PEOPLE V.

CA & CERBO Panganiban, J CarlosTheFierce Doctrine: If the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of public prosecutor, the trial court should respect such determination. Quick Facts Summary: Prosecutor amended an information to include Billy Cerbo in the murder case. Trial Court dismissed the amended information and ordered the prosecutor to exclude Billy Cerbo and retain only Jonathan Cerbo as the respondent. HELD: Trial Court should respect the determination made by the prosecutor in amending the information. FACTS: Jonathan Cerbo was the primary suspect for the fatal shooting of Rosalinda Dy. An information for murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo. But petitioner Alynn Plezette Dy, daughter of the victim Rosalinda Dy, executed an affidavitcomplaint charging private respondent Billy Cerbo of conspiracy in the killing. Prosecutor Protacio Lumangtad reinvestigated the case with leave of court. Prosecution then filed an amended information including Billy Cerbo in the murder case. A warrant for his arrest was issued. Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest. Trial Court dismissed the case against Billy Cerbo and recalled the warrant for his arrest. More importantly, the Judge ordered the prosecution to withdraw its Amended Information and file a new one charging Jonathan Cerbo only. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial courts dismissal of the Information for murder against Billy Cerbo is proper HELD: No. The trial court, as well as the Court of Appeals that affirmed its ruling, erred in dismissing the Information RATIO:

1. The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function, the correctness of the exercise of which is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. 2. The proceedings before a public prosecutorare essentially preliminary, prefatory and cannot lead to a final, definite and authoritative judgment of the guilt or innocence of the persons charged with a felony or crime. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor i. e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. The public prosecutor has broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom be or she believes to have committed the crime as defined by law. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court.

3.

4.

In a nutshell, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of public prosecutor, the trial court should respect such determination.

DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE The determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for the purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. The prosecutor passes upon the question on whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.

Sales v. Sandiganbayan (Ayesha)

November 16, 2001 REYNOLAN T. SALES, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (4th Division), OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THELMA BENEMERITO, Ynares-Santiago, J.

criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny the accuseds claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process. (Duterte v. Sandiganbayan)

SUMMARY: Incumbent Pagudpud Mayor Sales shot his political rival, Atty. Benemerito. A complaint for murder was filed by his wife, Thelma. Upon determination of probable cause, Judge Calvan issued a warrant of arrest and then forwarded the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos Norte for appropriate action. Sales then received a subpoena from the Provincial Prosecutor directing him to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, which Sales did the following day. However, the Ilocos Norte Provincial Prosecutor, instead of conducting a preliminary investigation of his own, merely forwarded the records submitted by J. Calvan to the Ombudsman for the latter to conduct the same. Sales then received a notice from the Ombudsman directing him to file his counter-affidavits, which he did not act on considering that he had already submitted his counter-affidavits to the Provincial Prosecutor. A Resolution was thus issued recommending the filing of an Information for Murder against Sales and four others before the Sandiganbayan. The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman. SC SET ASIDE the resolution, ordered Sandiganbayan to QUASH the warrant, and REMANDED the case to the Ombudsman for completion of the preliminary investigation. It HELD that from the gathering of evidence until the termination of the preliminary investigation, the state prosecutors were overly-eager to file the case and to secure a warrant of arrest of petitioner without bail and his consequent detention. (1) There was no complete preliminary investigation; (2) The preliminary investigation should be deeper and more thorough since Sales is an incumbent Mayor; (3) Sales was denied his right to file a motion for reconsideration, which is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper; and (4) Judge Calvan, the Ombudsman, and Sandiganbayan failed to apply the standards in determining probable cause.

2. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. A preliminary investigation has been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes a judicial proceeding when there is an opportunity to be heard and for the production of and weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon.

3. The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside or to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than a municipal judge or even a regional trial court judge. While the investigating officer, strictly speaking, is not a judge by the nature of his functions, he is and must be considered to be a quasi-judicial officer because a preliminary investigation is considered a judicial proceeding. A preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage.

4. Since a preliminary investigation is designed to screen cases for trial, only evidence may be considered. While even raw information may justify the initiation of an investigation, the stage of preliminary investigation can be held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated warranting the eventual prosecution of the case in court.

DOCTRINE (feeling ko important lahat sila. T.T):

1. Rationale: The purpose of a preliminary investigation or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is placed on trial, is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. It is also intended to protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. While the right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a

5. It is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of the guarantee of freedom and fair play which are the birthrights of all who live in our country. It is therefore imperative upon the fiscal or the judge, as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason.

6. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper.

FACTS: August 1999: Sales, the incumbent town mayor of Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte, fatally shot the former mayor and his political rival, Atty. Rafael Benemerito, in an alleged shootout in Barangay Caparispisan after a heated altercation. After the shooting incident, he surrendered and placed himself under the custody of the municipal police then asked that he be brought to the Provincial PNP Headquarters. Next day: PC Inspector Agno and private respondent Thelma Benemerito, wife of the victim, filed a criminal complaint for Murder against Sales at the MCTC Bangui, Ilocos Norte presided by Judge Calvan. Judge Calvan then conducted a preliminary examination of the witnesses, in accordance with Section 6 (b), Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, found the existence of probable cause, and thereafter issued an order for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of petitioner with no bail recommended. Sales was thus transferred the PNP Headquarters to the Provincial Jail. Judge Calvan, after his preliminary investigation, issued a resolution forwarding the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos Norte for appropriate action. He also submitted an NBI Parallel Investigation Report pursuant to the request for Investigative Assistance made by Dra. Thelma Benemerito, wife of the victim, with several annexed affidavits, sworn statements and documents. Sales then received a subpoena from the Provincial Prosecutor directing him to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents within ten (10) days from receipt, which Sales did the following day. Sales then filed a petition for habeas corpus with the CA alleging that the order and warrant of arrest is null and void for being issued by a judge who was disqualified by law from acting on the case by reason of his affinity to Thelma Benemerito; and the preliminary examination by the judge was so illegally and irregularly conducted as to oust the said judge of jurisdiction over the case. CA granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered the release of Sales subject to the outcome of the proper preliminary investigation. It held that: Judge Calvan is a relative within the third civil degree of affinity of Thelma Benemerito. He is married to Susana Benemerito-Calvan, whose father is a brother of the victim. CA cited Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court which mandatorily disqualifies a judge from sitting in a case in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity. It extends to all proceedings. It also cited Even Canon 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall take no part in a proceeding where the judges impartiality might be reasonably questioned, as when he is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree. Due process likewise requires hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal so that no

judge shall preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. The preliminary examination conducted by respondent Judge does not accord with the prevailing rules. He did it under the old rules, where the preliminary investigation by the municipal judge has two stages: (1) the preliminary examination stage during which the investigating judge determines whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof, so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial; and (2) the preliminary investigation proper where the complaint or information is read to the accused after his arrest and he is informed of the substance of the evidence adduced against him, after which he is allowed to present evidence in his favor if he so desires. Presidential Decree 911 (further amending Sec. 1, R.A. 5180, as amended by P.D. 77) upon which the present rule is based, removed the preliminary examination stage and integrated it into the preliminary investigation proper. Now the proceedings consists of only one stage. Thus, Judge Calvan: did not conduct the requisite investigation prior to issuance of the arrest warrant. The Rules require an examination in writing under oath in the form of searching questions and answers.The statements of witnesses were not sworn before him but before the Provincial Prosecutor. The purported transcript of stenographic notes do not bear the signature of the stenographer. did not complete the preliminary investigation. He claimed to have examined only the witnesses of the complainant. He issued a Resolution and forwarded the records to the Provincial Prosecutor without giving the accused (petitioner) an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and supporting documents. While it is true that the usual remedy to an irregular preliminary investigation is to ask for a new preliminary investigation, such normal remedy would not be adequate to free petitioner from the warrant of arrest which stemmed from that irregular investigation. The Provincial Prosecution has no power to recall the warrant of arrest. Ilocos Norte Provincial Prosecutor on the other hand, instead of conducting a preliminary investigation of his own, merely forwarded the said records to the Ombudsman for the latter to conduct the same. Sales then received a notice from the Ombudsman directing him to file his counteraffidavits. Considering that he had already submitted his counter-affidavits to the Ilocos Norte Provincial Prosecutor, he found the directive superfluous and did not act on it. Graft Investigation Officer II Cynthia V. Vivar issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Murder against Sales and four others before the Sandiganbayan. The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman. Sales belatedly received a copy of said Resolution, and because he was thus effectively prevented from seeking a reconsideration, he then filed a Motion To Defer Issuance th Of Warrant Of Arrest pending determination of probable cause. Sandiganbayan (4 Div.) denied the motion. Sales, owing to the urgency of the matter, opted to directly file a petition with the SC

instead of MR. Sales claims that Petitioner asserts the Information was hastily filed and the warrant for his arrest was improper because of an incomplete preliminary investigation. ISSUE: WoN proper procedure was followed (NO) HELD: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered: 1.] SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated July 13, 2000 and the Resolution of Graft Investigation Officer II Cynthia V. Vivar dated May 25, 2000 in Criminal Case No. 26115; 2.] Ordering the Sandiganbayan to QUASH the warrant of arrest it issued against petitioner; 3.] REMANDING the case to the Ombudsman for completion of the preliminary investigation. RATIO: The proper procedure in the conduct of the preliminary investigation was not followed, for the following reasons: 1. The records show that the supposed preliminary investigation was conducted in installments by at least three (3) different investigating officers, none of whom completed the preliminary investigation. There was not one continuous proceeding but rather a case of passing the buck, so to speak, the last one being the Ombudsman hurriedly throwing the buck to the Sandiganbayan. a. There was no showing of bad faith on the part of petitioner. It was, therefore, error for the Ombudsman to pass the buck, so to speak, to the Sandiganbayan to find absence of bad faith. (Venus v. Desierto) The charge against Sales is Murder, a non-bailable offense. The gravity of the offense alone, not to mention the fact that the principal accused is an incumbent mayor whose imprisonment during the pendency of the case would deprive his constituents of their duly-elected municipal executive, should have merited a deeper and more thorough preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman, however, did nothing of the sort and instead swallowed hook, line and sinker the resolution and recommendation of Graft Investigation Officer II Cynthia V. Vivar, among them the finding that, aside from the averment of respondent that the victim fired at him and he was only forced to fire back, no other evidence was adduced to indicate that such was what happened. a. Dubious circumstances: Four affidavits on record which state in categorical terms that it was the victim who first fired at petitioner with his Armalite rifle and that petitioner merely returned fire. The Ombudsman, however, neither called for the production of the firearm and the empty shells, nor did he ask for the production of the ballistic and laboratory examinations of the bloodstains on the Armalite rifle despite the statement by the Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte that these pieces of evidence were all available. Two (2) different autopsies on the cadaver of the victim, one indicating that the victim sustained two (2) wounds only and the other showing that the victim had three (3) wounds.

b.

c.

Given the foregoing circumstances, the Ombudsman for all practical purposes did an even worse job than Judge Calvan for, by adopting in its entirety the findings of the investigating officer despite its obvious flaws, he actually did nothing at all and, in effect, threw everything to the Sandiganbayan for evaluation. Prosecutors are endowed with ample powers in order that they may properly fulfill their assigned role in the administration of justice. It should be realized, however, that when a man is haled to court on a criminal charge, it brings in its wake problems not only for the accused but for his family as well. Therefore, it behooves a prosecutor to weigh the evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon to determine the existence of a prima facie case before filing the information in court. Anything less would be a dereliction of duty.

3.

2.

A person under preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman is entitled to file a motion for reconsideration of the adverse resolution. This right is provided for in the very Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman (Sec. 7 Motion for Reconsideration). a. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper. There is no dispute that the Information was filed without first affording Sales his right to file a motion for reconsideration. The denial thereof is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary investigation. This fact alone already renders preliminary investigation conducted in this case incomplete. The inevitable conclusion is that he was not only effectively denied the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans final resolution but also deprived of his right to a full preliminary investigation preparatory to the filing of the information against him. It was patent error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied purely on the Ombudsmans certification of probable cause given the prevailing facts of this case much more so in the face of the latters flawed report and one-sided factual findings. In the order of procedure for criminal cases, the task of determining probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is a responsibility which is exclusively reserved by the Constitution to judges. a. The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination; 2.] The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes, if any, and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutors certification which are material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause; and 3.] Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. Even if the two inquiries be made in one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of

4.

probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the prosecutor. i. When the preliminary investigation is conducted by an investigating prosecutor, in this case the Ombudsman, the determination of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor cannot serve as the sole basis for the issuance by the court of a warrant of arrest. This is because the court with whom the information is filed is tasked to make its own independent determination of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. ii. Judge Calvan committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutors certification and issued the questioned Order without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of probable cause. iii. Sandiganbayans CANNOT HAVE found probable cause on its own, considering the Ombudsmans defective report and findings, which merely relied on the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution and disregarded the evidence for the defense. It cannot be said that the Sandiganbayan reviewed all the records forwarded to it by the Ombudsman considering the fact that the preliminary investigation which was incomplete escaped its notice. iv. What the Sandiganbayan should have done, faced with such a slew of conflicting evidence from the contending parties, was to take careful note of the contradictions in the testimonies of the complainants witnesses as well as the improbabilities in the prosecution evidence. Baytan vs Comelec Facts: -

The Baytans now challenge this on the grounds of lack of intent and substantial compliance with cancellation of previous registration.

Issue: Whether the criminal cases should be dismissed on the ground of lack of intent and substantial compliance with the requirement of cancellation of previous registration. NO Held: The assailed resolutions were issued in the preliminary investigation stage function of this is to determine probable cause. Definition of probable cause - a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded x x x such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean `actual or positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. Based on the facts, a reasonably prudent man would readily conclude that there exists probable cause to hold petitioners for trial for the offense of double registration. Affidavits of Baytans had glaring inconsistencies Double Registration is malum prohibitum intent irrelevant nd Letter to cancel was sent after 2 registration after election officer of Cavite has reported their act to a higher official. Petitioners claim of honest mistake, good faith, and substantial compliance are defenses to be best ventilated in trial proper, not PI, because the established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof.

The Baytans registered twice in two different precincts for the upcoming elections in violation of Omnibus Election Code (double registration) The Baytans then forwarded a letter to COMELEC Assistant Executive Director Jose Pio Joson and cced COMELEC Registrar Francisco Trias asking for advice on how to cancel the earlier registration. Then after, the Election Officer of Cavite City forwarded copies of the Baytans Voters Registration Voters to Provincial Election Supervisor Juanito Ravanzo. Ravanzo endorsed the matter to the Regional Director for Prosecution. The Law Dept endorsed the case to Ravanzo for resolution. Ranvanzo recommended filing of the Information for Double Registration against the Baytans. The COMELEC en banc affirmed the said recommendation.

Paderanga v. Drilon (Millena) Petitioners: Atty. Miguel Paderanga Respondents: Frank Drilon, Silvestre Bello, Henrick Gingoyon, Helen Canoy and Rebecca Tan Regalado, J., 1991 Nature of action: Civil action for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction/restraining order seeking to enjoin respondents from including the petitioner in a criminal case for a multiple murder.

Facts: 1. 2. 3.

4. 5. 6. 7.

In 1986, some 5 people were charged with multiple murder for the death of Sps Bucag and their son Renato. Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged but later on escaped from detention. In 1988, the information was amended to include Felizardo Roxas as co-accused. Roxas retained Petitioner Paderanga as counsel. As counsel for Roxas, Paderanga filed motion to dismiss and quash the warrant of arrest and nullify the arraignment on Ocrober 14, 1088. Motion was dismissed but City Prosecutor was directed to conduct another preliminary investigation or reinvestigation in order to the accused opportunity to adduce evidence. During the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit, Roxas implicated Paderanga in the commission of the crime. City Prosecutor of Cagayan inhibited from the case and requested DOJ to designate a state prosecutor to continue the PI. Designated State Pros Gingoyon, in a resolution, directed the amendment of the previously amended information to include and implead Paderanga. Paderanga moved for reconsideration contending that the PI was not yet completed when the resolution was promulgated and that he was not able to present corresponding counter-affidavit and additional evidence crucial to the determination of his linkage to the crime. Motion denied. Petition for review with the DOJ. Usec Bello denied petition, hence this petition.

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied. The case of the petitioner does not fall under any of the above exceptions. Firstly, Petitioner was able to file a counter affidavit. Such is sufficient compliance with the procedural requirement of ROC Sec. 3b of Rule 112. Secondly, the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies are matters that will be best addressed during the trial. Thirdly, the right of petitioner to ask clarificatory questions is not absolute. It is discretionary upon the fiscal (Sec 3e Rule 112). Lastly, the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance not an appellate court. 2. There exists prima facie evidence of petitioner's involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein. A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence. It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to crossexamine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counteraffidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. Petition dismissed. Go v. CA (Monfort)

Issues: 1. WON the preliminary investigation as to him was not complete. NO, PI complete. 2. WON there exists no prima facie evidence or probable cause to justify his inclusion in the second amended information. NO, there is prima facie evidence. Held: 1. Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court. Hence, the general rule is that an injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution. The case of Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile, et al. cites several exceptions to the rule, to wit: a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;

En Banc | G.R. No. 101837 | 11 February 1992 | Feliciano, J.

the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the FACTS: fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court Eldon Maguan was driving his car when Rolito Go entered a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite direction. At the corner of these streets, their cars nearly bumped each or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel other. Go alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Go left the scene. A should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. security guard was able to take down the cars plate number. Verification at LTO showed that the The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, or the right of the People to due process of law. The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is car was registered to Elsa Ang Go. that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case [such] as its Go presented himself before the police and they detained him. An eyewitness identified him as dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. the gunman. The police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide against Go with the Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even Office of the Prov. Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Prov. Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is informed Go, in the presence of Gos lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Nonetheless, since Go in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and not for RPC. Go refused. a re-investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself While the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be filed in did file with the trial court on the 5th day after filing the information for murder, a motion for court, Maguan died. leave to conduct preliminary investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of Go's omnibus motion), we conclude that Go's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the trial court. What was Prosecutor filed an information for murder. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the crystal clear was that Go did ask for a preliminary investigation on the very day that the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted information was filed without such preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was five (5) because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the RPC. days later apprised of the desire of the Go for such preliminary investigation. Finally, the trial Gos counsel filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation. preliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of Go was unlawful and that no Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed. Go also prayed Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable, the 5-day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule that he be released on recognizance or on bail. Prov. Prosecutor Mauro Castro interposed no 112 must be held to have been substantially complied with. objection. RTC approved the cash bond and Go was in fact released. Prosecutor filed with RTC a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. RTC granted the motion and cancelled the arraignment until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary investigation. However, RTC motu proprio (1) recalled the bail and Go was given 48 hours to surrender himself; (2) recalled the leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation; (3) treated Gos omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation as a petition for bail. Go surrendered to the police. He was released thru the writ of habeas corpus. His petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and even for habeas corpus are consolidated by the CA, but it dismissed these petitions. Hence, this certiorari. ISSUE: WON Go had waived his right to preliminary investigation. HELD: NO. The preliminary investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. In Crespo v. MogulThe preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should While that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny Go's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. In the instant case, Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, Go was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial. Go remains entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to Go. ALLADO v DIOKNO 232 SCRA 192 BELLOSILLO; May 5, 1994

FACTS:

pulverized into ashes by simply burning it with the use of gasoline and rubber tires in an open field. Even crematoria use entirely closed incinerators where the corpse is subjected to intense Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L.Mendoza, alumni of the College of law, heat. Thereafter, the remains undergo a process where the bones are completely ground to University of the Philippines, are partners of the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado dust. (Their counsel in this case is Jovito Salonga). In the practice of their profession, and on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial confession of a security guard (Umbal), they have been accused of the Strangely, if not awkwardly, after Van Twest's reported abduction, which culminated in his heinous crime of kidnapping with murder of a German national named Van Twest by the decimation by cremation, his counsel continued to represent him before judicial and quasiPresidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested without bail by respondent judicial proceedings. Hence, even Asst. Solicitor General Estoesta believes that counsel of Van judge. Twest doubted the latter's death. Petitioners filed this petition and principally contended that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in "whimsically holding that there is probable cause against petitioners without determining the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners and without even stating the basis of his findings," and in "relying on the Resolution of the Panel and their certification that probable cause exists when the certification is flawed." Petitioners maintain that the records of the preliminary investigation which respondent judge solely relied upon failed to establish probable cause against them to justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Petitioners likewise assail the prosecutors' "clear sign of bias and partiality." Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant for the arrest of petitioners it appearing that he did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead, he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed. For, otherwise, he would have found out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners.

In Soliven v. Makasiar, we said that the judge (a)shall personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the determination of probable the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause is a function of the judge who is merely required to personally appreciate certain facts to cause, may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of convince him that the accused probably committed the crime charged. witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the existence of probable cause. ISSUE: W/N the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. HELD: In the Order of respondent judge, it is expressly stated that "[t]his court after careful evaluation of the evidence on record, believes and rules that probable cause exists; and therefore, a warrant ofarrest should be issued. "However, we are unable to see how respondent judge arrived at such ruling. We have painstakingly examined the records and we cannot find any support for his conclusion. On the contrary, we discern a number of reasons why we consider the evidence submitted to be insufficient for a finding of probable cause against petitioners. In People v. Inting, we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the determination ofprobable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause; and, (c)Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertainswhether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries be conducted inthe course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is a function of the prosecutor.

The PACC relies heavily on the sworn statement of Security Guard Umbal who supposedly confessed his participation in the alleged kidnapping and murder of Van Twest. For one, there is serious doubt on VanTwest's reported death since the corpus delicti has not been established, nor have his remains been recovered. Umbal claims that Van Twest was completely burned into ashes with the use of gasoline and rubber tires from around ten o'clock in the evening to six Dispositive: Petition granted. o'clock the next morning. This is highly improbable, if not ridiculous. A human body cannot be

Webb v De Leon -NBI filed with DOJ a letter complaint charging petitioners with crime of rape with homicide of the Vizcondes. DOJ panel thus conducts PI of those charged with said crime

-Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. Alfaro's May 22, 1995 sworn statement was inherently weak and uncorroborated due to alleged material inconsistencies in relation to her April 28, 1995 sworn statement. Alfaro also allegedly and erroneously described petitioner Webb's hair as semi-blond.

-NBI presented, among other evidence, a sworn statement dated May 22, 1995 of their principal witness, Maria Jessica M. Alfaro who allegedly saw the commission of the crime

-purpose of a PI per Section 1 of Rule 112: a preliminary investigation should determine " . . . whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-grounded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial."

-Petitioner Webb claims during PI that he did not commit said crime (on June 30, 1991) since he was in the US from March 1991 to October 1992 -Probable cause to warrant arrest pertains to facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.

-Petitioner Webb produced documentary evidence that he bought a bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car while in the US on said dates and that he was issued by the State of California a Driver's License on June 14, 1991.

-Petitioner also submitted a letter from a Legal Attache of the US Embassy, citing certain records tending to confirm, among others, his arrival at California on March 9, 1991 as a passenger in a United Airlines plane

-in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance.

-Alleged inconsistencies: Issues: 1) WON there was grave abuse of discretion in the DOJ's finding of probable cause to charge petitioners with said crime On whether Alfaro knew Carmela before the incident in question: First Affidavit: She had NOT met Carmela before June 29, 1991. Second Affidavit: "I met her in a party sometime in February, 1991."

2) WON DOJ Panel denied Petitioners their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation

On whether Alfaro saw the dead bodies: First Affidavit: She did not see the three dead persons on that night. She just said "on the following day I read in the newspaper that there were three persons who were killed . . ." Second Affidavit: "I peeped through the first door on the left. I saw two bodies on top of the bed, bloodied, and in the floor, I saw Hubert on top of Carmela."

Held: 1) No

On the alleged rape of Carmela Vizconde:

First Affidavit: She did not see the act of rape. Second Affidavit: She saw Hubert Webb "with bare buttocks, on top of Carmela and pumping, her mouth gagged and she was moaning and I saw tears on her eyes."

On how Webb, Lejano, and Ventura entered the Vizconde house: First Affidavit: "by jumping over the fence, which was only a little more than a meter high." Second Affidavit: They "entered the gate which was already open."

-DOJ Panel: In the case at bar, there is no dispute that a crime has been committed and what is clear before us is that the totality of the evidence submitted by the complainant indicate a prima facie case that respondents conspired in the perpetration of the imputed offense.

On whether Alfaro entered the Vizconde house: First Affidavit: She never entered the house. Second Affidavit: "I proceeded to the iron grill gate leading to the dirty kitchen."

-DOJ Panel's final evaluation of NBI inculpatory evidence vs petitioner's exculpatory evidence: despite evidence submitted by [petitioner] Webb to support his defense of denial and alibi, the panel, after a careful and thorough evaluation of the records, believes that they cannot outweigh the evidence submitted by the complainant. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by a prosecution witness. Alibi deserves scant consideration in the face of positive identification especially so where the claim of alibi is supported mainly by friends and relatives

-DOJ Panel ruled that these alleged misdescription and inconsistencies did not erode the credibility of Alfaro.

-DOJ Panel cited Angelo v CA: "There is no rule of law which prohibits a court from crediting part of the testimony of a witness as worthy of belief and from simultaneously rejecting other parts which the court may find incredible or dubious. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not a rule of law, let alone a general rule of law which is universally applicable. It is not a legal presumption either. It is merely a latinism describing the conclusion reached by a court in a particular case after ascribing to the evidence such weight or lack of weight that the court deemed proper."

-DOJ on petitioner Webb's exculpatory evidence: material dates in this case are June 29 and 30, 1991. While respondent Webb may have submitted proof tending to show that he was issued a California driver's license on June 14, 1991, there is no showing that he could not have been in the country on the dates above mentioned. No merit in the allegation that respondent Webb personally bought a bicycle on June 30, 1991 in California in view of his positive identification by Alfaro and the two (2) househelps of the Webb family who testified that he was here in the country on said dates. Additionally, the issuance of receipt evidencing the purchase of a bicycle in California is no conclusive proof that the name appearing thereon was the actual buyer of the merchandise.

-DOJ Panel: Alfaro was then having reservations when she executed the first statement and held back vital information due to her natural reaction of mistrust. This being so, the panel believes that the inconsistencies in Alfaro's two sworn statements have been sufficiently explained especially specially so where there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth. Consequently, the probative value of Alfaro's testimony deserves full faith and credit.

-SC: Given conflicting pieces of evidence of the NBI and the petitioners, the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt

-DOJ Panel: Ex parte statements are generally incomplete because they are usually executed when the affiant's state of mind does not give her sufficient and fair opportunity to comprehend the import of her statement and to narrate in full the incidents which transpired.

-SC quoting Brinnegar v US: while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

-SC: Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to call the NBI witnesses for clarificatory questions. The decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator and the investigator alone.

at bar, the risk to the liberty of petitioners cannot be understated for they are charged with the crime of rape with homicide, a non-bailable offense when the evidence of guilt is strong.

-If the evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the investigator need not hold a clarificatory hearing. Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence. In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel correctly adjudged that enough evidence had been adduced to establish probable cause and clarificatory hearing was unnecessary.

-Rules of procedure have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of preliminary investigation conducted by one whose high duty is to be fair and impartial.

-Go vs CA: "the right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense, and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right."

2) No -Petitioners assailed their alleged hasty and malicious prosecution by the NBI and the DOJ Panel. They also assailed the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.

-preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage.

-petitioners charge the NBI with violating their right to discovery proceedings during their preliminary investigation by suppressing the April 28, 1995 original copy of the sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report

-petitioners thus have the right to demand from their prosecutor, the NBI, the original copy of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report during their preliminary investigation considering their exculpatory character, and hence, unquestionable materiality to the issue of their probable guilt. The right is rooted on the constitutional protection of due process which we rule to be operational even during the preliminary investigation of a potential accused.

-Rules on Criminal Procedure do not expressly provide for discovery proceedings during the preliminary investigation stage of a criminal proceeding. Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 117 do provide an accused the right to move for a bill of particulars and for production or inspection of material evidence in possession of the prosecution. But these provisions apply after the filing of the Complaint or Information in court and the rights are accorded to the accused to assist them to make an intelligent plea at arraignment and to prepare for trial.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. L-49155. May 13, 1981.] REYNALDO RODIL, petitioner, vs. SEGUNDO M. GARCIA, (Municipal Judge of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque), and PC TSGT. IRENEO DELLOSA, respondents. Jorge L. Caballes for petitioner. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Santiago M . Kapunan and Solicitor Celso P. Ylagan for respondents.

-Failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation does not, however, negate its use by a person under investigation when indispensable to protect his constitutional right to life, liberty and property. PI is not too early a stage to guard against any significant erosion of the constitutional right to due process of a potential accused. The object of PI is to determine the probability that the suspect committed a crime. Finding of a probable cause by itself subjects the suspect's life, liberty and property to real risk of loss or diminution. In the case

SYNOPSIS Petitioner seeks the setting aside of respondent judge's order denying his counsel's request to recall government witnesses for cross-examination on clarificatory and amplificatory matters and the order denying his application for bail which was issued in the absence of a hearing. The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondents, asked for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the right to cross-examine in a preliminary investigation is not a right granted an accused and that the exercise of discretion by respondent judge considering the evidence of record sufficed to justify denial of the application for bail. The Supreme Court granted the petition, the absence of a hearing on the accused's application for bail being a clear violation of the constitutional right of due process, and ordered that a hearing on the application be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Court wherein the counsel for Petitioner can recall witnesses for the prosecution for the purpose of asking clarificatory questions. Writ of certiorari granted. Order denying bail set aside.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GRANT THEREOF AN EXERCISE OF JUDGE'S DISCRETION. In Dequito v, Arellano, 81 Phil. 130, this proposition was set forth: "there are an infinite number of things which a party may not in strict law do or cause to be done but which may be permitted by the court in the exercise of its discretion and in the interest of justice. Specially is this true in matters affecting the conduct of the trial and the calling, recalling and examination of witnesses. The judge is not a ministrial officer reduced to recording what takes place and what witnesses say in the examination. Above all, his is the great responsibility of safeguarding the accused from groundless or vindictive prosecution. If the justice of the peace is to ascertain, as he must, whether a crime has been committed and, if so, whether there is probable cause that the accused committed it, his authority cannot be confined as in a straight jacket to the stiffness of medieval and outmoded technicalities of practice." 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDGE'S DISCRETION TO BE EXERCISED TO ACHIEVE THE PURPOSE OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. The interest of a more speedy and a more efficient administration of justice would be best served if there is a greater awareness on the part of judges that in addition to safeguarding the express rights of an accused person, a matter mandated by the Constitution or the Rules of Court, they should likewise exercise their discretion in such a way that the purpose of a preliminary investigation, the avoidance of groundless or vindictive prosecutions, could be attained in as fair and objective manner as possible. 6.ID.; JUDGES; ENTITLED TO RESPECT AND COURTESY FROM LAWYERS. An occupant on the bench, while be should be on guard against undue emotional reaction, is, after all, not expected to be totally free from such traits as irritability and exasperation. Moreover, he is entitled and should get that proper degree of respect and courtesy from a lawyer appearing before him. While it is not only the right of an advocate but his duty to cite all pertinent authorities, this could be done in a less assertive manner and by way of a submission rather than a lecture. It must never be forgotten that a lawyer pleads; he does not dictate.

SYLLABUS 1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; DUE PROCESS; HEARING ON THE APPLICATION FOR BAIL; ABSENCE THEREOF A DENIAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED. The order of respondent judge denying bail explicitly admitted he issued it on the basis of the motion of Petitioner that he be granted such right and the opposition filed by the First Asst. Provincial Fiscal without conducting any hearing on such motion. Clearly, he acted on the mistaken belief that the presentation of evidence by the prosecution for the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the preliminary examination proper, suffices for the denial of the plea for bail. The order issued denying such petition is null and void as the accused himself, the explicit beneficiary of the constitutional right, was not heard. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE OF HEARING TO BE CONDUCTED. The procedure to be followed in the hearing of an application for bail, while summary in character, is not to be a mere sham or pretense. It must be an exercise in futility. The accused is not to be denied his day in court. 3.ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION; AN ACCUSED IS NOT ENTITLED BY LAW TO SUCH RIGHT DURING PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. In the leading case of Abrera y. Muoz and Flordeliza, 108 Phil. 1124, a 1960 decision, the Supreme Court held: "At the outset, it should be stated That the refusal of The Justice of the Peace to allow The defense to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses presented prior to Petitioner's arrest, cannot be utilized as argument for the contention that the prosecution should not have been allowed to cross-examine the defense witnesses. An accused is not entitled to cross-examine the witnesses presented against him in the preliminary investigation before his arrest, this being a matter that depends on the sound discretion of the Judge or investigating officer concerned.

G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010 JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE vs. HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS Facts: Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) was charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on before the RTC of Makati City. Petitioner was placed under police custody while confined at the Makati Medical Center. After petitioner posted a bond which the trial court approved, he was released from detention, and his arraignment was set. The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, an Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The RTC thereafter issued an Order (January 24, 2007) deferring petitioners arraignment and allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense and submit a recommendation within 30 days from its inception, inter alia; and another

Order denying reconsideration of the first order. Petitioner assailed these orders via certiorari and prohibition before the CA. Meantime, Leviste filed a motion before the RTC to defer acting on the public prosecutors recommendation on the proper offense until after the CA resolves his application for injunctive reliefs, or alternatively, to grant him time to comment on the prosecutors recommendation and thereafter set a hearing for the judicial determination of probable cause. Leviste also separately moved for the inhibition of Judge Alameda w/ prayer to defer action on the admission of the Amended Information. The trial court nonetheless issued the other assailed orders, viz: an Order (February 7, 2007) that admitted the Amended Information for murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and another Order of February 8, 2007 which set the arraignment on February 13, 2007. Petitioner questioned these two orders via supplemental petition before the appellate court. Issue: 1. 2. 3. Whether or not in cases when an accused is arrested without a warrant, the remedy of preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused. whether the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation Whether the trial court erred for not conducting, at the very least, a hearing for judicial determination of probable cause, considering the lack of substantial or material new evidence adduced during the reinvestigation. No. The Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation, subject to and in light of the ensuing disquisition. All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The private complainant in a criminal case is merely a witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask for the reinvestigation of the case after the information had been filed in court, the proper party for that being the public prosecutor who has the control of the prosecution of the case. Thus, in cases where the private complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the criminal action, and is granted the authority to prosecute, the private complainant, by counsel and with the conformity of the public prosecutor, can file a motion for reinvestigation. In fact, the DOJ instructs that before the arraignment of the accused, trial prosecutors must examine the Information vis--vis the resolution of the investigating prosecutor in order to make the necessary corrections or revisions and to ensure that the information is sufficient in form and substance. The prosecutions discretion is not boundless or infinite, however. The standing principle is that once an information is filed in court, any remedial measure such as a reinvestigation must be addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Once the trial court grants the prosecutions motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with discretion wide and far reaching regarding the disposition thereof, subject to the trial courts approval of the resulting proposed course of action.

Since a reinvestigation may entail a modification of the criminal information as what happened in the present case, the Courts holding is bolstered by the rule on amendment of information under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court: A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 11, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. In fine, before the accused enters a plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused. 2. Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged. The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.

Held: 1.

3.

NO. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of the accused before any warrant may be issued. Petitioner thus cannot, as a matter of right, insist on a hearing for judicial determination of probable cause.

Before the information for Homicide was filed, the heirs of Dimatulac filed an appeal on the resolution of Ass. Prov. Pros. Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) alleging mainly that Alfonso-Flores erred in lowering the crime from Murder as originally filed to Homicide despite the glaring presence of treachery, evident premeditation, etc. (Take note of Rule 70- NPS 1 Rules on Appeal in Syllabus ) Notice of the appeal was furnished to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Alfonso-Flores ignored this and proceeded to file the information for Homicide which the Prov. Prosecutor (Manarang) approved and certified Private prosecutor (counsel for private complainants) filed a motion to defer proceedings (i.e. arraignment) before the RTC in view of his clients pending appeal with the SOJ YABUTs opposed motion to defer proceedings/arraignment arguing that the pendency of the appeal before the SOJ was not a ground to defer arraignment and they had a right to a speedy trial [invoked the case of Crespo v. Mogul.

DIMATULAC V VILLON FACTS: SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. A complaint for Murder was filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito Miranda, SPO3 Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye, Vladimir Yumul, a certain Danny, and a certain Koyang/Arding. Judge David conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause, issued warrants for the arrest of the accused. Only David, Mandap, Magat and Yambao were arrested; while only Yambao submitted his counter affidavit. After the prelim investigation, the judge found reasonable ground to believe that Murder has been committed and the accused are probably the perpetrators thereof. He recommended the issuance of warrants of arrests and provided no bail Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q. Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation. It is not clear from the record whether she conducted the same motu proprio or upon motion of private respondents. The offense committed was only homicide (NOT murder) and all Yabuts were in conspiracy with one another. The 2 requisites of murder qualified by treachery were absent. She also recommended bail of 20k each. (note: the Yabuts were not under the custody of the law)

RTC judge denied motion to defer arraignment. RTC Judge set the arraignment. Private prosecutor moved to inhibit the judge, and filed a petition for prohibition to enjoin the judge from proceeding with the arraignment. RTC Judge voluntarily inhibited himself and then the case was transferred to herein respondent Judge Villion. Petitioners filed manifestation informing Judge Villlon him of the cases pending before the SOJ and the prohibition case before the CA. Judge ignored this and set the arraignment. Yabuts entered their plea of not guilty. Petitioners moved to set aside arraignment but to no avail. SOJ Guingona FINALLY came up with a resolution of the appeal. He directed the Provincial Prosec. To amend the info against the accused from homicide to murder. But he wrote to Provincial Prosec. Again and SET ASIDE his order to amend the info from homicide to murder, considering the appeal was moot and academic by the arraignment of the accused but Mallari must be included. Petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment of Accused Fortunato Mallari, denied. CA also dismissed the petition. Petitioners filed with the SC a petition for Certiorari/Prohibition and Mandamus to reverse the order of respondent Judge denying their Motion to Set Aside Arraignment; set aside arraignment of private respondents; order that no further action be taken by any court in criminal case until this petition resolved; and order Sec. of Justice and the prosecutors concerned to amend the information from homicide to murder.

ISSUES 1. 2. 3. WON the provincial prosecutor erred downgrading or lowering the crime charged from Murder to Homicide [YES] WON Judge Villion erred in proceeding with the arraignment of the accused and denying motion to set aside arraignment [YES] WON SOJ erred in reversing himself and his order to amend the information from Homicide to Murder [YES]

far as practicable, from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. There was clear and indecent haste on the part of the public prosec. In the filing of the information for homicide depriving the State and offended parties of due processs. Issue #2: WON Judge Villion erred in proceeding with the arraignment of the accused and denying motion to set aside arraignment [YES] Judge Villon set arraignment of the accused almost immediately upon receiving the records of the case from the former RTC Judge. He should have gone over the case and noticed the multiple motions, manifestations and utter vehemence of the petitioners to hear their cause. The judge had COMPLETE control over the case and any disposition rested on his discretion + was not bound to await the DOJ resolution on appeal. But he committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the arraignment of the YABUTs on the assailed information for homicide denying due process. Actions: nullifying without jurisdiction, the denial of the motion to defer further hearings, the denial of the motion to reconsider such denial, the arraignment of the YABUTs and their plea of not guilty Issue #3. WON SOJ erred in reversing himself and his order to amend the information from Homicide to Murder [YES] DOJ relinquished its power of control and supervision over the Provincial Prosecutor and the Asst. Provincial Prosecutors of Pampanga; and meekly surrendered to the latter's inappropriate conduct even hostile attitude, which amounted to neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The DOJ could have joined cause with petitioners to set aside arraignment and, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers over its personnel, the DOJ could have directed the public prosecutors concerned to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

HELD:Petition GRANTED. The orders denying the Motion to Defer Proceeding/Arraignment and denying the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment are declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The arraignment of private respondents is likewise declared VOID and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the order of SOJ is SET ASIDE and his initial order REINSTATED. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga is DIRECTED to file with the RTC the amended information for Murder. Issue #1: WON the provincial prosecutor erred downgrading or lowering the crime charged from Murder to Homicide [YES] There was No Basis for the Reinvestigation or downgrading of the Offense from Murder to Homicide. Warrants of arrest were issued against the Yabuts but they were never arrested/or surrendered and never brought into the custody of the law. How can the Ass. Prov Prosec. Conduct a reinvestigation then lower the crime from murder to Homicide? (Note that they re-appeared after crime was downgraded). She should have also waited for the resolution of the Sec of Justice, but instead entertained the motion for reinvestigation, accepted counter-affidavits and recommended bail. REMEMBER! They were never brought into the custody of the law. Petitioners had the right to appeal to the DOJ under Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and DOJ Order No. 223 S. 1993 recognizes the right of both offended parties and the accused to appeal from resolutions in preliminary investigations or reinvestigations. The sec. speaks of dismissing criminal complaint petitioners herein were not barred from appealing from the resolution holding that only homicide was committed, considering that their complaint was for murder. By holding that only homicide was committed, the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Pampanga effectively "dismissed" the complaint for murder. Appeal to the Sec. of Justice should not be dismissed motu propio on account of the Yabuts arraignment. The bar on Sec 4 does not apply! The cases of Crespo v Mogul forecloses the power of authority of the SOJ to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in court. The SOJ is only enjoined to refrain, as

Ty vs. NBI Supervising Agent De Jemil

Arnel U. Ty, MARIE ANTONETTE TY, JASON ONG, WILLY DY, and ALVIN TY, vs. NBI SUPERVISING AGENT MARVIN E. DE JEMIL, PETRON GASUL DEALERS ASSOCIATION, and TOTALGAZ DEALERS ASSOCIATION

G.R. No. 182147 | December 15, 2010 | Velasco, Jr.,J.: Facts: Petitioners are stockholders of Omni Gas Corporation ("Omni"). They are being suspected of engaging in illegal trading of petroleum products and underfilling of branded LPG cylinders in violation of B.P. 33, as amended by P.D. 1865. NBI Agents Marvin De Jemil and Edgardo Kawada conducted surveillance operations on Omni. On 15 April 2004, the NBI Agents carried out a testbuy. Using eight branded LPG cylinders from Shell, Petron and Total, they went to Omni for refilling. Omni refilled the cylinders. The NBI agents paid more than P1500. LPG Inspector Noel Navio found that the LPG cylinders were without LPG valve seals and one of the cylinders was actually underfilled. On 28 April 2004, Agent De Jemil obtained a search warrant from Pasig RTC branch 167. The NBI seized several items from Omni's premises. Subsequently, Agent De Jemil filed his ComplaintAffidavit before the DOJ. The Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasig found probable cause for violation of BP 33. This was later approved by Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuno.

refilling of branded LPG cylinders, contrary to Sec. 2 (a) in relation to Sec. 3 (c) of BP 33, as amended. Granting arguendo that the customers already owned the LPG cylinders, such fact does give Omni authority to refill the cylinders without authorization from the brand owners. Only the duly authorized dealers and refillers of the brand owners may refill the branded LPG cylinders. The offense of refilling a branded LPG cylinder without the written consent of the brand owner constitutes the offense regardless of the buyer or possessor of the branded LPG cylinder. Petitioner's contention that they are not liable because the underfilling that took place during the test-buy is an isolated event is UNTENABLE. A single underfilling under BP 33 is already a criminal act.

(3) Only Arnel Ty, as President of Omni, is liable. The other petitioners, who are members of Omni's Board of Directors, are not liable. Sec. 4 of BP 33 enumerates the persons who may be held liable, viz: (1) the president, (2) general manager, (3) managing partner, (4) such other officer charged with the management of the business affairs of the corporation or juridical entity, or (5) the employee responsible for such violation. The Board of Directors is primarily a Petitioners appealed the decision to the Secretary of Justice, who later reversed the decision of policy-making body of the Corporation who doesn't concern itself with day-to-day operations. the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor. NBI Agent De Jemil moved for reconsideration. Denied. He thus filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of Secretary of Justice. It later reversed itself and reinstated the Resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor. Issues: (1) Whether the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals was proper even if Agent De Jemil did not appeal to the Office of the President? (2) Whether probable cause exists against petitioners for violations of Sec. 2 (a) and (c) of BP 33, as amended? (3) Whether petitioners can be held liable therefor? Held: (1) YES. The determination of probable cause by the public prosecutor, and, later on, by the Secretary of Justice, is subject to judicial review where it is established that grave abuse of discretion tainted the determination. The aggrieved party need not resort to the Office of the President before availing of judicial remedies because the Secretary of Justice is an alter ego of the President who may opt to exercise or not to exercise his or her power of review over the formers determination in criminal investigation cases. Also, under the doctrine of qualified political agency, the determination of probable cause by the Secretary of Justice is presumably that of the Chief Executive unless disapproved or reprobated by the latter. (2) YES. The test-buy conducted on 15 April 2004 tends to show that Omni illegally refilled the eight branded cylinders. Such act is a clear violation of Sec. 2 (a), in relation to Secs. 3 (c) and 4 of BP 33, as amended. Omni has no authority to refill LPG cylinders as shown by the certifications provided by Shell, Petron and Total. The seized items also show that Omni has no authority to refill the cylinders. It shows that Omni really refilled branded cylinders without authorization. Omnis unauthorized

Roberts v CA 1996 Facts Several thousand holders of 349 Pepsi Crowns in connection with the Pepsi Number Fever Promotion filed complaints against petitioners who were the CEO, president and board of the Pepsi corporation. Estafa was filed against the petitioners, as well as violation of the Consumer Act, EO No. 913, and Act NO 2333. Background story re the Pepsi Number Fever Promo: if you get a cap with the winning digits plus seven digit security code, you win a prize. Apparently, thousands of buyers got the winning digits. The court didn't really explain whether it was because of a glitch from Pepsi's end. If petitioner were to give the complainants their prize, the amount may reach billions of pesos. Chief State Prosecutor De Guia directed the City Prosecutor to inform the DOJ whether petitioners were already arraigned and if not, to move in court for the deferment of further proceedings and to elevate the records of the case to the DOJ, as an exception pursuant to DOJ Department Circular No 7, section 4. Private prosecutor Julio Contreras filed an ex parte motion for issuance of warrants of arrest. Judge Asuncion, however, proceeded with the case, citing Crespo v Mogul, which says that the DOJ must refrain from entertaining petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complain or information has already been filed in court, and that the matter should be left entirely for the determination of the court. DOJ eventually dismissed the case, in deference to the Crespo ruling. Petitioner's Defense That the case was already pending under the DOJ No fraud, over acts, no admission of guilt, no evidence presented in court, and the filing of the resolution was under duress.

of resolutions finding probable cause when there is manifest error or GAD , provided that the accused has not yet been arraigned. Note that Circular No 7 was superseded by Circular NO. 223, but nothing in 223 recalls or removes the existing authority of the DOJ Secretary in reviewing cases based on Section 4. The rule therefore is that once a complaint or information is filed in court, the disposition of the case is at the discretion of the court. The fiscal retains direction and control only of the prosecution aspect of the case, but he cannot impose his opinion on the case to recall or dismiss the case. A motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the court who has the sole option to grant or deny the same, regardless of whether it is done before or after arraignment.

WON Asuncion committed GAD in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary investigation. YES Under existing laws, a warrant of arrest may be issued by a.) MeTCs and MCTCs in cases falling within their original jurisdiction, in cases covered b summary procedure and in cases cognizable by the RTC. Or, b.) by the MTC and MeTCs-NCR and RTCs in cases file with them after appropriate preliminary investigations. With regard to the second case mentioned above, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and the witnesses, but he must still personally evaluate the report and supporting documents . The judge must not rely solely on the report of the fiscal. In this case, the SC seems to be pointing out that the judge focused solely on the report of the fiscal.

Issues and Ruling

WON SC may determine in this proceedings the existence of probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners of for their prosecution in the crime of estafa. NO Preliminary investigation must be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature, while the second is judicial. General rule is that criminal prosecutions may not be stayed or restrained by injunction, except: To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice When the acts of the officer are in excess of authority When the prosecution is under an invalid law When there is apparent double jeopardy Where the court has not jurisdiction to the offense Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution

WON Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion (GAD) in denying the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after review by DOJ. YES There is nothing in Crespo which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal by an accused in a criminal case form an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised DOJ to refrain from doing so. More applicable is Marcelo v CA where the court said that there is nothing which forecloses the authority of the Secretary of Justice from reviewing resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. Note that DOJ has issued Circular No 7 which states that only resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint may be appealed to the DOJ secretary. The exception, however, is in Section 4, which allows the Secretary to take cognizance

When charges are manifestly false Where there is no prima facie evidence and motion to quash has been denied Where preliminary injunction has been issued by SC In the exemptions above, the SC may ultimately resolve the existence of probable cause by examining the records of the case. Here, though, this is not warranted, and the respondent judge in fact did not find the existence of probable cause.

7, 1989, the Ombudsman referred the matter of continuing and terminating the investigation of the present case to the newly deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutor, Sesinio Belen from the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (Annex "D-1", ibid.). However, the latter, in his 5th Indorsement dated February 27, 1989 to the Ombudsman, requested that the present case be reassigned to another Prosecutor considering that he is a long time close friend and "compadre" of petitioner and that one of the complainants therein Eustaquio Gacott, Jr., who was formerly a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, is now the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan, his present superior (Annex "D-2", ibid.). On April 25, 1989, petitioner was directed by the Ombudsman to comment on the letter-manifestation dated April 4, 1989 filed by Rodriguez requesting that an amendment be effected on certain portions of the present complaint (Annexes "E" & "E-2", ibid.). No comment having been received by the Ombudsman as of May 24, 1989, petitioner, on an even date, was again directed to comment thereon (Annex "E-1", ibid.). Finally, petitioner filed his required comment dated June 2, 1989 (Annex "E-3", ibid.). Based on the Resolution dated August 27, 1992 of Special Prosecution Officer I Wendell Barreras-Sulit (Annex "F-2", ibid.), which affirmed the Resolution dated February 21, 1992 rendered by Ombudsman Investigator Ernesto Nocos recommending the filing of appropriate charges against petitioner, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed on September 16, 1992 with the respondent Court two (2) Informations against petitioner, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 18027 and 18028. The first was for violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the second for violation of Section 3(e) of the same law (Annexes "F" & "F-1", ibid.). Before his arraignment could be set, petitioner initially filed an "Urgent Motion for Quashal of Information and/or Reinvestigation in the Light of Supervening Facts." However, when the said motion was subsequently called for hearing, petitioner's counsel was made to choose which of the aforesaid two (2) conflicting motions he preferred to take up with respondent Court. Thus, on January 18, 1993, petitioner filed an "Amended and Consolidated Motion to Quash the Information in the Aboveentitled Cases." After an Opposition and a Reply were filed by the prosecution and petitioner, respectively, respondent court issued its first assailed Resolution on February 9, 1994, denying the same (Annex "G", ibid.). On March 15, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation, which was subsequently denied by respondent court in its second assailed Resolution issued on May 24, 1992 (Annex "H-1", ibid.). CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SPEEDY TRIAL, DEFINED. A speedy trial is one conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of an accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time.

SOCRATES V. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Petitioner who is the incumbent governor of Palawan, was first elected governor of the said province in 1968 and was again reelected in both the 1971 and 1980 elections, until he was replaced by private complainant Victoriano Rodriguez as Officer-In-Charge Governor after the EDSA Revolution in February 1986. Subsequently, both petitioner and Rodriguez ran for governor in the 1988 elections where the latter emerged victorious. In the 1992 synchronized national and local elections, the two again contested the gubernatorial post; and this time, it was petitioner who won. Meanwhile, at the time Rodriguez was still the OIC Governor of the province, the Provincial Government of Palawan, as represented by Rodriguez and the Provincial Board Members of Palawan, filed before the Office of the Tanodbayan two (2) complaints both dated December 5, 1986 and docketed as TBP No. 86-01119. The first complaint charged petitioner with violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the second charged petitioner, together with several other provincial officers, with violation of Section 3(a) and (g) of the same law (Annexes "A" & "A-I", respectively, Petition). Instead of filing a counter-affidavit as directed, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Preliminary Investigation dated September 3, 1987 on the ground that upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the present Tanodbayan has been transformed into the Office of the Special Prosecutor and has, therefore, lost his power to conduct preliminary investigation (Annex "C", ibid). In a letter to the Honorable Tanodbayan dated June 23, 1988, however, Nelia YapFernandez, the Deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutor from the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City, requested that she be allowed to inhibit herself from handling the preliminary investigation of the present case considering that petitioner appears to be her co-principal sponsor in a wedding ceremony held last May 28, 1988 (Annex "C-3", ibid.). On January 16, 1989, the Office of the Ombudsman received a letter from Rodriguez, who was then the incumbent governor of the province, inquiring about the present status of TBP No. 86-01119 (Annex "D", ibid.). In its 4th Indorsement dated February

2.REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; EVIDENTIARY FACTS, NEED NOT BE ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATIONS. Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the information because these are matters of defense. Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial. 3.ID.; ID.; THE CHARACTER OF THE CRIME IS NOT DETERMINED BY THE TITLE OF THE INFORMATION BUT BY THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE BODY THEREOF. Axiomatic is the rule that what controls is not the designation of the offense but its description in the complaint or information. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. It is not the technical name given by the fiscal appearing in the title of the information that determines the character of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the information. This Court has repeatedly held that when the facts, acts and circumstances are set forth in the body of an information with sufficient certainty to constitute an offense and to apprise the defendant of the nature of the charge against him, a misnomer or innocuous designation of a crime in the caption or other parts of the information will not vitiate it. In such a case, the facts set forth in the charge controls the erroneous designation of the offense and the accused stands indicted for the offense charged in the statement of facts. The erroneous designation may be disregarded as surplusage. 4.ID.; ID.; WHERE THE OFFENSE MAY BE COMMITTED IN SEVERAL MODES, THE RULE IS IT IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE OFFENSE AS COMMITTED IN ANY ONE OF THEM IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION. It is an old and well-settled rule in the appreciation of indictments that where an offense may be committed in any of several different modes, and the offense, in any particular instance, is alleged to have been committed in two or more of the modes specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense committed through any one of them, provided that it be such as to constitute the substantive offense. Thereafter, a judgment of conviction must be sustained if it appears from the evidence in the record that the accused was guilty as charged of any one of these modes of the offense. 5.ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; ABSENCE THEREOF IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE QUASHAL OF A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION. It has been consistently held that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the criminal information or render it defective. Dismissal of the case is not the remedy. It is not a ground for the quashal of a complaint or information. The proper course of action that should be taken is for the Sandiganbayan to hold in abeyance the proceedings upon such information and to remand the case to the office of the Ombudsman for him or the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation, if the accused actually makes out a case justifying such relief. 6.ID.; ID.; AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO QUASH IS INTERLOCUTORY AND NOT APPEALABLE. We have but to reiterate the fundamental rule that an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. In other words, it cannot be the subject of appeal until the judgment or a final order is rendered. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that event is to enter a plea, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The special civil

action for certiorari may be availed of in case there is a grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. 7.CRIMINAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT LAW); SUSPENSION OF PUBLIC OFFICER IS MANDATORY AFTER THE VALIDITY OF THE INFORMATION HAS BEEN UPHELD IN A PRESUSPENSION HEARING. This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory after the validity of the information has been upheld in a pre-suspension hearing is conducted to determine basically the validity of the information, from which the court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. That hearing may be treated in the same manner as a challenged to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash. It is evident that upon a proper determination of the validity of the information, it becomes mandatory for the court to immediately issue the suspension order. The rule on the matter is specific and categorical. It leaves no room for interpretation. It is not within the court's discretion to hold in abeyance the suspension of the accused officer on the pretext that the order denying the motion to quash is pending review before the appellate courts. Its discretion lies only during the pre-suspension hearing where it is required to ascertain whether or not (1) the accused had been afforded due preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the informations against him, (2) the acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the provisions of Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, or (3) informations against him can be quashed, under any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the court must issue the order of suspension as a matter of court. There are no ifs and buts about it. This is because a preventive suspension is not a penalty. It is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. To further emphasize the ministerial duty of the court under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, it is said that the court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether or not a preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court. 8.REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; IT IS THE DUTY OF THE PROSECUTING OFFICER TO FILE CHARGES AGAINST WHOMSOEVER THE EVIDENCE MAY SHOW TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR AN OFFENSE. The rule under Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as reformulated in Section 2, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is that all criminal actions must be commenced either by complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines "against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved." The law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for an offense. This does not mean, however, that they have no discretion at all; their discretion lies in determining whether the evidence submitted justify a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense. What the rule demands is that all

persons who appear responsible shall be charged in the information, which conversely implies that those against whom no sufficient evidence of guilt exists are not required to be included. 9.ID.; ID.; MOTION TO QUASH; GROUNDS; FAILURE TO ASSERT, MAY BE DEEMED A WAIVER THEREOF; EXCEPTION. A failure to include other persons who appear to be responsible for the crime charged is not one of the grounds provided under Section 3, Rule 117 for which a motion to quash the information against the accused may be filed, most especially in the case at bar where there is prima facie proof that petitioner is probably guilty of the offense charged, aside from the fact that there is no allegation of conspiracy in the informations. Besides, such an infirmity would neither have the effect of extinguishing or mitigating petitioner's liability if he is subsequently found guilty of the offense charged. Section 8, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that "(t)he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy." The failure to include a co-accused is not covered by the exception; hence, the same is deemed waived.

Respondents filed a petition for change of venue, alleging that the presiding judge who took over the case, Judge Roberto Navidad, was a pawn in the political persecution being staged against them (denied). Navidad proceeded with the preliminary inquiry on the existence of probable cause, and he ruled that the finding of probable cause was supported by the evidence on record. He issued warrants of arrest against respondents. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion on Navidads end. They also sought a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction because the filing of murder charges against them smacks of political harassment at its foulest form, because the criminal complaint was filed two months after th Joseph Grey declared his intentions to challenge the incumbent congressman. The 18 division of the CA issued the writ of injunction sought. Petitioners argue that criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined, and any exception to this rule must be convincingly established. They also argued that the comparative injury to the People in permanently enjoining a criminal is beyond any of respondents speculative claim of injury ISYU: Whether or not the issuance of the preliminary injunction by the CA was proper? HELD: NO 1. General rule: Injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution because public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society. There however are exceptions to this rule. 2. Exceptions: a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub-judice d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance, or regulation f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense h. Where there is a case of persecution rather than prosecution i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the SC to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of the petitioners 3. Respondents insisted that the political persecution by their political rivals was the underlying reason for the filing of criminal charges against them, and used this basis for asking the appellate court to stop proceedings in the trial court. While the Court recognizes that in certain instances, political persecution or political motives may have impelled the filing of criminal charges against certain political rivals, the Court has also ruled that any allegation that the filing of charges is politically motivated cannot justify the prohibition of a criminal prosecution if there is otherwise evidence to support the charges. a. Judge personally examined the complaint and evidence before him and determined there was probable cause to issue the warrants of arrest after the provincial prosecution, based on the affidavits presented by complainant and her witness

10.ID.; ID.; REMEDIES OF THE OFFENDED PARTY IN CASE THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTOR REFUSES TO FILE INFORMATION. Where the government prosecutor unreasonably refuses to file an information or to include a person as an accused therein despite the fact that the evidence clearly warrants such action, the offended party has the following remedies: (1) in case of grave abuse of discretion, he may file an action for mandamus to compel the prosecutor to file such information; (2) he may lodge a new complaint against the offenders before the Ombudsman and have a new examination conducted as required by law; (3) he may institute administrative charges against the erring prosecutor, or a criminal complaint under Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code, or a civil action for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code; (4) he may secure the appointment of another prosecutor; or (5) he may institute another criminal action if no double jeopardy is involved. PEOPLE v. GREY G.R. No. 180109 July 26, 2010 J. Nachura FACTS: An information for murder was filed against Joseph Grey, former mayor of San Jorge, Samar, his son Francis, and two others for the death of Rolando Diocton, an employee of the San Jorge municipal government. Respondents filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice, while the presiding judge denied the motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The provincial prosecutor filed a petition for change of venue because the victims wife expressed fear for her life and that of other witnesses. The Secretary of Justice dismissed the petition for review and respondents counter-charge for perjury. Prosecution withdrew their motion for change of venue because of financial difficulties, while respondents opposed the motion and prayed that proceedings be suspended until the May 14, 2007 elections.

Finding of the provincial prosecutor as to the allegations was affirmed by the Secretary of Justice 4. To establish political harassment, respondents must prove a. that the public prosecutor and the private complainant acted in bad faith in prosecuting the case; or b. that the public prosecutor has lent himself to a scheme that could have no other purpose than to place respondents in contempt and disrepute; c. that the complainant possesses the power and influence to control the prosecution of cases 5. The allegation that the filing of the complaint was politically motivated does not serve to justify the nullification of the informations where the existence of such motive has not been sufficiently established nor substantial evidence presented in support thereof a. No proof from respondents that their rivals were waging political persecution They have not alleged nor proved any ill motive or malice that could have impelled the private prosecutor, judge, and eve Brocka v. Enrile by reinier jeffrey abdon J. Medialdea / GR No. 69863-65 / 10 Dec 1990 / En Banc DOCTRINE: When there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges (persecution) and where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted, charges filed should lawfully be enjoined. FACTS On 28 Jan 1985, petitoners Lino Brocka, Behn Cervantes, et al. were arrested by police after the violent dispersal of a demonstration in sympathy of a jeepney strike by ACTO (Alliance of Concerned Tranpsort Organization). They were charged of illegal assembly. Brocka et al. were not recommended bail as they were charged as leaders of the assembly although other petitioners were released for P3,000. Brocka's provisional release was ordered on 9 Feb only upon urgent petition for bail. However, despite the release order, he was not released because of an alleged Preventive Detention Action (PDA) issued against them, which was never shown. On 11 Feb, Brocka et al. were "reinvestigated" and subsequently charged with inciting to sedition at the QC fiscal, almost for the same utterances as that charged against them in the original charge of illegal assembly. Brocka et al. filed a petition to the SC on 13 Feb to secure their habeas corpus and to permanently enjoin the QC fiscal from investigating the inciting to sedition charges. They were released provisionally on 14 Feb upon the orders of Pres. Marcos. ISSUE WON a criminal prosecution may be enjoined by a petition. HELD Yes, if it falls under the exceptions.

b.

RATIO Although case to secure habeas corpus is moot and academic after release of petitioners, court still ruled on the second issue. General rule is that a criminal prosecution cannot be stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. However there are exceptions 1. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez v. Albano) 2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga et al. v. Fernandez) 3. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon v. Mabanag) 4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas v. Gil) 5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young v. Rafferty) 6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang v. People and Avendia) 7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez v. City Judge) 8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia v. Ocampo) 9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto v. Castelo) 10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga v. Pao) 11. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez v. Castelo)

Brocka cites circumstances under no. 8, that this is persecution. The hasty filing of second case of inciting to sedition premised on an inoperational PDA betrays respondents bad faith. In the Ilagan case the court held that persons issued PDAs should be furnished with the original, a duplicate and a certified true copy at the time of apprehension. The court here agreed with the Solicitor General that Brocka et al. should have filed a motion to quash the information, but considering the circumstances then prevailing, it would have been futile. Constitutional rights must be upheld at all costs.