Corporation A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the powers, attributes,

and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence. It exists only in contemplation of law. A corporation is a legal institution devised to confer upon the individuals of which it is composed powers, privileges, and immunities which they would not otherwise possess, the most important of which are continuous legal identity or unity, and perpetual or indefinite succession under the corporate name, notwithstanding successive changes by death or otherwise, in the corporators or members. B. Classes of corporations 1. Public formed or organized for the government of a portion of a State for the accomplishment of parts of its own public works. These are created by State either by special or general act. 2. Privateformed for some private purpose, benefit, aim or end; organized wholly for the profit and advantage of their own members and cannot constitutionally be granted governmental powers. These are created by the will of the incorporators with the recognizance of the State. Public vs Private Consider as criterion the relation of the corporation to the State. If it is created by the State as its own agency or instrumentality to help it carry out its governmental functions, then it is public. Otherwise, it is private. 3. Quasi-publicprivate corporations that render public service or supply public wants; while purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, the law requires them to discharge functions for the public benefit (i.e. utility companies). Classes of public corporations 1. Quasi-Corporationspublic corporations created as agencies of the State for a narrow and limited purpose. They differ from other public corporations in that they do not possess the powers and liabilities of self-governing corporations. Instead, their powers generally relate to matters of State, and not municipal concerns. Thus, although they are public in nature, they cannot be strictly considered municipal corporations because of their limited number of corporate powers and low grade of corporate existence. The main purpose of their creation is to aid the State in, or to take charge of, some public or state work other than community government for the general welfare. 2. 2. Municipal corporations a. Classes of Corporations Private Corporation -those formed for some private purpose, benefit, aim or end. DEFINITION -created for private aim, gain, or benefits of its members -created by the will of the incorporators with the recognizance of the State. -constitute a voluntary agreement by and among its members

PURPOSE CREATION CREATORS

OF

Public Corporation -one created by the State either by general or special act for purposes of administration of local government or rendering service in the public interest. -established for purposes connected with the administration of civil or local governments -creations of the State either by general or special act -involuntary consequence of legislation

NATURE

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000 A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a "body politic and corporate"-- one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the state b. Classes of Public Corporations Quasi-public Corporations -created as agencies of the State for narrow and limited purposes without the powers and liabilities of self-governing corporations.

Municipal Corporations/Local Government -body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants for purposes of local government thereof. -established by law partly as an agency of the State to assist in the civil government of the country, but chiefly to regulate and administer the local or internal affairs of the city, town or district which is incorporated. -political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs

1. 2. 3. 4.

B 1. Elements: Municipal Corporations A legal creation or incorporation A corporate name by which the artificial personality or legal entity is known and in which all corporate acts are done Inhabitants constituting the population who are invested with the political and corporate power which are executed through duly constituted officers and agents A place or territory within which the local civil government and corporate functions are exercised 2. Dual Nature and Function

Local Government: Dual Personality Public or Governmental -it is an agent of the state for the government of the territory and the inhabitants within the local government limits -exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the state -they serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government.

Private or Corporate -acts in a similar category as corporation, performing functions governmental or political -patrimonial powers

a business not strictly

-they act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs.

Bara Lidasan v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 496 1 The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections, is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's answer is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the present original petition for certiorari and prohibition. On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon,Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in theProvince of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent portions of which are: For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes, the Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato. Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces. Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation." Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court." This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified. RA 4790 creating the Muncipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur was enacted into law. Section 1 of the act reads:" xxxSECTION 1.Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga,Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamawakan, Kapatagan, Bongabong,Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan,Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Tagalogxxx Bara Lidasan, petitioner in this instant case, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Commission on Elections citing that the said law included two barrios from the Municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and, ten barrios that are parts and parcel of the Municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato, not Lanao del Sur thereby changing the boundaries of the two provinces. Since election are forthcoming, the COMELEC issued a resolution on August 15, 1967 which still puts the twelve barrios from Cotabato Province under the new Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The Office of the President thereafter recommended to COMELEC that the operation of the statute be suspended until clarified by correcting legislation but the COMELEC declared that the statute must be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. HELD: Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a 13 subdivision of the State.

Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory, and income. It was apparently these same factors which induced the writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking of the original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now Republic Act 4790, reads:The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality.This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy.When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios not nine barrios was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to progressive community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent municipality, still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assume that the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into a municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities of an independent municipal corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with the income to be derived in their community? How about the peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obligations? This Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems, or to answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to impute to Congress an undeclared will. With the known premise that Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of progressive community, large aggregate population and sufficient income, we may not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine of the original twenty-one barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly stretches judicial interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditional separation of powers, we may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that 14 congressional will.Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality. Surigao Electric Co., Inc. vs. Municipality of Surigao 24 SCRA 898 In this petition for review, a case of first impression, petitioner Surigao Electric Co., Inc., a legislative franchise holder, and petitioner Arturo Lumanlan to whom, on February 16, 1962, the rights and privileges of the former as well as its plant and facilities were transferred, challenge the validity of the order of respondent Public Service Commission, dated July 11, 1963, wherein it held that it had "no other alternative but to approve as [it did approve] the tentative schedule of rates submitted by the applicant," the other respondent herein, the Municipality of 3 Surigao. In the above order, the issue, according to respondent Commission, "boils down to whether or not a municipal government can directly maintain and operate an electric plant without obtaining a specific franchise for the purpose and without a certificate of public convenience and necessity duly issued by the Public Service 4 Commission." Citing the above amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 2677, respondent Commission answered the question thus: "A municipal government or a municipal corporation such as the Municipality of Surigao is a government entity recognized, supported and utilized by the National Government as a part of its government machinery and functions; a municipal government actually functions as an extension of the national government and, therefore, it is an instrumentality of the latter; and by express provisions of Section 14(e) of Act 2677, an instrumentality of the national government is exempted from the jurisdiction of the PSC except with 5 respect to the fixing of rates. This exemption is even clearer in Section 13(a)." The above formulation of respondent Commission could be worded differently. There is need for greater precision as well as further elaboration. Its conclusion, however, can stand the test of scrutiny. We sustain the Public Service Commission. The question involved is one of statutory interpretation. We have to ascertain the intent of Congress in introducing the above amendments, more specifically, in eliminating the requirement of the certificate of public convenience and necessity being obtained by government entities, or by government-owned or controlled corporations operating public services. Here, the Municipality of Surigao is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. It cannot be said, however, that it is not a government entity. 6 HELD: As early as 1916, in Mendoza v. de Leon, there has been a recognition by this Court of the dual character of a municipal corporation, one as governmental, being a branch of the general administration of the state, and the other as quasi-private and corporate. A well-known authority, Dillon, was referred to by us to stress the undeniable fact that "legislative and governmental powers" are "conferred upon a municipality, the better to enable it to aid a state in properly governing that portion of its people residing within its municipality, such powers [being] in their 7 nature public, ..." As was emphasized by us in the Mendoza decision: "Governmental affairs do not lose their governmental character by being delegated to the municipal governments. Nor does the fact that such duties are performed by officers of the municipality which, for convenience, the state allows the municipality to select, change their character. To preserve the peace, protect the morals and health of the community and so onIt would, therefore, be to erode the term "government entities" of its meaning if we are to reverse the Public Service Commission and to hold that a municipality is to be considered outside its scope. It may be admitted that there would be no ambiguity at all had the term "municipal corporations" been employed. Our function, however, is to put meaning to legislative words, not to denude them of their contents. They may be at times, as Cohen pointed out, frail vessels in which to embark legislative hopes, but we do not, just because of that, allow them to disappear perpetually from sight to find eternal slumber in the deep. It would be far from manifesting fidelity to the judicial task of construing statutes if we were to consider the order under review as a failure to abide by what the law commands. With the view we thus take of the amendatory statute, the errors assigned by petitioner, which would seek to fasten, mistakenly to our mind, an unwarranted restriction to the amendatory language of Republic Act No. 2677, need not be passed upon. An alleged error imputed to respondent Commission, however, needs further 10 discussion. Petitioners seek refuge in the legislative franchise granted them. Whatever privilege may be claimed by petitioners cannot override the specific constitutional restriction that no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual or corporation except under a condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by 11 Congress. Such amendment or alteration need not be express; it may be implied from a latter act of general applicability, such as the one now under consideration. Moreover, under a well-settled principle of American origin,

one which upon the establishment of the Philippine Government under American tutelage was adopted here and continued under our Constitution, no such franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of the police power. An early expression of this view is found in the leading American case of Charles River Bridge v. 12 Warren Bridge, an 1837 decision, the opinion being penned by Chief Justice Taney: "The continued existence of a government would be of no great value, if by implications and presumptions it was disarmed of the powers necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation; and the functions it was designed to perform, transferred to the hands of privileged Corporations. .. While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the community also have rights, and that the happiness and well-being of every citizen depend on their faithful preservation." Clearly, then, the relevancy of the statute providing for the taking or operation of the government of public utilities, appears, to put it at its mildest, far from clear. Petitioners' contention as to this alleged error being committed, therefore, far from being strengthened by such a reference, suffers from a fate less auspicious. the authority "to enact rules and regulations for the promotion of the general welfare. on a legislative franchise to operate an electric plant. Sec. 15 LGC of 1991 Section 15. Political and Corporate Nature of Local Government Units. - Every local government unit created or recognized under this Code is a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it shall exercise powers as a political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. 3 Sources of Powers

Local Governments: Power and Functions Sources of Power of Local governments 1. Constitution 2. R. A. No. 7160 3. All existing laws, acts, decrees. Executive orders, proclamations and administrative orders not inconsistent with the Constitution and R. A. No. 7160. A. Sources of Power 1. Constitution of a state 2. Statutes of a state including a) those applicable to all municipal corporation or to the class to which the particular municipal corporation belongs and b) special act of the legislature, as far as authorized, applicable to the particular municipal corporation. 3. The charter 4. Doctrine of inherent right of self-government with respect to certain municipal matters (applicable to states which adhere to it 4 Classification of local government power Express power- those granted in express words Implied powers- those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted Inherent powers- those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation not simply convenient but indispensable. Legislative powers- power to make laws Executive powers- power to execute laws. Intramural powers- those exercised within the corporate limits of a municipal corporation Extramural powers- those exercised outside of the corporate limits, like those given for the protection of water supply, prevention of nuisance and also for police forces Governmental powers- administer the powers of the State and promoting the public welfare within it. Example: Police power, Power of Eminent Domain. Power of Taxation Municipal powers- those for the special benefit and advantage of the community. Example: erection of waterworks, gas works, electric plants, from which profits may be derived by the municipality. B. Classification of Power 1.) Express, implied and inherent power a. Express - those granted in express word by the special charter or the general law under which corporation is organized. b. Implied- those granted which arise by natural implication from the granted of express power or by necessary inference from the purposes or function of the corporation (e.g. an ordinance to prevent fires necessarily carries with it the authority to chase fire trunks). c. Inherent-those which are necessary and inseparable from every corporation, and which come into existence as a matter of course as soon as an MC is created they are: 1. To have perpetual succession 2. To sue and be sued, implead, grant and receive by its corporation name and other acts as a judicial person 3. To make by laws and ordinances for the government of the corporation. 4. To make and ordinance for the government of the corporation. Note: Usually these so-called inherent powers are expressly provided in MCs charter. 2.) Legislative and executive powers a. Legislative authority to make laws b. Executive authority to enforce laws NOTE: The test to determine what is legislative and what is administrative is whether the ordinance is one making a new or one executing law already in existence. The former is legislative; the latters executive. 3.) Intramural and extramural powers 1.) Intramural those exercised within the corporate limits of a municipal corporation.

2.) Extramural those exercised without like those given for the protection of water supply, prevention of Nuisance, and also for police purposes. 4.) Governmental and municipal powers 1.) Governmental those exercised by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare within. They include those which are legislative, judicial, public and political. Specific examples are: Administration of justice, police power; eminent domain; promotes public education; fire prevention and safety; and all other powers to be exercised by the MC as an agent the State, for the benefit of the public or of the exercise of which the corporation receives consideration. 2.) Municipal those exercised for the specified benefits and advantage of the urban community and they include those which are ministerial, preemptory, private and corporate plans of which the corporation receives no compensation. 5.) mandatory and discretionary powers a.) Mandatory those the exercise of which are required of municipal corporations. b.) Discretionary those which the corporations may perform or not depending upon own judgment and discretion

5 1. 2.

a. b. c. d.

Types of Municipal Corporations TYPES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS De jure Municipal Corporations- those created or recognized by operation of law. De facto municipal corporations- where the people have organized themselves, under color of law, into ordinary municipal bodies, and have gone on, year after year, raising taxes, making improvements, and exercising their usual franchises, with their rights dependent quite as much on acquiescence as on the regularity of their origin Elements: A valid law authorizing incorporation An attempt in good faith to organize under it A colorable compliance with law An assumption of corporate powers

3. Municipal Corporation by prescription- exercised their powers from time immemorial with a charter which is presumed to have been lost or destroyed.

A municipal corporation is a body politic constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of its local government. It is established by law partly as an agency of the State to assist in the civil government of a country, but chiefly to regulate and administer the local or internal affairs of the city/town/district which is incorporated. Courts regard these as subordinate branches of government of the State exercising delegated powers (municipal administration as an instrumentality of state administration). Municipal corporations are granted charters for the better government of particular areas or districts. Municipal corporation vs public corporationAll municipal corporations are public corporations, but not all public corporations are municipal corporations. Municipal corporations refer to incorporated villages, towns, and cities with powers of local administration. Kinds: 1. Municipal Corporation Properincorporated cities/towns/villages invested with the power of local legislation. These exist and are governed by their respective charters. Its distinctive purpose and distinguishing feature is the power of local government. 2. Quasi-municipal corporationsame as a quasi-corporation, i.e. it operates directly as an agency of the State to help in the administration of public functions. Municipal corporation proper vs quasi municipal corporation When invested with the power of local government, the municipal corporation as an agency of the state becomes a municipal corporation proper. Consider as criterion the voluntary or involuntary nature of the corporation; the existence or non-existence of a charter; and whether the purpose of the corporation is solely a governmental agency or one for self-government. Municipal corporation proper vs quasi corporation Both are agents of the state for limited and narrow purposes but have different powers and liabilities. Municipal corporations proper are created either by the direct solicitation or by the free consent of the persons composing them while quasi corporations (also called involuntary corporations) are only local organizations which, for purposes of civil administration, are invested with some characteristics of corporate existence. They are local subdivisions of the state, created by the sovereign legislative power of its own sovereign will and without any particular solicitation, consent or concurrent action from the inhabitants (West Chicago Park Commissioners vs Chicago). 6 De facto Municipal Corporation Doctrine; Elements

De facto municipal corporations- where the people have organized themselves, under color of law, into ordinary municipal bodies, and have gone on, year after year, raising taxes, making improvements, and exercising their usual franchises, with their rights dependent quite as much on acquiescence as on the regularity of their origin Elements: e. A valid law authorizing incorporation f. An attempt in good faith to organize under it g. A colorable compliance with law h. An assumption of corporate powers Municipality of Jimenez vs. Baz, Jr. 265 SCRA 182

By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 171, dated November 22, 1988, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of [3] Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, and Sinara Alto, based on the technical description in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the Municipality of Jimenez.In its answer, the Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding that under E.O. No. 258 the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental, in its Resolution No. 77, dated February 18, 1950, which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez. In its [5] decision dated October 11, 1989, the Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving the agreement between the municipalities was void because the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. No. 258, that power being vested in Congress [6] pursuant to the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1983 (B.P. Blg. 337), 134. The Provincial Board [7] denied in its Resolution No. 13-90 dated January 30, 1990 the motion of Jimenez seeking reconsideration. On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 14. The suit was filed against Sinacaban, the Province of Misamis Occidental and its Provincial Board, the Commission on Audit, the Departments of Local Government, Budget and Management, and [8] the Executive Secretary. Jimenez alleged that, in accordance with the decision in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the power to create municipalities is essentially legislative and consequently Sinacaban, which was created by an executive order, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim vis--vis Jimenez, of which it remains part. Jimenez prayed that Sinacaban be enjoined from assuming control and supervision over the disputed barrios; that the Provincial Board be enjoined from assuming jurisdiction over the claim of Sinacaban; that E.O. No. 258 be declared null and void; that the decision dated October 11, 1989 and Resolution No. 13-90 of the Provincial Board be set aside for having been rendered without jurisdiction; that the Commission on Audit be enjoined from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds by Sinacaban; that the Department of Budget and Management be enjoined from allotting public funds to Sinacaban; and that the Executive Secretary be enjoined from exercising control and supervision over said municipality. ISSUE A. Whether the Municipality of Sinacaban is a legal juridical entity, duly created in accordance with law; B. If not, whether it is a de facto juridical entity Held: The RTC, inter alia, held that Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it had completely organized itself even prior to the Pelaez case and exercised corporate powers for forty years before the existence was questioned; that Jimenez did not have the legal standing to question the existence of Sinacaban, the same being reserved to the State as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General in a quo warranto proceeding; that Jimenez was estopped from questioning the legal existence of Sinacaban by entering into an agreement with it concerning their common boundary; and that any question as to the legal existence of Sinacaban had been rendered moot by 442 (d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which provides: Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. However, we have since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipallity of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor general: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the factthat the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. no. 7160), 442 (d) of which provides that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, 16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five (5) years from the time the act complained of was done or committed. On the contrary, the State and even the municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacabans corporate existence. Under Administrative order no. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated by 31 of the judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution no. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover following the ruling in Municipality of san Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban. Mun. of San Narcsio vs. Mendez, Sr. 239 SCRA 11 EO 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of

[2]

the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal district, and later the Municipality of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created LGU. Granting that EO 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of EO 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of EO 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres: While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 [Local Government Code of 1991] may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they, however, contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt to apply Section 442 of Republic Act 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner's theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably brought. Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal district, and later the Municipality of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly file, so also, if not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warrantoproceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it. Granting that Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country, certain municipalities that comprised the municipal circuits organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued by this court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order, the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon.At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code is proffered. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442 (d) in the Code. Curativelaws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be conceded. Mun. of Candijay vs. CA, 251 SCRA 530 The lower court's decision, among other things, declared "barrio/barangay Pagahat as within the territorial jurisdiction of the plaintiff municipality of Candijay, Bohol, therefore, said barrio forms part and parcel of its territory, therefore, belonging to said plaintiff municipality", and further permanently enjoined defendant municipality of Alicia "to respect plaintiff's control, possession and political supervision of barangay Pagahat and never to molest, disturb, harass its possession and ownership over the same barrio. On appeal, the respondent Court stated that "(S)crutiny of the conflicting claims and the respective evidence of the parties lead to the conclusion that the trial court committed an error in declaring that Barrio Pagahat is within the territorial jurisdiction of plaintiff-appellee (municipality of Candijay)." Said Court rejected the boundary line being claimed by petitioner based on certain exhibits, since it would in effect place "practically all of Barrio Pagahat . . . , part of Barrio Cagongcagong and portions of Barrio Putlongcam and La Hacienda and all of Barrio Mahayag and Barrio del Monte within the territorial jurisdiction of plaintiff-appellee Candijay." Added the respondent Court, "As aptly pointed out by defendantappellant in its appeal brief, 'the plaintiff municipality will not only engulf the entire barrio of Pagahat, but also of the barrios of Putlongcam, Mahayag, Del Monte, Cagongcagong, and a part of the Municipality of Mabini. Candijay will eat up a big chunk of territories far exceeding her territorial jurisdiction under the law creating her. Her claim opens the floodgate of controversies over boundaries, including with Mabini. ) ISSUE: the respondent municipality's purported lack of juridical personality, as a result of having been created under a void executive order, HELD On this issue, we noted that petitioner commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality of respondent municipality on 19 January 1984 (or some thirty five years after respondent municipality first came into existence in 1949) during the proceedings in the court a quo. It appears that, after presentation of its evidence, herein petitioner asked the trial court to bar respondent municipality from presenting its evidence on the ground that

it had no juridical personality. Petitioner contended that Exec. Order No. 265 issued by President Quirino on September 16, 1949 creating respondent municipality is null and void ab initio, inasmuch as Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, on which said Executive Order was based, constituted an undue delegation of legislative powers to the President of the Philippines, and was therefore declared unconstitutional, per this Court's 3 ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General. In this regard, we call to mind the ruling of this Court in Municipality of San 4 Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr. , which will be found very instructive in the case at bench. Therein we stated:While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 [Local Government Code of 1991] may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they, however, contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt to apply Section 442 of Republic Act 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Respondent municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 265 in 1949, or ten years ahead of the municipality of San Andres, and therefore had been in existence for all of sixteen years when Pelaez vs.Auditor General was promulgated. And various governmental acts throughout the years all indicate the State's recognition and acknowledgment of the existence thereof. For instance, under Administrative Order No. 33 above-mentioned, the Municipality of Alicia was covered by the 7th Municipal Circuit Court of Alicia-Mabini for the province of Bohol. Likewise, under the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of Alicia is one of twenty municipalities comprising the Third District of Bohol. Inasmuch as respondent municipality of Alicia is similarly situated as the municipality of San Andres, it should likewise benefit from the effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, and should henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality.WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED, with costs against petitioner. Sultan Osop Camid vs. Office of the President, GR No. 161414 Jan 2005 1 This Petition for Certiorari presents this Court with the prospect of our own Brigadoon the municipality of Andong, Lanao del Surwhich like its counterpart in filmdom, is a town that is not supposed to exist yet is anyway insisted by some as actually alive and thriving. Yet unlike in the movies, there is nothing mystical, ghostly or anything even remotely charming about the purported existence of Andong. The creation of the putative municipality was declared void ab initio by this Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists that in spite of this insurmountable obstacle Andong thrives on, and hence, its legal personality should be given judicial affirmation. The Executive Orders in question are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any 10 disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered. Among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No. 107 which created the Municipality of Andong. Nevertheless, the core issue presented in the present petition is the continued efficacy of the judicial annulment of the Municipality of Andong. Petitioner Sultan 11 Osop B. Camid (Camid) represents himself as a current resident of Andong, suing as a private citizen and taxpayer whose locus standi "is of public and paramount interest especially to the people of the Municipality of 12 Andong, Province of Lanao del Sur." He alleges that Andong "has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its 13 constituents," even though he concedes that since 1968, no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to 14 serve any of the elective local government positions of Andong. Nonetheless, the municipality of Andong has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, a Department of Education, Culture and Sports office, and at least seventeen 15 (17) "barangay units" with their own respective chairmen. From 1964 until 1972, according to Camid, the public officials of Andong "have been serving their constituents through the minimal means and resources with least (sic) honorarium and recognition from the Office of the then former President Diosdado Macapagal." Since the time of Martial Law in 1972, Andong has allegedly been getting by despite the absence of public funds, with the "Interim Officials" serving their constituents "in their own little ways and means. Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG "in not classifying [Andong] as a regular existing municipality and in not including said 21 municipality in its records and official database as [an] existing regular municipality." He characterizes such nonclassification as unequal treatment to the detriment of Andong, especially in light of the current recognition given to the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly annulled by reason ofPelaez. As appropriate relief, Camid prays that the Court annul the DILG Certification dated 21 November 2003; direct the DILG to classify Andong as a "regular existing municipality;" all public respondents, to extend full recognition and support to Andong; the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management, to immediately release the internal revenue allotments of Andong; and the public respondents, particularly the DILG, to recognize the "Interim Local Officials" of 22 Andong. Moreover, Camid insists on the continuing validity of Executive Order No. 107. He argues that Pelaez has already been modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence. Particularly cited is 23 ourDecision in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez, wherein the Court affirmed the unique status of the 24 municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a " de facto municipal corporation." Similar to Andong, the municipality of San Andres was created by way of executive order, precisely the manner which the Court in Pelaez had declared as unconstitutional. Moreover, San Narciso cited, as Camid does, Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 as basis for the current recognition of the impugned municipality. Section 442. Requisites for Creation. xxx(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. HELD: The importance of proper factual ascertainment cannot be gainsaid, especially in light of the legal principles governing the recognition of de facto municipal corporations. It has been opined that municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to 26 afford title by prescription. These municipal corporations have exercised their powers for a long period without objection on the part of the government that although no charter is in existence, it is presumed that they were duly 27 incorporated in the first place and that their charters had been lost. They are especially common in England, which, as well-worth noting, has existed as a state for over a thousand years. The reason for the development of that rule in England is understandable, since that country was settled long before the Roman conquest by nomadic

Celtic tribes, which could have hardly been expected to obtain a municipal charter in the absence of a national legal authority. What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by the other instrumentalities of the state. These disquisitions aside, the central issue remains whether a municipality whose creation by executive fiat was previously voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing statute. Apparently, the question has never been decided before, San Narciso and its kindred cases pertaining as they did to municipalities whose bases of creation were dubious yet were never judicially nullified. The effect of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as Andong warrants explanation. Besides, the residents of Andong who belabor under the impression that their town still exists, much less those who may comport themselves as the municipalitys "Interim Government," would be well served by a rude awakening. The Court can employ a simplistic approach in resolving the substantive aspect of the petition, merely by pointing out 29 that the Municipality of Andong never existed. Executive Order No. 107, which established Andong, was declared "null and void ab initio" in 1965 by this Court in Pelaez, along with thirty-three (33) other executive orders. The 30 31 32 phrase "ab initio" means "from the beginning," "at first," "from the inception." Pelaez was never reversed by 33 this Court but rather it was expressly affirmed in the cases of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, Municipality of 34 35 Malabang v. Benito, and Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya. No subsequent ruling by this Court declared Pelaez as overturned or inoperative. No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating a Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted municipality. This ratiocination does not admit to patent legal errors and has the additional virtue of blessed austerity. Still, its sweeping adoption may not be advisedly appropriate in light of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code and our ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, both of which admit to the possibility of de facto municipal corporations. From this survey of relevant jurisprudence, we can gather the applicable rules. Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local Government Code in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive order but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban was recognized by this Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored under. Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation? It is not. There are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact that the executive order creating Andong was expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If we were to affirm Andongs de facto status by reason of its alleged continued existence despite its nullification, we would in effect be condoning defiance of a valid order of this Court. l^vvphi1.net Court decisions cannot obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved.It bears noting that based on Camids own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality created by executive order may receive recognition, they must "have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local 60 Government] Code." Camid admits that Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all. This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality. The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality in the last four decades are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town. The certifications relied upon by Camid, issued by the DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose of attesting to Andongs legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications qualif y that they were issued upon the request of Camid, 61 "to support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur," thus obviously conceding that the municipality is at present inoperative. We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of the Local Government Codethat it does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders. The provision affirms the legal personalities only of those municipalities such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent, unless recreated through specific legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG. Those municipalities derive their legal personality not from the presidential issuances or executive orders which originally created them or from Section 442(d), but from the respective legislative statutes which were enacted to revive them. 7. Method of challenging existence of municipal corporation Quo Warranto must be timely filed; quo warranto suit against corporation for forfeiture of charter must be commenced within 5 years from time that act complained of was done or committed. Any other direct proceeding which must be brought in the name of the Republic. To change the name of a local government unit, a plebiscite is required to be conducted in the unit or units directly effected. Cannot be effected by mere resolution of sanggunian. Since the LGC is silent, sanggunian panlalawigan has no authority to change the name of its province authority lies with Congress. In cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. In the present case, the mere fact that the municipality of Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot make it a de facto corporation, because independently of Sec 68 of the Administrative Code, there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation. An unconstitutional act is not a law; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Attack against the validity of incorporation

The validity of incorporation and the corporate existence of a municipal corporation may not be attacked collaterally. It may be challenged only by the State in a direct proceeding such as quo warranto. But this rule applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a public corporation. Where it is neither a corporation de facto or de jure but a nullity, its existence may be questioned collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by anyone whose rights or interests are affected thereby, including the citizens of territory incorporated unless they are estopped from doing so (Municipality of Malabang vs Benito). The principle of estoppel applies to an individual who wants to attack the validity of incorporation of a municipal corporation. Where an individual dealt with it and acquiesced in the exercise of its corporate functions, or where he has entered into a contract with the said corporation, he may be estopped to deny its corporate existence. A person or private corporation may likewise be precluded by laches from attacking the validity of the incorporation of a municipality. Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533 The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, while the respondent Pangandapun Bonito is the mayor, and the rest of the respondents are the councilors, of the municipality of Balabagan of the same province. Balabagan was formerly a part of the municipality of Malabang, having been created on March 15, 1960, by Executive Order 386 of the then President Carlos P. Garcia, out of barrios and 1 sitios of the latter municipality. The petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullify Executive Order 386 and to restrain the respondent municipal officials from performing the functions of their respective office relying on the 2 3 ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General and Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva . In Pelaez this Court, through Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion, ruled: (1) that section 23 of Republic Act 2370 [Barrio Charter Act, approved January 1, 1960], by vesting the power to create barrios in the provincial board, is a "statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio [and] implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities," and (2) that section 68 of the Administrative Code, insofar as it gives the President the power to create municipalities, is unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (b) because it offends against section 10 (1) of article VII of the Constitution, which limits the President's power over local governments to mere supervision. As this Court summed up its discussion: "In short, even if it did not entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment."On the other hand, the respondents, while admitting the facts alleged in the petition, nevertheless argue that the rule announced in Pelaez can have no application in this case because unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez, the municipality of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation, having been organized under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action. It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual like the petitioner Balindong. It is indeed true that, generally, an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding, and that only in a few exceptions may a private person 4 exercise this function of government. But the rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal 5 corporation is at least a de facto corporations. For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may be, questioned collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by anyone whose rights or interests are affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are 6 estopped by their conduct from doing so. And so the threshold question is whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation. As earlier stated, the claim that it is rests on the fact that it was organized before the promulgation of this Court's decision in Pelaez. Accordingly, we address ourselves to the question whether a statute can lend color of validity to an attempted organization of a municipality despite the fact that such statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional. This has been a litigiously prolific question, sharply dividing courts in the United States. Thus, some hold that a de facto corporation cannot exist where the statute or charter creating it is unconstitutional 8 because there can be no de facto corporation where there can be no de jure one, while others hold otherwise on 9 the theory that a statute is binding until it is condemned as unconstitutional. An early article in the Yale Law Journal offers the following analysis: It appears that the true basis for denying to the corporation a de facto status lay in the absence of any legislative act to give vitality to its creation. An examination of the cases holding, some of them unreservedly, that a de facto office or municipal corporation can exist under color of an unconstitutional statute will reveal that in no instance did the invalid act give life to the corporation, but that either in other valid acts or in the constitution itself the office or the corporation was potentially created. The principle that color of title under an unconstitutional statute can exist only where there is some other valid law under which the organization may be effected, or at least an authority in potentia by the state constitution, has its counterpart in the negative propositions that there can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute that plainly so appears on its face or that attempts to authorize the ousting of a de jure or de facto municipal corporation upon the same territory; in the one case the fact would imply the imputation of bad faith, in the other the new organization must be regarded as a mere usurper. As a result of this analysis of the cases the following principles may be deduced which seem to reconcile the apparently conflicting decisions: I. The color of authority requisite to the organization of a de facto municipal corporation may be: 1. A valid law enacted by the legislature. 2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been upheld for a time by the courts or (b) not yet been declared void; provided that a warrant for its creation can be found in some other valid law or in the recognition of its potential existence by the general laws or constitution of the state. II. There can be no de facto municipal corporation unless either directly or potentially, such a de jure corporation is authorized by some legislative fiat. III. There can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone, the invalidity of which is apparent on its face. IV. There can be no de facto corporation created to take the place of an existing de jure corporation, as such 10 organization would clearly be a usurper.

In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid statute 11 to give color of authority to its creation. Indeed, in Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, this Court granted a similar petition for prohibition and nullified an executive order creating the municipality of Lawigan in Iloilo on the basis of the Pelaez ruling, despite the fact that the municipality was created in 1961, before section 68 of the Administrative Code, under which the President had acted, was invalidated. 'Of course the issue of De Facto Municipal Corporation did not arise in that case. Executive Order 386 "created no office." This is not to say, however, that the acts done by the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the executive order "is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." For the existence of Executive, Order 386 is "an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored. There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the executive order creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many an act done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that municipality. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, Executive Order 386 is declared void, and the respondents are hereby permanently restrained from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. C Overview of Philippine Local Government System Philippines under the Spanish Regime The basic unit of local administration was the pueblo, composed of numerous barrios, and governed by the cabeza de barangay, an honorific title continued by the Spaniards. Towns were organized, under the government of a gobernadorcillo, also called capitan, who represented the provincial governor as the arbiter of local questions, collected taxes, assisted the parish priest and entertained visiting officials. He was assisted by tenientes (deputies), alguaciles (subordinate employees) and chiefs of police. Elections for these municipal offices were held annually. Barangays were administered by cabezas de barangay whose principal duties were to act as agents for the collection of taxes. They paid no tribute on their own account and were members of the principalia, the voting and privileged class. The position was originally hereditary and breaks were filled by appointments, but eventually, the position became elective and service compulsory. The Maura Law constituted a municipal council of 1 captain and 4 lieutenants, in charge of the active work of governing the municipality, such as administration of public works and the details of taxation. These positions were honorary, and each of the members was required to have special qualifications. The Governor General, provincial council and provincial governor retained disciplinary jurisdiction over the council and its individual members. Philippines under the American Regime General Order No. 43, series of 1899 first provided for the government of municipalities. This was superseded by General Order No. 40, series of 1900, promulgated by the Military Governor, supposedly to give the Filipino people the right to elect their municipal officers, only slightly restricted by certain conditions. President McKinleys instructions to the 2nd Philippine Commission also directed the body to devote their attention to the establishment of municipal governments, giving the natives of the islands the opportunity to manage their own local affairs to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and subject to the least degree of supervision and control which a careful study of their capacities and observation of the workings of native controls show to be consistent with the maintenance of law, order and loyalty. The Philippine Commission passed Act No. 82 on January 31, 1901, providing for the organization and government of municipalities and Act No. 83 on February 5, 1901, for the organization of provinces. These were later modified in the Administrative Code.

1. The Unitary vs. the Federal Forms of Governments A unitary state is a state governed as one single unit in which the central government is supreme and any administrative divisions (subnational units) exercise only powers that their central government chooses to delegate. Many states in the world have a unitary system of government. Unitary states are contrasted with federal states (federations): In a unitary state, subnational units are created and abolished and their powers may be broadened and narrowed, by the central government. Although political power in unitary states may be delegated through devolution to local government by statute, the central government remains supreme; it may abrogate the acts of devolved governments or curtail their powers. The United Kingdom is an example of a unitary state. Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland which, along with England are the fourconstituent countries of the United Kingdom, have a degree of autonomous devolved power the Scottish Government and Scottish Parliament in Scotland, the Welsh Government and National Assembly for Wales in Wales, and the Northern Ireland Executive andNorthern Ireland Assembly in Northern Ireland. But such devolved power is only delegated by Britain's central government, more specifically by [clarification needed] the Parliament of the United Kingdom, which is supreme under the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. Further, the devolved governments cannot challenge theconstitutionality of acts of Parliament, and the powers of the devolved governments can be revoked or reduced by the central government (the Parliament with a government comprising theCabinet, headed by the Prime Minister). For example, the Northern Ireland Assembly has been suspended four times, with its powers reverting to the central government's Northern Ireland Office. Ukraine is another example of a unitary state (see Constitution of Ukraine). Republic of Crimea within the country has a degree of autonomy and is governed by its Cabinet of Ministers and legislative Council. In early 1990s the republic also had a post of president which was terminated due to separatist tendencies intended to transfer Crimea to Russia. In federal states, by contrast, states or other subnational units share sovereignty with the central government, and the states comprising the federation have an existence and power functions that cannot be unilaterally changed by the central government. In some cases, such as in the United States, it is the federal government that has only those powers expressly delegated to it. A system in which political power is divided between a central (national) government and smaller government units.The central government is often called the federal government and the smaller units, states or provinces. In a

true federal system, citizens owe their loyalty directly to the central government, even though they live in states or provinces. The central government has direct authority over the people concerning powers granted to it in the constitution. An example of a federal state is the United States; under the United States Constitution, power is shared between the federal government of the United States and the U.S. states. Many federal states also have unitary lower levels of government; while the United States is federal, the states themselves are unitary under Dillon's Rule counties and municipalities have only the authority granted to them by the state governments by the state constitution or legislative act. Zoomsat, Inc. vs. People , GR No. 135535 February 14,2005 Petitioner Zoomzat, Inc. alleged that on December 20, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City passed 3 Resolution No. 261 which resolved "to express the willingness of the City of Gingoog to allow Zoomzat to install and operate a cable TV system." Thereupon, petitioner applied for a mayors permit but the same was not acted 4 upon by the mayors office.Subsequently, or on April 6, 1993, respondents enacted Ordinance No. 19 which granted a franchise to Gingoog Spacelink Cable TV, Inc. to operate a cable television for a period of ten (10) years, subject to automatic renewal.Hence, on July 30, 1993, petitioner filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against herein respondents for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. The complaint alleged that in enacting Ordinance No. 19, the respondents gave unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to Spacelink, to the prejudice of petitioner who was a prior grantee-applicant by virtue of Resolution No. 261.Consequently, on June 17, 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued the now assailed resolution approving the dismissal of the case and ordering the withdrawal of the Information against the respondents. On September 9, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner assails the findings of Special 9 Prosecutor Pascual that under Executive Order No. 205, it is the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), and not the local government unit, that has the power and authority to allow or disallow the operation of cable television. It argues that while the NTC has the authority to grant the franchise to operate a cable television, this power is not exclusive because under the Local Government Code, the city council also has the power to grant permits, licenses and franchises in aid of the local government units regulatory or revenue raising powers.Petitioner also contends that the grant of exclusive franchise to Spacelink for a period of ten (10) years subject to automatic renewal, contravenes Section 2 of Executive Order No. 205, which provides that "a certificate of authority to operate a CATV by the Commission shall be on a non-exclusive basis and for a period not to exceed 15 years." Thus, in awarding an exclusive franchise, the petitioner asserts that respondents gave Spacelink undue or unwarranted advantage and preference because it stifled business competition. It claims that, even assuming the lack of actual damage or injury, the fact remains that respondents extended undue favor and advantage to Spacelink, which makes them liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. HELD: The petition is bereft of merit. Respondents were charged with violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, which states: Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. (Emphasis ours)Thus, for one to be held liable under Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, he must be an officer or employee of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.Executive Order No. 205 clearly provides that only the NTC could grant certificates of authority to cable television operators and issue the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Likewise, Executive Order 10 No. 436, vests with the NTC the regulation and supervision of cable television industry in the Philippines.Our 11 pronouncement in Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, is pertinent:There is no law specifically authorizing the LGUs to grant franchises to operate CATV system. Whatever authority the LGUs had before, the same had been withdrawn when President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1512 "terminating all franchises, permits or certificates for the operation of CATV system previously granted by local governments." Today, pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, "only persons, associations, partnerships, corporations or cooperatives granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install, operate and maintain a cable television system or render cable television service within a service area."It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises. Consequently, the protection of the constitutional provision as to impairment of the obligation of a contract does not extend to privileges, franchises and grants given by a municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra vires.It is undisputed that respondents were not employees of NTC. Instead, they were charged in their official capacity as members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City. As such, they cannot be charged with violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 for enacting Ordinance No. 19 which granted Spacelink a franchise to operate a cable television.Petitioner, however, insists that while the NTC is the licensing and regulatory body, nonetheless, the actual operations of cable television entails other activities, which may be regulated by the local government unit pursuant to the general welfare clause or subject to its revenue generating powers. But, lest we be misunderstood, nothing herein should be interpreted as to strip LGUs of their general power to prescribe regulations under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code. It must be emphasized that when E.O. No. 436 decrees that the "regulatory power" shall be vested "solely" in the NTC, it pertains to the "regulatory power" over those matters, which are peculiarly within the NTCs competence .There is no dispute that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, like other local legislative bodies, has been empowered to enact ordinances and approve resolutions under the general welfare clause of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code of 1983. That it continues to possess such power is clear under the new law, R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991).Indeed, under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code, the local government unit can regulate the operation of cable television but only when it encroaches on public properties, such as the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large 13 regions. Beyond these parameters, its acts, such as the grant of the franchise to Spacelink, would be ultra vires.Plainly, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City overstepped the bounds of its authority when it usurped

the powers of the NTC with the enactment of Ordinance No. 19. Being a void legislative act, Ordinance No. 19 did not confer any right nor vest any privilege to Spacelink. LGUs as agents and delegates of the National government Municipal Corporations (MC) derive their powers and rights from the legislature they can only exercise delegated legislative powers conferred by Congress as the national lawmaking body, therefore they cannot defy Congress will, nor modify or violate it. As agents, they are vested with the power of subordinate legislation, wherein the delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise higher powers. MCs have no power to impose tax on natl govt instrumentalities, or otherwise retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operations of constitutional law enacted by Congress to execute powers vested in the natl govt. Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat national policies. Exercise of governmental functions As agencies of the State, MCs enjoy sovereign immunity from suit when engaged in govern mental functions. However, they are subject to suit even in the performance of these functions if their charter so provides. Under the Real Property Tax Code, LGUs have no choice but to collect real property tax this means it is the national government expressing itself through the legislative branch that is levying the tax. The LGUs are merely constituted as agents to fix the rates.As agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local selfgovernment, MCs are endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Batangas CATV vs. CA. It is appropriate to stress that where the state legislature has made provision for the regulation of conduct, it has manifested its intention that the subject matter shall be fully covered by the statute, and that a municipality, under 39 40 its general powers, cannot regulate the same conduct. In Keller vs. State, it was held that: "Where there is no express power in the charter of a municipality authorizing it to adopt ordinances regulating certain matters which are specifically covered by a general statute, a municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to regulate the subject which is completely covered by a general statute of the legislature, may be rendered invalid. Where the subject is of statewide concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the State." A reason advanced for this view is that such ordinances are in excess of the powers granted to the municipal corporation.Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations shall be exercised by the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of the said law.It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to 42 be invalid. The principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of 43 the state. In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law. The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it." 2. Philippine Local Government System and the concepts of local Autonomy, Decentralization, Devolution, and Decentralization. Local Government Unit is a political subdivision constituted by law, possessing substantial control over its own affairs. In a unitary system of government, it is an intra-sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, and is not intended to be imperium in imperio (empire within an empire). The 1987 Philippine Constitution does not prescribe federalism. Autonomy does not contemplate the creation of mini-states. A Chartered City is a political body corporate, endowed with faculties of municipal corporations exercised through its city government in conformity with law and its proper corporate name; may sue and be sued, enter into contracts and be contracted with. No plebiscite is necessary when creating a national government agency such as the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA). Plebiscite is only required for the creation of local government units. Local autonomy is not the same as decentralization. Local autonomy can only mean a measure of decentralization of functions of government means a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization. -not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and LGU. Local Autonomy explained

1. Autonomy either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power (Limbona v. Mangelin) 2. Decentralization of Administration Occurs when the central government delegate administrative powers to political subdivision in order to broaden the basic government power and in the process to make local government more responsive accountable and Ensure their fullest development as self -reliant communities make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and progress. At the same time, it relieves the central government of the bureau managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate or national concerns ( Supra) 3. Decentralization of power An abdication of political power in favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case the local government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central government authorities. According to a constitution author (Father Bernas) decentralization of power amounts to self -immolation since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its own constituency ( Supra) 4. Local Autonomy, Philippine Concept The national government does not completely relinquish all its power over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social developments at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as whole the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinate towards a common national goal. Thus, policysetting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national government (Pimentel v. Aguirre) 5. Fiscal autonomy Local government have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to the allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. DECENTRALIZATION devolution of national administration to the local levels in which local officials remain accountable to the central govt in the manner law may provide. LGU is autonomous in the sense that is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resource. Power which used to be highly centralized is thereby deconcentrated. Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. Two levels of decentralization: 1. Decentralization of Administration/Administrative Autonomy central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions to achieve the ff. purposes: broaden local power base make units more responsive and accountable ensure full development of local governments as self-reliant communities break the monopoly of National Government over managing local affairs relieve National Government from the burden of managing local affairs Decentralization of Power/Political Autonomy involves abdication of political power in favor of LGUs; autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities; amounts to self-immolation. Autonomous government becomes accountable to constituency, not central authorities. SEC. 3. Operative Principles of Decentralization. The formulation and implementation of policies and measures on local autonomy shall be guided by the following operative principles: (a) There shall be an effective allocation among the different local government units of their respective powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources; (b) There shall be established in every local government unit an accountable, efficient, and dynamic organizational structure and operating mechanism that will meet the priority needs and service requirements of its communities; (c) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, local officials and employees paid wholly or mainly from local funds shall be appointed or removed, according to merit and fitness, by the appropriate appointing authority; (d) The vesting of duty, responsibility, and accountability in local government units shall be accompanied with provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge their powers and effectively carry out their functions; hence, they shall have the power to create and broaden their own sources of revenue and the right to a just share in national taxes and an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas; (e) Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions; (f) Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them; (g) The capabilities of local government units, especially the municipalities and barangays, shall be enhanced by providing them with opportunities to participate actively in the implementation of national programs and projects;

Role of the President: general supervision, only to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. He/She has no control over their acts in the sense that he/she can substitute their judgments with his/her own. Administrative Autonomy primarily pertains to: power and responsibility to deliver basic services. (h) There shall be a continuing mechanism to enhance local autonomy not only by legislative enabling acts but also by administrative and organizational reforms; (i) Local government units shall share with the national government the responsibility in the management and maintenance of ecological balance within their territorial jurisdiction, subject to the provisions of this Code and national policies; (j) Effective mechanisms for ensuring the accountability of local government units to their respective constituents shall be strengthened in order to upgrade continually the quality of local leadership; (k) The realization of local autonomy shall be facilitated through improved coordination of national government policies and programs and extension of adequate technical and material assistance to less developed and deserving local government units; (l) The participation of the private sector in local governance, particularly in the delivery of basic services, shall be encouraged to ensure the viability of local autonomy as an alternative strategy for sustainable development; and (m) The national government shall ensure that decentralization contributes to the continuing improvement of the performance of local government units and the quality of community life. Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. DEVOLUTION a mandatory process premised on the constitutional mandate that all local government units possess and enjoy local autonomy E.O. 503 effectively extends the period of devolution from 6 months as provided for in the LGC to 1 year in order to accommodate the smooth transition and address difficulties in the devolution process. Powers devolved to LGUs Specific grant necessary the enumeration of powers and services under sec. 17 of the LGC is not exclusive Power to discipline locally assigned national employees cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of the municipal council (ex. fire personnel are under Bureau of Fire Protection of DILG, fire protection not being a devolved function) Devolution has a corresponding effect on local budgeting processes. Although regulation of cockfighting has been devolved to local governments, a municipal government cannot issue a permit to a promoter to hold cockfights in places other than a licensed cockpit, since this would violate the law. Ports which are vital to the national interest and security which are linked to each other are expressly excluded from the coverage of devolution. Implementation of locally-funded communal irrigation projects (CIP) shall be devolved to LGUs. The allocation for locally funded CIPs will no longer be released to the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) as a consequence of devolution. However, foreign-assisted CIPs fall outside the coverage of devolution. Licensing and regulation of activities undertaken by travel agencies, tour operators and professional congress organizers should be transferred to LGUs. There is partial devolution in terms of the functions of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA). The functions devolved are the promotion, organization and development of cooperatives. CDA retains the powers relating to registration of cooperatives and the issuance of rules and regulations, policies and guidelines. General supervision over the implementation of the National Building Code, including appellate jurisdiction over the decisions and order of the local building officials remains with the Secretary of Public Works and Highways. With regard to the compensation and position classification system, the Joint Commission on Local Government Personnel Administration was abolished and transferred to the appropriate office in the CSC.

Absorption of personnel Devolution does not only involve the delegation of the powers to regulate but also the transfer of the necessary assets and personnel. Objectives To ensure the administrative and technical capabilities of the LGUs to provide the devolved basic services and facilities at the local level To ensure that the delivery of basic services is not duly prejudiced or disrupted. Devolved personnel are considered local government personnel and should be covered by the existing Position Classification and Pay Plan. There shall be no diminution in pay or benefits, therefore they may continue to enjoy higher rates than their counterparts. Gradual equalization of salaries of all local government personnel must then be achieved to eliminate (or at least minimize) the aforesaid disparity. Act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. National agencies or offices shall devolve to local government units the responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities within six (6) months after the effectivity of the LGC.

Includes the transfer to LGUs of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions, and responsibilities. Personnel of said national agencies or offices shall be absorbed by the LGUs to which they belong or in whose areas they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively viable as determined by the Oversight Committee The rights accorded to personnel pursuant to civil service law, rules and regulations shall not be impaired Regional directors who are career executive service officers and other officers of similar rank in the said regional offices who cannot be absorbed by the LGU shall be retained by the National Government, without any diminution of rank, salary or tenure. Regional offices of national agencies or offices whose functions are devolved to LGUs shall be phased out within one year from the approval of the LGC. National agencies and offices may establish such field units as may be necessary for monitoring purposes and providing technical assistance to LGUs. The properties, equipment, and other assets of these regional offices shall be distributed to the LGUs in the region in accordance with the rules and regulations issued by the Oversight Committee. The National Government or the next higher level of local government unit may provide or augment the basic services and facilities assigned to a lower level of local government unit when: Services or facilities are not made available If made available, they are inadequate to meet the requirements of its inhabitants. DECONCENTRATION Sec. 25, Art. II, 1987 Constitution Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. Sec. 2 Art. X Ibid Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. Section 2. LGC of 1991 Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local government units. (b) It is also the policy of the State to ensure the accountability of local government units through the institution of effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum. (c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. 1awphil.net Section 3 LGC of 1991. Operative Principles of Decentralization. - The formulation and implementation of policies and measures on local autonomy shall be guided by the following operative principles: (a) There shall be an effective allocation among the different local government units of their respective powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources; (b) There shall be established in every local government unit an accountable, efficient, and dynamic organizational structure and operating mechanism that will meet the priority needs and service requirements of its communities; (c) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, local officials and employees paid wholly or mainly from local funds shall be appointed or removed, according to merit and fitness, by the appropriate appointing authority; (d) The vesting of duty, responsibility, and accountability in local government units shall be accompanied with provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge their powers and effectively carry out their functions: hence, they shall have the power to create and broaden their own sources of revenue and the right to a just share in national taxes and an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas; (e) Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions; (f) Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources commonly beneficial to them; (g) The capabilities of local government units, especially the municipalities and barangays, shall be enhanced by providing them with opportunities to participate actively in the implementation of national programs and projects; (h) There shall be a continuing mechanism to enhance local autonomy not only by legislative enabling acts but also by administrative and organizational reforms; (i) Local government units shall share with the national government the responsibility in the management and maintenance of ecological balance within their territorial jurisdiction, subject to the provisions of this Code and national policies; (j) Effective mechanisms for ensuring the accountability of local government units to their respective constituents shall be strengthened in order to upgrade continually the quality of local leadership; (k) The realization of local autonomy shall be facilitated through improved coordination of national government policies and programs an extension of adequate technical and material assistance to less developed and deserving local government units; (l) The participation of the private sector in local governance, particularly in the delivery of basic services, shall be encouraged to ensure the viability of local autonomy as an alternative strategy for sustainable development; and (m) The national government shall ensure that decentralization contributes to the continuing improvement of the performance of local government units and the quality of community life. Section 17. LGC of 1991 Basic Services and Facilities.

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein. (b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) For Barangay: (i) Agricultural support services which include planting materials distribution system and operation of farm produce collection and buying stations; (ii) Health and social welfare services which include maintenance of barangay health center and day-care center; (iii) Services and facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation, beautification, and solid waste collection; (iv) Maintenance of katarungang pambarangay; (v) Maintenance of barangay roads and bridges and water supply systems; (vi) Infrastructure facilities such as multi-purpose hall, multipurpose pavement, plaza, sports center, and other similar facilities; (vii) Information and reading center; and (viii) Satellite or public market, where viable; (2) For a Municipality: (i) Extension and on-site research services and facilities related to agriculture and fishery activities which include dispersal of livestock and poultry, fingerlings, and other seedling materials for aquaculture; palay, corn, and vegetable seed farms; medicinal plant gardens; fruit tree, coconut, and other kinds of seedling nurseries; demonstration farms; quality control of copra and improvement and development of local distribution channels, preferably through cooperatives; interbarangay irrigation system; water and soil resource utilization and conservation projects; and enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves; (ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, implementation of community-based forestry projects which include integrated social forestry programs and similar projects; management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest development projects; (iii) Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code, health services which include the implementation of programs and projects on primary health care, maternal and child care, and communicable and non-communicable disease control services, access to secondary and tertiary health services; purchase of medicines, medical supplies, and equipment needed to carry out the services herein enumerated; (iv) Social welfare services which include programs and projects on child and youth welfare, family and community welfare, women's welfare, welfare of the elderly and disabled persons; community-based rehabilitation programs for vagrants, beggars, street children, scavengers, juvenile delinquents, and victims of drug abuse; livelihood and other pro-poor projects; nutrition services; and family planning services; (v) Information services which include investments and job placement information systems, tax and marketing information systems, and maintenance of a public library; (vi) Solid waste disposal system or environmental management system and services or facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation; (vii) Municipal buildings, cultural centers, public parks including freedom parks, playgrounds, and other sports facilities and equipment, and other similar facilities; (viii) Infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of the residents of the municipality and which are funded out of municipal funds including but not limited to, municipal roads and bridges; school buildings and other facilities for public elementary and secondary schools; clinics, health centers and other health facilities necessary to carry out health services; communal irrigation, small water impounding projects and other similar projects; fish ports; artesian wells, spring development, rainwater collectors and water supply systems; seawalls, dikes, drainage and sewerage, and flood control; traffic signals and road signs; and similar facilities; (ix) Public markets, slaughterhouses and other municipal enterprises; (x) Public cemetery; (xi) Tourism facilities and other tourist attractions, including the acquisition of equipment, regulation and supervision of business concessions, and security services for such facilities; and (xii) Sites for police and fire stations and substations and municipal jail; (3) For a Province: (i) Agricultural extension and on-site research services and facilities which include the prevention and control of plant and animal pests and diseases; dairy farms, livestock markets, animal breeding stations, and artificial insemination centers; and assistance in the organization of farmers and fishermen's cooperatives, and other collective organizations, as well as the transfer of appropriate technology; (ii) Industrial research and development services, as well as the transfer of appropriate technology; (iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, enforcement of forestry laws limited to community-based forestry projects, pollution control law, small-scale mining law, and other laws on the protection of the environment; and mini-hydroelectric projects for local purposes; (iv) Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code, health services which include hospitals and other tertiary health services; (v) Social welfare services which include programs and projects on rebel returnees and evacuees; relief operations; and population development services; (vi) Provincial buildings, provincial jails, freedom parks and other public assembly areas and similar facilities; (vii) Infrastructure facilities intended to service the needs of the residence of the province and which are funded out of provincial funds including, but not limited to, provincial roads and bridges; inter-municipal waterworks, drainage and sewerage, flood control, and irrigation systems; reclamation projects; and similar facilities; (viii) Programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings, except those funded by the Social Security System (SSS), Government Service Insurance System p. 172 (GSIS), and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF): Provided, That national funds for these programs and projects shall be equitably allocated among the regions in proportion to the ratio of the homeless to the population;

(ix) Investment support services, including access to credit financing; (x) Upgrading and modernization of tax information and collection services through the use of computer hardware and software and other means; (xi) Inter-municipal telecommunications services, subject to national policy guidelines; and (xii) Tourism development and promotion programs; (4) For a City: All the services and facilities of the municipality and province, and in addition thereto, the following: (1) Adequate communication and transportation facilities; (c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the national government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs, and services. (d) The designs, plans, specifications, testing of materials, and the procurement of equipment and materials at P170 from both foreign and local sources necessary for the provision of the foregoing services and facilities shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned, based on national policies, standards and guidelines. (e) National agencies or offices concerned shall devolve to local government units the responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities enumerated in this Section within six (6) months after the effectivity of this Code. As used in this Code, the term "devolution" refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. (f) The national government or the next higher level of local government unit may provide or augment the basic services and facilities assigned to a lower level of local government unit when such services or facilities are not made available or, if made available, are inadequate to meet the requirements of its inhabitants. (g) The basic services and facilities hereinabove enumerated shall be funded from the share of local government units in the proceeds of national taxes and other local revenues and funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned or controlled corporations which are tasked by law to establish and maintain such services or facilities. Any fund or resource available for the use of local government units shall be first allocated for the provision of basic services or facilities enumerated in subsection (b) hereof before applying the same for other purposes, unless otherwise provided in this Code. (h) Regional offices of national agencies or offices whose functions are devolved to local government units as provided herein shall be phased out within one (1) year from the approval of this Code. Said national agencies and offices may establish such field units as may be necessary for monitoring purposes and providing technical assistance to local government units. The properties, equipment, and other assets of these regional offices shall be distributed to the local government units in the region in accordance with the rules and regulations issued by the oversight committee created under this Code. (i) The devolution contemplated in this Code shall include the transfer to local government units of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions, and responsibilities. Personnel of said national agencies or offices shall be absorbed by the local government units to which they belong or in whose areas they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively viable as determined by the said oversight committee: Provided, That the rights accorded to such personnel pursuant to civil service law, rules and regulations shall not be impaired: Provided, further, That regional directors who are career executive service officers and other officers of similar rank in the said regional offices who cannot be absorbed by the local government unit shall be retained by the national government, without any diminution of rank, salary or tenure. (j) To ensure the active participation of the private sector in local governance, local government units may, by ordinance, sell, lease, encumber, or otherwise dispose of public economic enterprises owned by them in their proprietary capacity. Costs may also be charged for the delivery of basic services or facilities enumerated in this Section. Section 528 LGC of 1991 Deconcentration of Requisite Authority and Power. The national government shall, six (6) months after the effectivity of this Code, effect the deconcentration of requisite authority and power to the appropriate regional offices or field offices of national agencies or offices whose major functions are not devolved to local government units. Limbona vs. Magelin 170 SCRA 786 (1989) Petitioner Speaker Alimbusat Limbona was the speaker of the regional legislative assembly of central Mindanao. He was invited to attend a conference and hence he advised acting secretary Alimbuyao to inform the assemblyman that there will be no session on such that he will be away.The Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice. After declaring the presence of a quorum, all present voted that the seat of the speaker be declared vacant. The petitioner then went to court praying that judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents during the session and his ouster as null and void. PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions presented? Me chair hears none and the said motions are approved. ... Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant; one abstained and 1 none voted against. Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows: WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that(a) This Petition be given due course; (b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5, 1987, and on any day thereafter; (c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void; (d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting, and (e) Making the injunction permanent.

The respondents assails the jurisdiction of the Court to rule upon the issue. HELD: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy to Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the proper case. Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses. An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably, beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." 33 the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services. Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. The expulsion of the petitioner has no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. In the second place, the resolution appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the part of the latter. While it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating hand of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse. Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. Sangguniang Panglungsod of CDO passed several ordinances prohibiting the establishment of gambling casinos. PPC and PAGCOR assail the authority to pass such ordinances. HELD: Ordinances should not contravene a statute. The rational for this requirement is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature. This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93

prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void. Lina, Jr. vs. Pano GR No. 129093, Aug. 30 2001 On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor's permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 which was issued on September 18, 1995. As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 .On May 23, 1997, petitioners filed this petition alleging that the following errors were committed by the respondent trial court:the trial court failed to appreciate the argument posited by the petitioners that before any government project or program may be implemented by the national agencies or offices, prior consultation and approval by the local government units concerned and other concerned sectors is required. HELD: The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, contends that the Provincial Government of Laguna 11 has no power to prohibit a form of gambling which has been authorized by the national government. He argues that this is based on the principle that ordinances should not contravene statutes as municipal governments are merely agents of the national government. The local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers which have been conferred on them by Congress. This being the case, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. The OSG also adds that the question of whether gambling should be permitted is for Congress to determine, taking into account national and local interests. Since Congress has allowed the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant to its legislative grant of authority, the province's Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the exercise of said authority by preventing something already allowed by Congress. The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to issue a mayor's permit for the operation of a lotto outlet in favor of private respondent. According to the mayor, he based his decision on an existing ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto in the province of Laguna. The ordinance, however, merely states the "objection" of the council to the said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. Even petitioners admit as much when they stated in their petition that: 5.7. The terms of the Resolution and the validity thereof are express and clear. The Resolution is a policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement opposition and/or objection to the 12 operation of and/or all forms of gambling including the Lotto operation in the Province of Laguna. As a policy statement expressing the local government's objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government's autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government's. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. The pertinent provision reads:SECTION 1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, hereinafter designated the Office, shall be the principal government agency for raising and providing for funds for health programs, medical assistance and services and charities of national character, and as such shall have the general powers conferred in section thirteen of Act Numbered One thousand four hundred fiftynine, as amended, and shall have the authority:A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities, in such frequency and manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be promulgated by the Board of Directors.This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held 13 in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for 14 this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the state, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature (citing Clinton vs. Ceder Rapids, etc. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455).Nothing in the present constitutional provision enhancing local autonomy dictates a different conclusion. The basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our

previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax (citing Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution), which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local 15 government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization". It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an 16 "imperium in imperio". To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent mayor of San Pedro, cannot avail of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna as justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an expression of the local legislative unit concerned. The Board's enactment, like spring water, could not rise above its source of power, the national legislature. In sum, we find no reversible error in the RTC decision enjoining Mayor Cataquiz from enforcing or implementing the Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna. That resolution expresses merely a policy statement of the Laguna provincial board. It possesses no binding legal force nor requires any act of implementation. It provides no sufficient legal basis for respondent mayor's refusal to issue the permit sought by private respondent in connection with a legitimate business activity authorized by a law passed by Congress. San Juan vs. Civil Service Commission 196 SCRA 69 (1991) On March 22, 1988, the position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the province of Rizal was left vacant by its former holder, a certain Henedima del Rosario.In a letter dated April 18, 1988, the petitioner informed Director Reynaldo Abella of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Region IV that Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988 pursuant to a Memorandum issued by the petitioner who further requested Director Abella to endorse the appointment of the said Ms. Dalisay Santos to the contested position of PBO of Rizal. Ms. Dalisay Santos was then Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal before she discharged the functions of acting PBO.In a Memorandum dated July 26, 1988 addressed to the DBM Secretary, then Director Abella of Region IV recommended the appointment of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of all Municipal Budget Officers of the said province which included three nominees of the petitioner. According to Abella, the private respondent was the most qualified since she was the only Certified Public Accountant among the contenders.On August 1, 1988, DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabuquit, Jr. signed the appointment papers of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal upon the aforestated recommendation of Abella.In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to Secretary Carague, the petitioner reiterated his request for the appointment of Dalisay Santos to the contested position unaware of the earlier appointment made by Undersecretary Cabuquit.On August 31, 1988, DBM Regional Director Agripino G. Galvez wrote the petitioner that Dalisay Santos and his other recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements under Local Budget Circular No. 31 for the position of a local budget officer. Director Galvez whether or not through oversight further required the petitioner to submit at least three otherqualified nominees who are qualified for the position of PBO of Rizal for evaluation and processing.On November 2, 1988, the petitioner after having been informed of the private respondent's appointment wrote Secretary Carague protesting against the said appointment on the grounds that Cabuquit as DBM Undersecretary is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO; that the private respondent lacks the required three years work experience as provided in Local Budget Circular No. 31; and that under Executive Order No. 112, it is the Provincial Governor, not the Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO.On January 9, 1989 respondent DBM, through its Director of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative Affairs (BLLA) Virgilio A. Afurung, issued a Memorandum ruling that the petitioner's letter-protest is not meritorious considering that public respondent DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none of the petitioner's nominees met the prescribed requirements. On January 27, 1989, the petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the BLLA ruling.On February 28, 1989, the DBM Secretary denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.On March 27, 1989, the petitioner wrote public respondent CSC protesting against the appointment of the private respondent and reiterating his position regarding the matter All the assigned errors relate to the issue of whether or not the private respondent is lawfully entitled to discharge the functions of PBO of Rizal pursuant to the appointment made by public respondent DBM's Undersecretary upon the recommendation of then Director Abella of DBM Region IV. The petitioner's arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee should come only from his nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 which provides that:Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be appointed henceforth by the Minister of Budget and Management upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, and they shall be placed under the administrative control and technical supervision of the Ministry of Budget and Management. The petitioner maintains that the appointment of the private respondent to the contested position was made in derogation of the provision so that both the public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding Almajose's appointment. HELD: The issue before the Court is not limited to the validity of the appointment of one Provincial Budget Officer. The tug of war between the Secretary of Budget and Management and the Governor of the premier province of Rizal over a seemingly innocuous position involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. The exercise by local governments of meaningful power has been a national goal since the turn of the century. And yet, inspite of constitutional provisions and, as in this case, legislation mandating greater autonomy for local officials, national officers cannot seem to let go of centralized powers. The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy. However, in distinguishing between presidential control and supervision as follows: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. (Sec. 11, Article VII, 1935 Constitution)the Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to "general supervision as may be provided by law." The President controls the executive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has only supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute.

The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution. Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides: Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. The 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines but give in greater detail the provisions making local autonomy more meaningful. Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Article X provide: Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back.The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states: Sec. 6.0 The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications. The public respondent's grave abuse of discretion is aggravated by the fact that Director Galvez required the Provincial Governor to submit at least three other names of nominees better qualified than his earlier recommendation. It was a meaningless exercise. The appointment of the private respondent was formalized before the Governor was extended the courtesy of being informed that his nominee had been rejected. The complete disregard of the local government's prerogative and the smug belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom, authority, and discretion are manifest. In his classic work "Philippine Political Law" Dean Vicente G. Sinco stated that the value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy. Citing Tocqueville, he stated that "local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. . . . A people may establish a system of free government but without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Eleventh Edition, pp. 705-706). Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are SET ASIDE. The appointment of respondent Cecilia Almajose is nullified. The Department of Budget and Management is ordered to appoint the Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal from among qualified nominees submitted by the Provincial Governor. Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals GR No.120865-71 1995 Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable development, Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This Government Agency is supposed to carry out and effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act clearly named, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic development. Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos amended certain sections of Republic Act No. 4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of the Government and the general public over: the environment impact of development on the water quality and ecology of the lake and its related river systems; the inflow of polluted water from the Pasig River, industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas around the lake; the increasing urbanization which induced the deterioration of the lake, since water quality studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same; and the floods in Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns which will influence the hydraulic system of Laguna de Bay, since any scheme of controlling the floods will necessarily involve the lake and its river systems, likewise gave impetus to the creation of the Authority. Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides:Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges.(a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section.(b) The Sangguniang Bayan may:(1) Grant fishing privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussel or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it; (2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of other species and fish from the municipal waters by nets, traps or other fishing gears to marginal fishermen free from any rental fee, charges or any other imposition whatsoever. Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July, 1995, occupied almost one-third of the entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity.To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate independent policies in the operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake and their indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake. In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public that:In compliance with the instructions of His Excellency PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS given on June 23, 1993 at Pila, Laguna pursuant to Republic Act 4850 as amended by

Presidential Decree 813 and Executive Order 927 series of 1983 and in line with the policies and programs of the Presidential Task Force on Illegal Fishpens and Illegal Fishing, the general public is hereby notified that:1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay Region, which were not registered or to which no application for registration and/or permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March 31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal.2. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so declared as illegal shall be subject to demolition which shall be undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing.3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal shall, without prejudice to demolition of their structures be criminally charged in accordance with Section 39A of Republic Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same laws. Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or both at the discretion of the court.All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal in accordance with the foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before 27 October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their said fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures should not be demolished/dismantled.One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected.Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the Authority before various regional trial courts. HELD: We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the main and only issue posed is: Which agency of the Government the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above, specifically provide that the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters.We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed.It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the 3 special law." Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere 4 implication. Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission. "Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to the inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law the special law designed to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources.""Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the lake, abstraction of water therefrom or construction of fishpens by enclosing its certain area, affect not only that specific portion but the entire 900 km of lake water. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water resource management 5 policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay." The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local Government Units."On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality 6 control and management. It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease and desist order" and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.

The Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted before the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained. D. Local Governments in the Phillippines 1.Territorial and Political Subdivisions: Provinces,Cities,Municipalities,Barangays Definition of territorial boundaries of LGU is a standard provision of the law creating them. Such provision, however, is not a grant of ownership of National Govt properties within the boundaries to the LGU. Jurisdiction refers to the sphere of political authority, not the area of ownership. An express grant is necessary to effect transfer of ownership. Council sessions must be conducted within territorial jurisdiction, except for instances such as lahar having wiped out the barangay. Punong barangay cannot alter boundaries on his/her own. Sec. 1 Art. X 1987 Consstitution: Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. Sec. 12 Art. X 1987 Constitution: Section 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials. Abella vs. Comelec, 201 SCRA 253 (1991) Petitioner Benjamin P. Abella was the official candidate of the Liberal Party for provincial governor of Leyte in the local election held on February 1, 1988. The private respondent is the wife of Emeterio V. Larrazabal, the original candidate of the Lakas ng Bansa-PDP-Laban who was disqualified by the Commission on Elections on January 18, 1988, for lack of residence. (G.R. No. 88004, Rollo, pp. 102-104) (He filed a petition for certiorari to challenge this resolution. He, however, filed an urgent ex-parte motion to withdraw petition which was granted in a resolution dated January 21, 1988 and the case was dismissed. [G.R. No. 81313]) On January 31, 1988, the day before the election, she filed her own certificate of candidacy in substitution of her husband. (Ibid., p. 48) The following day, at about 9:30 o'clock in the morning, Silvestre de la Cruz, a registered voter of Tacloban City, filed a petition with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte to disqualify her for alleged false statements in her certificate of candidacy regarding her residence. (Id., pp. 113-118) This was immediately transmitted to the main office of the Commission on Elections, which could not function, however, because all but one of its members had not yet been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. De la Cruz then came to this Court, which issued a temporary restraining order on February 4, 1988, enjoining the provincial board of canvassers of Leyte 'from proclaiming Adelina Larrazabal as the winning candidate for the Office of the Governor in the province of Leyte, in the event that she obtains the winning margin of votes in the canvass of election returns of said province.' ( Id., p. 179) On March 1, 1988, the Commission on Elections having been fully constituted, we remanded the petition thereto for appropriate action, including maintenance or lifting of the Court's temporary restraining order of February 4, 1988. ( Id. pp. 182-184)In the meantime, petitioner Abella, after raising various verbal objections (later duly reduced to writing) during the canvass of the election returns, seasonably elevated them to the Commission on Elections in ten separate appeals docketed as SPC Nos. 88-627 to 88627-I. Pending resolution of these cases, Abella intervened on March 7, 1988 in the disqualification case, docketed as SPC No. 88-546, and the following day filed a complaint, with the Law Department of the COMELEC charging the private respondent with falsification and misrepresentation of her residence in her certificate of candidacy. On March 22, 1988, the public respondent consolidated the preproclamation and disqualification cases with the Second Division. In view of these rulings, the COMELEC, upon motion of Larrazabal, lifted its temporary restraining order against her proclamation paving Larrazabal's proclamation and her assumption to the Office of Governor of Leyte while the hearings in the disqualification case continued. On February 14, 1991, the second division in a 2-1 vote rendered a decision disqualifying Larrazabal as governor.On July 18, 1991, the Commission en banc issued a resolution which denied Larrazabal's motion to declare decision void and/or motion for reconsideration and affirmed the second division's decision. In the same resolution, the Commission disallowed Abella's proclamation as governor of Leyte.Hence, these petitions.We treat the various Comments as Answers and decide the petitions on their merits. HELD: The Court is bound by these factual findings as they are supported by substantial evidence: In Aratuc v. Commission on Elections (88 SCRA 251), speaking of the need to preserve the 'independence and all the needed concomitant powers' of the Commission on Elections, Justice Antonio P. Barredo declared that it is but proper that the Court should accord the greatest measures of presumption of regularity to its course of action ... to the end it may achieve its designed place in the democratic fabric of our government ... (Abella v. Larrazabal, supra) Failing in her contention that she is a resident and registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, the petitioner poses an alternative position that her being a registered voter in Ormoc City was no impediment to her candidacy for the position of governor of the province of Leyte. Section 12, Article X of the Constitution provides: Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials. Section 89 of Republic Act No. 179 creating the City of Ormoc provides: Election of provincial governor and members of the Provincial Board of the members of the Provincial Board of the Province of Leyte The qualified voters of Ormoc City shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte. Relating therefore, section 89 of R.A. 179 to section 12, Article X of the Constitution one comes up with the following conclusion: that Ormoc City when organized was not yet a highly-urbanned city but is, nevertheless, considered independent of the province of Leyte to which it is geographically attached because its charter prohibits

its voters from voting for the provincial elective officials. The question now is whether or not the prohibition against the 'city's registered voters' electing the provincial officials necessarily mean, a prohibition of the registered voters to be elected as provincial officials. The petitioner citing section 4, Article X of the Constitution, to wit: Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. submits that "while a Component City whose charter prohibits its voters from participating in the elections for provincial office, is indeed independent of the province, such independence cannot be equated with a highly urbanized city; rather it is limited to the administrative supervision aspect, and nowhere should it lead to the conclusion that said voters are likewise prohibited from running for the provincial offices." (Petition, p. 29) The argument is untenable. Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly-urbanized cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are independent of the province. In the same provision, it provides for other component cities within a province whose charters do not provide a similar prohibition. Necessarily, component cities like Ormoc City whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are treated like highly urbanized cities which are outside the supervisory power of the province to which they are geographically attached. This independence from the province carries with it the prohibition or mandate directed to their registered voters not to vote and be voted for the provincial elective offices. The resolution in G.R. No. 80716 entitled Peralta v. The Commission on Elections, et al. dated December 10, 1987 applies to this case. While the cited case involves Olongapo City which is classified as a highly urbanized city, the same principle is applicable. Moreover, Section 89 of Republic Act 179, independent of the constitutional provision, prohibits registered voters of Ormoc City from voting and being voted for elective offices in the province of Leyte. We agree with the COMELEC en banc that "the phrase 'shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte' connotes two prohibitions one, from running for and the second, from voting for any provincial elective official. 2.Autonomous Regions Sec. 1 Art. X 1987 Constitution Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 3.Special Metropolitan Political Subdivsions Sec. 11 Art. X 1987 Constitution Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.

MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village, GR no. 135962 March 27, 2000 Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order the following day.On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction.On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. Held: The Constitution, however, recognized the necessity of creating metropolitan regions not only in the existing 43 National Capital Region but also in potential equivalents in the Visayas and Mindanao. Section 11 of the same Article X thus provided: Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination. Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create "special metropolitan political subdivisions" which shall be subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected; the jurisdiction of this subdivision shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination; and the cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic services requiring coordination; and the cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic autonomy and their own local executive and 44 legislative assemblies. Pending enactment of this law, the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution gave the President of the Philippines the power to constitute the Metropolitan Authority, viz: Sec. 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may constitute the Metropolitan Authority to be 45 composed of the heads of all local government units comprising the Metropolitan Manila area. In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority 46 (MMA). The powers and functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA. It ought to be stressed, however, that not all powers and functions of the MMC were passed to the MMA. The MMA's power was limited to the "delivery of

basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila." The MMA's governing body, the Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the mayors of the component cities and municipalities, was merely given power of: (1) formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and consolidation; and (2) promulgation resolutions and other issuances, approval of a code of basic services and the exercise of its rule48 making power. Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMA's jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power . Its power was merely to provide the local government units technical assistance in the preparation of local development plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments and with the comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and 49 to "advise the local governments accordingly." When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units. Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. This was explicitly stated in the last Committee deliberations prior to the bill's presentation to Congress. It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly 56 affected." R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the 57 President, whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA. Clearly then, the MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R.A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary. We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDA's noble efforts to solve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila. Every day, traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling boulevards and avenues are now crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with motorists and pedestrians. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our people's productivity and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the country. The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law. E. Loose Federation of LGUs and Regional Development Councils Sec. 13 Art. X 1987 Constitution Section 13. Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them in accordance with law. Sec. 33 LGC of 1991 Section 33. Cooperative Undertakings Among Local Government Units. - Local government units may, through appropriate ordinances, group themselves, consolidate, or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them. In support of such undertakings, the local government units involved may, upon approval by the sanggunian concerned after a public hearing conducted for the purpose, contribute funds, real estate, equipment, and other kinds of property and appoint or assign personnel under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the participating local units through Memoranda of Agreement. Sec. 14 Art. X 1987 Constitution Section 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the region. PART II: THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 1. Constitutional Mandate Art. X sec 3. Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. 2. Sources of the Local Government Code of 1991 (codified laws) 3. Scope of Application

47

Sec. 4, LGC of 1991 Section 4. Scope of Application. - This Code shall apply to all provinces, cities, municipalities, barangays, and other political subdivisions as may be created by law, and, to the extent herein provided, to officials, offices, or agencies of the national government. Sec. 526 Ibid Section 526. Application of this Code to Local Government Units in the Autonomous Regions. - This Code shall apply to all provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays in the autonomous regions until such time as the regional government concerned shall have enacted its own local government code. Sec. 529 Ibid Section 529. Tax Ordinances or Revenue Measures. - All existing tax ordinances or revenue measures of local government units shall continue to be in force and effect after the effectivity of this Code unless amended by the sanggunian concerned, or inconsistent with, or in violation of, the provisions of this Code. Sec. 534 Ibid Section 534. Repealing Clause. (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed. (b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed. (c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect. (d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded projects. (e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16 and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Section 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

4. Rules of Interpretation Sec. 5 LGC of 1991 Section 5. Rules of Interpretation. - In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply: (a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned; (b) In case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be construed strictly against the local government unit enacting it, and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. Any tax exemption, incentive or relief granted by any local government unit pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming it. (c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community; (d) Rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of this Code and arising out of contracts or any other source of presentation involving a local government unit shall be governed by the original terms and conditions of said contracts or the law in force at the time such rights were vested; and (e) In the resolution of controversies arising under this Code where no legal provision or jurisprudence applies, resort may be had to the customs and traditions in the place where the controversies take place. 5. Effectivity Sec. 536 LGC of 1991 Section 536. Effectivity Clause. - This Code shall take effect on January first, nineteen hundred ninety-two, unless otherwise provided herein, after its complete publication in at least one (1) newspaper of general circulation. Approved: October 10, 1991 PART III: CREATION, CONVERSION DIVISION,MERGER,SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF BOUNDARIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS AND ABOLITION. A. Regular Political Subdivisions (Provinces, Cities, Municipalities, and Barangays) 1. Creation and Conversion a. General requirements: Law, Plebiscite, Compliance with Criteria on income, land and population Sec. 10-11 Art. X 1987 Constitution Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination. Sec. 6, 7, 10, LGC of 1991 General Powers and Attributes of Local Government Units

Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code. Section 7. Creation and Conversion. - As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit: (a) Income. - It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned; (b) Population. - It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and (c) Land Area. - It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. - No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date. Tan vs. Comelec 142 SCRA 727 (1986) BP 885 (an Act creating a new province of Negros del Norte) was enacted. It provides for the new provinces component cities, boundaries, and the conduct of a plebiscite for its creation. A plebiscite was held, pursuant to the requirement of said BP (shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected), but the plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of the new province, to the exclusion of the voters from the rest of the province. (Negros Occidental some cities and municipalities of Negross Occidental = Negros del Norte) WON the petition questioning the constitutionality and validity of the plebiscite renders the case moot and academic because the result was in favor of the creation of the new province and such creation was now fait accompli. HELD: No. It is the legality of the plebiscite itself which is challenged. WON the province complied with the plebiscite requirement. HELD: No. Sec 3, Art XI provides that No province, city, municipa lity or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. This means that the rest of Negros Occidental must be included in the conduct of plebiscite as the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province. WON the new province complied with the requirements of land area. HELD: No. Sec 197 of the LGC provides that a province may be created if it has a territory of at least three thousan d five hundred square kilometers, xxx. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands. The use of the word territory clearly, reflects that it has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control. It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area" only. Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, which took effect on December 3, 1985, Petitioners herein, who are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities therein, on December 23, 1985, filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law, was scheduled for January 3, 1986. Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the Local Government Code as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution, it is expressly mandated that See. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions which must exist to provide the legal basis for the creation of a provincial unit and these requisites are: SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it has a territory of at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five

hundred thousand persons, an average estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands. The average estimated annual income shall include the income allotted for both the general and infrastructural funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income. The environmental facts in the case before Us readily disclose that the subject matter under consideration is of greater magnitude with concomitant multifarious complicated problems. In the earlier case, what was involved was a division of a barangay which is the smallest political unit in the Local Government Code. Understandably, few and lesser problems are involved. In the case at bar, creation of a new province relates to the largest political unit contemplated in Section 3, Art. XI of the Constitution. To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three cities and eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent province of Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal of approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an existing province whose boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize that the consequent effects cf the division of the parent province necessarily will affect all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent province as well as that of the new province will be inevitably affected, either for the better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or both of these political groups will be affected and they are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein. Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after the creation of Negros del Norte, the province of Negros Occidental would be deprived of the long established Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the municipality of Victorias. No controversion has been made regarding petitioners' assertion that the areas of the Province of Negros Occidental will be diminished by about 285,656 hectares and it will lose seven of the fifteen sugar mills which contribute to the economy of the whole province. In the language of petitioners, "to create Negros del Norte, the existing territory and political subdivision known as Negros Occidental has to be partitioned and dismembered. What was involved was no 'birth' but "amputation." We agree with the petitioners that in the case of Negros what was involved was a division, a separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution anticipates, a substantial alteration of boundary. As contended by petitioners, Indeed, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged', 'abolished' as used in the constitutional provision do not contemplate distinct situation isolated from the mutually exclusive to each other. A Province maybe created where an existing province is divided or two provinces merged. Such cases necessarily will involve existing unit or units abolished and definitely the boundary being substantially altered. It would thus be inaccurate to state that where an existing political unit is divided or its boundary substantially altered, as the Constitution provides, only some and not all the voters in the whole unit which suffers dismemberment or substantial alteration of its boundary are affected. Rather, the contrary is true. It is also our considered view that even hypothetically assuming that the merits of this case can depend on the mere discretion that this Court may exercise, nevertheless, it is the petitioners' case that deserve to be favored. It is now time for this Court to set aside the equivocations and the indecisive pronouncements in the adverted case of Paredes vs. the Honorable Executive Secretary, et al. (supra). For the reasons already here express, We now state that the ruling in the two mentioned cases sanctioning the exclusion of the voters belonging to an existing political unit from which the new political unit will be derived, from participating in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose of determining the formation of another new political unit, is hereby abandoned. In their supplemental petition, dated January 4, 1986, it is prayed for by petitioners that a writ of mandamus be issued, directing the respondent Commission on Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the entire province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall participate and that this Court make a pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity. The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and void and violative of the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The Court is not, however, disposed to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because We find no legal basis to do so. With constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Big. 885 and also because the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, the factual and legal basis for the creation of such new province which should justify the holding of another plebiscite does not exist. The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control. Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, text, or adjacent (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous", when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R. p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning intended by the legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of construction (In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664). The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents make is an artificial or strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the words of the statute are arrested from their plain and obvious meaning and made to bear an entirely different meaning to justify an absurd or unjust result. The plain meaning in the language in a statute is the safest guide to follow in construing the statute. Padlilla vs. Comelec, 214 SCRA 735

Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7155, the Commission on Elections promulgated on November 13, 1991, Resolution No. 2312 which reads as follows:WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7155 approved on September 6, 1991 creates the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in the 1 Municipality of Labo, same province.WHEREAS under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution the creation of a municipality shall be subject to approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly 2 affected, and pursuant to Section 134 of the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections;In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo, only 2,890 votes favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Consequently, the day after the political exercise, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority 3 of votes. Thus, in this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken as provided by RA 7155. It is the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC Resolution No. 2312 should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should not have included the remaining area of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. In support of his stand, petitioner argues that with the approval and ratification of the 1987 Constitution, particularly 5 Article X, Section 10, the ruling set forth in Tan v. COMELEC relied upon by respondent COMELEC is now passe, 6 thus reinstating the case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary which held that where a local unit is to be segregated 7 from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be segrated should be included in the plebiscite. Accordingly, the issue in this case is whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and, consequently, whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is valid.We rule that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and that the plebiscite, which rejected the creation of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, is valid. Petitioner's contention that our ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC has been superseded with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, thus reinstating our earlier ruling in Paredes vs. COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines that since Tan vs.COMELEC was based on Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution our ruling in said case is no longer applicable under Section 10 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, 8 especially since the latter provision deleted the words "unit or."We do not agree. The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution not affected our ruling in Tan vs. Comelec as explained by then CONCOM Commissioner, now my distinguished colleague, Associate Justice Hilario Davide, during the debates in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, to wit:Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I would like to inform the Committee that under the formulation in the present Local Government Code, the words used are actually "political unit or units." However, I do not know the implication of the use of these words. Maybe there will be no substantial difference, but I just want to inform the Committee about this.Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will there be no objection on the part of the two Gentlemen from the floor? Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or" because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay plebiscite because it is affected . It 9 would mean a loss of a territory. (Emphasis supplied) It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units 10 directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-NaLupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, we conclude that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312. Lopez Jr. vs. Comelec, 136 SCRA 633 1 Presidential Decree No. 824 was a response to a felt need for a "central government to establish and administer program and provide services common to" the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, and Caloocan as well as thirteen 2 municipalities in the surrounding area. It is worth noting that such a problem was by no means unique and confined to the Philippines. Recent decades have witnessed a growing erosion in public confidence in the ability of local government units as traditionally organized to fulfill their responsibilities and discharge their functions 3 effectively, efficiently, and satisfactorily. The growth in population in Manila, the three other cities, and the adjacent municipalities has been unchecked since the end of World War II. There was of course the bright promise of a better fife especially so with the proliferation of commercial firms and the establishment of industries. The lure has thus proved irresistible. The result has been the ever increasing inability of the separate local governments to cope with the ensuing serious problems. A public corporation was thus created "to be known as the Metropolitan Manila, vested with powers and attributes of a corporation including the power to make contracts, sue and be sued, acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer and dispose of property and such other powers as are necessary to 4 5 carry out its purposes." It is administered by a Commission. 6 7 Petitioners in the second of the above cases assail the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 824. They rely on this provision: "No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and 8 subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." The Local 9 Government Code was not enacted until 1983. WON PD 824 (enacted November 1975) creating Metropolitan Manila is valid. HELD:Yes. In Paredes v. Executive Secretary the constitutional provision on the need for a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected would be satisfied even if "those voters who are not from the barangay to be separated were excluded in the plebiscite." It cannot be argued therefore that the plebiscite held in

the areas affected to constitute Metropolitan Manila in the referendum on February 27, 1975 was not a sufficient compliance with the constitutional provision. With the voters in such four cities and thirteen municipalities, now composing Metropolitan Manila, having manifested their will, the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioners has been satisfied. It is to be noted likewise that at the time of such plebiscite in February, 1975, there was no Local Government Code. Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly recognized the juridical entity known as Metropolitan Manila. Such express constitutional affirmation of its existence in the fundamental law calls for the dismissal of these petitions, there being no legal justification for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 824. Nor was it the first time that there has been acknowledgment in law of the creation of Metropolitan Manila. Under PD 824: "The Commission, the General Manager and any official of the Commission shall be under the direct supervision and control of the President. Notwithstanding any provision in this Decree, the President shall have the power to revoke, amend or modify any ordinance, resolution or act of the Commission, the General and the Commissioners." It may give rise to doubts as to its validity insofar as it confers the power of control on the President. That control he certainly exercises under the present Constitution over the ministries. His power over local governments does not go that far. It extends no further than general supervision. These doubts, however, do not suffice to nullify such a provision. Succinctly put, that construction that would save is to be preferred as against one that will destroy. To show fidelity to this basic principle of construction is to lend substance to the equally basic doctrine that the constitution enters into and forms part of every statute. Accordingly, the presidential power of control over acts of the Metro Manila Commission is limited to those that may be considered national in character. Where, however, the acts of the Metro Manila Commission may be considered as properly appertaining to local government functions, the power of the President is confined to general supervision. Sultan Osop Camid vs. Office of the President, GR No. 161414 Jan 2005 1 This Petition for Certiorari presents this Court with the prospect of our own Brigadoon the municipality of Andong, Lanao del Surwhich like its counterpart in filmdom, is a town that is not supposed to exist yet is anyway insisted by some as actually alive and thriving. Yet unlike in the movies, there is nothing mystical, ghostly or anything even remotely charming about the purported existence of Andong. The creation of the putative municipality was declared void ab initio by this Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists that in spite of this insurmountable obstacle Andong thrives on, and hence, its legal personality should be given judicial affirmation. The Executive Orders in question are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any 10 disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered. Among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No. 107 which created the Municipality of Andong. Nevertheless, the core issue presented in the present petition is the continued efficacy of the judicial annulment of the Municipality of Andong. Petitioner Sultan 11 Osop B. Camid (Camid) represents himself as a current resident of Andong, suing as a private citizen and taxpayer whose locus standi "is of public and paramount interest especially to the people of the Municipality of 12 Andong, Province of Lanao del Sur." He alleges that Andong "has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its 13 constituents," even though he concedes that since 1968, no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to 14 serve any of the elective local government positions of Andong. Nonetheless, the municipality of Andong has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, a Department of Education, Culture and Sports office, and at least seventeen 15 (17) "barangay units" with their own respective chairmen. From 1964 until 1972, according to Camid, the public officials of Andong "have been serving their constituents through the minimal means and resources with least (sic) honorarium and recognition from the Office of the then former President Diosdado Macapagal." Since the time of Martial Law in 1972, Andong has allegedly been getting by despite the absence of public funds, with the "Interim Officials" serving their constituents "in their own little ways and means. Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG "in not classifying [Andong] as a regular existing municipality and in not including said 21 municipality in its records and official database as [an] existing regular municipality." He characterizes such nonclassification as unequal treatment to the detriment of Andong, especially in light of the current recognition given to the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly annulled by reason of Pelaez. As appropriate relief, Camid prays that the Court annul the DILG Certification dated 21 November 2003; direct the DILG to classify Andong as a "regular existing municipality;" all public respondents, to extend full recognition and support to Andong; the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management, to immediately release the internal revenue allotments of Andong; and the public respondents, particularly the DILG, to recognize the "Interim Local Officials" of 22 Andong. Moreover, Camid insists on the continuing validity of Executive Order No. 107. He argues that Pelaez has already been modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence. Particularly cited is 23 ourDecision in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez, wherein the Court affirmed the unique status of the 24 municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a " de facto municipal corporation." Similar to Andong, the municipality of San Andres was created by way of executive order, precisely the manner which the Court in Pelaez had declared as unconstitutional. Moreover, San Narciso cited, as Camid does, Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 as basis for the current recognition of the impugned municipality. Section 442. Requisites for Creation. xxx(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. HELD: Section 442. Requisites for Creation. - xxx (d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall 25 henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. There are several reasons why the petition must be dismissed. These can be better discerned upon examination of the proper scope and application of Section 442(d), which does not sanction the recognition of just any municipality. This point shall be further explained further on. 54 The Court also considered the applicability of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991. It clarified the implication of the provision as follows:

Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is preferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in 55 this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. (Emphasis supplied) 56 The holding in San Narciso was subsequently affirmed in Municipality of Candijay v. Court of Appeals and 57 Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz In Candijay, the juridical personality of the Municipality of Alicia, created in a 1949 executive order, was attacked only beginning in 1984. Pelaez was again invoked in support of the challenge, but the Court refused to invalidate the municipality, citing San Narciso at length. The Court noted that the situation of the Municipality of Alicia was strikingly similar to that in San Narciso; hence, the town should likewise "benefit from the effects of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code, and should [be] considered as a regular, de 58 juremunicipality." The valid existence of Municipality of Sinacaban, created in a 1949 executive order, was among the issues raised in Jimenez. The Court, through Justice Mendoza, provided an expert summation of the evolution of the rule. The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling inPelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling in this case has been reiterated in a number of cases later decided. However, we have since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr. , this Court considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), 442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." It bears noting that based on Camids own admissions, A ndong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality created by executive order may receive recognition, they must "have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code." Camid admits that Andong has never elected 60 its municipal officers at all. This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality. The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality in the last four decades are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town. The certifications relied upon by Camid, issued by the DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose of attesting to Andongs legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications qualify that they were issued u pon the request of Camid, 61 "to support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur," thus obviously conceding that the municipality is at present inoperative. We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of the Local Government Codethat it does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders. The provision affirms the legal personalities only of those municipalities such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent, unless recreated through specific legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG. Those municipalities derive their legal personality not from the presidential issuances or executive orders which originally created them or from Section 442(d), but from the respective legislative statutes which were enacted to revive them. Alvarez vs. Guingona, 252 SCRA 695 Of main concern to the petitioners is whether Republic Act No. 7720, just recently passed by Congress and signed by the President into law, is constitutionally infirm. Indeed, in this Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago, mainly because the Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a component city. Undisputed is the following chronicle of the metamorphosis of House Bill No. 8817 into Republic Act No. 7720:On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the House of Representatives with Representative Antonio Abaya as princ ipal author. Other sponsors included Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor, Rodolfo Albano, Santiago Respicio and Faustino Dy. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Local Government and the House Committee on Appropriations on May 5, 1993.On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1, 1993, public hearings on HB No. 8817 were conducted by the House Committee on Local Government. The committee submitted to the House a favorable report, with amendments, on December 9, 1993.On December 13, 1993, HB No. 8817 was

passed by the House of Representatives on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on December 17, 1993. On January 28, 1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent] Component City to be Known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the Senate. It was introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as principal sponsor, on May 19, 1993. This was just after the House of Representatives had conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817.On February 23, 1994, or a little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the said committee submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation that it be approved without amendment, taking into consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was on all fours with SB No. 1243. Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, one of the herein petitioners, indicated his approval thereto by signing said report as member of the Committee on Local Government. On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on March 14, 1994. On March 22, 1994, theHouse of Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate. The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city. The question as to the validity of Republic Act No. 7720 hinges on the following twin issues: ( I) Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city, and (II) Whether or not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives. HELD: By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after deducting the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim that Santiagos income is far below the aforesaid Twenty Million Pesos average annual income requirement.The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance, which indicates Santiagos average annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accur ate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not excluded from the computation. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and! or budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing. In this regard, we hold that petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units.It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must, among others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) 1 consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. Such income must be duly certified by the Department of 2 Finance. Resolution of the controversy regarding compliance by the Municipality of Santiago with the aforecited income requirement hinges on a correlative and contextual explication of the meaning of internal revenue allotments (IRAs) vis-a-vis the notion of income of a local government unit and the principles of local autonomy and decentralization underlying the institutionalization and intensified empowerment of the local government system. A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of 3 substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but 4 not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it 5 is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not only 6 at their own pace and discretion but also with their oWn resources and assets. The practical side to development through a decentralized local government system certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. With its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a local government unit must now operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate 7 resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions. Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and 8. development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries. The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided for in the Local Government Code and its implementing rules and regulations. For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must 9 be set aside for local development projects. As such, for purposes of budget preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of 10 funds of the local government unit. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without 11 need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department of Finance certified, among others, that the municipality had an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. This, the Department of Finance did after including the IRAs in its computation of said average annual income.Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and nonrecurring income. To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of funding support from the national governmen t, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or12 13 controlled corporations. Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 3593 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities

and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, s ales of fixed assets, and similar others (Italics 14 ours). Such order, constituting executive or contemporaneous construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the task of interpreting and applying the same, is entitled to full respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, the governing statute, or other laws. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9009 FEBRUARY 24, 2001

AN ACT AMENDING SECTION 450 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991, BY INCREASING THE AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME REQUIREMENT FOR A MUNICIPALITY OR CLUSTER OF BARANGAYS TO BE CONVERTED INTO A COMPONENT CITY Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: Section 1. Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a)A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: (i)a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or (ii)a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office. The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b)The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c)The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." Section 2. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, and other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 3. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect on June 30, 2001 following its complete publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. League of Cities of the Philippines vs. Comelec GR No.176951 November 18, 2008 (En Banc) 1 These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry 2 P. Treas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws. th 3 During the 11 Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. th 4 5 During the 12 Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable 6 of fiscal independence. th 7 After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12 Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 8 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose th th cityhood bills were not approved in the 11 Congress. However, the 12 Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. th 9 During the 13 Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills 10 11 lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws ) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, 12 Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 13 285 of the Local Government Code. The Issues The petitions raise the following fundamental issues: 1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and 2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause. HELD: The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petitions. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. th Fifth, the intent of members of the 11 Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code. th th Sixth, the deliberations of the 11 or 12 Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in th interpreting a law passed in the 13 Congress. Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law th RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11 Congress. This law specifically amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code, which now provides: Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office. The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement. Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective th th on 30 June 2001 or during the 11 Congress. The 13 Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non17 retroactivity of laws. This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied retroactively but prospectively. Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in 18 the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code . Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement fromP20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution provides: Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall

be automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied)If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of local government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution. th The 11 Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government Code True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the th various deliberations on the matter during the 11 Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into law. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is fatal to the cause of respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the Local Government Code. Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations except by a general law. Section 16 of Article XII provides: The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation, organization, or regulation" of private corporations 21 in a general law applicable to all without discrimination . Congress cannot create a private corporation through a special law or charter. League of Cities of the Philippines vs. Comelec GR No.176951 Dec. 21, 2009 (On Reconsideration) The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City [8] [9] of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assail the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a city (cityhood laws, hereinafter) and seek to enjoin the [10] Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws. By Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and nullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being violative of the Constitution, specifically its Section 10, Article X and the equal protection clause. Subsequently, respondent local government units (LGUs) moved for reconsideration, raising, as one of the issues, the validity of the factual premises not contained in the pleadings of the parties, let alone established, which [11] became the bases of the Decision subject of reconsideration. By Resolution of March 31, 2009, a divided Court denied the motion for reconsideration. A second motion for reconsideration followed in which respondent LGUs prayed as follows: WHEREFORE, respondents respectfully pray that the Honorable Court reconsider its Resolution dated March 31, 2009, in so far as it denies for lack of merit respondents Motion for Reconsideration dated December 9, 2008 and in lieu thereof, considering that new and meritorious arguments are raised by respondents Motion for Reconsideration dated December 9, 2008 to grant afore-mentioned Motion for Reconsideration dated December 9, 2008 and dismiss the Petitions For Prohibition in the instant case. To be sure, courts, regardless of doubts they might be entertaining, cannot question the wisdom of the congressional [54] classification, if reasonable, or the motivation underpinning the classification. By the same token, they do not sit to determine the propriety or efficacy of the remedies Congress has specifically chosen to extend. That is its prerogative. The power of the Legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is, to reiterate, neither curtailed nor denied by the equal protection clause. A law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis.The classification is also germane to the purpose of the law. The exemption of respondent LGUs/municipalities from the PhP 100 million income requirement was meant to reduce the inequality occasioned by the passage of the amendatory RA 9009. From another perspective, the exemption was unquestionably designed to insure that fairness and justice would be accorded respondent LGUs. Let it be noted that what were then the cityhood bills covering respondent LGUs were part and parcel of the original 57 th conversion bills filed in the 11 Congress, 33 of those became laws before the adjournment of that Congress. The then bills of the challenged cityhood laws were not acted upon due, inter alia, to the impeachment of then President Estrada, the related jueteng scandal investigations conducted before, and the EDSA events that followed the aborted impeachment.While the equal protection guarantee frowns upon the creation of a privileged class without justification, inherent in the equality clause is the exhortation for the Legislature to pass laws promoting equality or reducing existing inequalities. The enactment of the cityhood laws was in a real sense an attempt on the part of Congress to address the inequity dealt the respondent LGUs. These laws positively promoted the equality and eliminated the inequality, doubtless unintended, between respondent municipalities and the thirty-three (33) other municipalities whose cityhood bills were enacted during the 11th Congress. Respondent municipalities and the 33 other municipalities, which had already been elevated to city status, were all found to be qualified under the old th Sec. 450 of the LGC of1991 during the 11 Congress. As such, both respondent LGUs and the 33 other former municipalities are under like circumstances and conditions. There is, thus, no rhyme or reason why an exemption from the PhP 100 million requirement cannot be given to respondent LGUs. Indeed, to deny respondent LGUs/municipalities the same rights and privileges accorded to the 33 other municipalities when, at the outset they were similarly situated, is tantamount to denying the former the protective mantle of the equal protection clause. In effect, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention are creating an absurd situation in which an alleged violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution is remedied by another violation of the same clause. The irony is not lost to the Court. Then too the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 is not limited in application only to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all time, as long as the contemplated conditions obtain. To be more precise, the legislative intent underlying the enactment of RA 9009 to exclude would-be-cities from the PhP 100 million criterion would hold sway, as long as the corresponding cityhood bill has been filed before

the effectivity of RA 9009 and the concerned municipality qualifies for conversion into a city under the original version of Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991.Viewed in its proper light, the common exemption clause in the cityhood laws is an application of the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 on the cityhood bills. It is not a declaration of certain rights, but a mere declaration of prior qualification and/or compliance with the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009. Lastly and in connection with the third requisite, the uniform exemption clause would apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and were compliant with then Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, which prescribed an income requirement of PhP 20 million. It is hard to imagine, however, if there are still municipalities out there belonging in context to the same class as the sixteen (16) respondent LGUs. Municipalities that cannot claim to belong to the same class as the 16 cannot seek refuge in the cityhood laws. The former have to comply with the PhP 100 million income requirement imposed by RA 9009.A final consideration. The existence of the cities consequent to the approval of the creating, but challenged, cityhood laws in the plebiscites held in the affected LGUs is now an operative fact. New cities appear to have been organized and are functioning accordingly, with new sets of officials and employees. Other resulting events need not be enumerated. The operative fact doctrine provides another reason for upholding the constitutionality of the cityhood laws in question.In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court ought to abandon as it hereby abandons and sets aside the Decision of November 18, 2008 subject of reconsideration. And by way of summing up the main arguments in support of this disposition, the Court hereby declares the following: (1) Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA 9009 to apply to the cityhood bills which became the cityhood laws in question. In other words, Congress intended the subject cityhood laws to be exempted from the income requirement of PhP 100 million prescribed by RA 9009; (2) The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, to exempt respondent LGUs from the PhP 100 million income requirement; (3) The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. It is really immaterial if Congress is not a continuing body. The th th hearings and deliberations during the 11 and 12 Congress may still be used as extrinsic reference inasmuch as the same cityhood bills which were filed before the passage of RA 9009 were being considered during the th 13 Congress. Courts may fall back on the history of a law, as here, as extrinsic aid of statutory construction if the literal application of the law results in absurdity or injustice. (4) The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had pending cityhood bills long before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from other municipalities aiming for cityhood. On top of this, each of the 16 also met the PhP 20 million income level exacted under the original Sec. 450 of the 1991 LGC.And to stress the obvious, the cityhood laws are presumed constitutional. As we see it, petitioners have not overturned the presumptive constitutionality of the laws in question. League of Cities of the Philippines vs. Comelec GR No.176951 August 24, 2010 For resolution are (1) the ad cautelam motion for reconsideration and (2) motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009 filed by petitioners League of Cities of the Philippines, et al. and (3) the ad cautelam motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City, and Oroquieta City. On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, struck down the subject 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause. On 31 March 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority vote, denied the respondents' first motion for reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a splitvote, denied the respondents' second motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the 18 November 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recorded, in due course, in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009. However, after the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision and without any exceptional and compelling reason, the Court En Banc unprecedentedly reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision by upholding the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in the Decision of 21 December 2009. Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motions for reconsideration meritorious and accordingly reinstates the 18 November 2008 Decision declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional. HELD: A. Violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied) The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local [1] Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code . Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such

exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. Section 1 of RA 9009 pertinently provides: "Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read as follows: x x x." RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code. RA 9009, by amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Considering the Legislature's primary intent to curtail "the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities," RA 9009 increased the income requirement for the creation of cities. To repeat, RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code, as it expressly amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The language of RA 9009 is plain, simple, and clear. Nothing is unintelligible or ambiguous; not a single word or phrase admits of two or more meanings. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 by increasing the income requirement for the creation of cities. There are no exemptions from this income requirement. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law. Moreover, where the law does not make an exemption, the Court should not create one. C. Equal Protection Clause As the Court held in the 18 November 2008 Decision, there is no substantial distinction between municipalities with th pending cityhood bills in the 11 Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of th a cityhood bill in the 11 Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the th purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 Congress does not affect or th determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11 Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the th classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities. th Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. In fact, the minority concedes that "the conditions (pendency of the cityhood bills) adverted to can no longer be repeated." Further, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an th arbitrary date the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11 Congress - as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009. In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded, the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. CONCLUSION Section 10, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that "no x x x city shall be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code." This provision can only be interpreted in one way, that is, all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than the Local Government Code, provided an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood Laws contravene the letter and intent of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Adhering to the explicit prohibition in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution does not cripple Congress' power to make laws. In fact, Congress is not prohibited from amending the Local Government Code itself, as what Congress did by enacting RA 9009. Indisputably, the act of amending laws comprises an integral part of the Legislature's law-making power. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution that "[n]o x x x city x x x shall be created except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code." In other words, Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the motions for reconsideration of the 21 December 2009 Decision andREINSTATE the 18 November 2008 Decision declaring UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491. We NOTE petitioners' motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009. League of Cities of the Philippines vs. Comelec GR No.176951 Feb. 15, 2011 These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen [1] (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. [2] In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection [3] clause.In the Resolution dated March 31, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a 7-5 vote, denied the first motion for [4] reconsideration. On April 28, 2009, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution, with a vote of 6-6, which denied the second motion for reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading.In its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court En Banc clarified its April 28, 2009 Resolution in this wise--As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that: "No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained." Thus, a decision becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration.However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court, the Court therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In effect, the Court allowed the filing of the second

motion for reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration was no longer a prohibited pleading. However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturn the 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 [5] Resolution, the Court denied the second motion for reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution. Then, in [6] another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared the Cityhood Laws as [7] constitutional. On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, resolved the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009, both filed by petitioners, and the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City, and Oroquieta City, reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision. Hence, the aforementioned pleadings.Considering these circumstances where the Court En Banc has twice changed its position on the constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws, and especially taking note of the novelty of the issues involved in these cases, the Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" dated August 24, 2010 deserves favorable action by this Court on the basis of the following cogent points: The 16 Cityhood Bills do not violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution. Article X, Section 10 provides-Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The tenor of the ponencias of the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution is that the exemption clauses in the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional because they are not written in the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), particularly Section 450 thereof, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9009, which took effect on June 30, 2001, viz.-Section 450. Requisites for Creation. -a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)Prior to the amendment, Section 450 of the LGC required only an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least P20,000,000.00 for the last two (2) consecutive years, based on 1991 constant prices. Clearly, based on the above exchange, Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills th during the 11 Congress would not be covered by the new and higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. When the LGC was amended by R.A. No. 9009, the amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent of the law, and such were incorporated in the LGC by which the compliance of the Cityhood Laws th th was gauged.Notwithstanding that both the 11 and 12 Congress failed to act upon the pending cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the th 13 Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were enacted. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.Even if we were to ignore the above quoted exchange between then Senate President Drilon and Senator Pimentel, it cannot be denied that Congress saw the wisdom of exempting respondent municipalities from complying with the higher income requirement imposed by the amendatory R.A. No. 9009. Indeed, these municipalities have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. It is also acknowledged that they were centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In this regard, it is worthy to mention the distinctive traits of each respondent municipality. The Cityhood Laws do not violate Section 6, Article X and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Both the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution impress that the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause enshrined in the Constitution. Further, it was also ruled that Section 6, Article X was violated because the Cityhood Laws infringed on the "just share" that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention shall receive from the national taxes (IRA) to be automatically released to them.Upon more profound reflection and deliberation, we declare that there was valid classification, and the Cityhood Laws do not violate the equal protection clause.As this Court has ruled, the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification, provided that it: (1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to existing conditions [12] only; and (4) applies equally to all members of the same class. The petitioners argue that there is no substantial th distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11 Congress and municipalities that did not th have pending bills, such that the mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. This contention misses the point.It should be recalled from the above quoted portions of the interpellation by Senate President Drilon of Senator Pimentel that the purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely to stop the "mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities" and the apprehension that before long the country will be a country of cities and without municipalities. It should be pointed out that the imposition of the P100 million average annual income requirement for the creation of component cities was arbitrarily made. To be sure, there was no evidence or empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support the choice of this amount. The imposition of a very high income requirement of P100 million, increased from P20 million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for municipalities to become component cities. And to highlight such arbitrariness and the absurdity of the situation created thereby, R.A. No. 9009 has, in effect, placed component cities at a higher standing than highly urbanized cities under Section 452 of the LGC, to wit--Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities. - (a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office, and with the latest annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices , as certified by the city treasurer, shall be classified as highly urbanized cities.(b) Cities which do not meet above requirements shall be considered component cities of the province in which they are geographically located. (Emphasis supplied)The P100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009, being an arbitrary amount, cannot be conclusively said to be the only amount "sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and services and special functions. From the foregoing, the justness in the act of Congress in enacting the Cityhood Laws becomes obvious, especially considering that 33 municipalities were converted into component cities almost immediately prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. In the enactment of the Cityhood Laws, Congress merely took the 16 municipalities covered thereby from the disadvantaged position

brought about by the abrupt increase in the income requirement of R.A. No. 9009, acknowledging the "privilege" that they have already given to those newly-converted component cities, which prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably in the same footing or "class" as the respondent municipalities. Congress merely recognized the capacity and readiness of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, who holds the power of the purse, in enacting the Cityhood Laws, only sought the well-being of respondent municipalities, having seen their respective capacities to become component cities of their provinces, temporarily stunted by the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. By allowing respondent municipalities to convert into component cities, Congress desired only to uphold the very purpose of the LGC, i.e., to make the local government units "enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals," which is the very mandate of the Constitution. Finally, we should not be restricted by technical rules of procedure at the expense of the transcendental interest of justice and equity. While it is true that litigation must end, even at the expense of errors in judgment, it is nobler rather for this Court of last resort, as vanguard of truth, to toil in order to dispel apprehensions and doubt, as the following pronouncement of this Court instructs:The right and power of judicial tribunals to declare whether enactments of the legislature exceed the constitutional limitations and are invalid has always been considered a grave responsibility, as well as a solemn duty. The courts invariably give the most careful consideration to questions involving the interpretation and application of the Constitution, and approach constitutional questions with great deliberation, exercising their power in this respect with the greatest possible caution and even reluctance; and they should never declare a statute void, unless its invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a court in pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional, or a provision of a state constitution to be in contravention of the Constitution x x x, the case must be so clear to be free from doubt, and the conflict of the statute with the constitution must be irreconcilable, because it is but a decent respect to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body by which any law is passed to presume in favor of its validity until the contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in no doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the constitution. To doubt the [18] constitutionality of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity. WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" dated August 24, 2010, dated and filed on September 14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al. is GRANTED. The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws--Republic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491--are declared CONSTITUTIONAL. League of Cities of the Philippines vs. Comelec GR No.176951 April 12, 2011 To recall, the Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011 granted the Motion for Reconsideration of the respondents presented against the Resolution dated August 24, 2010, reversed the Resolution dated August 24, 2010, and declared the 16 Cityhood Laws -- Republic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 -constitutional. Now, the petitioners anchor their Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration upon the primordial ground that the Court could no longer modify, alter, or amend its judgment declaring the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional due to such judgment having long become final and executory. They submit that the Cityhood Laws violated Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clause. The petitioners specifically ascribe to the Court the following errors in its promulgation of the assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution, to wit: I THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO PROMULGATE THE RESOLUTION OF 15 FEBRUARY 2011 BECAUSE THERE IS NO LONGER ANY ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY TO SETTLE. II THE RESOLUTION CONTRAVENES THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RELEVANT SUPREME COURT ISSUANCES. III THE RESOLUTION UNDERMINES THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN ITS DISREGARD OF THE PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGMENTS. IV THE RESOLUTION ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD BILLS DO NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE X, SECTIONS 6 AND 10 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. V THE SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD LAWS VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO A JUST SHARE IN THE NATIONAL TAXES. Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. The apprehensions of the then Senate President with respect to the considerable disparity between the income requirement of P20 million under the Local Government Code (LGC) prior to its amendment, and the P100 million under the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9009 were definitively articulated in his interpellation of Senator Pimentel during the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157. The then Senate President was cognizant of the fact that there were municipalities that then had pending conversion bills th during the 11 Congress prior to the adoption of Senate Bill No. 2157 as R.A. No. 9009, including the municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws. It is worthy of mention that the pertinent deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 th occurred on October 5, 2000 while the 11 Congress was in session, and the conversion bills were then pending in the Senate. Thus, the responses of Senator Pimentel made it obvious that R.A. No. 9009 would not apply to the th conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate during the 11 Congress. th R.A. No. 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12 Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear th legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11 Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on Joint Resolution No. 29. Even so, the House of Representatives th readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12 Congress, and forwarded Joint Resolution No. 1 to the Senate for approval. Again, the Senate failed to approve Joint Resolution No. 1. House Joint Resolution No. 1 seeks to exempt certain municipalities seeking conversion into cities from the requirement that they must have at least P100 million in income of locally generated revenue, exclusive of the internal revenue share that they received from the central government as required under Republic Act No. 9009. The procedure followed by the House is questionable, to say the least. The House wants the Senate to do away

with the income requirement of P100 million so that, en masse, the municipalities they want exempted could now file bills specifically converting them into cities. The reason they want the Senate to do it first is that Cong. Dodo Macias, chair of the House Committee on Local Governments, I am told, will not entertain any bill for the conversion of municipalities into cities unless the issue of income requirement is first hurdled. In this regard, it suffices to state that the share of local government units is a matter of percentage under Section 285 of the LGC, not a specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis of population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the number of existing cities, such that when the number of cities increases, then more will divide and share the allocation for cities. However, we have to note that the allocation by the National Government is not a constant, and can either increase or decrease. With every newly converted city becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the percentage of internal revenue allotment (IRA) entitlement of each city will decrease, although the actual amount received may be more than that received in the preceding year. That is a necessary consequence of Section 285 and Section 286 of the LGC.As elaborated here and in the assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution, the Cityhood Laws were not violative of the Constitution and the LGC. The respondents are thus also entitled to their just share in the IRA allocation for cities. They have demonstrated their viability as component cities of their respective provinces and are developing continuously, albeit slowly, because they had previously to share the IRA with about 1,500 municipalities. With their conversion into component cities, they will have to share with only around 120 cities. Local government units do not subsist only on locally generated income, but also depend on the IRA to support their development. They can spur their own developments and thereby realize their great potential of encouraging trade and commerce in the far-flung regions of the country. Yet their potential will effectively be stunted if those already earning more will still receive a bigger share from the national coffers, and if commercial activity will be more or less concentrated only in and near Metro Manila. III.Conclusion We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only th had conversion bills pending during the 11 Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress. WHEREFORE, the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011) is denied with finality. The Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP. GR No. 183591 October 14, 2008 On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of the late Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic 1 basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations. The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the 2 peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going. Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process. Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of 3 Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and carried out an "all-outwar" against the MILF.When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet 4 with the GRP. The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of 5 Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions. Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRPMILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting."A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003.Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace 6 negotiator of the MILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal. HELD: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot all be accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Respondents have admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court, and the MOA-AD itself recognizes the need to amend the existing legal framework to render effective at least some of its provisions. Respondents, nonetheless, counter that the MOA-AD is free of any

legal infirmity because any provisions therein which are inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until the necessary changes to that framework are made. The validity of this argument will be considered later. For now, the Court shall pass upon how The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded. In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe theenvisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government. 4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall beassociative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in international law, and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term " associative" in the MOA-AD. Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept ofassociation, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an "associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X: SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of 154 a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention , namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association - runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws . Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." (Emphasis supplied)As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term "autonomous region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the abovementioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE. Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro

people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment. Mariano vs. Comelec, 242 SCRA 211 At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly 1 Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds: 1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code; 2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. 3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for: (a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census; (b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and (c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus: Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila. The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local government units. (Emphasis supplied) In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes and bounds with technical 2 descriptions. The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality." The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed 3 city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with 4 unsettled boundary disputes. We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions" was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served. Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units

and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law. Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied) They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) 6 reapportionment cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title 7 of the bill and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 8 These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The 9 Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate 10 period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their 11 sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty. Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), 12 Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four 13 hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two 14 hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the " one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject." WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs. Sen. Benigno Aquino III vs. Comelec This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its 1 publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. In substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new second district. No other local executive joined the two; neither did the representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the province. Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation 5 of a legislative district. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum 6 population standard. The provision reads: Article VI Section 5. (1) x x x x (2) x x x x (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district. As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative." The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 26 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the subject of 27 interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC. In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts would be supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created district, explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit: Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two 28 hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. (Emphasis supplied) The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population. Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states: Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office. Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement. Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI. The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to the final document. The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure was used to determine how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the determination of the precise district within the province to which, through the use of the population benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole,though it was among, several determinants. 29 From its journal, we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the entire country into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original number of district representatives. The 200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three 30 (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a population of at least 250,000; second, the remaining seats were then redistributed among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the number of their

inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." Commissioner Davide, who later became a Member 32 and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark for the Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution: Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned among provinces and cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at least 250, 000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one representative, we first allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces, and each one for all cities with a population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied). Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from this, the determination of the districts within the province had to consider "all protests and complaints formally received" which, the records show, dealt with determinants other than population as already mentioned. Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative district in a province, whose population growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers. Translated in the terms of the present case: 1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is based on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities entitled to two (2) districts in addit ion to the four (4) that it was given in the 40 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point. In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786; 2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and complaints against strict conformity with the population standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners. 3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were: (a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities; (b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped municipalities; (c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the reconfigured District One; and 41 (d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of Districts One and Two. Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased population of the erstwhile 42 Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion, that would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716. To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition. 1avvphi1 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW. Municipality of Jimenez vs. Baz, Jr. In 1949, President Quirino issued E.O. 258, creating the municipality of Sinacaban in the Province of Misamis Occidental. In 1988 by virtue of said E.O. Sinacaban filed a claim with the provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the municipality of Jimenez territorial possession of about 5 barrios. Jimenez in its reply with the provincial Board that same year and later on with the RTC in 1990, said that Sinacaban had no juridical personality to file a suit because it was created under a void E.O. as promulgated in Pelaez Auditor General and 2) the disputed barrios belong to Jimenez since in 1950 the municipalities entered into an agreement duly approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental back then which recognized Jimenezs jur isdiction over the disputed barrio in 1992, the RTC ruled in favor of Sinacaban using as its basis the curative benefits of Sec. 2 of the LGC of 1991. Angrily, Jimenez added in its petition with the Supreme Court the RTCs decision was null and void becaus e it failed to decide the case within one year mandated by the LGC of 1983 and the Constitution. Held: Jimenez is incorrect Reasons: 1. Sinacaban can claim the benefits of Sec.442 (d) of the LGC of 1991, since various government acts through the years after the Pelaez case of 1965 indicate the recognition by the years after the Pelaez case 1965 indicate the recognition by the state of the municipality of Sinacaban, most notably when the 1987 Constitution recognized nd Sinacaban as part of the 2 District of Misamis Occidental. 2. Whatever agreement Sinacaban and Jimenez entered into 1950 must still conform with the territorial metes and bounds set forth in E.O. 258, otherwise the agreement in void (A relocation survey was ordered but the results of the survey was not stated in the case) 3. Even granting that the RTC was deliberately slow, its decision is not rendered void. The only remedy left would be to file administrative sanctions against it. The preliminary issue concerns the legal existence of Sinacaban. If Sinacaban legally exist, then it has standing to bring a claim in the Provincial Board. Otherwise, it cannot.The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was without power

31

to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling in this case has been reiterated in a number [9] of cases later decided. However, we have since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be [10] questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipallity of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor general: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. no. 7160), 442 (d) of which provides that m unicipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, 16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five (5) years from the time the act complained of was done or committed. On the contrary, the State and even the municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacabans corporate existence. Under Administrative order no. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated by 31 of the judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution no. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental. Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover following the ruling in Municipality of san Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban. This provision states: Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal district organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Second. Jimenez claims, however, that R.A. No. 7160, 442(d) is invalid, since it does not conform to the [11] constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation of new municipalities. This contention will not bear analysis. Since, as previously explained, Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, it is not subject to the plebiscite requirement. This requirement applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution. Actually, the requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in Art. XI, 3 of the previous Constitution which took effect on January 17, 1973. It cannot, therefore, be applied to municipal corporations created before, such as the municipality of Sinacaban in the case at bar. Third. Finally Jimenez argues that the RTC erred in ordering a relocation survey of the boundary of Sinacaban because the barangays which Sinacaban are claiming are not enumerated in E.O. No. 258 and that in any event in 1950 the parties entered into an agreement whereby the barangays in question were considered part of the territory of Jimenez. E.O. no. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now called Barangays) therein mentioned. What it say is that Sinacaban contains those barrios, without saying they are the only ones comprising it. The reason for this is that the technical description, containing the metes and bounds of its territory, is controlling. The trial court correctly ordered a relocation and consequently the question to which the municipality the barangays in question belong. B. Specific Requirements: Income, Land and Population Requirements. Barangay Secs. 385-386, LGC of 1991 Section 385. Manner of Creation. - A barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, by law or by an ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan or panlungsod, subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC in the local government unit or units directly affected within such period of time as may be determined by the law or ordinance creating said barangay. In the case of the creation of barangays by the sangguniang panlalawigan, the recommendation of the sangguniang bayan concerned shall be necessary. Section 386. Requisites for Creation. (a) A barangay may be created out of a contiguous territory which has a population of at least two thousand (2,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office except in cities and municipalities within Metro Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities where such territory shall have a certified population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the minimum requirement prescribed herein.To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous cultural communities, barangays may be created in such communities by an Act of Congress, notwithstanding the above requirement. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for barangays, based on the criteria prescribed in this Section, within his territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted to the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned for appropriate action. In the case of municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area and other metropolitan political subdivisions, the barangay consolidation plan shall be prepared and approved by the sangguniang bayan concerned. Municipality Secs. 441-442, LGC of 1991 Section 441. Manner of Creation. - A municipality may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered only by an Act of Congress and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC in the local government unit or units directly affected. Except as may otherwise be provided in the said Act, the plebiscite shall be held within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of its effectivity. Section 442. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the provincial treasurer, of at least Two million five hundred thousand pesos (P2,500,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on the 1991 constant prices; a population of at least twenty-five thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office; and a contiguous territory of at least fifty (50) square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population or income of the original municipality or municipalities at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund of the municipality concerned, exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-recurring income. (d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Mun. of Narciso vs. Mendez, Sr., 239 SCRA 11 On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.Executive Order No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon, in its Resolution No. 8 of 24 May 1959. By virtue of Executive Order No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of 2 Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515. The executive order added that "(t)he conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of Representatives." On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, in Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres. Docketed Special Civil Action No. 2014-G, the petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and 3 4 functions of their respective offices. Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the petitioning municipality contended that Executive Order No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued, the officials of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to exercise the duties and functions of their respective offices that righfully belonged to the corresponding officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.

HELD: On 27 November 1991, the Municipality of San Andres filed anew a motion to dismiss alleging that the case had become moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on 01 January 1991. The movant municipality cited Section 442(d) of the law, reading thusly:Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. .(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.The motion was opposed by petitioner municipality, contending that the above provision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres since the enactment referred to legally existing municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation had been void ab initio. Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably brought. Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and later the Municipality, of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another 19 to hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, so also, if not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it.At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be

one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per seof Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is proferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the 21 Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. Mun. of Candijay vs. CA, 251 SCRA 530 1 This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on June 28, 2 1994,reversing the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (Branch I) of the City of Tagbilaran, Bohol.The lower court's decision, among other things, declared "barrio/barangay Pagahat as within the territorial jurisdiction of the plaintiff municipality of Candijay, Bohol, therefore, said barrio forms part and parcel of its territory, therefore, belonging to said plaintiff municipality", and further permanently enjoined defendant municipality of Alicia "to respect plaintiff's control, possession and political supervision of barangay Pagahat and never to molest, disturb, harass its possession and ownership over the same barrio. On appeal, the respondent Court stated that "(S)crutiny of the conflicting claims and the respective evidence of the parties lead to the conclusion that the trial court committed an error in declaring that Barrio Pagahat is within the territorial jurisdiction of plaintiff-appellee (municipality of Candijay)." Said Court rejected the boundary line being claimed by petitioner based on certain exhibits, since it would in effect place "practically all of Barrio Pagahat . part of Barrio Cagongcagong and portions of Barrio Putlongcam and La Hacienda and all of Barrio Mahayag and Barrio del Monte within the territorial jurisdiction of plaintiff-appellee Candijay." Added the respondent Court, "As aptly pointed out by defendantappellant in its appeal brief, 'the plaintiff municipality will not only engulf the entire barrio of Pagahat, but also of the barrios of Putlongcam, Mahayag, Del Monte, Cagongcagong, and a part of the Municipality of Mabini. Candijay will eat up a big chunk of territories far exceeding her territorial jurisdiction under the law creating her. Her claim opens the floodgate of controversies over boundaries, including with Mabini.'" (Decision p. 4; rollo, p. 35.) The respondent Court concluded that "the trial court erred in relying on Exh. X-Commissioner [exhibit for petitioner], because, in effect, it included portions of Barrios Putlongcam and La Hacienda within the jurisdiction of appellee Candijay when said barrios are undisputedly part of appellant's (Alicia) territory under Executive Order No. 265 creating the latter" The respondent Court also found, after an examination of the respective survey plans of petitioner and respondent submitted as exhibits, that "both plans are inadequate insofar as identifying the monuments of the boundary line between [petitioner] and the Municipality of Mabini (which is not a party to this case) as declared by the Provincial Board of Bohol. Neither plan shows where Looc-Tabasan, Lomislis Island, Tagtang Canlirong, mentioned in the aforequoted boundary line declared by the Provincial Board of Bohol, are actually located." (Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 35.) The respondent Court, after weighing and considering the import of certain official acts, including Executive Order No. 265 dated September 16, 1949 (which created the municipality of Alicia from out of certain barrios of the municipality of Mabini), and Act No. 968 of the Philippine Commission dated October 31, 1903 (which set forth the respective component territories of the municipalities of Mabini and Candijay), concluded that "Barrio Bulawan from where barrio Pagahat originated is not mentioned as one of the barrios constituted as part of defendant-appellant Municipality of Alicia. Neither do they show that Barrio Pagahat forms part of plaintiff-appellant Municipality of Candijay." HELD: On that basis, the respondent Court held that: Clearly, from the foregoing, there is equiponderance of evidence. The Supreme Court has ruled: Equiponderance of evidence rule states:When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.Under said principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of defendant's claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action. On the second issue, we noted that petitioner commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality of respondent municipality on 19 January 1984 (or some thirty five years after respondent municipality first came into existence in 1949) during the proceedings in the court a quo. It appears that, after presentation of its evidence, herein petitioner asked the trial court to bar respondent municipality from presenting its evidence on the ground that it had no juridical personality. Petitioner contended that Exec. Order No. 265 issued by President Quirino on September 16, 1949 creating respondent municipality is null and void ab initio, inasmuch as Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, on which said Executive Order was based, constituted an undue delegation of legislative powers to the President of the Philippines, and was therefore declared unconstitutional, per this Court's ruling 3 in Pelaez vs. Auditor General. In this regard, we call to mind the ruling of this Court in Municipality of San Narciso, 4 Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr. , which will be found very instructive in the case at bench. Therein we stated:While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 [Local Government Code of 1991] may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they, however, contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt to apply Section 442 of Republic Act 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner's theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably brought. Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal district, and later the Municipality of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly file, so also, if not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warrantoproceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it. Respondent municipality's situation in the instant case is strikingly similar to that of the municipality of San Andres. Respondent municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 265 in 1949, or ten years

ahead of the municipality of San Andres, and therefore had been in existence for all of sixteen years when Pelaez vs.Auditor General was promulgated. And various governmental acts throughout the years all indicate the State's recognition and acknowledgment of the existence thereof. For instance, under Administrative Order No. 33 abovementioned, the Municipality of Alicia was covered by the 7th Municipal Circuit Court of Alicia-Mabini for the province of Bohol. Likewise, under the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of Alicia is one of twenty municipalities comprising the Third District of Bohol. Inasmuch as respondent municipality of Alicia is similarly situated as the municipality of San Andres, it should likewise benefit from the effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, and should henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality. CITY Secs. 449-450, 452-453 LGC of 1991 Section 449. Manner of Creation. - A city may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, only by an Act of Congress, and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC in the local government unit or units directly affected. Except as may otherwise be provided in such Act. the plebiscite shall be held within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of its effectivity. Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. Section 451. Cities, Classified. - A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, That the criteria established in this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities. component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component cities shall be independent of the province. Independent component cities are those Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities. (a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office, and within the latest annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer, shall be classified as highly urbanized cities. (b) Cities which do not meet above requirements shall be considered component cities of the province in which they are geographically located. If a component city is located within the boundaries of two (2) or more provinces, such city shall be considered a component of the province of which it used to be a municipality. (c) Qualified voters of highly urbanized cities shall remain excluded from voting for elective provincial officials. Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution or this Code, qualified voters of independent component cities shall be governed by their respective charters, as amended, on the participation of voters in provincial elections. Qualified voters of cities who acquired the right to vote for elective provincial officials prior to the classification of said cities as highly-urbanized after the ratification of the Constitution and before the effectivity of this Code, shall continue to exercise such right. Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. - It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9009 FEBRUARY 24, 2001 AN ACT AMENDING SECTION 450 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991, BY INCREASING THE AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME REQUIREMENT FOR A MUNICIPALITY OR CLUSTER OF BARANGAYS TO BE CONVERTED INTO A COMPONENT CITY Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: Section 1. Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a)A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: (i)a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or (ii)a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office. The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b)The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c)The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." Section 2. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, and other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 3. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect on June 30, 2001 following its complete publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. League of Cities of the Philippines vs. Comelec supra (2008,2009,2010,2011 decisions) 2008 First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. th Fifth, the intent of members of the 11 Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code. th th Sixth, the deliberations of the 11 or 12 Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in th interpreting a law passed in the 13 Congress. Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law th RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11 Congress. This law specifically amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code, which now provides: Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office. The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement. Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Thirty-three cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during th the 11 Congress. th During the 12 Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, exempting from the income requirement of P100 million in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon th th during the 11 Congress. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12 Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. th During the 13 Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows: Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009. This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income requirement ofP100 million prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009 . These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 th th became effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11 Congress. The 13 Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which became law only in 2007 . Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the 17 principle of non-retroactivity of laws. This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied retroactively but prospectively. Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied) The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local 18 Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires

Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement fromP20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement.In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. 2009 Prior to 1965, there was a certain lack of clarity with regard to the power to create, divide, merge, dissolve, or change the boundaries of municipal corporations. The extent to which the executive may share in this power was [30] obscured by Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan . Pelaez v. Auditor General subsequently clarified the Cardona case when the Supreme Court said that the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially [31] legislative in nature. Pelaez, however, conceded that the power to fix such common boundar y, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature-involving [32] as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities. Pelaez was silent about division, merger, and dissolution of municipal corporations. But since division in effect creates a new municipality, and both dissolution and merger in effect abolish a legal creation, it may fairly be inferred that these acts are also legislative in nature. Section 10 [Art. X of the 1987 Constitution], which is a legacy from the 1973 Constitution, goes further than the doctrine in the Pelaez case. It not only makes creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities x x x subject to criteria established in the local government code, thereby declaring these actions properly legislative, but it also makes creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries subject to approval by a majority [33] of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. x x x (Emphasis added.)It remains to be observed at this juncture that when the 1987 Constitution speaks of the LGC, the reference cannot be to any [34] specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the LGC of 1991. Be it noted that at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC, was still in effect. Accordingly, had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, then they would have actually referred to BP 337. Also, they would then not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new [35] LGC, as they did in Art. X, Sec. 3 of the Constitution. Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the local government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified income requirement from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified indicators. Petitioners theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in the LGC and not in any other law strikes the Court as illogical. For if we pursue their contention to its logical conclusion, then RA 9009 embodying the new and increased income criterion would, in a way, also suffer the vice of unconstitutionality. It is startling, however, that petitioners do not question the constitutionality of RA 9009, as they in fact use said law as an argument for the alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws.As it were, Congress, through the medium of the cityhood laws, validly decreased the income criterion vis--vis the respondent LGUs, but without necessarily being unreasonably discriminatory, as shall be discussed shortly, by reverting to the PhP 20 million threshold what it earlier raised to PhP 100 million. The legislative intent not to subject respondent LGUs to the more stringent requirements of RA 9009 finds expression in the following uniform provision of the cityhood laws:Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.In any event, petitioners constitutional objection would still be untenable even if we were to assume purely ex hypothesi the correctness of their underlying thesis, viz: that the conversion of a municipality to a city shall be in accordance with, among other things, the income criterion set forth in the LGC of 1991, and in no other; otherwise, the conversion is invalid. We shall explain. Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention, the Court finds that the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less, intended the LGUs covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP 100 million income criterion. In other words, the cityhood laws, which merely carried out the intent of RA 9009, adhered, in the final analysis, to the criteria established in the Local Government Code, pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution. We shall now proceed to [36] discuss this exemption angle. Among the criteria established in the LGC pursuant to Sec.10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution are those detailed in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 under the heading Requisites for Creation. The section sets the minimum income qualifying bar before a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be considered for cityhood. Originally, Sec. 164 of BP 337 imposed an average regular annual income of at least ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years as a minimum income standard for a municipal-to-city conversion. The LGC that BP 337 established was superseded by the LGC of 1991 whose then Sec. 450 provided that [a] municipality or cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, x x x of at least twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant

prices x x x. RA 9009 in turn amended said Sec. 450 by further increasing the income requirement to PhP 100 million, thus: Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.) The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is [37] couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and [38] lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the [39] principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law [40] controls its letter. It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the logical inferences [41] derivable therefrom assume relevancy in discovering legislative intent. The rationale behind the enactment of RA 9009 to amend Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 can reasonably be deduced from Senator Pimentels sponsorship speech on S. Bill No. 2157. Of particular significance is his statement regarding the basis for the proposed increase from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million in the income requirement for municipalities wanting to be converted into cities. 2010 A. Violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied) The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local [1] Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. Section 1 of RA 9009 pertinently provides: "Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read as follows: x x x." RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code. RA 9009, by amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Considering the Legislature's primary intent to curtail "the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities," RA 9009 increased the income requirement for the creation of cities. To repeat, RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code, as it expressly amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The language of RA 9009 is plain, simple, and clear. Nothing is unintelligible or ambiguous; not a single word or phrase admits of two or more meanings. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 by increasing the income requirement for the creation of cities. There are no exemptions from this income requirement. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law. Moreover, [2] where the law does not make an exemption, the Court should not create one. B. Operative Fact Doctrine Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional. However, the minority's novel theory, invoking the operative fact doctrine, is that the enactment of the Cityhood Laws and the functioning of the 16 municipalities as new cities with new sets of officials and employees operate to contitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood Laws. This novel theory misapplies the operative fact doctrine and sets a gravely dangerous precedent. Under the minority's novel theory, an unconstitutional law, if already implemented prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court, can no longer be revoked and its implementation must be continued despite being unconstitutional. This view will open the floodgates to the wanton enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate implementation before the Court can declare them unconstitutional. This view is an open invitation to serially violate the Constitution, and be quick about it, lest the violation be stopped by the Court.

The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law produces no effects. It can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an [3] unconstitutional act. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, the Court stated: The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been passed. Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded in accordance with the general civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides: ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it. (Emphasis supplied) The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law.Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself. Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the "new cities" or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective. This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void. Only the effects of the implementation of these unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent people who may have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Court's declaration of their unconstitutionality. Conclusion Section 10, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that "no x xx city shall be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code." This provision can only be interpreted in one way, that is, all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than the Local Government Code, provided an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood Laws contravene the letter and intent of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Adhering to the explicit prohibition in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution does not cripple Congress' power to make laws. In fact, Congress is not prohibited from amending the Local Government Code itself, as what Congress did by enacting RA 9009. Indisputably, the act of amending laws comprises an integral part of the Legislature's law-making power. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution that "[n]o x x x city x x x shall be created except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code." In other words, Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution. 2011 FEB.15 These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen [1] (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. [2] In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause. [3] In the Resolution dated March 31, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a 7-5 vote, denied the first motion for reconsideration. [4] On April 28, 2009, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution, with a vote of 6-6, which denied the second motion for reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading. In its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court En Banc clarified its April 28, 2009 Resolution in this wise-As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that: "No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained." Thus, a decision becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration. However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court, the Court therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading. In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In effect, the Court allowed the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration was no longer a prohibited pleading. However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturn the 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the second motion for reconsideration [5] in its 28 April 2009 Resolution. [6] Then, in another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared the Cityhood Laws as constitutional. [7] On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, resolved the Ad Cautelam Motion

for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009, both filed by petitioners, and the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City, and Oroquieta City, reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision. Hence, the aforementioned pleadings. Considering these circumstances where the Court En Banc has twice changed its position on the constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws, and especially taking note of the novelty of the issues involved in these cases, the Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" dated August 24, 2010 deserves favorable action by this Court on the basis of the following cogent points: 1. The 16 Cityhood Bills do not violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution. Article X, Section 10 provides-Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The tenor of the ponencias of the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution is that the exemption clauses in the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional because they are not written in the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), particularly Section 450 thereof, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9009, which took effect on June 30, 2001, viz.-Section 450. Requisites for Creation. -a) A municipality or a cluster ofbarangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: x x x x (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied) Prior to the amendment, Section 450 of the LGC required only an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least P20,000,000.00 for the last two (2) consecutive years, based on 1991 constant prices. Before Senate Bill No. 2157, now R.A. No. 9009, was introduced by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, there were 57 bills th filed for conversion of 57 municipalities into component cities. During the 11 Congress (June 1998-June 2001), 33 of these bills were enacted into law, while 24 remained as pending bills. Among these 24 were the 16 municipalities that were converted into component cities through the Cityhood Laws. The rationale for the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 can be gleaned from the sponsorship speech of Senator Pimentel on Senate Bill No. 2157 SECTION 7. Creation and Conversion. -- As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit: (a) Income. -- It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned; (b) Population .-- It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and (c) Land Area .-- It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bound with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 2011 APRIL 12 As indicated in the Resolution of February 15, 2011, fifty-nine (59) existing cities had failed as of 2006 to post an average annual income of P100 million based on the figures contained in the certification dated December 5, 2008 by the Bureau of Local Government. The large number of existing cities, virtually 50% of them, still unable to comply with the P100 million threshold income five years after R.A. No. 9009 took effect renders it fallacious and probably unwarranted for the petitioners to claim that the P100 million income requirement is not difficult to comply with.In this regard, the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 may prove enlightening. The Court takes note of the fact that the municipalities cited by the petitioners as having generated the threshold income of P100 million from local sources, including those already converted into cities, are either in Metro Manila or in provinces close to Metro Manila. In comparison, the municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws are spread out in the different provinces of the Philippines, including the Cordillera and Mindanao regions, and are considerably very distant from Metro Manila. This reality underscores the danger the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent, i.e., that "the metropolis-located local governments would have more priority in terms of funding because they would have more qualifications to become a city compared to the far-flung areas in Mindanao or in the Cordilleras, or whatever," actually resulting from the abrupt increase in the income requirement. Verily, this result is antithetical to what the Constitution and LGC have nobly envisioned in favor of countryside development and national growth. Besides, this result should be arrested early, to avoid the unwanted divisive effect on the entire country due to the local government units closer to the National Capital Region being afforded easier access to the bigger share in the national coffers than other local government units. Petitioner League of Cities argues that there exists no issue with respect to the cityhood of its member cities, considering that they became cities in full compliance with the criteria for conversion at the time of their creation.The Court considers the argument too sweeping. What we pointed out was that the previous income requirement of P20 million was definitely not insufficient to provide the essential government facilities, services, and special functions vis- -vis the population of a component city. We also stressed that the increased income requirement of P100 million was not the only conclusive indicator for any municipality to survive and remain viable as a component city. These observations were unerringly reflected in

the respective incomes of the fifty-nine (59) members of the League of Cities that have still failed, remarkably enough, to be compliant with the new requirement of the P100 million threshold income five years after R.A. No. 9009 became law.Undoubtedly, the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources under R.A. No. 9009 was arbitrary. When the sponsor of the law chose the specific figure of P100 million, no research or empirical data buttressed the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal took into account the after-effects that were likely to arise. As already mentioned, even the danger the passage of R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent might soon become a reality. While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth. Moreover, if we were now to adopt the stringent interpretation of the Constitution the petitioners are espousing, we may have to apply the same restrictive yardstick against the recently converted cities cited by the petitioners, and find two of them whose conversion laws have also to be struck down for being unconstitutional. The two laws are [31] [32] R.A. No. 9387 and R.A. No. 9388, respectively converting the municipalities of San Juan and Navotas into highly urbanized cities. A cursory reading of the laws indicates that there is no indication of compliance with the requirements imposed by the LGC, for, although the two local government units concerned presumably complied with the income requirement of P50 million under Section 452 of the LGC and the income requirement of P100 million under the amended Section 450 of the LGC, they obviously did not meet the requirements set forth under Section 453 of the LGC, to wit:Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status.--It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.Indeed, R.A. No. 9387 and R.A. No. 9388 evidently show that the President had not classified San Juan and Navotas as highly urbanized cities upon proper application and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. A further perusal of R.A. No. 9387 reveals that San Juan did not qualify as a highly urbanized city because it had a population of only 125,558, contravening the required minimum population of 200,000 under Section 452 of the LGC. Such non-qualification as a component city was conceded even by Senator Pimentel during the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157.The petitioners' contention that the Cityhood Laws violated their right to a just share in the national taxes is not acceptable.In this regard, it suffices to state that the share of local government units is a matter of percentage under Section 285 of the LGC, not a specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis of population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the number of existing cities, such that when the number of cities increases, then more will divide and share the allocation for cities. However, we have to note that the allocation by the National Government is not a constant, and can either increase or decrease. With every newly converted city becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the percentage of internal revenue allotment (IRA) entitlement of each city will decrease, although the actual amount received may be more than that received in the preceding year. That is a necessary consequence of Section 285 and Section 286 of the LGC. As elaborated here and in the assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution, the Cityhood Laws were not violative of the Constitution and the LGC. PROVINCE Secs. 460-461, LGC of 1991 Section 460. Manner of Creation. - A province may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, only by an Act of Congress and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC in the local government unit or units directly affected. The plebiscite shall be held within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of said Act, unless otherwise provided therein. Section 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprise two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers and non-recurring income. Navarro vs. Exec. Sec. Ermita, GR No. 180050, February 10, 2010 The mother province of Surigao del Norte was created and established under R.A. No. 2786 on June 19, 1960. The province is composed of three main groups of islands: (1) the Mainland and Surigao City; (2) Siargao Island and Bucas Grande; and (3) Dinagat Island, which is composed of seven municipalities, namely, Basilisa, Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo, Loreto, San Jose, and Tubajon. The Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands for calendar year 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices was P82,696,433.23. The land area of the proposed province is 802.12 square kilometers.On August 14, 2006 and August 28, 2006, the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, passed the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. It was approved and enacted into law as R.A. No. 9355 on October 2, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On December 3, 2006, the Plebiscite Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed that the creation of Dinagat Islands into a separate and distinct province was ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. On January 26, 2007, a new set of provincial officials took their oath of office following their appointment by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Another set of provincial officials was

elected during the synchronized national and local elections held on May 14, 2007. On July 1, 2007, the elected provincial officials took their oath of office; hence, the Province of Dinagat Islands began its corporate 7 existence. Petitioners contended that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands under R.A. No. 9355 is not valid because it failed to comply with either the population or land area requirement prescribed by the Local Government Code.Petitioners prayed that R.A. No. 9355 be declared unconstitutional, and that all subsequent appointments and elections to the new vacant positions in the newly created Province of Dinagat Islands be declared null and void. They also prayed for the return of the municipalities of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the return of the former districts to the mother Province of Surigao del Norte. WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9355, CREATING THE NEW PROVINCE OF DINAGAT ISLANDS, COMPLIED WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 461 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991. HELD: The constitutional provision on the creation of a province in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution states:SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Pursuant to the Constitution, the Local Government Code of 1991 prescribed the criteria for the creation of a province, thus: As a clarification of the territorial requirement, the Local Government Code requires a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. However, the territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities that do not contribute to the income of the province.If a proposed province is composed of two or more islands, does "territory," under Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code, include not only the land mass above the water, but also that which is 16 beneath it?To answer the question above, the discussion in Tan v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is enlightening. In Tan v. COMELEC, petitioners therein contended that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, creating the new Province of Negros del Norte, was unconstitutional for it was not in accord with Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, and Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the former Local Government Code. Although what was applicable then was the 1973 Constitution and the former Local Government Code, the provisions pertinent to the case are substantially similar to the provisions in this case.Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution provides:Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio (barangay in the 1987 Constitution) may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.The requisites for the creation of a province in Sec. 197 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 are similar to the requisites in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code of 1991, but the requirements for population and territory/land area are lower now, while the income requirement is higher. Sec. 197 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the former Local Government Code, provides:SEC. 197.Requisites for Creation.A province may be created if it has a territory of at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hundred thousand persons, an average estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands. The average estimated annual income shall include the income allotted for both the general and infrastructure funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income. At issue in Tan was the land area of the new Province of Negros del Norte, and the validity of the plebiscite, which did not include voters of the parent Province of Negros Occidental, but only those living within the territory of the new Province of Negros del Norte.The Court held that the plebiscite should have included the people living in the area of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province. However, the Court did not direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because the factual and legal basis for the creation of the new province did not exist as it failed to satisfy the land area requirement; hence, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, creating the new Province of Negros del Norte, was declared unconstitutional. The Court found that the land area of the new province was only about 2,856 square kilometers, which was below the statutory requirement then of 3,500 square kilometers. Respondents in Tan insisted that when the Local Government Code speaks of the required territory of the province to be created, what is contemplated is not only the land area, but also the land and water over which the said province has jurisdiction and control. The respondents submitted that in this regard, the marginal sea within the three mile limit should be considered in determining the extent of the territory of the new province. The Court stated that "[s]uch an 18 interpretation is strained, incorrect and fallacious." It held: The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly, reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control.Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, [n]ext, or adjacent (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous," when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R., p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning intended by the legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words 19 are used furnished the rule of construction (In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664). The discussion of the Court in Tan on the definition and usage of the terms "territory," and "contiguous," and the meaning of the provision, "The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands," contained in Sec. 197 of the former Local Government Code, which provides for the requisites in the creation of a new province, is applicable in this case since there is no reason for a change in their respective definitions, usage, or meaning in its counterpart provision in the present Local Government Code contained in Sec. 461 thereof. The territorial requirement in the Local Government Code is adopted in the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 20 (IRR), thus:ART. 9. Provinces.(a) Requisites for creationA province shall not be created unless the following

requisites on income and either population or land area are present:(1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; and(2) Population or land area - Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certified by National Statistics Office; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. However, the IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government Code when it added the italicized portion above stating that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands." Nowhere in the Local Government Code is the said provision stated or implied. Under Section 461 of the Local Government Code, the only instance when the territorial or land area requirement need not be complied with is when there is already compliance with the population requirement. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be 21 written in the Local Government Code. There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations 22 cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. Hence, the Court holds that the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR stating that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands" is null and void. To reiterate, when the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province on December 3, 2006, it had an official population of only 106,951 based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population. Less than a year after the proclamation of the new province, the NSO conducted the 2007 Census of Population. 37 The NSO certified that as of August 1, 2007, Dinagat Islands had a total population of only 120,813, which was 38 still below the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. In fine, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either the territorial or the population requirement for the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands. The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government 39 Code. Any derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10, 40 Art. X of the Constitution. Hence, R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as [An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands], is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared NULL and VOID. The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared NULL and VOID. Navarro vs. Exec. Sec. Ermita, GR No. 180050, April 12, 2011 Because they are the duly elected officials of Surigao del Norte whose positions will be affected by the nullification of the election results in the event that the May 12, 2010 Resolution is not reversed, they have a legal interest in the instant case and would be directly affected by the declaration of nullity of R.A. No. 9355. Simply put, movantsintervenors election to their respective offices would necessarily be annulled since Dinagat Island s will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte and a special election will have to be conducted for governor, vice governor, and House of Representatives member and Sangguniang Panlalawigan member for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. Moreover, as residents of Surigao del Norte and as public servants representing the interests of their constituents, they have a clear and strong interest in the outcome of this case inasmuch as the reversion of Dinagat as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte will affect the latter province such that: (1) the whole administrative set-up of the province will have to be restructured; (2) the services of many employees will have to be terminated; (3) contracts will have to be invalidated; and (4) projects and other developments will have to be discontinued. In addition, they claim that their rights cannot be adequately pursued and protected in any other proceeding since their rights would be foreclosed if the May 12, 2010 Resolution would attain finality.In their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, movantsintervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge the above Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case. On September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 17 Resolution, citing several rulings of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred that prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this case. Even for the sake of argument that they had notice of the pendency of the case, they pointed out that prior to the said elections, Sol T. Matugas was a simple resident of Surigao del Norte, Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr. was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Second District of Surigao del Norte, and Mamerto D. Galanida was the Municipal Mayor of Socorro, Surigao del Norte, and that, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it was only after they were elected as Governor of Surigao del Norte, Vice Governor of Surigao del Norte and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member of the First District of Surigao del Norte, respectively, that they became possessed with legal interest in this controversy. HELD: Also worthy of note are the requisites in the creation of a barangay, a municipality, a city, and a province as provided both in the LGC and the LGC-IRR, viz. For a Barangay: LGC: SEC. 386. Requisites for Creation. (a) A barangay may be created out of a contiguous territory which has a population of at least two thousand (2,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office except in cities and municipalities within Metro Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities where such territory shall have a certified population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the minimum requirement prescribed herein.

To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous cultural communities, barangays may be created in such communities by an Act of Congress, notwithstanding the above requirement. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for barangays, based on the criteria prescribed in this Section, within his territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted to the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned for appropriate action. In the case of municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area and other metropolitan political subdivisions, the barangay consolidation plan can be prepared and approved by the sangguniang bayan concerned. LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 14. Barangays. (a) Creation of barangays by the sangguniang panlalawigan shall require prior recommendation of the sangguniang bayan. (b) New barangays in the municipalities within MMA shall be created only by Act of Congress, subject to the limitations and requirements prescribed in this Article. (c) Notwithstanding the population requirement, a barangay may be created in the indigenous cultural communities by Act of Congress upon recommendation of the LGU or LGUs where the cultural community is located. (d) A barangay shall not be created unless the following requisites are present: (1) Population which shall not be less than two thousand (2,000) inhabitants, except in municipalities and cities within MMA and other metropolitan political subdivisions as may be created by law, or in highly-urbanized cities where such territory shall have a population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO. The creation of a barangay shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the prescribed minimum/ (2) Land Area which must be contiguous, unless comprised by two (2) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a barangay sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Municipality: LGC: SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the provincial treasurer, or at least Two million five hundred thousand pesos (P2,500,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on the 1991 constant prices; a population of at least twenty-five thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office; and a contiguous territory of at least fifty (50) square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population or income of the original municipality or municipalities at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund of the municipality concerned, exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-recurring income. (d) Municipalities existing as of the date of effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered regular municipalities. LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 13. Municipalities. (a) Requisites for Creation A municipality shall not be created unless the following requisites are present: (i) Income An average annual income of not less than Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the provincial treasurer. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; (ii) Population which shall not be less than twenty five thousand (25,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO; and (iii) Land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty (50) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the proposed municipality is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a municipality sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The creation of a new municipality shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners. City: LGC: SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisities: (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or, (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities. (a) Requisites for creation A city shall not be created unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are present: (1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average

annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; and (2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners. Provinces: LGC: SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 prices and either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or, (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9. Provinces. (a) Requisites for creation A province shall not be created unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are present: (1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and non-recurring income; and (2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The creation of a new province shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for. But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of Representatives, particularly the chairpersons of their respective Committees on Local Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight Committee of the exemption from the land area requirement with respect to the creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or more islands was intended by Congress, but unfortunately not expressly stated in Section 461 of the LGC, and this intent was echoed through an express provision in the LGC-IRR. To be sure, the Oversight Committee did not just arbitrarily and whimsically insert such an exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGCIRR. The Oversight Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with all the concerned sectors of society and considered the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the LGC when the IRR 33 was formulated. Undoubtedly, this amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and 34 respect from this Court, but to legislative construction as well, especially with the inclusion of representatives from the four leagues of local government units as members of the Oversight Committee.With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative construction of the LGC, the many details to implement the LGC had already been put in place, which Congress understood to be impractical and not too urgent to immediately translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land area requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355. C. PROCEDURE: A. IN CREATION OF LGU ARTICLE 9. Provinces. (a) Requisites for creation A province shall not be created unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are present:

(1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; and (2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The creation of a new province shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners. (b) Procedure for creation (1) Petition Interested municipalities or component shall submit the petition, in the form of a resolution, of their respective sanggunians requesting the creation of a new city to the Congress, and furnish copies thereof to the sangguniang panlalawigan of the original province or provinces. (2) Comments on petition The sangguniang panlalawigan of the original province or provinces shall submit to the Congress its comments and recommendations on the petition for creation of the proposed province. (3) Documents to support petition The following documents shall be attached to the petition for creation: (i) Certification by DOF that the average annual income of the proposed province meets the minimum income requirement and that its creation will not reduce the income based on 1991 constant prices, of the original LGU or LGUs to less than the prescribed minimum; (ii) Certification by the NSO as to population of the proposed province and that its creation will not reduce the population of the original LGUs to less than the prescribed minimum; (iii) Certification by LMB that the land area of the proposed province meets the minimum land area requirement and that its creation will not reduce the land area of the original LGU or LGUs to less than the prescribed minimum; (iv) Map of the original LGU or LGUs, indicating the areas to be created into a province. The map shall be prepared by the provincial, city, or district engineer and shall clearly indicate the road network within the proposed province; and (v) Such other information that the petitioners may deem relevant for consideration in the petition. All costs incurred in the production of the required documents shall be borne by the petitioning LGUs. (4) Plebiscite (i) Upon the effectivity of the law creating a province, the COMELEC shall conduct a plebiscite in the LGU or LGUs directly affected within one hundred twenty (120) days or within the period specified in the law. (ii) The COMELEC shall conduct an intensive information campaign in the LGUs concerned at least twenty (20) days prior to the plebiscite. For this purpose, the COMELEC may seek the assistance of national and local government officials, mass media, NGOs, and other interested parties. (c) Beginning of corporate existence When a province is created, its corporate existence shall commence upon the election and qualification of its governor and a majority of the members of its sanggunian unless some other time is fixed therefor by the law creating it. ARTICLE 10. Status of Existing Subprovinces. (a) The existing subprovinces of Biliran in the province of Leyte, and Guimaras in the province of Iloilo, shall automatically be converted into regular provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the said subprovince and the original provinces directly affected which shall be conducted by the COMELEC simultaneously with the national elections on May 11, 1992. (b) The new legislative districts created as a result of such conversion shall continue to be represented in the Congress by the duly elected representatives of the original districts out of which the new provinces or districts were created until their own representatives shall have been elected in the next regular congressional elections and have qualified. (c) The incumbent elective officials of the subprovinces converted into regular provinces shall continue to hold office until June 30, 1992. Any vacancy occurring in the offices occupied by said incumbents, or resulting from expiration of their terms of office in case of a negative vote in the plebiscite results, shall be filled by appointment by the President. cdt (d) The appointees shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected in the regular local elections following the plebiscite and have qualified. (e) After effectivity of such conversion, the President shall appoint the governor, vice governor and other members of the sangguniang panlalawigan if none has yet been appointed, all of whom shall likewise hold office until their successors shall have been elected in the next regular local elections and have qualified. (f) All qualified appointive officials and employees in the career service of the subprovinces at the time of their conversion into regular provinces shall continue in office in accordance with civil service law, rules and regulations. ARTICLE 11. Cities. (a) Requisites for creation A city shall not be created unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are present: (1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; and (2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.

(b) Procedure for creation (1) Petition Interested municipalities or barangays shall submit the petition, in the form of a resolution, of their respective sanggunians requesting the creation of a new city to the Congress, and furnish copies thereof to the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod of the LGUs concerned. (2) Comments on petition The sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod shall submit to the Congress its comments and recommendations on the petition for creation of the city. (3) Documents to support petition The following documents shall be attached to the petition for creation: (i) Certification by DOF that the average annual income of the proposed city meets the minimum income requirement and that its creation will not reduce the income based on 1991 constant prices, of the original LGU or LGUs to less than the prescribed minimum; (ii) Certification by NSO as to population of the proposed city and that its creation will not reduce the population of the original LGUs to less than the prescribed minimum; (iii) Certification by LMB that the land area of the proposed city meets the minimum land area requirement and that its creation will not reduce the land area of the original LGU or LGUs to less than the prescribed minimum; (iv) Map of the original LGU or LGUs, indicating the areas to be created into a city. The map shall be prepared by the provincial, city, or district engineer as the case may be and shall clearly indicate the road network within the proposed city; (v) Certification by LMB that disposable and alienable public lands are available in the area to be created into a city sufficient to meet its growing population and the following purposes: Government center site of not less than ten thousand (10,000) square meters which shall include the city hall site and those of other government buildings; Market site of not less than ten thousand (10,000) square meters, located out of view of the city hall, schools, plaza, and cemetery and near but not along a provincial road, railroad station, navigable river, or sea; Plaza or park of not less than ten thousand (10,000) square meters located preferably in front of the city hall; School site of not less than ten thousand (10,000) square meters, in well-drained location that conforms with the requirements prescribed by public school authorities; and Cemetery site of not less than five thousand (5,000) square meters for every ten thousand (10,000) population which conforms with the requirements prescribed by the health authorities; (vi) Number and nature of existing and commercial establishments in the territory of the proposed city as certified by NSO; (vii) Sources of potable water supply for the inhabitants as certified by the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWEI) or the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), as the case may be; (viii) Facilities, plans, and site for sewerage, garbage and waste disposal as certified by the local engineer; and (ix) Such other information that the petitioners may deem relevant for consideration in the petition. cda All costs incurred in the production of the required documents shall be borne by the petitioning LGUs. (4) Plebiscite (i) Upon the effectivity of the law creating a city, the COMELEC shall conduct a plebiscite in the LGUs directly affected within one hundred twenty (120) days or within the period specified in the law. (ii) The COMELEC shall conduct an intensive information campaign in the LGUs concerned at least twenty (20) days prior to the plebiscite. For this purpose, the COMELEC may seek the assistance of national and local government officials, mass media, NGOs, and other interested parties. (c) Beginning of corporate existence. When a city is created, its corporate existence shall commence upon the election and qualification of its mayor and a majority of the members of its sanggunian, unless some other time is fixed therefor by the law creating it. ARTICLE 13. Municipalities. (a) Requisites for Creation A municipality shall not be created unless the following requisites are present: (i) Income An average annual income of not less than Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the provincial treasurer. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; (ii) Population which shall not be less than twenty five thousand (25,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO; and (iii) Land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty (50) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the proposed municipality is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a municipality sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The creation if a new municipality shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners. (b) Procedure for creation (1) Petition Interested barangays shall submit the petition, in the form of a resolution, of their respective sanggunians requesting the creation of a new municipality to the Congress, and furnish copies thereof to the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan of the LGUs concerned. (2) Comments on petition The sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, together with the sangguniang panlalawigan, shall submit to the Congress its comments and recommendations on the petition for creation of the municipality. (3) Documents to support petition The following documents shall be attached to the petition for creation: (i) Certification by the provincial treasurer, in the case of municipalities and component cities, and the city treasurer, in the case of highly-urbanized cities, that the average annual income of the proposed municipality meets the minimum income requirement and that its creation will not reduce the income, based on 1991 constant prices, of the original LGU or LGUs to less than the prescribed minimum; (ii) Certification by NSO as to population of the proposed municipality and that its creation will not reduce the population of the original LGU or LGUs to less than the prescribed minimum;

(iii) Certification by the LMB that the land area of the proposed municipality meets the minimum land area requirement and that its creation will not reduce the land area of the original LGU or LGUs to less than the prescribed minimum; (iv) Map of the original LGU or LGUs, indicating the areas to be created into a municipality. The map shall be prepared by the provincial, city, or district engineer as the case may be and shall clearly indicate the road network within the proposed city; acd (v) Certification by LMB that disposable and alienable public lands are available in the area to be created into a municipality sufficient to meet its growing population and the following purposes: Government center site of not less than five thousand (5,000) square meters which shall include the municipal hall site and those of other government buildings; Market site of not less than five thousand (5,000) square meters, located out of view of the municipal hall, schools, plaza, and cemetery and near but not along a provincial road, railroad station, navigable river, or sea; Plaza or park of not less than five thousand (5,000) square meters located preferably in front of the municipal hall; School site of not less than five thousand (5,000) square meters, in well-drained location that conforms with the requirements prescribed by public school authorities; and Cemetery site of not less than five thousand (5,000) square meters for every ten thousand (10,000) population which conforms with the requirements prescribed by health authorities. (vi) Number and nature of existing industrial and commercial establishments in the territory of the proposed municipality as certified by NSO; (vii) Sources of potable water supply for the inhabitants as certified by LWUA or MWSS, as the case may be; (viii) Facilities, plans, and site for sewerage, garbage and waste disposal as certified by the local engineer; and (ix) Such other information that the petitioners may deem relevant for consideration in the petition. All costs incurred in the production of the required documents shall be borne by the petitioning LGUs. (4) Plebiscite (i) Upon the effectivity of the law creating a municipality, the COMELEC shall conduct a plebiscite in the LGUs directly affected within one hundred twenty (120) days or within the period specified in the law. (ii) The COMELEC shall conduct an intensive information campaign in the LGUs concerned at least twenty (20) days prior to the plebiscite. For this purpose, the COMELEC may seek the assistance of national and local government officials, mass media, NGOS, and other interested parties. (c) Beginning of corporate existence. When a municipality is created, its corporate existence shall commence upon the election and qualification of its mayor and a majority of the members of its sanggunian, unless some other time is fixed therefor by the law creating it. ARTICLE 14. Barangays. (a) Creation of barangays by the sangguniang panlalawigan shall require prior recommendation of the sangguniang bayan. (b) New barangays in the municipalities within MMA shall be created only by Act of Congress, subject to the limitations and requirements prescribed in this Article. (c) Notwithstanding the population requirement, a barangay may be created in the indigenous cultural communities by Act of Congress upon recommendation of the LGU or LGUs where the cultural community is located. (d) A barangay shall not be created unless the following requisites are present: (1) Population which shall not be less than two thousand (2,000) inhabitants, except in municipalities and cities within MMA and other metropolitan political subdivisions as may be created by law, or in highly-urbanized cities where such territory shall have a population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO. The creation of a barangay shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the prescribed minimum. (2) Land area which must be contiguous, unless comprised by two (2) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a barangay sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners. (e) Procedure for creation (1) Petition A written petition of a majority of the registered voters residing in the area sought to be created or resolutions of the sangguniang barangays desiring to be merged, as the case may be, shall be presented to the sangguniang panlalawigan, upon recommendation of the sangguniang bayan concerned, or to the sangguniang panlungsod, for appropriate action. In the case of municipalities within MMA, a similar petition or resolution shall be presented to the Congress, upon recommendation of the sangguniang bayan concerned. (2) Documents to support petition In addition to the petition or resolution, the following shall be submitted: (i) Certification by NSO as to the population of the proposed barangay and that its creation will not reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the prescribed minimum. (ii) Map of the original barangay or barangays indicating the areas to be created into a new barangay and technical description certified by LMB or city or municipal assessor, as the case may be. All costs incurred in the production of the required documents shall be borne by the petitioning LGUs. (3) Comments on petition The presiding officer of the sangguniang bayan shall require the sangguniang barangay of the original barangay or barangays to submit their comments on the proposed creation within twenty (20) days after receipt of said petition or resolution which shall serve as basis for recommending appropriate action thereon to the sangguniang panlalawigan. (4) Action on petition The sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod shall, within fifteen (15) days from submission of the petition and other required supporting documents, take action granting or denying the petition. (i) The ordinance granting the petition creating a new barangay shall be approved by two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod. cda The ordinance shall properly identify by metes and bounds or by natural boundaries, the territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay. The ordinance shall likewise fix the date of the plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC in the area or areas directly affected to ratify the creation of the new barangay.

(ii) A denial shall be in the form of a resolution stating clearly the facts and reasons for such denial. (5) Submission of ordinance to the COMELEC Within thirty (30) days before the plebiscite, the secretary to the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod shall furnish the COMELEC with a signed official copy of the ordinance creating the barangay. (6) Conduct of information campaign The COMELEC shall conduct an intensive information campaign in the LGUs concerned at least ten (10) days prior to the plebiscite. For this purpose, the COMELEC may seek the assistance of national and local government officials, mass media, NGOs, and other interested parties. (7) Submission of plebiscite results At least seven (7) days after the conduct of the plebiscite, the city or municipality concerned shall submit the Certificates of Canvass of Votes Cast, Statement of Affirmative and Negative Votes, Abstentions Cast in every voting center as well as the provincial or city ordinance creating the barangay to the COMELEC and DILG central office for inclusion in the Official Masterlist of Barangays. (f) Beginning of corporate existence When a barangay is created, its corporate existence shall commence upon the election and qualification of its punong barangay and a majority of the members of its sanggunian unless some other time is fixed therefor by the law or ordinance creating it. (g) Financial requirement The financial requirements of the barangays created by LGUs after the effectivity of the Code shall be the responsibility of the LGU concerned. (h) Consolidation plan of barangays Based on the criteria prescribed in this Article, the governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for barangays within his territorial jurisdiction. The said plan shall be submitted to the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod for appropriate action. In the case of municipalities within MMA and other metropolitan political subdivisions as may be created by law, the barangay consolidation plan shall be prepared and approved by the sangguniang bayan concerned. ONVERSION OF A COMPONENT CITY INTO A HIGHLY-URBANIZED CITY. ARTICLE 12. Conversion of a Component City Into a Highly-Urbanized City. (a) Requisites for conversion A component city shall not be converted into a highly-urbanized city unless the following requisites are present: (1) Income latest annual income of not less than Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer. The annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income; and (2) Population which shall not be less than two hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO. (b) Procedure for conversion (1) Resolution The interested component city shall submit to the Office of the President a resolution of its sanggunian adopted by a majority of all its members in a meeting duly called for the purpose, and approved and endorsed by the city mayor. Said resolution shall be accompanied by certifications as to income and population. (2) Declaration of conversion Within thirty (30) days from receipt of such resolution, the President shall, after verifying that the income and population requirements have been met, declare the component city as highlyurbanized. (3) Plebiscite Within one hundred twenty (120) days from the declaration of the President or as specified in the declaration, the COMELEC shall conduct a plebiscite in the city proposed to be converted. Such plebiscite shall be preceded by a comprehensive information campaign to be conducted by the Comelec with the assistance of national and local government officials, media, NGOs, and other interested parties. (c) Effect of Conversion The conversion of a component city into a highly-urbanized city shall make it independent of the province where it is geographically located. 2. Division and Merger A: requirements: same as creation and conversion B: Conditions and Limitations Sec. 8, LGC of 1991 Section 8. Division and Merger. - Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current classification prior to such division. The income classification of local government units shall be updated within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Code to reflect the changes in their financial position resulting from the increased revenues as provided herein. 3. Substantial Alteration of Boundaries Requirements Secs. 6, 10, LGC of 1991 Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code. Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. - No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date. 4. Abolition a: Grounds and Conditions Sec. 9 LGC of 1991 Section 9. Abolition of Local Government Units. - A local government unit may be abolished when its income, population, or land area has been irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed for its creation under Book III of this Code, as certified by the national agencies mentioned in Section 7 hereof to Congress or to the sangguniang concerned, as the case may be. The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the province, city, municipality, or barangay with which the local government unit sought to be abolished will be incorporated or merged.