[music] Paris Dennard: [0:17] Good evening. First of all, thank you all for coming.

My n ame is Paris Dennard. I am the Events Director here at the McCain Institute. Thi s is our first debate here in Phoenix, so we're very excited to have all of you here. [applause] Paris: [0:31] Yes, thank you. Thank you. Before we begin, let me remind you this is going to be live streamed online. So I want all of you to, if you have a sma rtphone or some type of device, put it on silent or vibrate. However, don't turn it off, because I want you to use it throughout the entirety of tonight's debat e. [0:51] If you have not liked us on Facebook, if you're not following us on Insta gram, if you're not following us on Twitter, Google+, our YouTube page, please d o so. You can find us, very simply, at "McCainInstitute." [1:06] And so, throughout tonight's debate, please be sure to utilize all of the hashtags of MIDebatesDrones as you begin. So, without further ado, I'd like to bring up to the podium our Executive Director of the McCain Institute, Ambassado r Kurt Volker. Thank you. [applause] Ambassador Kurt Volker: [1:28] Thank you very much. And let me let our debaters, uh, take their seats here, in the room. And, uh, Aaron, if you just want to tak e a chair over there, that would be great. [1:40] And, uh, welcome. Uh, welcome to this evening's debate concerning the use of lethal drone strikes. Right at the outset, I want to say thank you to the Wa lter Cronkite School of Journalism and to the Phoenix Committee on Foreign Relat ions for joining us in putting this, uh, debate together here, in Phoenix, first time that we have the opportunity as McCain Institute to do that here. [2:02] Um, as I was introduced, my name is Kurt Volker. I have the good fortune to be the Executive Director of the McCain Institute for International Leadershi p, which is a part of Arizona State University, and we have a presence both in W ashington, DC and here, in Tempe, Arizona. [2:19] Our mission is to advance character-driven leadership at home and around the world, contribute to humanitarian action, and to make better designs for bet ter decisions in national and international policy, and you can find us at mccai ninstitute.org. [2:35] Tonight's debate is part of a series of structured, timed debates on some of the most difficult foreign policy issues facing our nation. We've had previo us debates on Syria, on Afghanistan, on Iran, on the defense budget, and tonight we'll be looking at the issue of lethal drone strikes. Uh, through our debate s eries, we aim to illuminate the key challenges that our country has to deal with . [3:03] We aim scrupulously to avoid partisanship and to get deeply into the diff icult decisions that our leaders and our decision makers need to make. [3:14] Before kicking off the debate this evening, I want to introduce Paul John son from the Phoenix Committee on Foreign Relations for him to say a few words o f welcome as well. Paul Johnson: [3:25] Thank you, Ambassador. My name is Paul Johnson, I'm the Pre sident of the Phoenix Committee on Foreign Relations. We're an Arizona-based mem bership organization that attempts to educate our leaders here in Arizona and ou r members about foreign policy issues and we're thrilled to be one of the co-spo

nsors of this first McCain Institute debate that takes place here in Arizona on such a fascinating topic. [3:48] I got a little bit of a preview of some of the things that are going to b e talked about, uh, this evening, and it really is going to be fascinating. So o ur thanks go out to uh Senator and Mrs. McCain, Ambassador Volker, and Claire Me rkel for including the Phoenix Committee on Foreign Relations in this, and we lo ok forward to a vigorous and interesting debate. Thank you. [applause] Ambassador Volker: [4:12] Thank you Paul, and if I could now I'd like to introdu ce the man whose family uh has given the name to this institute and whose tradit ion of character-driven leadership and service to our nation has inspired everyt hing that we seek to do. Senator McCain. [applause] Senator John McCain: [4:30] Thank you very much, thank you all for being here. A nd I especially want to thank uh, the individuals on this panel. Um, they're hig hly qualified, they're informed, and the debate and discussion that you are abou t to observe is exactly what's going to happen on the floor of the United States Senate and in the House of Representatives. This is an issue that needs to be d ecided by the President and the Congress, and it's a serious one. [5:01] And that is, it's got a lot to do with how the United States uses its pow er and under what circumstances. And so I'm, I'm really looking forward to our p articipants and I must also tell you that there's a subset, by the way, of this, and I don't know if we're going to have time to talk about it, but there's a hu ge bureaucratic fight going on right now in Washington as to whether drones are controlled by the CIA, or by the Department of Defense, and it's been fascinatin g to watch them try to slit each other's throats, so... [laughter] Senator McCain: [5:35] Ah, I really want to thank our, our panel for being here. And believe me, this debate is something that needs to be held all over America , but particularly in the halls of Congress working with the President of the Un ited States because it is of the utmost seriousness, except for those of you tha t think that Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are going away. [6:02] This issue and this challenge is going to be with us for a long time. I t hank all of you for being here, I had a 45-minute uh prepared remarks on the Nor th Korean nuclear buildup. I will save that for the next time we are together. [ laughter] Senator McCain: [6:15] Thank you. [applause] Ambassador Volker: [6:22] Thank you Senator, and I want to mention as well we ar e thrilled not only to have Senator McCain but Mrs. Cindy McCain as well, and I also see... [applause] Ambassador Volker: [6:34] ...I also see one of our member of the board of truste es, Miss Sharon Harper, and I know another is due to join us, or I see him now, Jeff Cunningham, if there's any others I missed, I apologize. And, uh, let's get rolling here. [6:46] Um, tonight's debate is going to focus on the issue of lethal drone strik es. Are they an effective tool in fighting terrorists? People have already taken so many American lives, or are they creating more terrorists? Can we be sure we 're killing only those people who are true terrorist combatants? [7:04] Or are we relying too heavily on loose intelligence and hitting too many innocents in the process? And what will be our view of other powers such as Russ ia, or China, or Iran, start using their own lethal drone strikes against their own perceived terrorists? And what does this say about us a nation, if we're a c

ountry with a permanent hit list administered by the President himself. We have four distinguished debaters here tonight. [7:30] A former colleague who is Ambassador to Pakistan, another who is a lieute nant general overseeing drone operations, law professors from Arizona State Univ ersity and Pepperdine University who are expert in this issue of drone strikes. This is meant to be a structured and timed debate in order to give fair and equa l hearing to all points of view, but we do want it to be lively, and dynamic, an d interactive. [7:52] You will have an opportunity to ask questions, and uh, I encourage you to do so and also to really put it as a question and uh let our debaters express t he arguments, ah, as they are set to do. [8:06] As Paris has said, phones on silent, but do tweet. Hashtag #MI, McCain In stitute, hashtag #MIDebateDrones. After the opening of the debate, as I said, th ere will be questions, and uh, right now let me take the ah, opportunity to intr oduce our distinguished moderator, a professor here at Arizona State's Walter Cr onkite School of Journalism and a broadcast journalist himself, Aaron Brown. Tha nk you. [applause] Aaron Brown: [8:43] Thank you. That's great. Senator McCain, it is, uh, it's won derful to see you. Uh, I will say that Senator McCain was a frequent and perfect guest on the show I anchored. He was interesting always and available almost al ways, and that's what we care about. It's nice to see you. [9:05] I was thinking today about all of this and I thought um, of welcoming you to the Cronkite School, how pleased Walter would be at a night like this. [9:16] A thoughtful, civil, and important conversation about an issue facing all of us as Americans, it's the kind of conversation Walter would relish being a p art of, and I like to think that he is somewhere in the larger audience uh liste ning to our work today. [9:36] Um, let me, let me give a brief, um, I'm going to cut down the introducti on a little bit to um, our panel. [9:48] Um, this is a, Senator McCain alluded to, and I'm sure all of you underst and, this is a hugely complicated question that defies the kind of simple black and white answers that our politics often present to us and we will not present it in kind of simple black and white terms. It's just not that sort of thing. [10:09] Gregory McNeal is a professor of public policy at Pepperdine University focusing on some of the very issues that bring us here tonight. The intersection of law, security, and emerging technologies. His work includes, ah, helping the Army train soldiers to prevent harm to civilians, as well as the legal work on military tribunals at Guantanamo. [10:30] His partner in this discussion is Major General James Marks. Spider Mark s, General Marks, is a West Point grad, and in 30 years of service has just abou t held, had just about held, every leadership position imaginable and he was gre at to meet tonight. [10:47] The other side of the question, um, will be presented by Ambassador Came ron Munter, who, eh, is now on the faculty of Pomona, in Claremont, California, but had what is perhaps the hardest foreign policy job in the American Governmen t. He was the Ambassador to Pakistan. [11:05] And Daniel Rothenberg is a Professor of Politics of Global Studies, here at ASU, and is currently co-editing a book on drone politics with my old friend

, and CNN colleague, Peter Bergen, called, "Drone Wars." [11:18] It is nice to have all of you here, and let's go to work. [11:23] Ambassador and Professor Rothenberg, let's begin with you and you guys c an divide your five minutes up as you please. [11:32] You're not going to make the case that we shouldn't ever use drones. You 're going to make the case, what...? Cameron Munter: [11:41] Very good. Well, I'll begin. My name's Cameron Munter. I had the good fortune, or bad fortune, as the case may be, to be Ambassador to P akistan between 2010 and 2012, during a time of a number of drone strikes. [11:53] They took place doing strikes of different types that were very controve rsial. I'd like to make a few points in that brief two and a half minutes that I 've been given. [12:01] One is that, drones are, ah, ah, a weapon that can be, if used properly, a very humane weapon. A very precise weapon. A weapon that can do things that o ther weapons cannot. [12:12] And there are people in Pakistan, especially those people in the tribal areas, who uh, newspapermen have found out, actually support the idea of the dro nes. Because they, uh, have less collateral damage than say, traditional weapons . [12:26] Nonetheless, if you're going to use a weapon this, and if you're going t o talk about the complex legal, ethical, policy issues that we have to do, deal with today, we must not lose site of the fact that we need a strategy. A long-te rm goal, within in which, the drones must function. [12:42] One of the problems we had in Pakistan, when I was there was that we see med to have as our goal, to eliminate Al Qaeda. And I would argue to you, as I a rgued then, eliminating Al Qaeda is not a goal. It is a means to an end. [12:56] The goal is the protection of the United States and its allies. Preventi ng a catastrophic attack on the United States. Working hard to make sure that we have a long and sustainable strategic, uh, power, especially in that part of th e world. [13:11] When we began to see the elimination of Al Qaeda as a goal, we began to eh, uh, eliminate other elements in the policy. We began to use the drones, in m y opinion, indiscriminately. And the indiscriminate use of drones can be very, v ery, difficult. [13:27] Because what it did, among other things, was that it caused a public, ah , ah, ah, outrage against drones, and made our long term goal of having security and stability in that region, more difficult. [13:41] Using those, using drones as long-term artillery to help our soldiers in Afghanistan makes perfect sense, if the idea is forced protection. But for thos e people who are worried about a broader question, it's very dangerous to start thinking that way. [13:58] I would argue, as I did at that time, that our main goal is to figure ou t in this region, politically, what is the great prize? Is it Afghanistan with 2 5 million people? Or is it Pakistan with 200 million people and 100 nuclear weap ons?

[14:13] Which country do you want to get right? Now, this is a tough kind of que stion, because no military commander wants to do anything that would not allow h im or her, to protect his or her soldiers. [14:24] But using drones across the border in the way that we did, using them in what so-called, "signature" strikes, was a difficult and, I believe sometimes e rroneous decision. We have to have the debate about what this particular weapon is for. In which ways is it legal? But, in which ways is it effective? [14:42] The final point that I want to make in the brief time, I'm co, coming up to the, the end here, is that we have, uh, decided that we must, uh, maintain s ecrecy under in the way the uh, the, uh, drone strikes are used in Pakistan, for example. [14:57] That had prevented me, as an Ambassador, from being able to reach out bo th to the American and to the Pakistani public, to give an assessment to the peo ple of these two countries about what the effectiveness of drones was. [15:11] Again, there are legal considerations. There are reasons why this, this program is secret. There's reasons why different, different, uh, different argum ents are made. [15:20] But, my point was, if you're going to have a public debate, if you're go ing to bring the publics on your side, you have to figure out a way to talk hone stly about drones in a way that's not limited. [15:29] I'll turn it over to my colleague. Daniel Rothenberg: [15:32] Um, thank you all for coming here tonight. Thank you very much for the, to the McCain's, the McCain's too. Um, what I want to talk ab out is a broader picture of some of the problems that drones bring up. [15:42] Uh, hopefully, we'll be able to touch on the various issues that make dr ones specific. Drones are actually tra, uh, first signaled of the transformation of warfare in a series of ways that have pretty profound implications. [15:54] But, stepping back for a second, I teach law students, graduate students and undergrads, and they fall into the range, age range of somewhere between 18 , and say, 30, generally. [16:03] And I commonly begin classes...I teach classes like, International Right s Law. I commonly begin the classes by saying, asking them how they feel about b eing members of a war generation. [16:14] Um, my classes do not typically look like this audience, [laughs] in fac t. I say that because, the standard response I get is this sort of surprise. The y've never thought of themselves as part of a war generation. [16:27] Even though they've come of age at a time, at a time when their country' s been at war. In fact, they've become a political consciousness and paid attent ion to the news during a period when the country has been, been, involved in a s eries of complex, costly, ah, dangerous wars. [16:42] I don't think that the same response we would find among students, if we were in the World War II generation, or for that matter, the Vietnam generation . And this isn't about drones per se, but it's about one of the core implication s of expanding drones. [16:56] Which is one of the main things that drones allow, is a significantly re duced domestic cost for engaging in warfare. Uh, because drones don't put at ris

k any US personnel, it's substantially less costly for a drone operation to go b ad. [17:13] Or, for that matter, for a drone operation to, to, be launched. And as d rones become increasingly more ubiquitous, we will see more, potentially more an d more of these operations. [17:21] And it requires us to reflect on what sort of war we want. As a society, what sort of war are we...What kind of war making do we want to be a part of? A nd very briefly, our society is...Oh, OK. We'll catch up with the...point Senator McCain: [17:33] OK. [laughs] I want you, I want you to come sit on the f loor, so they can't miss you. OK? So, we know exactly how much time we've got. Man 1: [17:45] This is our time. But we had a clock, and as luck would have it, um... Senator McCain: [17:50] I'm just trying not to take too much of your time, so [i ndecipherable 0:17:48] Aaron: [17:53] Good. We're ten minutes behind. Um. [laughter] Aaron: [17:59] But it's a structured debate, so, kind of shaky. Um, you guys hav e five minutes to split as you wish. Take a little extra time, because I want to be fair to everybody. Uh, to make your case, and is the case you want to make, let me just ask it this way, that we're doing a difficult thing right? Is that? Make it. Daniel: [18:27] So let me talk a little bit about, about what we're doing, um, a nd process, and I think to have an informed debate about this, it's really very important for us to understand process. [18:36] And it's actually very hard to understand parts of the process because y ou have two agencies, uh, two government agencies involved in the use, lethal us e of drones. One being, the, the CIA, allegedly. And the other being the Departm ent of Defense. All of that stems from legal authority. [18:51] So I'm a law professor. I have one hammer. I'm going to hit on the law. Um, and so where does this legal authority come from? Uh, go all the way back to the September 11th attacks, shortly after the September 11th attacks Congress p asses an authorization for the use of military force that authorizes the Preside nt to use all necessary and appropriate force against those individuals he deems responsible for the September 11th attacks. [19:13] Think of that, as a small group, and then watch as it gets, as legislati on does, it gets worked through the courts, and the courts expand the authority, largely because of the Guantanamo litigation, to mean Al-Qaeda and associated f orces. And so, we have the authorization for the use of military force, a UMF, a uthorizes us to use force against Al-Qaeda and associated forces that has expand ed through judicial interpretations. [19:36] You get a little bit of support from Congress because Congress nually authorized through appropriations funding for both what the CIA what the Department of Defense does. Um, and so, with this, you give a uh, government agencies a mandate, and they go out and they act on it. ureaucrats start making lists of people to kill. has conti does and bunch of Um, and b

[19:56] And so who goes on those lists? You have really two categories of target s -- those targets that fall squarely within the authorization for the use of mi litary force, and then those targets that the President deems under his covert a

ction authority, it would be in the national security and foreign relations inte rest of the United States for us to engage. Those targets, the covert action tar gets, get struck by the CIA. Other targets get attacked by the Department of Def ense. Oftentimes the joint special operations come in. [20:23] And so, on this list, how do you identify who you're actually going to p ut on the list? We're actually pretty careful about creating the names of indivi duals who go on the list. We identify who they are. So there's an identification process. We vet them. What's their function? They're a senior bomb maker. They' re the most senior bomb maker. We look at what would be the impact of attacking them. They're no longer able to train people to make five bombs a month. Or, wha t's the impact of not attacking them? They'll continue to be able to train indiv iduals. They might even, uh, they might even grow with impunity and feel like th ey can continue to launch attacks. [20:55] There's also a validation question, all of which, by the way, this happe ns inside the bureaucracy. Could attacking this individual support the national objectives. Is the target operational? Are they still a member? Are there any po litical or cultural side effects? Is there an impact on host state public opinio n? This is the process that we follow for targeting. [21:14] There are fights inside of our government about whether or not particula r names should be on target lists. Um, it's not transparent to us that those fig hts are occurring. But it's actually occurring inside government. And ultimately , um, this is documented in electronic targeting folders, with records of approv als, changes in intelligence, collateral concerns. [21:34] If you're worried about the strikes that occur in Pakistan, and you're a member of Congress, for example, the only way that you can see the ETFs is if y ou're on House or Senate intelligence committee. [21:45] And the public, by the way, has no awareness of the existence of the str ikes, because of the, because uh, because it's denied, basically, as a matter of covert action. And I think this might be the one point of agreement for us wher e there really is an oversight challenge because of the two different agencies t hat are engaging in this. And I'm going to turn it over to my, my partner, Gener al Marks. General Marks: [22:02] Senator and Mrs. McCain, thank you very much. Aaron: [22:03] You've got a, got a couple of minutes, General. General Marks: [22:06] I'm sorry, Aaron. Aaron: [22:06] Couple of minutes. General Marks: [22:08] Got it. And Ambassador Volker, thank you as well. Um, I c ome at this from, essentially two perspectives. One, the technological perspecti ve, rather practical. And from the intelligence process, having been an intellig ence officer all my life. [22:23] Um, I grew up with unmanned aerial vehicles and with drones. As a battal ion commander over 25 years ago, I commanded drones. And I did that as a brigade commander, and I was, uh, as a senior intelligence officer, when we went to war in Iraq, I was responsible for all things Iraq, and among those many tasks, it was building the architecture so that we could move this video, these drone vide os, so that we could share situational awareness. [22:50] So I have a very practical and muddy boots and kind of broken-finger per spective. Um, the one thing I can state with absolute certainty is the technolog

y that has gone into our drones has gotten incredibly precise and better, and ev ery generation of our manufacturing and development has really been a light year development in terms of enhanced capabilities. So the, it's a very precise, and it's a very capable weapon system. [23:20] From the intelligence perspective, to your very point. We don't do a pre tty good job, or we're pretty careful about this. We're extremely careful about who populates these target lists. And it's based on collection, robust collectio n of intelligence, fusion of data, analysis of that data, distribution, shared p erspectives on different targets. And all governmental agencies that have an int elligence, uh, contribution, and all, and there are, there were originally sixte en of those, contribute and argue and debate about who populates that list and w ho, in fact, should be on that list and in what order. [23:57] So, from my perspective, it's a technological capability that we're not ever going to put this genie back into a bottle. It is capability [inaudible 0:2 4:06] capacity available to it, to us. But we have to be able to more, I think, precisely define how we're going to employ this weapon system. And we right now are at the very edge of a debate as the Senator indicated as to whether this is an agency type of activity or whether it's a DoD., Department of Defense activit y. Aaron: [24:27] All right. A lot, a lot, a lot has been said, and there's a lot t o digest. I want you, I want you each to take a couple of minutes. Let's, let's, let's do two minutes, OK? Two minutes each side, just react to what they have h eard, what you have heard. And that will kind of set the table for where we go f rom here. Everyone will have laid out, basically, their position. Man 2: [24:52] I only want to make one point. And that is, the concern that I tr ied to describe was the concern about the long term implications. I believe that we are very good at doing the technological acts, coming up with lists, getting caught into what the counter-terrorism center does. The efficiency is fine. But it does, in my opinion [inaudible 0:25:10] tend to the other side here, is that it falls into one of the classic problems of drone discussions, which is the as sumption is that everything related to how we should think and deal with drones assumes US dominance of the drone, of drone deployment. [25:26] So we know now, it's true that right now, there are only a handful of co untries that have used drones militarily, the United States, the UK, Israel. But over 80 countries have possession of drones, and it's inevitable that drones wi ll become ubiquitous in their military deployment, which means they'll be used t hroughout the world. [25:41] So what do we think? Step back a second. The overall argument here is to say that the targeting mechanism is above board. And, in a word, we can call th at the sort of just-trust-us argument. Maybe that's right. But we don't know, be cause it's secret. [25:54] What would you all think if when you opened up the newspaper, instead of seeing a wreck in, you know, a piece, a story about a drone attack in Yemen run by the CIA, what would you think if there was a drone attack run by the Chinese government targeting a Tibetan activist in Nepal or in Bolivia, or wherever, ou tside of a conflict zone, which was presented as a national security need with t he exact same arguments as are being presented here. How would that feel to you, and then multiply that by all the different drone possessing nations in the wor ld. What would that world look like? General Marks: [26:27] My immediate response would be, to, to the very point, wo uld be that we have to have an open dialogue, because the technology exists. Uh, military history is replete with examples of niche technologies that suddenly n

ow alter the form of warfare -- the crossbow to the longbow, just as an, and in fact how we employ those, are extremely important. We have to acknowledge that t he technology and the capability will proliferate. How do we bring that forward, and how do we discuss in a very, very open forum. That needs to take place. Aaron: [27:00] Can I, let me, I mean, let me ask a question on that, and let's j ust take a minute each, I guess, to toss it around. Because, um, I read this wee k about, uh, there's an air show, I think it was in Singapore. And the drones we re like the hot item. Everyone wanted to get, you know, everyone with $20 millio n, which eliminates a lot of people in this room, but everyone else with $20 mil lion wanted to buy a drone. [27:25] And, in fact, someday the Chinese will have a military drone if they don 't have one now, and maybe someday they'll attack someone in Tibet, and how is t hat different, honestly, than, in your mind, how we would feel if we woke up in the morning and found out that a Chinese fighter jet had, or bomber had dropped a bomb on a village in Tibet? Why is it, why is the drone different, why should we think about it differently, if in fact we should think about it differently? Man 2: [27:57] If, if in fact we think that the model that we are projecting is that we can go after people in places, in places where those people are in count ries with whom we're not at war. It propos...it poses a problem that ultimately is not going to be because of the drone technology, it's not going to be limited to us. Aaron: [28:16] It's not the technology, it's the rationale of using the technolo gy. Man 2: [28:19] Yes. Man 4: [28:20] Our underlying policy is that we are at war with Al-Qaeda and ass ociated forces, and it's a trans-national armed conflict that follows those comb atants wherever they go. And so, as a consequence of that, um, we have to recogn ize that other nation states may very well take that position. However, there is an argue...that would then just prompt a discussion about the underlying legiti macy of their arguments. [28:43] And so, um, non-violent Tibetan protesters being bombed by Chinese drone s or Chinese aircraft would subject the Chinese government to the types of criti cism that we would expect. [28:56] Whereas there's not a lot of reason to criticize the United States for t argeting members of Al-Qaeda who the United Nations has even declared, and all n ation states have signed onto believing that Al-Qaeda is a force that should be countered, sometimes with military force, or other times with law enforcement me ans. [29:13] And so it goes to the legitimacy of the underlying cause, and that's why I think it's a specious argument to sort of compare what we're doing to what wo uld we think if the Russians did it. If the Russians are indiscriminately bombin g civilians, it's very different than where we are purposely not trying to harm civilians. And we're purposely going after a legitimate enemy. Aaron: [29:32] I did cable TV, there's no such thing as a specious argument. OK? [laughter] Daniel: [29:37] So one of the sadder stories of Guantanamo that you may be aware of was the fact that several Uyghur, Uyghurs, Muslim minority in China, were pi cked up and held in detention even though it was clear to all of those in the US government that they were not posing any threat to the United States. Uh, their

status, it's an odd story, but, you know we don't have to invent false cases. [29:59] In fact, they were in a training camps, gaining armed insurgency skills to then go back and challenge the Chinese government. Now perhaps it wasn't a su bstantive challenge. But I don't think it's difficult at all to imagine that, uh , that if the justification for targeting individuals all over the world, outsid e of traditionally understood war zones, becomes a question of trusting states e valuation of the targeting process, uh you know, why wouldn't multiple states en gage in all sorts of actions? And if they were, they would certainly be able to say that their secret criteria were as valid as our secret criteria. Man 2: [30:35] But the idea that I shouldn't target Al Qaeda because the Chinese abuses its own people, to me, is the false argument. It doesn't present us with a real choice. Aaron: [30:46] Let me, let me... Man 1: [30:47] I don't think we're disagreeing. Last point on this is that the j udicious use of drones is something that none of us, I think, would disagree wit h. But the procedure that is secret, therefore not to be, uh, shared, and the in discriminate use that we, unfortunately, in my opinion, have engaged in, does le ave us open to criticism. [crosstalk] Aaron: [31:06] Let me, let me, let me do two, one thing and then ask a question here that will...If you all have questions, I, there are two microphones, one on each side of the room, and if you kind of wander that way we will, I promise yo u, get to them. I, I just would ask you graciously to ask questions as opposed t o make statements or, you know. Because otherwise, I have to be the bad guy and I just, this is enough. OK? [laughter] Aaron: [31:37] OK, so there's one there, one there. OK. I, I want to ask a coupl e things first that have come out of this that have jumped out at me. The word i ndiscriminately, Ambassador, you used the word indiscriminately, "We use these w eapons indiscriminately." Uh, General, do we use these weapons, in your view, in discriminately? General Marks: [32:00] Not at all. Not at all. Indiscriminate, not the connotati on, I think the definition would be very, very loose implementation of, of, of a capability. The process as described in terms of populating the target list is very, I would say dogmatic, it's very doctrinaire. We prescribe to some very hig h standards. [32:27] And because all of that data is, uh, classified in nature, albeit, there may be some open source or some unclassified data. But the product that is deri ved from that is classified, often to the very highest levels, it's, it's going to remain secret. The perception, then, is that when we use drones, the percepti on can be, and the Ambassador has indicated, with his spoke experience in Pakist an, nobody else can speak to that, is that there was an, uh, an element of indis criminate use. [33:01] I would argue that in order to simply, the decision to launch and employ a drone against a known target is any, is absolutely nothing close to indiscrim inate... [crosstalk] Aaron: [33:12] Right. Ambassador, when you used the word indiscriminate, honestl y, I got like a little goose bump thing happening here. Do you really mean indis criminate the way I use the word? Ambassador Munter: [33:20] You wanted this to be a good debate?

Aaron: [33:22] I want, uh, yeah, I do. [crosstalk] Ambassador Munter: [33:23] Let me be very... Aaron: [33:24] Sure. Ambassador Munter: [33:25] Let me be very straight with you about this and that was, and that's, let me correct that. When it is perceived as indiscriminate... Aaron: [33:32] We've got an issue. Ambassador Munter: [33:32] We've got an issue. And because of the use of what we called signature strikes where many of the criteria of which you spoke were les s clear and certainly because of the secrecy of the program, less open to debate or less open to public scrutiny. [33:49] We ran into a problem that we were perceived as being indiscriminate and that the political blowback was, indeed, something that undercut our overall go als in the region. [crosstalk] Aaron: [34:00] That's actually where I'd like to go next if I may. And that's a kind of, do we win the battle, lose the war kind of question here. There's a sto ry today that there was a drone attack in Yemen and that, uh, and that, uh, inno cent civilians died. Which may or may not be true. Ambassador Munter: [34:19] Right. Aaron: [34:20] It may or may not be true. There may have been innocents who, who died despite the, the, the perfection or, or, or, uh, improvements in the techn ology or maybe that's just what they say. But that's the story that's out there around the world today and we are saddled, as a country, with that story. [34:43] Did we win the battle or lose the war in trying to get people to be with us in this complicated long-term struggle? General? Professor? General Marks: [34:55] It's very, it's very difficult when, when you're in the U nited States people are going to take shots at you all the time. That's the fact of the matter. It's very, it's very difficult. The 12/12/13 strike in Yemen, um , those that were killed may or may not have all been members of Al Qaeda and/or affiliates. [35:13] The difficulty that, that the administration has to deal with right now is that if you release all the data as to who they were, that gets into a lot of classified sources and methods. That becomes problematic, and the nature of the use of the, of this weapon system. If all of these were civilians, we're probab ly not going to know that. So it's, frankly, it is a debate that's going to take place and there's no easy answer. [35:39] So we, we could have, in fact, won that very tactical engagement and los t some ground, that's the cost of our engagement. And in this particular posture , going after those targets. [crosstalk] Aaron: [35:50] Mr. Ambassador, Professor, is that what makes you nervous here, t hat we're winning lots of little battles and running the risk of losing some lar ger national security war? Ambassador Munter: [36:02] The point that I think we would agree on is that in t his case, because of the way the debate works on an event like what happened in Yemen, there is a gap in what we can speak about in public, to foreign publics w ith our elected representatives. And that does pose a big problem for our long-t

erm strategic goals. [36:24] I would argue that the debate about the debate that we're going into is what we have to, have to have, so that when we get involved in cases like this, the public is part, is aware and the foreign publics are aware of what we are tr ying to achieve. Because it is messy and it is difficult, but unless we have mor e of a debate in public, it is going to, increasingly, appear that we are achiev ing certain things and giving more away. Yes? Aaron: [36:56] Yeah, go ahead... [crosstalk] Aaron: [36:58] ...something stupid. Yeah, go ahead. Man 4: [37:00] You brought up the Yemen strike. The Yemen strike was a Joint Spe cial Operations Command strike, this was a military strike. It took place amidst a debate about whether we should transfer this authority from the CIA to the Do D. So you're seeing part of this debate is the bureaucratic in fire, DoD can't d o it as well as the CIA can. [37:22] And there's another contrast too, we've been talking a lot about Pakista n, but if you look how things are done in, in Afghanistan, ISAF is, our forces i n Afghanistan are transparent about civilian casualty incidents, when strikes ha ppen, and they have a semitransparent process. They don't give you the details, but they let you know that there is a process that's in place to investigate civ ilian casualties. [37:45] And when those civilian casualties occur there's a reparations process t hat's in place. That's what you get when you put it under DoD and you have Arms Services Committee oversight. When you put it under Title 50, the intelligence c ommunity, nobody's allowed to acknowledge that the strike existed, so you can't even have a public debate about it and talk about the things that we're talking about. [38:06] And that's a real big problem with the way that we've gone for it. It ma de sense, early on, that the drone was there, collecting the intelligence, "Hey, put a missile on it." It also made sense for deniability purposes in Pakistan s pecifically to not have boots on the ground. But as we look to the future, to a more sustainable policy, the CIA probably needs to get out of this business if w e want democratic accountability as a nation. Aaron: [38:31] And, and, I, I want to get some questions from the floor, but let me just ask you to consider something and we'll come back to it. Which is to mo st of your fellow citizens, whether it's the arm, it's the military or the CIA i s a distinction without difference. Bad guys get popped, the people who did 9/11 pay. [38:56] I mean, I, I hate reducing, and I don't really mean to be glib on this, something horribly complicated to something that pathetically simple. But I real ly believe that this is one of those gut issues to most of the country. And when we start talking Title 10, Title 50, Title this, Title that, I just want to kno w the people who killed 3,000 of my fellow New Yorkers pay. Sir. Skip Lend: [39:30] Am I up? Aaron: [39:31] Yeah. You're the sir I was, yeah. [crosstalk] Skip: [39:33] I'm Skip Lend, uh, Phoenix, Arizona. Uh, I think, to me, the real question is are we complying with all of our laws, ethics, morals, uh, that this country has. Uh, it's nice to comply with, with a congressional mandate to go o ff and attack anybody we want to that has an Al Qaeda nametag on. But, uh, launc

hing a weapon into a foreign country, the last time checked international law, w as an act of war. [40:01] Uh, have we gotten, uh, authorization from these foreign countries to la unch these attacks into these countries? I don't believe that's true. And my que stion is... [crosstalk] Aaron: [40:12] OK. Thank you. Skip: [40:13] ...are we complying with all of the laws? Aaron: [40:14] All right, the question is are we complying with the internationa l law here? Somebody, I thought we were. [crosstalk] General Munter: [40:25] Give it to the lawyers. [crosstalk] Aaron: [40:27] We've got like three lawyers here, someone's got to know this. [c rosstalk] General Munter: [40:30] So the international law arguments are, one is the contr oversial one is actually the one I advanced before, which is that the United Sta tes is involved in a borderless conflict that follows the enemy wherever it goes . But you don't have to go that far if you believe that Pakistan is involved in its own, internal arm conflict against individuals in the federally administered tribal areas, which they are. [40:50] They send troops in there all the time. They, they have fights on the gr ound. They send their air force in. And then the only leap that you need is has the Pakistani government invited us in to their internal arm conflict in which c ase we're a participant in what's known as a noninternational arm conflict. That would make it lawful. They publicly say, "We don't want you here." [41:10] And then in private, you can read the WikiLeaks, they said, "Please brin g on the drone strikes and we need you to hit the targets in the following areas ." [41:17] Yemen's an easier case. The Yemeni government has come out and said, "We want you here, continue doing it." [41:22] If you don't buy my argument on Pakistani airbases until 2011. A drone k, the bombs only go one direction. And that...Every Air Force cadet here knows the Pakistan case, we were flying out of takes off with bombs on it, it comes bac so you can figure out that everybody on that we know exactly what was happening.

[41:40] We were there with the consent of that government operating from their, uh, from their territory. And... [crosstalk] Man 3: [41:45] The short answer is yes. Man 4: [41:47] Yeah, it's lawful. [laughter] [crosstalk] Man 4: [41:50] Don't let lawyers talk. Man 2: [41:53] One of the core principles of the laws of war, it's part of what the US calls the Law of Arm Conflict and what the world calls [indecipherable 0: 41:58] law is distinction and distinction, in a word, is what allows military fo rces to legally kill an individual. So classically in, in the law of armed confl ict, soldiers in uniforms were surrounded by many of them and the purpose, the l egal reason, one reason, is so that you can be legally targeted, you can be dist inguished from civilian populations and in this situation of war, be targeted.

[42:22] So really briefly I'll try to...drones are changing the way, the nature of war, the innovations of drones is not that they deploy missiles. The innovati on is that they provide constant surveillance, live, permanently recorded survei llance that then gets collated with other data, human intelligence data, signals intelligence data. [42:41] And what's most interesting, as a kind of response to whether or not the se strikes are legal, is the signature strike idea. And in signature strikes, in dividuals are targeted, not based on existing understanding of distinction, they don't have uniforms, we don't actually know who they are, as in the case of the personality strike. So know who Mullah Omar is, you know who Osama Bin Laden is . [43:03] So there's a collation of data and the data gets brought together and de terminations are made, such serious determinations that people are categorized t o be killed. Now, just think, this is part of a transformation of the world wher e we're all data points and they can be collated together. [43:18] And think how nervous Americans are about the way in which their data po ints are recorded and the way that can be used. So just imagine, as all of this gets ever more sophisticated and the outcome of those data points is a signature strike that leads somebody to be killed and transforms the entire mechanism of distinction so that that becomes understood to be a way of targeting someone. [43:40] So we need debate and discussion and serious open, uh, clarification of how all this should operate, not just with US forces. Because, in fact, the laws of war are globally, they apply to all global militaries and we need to clarify this. Aaron: [43:57] That's just the simple... [crosstalk] Aaron: [44:00] Yes. Man 3: [44:01] The CIA doesn't comply with the rules of war. Aaron: [44:03] OK. Question mark. Uh, yes sir? Ryan: [44:11] Hi. I'm Ryan Stashrick, a student at Desert Vista High School down in Ahwatukee. [44:16] Professor Neil, you talked about how, exactly, we vet these people that are the targets of the strikes, and General Marks, you talked about how -- you r ebutted the word indiscriminate in strikes. But there have been numerous media o utlets, like Reuters, New York Times, Economist, et cetera, that have talked abo ut secondary strikes. As in, immediately upon after we launch a drone strike, a few hours or even up to half an hour after which we launch another strike. [44:43] I was wondering how exactly that process, how that process takes place a nd under what conditions we launch those strikes. Because oftentimes, there have been claims that they kill several first responders. Professor Gregory McNeal: [44:56] So, um, so... Aaron: [44:58] Go ahead. Professor McNeal: [44:59] So the first set of strikes, I think you accurately, u h, characterized my position. So then, uh, there's a second series of strikes th at, uh, the, the veterans in the room would be familiar with, circumstances wher e you're in direct fire combat with the enemy or, uh, time sensitive targets whe

re you would be calling in close air support. [45:16] And the examples you're talking about, about rescuers, you still have to comply with the law of armed conflict to ensure that the individual that you're targeting is a lawful target, you would just be operating that under a compress ed time, uh, uh, sequence. [45:29] So how might that happen. Um, I strike an enemy, I strike the leading en emy in a caravan. Um, and the three vehicles behind it, because I've had persist ent surveillance, I've been up on their phones, they're just coming from the rif le range, they're all in a convoy together. I very well might have enough pieces of data to put together that I don't know the names of those individuals, but I know that they're members of that armed group. [45:51] Just like if I go to Fort Bragg and I see a bunch of guys at the range, I don't have to read their name tape to know that they're probably in the 82nd A irborne Division and they're probably soldiers, that's why they're carrying rifl es and they're at the range. [46:01] My degree of certainty is lower on that type of strike, but the Law of A rmed Conflict doesn't require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it requires reaso nable certainty, the reasonable judgment of a commander in that circumstance. [46:12] And so in the circumstance as I described it to you, I don't think it wo uld be unreasonable to target those individuals. And, contrary to sort of popula r belief, first responders are not entitled to any special protections under the Law of Armed Conflict, if they're lawful targets. And so, that's the short way of answering the question. Aaron: [46:29] I'm sorry. [crosstalk] Professor McNeal: [46:29] Longer than the moderated one. Aaron: [46:31] Let me, let me...General, that sounds like a slippery slope we ju st got on, where we, we kind of, we change the rules a little bit, we relax the rules a little bit, is what I heard him say. We don't need the same level of spe cificity that we needed the first time, the second time. Am I...? General Marks: [46:51] That's, that's not what I heard. Aaron: [46:53] Well, he nodded yes, that's what he said. So I... Man 5: [46:55] Certainty. General Marks: [46:56] I'm nodding to say I understood your... [crosstalk] Aaron: [46:58] Oh, OK. [crosstalk] Man 5: [47:00] This is called acquiescence. The, there's a, there's a level of, of certainty and I think that's what you were talking about. Intelligence, the p roduction of intelligence, the collection of intelligence, the production of int elligence, it's distribution, doesn't revert back to zero. You know, the interse ction, uh, at all times. There is a foundation of intelligence upon which you bu ild. [47:21] So, fleeting targets and what we call targetable intelligence is extreme ly important because it could, in fact, that particular target could, in fact, d isappear, go away. You may lose the opportunity to strike. [47:35] So you've got a foundation of understanding that you've achieved. You go

from data to intelligence, to et cetera. You kind of go through this linear pro gression, it can take place very quickly, as Greg indicated, and very truncated time periods. You've got a level of certainty and it might not be the same level of certainty that you achieved upon the first strike. [47:55] But you've confirmed that that foundation of intelligence has not been a ltered, ergo you make a decision to go after some of those other targets. So is that a slippery slope? I think it's pretty solid ground. Woman 1: [48:08] Hello. This is Javeria Tarid. I'm from Pakistan. I'm a journali st. And, uh, a lot more discussion is going on related to Pakistan. [48:16] My question is, Mr. Cameron and Mr. Daniel, we all know, and you agreed that the drone technology is very important to kill the militant like Taliban. [48:25] So are we willing to accept that the innocent people have to die to brin g peace or is this acceptable that the innocent have to die in order to bring pe ace and how would we promote human rights in this scenario? [48:39] I just want to ask you this question and one more. Regarding the trial o f the Musharraf, do you think it will impact the relationship of US and Pakistan and the situation with Nawaz Sharif garment? Thank you so much. General Munter: [48:53] Let me take this on. First of all, I think the second qu estion is not really germane to what we're talking about today, so I'll pass on that. But the first one is that, um, I would take issue with the, the, the argum ent you make that there is a need for innocent people to die in order to win. [49:09] There is no intention, I think, that any of us would say, there's no int ent to kill people who are innocent. The argument we're having and the discussio n we want to work on is how are we as certain as we can be, not only that the pe ople who are targeted are people who are legitimately targeted. But in a broader sense, whether that act of doing it, however we do it, serves the larger strate gic goals that we and our friends -- and I would consider Pakistan our friend, I would like to see a stable, prosperous Pakistan -- have as goals for the region . [49:43] So the point is we can talk about the technology and the issues that we, that we, that we, um, uh, that we employ. None of us would argue that innocent people should be targeted for any reason. [49:55] The question we're having is how effective is this, how does it further the goals of the United States and, and it's allies, in trying to reach a, a, a kind of stability that's, that's good for everyone. Daniel: [50:06] We don't target innocents, just to be very, very precise, put a real, kind of a dot on this. You don't target innocents. Do innocents die? Somet imes they do. And within the process of the targeting that's taking place, there 's a collateral damage estimate that's done and it's overseen by a number of, yo u know, legal, legal chops all the way down to include intelligence observations . [50:31] So a decision is made, a go, no go decision is made based on, largely, w hat's called the CDE environment. What does the collateral damage estimate look like. And if it's far too high, the decision, more often than not, will be no go . So innocents are not targeted. Man 3: [50:51] Let me ask for a minute from each of you on something here and th en we'll go to this side.

[51:02] Anybody who's ever seen pictures of drone, the controllers, it's like wa tching a weird video game, but it's not a game, it's real. Do you have any conce rn that it makes the killing too easy? Daniel: [51:24] Why would you want to make killing hard? [laughter] Man 3: [51:29] I want...I think...All right...Let me...All right. How about it m akes war too easy? How about that? I want to make war hard. I, I do. I want...I want is... Daniel: [51:39] The decision. That's right. Man 3: [51:40] I want a...I want a full public policy debate on whether or not a nd the implications of. And I'm just wondering. I'm not making, I'm not taking a position. I promised I wouldn't, and I won't, OK? You'll never, you won't be ab le to beat it out of me, General. [laughter] Man 3: [51:58] But just it's so, in some way detach us from the, the, the, the p rocess, the worst part of this process that it, it, it harms our soul in some wa y. Man 1: [52:13] But Daniel, if I could just very briefly, Daniel made the point o f, um, limited domestic cost. Uh, which really gets to the, the intellectual thr ead that brings you to the moral discussion about conflict. And that is it, is i t more moral if I make a decision to go to war or engage is it more moral for me to look you in the eye before I stab you in the neck, or can I do that from dis tance and not put myself at increased risk, yet still achieve the same end state . [52:43] Um, the decision to go to war has to be uh, an exceptionally difficult a nd arduous process. Where we have migrated over the course of the last decade is I would, I could argue intellectually that we are in a continuous state of conf lict, and we will be through all your promotions up through the grade of O-5 and O-6. That for the next three decades, we're in a constant state of conflict, so how do you engage if you assume that's correct, how do you engage and how do yo u employ force in that type of an environment? Aaron: [53:18] Professor, take a minute on the question. Professor McNeal: [53:20] So one of the ironies of drones is that they're both d istanced in that the drone pilots, and in fact drones aren't unmanned, there are teams of people that are needed to run a drone. There's signals analysts, there 's the maintenance teams, there's, you know, it's a massive operation with a lot of people. [53:37] But one of the odd things, is that it's both very distanced in that dron e pilots are literally thousands of miles away from where the drones are deploye d, and yet it's exceedingly intimate. [53:46] If you interview drone pilots, as I have, you'll find that they know the ir targets with a level of specificity and detail that's almost unheard of in mo dern warfare. They hover over communities. They watch people. They don't just wa tch them involved in military activities. They watch them playing with their chi ldren, going to the market, all of the things that take place during a period of intelligence gathering. [54:07] And then after a drone attack, they hover over and do a damage assessmen t, and see the mangled bodies, and sometimes are even present for subsequent fun erals. It's an extraordinary, intimate process, and yet it's also a process wher e all of the US personnel are separated from the impact by a...an enormous physi

cal distance. [54:26] And this is another element of the changing nature of warfare. It's both closer and more intimate, and more complex, in one way. And yet, it's physicall y distanced and separated by the mediation of technology. Aaron: [54:40] Over here. Soraya Souleymane: [54:41] We're going that way for... Aaron: [54:42] Are we? OK. Soraya: [54:44] My name is Soraya, and I'm a fellow at the Next Generation Leade rs program of the McCain Institute. Uh, my question, I will ask this question fr om, um, a foreign point of view, because all the argument that you've put forth, ah, in favor of protecting the United States, their interests, their people, an d everything. [55:04] But look at it from an outsider point of view. You have this incredible, precise technology that is completely, uh, "more advanced" in quotes, as compar ed to normal, traditional warfare. And so, because it's so accurate, the margin of error that you allow yourself to have becomes a...becomes something of a lot of scrutiny. [55:30] So, you have a precise technology, and any casualty that's comes as resu lt of that technology will be looked at more severely than, uh, in a traditional warfare, because in a traditional warfare it's more obvious. [55:44] So, we...bearing that in mind, do you think that you are achieving a gre ater goal of reducing or increasing people who hate the United States and what t hey are doing in some countries? Protecting the American interests, of course, b ut how do you think people are perceiving you out there? Ambassador Munter: [56:06] I'll take a stab at that. One of the issues here is t hat, uh, you're mixing the question of the way, uh, a war is carried out with th e broader foreign policy aims of working with other people in other countries. A nd I would argue that you have a point. We have to put these things into context . [56:26] It's not that we don't want to protect ourselves in the best way we can. And, given the fact that we were attacked, and that we have this weapon, the ju dicious use of this weapon is one of the most important things that we can have. [56:39] I think what we're talking about today is how do we do that, and what yo u suggested should be part of that. What is the way in which that is perceived, not only by Americans, but by foreigners, as something that is reasonable? [56:54] I would argue that the secrecy that has been part of this does prevent u s. As a diplomat, it prevented me from engaging with the Pakistani public, for e xample, in making the case for why we're doing it, not being against doing it, b ut making the case for why we did it in, in that way. [57:10] So you raise a valid point, but it does mix something more than just dro ne and the drone issue. It has to do with foreign policy in general and the way that we deal with foreign publics. Man 1: [57:18] Let, let me ask in, in your response, if I may. It's just one of these, it's this terrible conundrum, in a sense. [57:27] And on the one hand, it's hard to argue with the Ambassador that if we c

ould make the case more publicly, we might mitigate, uh, some of the blowback th at we get when things go wrong or when people just say things go wrong, whether they went wrong or not. OK. [57:43] On the other hand, to do that is to sacrifice methods, operations, all s orts of things that we, that is not in our national interest to give up. Are we just kind of trapped in this and then we have to accept there's going to be a de gree of blowback, and that's just the way it is? General Marks: [58:03] Are you asking me? Man 1: [58:04] No, I'm not, actually, in this case. General Marks: [58:06] So, there are, there are two dimensions to this. Um, firs t with regard to the specific question, I, you know, the, the, America is, is so mewhat cursed because of our blessings. We have the financial resources to emplo y precision technology. [58:20] And because of that, we have a moral, a legal obligation to use it if it 's available. And we have the resources to make it available so that almost ever y, uh, piece of ordnance we drop is precision-guided. [58:33] Whereas a country with less resources could drop a dumb bomb. And so, if they're your ally, they can drop dumb bombs, but we can't. And that's, and that 's actually a good thing, right? [58:43] That, if we can make war, when we, when we make the decision to go to wa r, if we can make it more humane, that's a good thing. [58:49] The second sort of, uh, point about the transparency, Ambassador Munter hit on this, it's, it depends on the, the, the strategic goal, right? [58:58] So in Afghanistan, if you want to drop a piece of ordnance, um, prior to a pre-planned strike, against a name target, and you expect one civilian casual ty before dropping that bomb, there was a point in time, in 2009, when the McChr ystal directive came out, that you needed a four-star general's approval or the SecDef to sign off on that strike. [59:18] We just slowed down and weren't dropping ordnance anymore because winnin g hearts and minds, it was a decision that that was part of our strategic goals. [59:26] Now, if tomorrow the North Koreans roll over the border, you're not goin g to have a civilian casualty number of one. You're going to be pushing those de cisions, because of the optempo, down to the company commander level, down to th e platoon leader level, to make decisions, on the spot, about civilian casualtie s. [59:40] And it all, our national, political, and strategic objectives flow into our military objectives. And that's something that's oftentimes missing from the debate from those who have, who have never worn a uniform and don't understand the connection between the politics, our goals, and what we're doing on the grou nd. [59:56] Um, and it's tough to answer it in any one abstract sense because our ob jectives in Yemen are different than our objectives in Pakistan and different th an our objectives in Afghanistan. Ambassador Munter: [60:05] It really is, to bifurcate this, you've got the count erinsurgency strategy, and you've got a counterterrorism strategy, two different things. In Pakistan, it was CT. In Afghanistan, it was CI, for the longest time

. [60:17] Um, that dictates how you engage and how you accept and then work with t he perceptions, the blowback, the reactions that occur. Man 1: [60:28] And Ambassador, I don't, I didn't mean to be rude there. [laughte r] Man 1: [60:31] You were, you did look like you wanted to say something. Ambassador Munter: [60:35] No, I mean, the point here is that I'll, I'll just re peat what I think my colleagues are trying to say in a different way, which is t hat we do have to make sure that we've read our Clausewitz, that we, if you're g oing to engage as a military person, that the point of what you're doing in a mi litary endeavor is toward a political goal. [60:55] And the political goal, I would submit, as the questioner submitted, inv olves taking into account the perceptions of foreign friends, if indeed we feel that's part of our own security. Man 2: [61:06] May I say one thing in... Ambassador Munter: [61:08] Sure. Man 2: [61:08] So from the two, uh, um, foreign voices we've heard, one thing of the Pakistani journalist, I forgot your name, but it's got to be right that the US respects human rights law. [61:20] Legally, the country is legally obligated to respect this body of law. A nd so, when you bring up that point, that should be a fundamental baseline for a ny of these discussions. But linked to that, I think linked to what you're both suggesting is that the rule of law, and adherence to the rule of law, can't just be something abstract that exists behind closed doors. This is true in our own lives. [61:40] We, we trust our government, we believe our government not only because of things we can see but actually because over a period of time, there's relatio nships of trust, whereby you believe that, that entities given power will manage that effectively based on the kind of rule-based system, right? [61:56] So there's an enormous cost for the US to be seen largely in the world a s a non, as an entity that doesn't abide by rule of law principles, and there's enormous gain, I think, by doing those things that make drone deployments be und erstood to be more rule of law abiding to the degree that they are. [62:16] There may be some debate here as to the degree they are, but certainly w here the perception is severely against that, there's an enormous cost to it. Man 2: [62:26] I, I just want somebody to tweet a question, because I'm too old to have ever actually said, "We got this as a tweet." [laughter] Rochelle Edwards: [62:39] Good evening Senator, General, Ambassador, and Gentlem en. My name is Rochelle Edwards, I'm a midshipman at ASU. Um, my question is pur ely moral, so this question is going to be based as um, from one human being to another group of human beings. Um, with the use of drones, do you find that it t akes away a human being's self, sorry, self of self-preservation and mode of, um , protection when you use a drone against unarmed people, whether they be of ano ther military or not? [63:09] Does it take away the humanity um, and the ability to protect oneself an

d what are like the moral or and/or ethical um problems behind that? Man 2: [63:21] My answer is that engagement of armed conflict, whether it's by u se of drones, some other stand-off weapons system, or up close and personal, is an incredibly ethical, moral debate that we all need to have. And that needs to be a debate you have a priori before the decisions on whether you're going to em ploy that force, and you've exhausted every other means to try to resolve the co nflict. Paul Hansen Matev: [63:50] Hi, my name is Paul Hansen Matev, I'm a citizen of th e state of Arizona. Is it constitutional or more importantly, is it right that t he current President, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, and also a man who prevailed o ver audience member with us today, who was a former prisoner of war, is it right that that person has a kill list with United States on it in violation of judic ial review, due process, and the age old principle of habeas corpus? [64:22] It's directed first to the two lawyers and then to the ambassador and th e colonel. Thank you, kindly. Man 1: [64:28] Got demoted. Ambassador Munter: [64:30] If a US citizen joins a foreign military in a convent ional war, the fact that they're a US citizen becomes irrelevant to whether they could be targeted, right? The US joined, citizen joins the Wehrmacht then is fi ghting in the Second World War against Allied forces, right, that doesn't seem p roblematic. What really that question gets to the heart of is, what's the status of that individual as a US citizen? And that gets, really that just brings us b ack to the same discussions we're having as to, as to under what legal condition can people be targeted. Professor McNeal: [65:07] The keeping of a list to me, um, I'd rather we had a l ist than not a list. And in fact our, our, our current process at least as the A ttorney General gave it as his speech at Northwestern, involves intra-executive branch review, it's not just placing uh, it's not just going out and finding the person indiscriminately, it's actually an extra level of review that non-citize ns don't get. So I guess if I were a citizen of the world, uh, uh, verses Arizon a or the United States, I'd look at it and I'd say, "Well, why did US citizens g et special treatment?" [65:39] And that's actually a decision that we've made, I think part to foreclos e judicial review. But judicial, the idea of judicial review in, in warfare is s omething I think new that we've come up with. Think back to the Iraq war, it was very contentious. People sued to try and stop the idea of going to war itself, and the courts looked at it and said, "This is a non-justiciable political quest ion. The president and the Congress decide this and they're accountable to the e lectorate." [66:07] If you can't have a court review the decision to go to war itself, shoul d a judge be reviewing individual targeting decisions? Be they for US citizens o r should the judge be reviewing bridges? Which bridge should it be? And where do judges come from? They're just lawyers. I already talk too much, I'm the lawyer everybody hates, right? And, and what would I be doing if I were a judge? [66:25] I would be getting appointed to a judgeship, coming from maybe a bankrup tcy or decision or that recent employment law case, and then I go, "Oh, what do we got on our docket now? Oh! Targeting decision! What do I know about targeting ? Not much, but let me take a look at the file and make a decision about whether or not it's appropriate in warfare for us to do it. And, when I get it wrong, I have life, I have a lifetime appointment. I'm unaccountable. And, um, if the pr esident, if I shut the president down, and I say you can't do it, and the person

goes on to kill 200 people in a square in Baghdad, what does the president say? 'I tried to target the person but the court wouldn't let me do it.'" [67:00] And it allows us to all dodge accountability and push it off onto the co urts. To me? I'm OK with that, with that authority resting with the Commander in Chief, because that's where it is in the constitution under article two with ov ersight of people like Senator McCain and the rest of the congress. And so, that 's my...I'm not very opinionated on it, but... [laughter] Man 1: [67:21] There's nothing more refreshing than lawyer humility. [laughter] Man 2: [67:26] I like that thought. Man 1: [67:29] Just to be clear on this, because I got this lecture earlier actu ally. The American, there's a different set of rules in play for the American ci tizen than the non-citizen. Correct? Man 2: [67:45] As a matter of US law. Man 1: [67:46] As a, a matter of US law in practice, there is a different set of law, or a different set of rules. We look at it differently. OK. Michael Perry: [67:58] Thank you, sir. My name is Michael Perry and I'm a cadet here at Arizona State. Um, my question is directed to both sides but especially to you General Marks, Sir, from the perspective of a military intelligence offic er. Uh, we have other options for executing these targets and I would point uh m ost recently in October of last year, to the capture of Anas al Libi from his do orstep in Tripoli, or more notably to the uh killing of uh Osama Bin Laden in Pa kistan. [68:29] Sir, do we run the risk sometimes of simply killing these targets and no t exploiting the intelligence they have and the intelligence on the objective an d does that sometimes outweigh the benefit of simply killing these targets and r emoving them from circulation, and Sir, how do we strike a balance here between simply playing Whack-A-Mole with terrorists in our counter-terrorism campaign an d exploiting intelligence? General Marks: [68:53] That's a military term, Whack-A-Mole. What year are you? Michael: [68:59] I'm a senior, Sir, I'll be commissioning in May. General Marks: [69:02] Great question. Great question. I, I must say when I was a senior, I was not nearly as close as you are. It's not on my list of things I was talking about. [69:11] Um, there is a, there is a fundamental initial decision that is made. An d if you get to the point where this particular individual is on that list, is o n that target list, and has met all the cri, individual criterion to be there, t here's a capture or kill decision that's made. And it has to go to -- there are a lot of considerations, so to keep it simple, it is what is the risk to try to capture? What is the risk to try to kill? How do we want to try to exploit? Do w e think we can exploit this individual or do we think there has already been a m echanism in place where we might have already gotten enough and that the risks a re such that we need to have a kill decision versus a capture decision. [69:53] In Libya, a decision was made to capture. There was a desire to have som e exploitation. Also, that was a very congested area. There was CDE consideratio ns. We're not going to strike the guy. We're going to conduct a very simple -- a nd if you look at the details -- an amazingly simple plan with incredibly high r isk. But it was worth it to put our hands on him.

[70:14] So that was the Libya dis, discussion. So there was no, there was a very high, a very tight filter that we had to go through in order to make that decis ion. [70:23] Uh, relative to Osama bin Laden, almost three years ago now, in May of ' 11, um, I think the decision to commit the SEALS was there needed to be the DNA verification that it was him and that he was either alive or dead. And there was a possibility that he was going to give himself up. That didn't happen. [70:46] There could have been a very strong argument had it not been UBL, that y ou could have used a drone in that case or some other means to just level the co mpound, but we needed to know that it was UBL. So I think those were some very t actical decisions that had amazingly strategic implications. Aaron: [71:04] Just the, um, um, the "we" in that, "we needed to know." Who is t he "we? General Marks: [71:09] It's the administration. Aaron: [71:10] The world needed to know? General Marks: [71:11] The world needed to know. Our administration needed to be able to state with certainty, "This is the guy. We validated it, and he's..." Ambassador Munter: [71:17] You've all seen the movie "O Dark Thirty." And you kn ow the role when the ambassador in place, placed by George Clooney, is an incred ible hero. You remember that part? [laughter] Ambassador Munter: [71:29] No, you don't remember that part, because it wasn't i n the movie! But... Aaron: [71:33] There's nothing like Foreign Service Officer humility. [laughter] Ambassador Munter: [71:37] No, but, but, but the point here is also, uh, what, u h, to add to what to what the general said, there is always going to be a calcul ation not only of the effectiveness in the terms of, uh, intelligence, but there 's going to be the effectiveness or the effect of any act on, uh, the politics, the policy in the region. [71:55] And one of the things you have to reckon with is on Abbottabad, which is a settled region outside of the n, there will be a different reaction in the country and u have what is seen as a more surgically, uh, clean, uh, that if you drop a bomb tribal areas of Pakista in the world than if yo uh, act as what we had.

[72:13] So in other words, it's not just the question of intelligence. It's also the question of politics. Professor McNeal: [72:18] Let me just add one, one tiny thing. Given this ce. I mean, look on your shoulder. Are you a soldier, a sailor, airman or ? Are you a cadet or midshipman? That decision is not just at the general r level. My eyes are failing me, but it looked like you're going to be an ry officer. Michael: [72:35] Yes, sir. Professor McNeal: [72:35] About 18 months from now, you're going to be downrange somewhere, and you're going to have to tell a squad leader take a particular bu ilding. And they're going to have to make a decision about, you're going to have to make a decision about whether you're going to need indirect fire to support audien marine office infant

you while you fire maneuver. [72:49] Your squad leaders are going to have to make decisions about whether the y're putting 5.56 through a window where there might be civilians inside or they 're going to slide their finger forward and put a .203 round through the window. [72:59] And you're, they're making decisions about capturing people. They're mak ing decisions about civilian casualties. We're pushing that down to the level of the 18 year old straight out of basic or AIT or the 23 year old, just out of th e officer basic course in ranger school. And so -- hopefully ranger school. Michael: [73:16] Yes, sir. [laughter] Professor McNeal: [73:16] And so, and so we're, we're talking about this at such a high level because of what we do as, as the United States of America with, wi th principles and deputies at the National Security Council deciding about targe t lists. But the Law of Armed Conflict entrusts that one of your squad leaders m ight make that decision. One of your, one of your just fire team members might m ake that decision. [73:36] So, uh, when we make the decision to go to war, and we do it with a broa d authorization for use of military force that goes on forever, we trust that at some point in time at the tip of the spear, an 18 year old's making a decision about whether a bad guy's going to die and whether or not that might also inflic t harm on civilians. Michael: [73:55] Thank you, gentlemen. Aaron: [73:59] Well, it's something to think, I mean, I teach 18 year olds. You teach 18 year olds, you know? [74:08] Five minutes. OK. Thank you. I almost lost track of you altogether. [74:12] Um, let me take one more question and then give our panelists, uh, proba bly, unless I think of something I want to desperately ask, opportunity to wrap it up. Mitchum: [74:22] Evening, gentlemen. Uh, in lieu of time we're going to ask ours as a joint question. You can answer as you see fit. I'm Mitchum [indecipherable 1:14:29] . I'm, uh, at Arizona State. My quest, my question relates to this ide a that you talked about with the disconnect of the kind of drone warfare and as we improve in technology, we tend to separate ours...affect the effectiveness an d the longevity of the drone, the drone strike program? Thank you, gentlemen. Aaron: [74:48] That's a really, um... Daniel: [74:49] So once, you bring up a really fascinating point that people who are not familiar with drones may not be aware of which is if you're fly, flying jets out of a base in a foreign country, you live on that base. Your life is fu ll of base existence. Eating with other members of the military in a facility. [75:08] A drone pilot, say, you know, in, in an ordinary city living on a US bas e might leave a mission, walk out of the base, get in their car, go home, go to a baseball game, eat dinner with their family, and it's an entirely new understa nding of what warfare means. [75:25] And I, this, I don't know that this fits into the theme of this discussi on exactly, but it certainly has a lot to do with the ways in which war may be c hanging. And I don't think we know how to manage this.

[75:35] What does it mean for people to effortlessly -- or not effortlessly -- t o move back and forth between a place where they're, where they're engaged in ki lling and surveillance to a place where it's the ordinary life and they're at so me fast food restaurant, wherever, a park. So that issue is profound. [75:50] And we don't know how to make sense of it, because this is probably the beginning of an entire new mode of projecting force where there's all kinds of w ays in which we'll see warfare going in this direction. It's the beginning. Aaron: [76:02] Is, um, I'm going to move towards -- this is my editorial observa tion. It's amazing to listen to, um, all of you, uh, the ROTC folks who have had questions, because honestly, I, I talk to my students all the time about, about journalism and war. And their country, your country, our country has been at wa r half their lifetime. Half of your lifetime. [76:29] And it's amazing how much smarter you guys are. How much more attention you pay. You have skin in the game. Since skin in the game counts as every Vietn am era kid knows, skin in the game matters, but it's really impressive. And you' ve, you've added immeasurably to the quality and the intelligence of the convers ation that's gone on tonight. Thank you. [76:54] Um, take, each of you, Professor, start with you, a minute and address, try in really a minute, like a real minute, like an honest minute. [77:07] Um, because you were kind of on this. The nature of warfare is changing. So we have this thing. It's pretty new still. Where does the policy go or where would you like it to go moving forward? Daniel: [77:26] So I think there is a sense in which drones are changing warfare . It isn't the drones themselves, right? It's what the drones represent. And for some odd reason, drones are the only weapons system I think in this 13 years of conflict that's garnered public attention. [77:40] I think what we need to think about, we've seen other weapons systems an d other innovations in warfare regulated and discussed. Chemical weapons, nuclea r weapons. This shift to data driven warfare is substantial and transformative. I can't give the answer as to how we ought to engage with all of this, but there are significant policy and legal implications, and they should be put at the fo refront and they should be openly discussed. I think that should at, to the degr ee that that happens, that will be a benefit for this side. Aaron: [78:11] Ambassador, are there specific things you would change in this po licy going forward? Ambassador Munter: [78:18] No, I would just echo, I think, what my colleague has said, that the way in a democracy that you come to the right answer about this is through open discussion. Obviously, there are, there's gives, there's give an d take, there's the question of methods, and the, the, the legitimately secret t hings that the people in the intelligence world need to protect. [78:42] But we are not doing ourselves a service if we engage in this new era of warfare without a very healthy public debate. Otherwise, that which America sta nds for as a country of values and a democracy around the world is in peril. Aaron: [78:58] Professor? Professor McNeal: [78:58] Um, three things I would do. First, I would introduce legislation if I were capable of doing so. Maybe we could find someone? Aaron: [79:06] We can get someone up... [laughter]

Aaron: [79:08] I got the guy! Professor McNeal: [79:10] That requires the Department of Defense, because I thi nk DOD does it right and so I want their data to be transparent. Number of strik es, anticipated casualties prior to the strike and actual casualties that were m easured after the strike. [79:23] The military has this data. They maintain it at the, at the brigade leve l and at the division level. I want it published in an annual report to show tha t they're doing right and to shame the intelligence agencies into either being m ore transparent or getting out of the business of doing these strikes. [79:37] So that's the first thing. [79:39] The second thing that I would do is that with regard to the intelligence community, I would think about, um, what, what's happened with the NSA and the privacy and civil liberties oversight board. And I would have a group of securit y cleared people do an independent audit of the CIA's data and their strikes and their procedures and write a declassified report. They see the data. They write a summary of the report. [80:02] It gives us some information. Nobody's on the hook for that in the legis lature or in the executive branch, because it's an independent board. It comes f orward and, uh, and puts this information out. [80:12] And then the final thing is I would want greater transparency with regar d to who are the people that we are targeting. The State Department has a design ations list. Well, we'll, we'll publish when you're designated as someone that y ou can't do business with, because you're a, because you're a terrorist or a ter rorist group. [80:27] I want that to be part of the targeting process, so at least we know the groups who we're at war with. And we could talk about the AUMF another time, bu t it's time to stop with the AUMFs that go on forever. We need to have sunset da tes on those. We need to sunset the AUMF, the existing one, and have reviews on an annual or semi-annual basis about whether or not we should continue to be at war. [80:48] So that was four things. Aaron: [80:50] General, bring us home. General Marks: [80:51] Not to be facetious. Maybe we should publish the, the lis t of those that are being targeted. Might see some behavior modifications, um. [ laughter] General Marks: [80:58] I, no, seriously. If I was in Iran, if I was in Iran and I was sitting at the dinner table. And I said, "Mom, I want to be a nuclear phys icist." I would think my mother might say, "You know, son. You might want to cha nge your desired profession. You got a short, short life." Aaron: [81:14] You don't think they know, huh? You don't think they figured that danger of that job out yet? General Marks: [81:19] Nobody wants to be number five in Al Qaeda. Aaron: [81:21] Or number three is a really bad gig, too. General Marks: [81:24] Very shortly, I would say DoD, the subject and the verb i

s DoD must take over the, the drone targeting process. Um, all of the, all of th e, uh, you know, the, the points that you made, Greg, are absolutely germane to that discussion. DoD knows how to do it and they do it quite transparently. I th ink that's the very first step in order to make it easy. [81:46] The difficulty with having the CIA do it having lived in this world is t hat CIA, Central Intelligence, does not always share those, the sourcing that th ey have for their intelligence. And if I'm in DoD and I'm pulling the trigger, I 'm accountable. I need to know why, who, how it all came together. Aaron: [82:03] Gentlemen, thank you. Man 1: [82:06] Thanks, General. [applause] Aaron: [82:12] Um. You didn't, you didn't leave it all in the green room. Um, th ank all of you for, uh, coming and sharing, um, this at, at, at Cronkite with us . As I said at the beginning, I think this is the kind of thing Walter would fee l great about. [82:32] And finally, Senator McCain, it's only slightly intimidating to do this in front of you. [laughter] Aaron: [82:38] Thank you, and the institute, for having us. [applause] Ambassador Volker: [82:48] I, I would like just to add a couple of thank-yous. F irst off, thank you to our moderator, uh, Professor Aaron Brown. Excellent job. [applause] Ambassador Volker: [82:58] Thank you to our audience. I think it is tremendous t hat you came out for this on a Thursday evening. Especially to our young men and women in uniform, thank you for coming, and thank you for your service. [applau se] Ambassador Volker: [83:17] And, and lastly, uh, thank you to our debaters, and t hank you, Senator and Mrs. McCain, for making all this possible. Thank you. [app lause]