant text has not been
included).
67 66
Appendix B
(Refers to Paragraph 11(a)
(iii) of Chapter 3)
COAS TEN COMMANDMENTS (1993)
1. No rape.
2. No molestation.
3. No torture resulting in death or maiming.
4. No military disgrace.
5. No meddling in civil administration.
6. Competence in platoon/company level tactics in counter
insurgency operations.
7. Willingly carry out civic action with innovations.
8. Develop media interaction.
9. Respect Human Rights.
10. Only fear God, uphold Dharma and enjoy serving the country.
SUPPLEMENTARY COMMANDMENTS (2005)
1. Remember that people you are dealing with, are your own
countrymen. All your conduct must be dictated by this one significant
consideration.
2. Operations must be people friendly, using minimum force and
avoiding collateral damage - restraint must be the key.
3. Good intelligence is the key to success - the thrust of your
operations must be intelligence based and must include the militant
leadership.4. Be compassionate, help the people and win their hearts
and minds. Employ all resources under your command to improve their
living conditions.
5. No operations without police representative. No operations
against women cadres under any circumstances without Mahila Police.
Operations against women insurgents be preferably carried out by police.
6. Be truthful, honest and maintain highest standards of integrity,
honour, discipline, courage and sacrifice.
7. Sustain physical and moral strength, mental robustness and
motivation.
8. Train hard, be vigilant and maintain highest standards of military
professionalism.
9. Synergise your actions with the civil administration and other
security forces.
10. Uphold Dharma and take pride in your Country and the Army.
69 68
Appendix C
(Refers to Paragraph 11(a)
(iii) of Chapter 3)
LIST OF DO'S AND DON'TS WHILE ACTING UNDER THE
ARMED FORCES (SPECIAL POWERS) ACT, 1958
PREAMBLE
1. Protection and respect of human dignity, human decency and
human rights are the very essence of rule of law and social order in
civilised society. Armed Forces are called in aid to civil authorities to
maintain and restore law and order as also to provide assistance in case
of natural calamities and catastrophies. Thus members of the Armed
Forces act as the protectors of the social order so that other citizens can
enjoy the fruits in an orderly society.
2. When deployed in aid to civil authority, the Armed Forces of the
Union operate in the State concerned in cooperation with the civil
administration so that the situation affecting maintenance of public order,
which has necessitated the deployment of the Armed Forces, is
effectively dealt with and normalcy is restored. The Central Act, viz
Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958, does not displace the civil
power of the State by the Armed Forces of the Union and it only provides
for deployment of Armed Forces of the Union in aid of the civil power. The
word 'aid' postulates the continued existence of the authority to be aided.
This means that even after deployment of the Armed Forces the civil
power continues to function.
3. The instructions given below in the form of DO's and DON'Ts are
binding instructions which are required to be followed by the members of
the Armed Forces exercising powers under the Armed Forces (Special
Powers) Act 1958 and any disregard of these instructions would entail
suitable action under Army Act, 1950.
DO's AND DON'Ts
DO's
4. Action Before Operation.
(a) Act only in the area declared as "Disturbed under Section 3
of the Act.
(b) Before taking action to fire upon or using force, ensure :-
(i) There exists a prohibitory order against assembly of
five or more persons or carrying of weapons or fire arms/
ammunition or explosive substances in the disturbed area
and the persons concerned have acted in contravention of
such order.
(ii) Power to open fire, using force or arrest is exercised
only by an Officer, JCO/WO or NCO.
(iii) Such officer is satisfied that action is necessary for
maintenance of public order, and
(iv) Due warning is given by such person exercising
powers under this section.
(c) Under Section 4(b) of the Act, any Officer, JCO/WO and
NCO may destroy those arms dump, prepared or fortified
position or shelter from which armed attacks are made or are likely
to be made or are attempted to be made or any structure used as
training camp for armed volunteers or utilised as hide out by armed
gang or absconders wanted for any offence. Before taking action,
ensure that such officer is of the opinion that it is necessary to
destroy any arms dump etc.
71 70
(d) Under Section 4(c) of the Act, powers to arrest any person
without warrant can only be exercised if that person has committed
a cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable suspicion
exists that he has committed cognizable offence or is about to
commit a cognizable offence. For effecting arrest, such force as
may be necessary can be exercised. Ensure that only such a
person who has either committed a cognizable offence or against
whom reasonable suspicion exists, is arrested, innocent persons
are not to be arrested.
(e) Under Section 4(d) of the Act, power can only be exercised
to enter and search without warrant any premises, to make any
such arrest of any person as mentioned in Sub Para 4(d) above, to
recover any person believed to be wrongfully restrained or
confined or any property reasonably suspected to be stolen
property or any arms, ammunition or explosive substances
believed to be unlawfully kept in such premises and the concerned
person may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary.
Ensure that before launching any raid/ search, definite information
about the activity is obtained from the local source and/ or civil
authorities.
(f) Ensure that the troops deployed in aid to civil authorities
operate in the State concerned in cooperation with the civil
administration.
5. Action During Operation.
(a) While exercising powers conferred under Section 4 of the
Act, ensure that minimal force required for effective action against
the person/ persons acting in contravention of the prohibitory order
is used.
(b) n case of necessity of opening fire or using any force
against any person(s), ascertain that the same is essential for
maintenance of public order. Open fire only after due warning.
(c) The provisions of Criminal Procedure Code governing
search and seizure are applicable during the course of search and
seizures conducted in exercise of powers conferred vide Section
4(d) of the Act. Therefore:-
(i) Before making a search, the concerned person
about to make search is to ensure that two or more
independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality are
available or are willing to be a witness to the search, to
attend and witness the search and may issue an order in
writing to them or any of them so to do on Form at Appendix
(not attached). The search is to be made in their presence
and a list of all things seized in the course of such search
and of the places in which they are respectively found is to
be prepared by such officer or other person and signed by
such witnesses but no person witnessing a search under
this Section, is required to attend, the Court as a witness of
the search unless especially summoned by it.
(ii) The occupant of the place searched, or some
person on his behalf, in every instance, is to be permitted to
attend the search, and a copy of the list prepared duly
signed by the said witnesses, is to be delivered to such
occupant or person.
(d) The persons acting under the Act while effecting the arrest
of a woman or making search of a woman or in searching the place
in the actual occupancy of a female shall follow the procedure
meant for the police officers as contemplated under the various
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely, the
73 72
provison to Sub Section (2) of Section 47, Sub Section (2) of
Section 51, Sub Section (3) of Section 100 and proviso to Sub
Section (1) of Section 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
These provisions in substance provide as under:-
(i) f any place to be searched is an apartment in the
actual occupancy of a female (not being the persons to be
arrested) who, according to custom, does not appear in
public, then before entering such apartment, such female
shall be informed that she is at liberty to withdraw, and shall
afford her every reasonable facility for withdrawing, and
may then break open the apartment and enter it.
(ii) Whenever it is necessary to cause a female to be
searched, the search shall be made by another female with
strict regard to decency.
(iii) No male person under the age of fifteen years or
woman is required to attend at any place other than the
place in which such male person or woman resides.
(e) Ensure that troops under command do not harass innocent
people, destroy property of the public or unnecessarily enter into
the houses/dwellings of people not connected with any unlawful
activity.
(f) Ensure proper record is maintained of arrested and
released persons after apprehension.
6. Action After Operation.
(a) After arrest, prepare a list of the persons so arrested and
handover the arrested persons to the officer-in-charge of the
nearest police station with the least possible delay together with a
report of the circumstances occasioning the arrest so that the
arrested person can be produced before the nearest Magistrate
within a period of 24 hours of his arrest excluding the time taken for
journey from place of arrest to the Court of Magistrate.
(b) Every delay in handing over the arrested person to the
police must be justified depending upon the place, time of arrest
and the territory in which such person has been arrested.
(c) After raid, make out a list of all property, arms, ammunition
or any other incriminating material/ documents taken into
possession.
(d) All such property, arms, ammunition, stores, etc are to be
handed over to the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station
together with a report of the circumstances occasioning such
search and seizure. Supreme Court Order passed on petition No
4198 of 1999 will be scrupulously followed with regard to custody
of seized arms, ammunition and other property by the Army
authorities.
(e) Obtain receipt of persons and arms/ammunition stores etc
so handed over to the police and maintain proper record of such
receipts.
(f) Maintain record of the area where operations are launched,
with details of date, time and the persons participating in such
operations.
(g) Maintain a record of the Commander and other
Officers/JCOs/NCOs forming part of such task forces.
(h) Ensure medical relief to all persons injured during the
encounter. f any person dies in the encounter, the dead body be
handed over immediately to the officer-in-charge of the nearest
75 74
police station along with the details leading to such death.
(j) Maintain detailed record of the entire operation correctly
and explicitly.
7. DeaIing with CiviI Courts.
(a) Ensure that directions/ instructions of the Supreme Court/
High Courts and other subordinate judiciary are promptly attended
to.
(b) Whenever summoned by the Courts, ensure that decorum
of the Court is maintained and proper respect paid.
(c) Answer questions of the Courts politely and with dignity.
DON'Ts
8. (a) Do not keep a person under custody for any period longer
than the bare necessary for handing over to the nearest Police
Station.
(b) Do not use third degree methods to extract information or to
extract confession or other involvement in unlawful activities.
(c) Do not use any force after having arrested a person except
when he is trying to escape.
(d) Do not release the person directly after apprehending on
your own; effect release of such person through civil police.
(e) Do not take back a person after he is handed over to civil
police.
(f) Do not tamper with official records.
LIST OF DO'S AND DON'TS WHILE PROVIDING AID TO CIVIL
AUTHORITY IN LAWAND ORDER SITUATION (CrPC-131)
DO's
9. (a) Act in close cooperation with civil authorities throughout.
(b) Maintain inter-communication if possible by telephone/
radio.
(c) Obtain requisition from the Magistrate when present.
(d) Use as little force and do as little injury to person and
property as may be consistent with attainment of objective in view.
(e) n case you decide to open fire:-
(i) Give warning in local language that fire will be
effective.
(ii) Attract attention before firing by bugle or other
means.
(iii) Distribute your men in fire units with specified
commanders.
(iv) Control fire by issuing personal orders.
(v) Note number of rounds fired.
(vi) Aim at the front of crowd actually rioting or inciting to
riot or at conspicuous ring leaders, ie, do not fire into the
thick of the crowd.
77 76
(vii) Aim low and shoot for effect with personal weapons
on specific orders.
(viii) Keep all other weapons in reserve.
(ix) Cease fire immediately once the object has been
attained.
(x) Take immediate steps to secure the wounded.
(f) Maintain cordial relations with civilian authorities and Para
Military Forces.
(g) Ensure high standard of discipline.
DON'Ts
10. (a) Do not use excessive force.
(b) Do not get involved in hand to hand struggle with the mob.
(c) Do not ill treat any one, in particular, women and children.
(d) Do not harass any civilian.
(e) Do not resort to any torture.
(f) Do not show any communal bias while dealing with
civilians.
(g) Do not meddle in civilian administration affairs.
(h) Do not accept loss/ surrender of weapons by troops.
(j) Do not accept presents, donations and rewards.
(k) Do not resort to indiscriminate firing.

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