Real and Personal Properties Laurel v Garcia The respondents try to get around the public dominion character

of the Roppongi property by insisting that Japanese law and not our Civil Code should apply. It is exceedingly strange why our top government officials, of all people, should be the ones to insist that in the sale of extremely valuable government property, Japanese law and not Philippine law should prevail. The Japanese law its coverage and effects, when enacted, and exceptions to its provisions is not presented to the Court. It is simply asserted that the lex loci rei sitae or Japanese law should apply without stating what that law provides. It is assumed on faith that Japanese law would allow the sale. !e see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. " conflict of law situation arises only when# $%& There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to ta'e and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined $(ee (alonga, Private International )aw, %*+% ed., pp. ,--.,+,&/ and $0& " foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. 1ence, the need to determine which law should apply. In the instant case, none of the above elements exists. The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no 2uestion that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the (tate. "nd the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine )aw. The rule of lex situs does not apply. The assertion that the opinion of the (ecretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tac'le the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of ac2uiring the lots, the (ecretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can ac2uire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on ac2uisition of lands of the public domain to 3ilipino citi4ens and entities wholly owned by 3ilipinos is inapplicable. !e see no point in belaboring whether or not this opinion is correct. !hy should we discuss who can ac2uire the Roppongi lot when there is no showing that it can be sold5 Lim v CA Petitioners maintain that the prosecution failed to prove that any of the essential elements of the crime punishable under 6.P. 6lg. 00 was committed within the 7urisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of 8alabon. They claim that what was proved was that all the elements of the offense were committed in 9aloo'an City. The chec's were issued at their place of business, received by a collector of )I:T;:, and dishonored by the drawee ban', all in 9aloo'an City. In fine,

considering that the chec's were all issued, delivered, and dishonored in 9aloo'an City, the trial court of 8alabon exceeded its 7urisdiction when it tried the case and rendered 7udgment thereon. 1eld Petitioners are wrong. If all the acts material and essential to the crime and re2uisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the court therein has the sole 7urisdiction to try the case. There are certain crimes in which some acts material and essential to the crimes and re2uisite to their consummation occur in one municipality or territory and some in another, in which event, the court of either has 7urisdiction to try the cases, it being understood that the first court ta'ing cogni4ance of the case excludes the other. These are the so.called transitory or continuing crimes under which violation of 6.P. 6lg. 00 is categori4ed. In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. King Mau Wu v Sycip This is an action by an agent to collect money from his principal. <nder an agency agreement set forth in a letter made in :ew =or' addressed to the defendant and accepted by the latter, the plaintiff was made the exclusive agent of the defendant in the sale of Philippine coconut oil and its derivatives outside the Philippines. The plaintiff claims that for that sale he is entitled under the agency contract to a commission stipulated therein. The defendant contends that Philippines courts have no 7urisdiction. 1eld The contention that as the contract was executed in :ew =or', the C3I has no 7urisdiction over this case, is without merit, because a non.resident may sue a resident in the courts of this country where the defendant may be summoned and his property leviable upon execution in case of a favorable, final and executory 7udgment. It is a personal action for the collection of a sum of money which the Courts of 3irst Instance have 7urisdiction to try and decide. There is no conflict of laws involved in the case, because it is only a 2uestion of enforcing an obligation created by or arising from contract/ and unless the enforcement of the contract be against public policy of the forum, it must be enforced. La Chemise v Fernandez Trademar' case. Can a foreign corporation whose trademar' has been purportedly violated, sue in the Philippienes5 1eld =es. " right to the use of its corporate and trade name is a property right, a right in rem, which its owners may assert and protect against all the world, in any of the courts of the world even in 7urisdictions where it does not transact business 7ust the same as it may protect its tangible property, real or personal, against trespass, or conversion.

(ince it is the trade and not the mar' that is to be protected, a trade.mar' ac'nowledges no territorial boundaries of municipalities or states or nations, but extends to every mar'et where the trader>s goods have become 'nown and identified by the use of the mar'. In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before our courts for unfair competition or infringement of trademar's of a foreign corporation, we are moreover recogni4ing our duties and the rights of foreign states under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to which the Philippines and 3rance are parties. !e are simply interpreting and enforcing a solemn international commitment of the Philippines embodied in a multilateral treaty to which we are a party and which we entered into because it is in our national interest to do so. The Paris Convention has extraterritorial application. The Paris Convention provides in part that# "RTIC)? 0 $0& :ationals of each of the countries of the <nion shall, as regards the protection of industrial property, en7oy in all the other countries of the <nion the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals, without pre7udice to the rights specially provided by the present Convention. Conse2uently, they shall have the same protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy against any infringement of their rights, provided they observe the conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals. "RTIC)? @bis $%& The countries of the <nion underta'e, either administratively if their legislation so permits, or at the re2uest of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration and to prohibit the use of a trademar' which constitutes a reproduction, imitation or translation, liable to create confusion, of a mar' considered by the competent authority of the country of registration or use to be well.'nown in that country as being already the mar' of a person entitled to the benefits of the present Convention and used for identical or similar goods. These provisions shall also apply when the essential part of the mar' constitutes a reproduction of any such well.'nown mar' or an imitation liable to create confusion therewith. "RTIC)? + " trade name shall be protected in all the countries of the <nion without the obligation of filing or registration, whether or not it forms part of a trademar'. "RTIC)? %Abis $%& The countries of the <nion are bound to assure to persons entitled to the benefits of the <nion effective protection against unfair competition. Thus, petitioner should be given the same treatment in the Philippines as we ma'e available to our own citi4ens. !e are obligated to assure to nationals of Bcountries of the <nionB an effective

protection against unfair competition in the same way that they are obligated to similarly protect 3ilipino citi4ens and firms. General Garments v Director of atents Patent case. Petitioner contends that Puritan (portswear Corporation $hereinafter referred to as respondent&, being a foreign corporation which is not licensed to do and is not doing business in the Philippines, is not considered as a person under Philippine laws and conse2uently is not comprehended within the term Bany personB who may apply for cancellation of a mar' or trade. name under (ection %-$c& of the Trademar' )aw afore2uoted. That respondent is a 7uridical person should be beyond serious dispute. The fact that it may not transact business in the Philippines unless it has obtained a license for that purpose, nor maintain a suit in Philippine courts for the recovery of any debt, claim or demand without such license $(ec. @+ and @*, Corporation )aw& does not ma'e respondent any less a 7uridical person. Indeed an exception to the license re2uirement has been recogni4ed in this 7urisdiction, namely, where a foreign corporation sues on an isolated transaction. "s first enunciated in 8arshall.!ells Co. v. ?lser C Co. Bthe ob7ect of the statute $(ec. @+ and @*, Corporation )aw& was not to prevent the foreign corporation from performing single acts, but to prevent it from ac2uiring a domicile for the purpose of business without ta'ing the steps necessary to render it amenable to suit in the local courts . . . the implication of the law $being& that it was never the purpose of the legislature to exclude a foreign corporation which happens to obtain an isolated order for business from the Philippines, from securing redress in the Philippine Courts . . .B The principle has since then been applied in a number of other cases. The right to the use of the corporate or trade name is a property right, a right in rem, which it may assert and protect in any of the courts of the world even in 7urisdictions where it does not transact business 7ust the same as it may protect its tangible property, real or personal against trespass or conversion. In any event, respondent in the present case is not suing for infringement or unfair competition under (ection 0%.", but for cancellation under (ection %-, on one of the grounds enumerated in (ection D. The first 'ind of action, it may be stated, is cogni4able by the Courts of 3irst Instance $(ec. 0-&/ the second parta'es of an administrative proceeding before the Patent ;ffice $(ec. %+, in relation to (ec. +&. "nd while a suit under (ection 0%." re2uires that the mar' or tradename alleged to have been infringed has been Bregistered or assignedB to the suing foreign corporation, a suit for cancellation of the registration of a mar' or tradename under (ection %has no such re2uirement. 3or such mar' or trade.name should not have been registered in the first place $and conse2uently may be cancelled if so registered& if it Bconsists of or comprises a mar' or tradename which go resembles a mar' or tradename . . . previously used in the Philippines by another and not abandoned, as to be li'ely, when applied to or used in connection with goods, business or services of the applicant, to cause confusion or mista'e or to deceive purchasers/ . . .B

Sterling roducts v !ayer " case for trademar' infringement and unfair competition. 1eld :either will the %*0- registration in the <nited (tates of the 6"=?R trademar' for insecticides serve plaintiff any. The <nited (tates is not the Philippines. Registration in the <nited (tates is not registration in the Philippines. "t the time of the <nited (tates registration in %*0-, we had our own Trademar' )aw, "ct :o. @@@ aforesaid of the Philippine Commission, which provided for registration here of trademar's owned by persons domiciled in the <nited (tates. !hat is to be secured from unfair competition in a given territory is the trade which one has in that particular territory. There is where his business is carried on/ where the goodwill symboli4ed by the trademar' has immediate value/ where the infringer may profit by infringement. There is nothing new in what we now say. Plaintiff itself concedes that the principle of territoriality of the Trademar' )aw has been recogni4ed in the Philippines, citing Ingenohl vs. !alter ?. ;lsen, - ).ed -@0. "s Callmann puts it, the law of trademar's Brests upon the doctrine of nationality or territoriality.B "ccordingly, the %*0- registration in the <nited (tates of the 6"=?R trademar' would not of itself afford plaintiff protection for the use by defendants in the Philippines of the same trademar' for the same or different products.