SIGAYA vs. MAYUGA, GR. No. 143254, 18 Aug.

2005 FACTS: Dionisia Alorsabes owned a three hectare land in Dao, Capiz, denominated as Lot 3603. In 1934, she sold a portion of the lot to Juanito Fuentes while the remainder was inherited by her children Paz Dela Cruz, Rosela Dela Cruz, and Consorcia Arroja (an adopted child), and a grandson, Francisco Abas, in representation of his deceased mother Margarita Dela Cruz. These four heirs executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale dated February 4, 1964 wherein Consorcia sold her share with an area of 6,694 square meters to spouses Balleriano Mayuga. On April 1, 1977, Paz also sold her share to Honorato de los Santos. Later, another document entitled Extra-Judicial Partition with Deed of Sale dated November 2, 1972 was uncovered wherein the heirs of Dionisia purportedly adjudicated Lot 3603 among themselves and sold their shares to Francisco. On January 9, 1978, Francisco executed a Deed of Sale over Lot 3603 in favor of Teodulfo Sigaya. Thus, the title over Lot 3603 was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of Teodulfo, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners herein. The petitioners, who are the widow and children of Teodulfo, filed an action for recovery of possession and damages against the herein respondents. The trial court believes and that the evidence of actual occupation and possession of the defendants of the portions of Lot 3603, to each of them appertaining had been satisfactorily proven. From the evidence taken together by its totality of evidence tilts more in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs. The CA affirms the lower courts decision. ISSUE: Whether Teodulfo Sigaya is a purchaser in good faith. Whether there is double sale. HELD: In this case, petitioners failed to show that they fall under any of the exceptional circumstances. This Court has held that the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith lies upon one who asserts that status and this onus probandi cannot be discharged my mere invocation of the legal presumption of good faith. In this case, preponderance of evidence shows that respondents had been in actual possession of their respective portions even prior to 1960. There being occupants of the property, the Court cannot ascribe good faith to Teodulfo who has not shown any diligence in protecting his rights. In this case, respondents derive their right over their respective portions either through inheritance or sale from Dionisia while petitioners invoke their right from the sale of the land fro m Francisco. Clearly, the law on double sales does not apply here.

BRICKTOWN DEVT vs. AMOR TIERRA, GR. No. 112182, 12 Dec. 1994 FACTS: On 31 March 1981, petitioner corporation, executed two Contracts to Sell in favor of private respondent, covering a total of 96 residential lots with the total price of P21,639,875.00. Private respondent was only able to pay petitioner corporation the sum of P1,334,443.21. On 12 October 1981, petitioner Corporation, through its legal counsel, sent private respondent a "Notice of Cancellation of Contract on account of the latter's continued failure to pay the installment due 30 June 1981 and the interest on the unpaid balance of the stipulated initial payment. Petitioner corporation advised private respondent, however, that it (private respondent) still had the right to pay its arrearages within 30 days from receipt of the notice "otherwise the actual cancellation of the contract (would) take place." Several months later, or on 26 September 1983, private respondent, through counsel, demanded the refund of private respondent's various payments to petitioner corporation, allegedly "amounting to P2,455,497.71," with interest within fifteen days from receipt of said letter, or, in lieu of a cash payment, to assign to private respondent an equivalent number of unencumbered lots at the same price fixed in the contracts. The demand, not having been heeded, private respondent commenced, on 18 November 1983, its action with the trial court. ISSUE: Whether the contracts to sell were validly rescinded or cancelled by petitioner corporation. HELD: The cancellation of the contracts to sell by petitioner corporation accords with the contractual covenants of the parties, and such cancellation must be respected. Petitioner corporation still acted within its legal right to declare the contracts to sell rescinded or cancelled, considering, nevertheless, the peculiar circumstances found to be extant by the trial court, confirmed by the Court of Appeals, it would be unconscionable, to likewise sanction the forfeiture by petitioner corporation of payments made to it by private respondent.

OCAMPO vs. CA, GR. No. 97442, 30 June 1994 FACTS: On 21 April 1975, the parties entered into an "Agreement to Sell Real Property", Tolosa "sells, cedes and transfers" the land to Ocampo in consideration of P25,000.00, P12,500.00 of which was paid upon signing of the deed and the balance to be due within six (6) months thereafter. Before the six-month period to complete the payment of the purchase price expired, Ocampo paid but only the total of P16,700.00. Nevertheless Tolosa accepted her subsequent late payments amounting to P3,900.00. On 3 June 1977, Tolosa and Magdalena S. Villaruz executed a "Contract to Sell whereby Tolosa "sells, cedes, transfers, and conveys" to Villaruz the same land in consideration of P94,300.00. Tolosa filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to cancel the adverse claim of Ocampo. On 30 July 1977. ISSUE: Whether petititioner Ocampo has the better right over the property. HELD: The failure of Ocampo to complete her payment of the purchase price within the stipulated period merely accorded Tolosa the option to rescind the contract of sale upon judicial or notarial demand. The letter of 2 August 1977 claimed to have been sent by Tolosa to Ocampo rescinding the contract of sale was defective because it was not notarized and, more importantly, it was not proven to have been received by Ocampo. While Villaruz may have registered his contract or came into possession ahead of Ocampo, Villaruz was never in good faith. Ocampo having the older title in good faith and considering that personal knowledge thereof by Villaruz constitutes registration as against the latter, Ocampo should be considered the preferred buyer.

RAMEL vs. AQUINO, G.R. No. 133208, July 31, 2006 Facts: Daniel Aquino is the registered owner of a lot in Tanggal, Cordon, Isabela. He mortgaged the property to the DBP for P50K. In 1983, the property was in danger of being foreclosed as he had no means to pay for the loan. Aquino offered to sell to Ramel the mortgaged property for 110K as well as assume the remaining mortgage of respondents in DBP in the amount of 85K. Petitioners agreed to purchase the property but the agreement was not reduced into writing. Ramel introduced into the property improvements such as a house, irrigation canals. Ramel applied for a restructuring of the mortgage loan with the DBP for a period of ten years. They did so without the consent of respondents. Aquino now wants to pay the mortgage in the bank in full, and wants to rescind the contract made between him and Ramel. Ramel was only able to subsequently fully settle the mortgage loan two years and five months from the constitution of the contract, and one and a half years after they filed this case. Issue: 1. WON Ramel substantially breached their obligation warranting the rescission of the contract? YES 2. WON there can be offsetting of the claim of improvements by petitioners to the claim of fruits derived from the land by respondents? YES Held: 1. Petitioners cannot argue that their breach is merely casual and slight, especially that they were able to subsequently pay the loan and the purpose of the contract has been fulfilled by petitioners, i.e., that the mortgage obligation shall be paid and respondents shall be able to retain at least the rest of the land free from any liens or encumbrances. It is admitted that the underlying purpose of the Aquinos to sell a portion of the land was in order that their mortgage obligation shall be paid and they shall be able to retain at least the rest of the land free from any liens and encumbrances. It was imperative then for Rene Ramel to pay the mortgage obligation. He did not do so. It was never the intention of respondents to be left at the mercy of petitioners as to when the latter would complete payment of the remaining mortgage obligation. It goes against the common sense of man and the ordinary course of business that an owner of land sells his property without any definite agreement as to when the obligation shall be paid, especially if his property is facing foreclosure. 2. We cannot order an offsetting of the claims as did the trial court and the appellate court. The evidence show that both parties failed to prove their respective claims. In the absence of evidence from both parties on their claims, offsetting is improper. The right to offset may exist but the question of how much is to be offset is factual in nature and needs to be proved by proper evidence. The records show that both parties failed to prove their claims through any receipt or document.