abs cbn broadcasting corp v philippine multi media system Philippine Multi-Media System Inc (PMSI) is a signal provider

which has cable and satellite services. It is providing its satellite services through Dream Broadcasting System. PMSI has its Free TV and Premium Channels. The Free TV includes ABS -CBN, GMA-7 and other local networks. The premium channels include AXN, Jack TV, etc which are paid by subscribers before such channels can be transmitted as feeds to a subscribers TV set which has been installed with a Dream satellite. ABS-CBN is a television and broadcasting corporation. It broadcasts television programs by wireless means to Metro Manila and nearby provinces, and by satellite to provincial stations through Channel 2 and Channel 23. The programs aired over Channels 2 and 23 are either produced by ABS-CBN or purchased from or licensed by other producers. ABS-CBN also owns regional television stations which pattern their programming in accordance with perceived demands of the region. Thus, television programs shown in Metro Manila and nearby provinces are not necessarily shown in other provinces. In May 2002, ABS-CBN sued PMSI for allegedly engaging in rebroadcasting and thereby infringing on ABS-CBNs copyrights; that the transmission of Channels 2 and 23 to the provinces where these two channels are not usually shown altered ABS-CBNs programming for the said provinces. PMSI argued that it is not infringing upon ABS-CBNs copyrights because it is operating under the Must-Carry Rule outlined in NTC (National Telecommunications Commission) Circular No. 4-08-88. ISSUE: Whether or not PMSI infringed upon the copyrights of ABS-CBN. HELD: No. The Must-Carry Rule under NTC Circular No. 4 -08-88 falls under the limitations on copyright. The Filipino people must be given wider access to more sources of news, information, education, sports event and entertainment programs other than those provided for by mass media and afforded television programs to attain a well informed, well-versed and culturally refined citizenry and enhance their socio-economic growth. The very intent and spirit of the NTC Circular will prevent a situation whereby station owners and a few networks would have unfettered power to make time available only to the highest bidders, to communicate only their own views on public issues, people, and to permit on the air only those with whom they agreed contrary to the state policy that the (franchise) grantee like ABS-CBN, and other TV station owners and even the likes of PMSI, shall provide at all times sound and balanced programming and assist in the functions of public information and education. PMSI was likewise granted a legislative franchise under Republic Act No. 8630, Section 4 of which similarly states that it shall provide adequate public service time to enable the government, through the said broadcasting stations, to reach the population on important public issues; provide at all times sound and balanced programming; promote public participation such as in community programming; assist in the functions of public information and education. The Must-Carry Rule favors both broadcasting organizations and the public. It prev ents cable television companies from excluding broadcasting organization especially in those places not reached by signal. Also, the rule prevents cable television companies from depriving viewers in far-flung areas the enjoyment of programs available to city viewers. columbia pictures vs ca case digest Intellectual Property Law on Copyright Requirements Before a Search Warrant May Be Issued in Copyright Cases Piracy In 1986, the Video Regulatory Board (VRB) applied for a warrant against Jose Jinco (Jingco), owner of Showtime Enterprises for allegedly pirating movies produced and owned by Columbia Pictures and other motion picture companies. Jingco filed a motion to quash the search warrant but the same was denied in 1987. Subsequently, Jinco filed an Urgent Motion to Lift the Search Warrant and Return the Articles Seized. In 1989, the RTC judge granted the motion. The judge ruled that based on the ruling in the 1988 case th of 20 Century Fox Film Corporation vs CA, before a search warrant could be issued in copyright cases, the master copy of the films alleged to be pirated must be attached in the application for warrant. ISSUE: Whether or not the 20 Century Fox ruling may be applied retroactively in this case. HELD: No. In 1986, obviously the 1988 case of 20 Century Fox was not yet promulgated. The lower court could not possibly have expected more evidence from the VRB and Columbia Pictures in their application for a search warrant other than what the law and jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted, required with respect to the finding of probable cause. th The Supreme Court also revisited and clarified the ruling in the 20 Century Fox Case. It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to do, that in copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of the copyright films is always necessary to meet the requirement of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. It is true that such master tapes are object evidence, with the merit that in this class of evidence the ascertainment of the controverted fact is made through demonstration involving the direct use of the senses of the presiding magistrate. Such auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the use of testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence tending to prove the factum probandum, especially where the production in court of object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to is evidentiary value. In fine, the supposed pronouncement in said case regarding the necessity for the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for the validity of search warrants should at most be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in determining the existence of probable cause in copy-right infringement cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape and the pirated copies. An objective and careful reading of the decision in said case could lead to no other conclusion than that said directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright infringement cases.
th th

Pacita Habana and two others were the authors of College English for Today Series 1 and 2 (CET). While they were researching for books to assist them in updating their own book, they chanced upon the book of Felicidad Robles entitled Developing English Proficiency Books 1 and 2 (DEP). They discovered further that the book of Robles was strikingly similar to the contents, scheme of presentation, illustrations and illustrative examples of CET. They then sued Robles and her publisher (Goodwill Trading Co.) for infringement and/or unfair competition with damages. Robles, in her defense, alleged that her sources were from foreign books; that in their field similarity in styles cannot be avoided since they come from the same background and orientation. The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Robles. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD: No. A perusal of the records yields several pages of the book DEP that are similar if not identical with the text of CET. In several other pages the treatment and manner of presentation of the topics of DEP are similar if not a rehash of that contained in CET. The similarities in examples and material contents are so obviously present in this case. How can similar/identical examples not be considered as a mark of copying? Robles act of lifting from the book of Habana et al substantial portions of discussions and examples, and her failure to acknowledge the same in her book is an infringement of Habana et als copyrights. The Supreme Court also elucidated that in determining the question of infringement, the amount of matter copied from the copyrighted work is an important consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not necessary that the whole or even a large portion of the work shall have been copied. If so much is taken that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially and to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient in point of law to constitute piracy. FACTS: Pacita Habana et al., are authors and copyright owners of duly issued of the book, College English For Today (CET). Respondent Felicidad Robles was the author of the book Developing English Proficiency (DEP). Petitioners found that several pages of the respondent's book are similar, if not all together a copy of petitioners' book. Habana et al. filed an action for damages and injunction, alleging respondents infringement of copyrights, in violation of P.D. 49. They allege respondent Felicidad C. Ro bles being substantially familiar with the contents of petitioners' works, and without securing their permission, lifted, copied, plagiarized and/or transposed certain portions of their book CET. On the other hand, Robles contends that the book DEP is the product of her own intellectual creation, and was not a copy of any existing valid copyrighted book and that the similarities may be due to the authors' exercise of the "right to fair use of copyrighted materials, as guides." The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents, absolving them of any liability. Later, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in favor of respondents Robles and Goodwill Trading Co., Inc. In this appeal, petitioners submit that the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's decision. ISSUE: Whether Robles committed infringement in the production of DEP. HELD: A perusal of the records yields several pages of the book DEP that are similar if not identical with the text of CET. The court finds that respondent Robles' act of lifting from the book of petitioners substantial portions of discussions and examples, and her failure to acknowledge the same in her book is an infringement of petitioners' copyrights. In the case at bar, the least that respondent Robles could have done was to acknowledge petitioners Habana et. al. as the source of the portions of DEP. The final product of an author's toil is her book. To allow another to copy the book without appropriate acknowledgment is injury enough. Case title: JESSIE G. CHING vs. WILLIAM M. SALINAS, SR., WILLIAM M. SALINAS, JR., JOSEPHINE L. SALINAS, JENNIFER Y. SALINAS, ALONTO SOLAIMAN SALLE, JOHN ERIC I. SALINAS, NOEL M. YABUT (Board of Directors and Officers of WILAWARE PRODUCT CORPORATION) Petitioners claim: Ching and Joseph Yu were issued by the National Library Certificates of Copyright Registration and Deposit of the work described therein as Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile. Ching requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for police/investigative assistance for the apprehension and prosecution of illegal manufacturers, producers and/or distributors of the works.As such, inventory items were seized from Salinas for violating the provisions of ra 8293. He claims that R.A. No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines provides in no uncertain terms that copyright protection automatically attaches to a work by the sole fact of its creation, irrespective of its mode or form of expression, as well as of its content, quality or purpose. The law gives a non-inclusive definition of work as referring to origina l intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation; and includes original ornamental designs or models for articles of manufacture, whether or not registrable as an industrial design and other works of applied art under Section 172.1(h) of R.A. No. 8293. As such, the petitioner insists, notwithstanding the classification of the works as either literary and/or artistic, the said law, likewise, encompasses works which may have a bearing on the utility aspect to which the petitioners utility designs were classified. Moreover, according to the petitioner, what the Copyright Law protects is the authors intellectual creation, re gardless of whether it is one with utilitarian functions or incorporated in a useful article produced on an industrial scale. The petitioner also maintains that the law does not provide that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for patent bars or invalidates its registration under the Law on Copyright. The test of protection for the aesthetic is not beauty and utility, but art for the copyright and invention of original and ornamental design for design patents.[16] In like manner, the fact that his utility designs or models for articles of manufacture have been expressed in the field of automotive parts, or based on something already in the public domain does not automatically remove them from the protection of the Law on Copyright. Respomdents claim: The respondents averred that the works covered by the certifica tes issued by the National Library are not artistic in nature; they are considered automotive spare parts and pertain to technology. They aver that the models are

not original, and as such are the proper subject of a patent, not copyright.respondents aver that the work of the petitioner is essentially a technical solution to the problem of wear and tear in automobiles, the substitution of materials, i.e., from rubber to plastic matter of polyvinyl chloride, an oil resistant soft texture plastic material strong enough to endure pressure brought about by the vibration of the counter bearing and thus brings bushings. Such work, the respondents assert, is the subject of copyright under Section 172.1 of R.A. No. 8293. The respondents posit that a technical solution in any field of human activity which is novel may be the subject of a patent, and not of a copyright. They insist that the certificates issued by the National Library are only certifications that, at a point in time, a certain work was deposited in the said office. Furthermore, the registration of copyrights does not provide for automatic protection. Citing Section 218.2(b) of R.A. No. 8293, the respondents aver that no copyright is said to exist if a party categorically questions its existence and legality. Moreover, under Section 2, Rule 7 of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 8293, the registration and deposit of work is not conclusive as to copyright outlay or the time of copyright or the right of the copyright owner. The respondents maintain that a copyright exists only when the work is covered by the protection of R.A. No. 8293. Issue/s: Whether or not copyright granted by law can be said to arise in favor of the petitioner despite the issuance of the certificates of copyright registration and the deposit of the Leaf Spring Eye Bushing and Vehicle Bearing Cushion Ruling: No. as gleaned from the specifications appended to the application for a copyright certificate filed by the petitioner, the said Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile is merely a utility model.These are not literary or artistic works. They are not intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain, or works of applied art. They are certainly not ornamental designs or one having decorative quality or value. It bears stressing that the focus of copyright is the usefulness of the artistic design, and not its marketability. The central inquiry is whether the article is a work of art.[33] Works for applied art include all original pictorials, graphics, and sculptural works that are intended to be or have been embodied in useful article regardless of factors such as mass production, commercial exploitation, and the potential availability of design patent protection.[34] As gleaned from the description of the models and their objectives, these articles are useful articles which are defined as one having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. Indeed, while works of applied art, original intellectual, literary and artistic works are copyrightable, useful articles and works of industrial design are not.[35] A useful article may be copyrightable only if and only to the extent that such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects of the article. We agree with the contention of the petitioner (citing Section 171.10 of R.A. No. 8293), that the authors intellectual creation, regardless of whether it is a creation with utilitarian functions or incorporated in a useful article produced on an industrial scale, is protected by copyright law. However, the law refers to a work of applied art which is an artistic creation. It bears stressing that there is no copyright protection for works of applied art or industrial design which have aesthetic or artistic features that cannot be identified separately from the utilitarian aspects of the article.[36] Functional components of useful articles, no matter how artistically designed, have generally been denied copyright protection unless they are separable from the useful article.[37] In this case, the petitioners models are not works of applied art, nor artistic works. They are utility models, useful articles, albeit with no artistic design or value. Case Title: PEARL & DEAN (PHIL.), INCORPORATED vs. SHOEMART, INCORPORATED, and NORTH EDSA MARKETING, INCORPORATED Petitioners Claim: Petitioner Pearl and Dean, Inc. was able to secure a copyright registration on advertising units referred to as light boxes and was also able to secure the trademark of Poster Ads. Sometime in 1989, Pearl and Dean, received repor ts that exact copies of its light boxes were installed at SM City and in the fastfood section of SM Cubao. Upon investigation, Pearl and Dean found out that aside from the two (2) reported SM branches, light boxes similar to those it manufactures were also installed in two (2) other SM stores. It further discovered that defendant-appellant North Edsa Marketing Inc. (NEMI), through its marketing arm, Prime Spots Marketing Services, was set up primarily to sell advertising space in lighted display units located in SMIs different branches. Pearl and Dean noted that NEMI is a sister co mpany of SMI.In the light of its discoveries, Pearl and Dean sent a letter dated December 11, 1991 to both SMI and NEMI enjoining them to cease using the subject light boxes and to remove

the same from SMIs establishments. It also demanded the discontinued use of the trademark Poster Ads, and the payment to Pearl and Dean of compensatory damages in the amount of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00). Respondents Claim: SMI maintained that it independently developed its poster panels using commonly know n techniques and available technology, without notice of or reference to Pearl and Deans copyright. SMI noted that the registration of the mark Poster Ads was only for stationeries such as letterheads, envelopes, and the like. Besides, according to SMI, the word Poster Ads is a generic term which cannot be appropriated as a trademark, and, as such, registration of such mark is invalid. It also stressed that Pearl and Dean is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for in its complaint since its advertising display units contained no copyright notice, in violation of Section 27 of P.D. 49. SMI alleged that Pearl and Dean had no cause of action against it and that the suit was purely intended to malign SMIs good name. Issue/s: 1) if the engineering or technical drawings of an advertising display unit (light box) are granted copyright protection (copyright certificate of registration) by the National Library, is the light box depicted in such engineering drawings ipso facto also protected by such copyright? 2) should the light box be registered separately and protected by a patent issued by the Bureau of Patents Trademarks and Technology Transfer (now Intellectual Property Office) in addition to the copyright of the engineering drawings? 3) can the owner of a registered trademark legally prevent others from using such trademark if it is a mere abbreviation of a term descriptive of his goods, services or business? Ruling:1) No. P & D secured its copyright under the classification class O work. This being so, petitioners copyright protection extended only to the technical drawings and not to the light box itself because the latter was not at all in the category of prints, pictorial illustrations, advertising copies, labels, tags and box wraps. Stated otherwise, even as we find that P & D indeed owned a valid copyright, the same could have referred only to the technical drawings within the category of pictorial illustrations. It could not have possibly stretched out to include the underlying light box. The strict application*9+ of the laws enumeration in Section 2 prevents us from giving petitioner even a little leeway, that is, even if its copyright certificate was entitled Advertising Display Units. What the law does not include, it excludes, a nd for the good reason: the light box was not a literary or artistic piece which could be copyrighted under the copyright law. And no less clearly, neither could the lack of statutory authority to make the light box copyrightable be remedied by the simplistic act of entitling the copyright certificate issued by the National Library as Advertising Display Units. 2) Yes Petitioner never secured a patent for the light boxes. It therefore acquired no patent rights which could have protected its invention, if in fact it really was. And because it had no patent, petitioner could not legally prevent anyone from manufacturing or commercially using the contraption. To be able to effectively and legally preclude others from copying and profiting from the invention, a patent is a primordial requirement. No patent, no protection. The ultimate goal of a patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public through disclosure. Ideas, once, disclosed to the public without protection of a valid patent, are subject to appropriation without significant restraint. The Patent Law has a three-fold purpose: first, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes disclosures of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to practice the invention once the patent expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent protection seek to ensure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public. It is only after an exhaustive examination by the patent office that patent is issued. Therefore, not having gone through the arduous examination for patents, petitioner cannot exclude other s from the manufacture, sale or commercial use of the light boxes on the sole basis of its copyright certificate over the technical drawings. 3) No. Poster Ads was generic and incapable of being used as a trademark because it was used in the field of poster advertising, the very business engaged in by petitioner. Secondary meaning means that a word or phrase originally incapable of exclusive appropriation with reference to an article in the market (because it is geographically or otherwise descriptive) might nevertheless have been used for so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference to his article that, in the trade and to that branch of the purchasing public, the word or phrase has come to mean that the article was his property.[29] The admission by petitioners own expert witness that he himself could not associate Poster Ads with petitioner P & D because it was too generic definitely precluded the application of this exception. Facts of the Case

Grokster and other companies distributed free software that allowed computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks. In such networks, users can share digital files directly between their computers, without the use of a central server. Users employed the software primarily to download copyrighted files, file-sharing which the software companies knew about and encouraged. The companies profited from advertising revenue, since they streamed ads to the software users. A group of movie studios and other copyright holders sued and alleged that Grokster and the other companies violated the Copyright Act by intentionally distributing software to enable users to infringe copyrighted works. The district court ruled for Grokster, reasoning that the software distribution companies were not liable for copyright violations stemming from their software, which could have been used lawfully. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Were companies that distributed file-sharing software, and encouraged and profited from direct copyright infringement using such software, liable for the infringement? Argument MGM Studios v. Grokster - Oral ArgumentMGM Studios v. Grokster - Opinion Announcement Conclusion Decision: 9 votes for MGM Studios, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: 17 U.S.C. 101 Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the Court held that companies that distributed software, and promoted that software to infringe copyrights, were liable for the resulting acts of infringement. The Court argued that although the Copyright Act did not expressly make anyone liable for another's infringement, secondary liability doctrines applied here. The software in this case was used so widely to infringe copyrights that it would have been immensely difficult to deal with each individual infringer. The "only practical alternative" was to go against the software distributor for secondary liability. Here the software companies were liable for encouraging and profiting from direct infringement.

Sony Corporation of America manufactured and sold the "Betamax" home video tape recorder (VTR). Universal City Studios owned the copyrights to television programs broadcast on public airwaves. Universal sued Sony for copyright infringement, alleging that because consumers used Sony's Betamax to record Universal's copyrighted works, Sony was liable for the copyright infringement allegedly committed by those consumers in violation of the Copyright Act. Universal sought monetary damages, an equitable accounting of profits, and an injunction against the manufacturing and marketing of the VTR's. The District Court denied all relief, holding that the noncommercial home use recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was a fair use of copyrighted works and did not constitute copyright infringement. Moreover, the court concluded that Sony could not be held liable as contributory infringers even if the home use of a VTR was considered an infringing use. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Sony liable for contributory infringement. Question Does Sony's sale of "Betamax" video tape recorders to the general public constitute contributory infringement of copyrighted public broadcasts under the Copyright Act? Argument Sony Corp v. Universal City Studios - Oral ArgumentSony Corp v. Universal City Studios - Oral ReargumentSony Corp v. Universal City Studios - Opinion Announcement Conclusion Decision: 5 votes for Sony Corp, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: 17 U.S.C. 102 No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that "[t]he sale of the VTR's to the general public does not constitute contributory infringement of [Universal's] copyrights." The Court concluded that there was a significant likelihood that a substantial number of copyright holders who license their works for free public broadcasts would not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by private viewers and that Universal failed to show that time-shifting would cause non-minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that "[t]he sale of copying equipment...does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes, or, indeed, is merely capable of substantial noninfringing uses." For the dissenting minority, Justice Blackmun expressed the views that taping a copyrighted television program is infringement and that the recorder manufacturers were guilty of inducing and materially contributing to the infringement.