Carino vs CHR Constitutional Law Adjudicatory Power of the CHR On 17 Sept 1990, some 800 public school teachers

s in Manila did not attend work and decided to stage rallies in order for their grievances to be heard. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on 17 Dec 1990, Secretary Carino ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Carino. ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights. HELD: The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all forms of human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and decide on the merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the trial.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.

While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return -towork orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the striking teachers were denied due process of law;they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.

ISSUE: Carino vs. CHR 204 SCRA 546 Distinction between the power to adjudicate and the power to investigate FACTS: Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-towork order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges. Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved

HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial

function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Power to Investigate The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasijudicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings. Investigate vs. Adjudicate "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances

complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions. Who has Power to Adjudicate? These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC. Manner of Appeal Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return -towork orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the striking teachers were denied due process of law;they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate. ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights. HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law

CARIO vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991 FACTS: Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-towork order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges. When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers to due process of law.

CD Simon, Jr. vs. CHR Edit 0 1 Topic: Personal Dignity and Human Rights (Sec. 11, 1987 Constitution) SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994

FACTS: On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in business". On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991. The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al". ISSUE: Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the CRH?

HELD: No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and political rights". The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that the it does not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC. The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.

capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of 3 days within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA to give way to the construction of the"People's Park". On 12 July 1990, private respondents, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint with the CHR against the petitioners, asking for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr. of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents'stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. CHR issued a preliminary order directing the petitioners to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. Petitioners started the demolition despite CHRs order to desist. Respondents consequently asked that petitioners be cited in contempt. Meanwhile, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by respondents. They alleged that the Commission has no jurisdiction over the complaint as it involved respondents privilege to engage in business, not their civil and political rights. In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. On 1 March 1991, the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss. The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines " Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petioners Simon Jr. et al filed a petition for prohibition to enjoin the CHR from hearing private respondents complaint.

Issue/s: WON CHR has jurisdiction to hear the complaint and grant the relief prayed for by respondents. WON the CHR can investigate the subject matter of respondents complaint. Held:

SIMON JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS Facts: A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his No. Under the constitution, the CHR has no power to adjudicate. No. Complaint does not involve civil and political rights. Rationale:

Art XIII, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that the CHR has the power to investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. In Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, the Court through Justice Andres Narvasa observed that: (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have

disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park." Looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.

Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights [GR 100150, 5 January 1994] En Banc, Vitug (J): 12 concur

CHRs investigative power encompasses all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. The term civil rights has been defined as referring to those rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government. Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of

Facts: A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the Roque Fermo, et. al. (being the officers and members of the North Edsa Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, Fermo, et. al. were given a grace-period of 3 days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, Fermo, et. al. were informed by Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) against Brigido R. Simon, Carlos Quimpo, Carlito Abelardo, and Generoso Ocampo, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Simon of Quezon City to stop the demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA (CHR Case 90-1580). On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing Simon, et. al. "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering Simon, et. al. to appear before the CHR. On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by Fermo, et. al. on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 Simon, et. al. carried out the demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of Fermo, et. al. to purchase light housing

materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed Simon, et. al. to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." A motion to dismiss, dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. During the 12 September 1990 hearing, Simon, et. al. moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved, and likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts. In an Order, dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited Simon, et. al. in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. On 1 March 1991, the CHR issued an Order, denying Simon, et.al.'s motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss. In an Order, dated 25 April 1991, Simon, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration was denied. Simon, et. al. filed the petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction, questioning the extent of the authority and power of the CHR, and praying that the CHR be prohibited from further hearing and investigating CHR Case 90 1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."

Issue: Whether the CHR has the power to issue the order to desist against the demolition of Fermo, et. al.s stalls, and to cite Mayor Simon, et. al. for contempt for proceeding to demolish said stalls despite the CHR order.

Held: Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights." Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations; such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of

investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." Herein, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by Fermo, at. al. on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park." More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, the Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if its is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining herein, the Court not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of Fermo, et. al. can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution. On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) herein, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. As held in Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights, "The constitutional provision directing the CHR to 'provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection' may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. 'Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law'. It is never derived by implication. Evidently, the 'preventive measures and legal aid services' mentioned in the Constitution refer to

extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued `by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." G.R. No. L-117376 December 8, 1994 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF OSCAR DE GUZMAN, CHAIRMAN SEDFREY A. ORDOEZ, DIRECTOR EMMANUEL C. NERI AND THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, petitioners, vs. DIRECTOR VICENTE VINARAO, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, respondent.

that, therefore, he should be released from prison without further delay. In aid of judicial administration, petitioners further recommend that all prisoners similarly situated be likewise released from prison. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty upon a verified petition setting forth: 1. that the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; 2. the officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained; 3. the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; and 4. a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person (Section 3, Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court). It appearing that all the above requirements have been met and finding merit in the petition, the same is hereby GRANTED. Let a writ of habeas corpus issue immediately. The Director, New Bilibid Prisons, is commanded to forthwith execute the writ for de Guzman's discharge from confinement unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause, to make due return of the writ, and to submit a complete inventory of all other prisoners therein similarly situated within thirty days, to relieve them from further confinement. With costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS Simon v. CHR, G.R. No. 100150, 05 January 1994 Commission on Human Rights is empowered to investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991 The Commission on Human Rights was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi- judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make

ROMERO, J.: This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed directly before this Court in behalf of Oscar de Guzman y Enriquez, who was tried and convicted by the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City Branch 39 in G.R. No. 76742, "People of the Philippines v. Oscar de Guzman y Enriquez," 188 SCRA 407, for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, alleging in particular the fact that de Guzman wilfully and unlawfully sold two (2) sticks of marijuana. Upon review by this Court, the trial court's decision sentencing de Guzman to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment plus payment of P20,000 fine and costs was affirmed in toto and the appeal was dismissed with costs against accused-appellant. Under the provisions of Section 20, Republic Act No. 6425 as last amended by R.A. 7659, which became effective on December 31, 1993, and as interpreted by 1 this Court in the case of People v. Simon, if the quantity of the marijuana involved is less than 250 grams, the imposable penalty, in the event that the conviction should be affirmed, shall be within the range of prision correccional (from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years). Clearly, de Guzman is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law. Petitioners allege that since de Guzman has been serving sentence since July 1984 or for more than ten (10) years now, his continued detention in the National Penitentiary is a violation of his basic human rights and

findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. EPZA v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992 The constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so